

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

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BY

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
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PREFACE.

EZEKIEL GILMAN ROBINSON was born at Attleborough, Mass., March 23, 1815, and died in Boston, June 13, 1894. He was graduated at Brown University in 1838, and took his Theological course at Newton, Mass. His honorary degrees were conferred by Brown and Harvard. He was Professor of Theology in the Rochester Theological Seminary from 1853 to 1872, and President of Brown University from 1872 until 1889. During his last year of instruction at Rochester, 1871-72, he revised and printed three hundred and twenty pages of his "Christian Theology." The book was not originally designed for publication; but was printed for the use of students in theology at their earnest solicitation.

After Dr. Robinson became President of Brown University it was hoped that he would complete and give to the public his "Christian Theology." But on account of his long continued and absorbing duties at Brown, the revision of the "Christian Theology" remained until the author's death incomplete and precisely as it was left when Dr. Robinson removed from Rochester to Providence, in 1872. There have been repeated requests that the work, in some practicable form, be given to the public. In deference to that expression, and to the opinion of several of Dr. Robinson's former pupils whose judgment is entitled to consideration, three hundred copies have been prepared for distribution.

The entire edition comprises considerably less than four hundred copies, including the hitherto incomplete copies which were originally used by two classes of students. With the exception of pages 81-96, pp. 161-176 and pp. 305-320 which are reprinted almost without change, the first 320 pages are the identical sheets which were printed in 1872. The additional pages are now printed for the first time. They contain most of the section on Regeneration,

the sections on Repentance and Faith, Sanctification, and Eschatology. This portion of the book has been prepared by a comparison of manuscript notes taken by students during the later years of Dr. Robinson's theological instruction. It is believed that these additional pages faithfully represent the views of the author, and give to the book a measure of completeness and value which it would not have were they omitted. An Appendix contains the Inaugural Address on Experimental Theology, delivered at Rochester, July, 1853. The Index has been prepared by the Rev. Robert Kerr Eccles, M. D., of Salem, Ohio, and the list of Corrigenda, at the close of the volume, by Alfred G. Langley, A. M., of Newport, R. I.

The treatment of Eschatology may appear somewhat disappointing on account of its brevity and the want of reference to phases of the subject which have recently received special attention in this country. But it must be distinctly remembered that these sections were written more than twenty years ago. The only present alternative is to print what is here given or to print nothing on these themes. Manifestly no hand has now the right, for the sake of amplification or symmetry, essentially to change or to enlarge what Dr. Robinson is known to have taught his last classes in theology. Had he revised these brief notes on Eschatology, probably he would have expressed his views more fully, yet undoubtedly with great caution and with pronounced deference to the declarations of Scripture. The main positions of this portion of the book are significantly accordant with the preceding views of the holiness of God, the fact and turpitude of human sin, and the immutability of moral law. For that reason, if for no other, notwithstanding their brevity, the insertion of the sections on Eschatology seems fully justified.

It is not expected that Dr. Robinson's former pupils will fully agree with all the statements of this volume. He would not expect, perhaps would not wish, such a result. But if these pages serve to quicken into full and just realization that personal gratitude of which his students are conscious; and if mature men are led to recognize anew and with full appreciation the source to which they owe

a most potent influence in their mental and spiritual growth, the book may be more useful than if it were a "standard" of belief.

Those who were unacquainted with Dr. Robinson's personality and methods of instruction should understand that, however they may value this book, the printed page can only imperfectly indicate the power of the living teacher or yield the satisfaction with which his instruction was received.

This "Christian Theology" and the prolonged but now finished service of its author, as a religious teacher, take their proper place in the history of theological thought and instruction in America.

B. O. TRUE.

Rochester, N. Y., Nov. 1, 1894.

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CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

INTRODUCTORY.

§ 1—*Idea and Definition.*

Theology, strictly speaking, is the science which treats of God. The term, having varied in comprehensiveness at different periods, is now used to denote the science¹ which treats of both God and man as moral beings, and of their mutual relations. Christian Theology² treats of these subjects according to the teachings of the Christian religion.

Theology is thus commensurate in its range of meaning with religion; and the two are also otherwise closely related. Religion is the rendering to God of the service and worship supposed to be due and acceptable to him—is a distinct and determinate life in relation to God; and whether regarded subjectively as spirit and life, or objec-

1. Any objection that can be valid against the right of Theology to be called a Science, must be equally available against a Science of Mind, of Ethics, of Economics, or, in fact, of any species of knowledge not reducible to the formulas of numbers and dimensions. But if the word science denotes classification and systematic arrangement of what is actually known in respect to any given subject, then Christian Theology is entitled to be called a science. "A science is a complement of cognitions, having, in point of form, the character of logical perfection; in point of matter, the character of real truth."—Sir Wm. Hamilton's *Lectures on Logic*, lec. 24, ¶ LXXX.

2. Theology may be specifically entitled, Biblical, Systematic, Dogmatic, Scientific, Polemic, or otherwise, according to its special aim; but a truly Christian Theology would seem to demand, at this day, a treatment, which to some extent at least, should partake of all the characteristics implied in these several titles.

tively as form and phenomena, is man's convictions¹ revealing themselves, in self-consciousness or to outward observation, as vital and determinative force. The convictions themselves are explicable, only by taking into account a two-fold consciousness of dependence and obligation, by recognizing the double and correlative existence of a constitutional susceptibility for divine things, and those phenomena and traditions which man regards as authoritative communications of divine thought and will. Without recognition of this divine thought and will, there can be no religion. Theology treats of the truths or principles which Religion thus implies, embodies or involves. Theology, therefore, has to do with religion, objectively considered, very much as Geology has to do with the earth's crust; and with Religion subjectively considered, very much as Physiology has to do with the hidden principle of life. The Christian theologian, as such, while critically attentive to all religions, is strictly concerned with the principles and doctrines of the Christian religion alone, or with the convictions embosomed in the Christian consciousness, resolved into formulas in the creeds of the church, and referable to a formal Revelation, which has been authenticated as authoritative and divine.

1. Schleiermacher's well known definition of religion as "feeling of absolute dependence" assumes that this feeling is immediate and uncaused in the soul, and is not the invariable correlative of thought. The followers of Schleiermacher, known as the "mediating" school, have so modified his definition, as to recognize the office of truth. Nitzsch, a fair representative of the school, says: "Religion is an active and passive relation of the finite consciousness to the Creator, Upholder and Ruler."—Note 2, § 6, *Christ. Lehre*; (trans. Clark's *For. Theol. Lib.*) As representative of the opponents of the above definitions, see Lechler, *Theo. Stud. und Krit.*, 1851, pp. 755–825, who says pp. 786 and 788: "Religion is a divine act, is God's well-considered and predetermined revelation of himself in humanity,"—"is the fellowship established of God between himself and humanity." See an abridged translation of Lechler's article in *Bib. Sac.*, April, 1852.—Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, vol. p. 13. Comp. Kant, *Metaphysic of Ethics*, trans. by Semple, p. 247. On the derivation of the word Religion, comp. *Cicero de Nat. Deo*. 11: 28, with Lactantius, *Inst. Div.*, 4: 28. On the whole subject of Religion, Nitzsch, *Ch. Lehre*, §§ 6–21.—Herzog, *Realencycl.*, arts. "Abhängigkeitsgefühl" and "Religion."

§ 2—*Sources.*

These may be divided into direct or original, indirect or collateral, tributary or auxiliary.

1. Christianity is distinctively a Revealed Religion. Christian Theology, therefore, has to do with revealed truth, and its one direct and controlling source, to which the decisive appeal must always be made, is the Sacred Scriptures. No doctrine is to be received which is unwarranted by their teachings. But the Author of the Scriptures was also the prior author of man, and of the world in which man lives. And the Scriptures presuppose a certain amount of religious knowledge to be already in the possession of man,—Acts, 17: 19. He is so constituted, intellectually and morally, and so surrounded by objects which spring from the divine mind and embody divine thoughts, that he cannot but have some knowledge of God and his will,—Rom., 1: 18-20; and this knowledge, so far as it is positive and indubitable, cannot but be authoritative.

2. All other Sciences, therefore, whether mental, moral or physical, so far as their teachings relate to the same subjects as those of the Bible, must be an indirect source¹ of Theology collateral with the Bible. It is not the province of these sciences to teach the distinctive truths of Christian Theology; they can give no satisfactory answer to questions of first cause or of final cause; they know nothing of supernatural methods and aims—of a salvation through the interposition of a Divine Redeemer; their sphere is restricted to the observable processes of Nature; but in their explanation of these processes, they have spoken so

1. These may be regarded as mere HELPS in understanding the one exclusive source, the Bible. See *Am. Theo. Rev.*, vol. 1, pp. 115-119. But a help which so far proves a master as to compel the discontinuance of interpretations that have existed for centuries, and to put meanings into the words of the Bible not before thought of, must be regarded, however ancillary its position, as having some kind of authority and some kind of right to speak in its own name. See Essay 11, "Revelation and Science," in *The Church and the World*, for 1866.—Wiseman's *Lectures on Science and Revealed Religion*.—Baden Powell on the *Order of Nature*.

explicitly as to have dictated a change from the former interpretation of various parts of the Scriptures, and thus to have established their claim to be regarded as an indirect, though so far as their teachings extend, an authoritative, source of Theology.

3. Thus Theology has been a progressive science. Its principles have been formulated along centuries of conflict, and its formulas have been collected into gradually widening creeds, confessions and systems. Parallel with the growth of these, and as a reflex of their changes, have been the types of piety into which the beliefs of the church have been crystallized. Within these creeds, confessions, systems and types of piety, the Divine Spirit, the formative force of Christianity, has garnered the thoughts which the Church has gathered from the Bible; and through these, as an organic and indivisible whole, the doctrines of the Christian Church, amid endless discussions and controversies, have become what we now denominate Christian Theology. The Theology of to-day is the growth of all the centuries since the beginning of the Christian era¹. As auxiliary or tributary sources, therefore, of which use must be made in constructing a system of Theology, may be mentioned:

(1.) The History of Doctrines. (a.) Their genesis in the facts of the Gospels and the teachings of the Apostles, including the process of their successive recognition and enunciation at various periods in the history of the church. No doctrine can be fully understood or intelligently held, the historical origin of which is not understood. (b.) The process of their growth or development, including the controversies elicited, and the methods of philosophy applied to the discussion of them. A strong light is thus often thrown on the phases of special doctrines and on the texts cited in their support. (c.) The relative position of doc-

1. It is Theology, and not, as rationalists assume, Revelation, that has been progressive; and the manifest errors of J. H. Newman's theory of Development are, that the "idea" to be developed, "is not in the sacred text, but in the mind of the reader," and that the development must be by the "developing authority" of "the Holy See." See his *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*. Compare chh. 1 and 2.

trines at different periods, one doctrine being elevated at one time to the depression of another, which, in a succeeding age, itself becomes conspicuous. Some acquaintance with these alternations in the theological scale is indispensable to him who would preserve himself from distorted views.

(2.) The Types of Piety, the special manifestations of the practical spirit of Christianity, at strongly marked periods of its history. These types, products of doctrines, single or combined, furnish in themselves practical tests both of the truth of the doctrines they represent and of the relative position these should occupy in a doctrinal system.

(3.) The different Schools of Theology in our own day and their various methods. Every age has its special methods, no one of which is faultless, and its prevailing systems, no one of which contains all truth, or is wholly devoid of truth; and since every theologian will have his special method and system, it becomes indispensable that he constantly guard himself against narrowness and prejudice, by employing such tests and analyses as will enable him to detect in contemporary methods and systems, the truth under all its various guises. Without intelligent consultation of this source, onesidedness is almost inevitable. There is always danger of finding in the Bible whatever our method prompts, or our sect maintains.

These tributary sources, brought under a single designation, may not inappropriately be denominated the Church. The dissociation of the Bible and the Church, as conjoint sources of Theology, and the array of these as antagonistic in authority, has been the natural result of the Romanist and Protestant controversy about the true theory of the Church. To the Romanist, the Church—by which he means the hierarchy—not only preceded the Bible in time and produced it, but is superior to it in authority¹; even the canons and the rubrics are set practically above it. To the ultra Protestant, the Bible—by which he means his

1. The "fontes" of Theology, according to Cardinal Perrone, in his *Prælectiones Theologicæ Proleg.*, v. 1, p. 16, should vary according to the aim of the theologian. When dealing with Jews, we should draw "ex vetere Testamento atque auctoritatibus, quas ipsi non respuunt;" when with Protestants and heretics, "ex sacris

interpretation of it—was not only anterior in origin to the Church, but is superior to it in authority, while the Church, which to him is only an assemblage of individuals, can never give to her utterances any greater weight of authority than that which attaches to individual opinions¹. But the Church and the Scriptures are authorities which can never be justly or safely divided². The old question of the priority of their origin, answer it as we may, can never determine the question of their relative authority; for though the Christian Church was founded upon the recognized authority of the Old Testament Scriptures, Matt., 5: 17, 19. Luke, 16: 17. John, 2: 22. Acts, 2: 14–40. 2 Tim., 3: 15, 16. 2 Pet., 1: 19; yet the Church must have originated before the writing of any portion of the New Testament, and must also have been built on the unwritten teachings of the New Testament Apostles and Prophets; and only as the Church has studied and obeyed the written teachings of both Testaments, has she proved herself to be the Church of the living God. Without the Scriptures of both Testaments, the Church has no accredited or infallible guide for herself, or authority for her teachings; and without the Church, the Scriptures have no visible, trustworthy expounder of their meaning, 1 Tim., 3: 14, 15. [The forced Protestant con-

litteris universim sumptis;” when with those “quise Catholicos profitentur—ex Romanorum Pontificorum constitutionibus atque Conciliorum præsertim œcumenicorum decretis, ex recepta in Ecclesia Catholica doctrina et Patrum auctoritate.”

1. “Ecclesia docet quod credidit non quod novit,” Augustine, *Works*, v. 5, Migne ed., pt. 2, p. 1613. On the Romanist side: see Perrone, *Theol.*, props. 1–12, vol. 1; Möhler, *Symbolism*, pt. 1, c. 5. On the Protestant side: see Nitzsch, *Prot. Beantwortung d. Symb. von Moehler*. For extreme or rationalistic Protestant views, see Schenkel, *Das Wesen d. Protestant.* Comp. his *Dogmatik vom Standpunkte des Gewissens*. See also a critique on Schenkel by DeWette in *Theol. St. u. Krit.*, heft 1, 1848; and in the same, h. 1, 1854, a letter to Schenkel by Hagenbach.

2. What may be the conception of the relation of these authorities, on the part of those who reiterate the “absolute and final authority of the Bible,” and yet bind themselves to abide, as theological teachers, by the meaning of the “standards” of their “church,” it may be difficult to determine. Which is “final” in such a case, the Bible or the “standard?” Was the Westminster Assembly of divines, for instance, so gifted with insight as to determine for a finality the meaning of Scripture, and have the past two hundred years thrown no additional light on its pages?

struction of this passage by Connybeare and Howson, happily is not sustained by the great majority of either the most ancient or the most modern expositors. That the phrase "pillar and ground of the truth" must be in opposition to the phrase "church of the living God," would seem hardly to admit of a doubt. See *Meyer in loco*.] The Church neglecting or setting aside the authority of the Scriptures, has always plunged into fanaticism or superstition; and Scripture, read in contempt of the views of the generations of believers who have studied its meaning and reproduced it in their lives, has always been made to teach another gospel than that of Christ, and in due time has been reduced to the level of any other ancient and by-gone literature.

§ 3—*Relations.*

These are numerous, extending to almost every department of human knowledge; complex, the subjects related being as closely interlaced as are the various forces which God employs in the world; and interdependent, inasmuch as the Divine mind and will, represented by Theology, stand at the center of all knowledge and forces, giving unity of meaning to the one and of operation to the other. To sketch even the most obvious of these relations requires careful discrimination. We can here instance those only to which the student of Theology will do well to give special heed.

1. To the Theologies and Mythologies of other religions, in which the nations have blindly groped their way after the true God and a true Theology. (*a.*) To Hinduism, (Vedism, Brahmanism, Buddhism,) with its monotheism, incarnations and trinities, and its primeval and fallen man'.

1. See Colebrooke, *Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus.*—Hardwick's *Christ and other Masters*, vol. 1, pt. 11, chh. 1-4.—Max Müller's *Chips*, vol. 1.—Rowland Williams, *Christianity and Hinduism.*—Dorner's *Hist. of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, vol. 1, Intro.

(b.) To the religion of ancient Egypt, with its circumcision, sacrifices, priests and temples, and its immortality of the soul¹.
 (c.) To Zoroastrianism, with its angelology and its resurrection². (d.) To the polytheisms of various religions, with their deifications of nature and apotheoses of heroes and social benefactors³. Due attention to this relation will not only give us clearer conceptions and more sharply defined statements of Christian doctrine, but show the immeasurable superiority of the doctrines of Christianity over those of other religions⁴.

2. To Natural Theology, or to that knowledge of God which may be supposed to be derived from the study of nature alone. How shall this relation be regarded by us? Shall we first treat of natural theology as a distinct science which shall serve as the basis⁵ of our revealed theology, or shall we combine the two under one general title of Christian Theology, drawing our materials alike, from revelation,

1. See Wilkinson's *Ancient Egyptians*.—Bunsen's *Egypt's Place in Univ. Hist.*, vols. 1 and 4.—Hardwick's *Christ and other Masters*, vol. 2, pt. 4, chh. 1 and 2.—*Bib. Sac.*, Jan. 1868, art. 5.

2. Max Müller's *Chips*, vol. 2, "The Zend-Avesta, and the Modern Parsis."—Haug, *Essays on the Sac. Lang., Writings and Religion of the Parses*: also, *Am. Theo. Rev.*, April '63, art. 5.—Hardwick, *Christ and other Masters*, vol. 2, pt. 4, chh. 3 and 4.

3. Max Müller's *Chips*, vol. 2, "Comparative Mythology."—Herzog, *Realency*, art. "Polytheismus."

4. See F. D. Maurice, *Religions of the World*. The materials that may be derived from a consideration of this relation would enable us also to vindicate Christianity against the insinuation, and sometimes direct assertion, of its indebtedness to Gentile sources. The new Science of Comparative Religion now makes the comparison possible, and will soon render it necessary. See J. F. Clarke, *Ten Great Religions*.

5. In an elaborate article on Natural Theology in the *Bib. Sac.*, vol. 3, pp. 276, 277, we read: "It forms the basis on which the written revelation rests,"—"the revealed system must be founded on natural theology." Dr. Chalmers, in his *Nat. Theol.*, vol. 2, Am. ed., pp. 298, 299, says: "Natural theology is quite overrated by those who would represent it as the foundation of the edifice." "Christianity rests on its own proper basis; and if instead of this, she is made to rest on an antecedent natural religion, she becomes weak throughout, because weak radically." *Comp.* vol. 1, p. 177. Dr. Chalmers, however, is not quite consistent with himself, for his *Nat. Theo.* is a foundation on which his *Institutes of (Revealed) Theology* unquestionably rests, and all the more for the analytical method which he has adopted, and so earnestly advocated.

and from every avenue of nature which revelation and science may together open to us. The latter method seems preferable, and for the following reasons :

(1.) Both Testaments of the Scriptures appeal to the teaching of nature as cognizable to all men, and as proceeding from the same Will with their supernatural declarations. This teaching they incorporate with their own, combining the two into one harmonious whole. Job, *passim* ; Ps., 8 and Ps., 19 : 1-6, compare Ro., 10 : 18. Matt., 5 : 45, 16 : 3. Luke, 12 : 24, 13 : 2-5. Acts, 17 : 24-29. Ro., 1 : 18-21, 2 : 14-15. Heb., 3 : 4. What the Scriptures thus unite we should not divorce.

(2.) To separate Natural Theology from Revealed is unscientific ; they both treat of the same Being, whose will, however various his methods, is one and immutably the same. It is unscientific to distribute our knowledge of this Being into kinds according to the sources from which it is derived, rather than according to some principle that shall give it unity and harmony. If God speaks to us, it matters not through what channels so that we be sure the voice is his ; to sum up his declarations according to their sources, is to run the risk of dividing against itself the authority of him who is one and indivisible.

(3.) We cannot in fact now construct a strictly Natural Theology. The office of the Bible as a supernatural revelation, is to interpret, to supplement and to complete, the prior revelation of nature. In the fulfillment of its office, the Bible has so completely irradiated every natural source of divine knowledge as to leave it quite impossible for us to distinguish between the knowledge which is natural in its origin and that which is supernatural. Even Plato and Plutarch, Cicero and Seneca, could not escape the traditions and mythologies of their nations and times, and escape now from the influence of Christianity must be proportionately as much more difficult as Christianity is more philosophical and conformable to nature than were the religions of Greece and Rome. Every modern work on natural theology shows its indebtedness to Christianity. No amount of science

could have produced the Bridgewater Treatises, or Dr. Chalmers' two volumes on natural theology, without the light that shines from the New Testament. The Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy attempted to construct a system by strict demonstration, independently of revelation, and the result, as Hase (*Ch. Hist.*, § 410) admits, "was a Natural Theology whose essential principles were derived from the Christian system."

(4.) The attempt to distinguish between Natural and Revealed Theology, remanding each as it does to an independent and clearly definable domain, has led in the past to no inconsiderable mischief. And the result has been the same, whether the attempt has been made by those who would exalt the Bible at the expense of nature, or by those who would exalt nature at the expense of the Bible. It has led, (*a.*) to unsupported theories of God's relation to the natural world; (*b.*) to unauthorised definitions of miracles as violations or suspensions of the laws of nature; (*c.*) to unnatural and repulsive types of piety, which have sprung from a violation of the natural laws of personal being in obedience to supposed supernatural requirements, and have resulted in caricatures, rather than in realizations, of the ideal man typified in Christ; and (*d.*), in no small degree, to German Rationalism, which had its formal origin in a reaction against the separation of revelation from nature by abrupt and impassable chasms, but which sprung, in reality, from the Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy¹—a philosophy that aspired to demonstrate, on the principles of exact science, a natural theology, on which revealed theology could rest as on an immutable foundation—and which, as the completion of its work, has claimed to have reduced all that was

1. It is worthy of note, though for some reason not recognized in histories of Rationalism, that Reimarus, who is very generally admitted to have been the author of the *Wolfenbützel Fragments*, was an adherent of this philosophy; and in the preface to his able treatise on natural theology, (*Die Vornehmsten Wahrheiten d. nat. relig.*) he sets forth that science as the "foundation" without which "a slight shock would suffice to make faith and Christianity, and, in fact, all religion, totter and fall."

regarded as supernatural to the dreary and hopeless level of the natural. No inconsiderable portion of the argument for the independent treatment of natural theology is derived from an unwarranted extension of its domain. Within its precincts, it is quietly assumed, lies the science of Ethics, and all that can be said in behalf of the independence of the latter is forced to do service in support of the unauthorized claims of the former¹. Deontology is not an integral part of theology, natural or revealed; whereas Ontology being essential and common to both, they should not be treated as independent sciences².

3. To Ethics, or the science of morals. Until after the middle of the 16th century, dogmatic theology was made to include ethics³, as an integral part of itself. From that time to the present the question of their relation has been

1. For an example of this kind of extension and argumentation, see the art. in *Bib. Sac.*, vol. 3; cf. vol. 1, p. 744.

2. On the relation of the Revealed to the Natural, see Bowen, *Metaphysics and Ethics*, pt. 2, ch. 10.—Chalmers, *Nat. Theol.*, bk. 5, ch. 4.

3. In 1577 Lambert Daneau, of the Reformed (Calvinist) church, took the first step towards their separation, by publishing his *Ethica Christiana libri tres*, and in 1634, Geo. Calixtus, one of the most noted theologians of the Lutheran church, published a work entitled *Epitome Theologiæ moralis*, in which he not only distinguished between theology as dogmatic and moral, but also between ethics or morals as theological and philosophical. Ethics thenceforward were recognized as an independent science, and theology began to be distributed under the two general titles of dogmatic and moral. Ethics were, thenceforward, also clearly distinguished as philosophical, or as Christian, according to the method of treatment—as philosophical when its principles were grounded in reason, and as Christian when derived from the teachings of Christ and his Apostles. The latter has been and still continues to be the prevailing German method. See Rothe, *Theo. Ethik*, Harless *Christliche Ethik*, (translation by Morrison in Clark's *For. Theo. Lib.*)—Wuttke, *Handbuch d. chr. Sittenlehre*.—Schmid, *chr. Sittenlehre*; cf. art. *Ethik*, by Dörner, in Herzog, *Realency.* In English literature, since the time of Hobbes, (see Sir Jas. Mackintosh, *Progress of Eth. Phil.* &c.—Whewell, *Lects. on Hist. of Moral Phil. in Eng.*), ethical principles have been made, except by a few such authors as Wardlaw and Dymond, to rest on the authority of reason, that of Scripture being appealed to as corroborative rather than as fundamental. American writers on Ethics have followed the English. But any attempt now to distinguish between what is derived from reason alone, irradiated as it has been by the light of Christianity, and what from the Scriptures, is simply impossible. Cf. Neander, *Geschichte d. chr. Ethik*, 3, Einleitung.

more or less discussed, though their right to independent treatment remains undisputed. But as many of their principles are derived from common sources¹, and as they aim directly at a common end, the welfare of man, it is impossible that their domains should not impinge.

Several methods of dealing with this relation are now possible: (*a.*) to imitate many Protestant theologians of the middle and latter half of the 17th century, who remanded all ethical questions to a Moral Theology which served as an appendix to their Dogmatic Theology; or (*b.*) like many modern Germans to treat of Dogmatics and "Christian Ethics" as coördinate branches of a more comprehensive Systematic Theology; or (*c.*) with Nitzsch, in his *System der chr. Lehre*, to distinguish between Dogmatics as the doctrines of the Churches², and Christian doctrine as the teaching of Scripture and superior to all formularies, and selecting the latter to show at each step the relation of faith to practice, and of doctrine to life; or (*d.*) to treat of Theology as wholly independent of Ethics, with which it is to be regarded as only casually connected by community of aim³, the former as working from above downward and from without inward, and the latter from beneath upward and from within outward; or (*e.*) like Dr. Alexander⁴ of Princeton, and Dr. Chalmers⁵, to treat of Theology and Ethics as independent, but closely related, and mutually helpful, sciences; or (*f.*) like Dr. Taylor⁶ of New Haven, and Prof. Finney⁷, and all those American authors who in their systems attach so much importance to theories of the will, of moral agency, of natural ability, &c., to con-

1. To attempt to distinguish between the sources of Theology and Ethics, by restricting the former to the formal teachings of an objective revelation and the latter to the affirmations of the subjective nature of man, is not only to contradict history and fact, but to remove the foundations of morality by severing it from religion.

2. § 2-4. cf. Bretschneider, *Dogmatik*, vol. 1, § 5.

3. See Hampden's *Bampton Lectures*, lec. 6.

4. See his *Moral Science*, specially the preface.

5. *Institutes of Theol.*, vol. 1, lec. 1.—*Memoirs*, vol. 2, pp. 218, 219.

6. Compare his *Moral Government* with his *Revealed Theol.*

7. Comp. the first half of his *Systematic Theol.* with the last half.

struct a system of moral science, on which as a foundation, our theology is to be reared ; or finally, (*g.*) to treat of each ethical question, both theoretic and practical, only and always as it emerges in our theological enquiries, and always under the guidance of the Christian Revelation. This last method would seem to be both natural and legitimate. A complete system of Theology necessarily brings us face to face, at particular points, with the questions which must be fundamental in any system of theoretic ethics, viz: the nature and office of conscience, the idea of law, the theory and nature of virtue, the nature and ground of moral obligation, &c. And as to practical ethics, if moral duties and moral character be the final aim of all true religious and theological investigation, there is no reason why our theology, if it be, as it should, in the fullest sense biblical and christian, should not also, at every stage of its progress, take cognizance of those facts and laws of being which lie at the basis of practical morality, but a full discussion of which, with the wide subject of casuistry, belongs more especially to the science of Ethics¹.

4. To Metaphysical Philosophy. This has always been a close and perplexingly delicate relation. All attempts to sever it have been, and ever must be, in vain. Indeed, theology and metaphysics both deal, in many instances, with the same questions², and each will necessarily contribute, as it always has done, more or less directly to the conclusions of the other. Many of the facts of consciousness also, with which Psychology, the main branch of modern metaphysics, has to do, underlie some of the principal doctrines of Christianity³, and the theologian cannot ignore them even if he would.

A metaphysical philosophy moreover is the necessary possession of all enlightened nations—is at once the product

1. See Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, § 16.

2. The well known dictum of Sir William Hamilton, that "no difficulty emerges in Theology which has not previously emerged in Philosophy," implies not only a certain community of domain, but also an inseparable alliance of office.

3. cf. Porter. *The Human Intellect*. p. 14: also *Bib. Sac.*, vol. 3, pp. 683-4.

and measure of a nation's intelligence. Being, in fact, the philosophy of the human mind, it very naturally becomes, in respect to related branches of knowledge, a method¹ according to which the study of these is prosecuted. A people's metaphysics, therefore, necessarily must affect their theology. Every doctrine of theology will be more or less colored by the philosophy through which it is contemplated.

The real difficulty here, is to determine just how far our philosophy can aid us without misleading. The exact point where aid becomes dangerous, is not clearly perceivable. The most that can here be said is, that as the aid cannot be declined², nor the influence escaped, we should be ever on our guard lest our Theology should anywhere substitute the suggestions of our Philosophy for the plain declarations of Scripture. Philosophy, as a method, may help explain the Scriptures—may aid in analysing and classifying their truths and facts, as well as in establishing their trustworthiness, but its aid must ever be regarded as that of a servant and never that of a master³.

5. To the Natural Sciences. The demonstrable conclusions of a real science must certainly have a positive authority; so must also the explicit declaration of the

1. "Theology—Christian theology is, as a human science, a philology and history applied by philosophy; and the comparatively ineffectual character of our British theology has, for generations, in the case of England, mainly resulted from the deficiency of its philosophical element. The want of a philosophical training in the Anglican clergy, to be regretted at all times, may soon, indeed, become lamentably apparent, were they called on to resist an invasion, now so likely, of certain foreign philosophico-theological opinions." Sir Wm. Hamilton's *Phil. Discussions*, Am. ed., app. 3, p. 714. Prophetic words, already fulfilled!

2. The aversion of some good people to metaphysics in theology, may consist with soundness of piety, but with neither breadth nor soundness of intelligence. Every man has just as *much* of metaphysics as, all things considered, he is capable of, or in other words, as he has of mental discipline; the *kind* or quality of his metaphysics, must depend, in part, on mental constitution, and, in part, on educational influences. No system of theology ever yet existed, no single treatise was ever yet made to embody an author's view of Scripture teaching, which did not betray an underlying system of metaphysics.

3. See Hagenbach, *Ency. u. Methodologie d. theo. Wissenschaften*, §§ 28–30.—Mansel, *Limits of Relig. Thought*.—McCosh, *Intui. of the Mind*, pt. 2, bk. 2, c. 5, sec. 5.—Vinet, *Outlines of Philosophy*, sec. 2.—Porter, *The Human Intellect*, c. 8.

divine word. But these two authorities cannot clash. God cannot contradict in his word what he has already declared in his works. Many of the doctrines of the Bible, it is true, lie altogether above and beyond the range of natural science, but none can be maintained that are unquestionably contrary to its indubitable teachings. There need be no timidity here, but there should be caution. A true theology and a real science, must in the end be in harmony. But before we shape our theology, or seek to accommodate our interpretation of Scripture, to the demands of science, we may first justly demand that the claims of the science be established beyond dispute. We should ask no scientist to put on the trammels of theology, neither should the theologian consent to pay deference to the mere guesses of a science which is yet in its nonage. Our understanding of God's word, must be our absolute and final authority, until our understanding of it, or the word itself, shall be shown to be demonstrably in error¹.

6. To the Science of Biblical Hermeneutics². It is the office of systematic theology, not only to summarize the interpretations of Scripture, but also to justify the interpretations which it adopts. In the exercise of this latter function, it should see, (*a.*) that due attention is paid to the distinction between literal language and metaphorical, and between the poetical, parabolic, historical and didactic portions of scripture; (*b.*) that too much reliance is not placed on mere grammar, lexicography and *usus loquendi*: but, (*c.*) that due attention be given to the harmony of one part of Scripture with another, and specially of each author with himself³.

7. To Catechisms, Symbols or Creeds, and Comparative Dogmatics. The catechism is a popular summary of the

1. See Tayler Lewis, *The Six Days of Creation*; Critique of the same by Prof. Dana in *Bib. Sac.*, vol. 13, pp. 80-120 and 631-656.—Guizot, "Faith and Science," *Kitto's Jour. Sac. Lit.*, vol. 5.

2. See Hagenbach, *Theol. Ency. u. Methodologie*, §52.—E. nesti, *Principles of Interp.*—Fairbairn, *Hermeneu. Manual*.

3. See Ellicott, in *Aids of Faith*, pp. 508-511.

rudiments of theology, in the form of questions and answers, and is for scientific theology just what an elementary treatise would be for any other science. A symbol or creed embodies the belief of a certain number of persons at a given time, and may have been assented to, or voluntarily adopted, more or less widely by others. All such symbols, which were mere compromises in their origin, bear unmistakable evidence of the fierce struggles through which they passed in coming into being¹, and of the skillful handiwork of the one or more who shaped them to the exigencies of their day. They are valuable as indices, but worthless as authorities to him whose care is to know, not what a given people may have accepted as true, but what the Scriptures teach. The dogmatic treatises of individual authors may be of service, and should have weight with us, just in proportion to their manifest qualifications for trustworthy judgments of the meaning of Scripture. The selection of any one or more of these, of any given age or sect, or the adoption of any particular creed or confession as ultimate authority in theology, is simply preposterous and an offence against the authority of the word of God. But a comparison

1. This is not untrue of the so-called Apostolic creed, but is specially manifest in the Nicene, the misnamed Athanasian, and all the multitudinous confessions originated within the last 340 years. See Witsius, *Exercitationes in Symb. Apos.*—Pearson, *On The Creed.*—Harvey, *The Three Creeds.*—Hase, *Libri Symbolici.*—Niemeyer, *Collectio Confessionum.*—Dean Stanley, *Hist. of the Eastern Ch.*, and, on the Athanasian Creed, in *Contemporary Rev.*, August, 1870.

The original designation of a summary of belief was always significant. It was a *Creed*, when the person or persons adopting it spoke freely, recognizing no authority but God; a *Confession*, when there was a power, civil or ecclesiastical, to which the party confessing was amenable, (Augsburg, Westminster, &c.); a *Consensus*, when certain parties had been induced to accept, in the given formula, what they had before dissented from, (Genevensis, Polonae, &c.); *Articles*, when a statement had been adopted by opposing parties as a kind of mutual compact of belief, (Smalcald, Church of England); *Canons*, when an ecclesiastical body declared by authority what should be believed, (Trent, Dort); *Declaration*, when a single church, in the exercise of its independence, or an assembly of members of independent churches, made declaration of its belief, (Savoy and New Hamp. Bapt. Convention). On the word *Symbol*, see *σύμβολον* in *Suiceri Thesaurus*. The more generic and more prevalent *formular*y, is expressive of the formulation of points of belief in the confession or creed.

of the catechisms, creeds and theological systems of the various divisions and subdivisions of christendom, may be serviceable to discriminating minds.¹

8. To Practical Theology. This is the relation of science to art. Practical theology is scientific theology applied. The word practical, in this connection, has been used in a somewhat loose and indefinite sense, sometimes trenching in its breadth of meaning on the sphere of ethics or of practical religion, and sometimes limiting itself to the mere functions of the clergyman; but it may not unwarrantably be made to include, (*a.*) all instrumentalities employed in the origination of christian life, (Sunday-schools, catechetical instructions, exhortations, etc.); (*b.*) whatever nurtures and cultivates christian life and builds up christian character, (homiletical and liturgical service and pastoral visitation); and (*c.*) church organization and government, whereby the whole body is made efficient, active, healthful and progressive. To all these varied forms of activity, systematic theology, as furnishing guiding principles, sustains an intimate and indissoluble relation.²

§ 4—*Aims and Uses.*

The Idea, Sources and Relations of Christian Theology being as already described it evidently should aim:

1. To ascertain the whole truth pertaining to God and man as moral beings, and to their mutual relations. But as every other source has become fully intelligible only under the tuition of the written word of God, it follows that

1. See Marheineke, *Christl. Symbolik*, and *Institut. Symbolicæ*, etc.; Mochler, *Symbolik*, (Eng. trans.,) and Baur, *Gegensatz des Cathol. u. Protest.*; Koellner, *Symbolik aller Christl. Confess.*; Schneckenburger, *vergleichende Darstellung d. luther u. reform. Lehrbegriffs*; Winer, *comp. Darstellung d. Lehre. d. verschied. Christl. Kirchenpartien. dritte ausg.*

2. See Hagenbuch, *Ency. u. Methodologie*, §§ 96-98; Bridges, *The Christian Ministry*; Palmer, *Homiletik*; Vinet, *Pastoral Theol.*; Shedd, *Homiletics and Past. Theol.*; Hoppin, *Office and Work of the Christian Ministry*; etc.

the prominent aim of theology should be to ascertain by patient enquiry and by exact interpretation, the teachings of the sacred Scriptures. What it thus ascertains it should aim,

2. To classify and systematize. (*a.*) All revealed truths or doctrines, relating to God and his purposes which are indivisibly one, must be interdependent, and when taken together constitute a harmonious whole; and to exhibit this whole each truth must be adjusted to its right position, every truth being one-sided or inexact in proportion to the mal-adjustment of its relations to others. (*b.*) Disciplined intellect always demands system and order, every mind being systematic and orderly in the classification of its possessions according to the degree of its discipline. (*c.*) Each doctrine, as well as the totality of christian truth, becomes intelligible and thus available to both the theologian and the preacher, in proportion as each is contemplated in its true relation to all the others.

The deep-seated popular prejudice against systems of theology, is easily accounted for as the natural heritage of Protestantism. It was against the scholastic systems of theology, as well as against papal assumptions and priestly corruptions, that the reformers arrayed themselves. Scholasticism had enslaved medieval theology, and the appeal of the reformers was immediately and without qualification to the holy Scriptures. But a lapse from this method into rigid systemization in the 17th century was rapid and inevitable, from which again a reaction led back the Protestant mind, not only to its original dislike of all scholasticism, but to a settled and hereditary distrust of all systems of theology¹.

The tendency to a disregard of the systematic relations of truth in popular ministrations, both in the pulpit and by

1. This distrust shows itself as positive hostility in many later Anglican writers. See *Essays and Reviews*, specially essay I. Dean Stanley, *Essays*. Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*. Hampden, *Bampton Lectures*, and Hey, *Lectures on the Articles*. On the other side, see Leon. Wood, *Lectures*, lec. 8. *Princeton Essays*, 2d series, essay 3. Garbett's Bampton Lectures *The Dogmatic Faith*.

the press, has been, and still is, one of the noticeable signs of our time. Single truths are often wrenched from their connection with coordinate truths and treated as if in no way qualified by them. Special doctrines and consequently special duties, are thus often thrown out of their true position, and carried to the verge of positive error. Several causes contribute to strengthen and perpetuate the tendency, among which may be mentioned; undue reliance on mere philology in the interpretation of scripture, to the neglect of the analogy of scripture and the analogy of faith;¹ the intensely practical spirit of the age; the wide spread demand for social, political and religious reforms; and withal, the methods and claims of physical science, as contradistinguished from those of metaphysical philosophy. Against the mischief of this tendency one great safeguard may be found in a thoroughly biblical and systematic Christian Theology.

3. Another aim should be, to ascertain by careful and searching analysis those distinctions between doctrines, and those shades of meaning in particular doctrines,² without a recognition of which, there can be no scientific exactness, and consequently no trustworthy system. The lines that separate truth from error, are often very delicate, and sometimes obscure. Gross and pernicious errors have had their origin in a failure to discern them.³

In pursuance of this aim much may be learned from the Protestant scholastic theologians of the 17th century, and even from the Romanist schoolmen of the 12th and 13th centuries. Many of their distinctions were too refined and subtle to be true; many now adopted are too crude and ill-defined to be just.

Refinement of analysis is not as sometimes alleged a hindrance to a successful proclamation of the truth. On the

1. See Ellicott, *Aids to Faith*, pp. 503-511.

2. Tributary to this, would be a critical examination of words and phrases used in the Septuagint and afterwards by the Apostles in their Epistles, and a careful scrutiny of the meaning of theological terms at different periods of the history of the Church. See Max. Mueller, *Science of Language*, vol. 2, pp. 526-580.

3. "Campbellism" for instance, and its doctrine of faith.

contrary, it is requisite not only to accuracy and depth of view, but to that clearness of perception and vividness of apprehension which are the first conditions to its effective presentation. It is accurate analysis also which alone can supply the variety, freshness, instructiveness and searching power in pulpit ministrations, so eagerly welcomed and so rarely exhibited. The general truths of Christianity are now so well understood that generalities are threadbare and common-place; and novelties in the gospel must always be crudities. The special need of our time is, not novel themes, but that use of the inexhaustible fullness of the old eternal truths which is made possible by the thorough analysis of a scientific and systematic theology.

4. Theology should aim to indicate clearly the relation subsisting between the doctrines of Christianity and the Christian life. All real righteousness or true Christian life is referable to healthy emotions; these to intelligent convictions; these again to conscious belief; and this, at last, to sound (hygienic, *ὑγιής*,) doctrine.¹

§ 5—*Limitations.*

The desire in man for knowledge when once awakened, may become insatiable. The further the mind pushes its inquiries in a given direction, the more intense is its desire to proceed. And in most departments of knowledge no limits need be imposed on this desire. The physical limits in Natural Science may be gradually extended before a spirit of resolute and patient inquiry; and even in Psychology the facts of consciousness, subjected to new analyses, may be compelled to disclose more and more of their long kept secrets. But in Theology there are unchangeable limits—barriers which no skill of man can pierce or surmount. Attempts to pass them have resulted, sometimes in gross errors of doctrine and practice, and sometimes in a total

1. See *Chris. Rev.*, April, 1859; *Am. Theol. Rev.*, Jan., '59, art. 7.

disbelief of whatever escapes the test of sense. The limits lie chiefly within the limitations of our own nature.

1. To us as finite beings, infinite subjects are necessarily incomprehensible. Revelation tells us of the infinite God, of his eternal purposes, and of an eternal duration in the past;¹ but any attempt to state exhaustively the contents of these thoughts, or to traverse the whole region they cover, is to cross limits beyond which thinking becomes a delusion and a snare.²

2. As limited in our experience, many truths are incommunicable to us for lack of typical terms. There are modes of existence and personal relations brought to light in the Scriptures, for the judging of which finite minds have no experiential criteria, and for even the understanding of which they have no correlative knowledge whence the omniscient Spirit in his revelation could draw metaphorical or typical forms of thought.³ Of this class of truths are the doctrines of the Trinity, and of the two natures in the Person of Christ.

3. As limited in our ratiocinative faculties, certain great coordinate truths, like those of divine sovereignty and human freedom, must remain inexplicably conjoined; and any attempt to solve the mystery of their conjunction must result in confusion or contradiction of thought.

4. To us as limited in our knowledge of ourselves, (*a.*) of our mental and our volitional processes, (*b.*) of the relation of the soul to the body, (*c.*) of the nature of the essence of the soul itself, many of the doctrines relating to the work of the Holy Spirit in the heart of man—to the method of regeneration—to the mode of the soul's existence after death, &c., &c.,

1. "How an eternal duration can be now actually past, is a thing utterly as impossible for our narrow understandings to comprehend, as anything that is not an express contradiction can be imagined to be: and yet to deny the truth of the proposition that an eternal duration is now actually past, would be to assert something still far more unintelligible, even a real and express contradiction."—Sam. Clarke, *The Being and Attributes of God*, p. 9.

2. See Mansel, *Limits of Religious Thought*, and various critiques on the same, in the *Quarterlies* of '59 and '60.

3. See McCosh, *Typical Forms in Creation*, book 3, specially ch. 3.

must remain inscrutably mysterious ; and any attempt to lift the veil of their mystery by forcing the boundaries of our knowledge, can only result in final disaster to our theological system.

5. Perhaps we should add the purposed silence of the Scriptures.¹ It is not impossible that this silence is never self-imposed, and that it is always made imperative by our incapacity to understand ; and yet there are certain questions about which we are instinctively disposed to be inquisitive, and to which, so far as we know, the answer might have been intelligible. Such are the questions of the relation of God to the material universe, the origin of sin, the relation of departed spirits to the living, &c., &c. To all these the Scriptures give no response. In the presence of this suggestive silence, the prudent theologian will be cautious of conjectures and theories.² Within the prescribed limits of revealed truth we may pursue our inquiries with zeal and confidence unflagging, but beyond the silent boundaries we should beware of aspiring to pass.³

§ 6—*Requisites.*

1. A certain amount of intellectual discipline, of general knowledge and of special acquisition : (a.) Intellectual discipline, because careful analysis and discrimination must be made, and because a vast body of correlated thought must be brought under survey ; (b.) of general knowledge, because in the examination of the truths and doctrines of Theology we are not only taken back to a remote antiquity

1. See Fairbairn, *Typology of the Scriptures*, pt. 1, ch. 6.

2. "He that will reduce a knowledge into an art, will make it round and uniform ; but in Divinity many things must be left abrupt and concluded with this : 'O altitudo sapientiæ et scientiæ Dei !' etc. So again the Apostle saith : 'Ex parte scimus ;' and to have the form of a total, where there is matter but for a part, cannot be without supplies by supposition and presumption."—Bacon, *Advancement of Learning*, near the close.

3. Chalmers, *Nat. Theol.*, book 5, ch. 1.

in which they originated, but are required to trace their interlacings with the thinking and principles of the civilized world ; (c.) of special acquisition, such as some acquaintance with the principles of mental philosophy and the conclusions of natural science, because of the intimate relations of these with theology, and some knowledge of the original languages of the Scriptures, because many points in Christian doctrine are determinable only by minuteness of textual criticism which no translation can make in the fullest sense appreciable.¹

2. Experimental acquaintance with the truths of Christianity. Every proposition that is to command assent must be intelligible; and to be intelligible must be capable of being tested by the special faculties addressed by it; and these faculties to perform their functions must have been trained by exercise. Christian truths are addressed to the religious faculties of man, the moral reason,² the conscience, the affections, the will; and these to perform their testing functions aright, must have been trained by exercise. This training by exercise is nothing else than Christian experience. Wanting this experience one lacks a fundamental requisite in the study of theology. 1 Cor. 2: 14, 15.

3. A minute and comprehensive acquaintance with the contents of the Scriptures; minute, because some of the most conclusive evidence in support of the most important doctrines often lie in incidental expressions, in the particles of language and in implications and logical inferences; comprehensive, including not only single books and epistles as wholes, but the entire Scriptures, because the revealed truth of the Bible is an organic whole, each part of which is requisite to the full understanding of every other.

1. See Tholuck on Theo. Ency. and Methodology in *Bib. Sac.*, vol. 1; also in the same vol., art. 7, Nov. number. "Theology, comprehending (or rather being itself contained in) a wider sphere of scholarship than any other learned profession, and its successful cultivation necessarily proportioned to the degree in which that scholarship is applied: it follows that the theology of a country can never transcend, and will rarely fall beneath, the level of its erudition;" Sir Wm. Hamilton, *Phil. Discussions*, p. 378.

2. See Pres. Hopkins, *Moral Science*, div. 1, ch. 2.

4. That hearty love of truth as such, which growing into enthusiasm, supplies a tireless energy in the pursuit of it. Such love and enthusiasm never fail to command the approval of reason and the sanction of conscience.

5. A devout, humble and prayerful spirit. Devout communion with the omniscient Spirit and unfeigned submission to his guidance, are indispensable to him who would know the mind of the Spirit through whom the truth has been revealed.¹

§ 7—*Methods of Inquiry.*

These may be considered as either special or general, according as we contemplate the treatment of single topics, or the disposition and treatment of these as parts of a whole.

In respect to the former, we must determine: (*a.*) Whether we will resort at once to the Scriptures and attempt to ascertain each doctrine *de novo et ab ovo* for ourselves; or whether, accepting from our creed or catechism each formula we will take it to the Scriptures for justification; or whether, which seems more feasible than the first and more rational than the second, adopting a kind of exegetico-dogmatic method, *i. e.* taking the statements of the highest authorities, both creeds and single authors, we will subject them, for verification, modification, or rejection, as the case may be, to the critical tests of Scripture; (*b.*) whether we will aim, by relying exclusively on the latest accredited exegesis, to be distinctively biblical; or, by tracing the progress of theological discussion, to be chiefly historical; or, by regarding system, to be pre-eminently systematic; or, by regarding ecclesiastical authority, to be uniformly didactic and dogmatic; or, by attention to other sects, to be prevailingly polemic; or whether we should not rather adopt just so much of all these methods as may be requisite to a full justification of each of our doctrinal conclusions; (*c.*) whether

1. Woods, *Lects.*, 1, 127 and 128.

we will classify the proofs of our doctrinal positions as respectively those from Revelation and those from Reason, or whether we will rather regard every legitimate argument as equally revealed and authoritative, be it founded on the letter of Scripture, on the facts of consciousness, or on the demonstrations of science.¹

As respects the general distribution of the principal parts of theology, various methods have been adopted. The oldest and still most prevalent of these, the topical method, now known as the synthetic, begins with God the First Cause of all things, and ends with the final salvation of man. Several other methods were propounded in the 17th century, among which were: the analytic, adopted by Geo. Calixtus, Prof. of Helmstadt, (died 1656,) and in later years by Dr. Chalmers, and which, as compared with the synthetic, begins at the opposite pole of theological thought, or with the salvation of man: the federal or covenant method, adopted by Coccejus of the University of Leyden, (died 1656,) by his disciples Burmann, Witsius and others, and which followed the supposed covenants of God with man and with Christ: the economic, adopted by Leydecker of the University of Utrecht, (died 1721,) and which distributed the whole of theology under the three persons of the Trinity.² In later times other methods still have been proposed.³ But the

1. It is not here intended to be intimated that the isolated authority of either consciousness or science is equal with that of Scripture, but that the teachings of the three sources constitute a conjoint authority which is not to be divided. It is noteworthy how often the authority of the Scripture is confidently put forth to the exclusion of every other, when the very thought which the Scripture is cited as sustaining is one which a careful study of the facts of consciousness, or of some branch of modern science, has enabled the exegete to find in the words.

2. Adopted also by Marheineke in his *Dogmatik*.

3. The biblico-historical method has been adopted at different periods in popular treatises, as for instance by Jonathan Edwards, in his *Hist. of Redemption*. See also a species of Christological method propounded by Andrew Fuller, *Works*, vol. 1, p. 684 and ff. Among the most noticeable of those proposed by later theologians are, that of Hase, who distributes his whole system of theology under Ontology and Christology, and that of Nitzsch, whose general divisions are: Agathology, Ponerology and Soteriology. For other older methods, see Hase, *Hutterus Redivivus*, p. 40 and ff.; and for various later ones, Hagenbach, *Encl. u. Method.*, p. 288 and ff.; and Nitzsch, *Chr. Lehre*, § 57.

synthetic retains its hold, and may be regarded as preferable to any other, because,

1. It is the most accordant with the method which God has adopted in the revelation of himself, in his works and his word.

2. It accords more nearly than any other, with the order in which Christian doctrines have been progressively apprehended and elaborated in history, and are still apprehended by individual minds.

3. It is more scientific than any other, inasmuch as it more clearly recognizes than any other, the causal or semi-organic relation subsisting between the fundamental truths of christianity. The first and deepest thought of religion and of theology is that of God, the creator and controller of all; the second, is that of man, the creature and image of God, now fallen and helpless; and the third, is that of an interposing Redeemer and his work of redemption, &c., &c.

4. When proper regard is paid to relations in its distribution of topics,¹ it anticipates less in its several stages than any other, and is consequently under far less necessity than any other, of returning on its own track.

5. For beginners in the study of systematic theology, it has the great merit of simplicity of plan, lucidity of order and logical connection of parts.

In these lectures, omitting Apologetics excepting the question of Inspiration, the order will be: Doctrine of God, or Theology proper: Man, or Anthropology: Salvation, or Soterology and Soteriology: Last things, or Eschatology.

1. The doctrine of the Trinity is ordinarily introduced in the synthetic method, under the doctrine of God, thus necessarily anticipating and taking out of its connection, the doctrine of the Person of Christ. This is not only illogical but throws the whole order of thought into confusion. It was this confusion which compelled Chalmers to abandon the synthetic for the analytic method. See Introductions to his *Nat. Theol.* and to his *Institutes of Theol.* and pt. 1, lect. 1, of his *Institutes*. For a complex modification of the synthetic proposed by Hugenbach, see his *Ency. u. Method.*, p. 290.

§ 8—*Bibliological.*

SOME OF THE MOST NOTE-WORTHY WRITERS ON SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

These may be distributed under three well known divisions: the first extending from the time of the Apostles to that of John of Damascus in the 8th century; the second from John to the Reformation in the 16th century; the third from the Reformation to our own day.

1. During the first period, Systematic Theology was in its forming state. Most of the fathers, both Greek and Latin, discussed questions that are fundamental in doctrinal theology, yet no one of them surveyed these questions as a whole and reduced them to logical order. The nearest approach to this was made by Isidore of Seville, (d. 636,) in his *Sententiarum libri tres; sive de summo bono*, made up, as its title indicates, of extracts from the fathers.

2. The three great writers of the second period were, (a.) John of Damascus, (d. 754,) the author of the first complete treatise on Systematic Theology, entitled *Εκδόσεις ἀκριβῆς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως*, or, *de fide orthodoxa*. He was both the first and the last great theologian of the Greek church; was the first to apply the formulas of Aristotle to theology, and so laid the foundation for scholastic theology. His doctrinal statements were mostly taken from the fathers of Cappadocia, Basil of Cesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzen. The treatise of John is still valuable for its discussion of the doctrine of the person of Christ, (see *Christian Rev.* Dec., 1842,)—Anselm, (d. 1109,) though he arranged no system, yet wrote the tractate, *Cur Deus homo*, which gave to the Church a theory of the atonement that still survives, and which, in any thorough discussion of the atonement, must receive careful attention. (b.) Peter Lombard, (d. 1164,) “magister sententiarum,” wrote a treatise entitled *Sententiarum libri quatuor*, and which was for a long period the one great authority in the Latin church, subsequent writers contenting themselves with writing commentaries on it. It was drawn from the writings of the Latin fathers, and is distinguished for its philosophical acumen and the skill with which it reconciles the opposing views of the fathers, which Abelard (d. 1142,) had put into such sharp contradiction in his *Sic et Non*. (c.) Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274,) one of the ablest theologians of any period, wrote *Commentarium in quat. libros sententiarum; summa theologiae*, which, pre-eminently scholastic in method, and thoroughly Romish in doctrine, is yet transparently clear in thought, and has always had a charm for the lovers of profound and exact thinking.

3. Writers of the third period subdivide themselves, at the beginning, into two general classes—Lutherans and Reformed (Calvinists), and afterwards into a variety of schools.

A. Lutherans.

(a.) Melancthon, (d. 1560.) His *Loci* Communes*, first printed in 1521, consisted originally of an abstract of his lectures on the Epist. to the Romans and was a summary of the doctrines of that epistle; was in sentiment strictly Augustinian, (Calvinistic,) but treated neither of the Incarnation nor of the Atonement. It was subjected to great modifications in the editions of 1535 and 1543,

* On the word “locus” see Heppé, *Dogmatik d. deutschen Protest. im 16 Jahrhundert*, vol. 1, §2.

adopting the theory of Synergism and defending the Calvinistic doctrine of the supper. According to Heppé, *Dogmatik*, vol. 1, §3, 84 editions of the *Loci* were published in Melancthon's life time.

(b.) Martin Chemnitz, (d. 1588,) Prof. at Wittenberg; *Loci Theologici*; the first commentator on the *Loci* of Mel. and one of the ablest and most learned of those who adopted his views.

(c.) Leonard Hutter, (d. 1616); *Compend. Locor Theolog.* introduced into all the schools; and larger work, *Loci Com. Theol.* opposed to the views of Melancthon; called "Lutherus redivivus."

(d.) John Gerhard, Prof. at Jena, (d. 1637); *Loci Theolog.* in 9 vol., 4to.; styled by Hase for his learning and piety "one of the Prot. ecclesiastical fathers;" his work one of the highest authorities in Lutheran theology.

(e.) George Calixt, Prof. at Helmstadt, (d. 1656,) distinguished for his erudition and broad charity; wrote *Epitome Theol.*; separated Theology from Moral Science and introduced a scholastic and the analytic method; sought to reduce all creed tests to the Apostles' creed, and to reunite Catholics and Protestants—hence called Syneretist by the Lutherans. Sympathized more with the views of Melancthon than of Luther.

(f.) Ab. Calov, Superintendent at Wittenberg, (d. 1686); *Systema Locor. Theol.*; adopted the scholastic and analytic methods of Calixtus, but violently assailed him and his views; an honest zealot, whose daily prayer was, *Imple me, Deus, odio hæreticorum.*

(g.) J. A. Quenstedt, Prof. at Wittenberg, (d. 1688,) *Theologia didactico-polemica*; a compact and logical treatise, neither original nor independent in spirit, but concise and comprehensive in its statement of orthodox Lutheranism as found in its exponents from Hutter to Calov; analytic and scholastic in method.

(h.) J. F. Buddeus, Prof. at Halle and Jena, (d. 1729); *Institutiones Theologicæ dogmat.*; analytic in method but wholly free from scholasticism, both in form and phraseology; opposed the Wolfian philosophy; by no means one of the ablest, but one of the most temperate and best written of the Lutheran treatises. The author's sympathies were more with the pietists than with their opponents.

Rationalism and Pietism here interrupt the historical continuity of Lutheran Theology. The few of its writers who adopted the philosophy of Leibnitz, did not enough modify the course of Lutheranism to require here to be specified. The pietists, regarding religion as a matter of the heart rather than of the understanding, neglected systematic Theology; and the original rationalists, or naturalists, were so much more intent on the work of destruction than of construction that they contributed nothing to dogmatics. Representative of opponents of initial rationalism may be mentioned;

(i.) G. T. Zachariæ, Prof. at Kiel, (d. 1777); *Bibliche Theologie*; biblical in contradistinction to systematic; had but little influence beyond its own generation.

(j.) J. Ch. Doederlein, Prof. at Butzow, (d. 1789); *Institutio Theol. Chr.*; evangelical, though carefully adjusted, both in its statements and in its definition of orthodoxy, to the exigencies of its time.

Representative of the opponents of later and more pronounced Rationalism, and known distinctively as Supernaturalists, but differing widely in spirit and method from the Lutheranism of the 17th century are,

(k.) T. C. Storr, Prof. at Tuebingen, (d. 1805); *Doctrina Chr. Pars. theoretica*; afterwards translated from Latin into German, and edited and illustrated by C. Ch. Flatt, also of Tuebingen. See Storr and Flatt's *Elements of Bib. Theol.*, translated into Eng. by S. S. Schmucker; evangelical, but almost worthless in its biblical exegesis.

(l.) F. V. Reinhard, Court preacher at Dresden and author of the well-known *Plan of Jesus*, (d. 1812.) *Vorlesungen ueber die Dogmatik*; his supernaturalism rather moral and philosophical than theological; not comprehensive nor vigorous.

(m.) G. Ch. Knapp, Prof. at Halle, (d. 1825); *Vorlesungen ueber die chr. Glaubenslehre*. (*Chr. Theology*, trans. into Eng. by Leon. Woods Jr. Andover, 1831); rests exclusively on the authority of the Scriptures as a supernatural Revelation; recognizes historical development and yet independent of Lutheran traditions and to a great extent of philosophical systems. A. Hahn, Prof. at Leipsic, *Lehrbuch d. chr. Glaubens*, not unlike Knapp, in spirit and in method.

Representative of Rationalists is,

(n.) J. A. L. Wegscheider, Prof. at Halle, (d. 1848); *Institutiones Theologicæ Chr. dog.*; grossly rationalistic.

Intermediate, between Rationalists and Supernaturalists are,

(o.) K. G. Bretschneider, General superintendent in Gotha, (d. 1848); *Handbuch der Dogmatik, d. evan. Kirche*:—"rational supernaturalist"—elaborate and comprehensive. De Wette, *Dogmatik*, belongs to the same school. Twisten, Prof. at Berlin, *Dogmatik*; 2 vols. on the doctrine of God and angelology published many years since: never finished; an elaborate presentation, so far as it goes, of old orthodox Lutheranism. The *Dogmatik* of Schmid, of Erlangen, and the *Christi Person und Werk* of Thomasius, are of the same character.

B. Reformed, (Calvinistic). The Reformed writers on systematic theology are more naturally distributed than the Lutheran, into schools that are determinable by differences in philosophical method or in the fundamental principles of their systems.

Of the most noted writers we may name:

(a.) John Calvin, Prof. at Geneva, (d. 1564); *Institutio Chr. Religionis*; entirely superior to Melancton's *Loci*, whether in depth, comprehensiveness or logic; and incomparably more influential in Protestant Christendom than any other single treatise. In strict harmony with the views of Calvin may be mentioned the *Loci Communes* of Peter Martyr, a fugitive Italian, Prof. at Zurich, (d. 1562); the *Compendium Relig. Chr.* of Bullinger, also of Zurich, (d. 1575); the *Loci Com. Theol.* of Musculus, Prof. at Berne, (d. 1563); and the *Syntagma Theol. Chr.* of Polanus, Prof. at Basle, (d. 1610).

(b.) Belonging to the hyper-Calvinistic school, which originated with the great exegete, Beza, were Peter Ramus, martyred St. Bartholomew's night, 1572, author of *Commentarium de Religione Chr.*; Bucanus, Prof. at Lausanne, *Institutiones Theologicæ*, 1 vol., (trans. into Eng. by Robert Hill, 1606); John Sharp a Scotchman, *Cursus Theologicus*; Benedict Pictet, Prof. at Geneva, (d. 1724); *Institutiones Theologicæ*, 2 vols. 8vo. (trans. into Eng. by Rev. Fred. Leroux, 1833.)

(c.) German Reformed. The two most noted writers were Ursinus, Prof. at

Heidelberg, (d. 1583,) and Olevianus, also of Heidelberg, (d. 1587,) who were the joint authors of the Heidelberg Catechism, the great symbol of this school. (Ursinus also wrote a *Loci Theologici*.) Its type of doctrine was that of the Melanthonian party of the Lutheran Ch., rather than that of the strict predestinationists, though the later writers verged towards the latter type.

(d.) Scholasticism in the Reformed Ch.; introduced by Wollebius, Prof. at Basle, (d. 1629,) *Theologia Compend.*, (trans. into Eng. by Alex. Ross in 1656); his type of doctrine is strictly that of Calvin; Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, §34, pronounces him "decidedly the ablest theologian that ever lived—a true Peter Lombard of reformed scholasticism." Scholasticism reached its highest development in the renowned Gilbert Voetius, Prof. at Utrecht, (d. 1576,) author of *Institutiones Theologiae* and of *Disputationes Selectae*, 5 vols., 4to.

(e.) The Federal School, ("Covenant System"); originated with Coccejus, Leyden (d. 1669,) in reaction against scholasticism. He wrote *Summa Doctrinae de Fide et Testamento Dei*. Francis Burmann, Utrecht, (d. 1681); *Synopsis Theologiae ac speciatim Oeconomiae Fœderum Dei*, etc., 2 vols.: and Herman Witsius, Leyden, (d. 1708); *Oeconomia Fœderum Dei*. The latter less able than the former, is better known through English translations. This school gave its method and phraseology to English Puritan Theology.

(f.) Those affected by Cartesianism: (Des Cartes, starting with honest doubt, founded all philosophy in consciousness—in this found his evidence of the existence of God; referred the universe and all it contains, even necessary truths to the will of God; held ideas to be innate and the reason rather than the will to be the grand characteristic of man. As related to theology, the question of Cartesianism was, the capacity of unaided reason for the knowledge of divine things.) Voetius had opposed Des Cartes, and others of the scholastic school had joined in the opposition, particularly Van Maastricht of Utrecht, (d. 1706,) in his *Theologia theoretico-practica*, and even bitterly in his *Theologia seu Gangrena Cartesiana*, while several of the federalists, like Heidanus and Burmann, defended and adopted the principles of his system. Van Til of Leyden, (d. 1713,) one of the ablest Ref. theologians, in his *Theologiae utriusque Compendium Nat. tum Rev.*; Vitringa in his *Doctrina Chr. Rel.*; and Marckius in his *Compendium Theologiae Chr. didactico-elenct.*, attempted to mediate between the Scholastics and the Cartesians.

(g.) The school at Saumur—Amyraldism and Placeanism. The views of this school, initiated by the Scotchman John Cameron, took the distinctive form with Amyrald, (d. 1664,) of predestinationism conditioned by "hypothetical universalism," and with Placeus, (d. 1655,) of mediate, in contradiction to im-mediate, imputation. Against Amyrald's views of sin, Rivetus, (d. 1651,) collected many testimonies from previous authors. See vol. 3d of his works, and first series Princeton Essays.

(h.) Francis Turretin, Prof. Geneva, (d. 1687,) *Institutio Theol. elencticae*; one of the ablest theologians of the last quarter of the 17th century; independent of existing schools and methods; an earnest opponent of Amyraldism and a zealous defender of the orthodoxy of the Synod of Dort; a sound exegete and a devout philosopher.

(i.) Those affected by the Leibnitzian-Wolfian Phil.; [Wolf completed and systematised the phil. of Leibnitz, the two fundamental ideas of which were

monadology, including the notion of an inherent self-developing energy in every monad, and pre-established harmony. Both philosophy and theology, with Wolf, became mere systems of definitions and formal deductions. As applied to theology, his philosophy distinguished between revealed theology and natural, assuming the latter to be demonstrable, and the contents of the former to be reducible to definitions and dogmas, which are representative of real as well as of formal truths.] Daniel Wytttenbach, Prof. first at Berne and then at Marburg, (d. 1779,) adopted the Wolfian method in his *Tentamen Theolog.*, as did also J. F. Stapfer, Prof. Berne, (d. 1775,) in his *Institutiones Theol. polem.*

(j.) Of later writers may be mentioned Schleiermacher, Prof. Berlin, (d. 1834,) *Chr. Glaubenslehre*; though independent of all confessions yet more Reformed than Lutheran; the creator of an epoch in German theology; rationalistic in criticism, pantheistic in philosophy, but devoutly earnest and christian in spirit. C. J. Nitzsch, Berlin, (d. 1868,) *System d. chr. Lehre*, (*Chr. Doctrine*, trans. Clarke's Library,) mediates between Lutheran and Reformed; Ethical theological. Lange, *Chr. Dogmatik*, and Ebrard, *Chr. Dogmatik*; both of them decidedly Reformed and evangelical

(k.) Socinianism; name derived from Laelius Socinus, (d. 1562,) and his nephew Faustus Socinus, (d. 1604.) The views of the early writers of the sect are found in the *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*, 8 vols. fol., and in the *Racovian catechism*. Socinianism, as yet, has produced no complete treatise on systematic theology.

(l.) Arminians; name derived from Arminius, Prof. Leyden, (d. 1609.) Their ablest writer was Philip Limborch, Prof. in Remonstrant Gymnasium at Amsterdam, (d. 1712); *Theologia Christiana*; written with exegetical and philosophical skill. Richard Watson, Eng. *Theological Institutes*; able but prolix.

(m.) Anglican; Thos. Stackhouse, (d. 1752,) *Complete Body of Divinity*; gathered mostly from Anglican divines; no philosophical skill; hesitating and uncertain in his doctrinal views. Bishop Tomline, (d. 1827,) *Elements of Chr. Theology*; anti-Calvinistic and weak. John Hey, Prof. Divinity, Cambridge, (d. 1815,) *Lectures on Divinity*; mediates like most Anglican theologians between Romanist and Reformed doctrines. Pearson on *The Creed*, and Burnet on *The thirty-nine Articles*, should also be mentioned.

(n.) Presbyterian, (Calvinistic); (Eng.) Thos. Ridgely, (d. 1734,) *Body of Divinity*; lectures on the Assembly's larger Catechism. (Scotch.) George Hill, Prin. St. Mary's, (d. 1820,) *Lecs. on Divinity*. John Dick, (d. 1833,) *Lecs. on Theology*; echo of Turretin. Chalmers, (d. 1847,) *Institutes of Theol.*; analytic in method; less dogmatic and more moderately Calvinistic than the other Scotch theologians; of no special value. (Amer.) Breckenridge, *Doctrine of God objectively and subjectively considered*; mediate imputation. Hodges' *Outlines*; immediate imputation. Jas. Richards, (d. 1843,) Prof. Auburn, *Lecs. on Ment. Phil and Theol.*; new school.

(o.) Quakerism; Robert Barclay, a Scotchman, (d. 1690,) wrote *Theologia vere Chr. Apologia*, on the basis of certain Theses Theologicæ, which he had previously written and sent to the scholars and clergy of all lands; afterwards published in English, *An Apology for the true Chr. Divinity*; not a formal treatise on systematic theology, but the ablest exposition of the views of the Quakers.

(p.) Baptists: (Eng.) John Gill, (d. 1771.) *Body of Divinity*, hyper-Calvinistic; Andrew Fuller, (d. 1815,) wrote no one treatise on theology, but smaller works and essays; followed the elder Jona. Edwards in his earlier writings, in which he is temperately old school, especially in his treatment of the doctrine of the atonement, but the younger Edwards in his later essays, in which in his treatment of the atonement he is decidedly new school; (Freewill Baptist, Amer.,) Prof. New Hampton, N. H.: *Nat. and Revealed Theol.*; Arminian.

(q.) Independents: (Eng.) George Payne, (d. 1848,) *Lecs. on Theol.*; J. Pye Smith, (d. 1851,) *First Lines of Theol.* (Amer.) Jonathan Edwards, Sr., wrote no complete treatise on systematic theology, but by several of his essays prepared the way for New Eng. (new school,) theology. Sam'l Hopkins, (d. 1813,) pupil and disciple of Edwards, *System of Theology*; theory of "disinterested benevolence." Nath'l Emmons, (d. 1840,) *Sermons*, "Exercise Scheme;" a compound of extreme old-schoolism and extreme new-schoolism. Dr. Dwight, Pres. of Yale Col., (d. 1817,) *Theology in a series of Sermons*; moderate or diluted Calvinism. Leonard Woods, Prof. And., (d. 1847,) *Lecs. on Theology*, Hopkintian and "Taste scheme." N. W. Taylor, New Haven, (d. 1858,) *Moral Government and Revealed Theology*; extreme new school. Bennet Tyler, Prof. E. Windsor, (d. 1858,) *Lecs. on Theology*; opposed to Dr. Taylor; modified and softened type of Calvinism. C. J. Finney, Prof. at Oberlin, *Lecs. on Systematic Theology*; extreme new school.

(r.) Modern Roman Catholicism; (German,) George Hermes, Prof. at Muenster and afterwards at Bonn, (d. 1831): *Christcatholische Dogmatik*; an attempt to establish the Romish doctrines by philosophical processes; his method condemned by the last and by the present Popes. J. Kuhn, *Katholische Dogmatik*; a more successful attempt to adjust the relations of faith and reason in theology. (Italian,) Cardinal Perrone, Prof. Collegium Romanum; *Prolectiones Theologicae*, 9 vols., 8vo., first published in 1835, with very many editions since; in high esteem at Rome and with all thorough going Catholics; is specially able in its exposition of the Romish theories of the church and of its sacraments.

(s.) There are also many special historical treatises, and monographs on single doctrines, to which the student of theology will do well to give attention; of such, are: Mochler, *Symbolism*, with the answers (not translated,) of Nitzsch and Baur; Neander, *Planting and Training of the Chr. Church*; Schaff, *Hist of the Apostolic Ch.*; Chr. Fried. Schmid, Prof. Tuebingen, *Biblische Theologie d. N. Test.*, and Weiss, Prof Kiel, *Lehrbuch d. bib. Theol. d. N. Test.*; Baur, *Die chr. Lehre von der Trinität*; Dorner, *Entwicklungsgeschichte d. Lehre von d. Person Christi*, or *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, trans. Clark's library; Baur, *Die chr. Lehre von d. Versöhnung*, and various treatises and essays on the Atonement by (Scotch) McLeod, Smenton, Young; (Amer.) Beman, Hodge, (*Princeton Essays*), Barnes, Park, Bushnell and others. Mueller, *Chr. Doctrine of Sin*, trans. by Urwick, and various discussions of the doctrine of sin in *Princeton Essays*, in *Amer. Bib. Repository*, by Moses Stuart, second series, vol. 2, and in a controversy between Dr. Park, *Bib. Sac.*, vols. 8 and 9 and Dr. Hodge, *Hodge's Essays*; Uhlmann, *Sinless of Jesus*, &c., &c.

On Bibliography, see Hase, *Hutterus Redivivus*. Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, §§ 17-51. Heppe, *Dogmatik des Deutsches Protest.*, Schweizer, *Die Glaubenslehre d. Eevan. ref. Kirche*. Baur, *Dogmengeschichte*. W. Gass, *Geschichte d. protest. Dogmatik*.

§ 9—*Inspiration.*

Christian Theology builds on the Christian Scriptures. Are these Scriptures trustworthy? The question divides itself into two others: Are the Scriptures genuine and authentic? Are their contents authoritative? The first of these questions is answered in "Introductions" to the Scriptures and in treatises on the canon: we here restrict ourselves to the latter. Were the writers of the Bible so controlled and guided by superhuman wisdom as to make their writings authoritative and infallible sources of religious knowledge? The answer to this question constitutes the Doctrine of Inspiration. The very diverse views of authors in discussing it may, with sufficient accuracy for our present purpose, be arranged under the three following classes.

1. Those who hold to "Plenary Inspiration;" that is, that the sacred writers were so guided by the Holy Spirit as to secure absolute accuracy in every respect to whatever they have contributed to our present canonical Scriptures. The holders of this general view have been subdivided into: (a.) The supporters of a rigid theory of verbal inspiration, commonly known as the Mechanical Theory, and including nearly all the Protestant Theologians of the 17th century,¹ many, particularly among the English and Scotch, in the 18th, and a few in the present century, among the last of whom may be mentioned Carson, Haldane, Gaussen, Count Gasparin; and (b.) Those who maintain the inspiration of all the thoughts but not of all the language of Scripture—who believe that the sacred writers were so guided and controlled by the Divine Spirit as to be allowed to fall into no error or mistake of doctrine or fact, though in all that per-

1. What were the views of the early Church Fathers is still a question in dispute. So much is clear, however, that the theory of *verbal inspiration* can be ascribed to them only by imparting to their imagery a meaning wholly foreign to their thoughts. See Lee, *Insp. of Script.*, appendix G. Westcott, *Intro. to the Study of the Gospels*, appendix B. Archbp. Manning, *Temp. Mission of the Holy Ghost*.

tained to the mode of presentation, each writer was left to the free activity and spontaneous movement of his own mind. This is known as the Dynamical Theory, and is supported by the majority of later English, Scotch and American writers.¹

The views of this class are open to the criticism of building on purely a priori conceptions of what the records of a supernatural revelation must be if inspired, assuming (*a.*) that whatever proceeds from the mind of God must come to us in an absolutely perfect form—an assumption contradicted by the analogy of the material creation and by the plainest facts of the Scriptures themselves, to say nothing of the impossibility of any standard of perfection of form that shall not be relative and thus ever changing; (*b.*) that ethical and religious truth to be authoritative must be couched in fixed and definite forms of speech, which represent precisely and exhaustively the “mind of the Spirit”—an assumption contradicted by the progressive history contained in the Bible itself, by the history of Christian doctrines, and by the consciousness of every reflecting mind that reads the Scriptures; and (*c.*) that the Holy Spirit in inspiration must have acted either upon or with the spirit of the biblical writers, according to some ascertained and definable method. The difficulties which this sharply defined theory of inspiration encounters in the Scriptures, are too often dealt with by this class of writers in a manner that fails utterly to strengthen the confidence of candid minds in the view they would support.

2. In reaction from the more rigid theories just named arose that of the “Naturalists,” of those who, regarding the literatures of all religions as alike inspired, recognize in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures a greater degree of inspiration than in any other literature, because they find in the Jews a “genius for religion” which has distinguished

1. See Doddridge, *Dissertation on Insp.* Dick, *Essay on the Insp. of the H. Scrip.* Henderson, *Divine Insp. Lec, Insp. of Scrip.* Westcott, *Introduction*, etc. Intro. ch. Wood's *Lectures*. Hannah, Bampton Lect., *The Relation bet. Divine and Human Elements in H. Scrip.* Taylor Lewis, *The Divine Human in the Scripts.* Hodge's *Outlines.*

them above every other people. This view, originated by English Deists and elaborated by German Rationalists, is that on which the Positivists of all shades of thought are now rapidly harmonizing.¹

A full discussion of all that is involved in this theory would require us to traverse the whole field of Apologetics, for it is not so much the distinctive inspiration of the Scriptures which it impugns, as it is the supernatural authority of the religion whose origin the Scriptures record. The Christian religion claims to be, in comparison with all other religions, in an exclusive sense, revealed, and affirms its records to have been made by men who were guided as no other writers ever were by an Omniscient Spirit. But if there be a common inspiration of all religious literatures, that of the Jewish differing from the others only in degree, then (*a.*) God is self contradictory, having inspired some men to assert what he has inspired others to contradict—some to teach and urge as obligatory what Christianity pronounces immoral and wicked; (*b.*) there is no ultimate standard by which to distinguish religious truth from error, and, each man's convictions and ethical principles varying with his tastes and culture, there can be no common standard of appeal, and right and wrong must be variable quantities.

3. As mediating between the two extremes appeared the advocates of "Partial Inspiration;"² or those who recognize the special and supernatural office of the Holy Spirit in the illumination and guidance of the writers, only in the records of ethical and religious truth. Very different explanations of the method of inspiration are found among the holders of this general view—some accepting the Dynamical Theory, others maintaining that the work of the Spirit in Inspiration differed from his ordinary offices

1. Thos. Carlyle, Theo. Parker, R. W. Emerson, and the radical Unitarians of our own country, also belong here.

2. What may have been the origin of this unsatisfactory phrase is uncertain, but since its use by Bishop Warburton, [*The Doctrine of Grace*, b. 1, c. 8, 7,] it has maintained its place, and serves, though imperfectly, to designate a class of writers.

in believers, not in kind, but in degree only,¹ and others still declining to theorize on the subject. Their formula is, not that the Scriptures *are* the Word of God, but that they *contain* the Word of God. They are also arranged under two sub-classes: the one maintaining that all the doctrinal teachings of Scripture are inspired, but that these teachings lie embedded in pure human composition which may be more or less accurate, according to the critical habits of the writers and their opportunities for exact information;² and the other affirming that even with the doctrinal and ethical teachings of the biblical writers are intermingled their own doctrinal misconceptions and errors.³

The views of this class of writers are objectionable as making an unwarrantably broad distinction between the Scriptures and the Word of God—as having been supported by an over readiness to recognize errors of ignorance or of prejudice on the part of the Scripture writers—as requiring each reader of the Bible to distinguish by his own “verifying faculty” between truth and error, and as resting, in fact, notwithstanding the disclaimers of some of its advocates, on theories of the Spirit’s method of operation in inspiration, a subject of which neither the Scriptures, nor consciousness give us any information whatever.

1. This theory, originated by Schleiermacher, adopted with various qualifications and modifications by his followers, was defended by Morell in his *Philosophy of Religion*, has received the sanction of Arnold, Maurice, and other English writers, and constitutes the basis of McNaught’s *Doctrine of Inspiration*.

2. Neander, *Life of Christ*, author’s “Address” to American readers, prefixed to Amer. translation, and the text; *passim*. Tholuck, Die Inspirationslehre in *der Deutschen Zeitschrift*, 1850, translation, in Kitto’s *Jour. of Sac. Lit.*, vol. 7, sec. series, and in *Noyes’ Essays*. Coleridge, *Works*, vol. 5, Amer. ed., *Inquiring Spirit*. Arnold, of Rugby, *Life and Correspondence* and essays on “The Bible” and “Interpretation of the Script.” in his *Miscellanies*. Maurice, *Theolog. Essays*. Dean Stanley, *Hist. of Jewish Ch. ; Essays on Ch. and State*; and the conservative portion of the Anglican broad-Church party.

3. German Rationalists. F. W. Newman, *Hebrew Monarchy* and *Phases of Faith*. Jowett, *Comment. on the Epistle of St. Paul*, and on “Int. of Script.” in *Essays and Reviews*. Colenso, *The Pentateuch and Bk. of Josh.* and *Comment. on Epistle to the Romans*; and extremists of the broad-Church party.

Discarding then every theory of Inspiration, and declining any attempt to state by what method the Spirit must have fulfilled the Divine will in the writing of the Scriptures, we turn at once to the Scriptures themselves. In examining these we shall find : (a.) that we must distinguish between the office of the Holy Spirit in the original communication or revelation¹ of the thoughts of God, and that Divine superintendence of the same Spirit which secured accuracy in the record of the revelations. To some of the Old Testament prophets, as well as to the New Testament apostles, the offices of the Spirit in revelation and in the guidance of their minds as authors, were vouchsafed in conjunction, and to other writers, like the unknown authors of several historical books in the Old Testament, and Mark and Luke in the New, there may have been granted as there was needed by them only the inspiration that secured the needed accuracy. (b.) Inasmuch as what was thus revealed and recorded reaches us only through the imagery and phraseology peculiar to the communicating prophet or apostle, not to say also in many cases to the intermediate penman through whom their words have been recorded, it is simply impossible for us to distinguish between the Divine and the human in any given message—between the word of God and the Scriptures through which that word has come to us ; (c.) inasmuch also as each successive writer reflects the age and country in which he wrote, and each age and writer was an advance on the preceding as well as a type of the following, and all became fully intelligible only in the light of the final and consummating period of the Apostles, it is evident that the Bible can be properly understood only as a whole, as an organic growth of many centuries, all of which are necessary to be taken into account if we would see the consistency of its parts, the one with another ; and (d.) though the writings of each age, Mosaic, Prophetic and Christian, are now requisite to the completeness and intelligibility of Scripture as a whole, yet to each age its own revelations and writings,

1. Unveiling, ἀποκάλυψις: see Westcott's *Intro. to Stud.* pp. 34–36, Amer. Ed.

conjoined with all that had preceded, must have been absolutely authoritative, because it was as complete and explicit a revelation of the Divine mind as then was possible. To deny, therefore, that the Bible is a Divine book on the ground of its real or supposed imperfections, is as unreasonable as to deny that the world is the creation of God because it is not what we should call absolutely perfect, or that Jesus Christ was Divine because while on earth he was limited in power and knowledge,¹ was a man of sorrows and finally died. The question of Inspiration is to be decided, not by imaginary tests, but like every other question of fact, by adequate evidence.

The direct evidence, that the writers of the Scriptures were divinely guided, lies within a narrow compass, and may be conveniently distributed into that which pertains to the writers of the New Testament, and that to the writers of the Old.

We will begin with the NEW TESTAMENT :

1. The Gospels claim that Christ promised Inspiration to his Apostles: John, 14: 16, 17 and 26; 15: 26, 27; 16: 13-15. Comp. Acts, 1: 8. This promise is clearly included in the authority to bind and loose: Matt., 16: 18, 19; 18: 18; John, 20: 22, 23—and seems to be necessarily implied in the promised aid of the Spirit in times of special need: Matt., 10: 19, 20; Mark, 13: 11; Luke, 12: 11, 12.

2. The New Testament claims that, in accordance with Christ's promise, the Apostles were divinely inspired in their teachings: Acts, 4: 8; 11: 12; 15: 28; 1 Pet., 1: 12. Paul makes abundant claim to Divine guidance and authority, or to the inspiration of his writings, both when vindicating his apostleship—Gal., 1: 11-24, and 2: 1-14; 1 Cor., 1: 1; 9: 1; 2 Cor., 11: 5; 12: 11—and in other connections: 1 Cor., 2: 7, 10-13; 14: 36, 37; 2 Cor., 3: 4-6; Gal., 1: 8-10 and 12; Eph., 3: 2-4; 1 Thes., 4: 2. Comp. also, Gal., 2: 6-9; 2 Pet., 3: 15, 16; Rev., 1: 10, 11.

1. John, 5: 19; Matt., 24: 36.

3. In conjunction with the claim just named it is noticeable: (*a.*) that the Apostles, while distinctly recognizing the Divine authority of the Old Testament, put themselves on a level with its authors: 2 Tim., 3: 15, 16¹; 2 Pet., 1: 19-21²; and, (*b.*) that the entire New Testament is pervaded by a spirit and tone of Divine authority which are quite unaccountable, except on the assumption that the writers regarded themselves as writing under the direction of supernatural wisdom.

If it here be said that the Apostles are incompetent witnesses for their own inspiration, since they may have been deceived or deceivers; or if it be maintained that the evidence adduced is rather for the divine origin of *what* is taught than for any divine direction in the mode of teaching, whether oral or written; observe

That the Gospels contain explicit promises of Divine attestation of the Apostles' mission—Matt., 21: 21; John, 14: 12-14—and the Acts minutely detailed accounts of miraculous fulfillments: Acts, 4: 30, 31; 5: 12, 16; 16: 18; 19: 11, 12. Comp. 2 Cor., 12: 12; 13: 3; Heb., 2: 4. To suppose these promises and recorded fulfillments to have had their origin in the dishonesty, or fanaticism, or vanity of the Apostles, or in the minds of forgers of their names, or in legendary stories, is to suppose what is to the last degree inconsistent with the transparent and healthful, moral and intellectual atmosphere everywhere pervading the New Testament; while the supposition that the teachings, thus attested as divine, should have been left to the thousand accidents of an unguided record by men whom education and the time had loaded with prejudices, would be inconsistent with the teachings themselves, even had no claim of super-

1. The reference here is unquestionably to the Old Testament Scriptures. *Θεόπνευστος* may be a predicate, but it is more natural to regard it as an attribute of the subject, and at the same time to retain *καί* and render it "also." As Meyer remarks, no one then doubted the inspiration of the Jewish Scriptures and there was no occasion for setting it forth, but there was occasion in the Apostle's mind for asserting that these inspired Scriptures were "also profitable," &c., &c.

2. 2 Pet., 3: 16 does not refer to the Old Testament. See Meyer's *Commentary*.

natural guidance been made by the writers. And this inconsistency is the more apparent from,

2. The absolute impossibility of accounting for the superhuman moral teaching and the spotlessness of character, which the New Testament writers uniformly ascribe to Christ, unless Christ was what they represent. But if he was such a Being, then it is simply inconceivable that the Apostles should have been other than what they claim.

3. The New Testament, written by various authors, each of whom maintained his own individuality of character and purpose, is yet such a unity of thought, aim and spirit, as is absolutely unaccountable, unless a Divine, superintending Spirit ruled in them all. Each writer seems to have had his own immediate end in view, and to have pursued it as independently as if he stood by himself alone. Nothing seems farther from the mind of either of them than that he was contributing to a body of literature that should afterwards rule the world.

4. The almost measureless separation of the New Testament, in respect to both substance and form of thought, from all the literatures that immediately preceded or followed its origin, and the total absence from all the thinking of the age in which the New Testament theology and morality must have originated, of anything that can account for their origin, leave us no alternative but to accept the explanation which the writers themselves supply. The historical growth of all other literatures—the organic relation of each age to the preceding—is universally recognized; but the application of this law to the New Testament shows how unaccountable was its origin, if it be denied to have been supernatural.

5. There is a simplicity and directness of statement in the New Testament—a calmness of tone, and even on the most difficult questions, a precision and comprehensiveness of expression, combined with a more than human reticence,—which lift its writings entirely above the dogmatism and pretentiousness of ordinary authors, and impart to them a

majesty and authority simply inexplicable on any other theory than that of divine aid in their origin.

6. Biblical Christianity, that is, a Christianity which appeals for its authorization and direction to the New Testament Scriptures rather than to tradition, has exhibited, amid all the social and religious revolutions through which it has passed, a recuperative and irrepressible energy which is unaccountable, unless its records, supernaturally provided and preserved, embody the mind and the will of the Supreme Being. There is no known form of criticism to which these records have not been subjected—every system of religion, philosophy and science having in turn tried its analysis on them; and yet the religion which these records contain, and the purity and existence of which rest on the records themselves, was never purer, or more aggressive, or more authoritative over the consciences of men, than it now is.

7. The person and character of Christ, and the spirit and form of his religion, do not differ more unmistakably in kind from those of all other teachers of religion and their religions, than do the apostolic writings from all other literatures:—their writings are stamped with the marks of supernatural guidance different in kind, and not in degree only, from all that can be claimed for any other writers.

Those portions of the New Testament not written by the Apostles may be regarded as of equal authority with theirs, if we remember that,

1. Inspiration in the Apostolic church was not restricted to the Apostles but bestowed on many others, possibly on all: Acts, 2: 17, 18; 11: 27, 28; 21: 9; 1 Cor., 11: 4; 14: 24-34.

2. The complete harmony of the spirit, facts and doctrines of these writings with those of the Apostles, affords a strong presumptive argument in support of an inspired authority, co-ordinate with that of the Apostles. This is true of the Epistle to the Hebrews, as well as of the Gospels of Mark and Luke.

3. This view, furthermore, is strengthened by the close intimacy which the latter half of the Acts and the Epistles

of Paul, show to have subsisted between Mark and Luke and the Apostles.¹ And with the foregoing agree,

4. The unvarying testimony and traditions of the early Church in respect to Mark and Luke ; (*a.*) of Mark, that he accompanied Peter as interpreter or secretary and composed his Gospel from the oral teachings of Peter ;² (*b.*) of Luke, that, as the intimate companion of Paul, his writings had the special assistance and sanction of that apostle.³

Nor is the claim of Divine guidance in the composition of the New Testament invalidated by any of the literary, logical, scientific or historical defects which modern criticism have made apparent. These may invalidate exact theories, but not the fact, of inspiration. What are declared to be defects according to our standard of judgment, manifestly were not defects in the eyes of either the writers of the New Testament or of the people for whom they specially wrote. A revelation which should have contradicted what was then accounted sound logic, or was held as undoubted fact, either of nature or of history, would have been a hopeless failure. In using human instruments, whether individuals or generations, for his purposes, the infinitely-wise God used them in strict accordance with the laws of their mental operations. In searching for traces of the Divine Mind in the result of the divine working, our survey must be of the work as a whole, and not of mere fragments nor of petty details. From single effects, or from series of effects in the natural world, we may discern no Creator—nothing but traces of blind force through which the Creator works ; it may be only when the harmonious whole reveals to us its unity of design, that the designing mind of the Creator speaks to us and we hear ; so in all the details and single portions of Scripture we find, so far as Inspiration¹ is concerned, nothing but evidence of

1. Col., 4 : 10, 11 ; Philem., 24 ; 2 Tim., 4 : 11.

2. Eusebius, quotation from Papias, *Eccles. Hist.*, 3, 29. Justin Martyr, *Dial. cum Tryphone*, sec. 100, p. 360, ed. Otto. Irenæus, *adv. Hæres*, 3, 1. Tertullian, *adv. Marc.*

3. Irenæus, *adv. Hæres*, 3, 1, 1 and 3, 14, 1. Eusebius' *Eccl. Hist.*, 3, 4. Tertullian, *adv. Marc.*, 4, 2. 4, 5.

the imperfect minds of the writers : but from the Bible as an organic unity speaks unmistakably the Omniscient mind that organized it.

Inspiration of the OLD TESTAMENT :

As preliminary to evidence of this, observe, (*a.*) it is absolutely certain, that the Old Testament existed for many centuries, and the Septuagint translation of it for at least a century and a half, before the coming of Christ ; (*b.*) the Old Testament writings were universally recognized by the Jews at the coming of Christ as sacred and inspired : John, 19 : 28, 29 ;² and, (*c.*) the further we advance in historical criticism, in Oriental explorations and excavations, the more the evidence accumulates of the absolute trustworthiness of the Old Testament as mere history.³

As direct evidence of its Inspiration may be mentioned :

1. The special kind of reference to the Old Testament made by Christ and the New Testament writers. If these latter were inspired, as we think they are shown to have been, then must the Old Testament have been written by inspired men ; (*a.*) Christ cited the Old Testament as undisputed authority : Matt., 5 : 17 ; 11 : 13 ; 15 : 4 ; 22 : 31 ; 25 : 54 ; Mark, 7 : 9, 10, 13 ; Luke, 24 : 25-27, 44-46 ; John, 10 : 31-36 ; (*b.*) the Apostles in all their writings uniformly appealed to it as absolutely authoritative ;⁴ (*c.*) the Apostles directly assert the Inspiration of the Old Testament : 2 Tim., 3 : 16 ; 2 Pet., 1 : 20, 21.⁵

2. The Inspiration of the Old Testament is to be inferred from the numerous, explicit and varied protestations to

1. Evidence of supernatural knowledge is here carefully to be distinguished from evidence of supernatural aid in recording what is known.

2. See the *Introductions* of Hug, Haevernich, Bleek, Keil, Davidson, Horne ; treatises on the *Canon* by Stuart, Alexander, Gausson, Westcott, as well as the word "Canon" and names of the Old Testament books, in Winer's *Biblisches Woerterbuch*, Herzog's *Encyclo.* and Smith's *Bible Dictionary*.

3. See Rawlinson's *Herodotus* and his Bampton Lectures on *Historical Evidences* ; Layard's *Nineveh* ; Hengstenberg's *Pentateuch* ; and *Egypt and the books of Moses* ; Kurtz, *The Old Covenant* ; B. B. Edwards, in the *Bib. Sac.*, vol. 2.

4. See their Epistles and the Acts, *passim*. Comp. also Mark, 1 : 2, 3, and the entire Epistle to the Hebrews.

5. See note, p. 39.

that effect on the part of the authors of a very large portion of it; and still more from—

3. The abounding prophecies and predictions—in short the prophetic nature of the whole Old Testament in its relation to Jewish and Christian history; (*a.*) express predictions of Jewish events; among many passages, see Is., 44: 28; 45: 1; Jer., 25: 12; ch. 28; 31: 16; (*b.*) numerous prophecies respecting the introduction of Christianity, and special predictions of events in the life of Christ, as of the place of his birth, circumstances of his death,¹ &c.

4. The Divine authority of the whole of the Old Testament is also to be inferred from the fact that neither Christ nor the Apostles, nor any New Testament writer ever makes any distinction between parts of it: on the contrary, Christ seems to have taken special pains by enumeration of its parts to sanction the authority of the whole: Matt., 5: 17, 18; Luke, 24: 44.

OBJECTIONS. 1. Errors: (*a.*) in cosmogony and cosmology: founded in an attempt to interpret the orientalisms of Genesis according to the exact and scientific rules of the occidental mind; (*b.*) ethnology: ethnological science has not yet invalidated the trustworthiness of the account which Genesis gives of the original distribution of the races; (*c.*) chronology: this is a difficulty for the solution of which we have not yet the definite data; (*d.*) statistics: it is always to be remembered that in rude ages and among semi-civilized peoples, like those of the early periods of the Jewish history, exaggerations and employment of round numbers always prevail. To inspire was not to educate.

2. The gross anthropomorphic and anthropopathic ideas of God. Revelation being necessarily progressive and by types, they who are inspired to make it must begin at the level of the people to whom it is made. The inspiration of the Bible began at the level of the Jews just escaped from three centuries of slavery, but ever elevating them, gave them also progressively spiritual conceptions of God.

1. See citations throughout the New Testament.

3. The Old Testament contains unintelligible and unfulfilled prophecies. The objection, on either side of it, rests on false conceptions of both the nature and design of prophecy; the former assuming that it must be a complete picture of what is foretold, and be designed to be fully understood before fulfillment, and the latter assuming, what cannot be proved, that certain events were specified which did not and cannot now take place.

4. Immoral influence: (a.) from the bad examples of great personages, like Abraham, Jacob and David: but the record never commends their misdeeds; it only reports them impartially, presenting elsewhere the moral precepts by which they and their acts are to be measured: (b.) from its low motives of temporal rewards and penalties: the objection forgets that motives must always be such as a people can appreciate, and that the motives of the Old Testament were progressively elevated and pure as the revelation progressed historically: (c.) a fiercely vindictive spirit as shown against the Canaanites and in the imprecatory Psalms: but it is here forgotten that the Old Testament is not to be judged in the light of the nineteenth century of the Christian era, but in the dim twilight of the fourteen centuries during which it was written. The fate of the Canaanites was contrary to neither the spirit nor the usage of the times, and need not now disturb us; it was not the imprecations of the Psalms that were inspired of God, but his purposes and ideas of which these were by the times the necessary vehicle; just as the adultery of David was not by divine command though the divine purposes in regard to the natural descent of Christ, were thereby accomplished.¹

1. See Hengstenberg, *Genuineness of the Pentateuch*, and his *Christology of the O. T.*

In addition to the works above referred to, see Wordsworth, *Inspiration of Holy Scripture*. Lee, *Inspiration of Scripture*. Steudel, *Inspiration of the Apostles*, *Ch. Rev.*, Jan. and April, '61. Bannerman, *Inspiration of the Scriptures*. Prof. Fitch, *Bib. Sac.*, vol. 12. Garbett, *Doctrine of the Insp. of Holy Script. Aids to Faith*, essays 7 and 9, Row, *The Nature and Extent of Divine Insp.* Curtis, *The Human Element in the Insp. of the Sac. Scripts.*

DOCTRINE OF GOD.

§ 10—*Proofs of his Existence.*

The Bible never attempts to prove the being of God, but always assumes it. Indeed the very idea of a Revelation presupposes the recognized existence of a Revealer. The Scriptures accordingly assume this existence as well-known and universally admitted.

In like manner, the earliest Christian apologists attempted no formal proof of the divine existence. Denying as they did the real existence of the heathen deities, and compelled in consequence of this, to defend themselves against the charge of atheism, it was not so much the existence of God as their recognition of it, which they were required to prove. The apologists of the first two or three centuries did little else than assume the being of God as an intuitive belief or an axiomatic truth of religion.¹ But from the close of the 4th and beginning of the 5th centuries, there began to be something like formal argumentation in support of the belief.² From the time of Anselm in the 12th century, this argumentation became more elaborate—was pursued by the Schoolmen—and in the 17th and 18th centuries became, among Protestant writers, one of the engrossing topics of both theology and philosophy.

It may here be asked, why not now imitate the writers of Scripture in assuming the existence of God, or at least the earliest apologists, in appealing to consciousness, and so dispense with all argumentation on the question. In the pulpit this doubtless is ordinarily the preferable method, but it is indispensable that we somewhere vindicate the truth of this fundamental conception of theology, because,

1. The legitimacy of the assumption and appeal has been denied. It has been alleged that the idea of God, the Crea-

1. Justin Martyr, *Apologia* II, ch. 6, *Dial. cum Try.*, c. 93. Tertullian, *Apol.* c. 17. *De Test. Animæ*, c. 2. Clement of Alex., *Strom.* 5, 12.

2. See Augustine, *de libero Arbit.*, lib. 2, c. 3-15.

tor and Ruler of the universe, is a fiction of the imagination, or, at least, the product of ungrounded fears.

2. The assumption must rest on some recognized and defensible grounds, and the appeal must be made to something in consciousness, which can and ought to be vindicated at the tribunal of reason. If the existence of God be not logically demonstrable, it may yet be so supported against atheism as that not to believe it would be extremely unreasonable.

3. Whatever may be the origin of the idea of God, or of the universal belief in his existence, whether traditional (from a primal revelation,) innate,¹ instinctive,² intuitional,³ necessary,⁴ or inferential,⁵ the belief must be capable of some kind of rational justification or it cannot be rationally retained. The origin of the idea of God is not to be confounded with the method of its justification.

4. The need of this justification is now rendered imperative by the persistent use made of both metaphysical philosophy and physical science in attempted proof of the non-existence of a personal God. The author of the Bible, if it be what it claims, must also be the author of Nature,

1. See Descartes, *Principia Philosoph.*, part 1, sects. 14 and 17. Comp. Cudworth, *Intellectual System*, Harrison's ed., containing Mosheim's notes, vol. 3, pp. 37-48; also Locke, *Human Understanding*, bk. 1, ch. 4.

2. See Renan quoted and criticised by Max Müller, *Chips*, vol. 1, pp. 845-6, Amer. ed.

3. Theodore Parker, *Discourse of Religion*, bk. 1, ch. 2.—Max Müller, *Chips*, vol. 1, pp. 848-9.

4. Calderwood, *Philosophy of the Infinite*, ch. 2, though asserting, p. 48, that "there are no arguments for the being of God sufficient to warrant the belief as it is held among men," yet declares it, p. 48, to be "a necessary belief, that is, a belief essential to our nature, so that the opposite cannot be believed, when the real problem is presented to the mind," and speaks of it indifferently as a "primary belief," an "intuitional belief," and an "innate," a "fundamental," a "necessary conviction."

5. Mc Cosh, *Intuitions of the Mind*, bk. 2, ch. 5, sec. 2, in language not specially lucid says, "the belief in God is native to man"—"yet it is not a single instinct incapable of analysis, but is the proper issue of a number of single principles, all tending to a certain point." "There are both experiential and *a priori* elements."

and his existence be reflected alike in consciousness and in the unvarying order of the physical universe.

Arguments for the Divine existence have been variously classified, though commonly distributed under the two general divisions of *a priori* and *a posteriori*. This distribution, however, has been objected to on the ground that the so called *a priori* is, in truth, *a posteriori*, since it rests on experience and is inductive from fact rather than deductive from principle.¹ Considerable diversity has always existed in the special classification of arguments;² but all legitimate evidence of the Divine existence, at present employed, would seem to be reducible to one or another of the five following well established kinds of argument:

1. The Cosmological, or argument from contingency. It has been variously stated: by Aristotle,³ that the motion manifest in the world must have required an immovable mover as its cause; by Leibnitz,⁴ and Wolff,⁵ that a universe of contingent things and dependent beings, must have the ground of its existence in a self-existent or necessary Being. With slight variations⁶ it has continued to be fre-

1. See Lord Brougham, *Discourse of Natural Theol.*, part 1, sec. 4.—*Bib. Sac.*, vol. 6, pp. 614-15.

2. Thos. Aquinas, *Summa Theol.* pars. 1, ques. 2, art. 3, employs five arguments; but the first three are only branches or forms of the cosmological, the other two being the ontological and the teleological; he makes no use of the historical or of the moral. The first Protestant theologians, both Lutheran and Reformed, assumed the existence of God as a truth planted in or impressed on the minds of all men, see Melancthon's *Loci*, locus de Deo, and Calvin's *Institutiones*, lib. 1, cap. 3; but their successors soon entered on the work of argumentation in its support, and, in due time, under the guidance of Descartes, Leibnitz, Wolff, and Kant, the five general classes of argumentation now employed, were clearly recognized.

3. *Metaphysica*, 4, 6. Comp. the first argument of Thos. Aquinas.

4. *Theol.* P. 1, § 7. Comp. Aquinas' second argument.

5. *Theol. Nat.*, P. 1, § 24.

6. See Clarke, *Demonstration of the Being of God*, prop. 3. Dr. Emmons, *Works*, vol. 2, sermon 1, states the argument thus: "This world might have had a beginning;" if so, "then it might have had a cause of its existence; if the world might have had a cause, then it must have had a cause." The argument, by the insertion of a negative, may be made equally available for the opposite conclusion.

quently and confidently employed; but in all its various forms it is virtually this: whatever exists must either be self-existent or have been caused to exist; the Cosmos is an aggregate of contingent phenomena and as such cannot be self-existent and eternal; it must therefore have been created, and its creator must be God.

The weakness of the argument has always been in its second step or its minor premise—in its inability to show beyond a doubt, that the Cosmos is not an endless, self-contained succession of phenomena, an infinite series of causes and effects. Such an infinite series of causes can be shewn to be metaphysically impossible, only by assuming the very thing to be proved, viz.: that it is not infinite—that because each member of the series is dependent, therefore the infinite whole must be dependent¹. The opponents of the argument affirm furthermore, that an infinite series of causes and the eternity of matter, are no more inconceivable² or irrational than the supposition of an infinite and eternal Being who has been the Creator of all³.

The argument has also been objected to on the ground of the untenableness of its idea of causation. Phenomenal relation, it is said, is no evidence of causal connexion. The sensationalist philosophers, maintaining that all our knowledge comes through external experience, affirm that experience gives simply the antecedence and consequence of phenomena and can prove nothing more than invariableness of sequence⁴—that the only idea we can have of cause is

1. See Gillespie, *Necessary Existence of God*, pp. 24–29.

2. F. W. Newman, *Nat. History of the Soul*, p. 36.

3. The notion of an infinite series of causes was once supposed to be overthrown by the geologic evidence of successive cataclysms—of complete extinctions and new creations—above all, of the comparatively recent and miraculous appearance of man on earth; but new geological facts and theories—the multiplying proofs of the great antiquity of man—and withal, the accumulating arguments in support of some kind of “evolution” by natural law, are so far lengthening the series of causes and effects as to make it inconceivable in extent and practically infinite.

4. See Hume's *Essays*, An Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 4. Comp. sec. 7. For Stuart Mill's modification of Hume's “invariableness of sequence,” (to obviate Reid's criticism, see *Essays on the Intel. Powers*, essay 6, ch. 6.) by the addition of “unconditionalness,” see Mill's *Logic*, bk. 3, ch. 5, § 5.

just this "invariableness" and nothing more¹. To which it is sufficient to reply that,

(a.) The idea of causation² is not derived from external experience alone, that is, by induction from observed uniformity of sequence, but originates in the mind with the first conscious exercise of volition,³ and becomes at once as clear and fixed in the mind of a child as in that of a man.

(b.) The thinking mind of a personal being, thus necessarily in possession of the idea of cause, is compelled by its own laws of thought to demand a cause for every change it witnesses, and instinctively to seek a noumenon behind every phenomenon⁴.

(c.) Causality thus becomes an axiom⁵ in thought, which, in spite of all speculation to the contrary, forces itself into recognition in all our thinking.

1. Comte not only insists on "our ignorance of anything beyond phenomena" and repudiates "every inquiry for causes and modes of production," but maintains that "force" is a mere figment of the imagination. See Comte's *Positive Philosophy*, translated and condensed by Harriet Martineau, *passim*, and especially Intro. ch. 1, and bk. 6, ch. 13.—Moleschott, Vogt and Büchner recognise the existence of force, but find in it an explanation of all phenomena; for blank atheism, see Büchner's *Kraft und Stoff*, (*Force and Matter*.)

2. On the idea of causation and theories of its origin, see Cousin, *Elements of Psychology*, ch. 4.—Sir Wm. Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, p. 532, ff. *Philosoph. Discussions*, app. 1.—Mill, *Examination of Ham.*, ch. on causation. Mansel, *Prolegomena Logica*, ch. 5.—Lowndes *Int. to Phil. of Primary Beliefs*, pt. 2, ch. 7.—Calderwood, *Phil. of the Infinite*, ch. 7.—Bowen, *Metaphysical and Ethical Science*, pt. 1, ch. 4.—McCosh, *The Intuitions of the Mind*, pt. 2, bk. 3, ch. 2, sec. 8; and his *Examination of Mill's Phil., or Defence of Fund. Truths*, ch. 13.—Brougham, *Nat. Theol.*, pt. 1, sec. 3, note 3.—*Baptist Quarterly*, April, 1869, art. by Prof. Chace.

3. Bain, *The Senses and the Intellect*, pp. 98, 267.—Jas. Martineau, *Essays Phil. and Theol.*, "Nature and God," p. 139, ff., Amer. ed.—Prof. Bowen, *Meta. and Ethical Science*, p. 87, ff.—Sir John Herschel, *Treatise on Astronomy*, beginning of ch. 7, and in the *Fortnightly Rev.*, vol. 1, p. 435, ff.

4. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, bk. 2, ch. 2, sec. 9, § 3.—McCosh, *Intuitions of the Mind*, pp. 258–262, Amer. ed.—Calderwood, *Phil. of the Infinite*, p. 363, ff.—Dr. Thomas Brown, (*On Cause and Effect*.) admitted that a belief in causation is intuitive, but maintained with Hume, that by cause we can mean nothing more than uniformity of sequence.

5. See an article by James Martineau in *Contemporary Rev.*, July '70, vol. 14. p. 636, ff.

(*d.*) The idea of cause, thus necessarily originating in the mind and controlling its thoughts, gives its possessor no rest, in his search for causes, till it brings him to the infinite personal Will, from which all force, personal and physical, has emanated¹.

Mere external observation of the facts of physical science may of itself supply no proof of a First Cause, but rational minds cannot observe their own laws of thought in the contemplation of cosmical phenomena, and not be reminded of a primal and Personal Force²; and the wider the range of phenomena observed, and the closer the inspection of the laws of thought in observing them, the more convincing the evidence of a Supreme Power and Reason lying behind and originating the universal whole. "The belief in God is primarily based on mental and not on physical phenomena³."

2. The Teleological, or Argument from Design. This is the oldest argument of all—is the most frequently used—and is the most readily appreciated by the common mind. It may be stated thus: adaptations to ends are marks of design—are evidences of purpose; the world abounds in adaptations to ends; therefore the world must have been purposed, or there is a personal Intelligence, God, by whom it has been fashioned.

The validity of the argument has been assailed on a variety of grounds⁵; formerly by a denial of its major premise

1. See Sir John Herschel, on The Origin of Force, in *Fortnightly Review*, vol. 1, p. 435-442.—Martineau, *Essays*, v. 1, 138 ff.

2. See Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*, pt. 2, c. 6, § 60.

3. Even Baden Powell, who, in his *Order of Nature*, goes beyond Hume and Mill, declaring, p. 476, that "when we have *merely an inductive* truth then we can have no other real idea of causation than 'relation' or 'concurrence,'" and p. 232, "that the supernatural can never be a matter of *science or knowledge*," is obliged to recognise a "Supreme Reason in Nature" and to admit that "it belongs properly to the function of reason to acknowledge universal reason—of intellect to recognize infinite intelligence, as pre-eminently harmonious with its own operations, by which the indications of universal mind are discovered," &c. p. 223.

4. See Sir Wm. Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, lect. 2. Comp. Mansel, *Limits of Religious Thought*, lect. 4, note 4.

5. See *British Quarterly*, art. Theism, July, 1871.

alone; but latterly by a denial of both premises. Thus Hume declared the notion of design to be derived from experience, and pronounced it illogical to reason from objects known to have been made, to the making of worlds of the origin of which we have no experimental knowledge¹; to which Reid, and the Scotch metaphysicians generally, replied, that the inference of design in a cause from marks of fitness in the effect, is a first principle or primary belief of the mind². Chalmers, at a later day, admitted the idea of design to be derived primarily from experience, yet maintained that the idea, once received, becomes, by ever widening experience and generalization, a necessary thought of the mind; and being thus a necessary thought, it just as inevitably accompanies us in our contemplation of a world, as of an object which we know from experience to have been made³.

Again, both premises have been denied on the double ground, first, that adaptedness to given ends does not prove purposed adaptation⁴, and secondly, that adaptedness to ends in nature is the simple product of natural law—new organs and new species being evoked amid the wants of new and altered conditions; according to Lamarck, by inherent “appetency;” according to Darwin, by “natural selection;” and according to Owen, by “derivation,” “through innate tendency to deviate from parental type⁵.” But any such explanation of adaptedness must either account for

1. See his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*.

2. See Reid, *Works*, Essays on the Intel. Powers, ess. 6, ch. 6; or Hamilton's ed., vol. 1, pp. 456-461.

3. *Nat. Theol.*, vol. 1, bk. 1, ch. 4.

4. Physicists, from Bacon (see his *Novum Organum*, lib. 1, aphor. 48, 96. *Advancement of Learning*, b. 2, vol. 1, p. 198, Montagu ed., Carey & Hart, 1844.) down to our own day, have quite too frequently clamored against the inquiry for final causes as unscientific and misleading. On the contrary, see Whewell, *Hist. of Induc. Sciences*, b. 17, c. 8, sec. 2, and additions to 3d edition, b. 17.

5. See *Vestiges of the Nat. Hist. of Creation*.—Darwin, *Origin of Species and Descent of Man*.—Owen, *Comparative Anatomy and Physiology*, vol. 8, ch. 40.—Wallace, *Contributions to Theory of Nat. Selection*.

it as the result of fortuitous occurrences, or as the product of a foreseeing and purposing mind ; suppositions, the first of which, even if admissible in single cases, becomes repugnant to every law of thought when applied to the complexity of our Cosmos, and the second of which alone commends itself to the rational mind. Prof. Owen, who even holds to spontaneous (nomogenous) generation, who rejects what he calls Cuvier's theory of adaptation by "miraculous creation," and finds the origin of adaptations in secondary causes, is obliged to recognise an archetypal ideal running through the animal kingdom from the lowest vertebrates up to man ; to recognise in all "a manifestation of creative power ;" and to regard secondary cause as "the servant of predetermining, intelligent Will."

The argument from design, therefore, so far from being overthrown by physical science, remains intact, as proof of the existence of a Supreme Mind, and is yet to find a useful ally in a threatened enemy. All that is essential in the argument, in either premise, addresses itself to-day as ever, to the intelligence of man, proclaiming to him the existence of that Supreme Intelligence who conceived and in his own way fashions all things³.

3. The Ontological, or Argument from the Idea of the most perfect Being. The germs of the argument are found in Augustine², but it was first wrought into definite and logical form by Anselm⁴, with whom it was substantially as follows : There is in the mind of man the idea of the most perfect Being—of a Being who, as the most perfect conceivable, must be self-existent, or have a necessary existence ; but a self-existent or necessarily existing Being, cau-

1. See *Comp. Anat. and Phys.*, vol. 3, pp. 787-88, 796, 808.

2. On this argument see the treatises on *Nat. Theology* by Derham, Wolff, Paley, Reimarus, Brougham, Chalmers, and others ; the Bridgewater treatise of Whewell on *Astronomy and Gen. Physica*.—Hugh Miller, *Foot-prints of the Creator*.—Hitchcock, *Geol. and Christianity*.—McCosh, *Divine Government*, and other works.—Tulloch, *Theism*.—Buchanan, *Modern Atheism*.—Agassiz, *On Classification*.—Wharton, *Theism and Scepticism*.—Duke of Argyle, *Reign of Law*. Ulrici, *Gott and Natur.*, absch 5.—Lotze, *Mikrokosmos*, B. 4, kap. 1. 2.

3. *De Lib. Arbitrio*, lib. 2, chh. 3-15.

4. *Proslgion*, chh. 2-4.—trans. *Bib. Sac.*, July 1851, vol. 8, p. 529, ff.

not, without contradiction, be conceived of as non-existent; the most perfect Being, therefore, is a real existence. Descartes¹, on the basis of his theory of innate ideas, reasoned that, since we have the idea of an infinitely perfect Being, and this idea could have come only from a perfect Being, such a Being must exist. Cudworth, though he criticised Descartes' mode of stating the argument, adopted it², as Stillingfleet had previously done³. It was also used by Wolff, in his *Theologia Nat.*⁴ But the most noted use of it after Anselm, was made by Samuel Clarke⁵, who began with the proposition that something must have existed from eternity; proceeded to a second, that an unchangeable and independent Being must have existed from eternity—a Being who, necessarily existing, cannot without contradiction be conceived of as non-existent; and made the whole argument finally to turn on the assumptions that eternal duration and infinite space, the non-existence of which is inconceivable without a contradiction, must be attributes of a substance or essence, which he concludes to be God. William Gillespie⁶, in a compact and ingenious argument, from the ideas of infinite extension and infinite duration, avoids what he regards as a *petitio principii* in the second propo-

1. *Meditationes de prima Philosophia*, 3, 5.

2. See Cudworth, *Intell. System*, ch. 5, sec. 1, or, for the same, with Mosheim's criticism of Cudworth, see Harrison's Eng. edit., vol. 3, pp. 41-55.

3. *Origines Sacrae*.

4. Pt. 1, c. 1, § 24, ff. comp. pt. 2, sec. 1, c. 1.

5. *A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*. The force of Clarke's argument becomes a little more apparent, if we may re-arrange its materials somewhat after the following order: Something must have existed from eternity, and thus be self-existent, *i. e.* be necessarily existent; what necessarily exists cannot without contradiction be conceived of as non-existent; the world can without contradiction be conceived of as non-existent and thus cannot be self-existent; but it is a contradiction not to suppose that something now existing has necessarily and eternally existed; eternal duration and infinite space cannot without contradiction be conceived of as not existing; but duration and space cannot be substances, and must therefore be properties or attributes of some eternal Essence or Substance, which is God.

6. *The necessary Existence of God*, first published in 1833, and a new ed., Edinburgh, 1843.

sition of Clarke's argument, but does not otherwise differ essentially from Clarke.

The fatal error of the argument has always been its assumption, amounting to a *petitio principii*, that our subjective conceptions, however necessary as modes of thought, must have a corresponding objective reality. Between the conceivable and the real, the admitted possible and the demonstrably actual, there is a chasm which no logic can bridge. Our modes and conditions of thought can never be shewn to be the adequate measure of realities or modes of Being that transcend our experience¹.

4. The Historical Argument. History has been supposed to testify in several ways to the being of God :

(a.) By shewing the universality of a belief in some kind of a Deity²—a belief which it is thought can be accounted for only by the fact of the Divine existence ;

(b.) By shewing, through the Philosophy of History, a convergence of aims and a comprehensive unity of purpose in the rise and progress of nations—a species of argument almost identical with the teleological ;

(c.) By exhibiting the uniform beneficent influence of Theism, as compared with the disastrous consequences of every instance of a practical national atheism.

The argument often adduced from the biblical histories and their recorded miracles, or from a historical Revelation as a whole, contains so manifest a *petitio principii* as to be hardly worthy of serious criticism. In truth, the historical argument, in any form, is drawn from premises so uncertain as to add but very little weight to the general evidence for the existence of God.

1. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pt. 2, div. 2, b. 2, ch. 3, sec. 4 ; or pp. 364-70, trans. Bohn.

2. See Aristotle, *de Cælo*, 1, 3.—Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum*, 1, 17, 18.—John Howe, *Living Temple*, pt. 1, ch. 2. As to the truth of this universality there has of late years been much dispute. See Moffatt's *Miss. Scenes and Labors in Southern Africa*, 1842, ch. 16. Comp. Livingstone, *Travels and Researches in Southern Africa*, ch. 8. In defence of its truth, see Calderwood, *Phil. of the Infi.*, app. B. Against it, see Sir John Lubbock, *Prehistoric Times*, 2d ed., ch. 15, pp. 564-68.

5. The Moral Argument, founded on the Moral Nature of man. The argument may take various forms, according to its premises. Thus,

(a.) The human soul spontaneously forms to itself an ideal existence higher than its own, and instinctively seeks to realize its ideal. It craves the knowledge of some one on whom it can entirely rely, and whom it can completely imitate; and this feeling is the strongest in the best men. But there is no point at which the soul in its aspirations and cravings can find its ideal and its repose, till it finds them in its all-perfect archetype, its Supreme Being, God.

(b.) Man is so constituted as necessarily to make moral distinctions. There is a power or faculty within him by which he decides and must decide, some things to be right and others to be wrong¹. The decisions of this faculty, moreover, are always according to some absolute authority or law, and its decisions are always uncompromisingly imperative. An authority—a law—thus controlling man's will, must itself be the expression of a superior, a Supreme Will². But if there be in man a moral faculty, if that faculty always represents and enforces moral law, and moral law represents authoritative will, then there is a God. "If our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart and knoweth all things." Nor is this argument invalidated by any defensible theory of the nature and functions of conscience³; for whether we ascribe its decisions to our own im-

1. Kant, in his *Metaphysik der Sitten*, represents the action of conscience as like "conducting a cause before a court;" and adds, "now that he who is the accused by his conscience should be figured to be just the same person as his judge, is an absurd representation of a tribunal; since in such an event the accuser would always lose his suit. Conscience must therefore represent to itself always some one other than itself as JUDGE, unless it is to arrive at a contradiction with itself." See trans., *Metaphysics of Ethics*, by Semple, Edinburgh, 1869, pp. 245, 246.—See also, Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, pt. 1, c. 5, § 1.

2. "Moral laws not merely presuppose the existence of a Supreme Being, but also, as themselves absolutely necessary in a different relation, demand or postulate it." *Critique of Pure Reason*, Bohn, p. 389. Comp. Müller, *Doct. of Sin*, b. 1, p. 1, c. 2, § 3.

3. The Evolutionist theory of morals, which sees in conscience only the transmitted and cumulative effect of pleasurable or painful sensations, (see Bain's

mediate intuitions, or regard them as the reflex of an external discipline, the soul, forced by an inherent necessity to make moral distinctions and to recognize an authority higher than itself, finds in consciousness an unmistakable testimony to the existence of Him who is at once the soul's author, and its ultimate standard of right and wrong.

(c.) Human society is a commingling of the virtuous and the vicious, of right and wrong, with a frequent triumph of the latter. This confusion has always been one of the world's perplexing riddles¹. But man is so endowed with an ineradicable sense of right as to demand a final enforcement of justice—as to look for the interposition, and consequently to believe in the existence of a Supreme Judge and Disposer, who shall administer justice to all men at the last².

But of all the arguments that can be adduced in proof of the existence of God, no one can be said to be a demonstration, nor can all combined suffice to convince a determined atheist. The evidence of the divine existence is not so much logical as moral; it is adjusted rather to the "eye of the soul" than to the "logical faculty;" if that eye be darkened God is not seen in any evidence he may give of his being. The validity of the evidence is not so much to be tested by syllogisms as by analysis of the moral consciousness.

If it be asked, what then is the value of these formal proofs, we answer, all depends on the use to be made of them. To one who already believes in the existence of God, they have value as corroborative evidence and correc-

The Emotion and the Will, p. 1, c. 15, and Herbert Spencer's letter to J. Stuart Mill, quoted in Bain's *Mental and Moral Science*, p. 722.—Darwin's *Descent of Man*, v. 1, p. 1, c. 3.—Sir John Lubbock. *The Origin of Civilization and Prim. Cond. of Man*, p. 270, ff.) breaks down hopelessly when tested either by facts or by critical analysis. See Mivart's *Genesis of Species*, c. 9.—R. H. Hutton's criticism of Spencer in *Macmillan's Magazine*, July, 1869, and *The Contemporary Rev.*, July, 1871

1. See the book of Job; Jeremiah, 12: 1.; Psalm, 73. Plutarch, *De Sera Numinis Vindicta*, Hackett's ed. with notes.

2. See Hase, *Hutterus Redivivus*, § 56, 2.

tive knowledge¹; to honest enquirers, though insufficient to convince when taken simply, yet unitedly they are well nigh irresistible; but in the conflict with theoretic atheism they cannot be regarded as decisive. Nor is an extended and formal use of them in the pulpit desirable. Ordinarily, the better method in religious instruction is to imitate the Scriptures and the earliest Christian fathers in assuming that God is, and in relying on the moral consciousness of every man for the evidence of his existence. So immediate is the response of the moral nature of man to the teachings of Christ, that the existence of God may be regarded as one of the axioms of his religion². But we should not, as consistently we cannot, ignore the various kinds of evidence for the Divine existence on which the several classes of arguments we have now glanced at are based. They thrust themselves on our notice and should be used to stimulate attention to the revelations which God has made of himself, and to irradiate the consciousness to which we appeal. See Pss., 8. 19. 104. Acts, 14: 17. 17: 24. Ro., 1: 19, 20. 2: 14.

§ 11—*Origin of our Conceptions of God.*

This inquiry is two-fold; relating primarily, to our forms of thought, and secondarily, to the contents of our thoughts³. The first are necessary and universal, springing from our own mental constitution and modes of being; the second are derived from the external world, from our moral nature, from the Scriptures, etc.

1. The Forms of our Conceptions. It is impossible for us to think of God at all, except under modes of thought derived from our consciousness. This is true of the most rudimen-

1. See Mansel, *Limits of Religious Thought*, lect. 2, pp. 115, 116. Am. ed.

2. See Baring Gould's *Origin and Development of Religious Beliefs*, p. 2, *Christianity*, chh. 1—8.

3. For a noticeable confounding of these, see McCosh, *Divine Government*, ch. 1, sec. 1.

tary conception of him as First Cause. We are conscious of thought, purpose, power ; of the moral emotions of justice and benevolence, of love and aversion ; and we cannot consult these sources of our knowledge of God, without giving to our ideas of him such forms of conception as ground themselves in our own activities and emotions. It is in view of these necessary forms of our thoughts of God, that we can understand,

(a.) The anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms of the Scriptures ;

(b.) Why it is that a people's character and its Deity or deities are always correlative ;

(c.) Why all the Old Testament theophanies were through angelico-human forms and modes ; why the Logos, to give us distinct and effective conceptions of the Divine nature and character, must be incarnate ; and why, becoming incarnate, he should be recognized as divine, because he was the perfect archetype of an image already existing (however obscured) in the mind of man. "In Him was Life, and the Life that was in Him was the light of men ;"

(d.) Why it is that, though our most exalted and spiritual conceptions of God can be but ennobled modifications of ourselves, any attempt at imaging him to the senses is forbidden. The mind's conceptions of God as Spirit are ever refining and becoming transfigured to the mind's eye, but images of whatever kind, wanting the essence of life and rigidly fixed, are soon exhausted, and instead of lifting the mind upward ever drag it downward.

II. The Contents of our Conceptions. These are derived partly from the world around us, partly from the world within us, partly from the Scriptures, and partly from our experience as the reflex of Scripture.

(a.) From the world around us. On every hand we observe changes or phenomena, whence we infer the existence of force or power ; from the necessary conception of a beginning of changes or phenomena, we infer creative force ; from the aggregate of phenomena, unlimited power. But from the mere existence of phenomena we can infer the

existence of nothing more than creative force. On closer inspection of phenomena we find them adjusted to one another and to given ends. Adjustment betokens an intelligent, purposing, skilful or wise, force ; and intelligence and wise purpose both necessitate and justify the conception of personality. We observe in society that the moral actions of men are followed by moral consequences, correspondent to the moral qualities of their acts, and these consequences thrust on the mind the conviction that the creative force of the universe is not only a purposing and wise intelligence, but an overruling Being whose government is at the same time just and benevolent. Ro., 1 : 18-20.

(*b.*) Correlated with the world around us is the world within us, or our moral nature. Awakened to activity, this moral nature, by its primary affirmations, makes deliverances through the moral consciousness which enter necessarily into our conceptions of God. The conviction in man is ineradicable, that if there be a God he must in some sense be that archetypal existence of which we are the antitypes. The trustworthiness of these deliverances of consciousness must, therefore, be admitted, if we are to have any foundation on which to stand in our thoughts of God. But the deliverances are not absolutely self-generated and independent; they are elicited by awakening and tuition, either from the world of nature about us, or, from that product of the supernatural world known as,

(*c.*) The Sacred Scriptures. To this source, more than to any or to all others, every unprejudiced mind must admit that mankind have been indebted for all just and worthy conceptions of God. It not only supplies a corrective and supplement to both the preceding, but from its teachings respecting God, definitely understood, there can be no appeal. Cognate with the Scriptures as a source, is,

(*d.*) Christian Experience. This experience is the practical testing of the New Testament teaching. The doctrines of the Apostles were, to a great extent, statements of their experience of the contents of the Gospels; and Christian experience with us is a like reproduction, or practical test-

ing in ourselves, of the contents of both the Gospels and the Apostolic epistles. We acquire in our experience a new sense for the apprehension of what is written; this new sense gives to its possessor, though unlearned, an advantage in the knowledge of God over the most cultivated in whom it is wanting. The knowledge of learning may be the broader; that of experience will be the profounder. But as experience, to be trustworthy, must be strictly a reflex of Scripture, this source can only be subordinate and subsidiary to that of the Bible. Finally,

(e.) A corrective and regulative principle in all our thinking of God is the idea of perfection. Whatever may be the origin of the idea, it seems to be necessarily in our possession. We cannot conceive of imperfection without the alternative conception of perfection, nor think of the finite without the correlative thought of the infinite, whether of time, space, or being¹. The idea of perfection evidently underlies the Scriptural conceptions of God, though there was a manifest growth in the clearness and accuracy of the idea itself between the periods represented in the beginning and close of our canonical books; and that idea should be the controlling one, whatever the process by which our present conceptions of God are completed².

§ 12—*Personality of God.*

If God exists, it must be either as personal or as impersonal—either as self-conscious intelligence and self-determining will, or as one and identical with the universe. His personality, as taught in Scripture, has been denied by

1. See Cousin, *Introduction to the Hist. of Philosophy*, lects. 4, 5.—Hamilton, *Phil. Discussions*, "Phil. of the Conditioned," pp. 36, 37. Harpers, 1853.—Ulrici, *Gott und Natur*, p. 612.

2. The two general sources above named will be found to correspond very nearly and respectively to the well known distribution by the older theologians into *via eminentiæ* and *via causalitatis*; the last special source, to their *via negationis*. See Hollaz, *Exam. Theol.*, de Deo.—Turretine, *Insti. Theol.*, locus 3, ques. 2, § 8.—Reinhard, *Dogmatik*, § 31, 3.—Bretschneider, *Dogmatik*, § 51.

positivists, who know no God but law, or at best but physical force; by pantheists, who recognize no God but the universe, or at best but the universal reason of man; both, though starting from antipodal points in their reasoning, reach a common conclusion in the denial of a purposing, personal God. Both are practically atheistic; the first by deficiency, the second by excess.

The idea of personality originates in our consciousness of self—of *ego* as distinguishable and distinct from all that is *non-ego*; analysis of the idea shews that its contents or elements consist of intelligence, will and conscience¹. Thus personality consists of free moral reason, of self-determining intelligence under the dominion of moral law; and free moral intelligence can only be thought of as personal². God, therefore, the infinite intelligence, self-conscious and self-determined, must be conceived of as personal—as personal will, acting with absolute freedom and absolute rectitude³. We should believe in the personality of God,

1. Because of the naturalness and necessity of the idea. It is thrust on us, as we have seen, by consciousness—by marks of design in the external world—by conscience—by the laws of our moral being; every reason for believing in a first or creative cause at all, compels us to think of that cause as personal; and unless we are so constituted as to be necessarily self-deceived, God is a personal being.

2. The conception of personality lies at the basis of any just conception that we can have of physical law⁴. The primary idea of law is that of a rule of action. As metaphorically used by physical science, the term law can properly denote only an order of sequence in physical phenomena, a

1. See Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, vol. 1, bk. 1, pt. 1, ch. 2, § 2.—Mansel, *Limits*, lect. 3: *Prolegomena Logica*, p. 123, Am. ed.—Mark Hopkins, *Lectures on Moral Science*, lect. 7.—Delitzsch, *Bib. Psychol.*, 4, § 1.—McCosh, *Intuitions*, p. 2, b. 2, sec. 5.

2. Hopkins, *The Law of Love and Love as Law*, div. 1, c. 7.

3. Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, b. 3, p. 1, c. 4, §§ 1, 2.—Calderwood, *Phil. of the Infinite*, pp. 68, 408.

4 The Duke of Argyll, *The Reign of Law*, c. 2.—Jas. Martineau's *Essays*, Amer. ed., v. 1, p. 138, ff.—Comp. Wallace, *Nat. Selection*, last ch.

rule according to which physical force, under given circumstances, always acts; but to the reason, possessed as it necessarily is of the idea of causation, the conviction is irresistibly carried that the law which controls the action of physical force is an expression of a purposing, personal intelligence.

3. Denial of the personality of God involves us in self-contradiction: (*a.*) A cause cannot be one with its effect; that is, a cause cannot be its own effect, nor an effect its own cause. But man is manifestly an effect, and if, according to development theories, pantheistic or positivistic, the only God possible is the conscious personal reason of man, then God is simply an effect; and, since he as self-developing force is the author of all things, he is an effect which is its own cause; (*b.*) Finite and infinite are opposites, which by no possibility can ever be changed the one into the other; yet, according to pantheism, the infinite is ever becoming finite, and the sum total of finites in fact constitutes the infinite.

4. Denial of the Divine personality leads inevitably to the most fearful consequences¹. Morality becomes merely prudential and utilitarian; virtue and vice are transformed from immutable opposites into stages of progress; no archetypal ideal is left to the race; no stimulus remains to the finer and nobler sentiments of the soul; the moral cement of society is dissolved and moral chaos sooner or later is the result. Moral consequences are not a decisive proof of the truth or the falsity of a doctrine; but it is incredible that that should be true, which, if acted on, would lead necessarily to the overthrow and extinction of all that is beautiful or good in the individual and in society².

1. See Burke's *Reflections on the French Rev.*—Alison's *Hist. of Europe*, v. 1, chh. 10—14.—Luthardt, *The Fundam. Truths of Christianity*, last half of lec. 3.

2. On the general subject of the Personality of God, see Saisset's *Modern Pantheism*, specially p. 2, medita. 4.—Fisher's *Essays on the Supernat. Origin of Christianity*, ess 18.—*Princeton Rev.*, Oct., '41, art. 8.—*Bib. Repos.*, July, '42, art. 9.

§ 13—*Unity of God.*

The Unity of God has been thought by some to be easily established as one of the doctrines of Natural Theology. The following considerations may be adduced in its support:

1. Though there are sufficient reasons for believing in one God, there is no evidence of the existence of more than one.

2. If there be more Gods than one, then these must either be unequal or equal: if unequal, then one must be greater than the other, and thus be the one Supreme God: if equal, then they must be equal in every conceivable perfection, and thus, since there cannot exist two infinites of the same kind, they must be one and the same Being; that is, there can be but one God.¹

3. There is manifest unity of design in the constitution of the world: the laws of each kingdom, whether mineral, vegetable or animal, are not only harmonious in themselves, but constitute in their totality an independent, harmonious whole. The more minute and extended our research into the departments of Nature, the more convincing the evidence of a unity of aim in them all, and, consequently, of a unity in the origin of all.

4. A unity of ends shews itself in the moral government of God—a unity so clearly marked and complete as to suggest inevitably a unity of will that originated and still directs the whole. These ends, indefinitely numerous and complex, are found on examination to be successively subordinate to an ever ascending and ever diminishing number of higher ends, and to indicate a unity of purpose which suggests to rational minds the existence of a single, personal Will.

5. The laws of the moral nature of every individual man are in strict harmony with those of every other man, as well as with those of society and of the race; and the conscience of

1. See Turretine, locus 3, ques. 3.—Clarke, *Demonstration*, prop. 7.—Gillespie, *Necessary existn. of God*, pt. 1, prop. 4: pt. 2, prop. 4; pt. 3, props. 1, 2.

every man responds to the demands of each and all of these laws as to the will of the one Creator of all¹.

6. Modern science intimates very clearly that every species of physical force is resolvable into one common force—that all are but modes of one and the same force²—and that all force, in our last conception of it, must be Personal Force³—thereby pointing also to the unity of the Creator.

DUALISM. The Manichæan⁴ notion of an eternal principle of evil is contradicted,

(a.) By the nature of evil. Evil has no independent existence, but is simply a qualification or perversion of the good. Moral evil being unnatural, *i. e.* opposed to the soul, exists only as a moral disease, a derangement or distortion, of the soul. Evil as absolute is inconceivable.

2. By the spirit of evil. Moral evil is always divided against itself, and never as pure evil harmonizes or even confederates. Mixed evil may confederate when the lingering relic of good within, or the pressure of good without, is strong enough to constrain it⁵.

3. By the testimony of conscience. When good and evil are alike pictured to the conscience, the first is instinctively and invariably recognized as authoritative over the second.

But the evidence from natural religion for the Divine unity has never been decisive enough to preclude the neces-

1. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Transcend. doct. of method, ch. 2, sec. 2, Bohn, p. 498.—Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, pt. 1, c. 5, § 1; pt. 2, c. 10 § 1.

2. See Grove, *The Correlation of Physical Forces*.—Carpenter, *On the Correlation of the Physical and the Vital Forces*.

3. Wallace, *On Natural Selection*, c. 10.—Jas. Martineau, *Essays*, "Nature and God," pp. 139—141.

4. As to the disputed question respecting Persian or Zoroastrian dualism, whether Zoroaster was theologically, or only philosophically, a dualist—see Haug's *Essays on the Language, Writings and Religion of the Parsees*; and *Lecture on an original speech of Zoroaster*. Comp. Max Müller, *Chips*, vol. 1, ea. 6, and es. 8, II.

5. See Müller, *Doctrines of Sin*, vol. 1, bk. 2, ch. 5, § 2.

sity of a reiterated proclamation of it by the inspired writers of Scripture. The possibility of demonstrating the existence of one, personal, Supreme Being from any light of Nature, is more than doubtful. There were frequent lapses of the Jewish people into idolatry and polytheism, until after the Babylonian captivity, when the doctrine of the Divine unity was instilled into their minds by the stated reading of the Scriptures on the Sabbath; and the unaided Gentile mind was ever oscillating between the pantheism of the philosophers¹ and the polytheism of the multitude, Rom., 1 : 19-25. Acts, 17 : 23. It is extremely doubtful if the Greek and Roman classical writers had any definite conceptions of the Divine unity². This truth, which to enlightened minds is now apparently so self-evident, has received recognition among men only after those reiterated declarations and that enforcement by a most protracted and painful discipline, of which the Holy Scriptures contain the details.

The Scriptural declarations of the unity of God are both numerous and various : Deut., 4 : 35, 39. 6 : 4. 32 : 39. Is., 43 : 10, 11. 44 : 6. 45 : 5, 6, 14. 46 : 9. John, 17 : 3. Ro., 3 : 29, 30. 1 Cor., 8 : 4-6. Gal., 3 : 20. Eph., 4 : 6. 1 Tim., 1 : 17 ; 2 : 5.

1. The special question of the monotheism of the Pentateuch as involved in the use of the plural Elohim, and the interchangeable use of Elohim and Jehovah, belongs to Exegesis and to special Introductions. See Max Müller on "henotheism" by intuition and "monotheism" by revelation, *Chips, Semitic Monotheism*, pp. 348, 369, Am. ed.

2. In reading some of the histories of Ancient Philosophy, such as that of Ritter, —see vols. 2, 3, trans. by Morrison; comp. Archer Butler, *Lectures*, 2d series, lecs. 5 and 6,—one is led to conclude that Plato and Aristotle held clearly and firmly to the Unity of God; but it is an open question just how much they, or any other Greek or Latin classical writers, meant by the singular *θεός* and *deus*. The Christian fathers and Cudworth,—See *Intellectual System*, bk. 1, ch. 4, Harrison's ed. vol. 2, p. 65-105,—believed the use of the singular was an instinctive recognition of the One Supreme Being; others believe they used the singular to denote a *genus divinum*, just as *homo* denotes a *genus humanum*, —See DeGroot, *Insti. Theologia nat.*, 1845, p. 62. *Comp. Bib. Sac.*, vol. 13, pp. 666-7.

§ 14—*The Attributes of God and his Essential Being.*

The attributes of God are our modes of conceiving of him ; *modi concipiendi existentiam divinam*¹. The old dispute between the Nominalists and the Realists,² and afterwards between the Socinians and Trinitarians, whether the attributes were to be distinguished from the essence of God *realiter*, (*essentialiter*), as the Socinians affirmed, or only *virtualiter*, (*formaliter*), as the Trinitarians affirmed,³ has, in our day, under the Hamiltonian principle of the relativity of human knowledge, re-appeared in a modified and advanced form, and, conjoined with the question of the trustworthiness of our knowledge of God, has touched vital points in the doctrine of God. Rightly to understand this twofold controversy, and clearly to apprehend the truth that underlies it, we must remember,

1. That the origin of our conceptions—the attributes, of God, is very nearly identical with the origin of thought itself. All thought, or conception, originates in a perceived distinction between ourselves and the objects of our thought. From a conception of our relation to space, time and the external world spring our conceptions of the qualities or attributes of ourselves and of others. These conceptions, divested of their finiteness, we, by necessity of thought, ascribe to God when assured of his existence, and call them his attributes.

2. The process through which we satisfy ourselves of the existence of God, and ascertain his attributes—arrive at our conceptions of him—is the same in kind, if not in directness, with that by which we satisfy ourselves of our own exist-

1. *Conceptus essentiae divinæ inadequati*—see Quenstedt, *Theologia*, c. 8, sec. 1, thesis 3,—Comp. Turretine, locus 3, ques. 5. It is noteworthy that the word “*proprietas*,” used by Turretine and other Calvinist writers, to designate the divine attributes, is restricted by Lutherans to a designation of the relations of the three persons of the Trinity. See Bretschneider's *Dogmatik*, § 51

2. Petavius, *De dogmat. Theol.*, v. 1, chh. 8—18.

3. See Turretine, liber 3, questio 5, and Lutheran theologians quoted in Hase's *Hutterus Redivivus*. Comp. Bretschneider, *System. Entwickel.*, p. 582.

ence, or of that of any other person. And if the testimony of consciousness respecting the real nature of ourselves or of others, known to us only in relations, be trustworthy, there is no good reason why the knowledge of an infinite Being derived in like manner from relations, should be set aside; especially since,

3. The very relations through which an infinite Being may notify us of his existence, must necessarily report to us something of the nature of his being. One cannot know that God is, and not, by the very process of knowing, to some extent ascertain what kind of a being he is. Within every conception we may have of him must be concentrated a meaning which necessarily carries us behind and beyond the relations, to the Being related. Thus, for instance, spirituality may be predicated of God as an attribute; but when the Bible, on the ground of this conception or attribute assures us that "God is spirit," the mind is carried beyond mere relation, to some apprehension, however feeble, of essential being.¹ So also when we are told that "God is love," the mind is carried beyond the mere conception of love as relative, to the idea of love as absolute, or to the simple essence of God. This notion of essence must be exceedingly dim and ill defined. But we can conceive of the Supreme Being as originating the relations through which he becomes knowable to us, and we can conceive of him as removing those relations, himself remaining unconditioned by their presence or absence. In other words, we can conceive of God as centering in his essence not only the potentiality but the essentiality of all that we attribute to him.

4. In the Being to whom we are thus carried back, we necessarily believe. On the necessity of this belief special

1. The question of the relation of the substance or essence of matter to its qualities, differs from that of the relation of attributes to the essence of a personal being, by just so much as matter differs from spirit, and the intelligent volitional power of a personal being from the mechanical force of matter. We may know equally well, by one concrete act of the mind, both the substance and the qualities of matter, which are inseparable, but we apprehend being only by its modes or relations which are variable and totally distinct from itself.

stress is laid by the advocates of the relativity of our knowledge of God. But our belief in any being, God included, so far from being contrary to, must be connate, if not commensurate, with our knowledge of him. An unthinkable Being must also be an unbelievable one. He may not be comprehensible, but to be believed in, must in some clear and positive sense be knowable.

5. On the other hand, the essence of God is not to be regarded as identical with any one, or with all, of his attributes, but as the common subject of them all. Attributes do not represent distinguishable properties in the Divine Essence. Not only is all our knowledge of God relational in its origin, but God is cogitable to us only as he is cognizable to us, and he is cognizable to us only as related. Whatever our notion of essence, both our terminology and our laws of thought hold us rigidly to the relations in which alone he is conceivable to us. To suppose that we treat of essence, therefore, when we treat of attributes, is to confound God with our conceptions of him. An "absolute attribute"¹ is a contradiction of terms, and the epithet "essential"², as applied to one class of attributes to distinguish them from another, is unmeaning.

6. Any argumentation which will show that our conceptions of God can only be relatively true to us, and not positively true in themselves, will equally avail to overthrow the trustworthiness of all our knowledge, and can end only in universal scepticism. Our conceptions are inadequate but not therefore untrue; they are limited, because we are finite, but not therefore untrustworthy or false.³

1. See DeWette, *Dogmatik*, §34.

2. Breckinridge, *God Objectively Considered*, c. 19. We may attempt by a few comprehensive attributes to state our fundamental conceptions of God, but to attempt by these, as distinguishable from other attributes, to describe the essence of God, (see. Nitzsch *Chr. Lehre*, §§61-64.) is to make a distinction without pointing out a difference.

3. On this whole question, see Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 8, ch. 6, and lib. 11, ch. 10.—Thos. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, dis. 8, ques. 12.—Gerhard, *Loci*, tom. I.—Quenstedt, *Theologia*, ch. 8, secs. 2 and 3.—Schleiermacher, *Geschichte der Phil.*, p. 166.—Turretine, *Theologia*, locus 3, ques. 5.—Limborch,

§ 15.—*Attributes.*

Various classifications of these have been adopted¹; but that would seem to be the most natural and accurate which proceeds according to some order in the relations through which the attributes are presented to us²; and this order would seem to be determined by the chronological necessities of thought. Thus there must have been space before the universe could have existed; and time, which is but a measurement of duration rendered possible by succession, must have begun with the very beginning of the phenomenal universe—space and time thus suggesting the attributes of Immensity and Eternity. Then came the successive adjustments of the Cosmos in preparation for the appearance of man, or those displays of divine resources whence the attributes of the infinite Architect; last of all came man, or those revelations of moral law whence the attributes of the moral Ruler. We begin with :

I. God's relation to space, or his attribute of IMMENSITY. By this is meant the illimitableness of his personal being. God cannot be conceived as occupying space, and if not spatial, then is he illimitable in his personal presence, or has the attribute of Immensity. Space does not contain God, but he, as the all-originating, all-sustaining cause, is

Theologia, lib. 2, cap. 2, Twisten, *Dogmatik*, beginning of 2d thelle. Nitzsch, *Chr. Lehre*, §§81-86.—Breckinridge, *Knowledge of God Objectively Considered*, ch. 17.—Dick, *Theology*, vol. 1, p. 157.—Sir Wm. Hamilton, *Phil. Discussions*, Phil. of the unconditioned.—Mansel, *Limits of Relig. Thought*.—H. Spencer, *First Principles*, pt. 1.—Calderwood, *Philos. of the Infinite*.—Lowndes, *Phil. of Primary Beliefs*. Also, various criticisms of Hamilton and Mansel in the *Quarterlies*, both Foreign and American, during the years '58, '59 and '60.

1. For Lutherans, see Hase, *Hutterus Redivivus* § 80; the classifications of the older Reformed theologians were not dissimilar to those of the Lutherans—Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, classifies as “metaphysical (ontological), and ethical.” For one of the most pretentious, and at the same time complex and unscientific, of classifications, see Breckinridge, *The Knowledge of God Objectively Considered*, c. 17.

2. Comp. Nitzsch *Chr. Lehre*, §§ 65-74.

its author.¹ The Scriptures, which abound in descriptions of Divine Omnipresence² in the Universe, do not distinctly assert, though they plainly imply, according to Jewish modes of thought, the divine Immensity in space. Job, 11: 7-9. 1 K., 8: 27.

II. Relation of God to time, or his attribute of ETERNITY. By this is meant that God neither began, nor can cease, to be. The attribute has been justly defined as *duratio principio et fine carens*.³ Starting with the facts of orderly succession, whence the idea of time, the mind, by the act of regression, travels backward through cycles of the past to the beginning of phenomenal changes, and then, by the opposite act of progression, travels onward through anticipated cycles of the future, finding at the last stage of thought, in either direction, an existing Godhead, which, by the necessity of thought, it pronounces eternal: Ro. 1: 20.⁴ By some such act of regression and progression the writers of Scripture seem to have apprehended and to set forth the eternity of the being of God: Pss., 90: 2; 93: 2; 102: 25-27. Comp. Rev., 1: 8; 4: 8. See also the designation of God as the "King eternal," or King of the ages: 1 Tim., 1: 17. In a similar manner, by contrasting God with the perishable generations of men, he is styled "incorruptible" and "immortal:" Ro., 1: 23; 1 Tim., 1: 17; 6: 16.

Eternity is necessarily one of the Divine attributes. God must either have a necessary and independent existence, or a

1. "Deus ipsius spatii auctor est." Hase, *Hutterus*, p. 138; comp. Nitzsch, *Chr. Lehre*, §69, and Schleiermacher, quoted by Nitzsch.—Sir I. Newton says, Deus durat semper et adest ubique, et existendo semper et ubique durationem et spatium constituit.

2. Immensity is not synonymous with omnipresence, though often confounded with it; the former expresses the immeasurableness of the Divine Essence in space, and the latter the personal presence of God in all parts of the universe.

3. See Quenstedt, Limborch and others.

4. The "power and Godhead" spoken of in this passage are "seen" to be "eternal," not from the creation as such, but from the necessity of thought; as creative power must have existed before the creation, so it must have existed before the beginning of time, and thus be eternal. Comp. also Gen., 1: 1, and John, 1: 1.

dependent and derived existence ; if derived, then the derivation must have been either from himself, which is inconceivable, or from another, which is inconsistent with Godhead : but if he has a necessary existence, then an eternal, since a necessary and eternal existence are identical thoughts.

IMMUTABILITY is commonly treated of as an attribute distinguishable from Eternity, and is usually predicated of the modes of the Divine existence—of the nature and purposes of God, eternity being restrictedly applied to the Divine existence, or the being of God as such ; but an eternity of being is inconceivable, which does not, by the very conditions of its independence of time and change, also necessitate the conception of eternity of nature and purpose ; in other words, the proper attribute of Eternity, in the comprehensive Scripture sense of it, includes the more limited conception of Immutability. See James, 1: 17.

But though eternity, inclusive of immutability, be thus predicable of God, we are not thereby necessitated to conceive of him as impassive and indifferent to change in us ; this would rob him of his Fatherhood and his sympathy with his creatures, as well as subvert the foundations of morality by making him indifferent to right and wrong among men. Our safe-guard is in the Scripture method of distinguishing between the Divine mode of being and our own: Ps., 90: 4 ; 2 Pet., 3: 8.

III. The attributes of God derived from his relation to the material universe. The Universe or Cosmos, with the necessary idea of causation in mind, was doubtless the source of the conceptions of the power, knowledge, wisdom, presence, &c., of God, and it is from the study of this source that, under the guidance of the Scriptures, these conceptions can be completed and justified.

In the enumeration of the attributes of this class, we might either begin with some one from which the others should be logically deduced, in which case we should select Omnipresence ; or we might adopt a supposed natural and chronological order of observation, in which case we should begin with Omnipotence. The first conception naturally

suggested by the Cosmos to the mind of a beholder, would seem to be that of power, the second, the two-fold one of knowledge and wisdom; then, on reflection, that of omnipresence, and so on, from the more to the less apparent. We shall begin with,

1. The OMNIPOTENCE of God. By this is meant the power of God to do absolutely all things not contrary to himself¹.

The conception of Omnipotence arises from the conception of the Universe as the creation of God; if all power in the Universe is dependent on his creative will for its existence, it is impossible to conceive of any limit to his power except that laid on it by his own will. But this is only negative proof; absolute Omnipotence is not logically demonstrable, though readily enough recognized as a just conception of the infinite God, when propounded on the authority of a positive revelation.

The metaphysical conception of absolute Omnipotence is only indirectly given in the Scriptures. God as the originator of the universe, is its absolute controller, and to the biblical writers this control is a supremacy of power than which nothing greater is conceivable. As historically taught in the Scriptures, it seems to have been progressively apprehended. With Abraham, God was Almighty or all-sufficient to fulfill his promises, Gen., 17: 1; 18: 14.; with the Jews, he was the Lord whose "mighty power" and "right hand" had delivered them, Deut., 4: 37; Ex., 15: 6; with the Prophets, "the Almighty," with whom "nothing was too hard:" Jer., 32: 17, 27; with the New Testament writers, the One to whom "nothing is impossible," Matt., 19: 26; Luke, 18: 27; 1: 37; Phil., 3: 21.

2. OMNISCIENCE. All possibilities and all actualities—all that has been, that is to be, or that might have been—must be alike known to God. If he be the Creator of all things, then no event can spring from any force, physical or personal, which is unknowable to him; for the creative act

1. The question whether omnipotence includes the power of working opposites—of creating and not creating at the same instant—is a mere juggle of words, representing nothing real or conceivable.

must have embodied a definite creative purpose, and that purpose must have been commensurate with all the capabilities of the powers created. To suppose the contrary, is to suppose God to act blindly, or to exercise a power the consequences of which he does not understand ; neither of which is consistent with any intelligible notion of a Supreme Being.

If the knowledge of God be infinite, then it is not contingent, but absolute,—is not inferential or deductive, but is eternal ; is not experimental or relative, but is essential, or pertains to the essence of beings and things.

That the knowledge of God is thus infinite in degree and perfect in kind, is clearly taught in the Scriptures, both by what is implied in their idea of God, and by what is distinctly asserted. As Judge of the whole earth, (Gen., 18 : 25,) he knows all the past acts of his creatures, and whatever may have qualified their innocence or guilt, (1 Sam., 2 : 3) ; as Ruler, whose “kingdom ruleth over all,” he sees the end from the beginning, directing all with plan and purpose unchanging. The same is implied in the vast scheme of prophecy that runs like an unbroken web throughout, not only the fourteen centuries of biblical history, but the centuries of all time. The Scriptures directly assert Omniscience : Pss., 94 : 11 ; 139 : 1-6 ; Ez., 11 : 5 ; Luke, 16 : 15 ; Heb., 4 : 13 ; 1 John, 3 : 20.

Nor is the attribute of Omniscience properly open to the objection of inconsistency with the free agency, and thus with the accountability, of man. The absolute certainty of events, which is all that Omniscience determines respecting them, is not identical with their necessitation¹. A finite understanding can predicate absolute certainty of nothing which is not seen to be necessary ; to the Omniscient Mind, in which there is no succession, no events are contingent ; causes with their conditions and effects, are alike and always known as indissolubly one. His knowledge and purposes both being eternal, one cannot be conceived as the ground of the other, nor can either be predicated, to the exclusion of

1. See Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, lib. 2, cap. 4.—Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, b. 3, p. 2, c. 2.

the other, as the cause of things,¹ but, correlative and co-eternal, they must be co-equal quantities in thought.

Conjoined with the infinite knowledge of God is his infinite skill in the use of it,² or his infinite WISDOM. This attribute reveals itself to us primarily and literally in the constitution and course of nature, and metaphorically in the Divine dealings with man in Christianity. The Scriptures dwell largely on it in both Testaments; chiefly on the first or literal sense in the Old Testament: Ps., 104: 24; Prov., 8: 22-31; Jer., 10: 12; and on the metaphorical in the New: 1 Cor., 2: 7; Eph., 3: 10; Col., 2: 3; perhaps both senses are included in Rom. 16: 27.

3. OMNIPRESENCE. By this is meant the presence of God in all parts of the universe. Theologians have not been unanimous in their explanations of the mode of this presence. With Reinhard, Morus and Knapp, omnipresence is not the presence of the Divine personality in all placés, but the presence of the Divine purpose, through the omniscient use of infinite power³—Omnipresence thus being a mere compound of Omnipotence and Omniscience. But it is an essential, personal, and not a figurative presence, of which the Scriptures speak—a presence which we can neither elude nor shut out from our own inmost being. Ps., 139: 7; Jer., 23; 24; Acts, 17: 27, 28.

1. That conception of God in theology or philosophy which makes his knowledge, rather than his purpose, the ground of his action, solves no problem; whether the origin of evil or the relation of human freedom to Divine Sovereignty. Thos. Aquinas, who asserts, *Summa Theologica*, sent. 1, dist. 88, ques. 1, art. 1, *Scientia Dei est causa rerum*, is obliged to add, *non omnium scitorum a Deo, causa est Deus; quia, mala quæ sunt a Deo scita, non sunt ab ipso.*—Turretine, *Institutio Theol.*, locus 3, ques. 12, (18,) says, *Præcipuum fundamentum scientiæ divinæ circa futura contingentia—est—DECRETUM solum.* Milton wisely says of our first parents, *Paradise Lost*, b. 3:

“Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault,
Which had no less proved certain unforeknown.”

2. For a good statement of the distinction between wisdom and knowledge, see Cowper's *Task*, bk. 6, near the beginning.

3. Reinhard, *Dogmatik*, § 86, defines omnipresence as, *illud attributum Dei, quo ubique et semper immediate efficax esse potest.* Comp. Storr & Flatt, *Bib. Theol.*, § 89, illus. 11.—Doederlein, *Institutio Theol.*, § 98.

The interpretation, furthermore, of the Scripture representations of God's special presence with his people, (Gen., 17: 1. Is., 43: 2; Eph., 4: 6; Jas., 4: 8; Rev., 3: 20,) as expressive of mere influence of truth or moral sympathy, is too frigid and unnatural to be true. God, who is alike personally present in all parts of his dominions, makes that presence, by some method to us inexplicable, specially appreciable to those who seek him.

4. SPIRITUALITY. This attribute, by which is meant that God is a Spirit, is suggested, like Omnipresence, only on reflection. If the physical universe justify our conceptions of the power, knowledge, and presence of God, the question, whether he be material or spiritual, is also at once suggested. This question, thrust on us by the very process through which we justify our belief in the Divine existence, has been in part anticipated in treating of the Personality of God, and it only remains for us at this point, simply to assure ourselves, on the authority of Scripture, that God, everywhere present in the Cosmos, is a Spirit totally distinct from matter, independent of it, and the almighty Creator and Controller of it.

IV. Attributes discoverable from the relations of God to moral beings, commonly known as his Moral Attributes. These have been variously subdivided and named, and variously arranged in the order of treatment. Almost every attribute of the class has been selected by one or another, as his ground conception. As a consequence or a cause of this, we have the most diverse systems of theology. In later years, theologians in this country have been ranging themselves under one of two classes: those who make the JUSTICE of God¹ to be their fundamental moral conception of him, and those who give this position to BENEVOLENCE². But

1. Hodge, *Essays*, ess. 4 and 8.—Princeton, *Essays*, 2d series, ess. 4, 6, 7.—Breckinridge, *Knowledge of God*.—Shedd's *Discourses and Essays*, The Doct. of Atonement.—Hodges' *Outlines*.

2. Beman and Barnes, *On the Atonement*.—Taylor, *Moral Government*.—Finney's *Lects. on System. Theol.*—Prof. Park, *The Atonement*.—Bushnell, *Vicarious Sacrifice*.

that HOLINESS should be our fundamental conception and consequently furnish our point of departure, would seem to be evident, from observing that,

1. It is of the Holiness of God that conscience first reminds us, after we have once become assured of his existence and of his relations to us. Conscience approves or condemns us, according to our supposed worthiness or unworthiness of him whose creatures and children we are, whose image we bear, and to whom, as the supremely best Being, our allegiance is due. Even the conscience of a heathen upbraids him, not because he is in danger of punishment, but because of his unlikeness to, or antagonism with, the ideal character of his deity.

2. Holiness is that attribute of himself which, above all others, God in the Bible seems desirous to give an effective conviction of to men. He styles himself pre-eminently, "the holy one;" he enforces his moral precepts to Moses with the declaration, "for I the Lord your God am holy," Lev., 19: 2; 20: 25, 26; 22: 31-33; and the reason assigned in the New Testament for our being holy, is the holiness of God, 1 Pet., 1: 15, 16. Angelic declarations of the Divine holiness accompany special revelations, Is., 6: 3; Rev., 15: 4; and an implied or express declaration of it runs throughout the Bible.

3. Holiness is that conception which underlies, pervades and gives significance to, the whole ritualistic system of Judaism¹, as well as gives meaning, consistency and completeness, to the redemptive work of Christ. Even the assurance that, "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son," &c., Joh., 3: 16, rests on the idea of the Divine holiness as an immutable basis, which made possible and requisite that stupendous exhibition of the Divine benevolence.

1. It is the underlying idea of sacrifice in the Scriptures, that he who offers it is unclean—unholy in the sight of him to whom it is offered, and needs by it to be cleansed or made holy. See Kurtz, *The Sacrificial Worship of the Old Testament*.

4. The one all-inclusive aim of biblical Christianity, is the holiness, (Eph., 4: 24, Heb., 12: 14;)—the righteousness, (Ro., 9: 10,)—the godliness, (Ti., 1: 1,)—the salvation¹, (1 Pet., 1: 9,) of man; but personal holiness will be the one absorbing and attainable aim of man, only as he recognizes it to be the one pre-eminent attribute of God. Tributary to this recognition, the whole Jewish economy gives prominence to the Divine Holiness; and every agency and instrument employed in Christianity is denominated holy: the temple is holy, the Scriptures are holy, faith is most holy, Jesus, the Saviour, is the Holy One and the Just, and the renewing Spirit, through whom all blessings are bestowed and all the saved are sanctified and made holy, is pre-eminently the Holy Spirit.

5. Every other attribute of this class, when analyzed, brings us more or less directly to Holiness as its underlying thought. The last analysis of justice, mercy, benevolence, blessedness, veracity, glory, majesty, is holiness: Ps., 47: 8; Amos, 4: 2; Ps., 89: 35; Ex., 15: 11. The true explanation of all God's revelations to men, be they punitive, complacential or merely apocalyptic, is in the spontaneous attraction or repulsion between the holy nature of God and the holy or unholy natures of men.

6. From the infinite Holiness of God every other moral attribute may be synthetized or logically deduced; that genetic conception being once clearly established, every other of the class necessarily follows.

We will begin with,

1. The HOLINESS of God. Theologians have not been uniform in their explanation of what is to be understood by this attribute. The earliest Protestant writers, both Lutheran and Reformed, did not treat of it as an attribute²;

1. The ground idea of all these terms is essentially one, the difference between them being formal, rather than real.

2. Protestantism originated in a dispute with Romanism over the material principle of justification; the poles of its thought were righteousness and grace; the holy fatherhood of God, John, 17: 11, with its earliest authors, failed of due recognition.

the Lutherans being the first to recognize it as such,¹ and the great majority of the Reformed either identifying it with justice in its comprehensive sense,² or making it to be the sum of all the Divine perfections.³

But Holiness is just as distinctively and separately predicated of God in the Scriptures as is his power, or his knowledge, or his justice, or any other attribute; and there is no more reason why its meaning should be made to usurp that of all others of its class, than there is why any other single attribute should be regarded as a composite of many, or of all others. Its relative importance in Scripture, as compared with others, is apparent enough, but relative importance is one thing, and relative meaning is another.

Holiness in man, furthermore, for which all revealed religion has been given him, cannot be different in kind from

1. Quenstedt, *Theologia*, and Baier, *Compendium Theo. pos.* Comp. Buddeus, lib. 2, cap. 1, § 36.

2. Heidegger, *Medulla Theol.*, locus 3, § 52: Sanctitas, justitia vel bonitas, per quam in omnibus dictis et factis a seipso, immutabili essentia necessitate sic sanctus, justus et bonus est, ut nihil divinitate et veritate sua indignum dicat vel faciat.—Burmman, *Synopsis Theol.*, lib. 1, cap. 15: Justissimæ voluntatis Dei beneplacitum sanctitas ejus est; quæ in eo consistit, quod actiones ipsius exacte cum ejus voluntate conveniunt.—VanMastricht, *Theol.*, lib. 2, cap. 19, § 6, defines it as bonitas moralis, excellentia moralis, but so explains as to make God in omnibus suis cogitatis, dictis et factis, exacte conformis isti sanctitati, quam in lege sua expressit.—Limborch, *Theologia*, lib. 2, cap. 12: Sanctitas est rectitudo seu puritas naturæ divinae, qua Deus nihil nisi quod rectum ac bonum est vult ac facit.—Turretine, *Theologia*, locus 3, ques. 9: Justitia universalis, per quam Deus in se justissimus est et sanctissimus.

3. Pictet, *Theologia*, lib. 2, cap. 8: Justitia designat Sanctissimum divinarum Virtutum Complexum, sicque confunditur cum sanctitate Dei.—Stapfer, *Institu. Theol.*, vol. 1, cap. 3, § 548: Quicquid perfectionis cogitari potest complectitur, et quidem perfectiones solas, exclusa omni imperfectione, et hoc sensu Deus vocatur sanctus; § 551: Sanctitas Dei versetur in complexu omnium perfectionum. Comp. Wytttenbach, *Tentamen Theol.* locus 3, §§ 332, 333;—Ridgely, *Body of Div.*, ques. 7, § 16,—Dick, *Lects.*, lec. 27,—Hodge, *Outlines*, attrib. Holiness.

Zachariæ, in his *Biblische Theol.*, § 240, defines the Holiness of God as "his venerableness"—thus confounding an effect with its cause; Storr and Flatt, *Bib. Theol.*, as "incomparableness"—identifying it with the infiniteness of all the Divine perfections; Knapp, *Chr. Theol.*, bk. 1, pt. 1, sec. 29, as "moral perfection"—an indefiniteness of idea which admits of his declaring justice and holiness to be "one and the same thing."

the holiness of God: Lev. 11: 44; 1 Pet., 1: 15, 16; but it is self-evident that holiness in man is not in proportion to the other perfections of his being—to his power, his knowledge, his wisdom, though it is in proportion to his rectitude of will—and cannot therefore be the sum of all his perfections.

Appealing to Scripture, it becomes at once apparent, from the use of the word *quadhosh*, in the Old Testament, Lev., 19: 2; Is., 62: 12, and *ἀγιος*, Eph., 1: 4; 5: 27; 1 Pet., 1: 15, 16; Rev., 4: 8, in the New, that holiness is moral purity, not only in the sense of absence of all moral stain, but of complacency in all moral good; or, in the words of Quenstedt, it is, "*summa omnisque labis expers in Deo puritas, puritatem debitam exigens a creaturis. Theologia*," cap. 8, sect. 1, thesis 34. Thus Holiness, however closely akin to justice or righteousness, is not identical with it; if holy, God must be just, but his being just does not necessitate his being holy. If holy every other moral attribute follows; but these moral attributes do not constitute holiness. Itself is as distinct an attribute as any other.

2. The JUSTICE of God. This attribute sustains a relation to holiness not unlike that of act to disposition. It is the outward or active exhibition of the Holiness of God in its relations to the character and conduct of his creatures¹. The first, is an attribute of his being as such; the second, an attribute of his being, in its active relationship as Father and Ruler of all.

Justice, in the abstract, was well defined by Cicero, *De Finibus*, lib. 5, cap. 28, as *in suo cuique tribuendo*; but ustice, as exhibited in the legal sanctions—in the rewards and penalties—according to which the Divine government of the world proceeds, is the complacential or reactionary relation of God as a holy being to men as holy or unholy. Thus, justice is not merely the attribute of a Lawgiver, but is the animating spirit of all Divine action,—is the infinite holiness of God revealing itself as infinite rectitude of act. It is not the attribute of a merely benevolent and wise being

1. Quenstedt, 8, 1, 35, *Justitia Dei est summa et immutabilis voluntatis, divinæ rectitudo, a creatura rationali, quod rectum et justum est, exigens.*

whose decisions are determined by ends to be sought, but of an infinitely pure nature whose standard of right is it itself. Moral sanctions have their ground, not in mutable ends, but in the immutable, holy nature of an infinite Being.

But if the attribute of Divine Justice be as thus described, there is no ground in truth for that conception which makes it to be the combined exercise of wisdom and benevolence, or of wisdom and goodness.¹ Such a conception can be maintained only on the theory that justice exists for certain ends, rather than as the expression of eternal right, and of the inexorable demands of related moral natures. Its exercise is undoubtedly benevolent, as compared with injustice, or with no justice, but accompanying benefits reveal neither the grounds of its existence nor the qualities of its nature.

There is, furthermore, no good reason for the division of justice into various kinds, so common with the older and more scholastic theologians, and on which so great stress has been laid by modern writers.² Justice can be nothing else than simple justice, whatever the objects to which it is applied, or the ends which it may subserve. The distinctions between justice commutative and distributive, or between justice public and distributive—vindictive—punitive, are distinctions *de modo* and not *de re*. The distinctions, moreover, assume that justice is the product, or expression, of the wise and benevolent will of God, rather than the revelation of the demands of his immutably holy nature—assumptions that can be consistently held only on the Cartesian theory that the ground of right and of moral obligation is in the wise will, rather than in the immutable nature, of God.

1. Leibnitz, *Causa Dei Asserta per Justitiam Ejus*, § 50: Bonitas cum sapientia conjuncta justitiam constituit; cujus summus gradus est sanctitas.—Wolff, *Theol. Nat.*, § 1067: Bonitas sapientiæ attemperata est justitia.—Stapfer, § 565, Justitia vulgo definitur, quod sit studium suum cuique tribuendi; § 566: Aliter etiam definitur; esse bonitatem, quæ administratur cum sapientia, sive bonitatem sapientiæ attemperatam. See also the same in Wytttenbach, locus 3, § 312. Comp. Nitzsch, §§ 79 and 80.—Reinhard, *Dogmatik*, § 37, p. 129.

2. See the younger Edwards, Three Sermons on the Atonement, *Works*, vol. 2, and almost all modern treatises on the Atonement.

3. The **MERCY** of God is easily and naturally developed as the counterpart and correlative of justice, with which the Scriptures so frequently conjoin it. A pure Being seeks the purity of others, and in so doing shows his mercy. The Benevolence of God, which is only a generic and more comprehensive conception than mercy, is derived from a comprehensive survey of all the divine provisions for our welfare and happiness,—a survey which is easily made. A Being, furthermore, who is infinitely holy, just, merciful and benevolent, must also have the attributes of infinite Blessedness, Veracity, and Glory. But these attributes can easily be unfolded in the light of what has been said, and need not here be formally discussed.

In respect to all the attributes of God, it should always be borne in mind that:

1. Whatever our analysis or classification, every attribute has its special significancy for man. It is to him that God reveals himself, and through whatever medium the revelation comes, its single object is to communicate to rational and moral beings as complete and harmonious conceptions as possible of the entire Godhead.

2. Of all the attributes, the moral are incomparably most important. Every other attribute is of moment only as connected with moral issues. It is for moral results that God reveals himself to man, and pre-eminently for these that God in his word reiterates so frequently and emphatically the moral character of both himself and man.

3. In treating of the attributes we can never be too careful not to exalt one at the expense of another. Each is always qualified by every other. There can be no conflict between them. God is indivisibly one and perfect, and cannot contradict himself.

4. There is a comprehensive conception of God as the One infinitely perfect, personal Being, the Source and Archetype of all other beings, to which every other conception should be made to conform.¹

1. One-sided conceptions of God lie at the foundation of all one-sided systems of theology. The New Testament presents to us an infinitely perfect Being.

§ 16—*The Eternal Purposes or Decrees of God.*

The will of God is either revealed or unrevealed, conditional or absolute. The first, is made known to us in Scripture and Nature, and demands our obedience; the second, becomes apparent incidentally in Scripture, and necessarily in thought, as underlying and conditioning the first. The latter is unchanging, and its ends constitute the eternal purposes of God. The whole scheme of creation, whether contemplated as process or as consummation, is simply the embodiment and completion of immutable purposes. These purposes, so far as accordant with the known Divine will, may be referred to its efficient causation, but so far as contrary to that will, and finally made subservient to it only by overruling wisdom and power, they must be ascribed to the free volitions of co-ordinated agents; but both the process, in which the free volitions of others mingle, and the ends which are God's alone, are alike the fulfillment of his absolute and eternal decrees. His decretive permission¹ of the free and opposing activities of his creatures, is as much a part of his eternal purposes, as are the ultimate and eternal ends to which the universe of beings and of matter alike contribute. He "worketh all things after the counsel of his own will," Eph., 1: 11. That all things are thus wrought, may be inferred:

1. From our necessary conceptions of God—

(a.) From his infinite knowledge. He knows all events, past, present and future; knows them not as possibilities, but as certainties; not as certainties dependent on his efficient causation alone, but as certainties which so include all contingent causes and volitions as to subserve them to his

1. Earnest as was Calvin's rejection of the distinction of permissive decrees (see *Institutes*, b. 1, c. 18, §§ 1, 2; b. 3, c. 23, § 8), it was adopted by most of the Calvinistic writers; see Wollebius, Van Maastricht, Pictet, Turretine, Stapfer, and others; but "permissive" should not be confounded with the Lutheran and Arminian "conditional."

own unchangeable will. His infinite knowledge and eternal decrees are co-eternal and inseparable.

(*b.*) From the perfection of his nature. His will, which is synonymous with his purposes or decrees, is only an expression of his nature; and must, like his nature, be perfect, that is, incapable of change.

(*c.*) From his absolute sovereignty. If sovereign, all wills must be subject to his will; but if his will varies with the contingent will of his creatures, or has been accommodated to it, he is not supreme or sovereign; if not unchangeable or eternal in his purposes, then he is not an absolute sovereign, but is more or less controlled by finite wills, or by a fate or a chance, which, at times and in some respects, is greater than he. But God, to be God, must be sovereign, and, as such, immutable or eternal in his plans and purposes.

2. The doctrine of decrees may be inferred from the interdependence of all known causes, events, and beings. No force, phenomenon, or being, exists in and for itself alone. The Universe is a boundless system of complex but harmonious interdependencies. The natural and the supernatural, the physical and the spiritual, the mechanical and the vital, everywhere so interlock and co-act, that fixed and definite results are invariable. Such a system is inconceivable except upon the basis of foregone and immutable purposes.

3. The existence of divine decrees may be inferred from the existence of natural law.¹ The very idea of law is that of invariableness or certainty; and as every part of the Cosmos must be in co-relation with every other part, so every special law must be as invariable or immutable as is the universal order of which it is a part. But natural laws

1. Writers of all shades of opinion of the Positivist school—Buckle, Bain, Mill, Herbert Spencer,—express great contempt for the doctrine of the eternal purpose of God, and yet consign us without mercy to the iron necessity of physical forces and natural laws. Disgust towards the theological controversies about predestination and free will is, with some of them, irrepressible, but they never tire in their controversial defence of the blind necessitarianism of law.

are only God's fixed mode of governing—the mere sequences of his will. And as every thing in the universal domain of God (beings as well as bodies), must be subject to its own invariable laws, to the will of the unchangeable Being whose will the laws are, so everything in the universe, to its minutest occurrence, must be certain or according to the changeless laws, purposes, decrees, of the universal Ruler.

4. The doctrine of decretive purpose is very plainly and variously taught in the Scriptures; not in reiteration and absolute statements, such as are made of the universal truths that relate to human duty, but always impliedly in these universal truths, and often formally on special occasions, and in explanation of specific events.

(*a.*) It is implied in the prophecies, including predictions, which run throughout the Scriptures, and were recorded at various intervals during many centuries. Prophecies are foretold purposes, which, to be fulfilled, must be fixed and unalterable. The Omniscient Spirit, the author of Scripture, which is at once historic and prophetic, has united the past and the future, in the written word, by the single clasp of the eternal purpose of God.

(*b.*) Particular events, foretold long beforehand, are explicitly declared to have occurred in accordance with decretive will. The death of Christ is specially mentioned as one of these: Acts, 2: 23. Comp. Luke, 22: 22. Acts, 4: 28; 1 Pet., 1: 20. Comp. Ro., 16: 25; Eph., 3: 9.

(*c.*) That decretive purposes underlie and determine God's method of dealing with our race, is taught both in connected passages of Scripture, like the ninth chapter of Romans and the first chapter of Ephesians, and in single texts, as in Is., 14: 24; 46: 10; 1 Cor., 2: 7.

(*d.*) Individual salvation is said to be in accordance with a predetermined and eternal purpose: Ro., 8: 29, 30. Comp. Ro., 9: 11, 12; and Eph., 1: 5. Eph., 3: 11; 2 Tim., 1: 9. But in this special form the doctrine of eternal purpose becomes the specific doctrine of Election, which

will be more properly discussed under the general topic of Soteriology.¹

OBJECTIONS : The doctrine of decrees has been rejected by many,² not so much because unsupported by Scripture, as on account of the supposed impossibility of reconciling it with other recognized truths. To avoid the misapprehended mischief of admitting the doctrine, the passages of Scripture supposed to teach it have sometimes been subjected to constructions that are forced and interpretations that are unnatural. The most common and weighty objections are :

1. Its inconsistency with the character of God. If all things are by the decree of God, it is said, then moral evil is by the same decree, and God is more or less directly its author. But the objection rests upon the assumption, that decreed ends can be secured only by compulsion; that eternal purposes necessitate efficient causation on the part of the purposer; whereas each purpose, though including and implying absolute knowledge of all contingencies and events, does not necessitate, or even imply, compulsion as a condition of its existence. Between decree as expressive of the immutable, immediate, causative will of God, and decree as the immutable, mediate, permissive will of God, the distinction is clearly defined and wide.

2. Its inconsistency with human accountability. In this objection it is assumed that the eternal purposes of God cannot be invariably secured without some constraint of man's will and some consequent infringement on its free-

1. Calvin narrowed his whole treatment of the doctrine of eternal purposes to the single conception of personal election—individual predestination,—and restricted his treatment of it to the closing portion of the third book of his *Institutes*—in which he was followed by Richard Watson in his *Institutes*. See also the *Thirty-nine Articles* of the Anglican Church, and N. W. Taylor's *Revealed Theology*; but most later Calvinist writers treat of Decrees under the general doctrine of God, and, in strange disregard of logical relations, include in their treatment a minute discussion of predestination.

2. By all Arminians, including most modern Methodists, and the Free Will Baptists, by Lutherans, by Socinians, including modern Unitarians, and by the majority of modern Episcopalians, both English and American.

dom. But it certainly is conceivable, that the infinite compass of the Divine decrees may afford scope enough for the largest possible range of human wills, without an infringement of either on the domain of the other. For aught we know to the contrary, the eternal purposes may have been so quadrated with human wills as to have provided for their largest conceivable freedom; indeed, the very constitution of man's spiritual nature may have been so grounded in the eternal purposes as to make the freedom of his will an essential factor in their ultimate fulfillment. The purposes may be unalterably fixed, every act of man may invariably contribute to their fulfillment, and yet every act be as voluntary and as free as if there existed no decrees to be fulfilled.

3. Its encouragement to moral negligence and license, by assuring one that whatever he does is by Divine determination. The objection might have weight if the Divine purposes were ever propounded to man as his rule of action. But his rules of action, which are the known laws of God, are always addressed to his volition, and he obeys or disobeys as he chooses. No act of his can be regarded as decreed till he has chosen to perform it, and by his choice has made it his own.¹

But in answer to all objections, it should be remembered that a doctrine is not to be rejected because it may be misunderstood, or may have been perverted; nor because we may be unable, in every respect, to harmonize it with every

1. The literature covering the points involved in these objections and answers began to accumulate in the time of Augustine, and received large additions from the principal writers in the middle ages. The reformers, who adopted the Augustinian view of predestination, were followed in due time by Supralapsarians, Infralapsarians, and the Synod of Dort—the two sides of the dispute, even to our own day, never failing of their supporters. Sometimes the controversy has been waged in comprehensive treatises on Theodicy, as by Leibnitz, on the predestinarian side with great ability, in the last century, and by Bledsoe on the opposite scheme in the present; sometimes incidentally, as by many modern writers on *Metaphysics*; but most commonly, in later years, the controversy has been brought within a narrow compass in special treatises on the Will, as by Edwards, Day, Tappan, Whedon, Hazard, and others. See also Luthardt, *Lehre vom freien Willen*. Among later theologians, Emmons has been the most earnest defender of the doctrine of decrees.

other doctrine. The only question to be asked is, does Revelation teach it and reason justify it? If it be both scriptural and rational, it is idle to set it aside, or for any reason to attempt to evade it.

§ 17 — *Creation.*

Creation is strictly a biblical idea and follows naturally, if not necessarily, from that of a personal God. The attempts to support the idea by metaphysical argumentation and by an appeal to physical science, are differently regarded by different minds. Let us glance at these three kinds of evidence.

1. The Scriptures explicitly teach the doctrine of creation, reiterating it with equal clearness in both the Old Testament and in the New. From Genesis to Revelation it is, in one form or another, a perpetually recurring thought. See Gen., chaps. 1 and 2; Neh., 9: 6; Ps. 102: 25; 121: 2; 146: 6; Is., 42: 5; 45: 12; Acts, 14: 15; Rev., 10: 6; 14: 7. But whether the Scriptures teach the absolute origination of matter, its creation out of nothing, is an open question.¹ The texts ordinarily cited as proving it may, without violence, be so interpreted as to suit the views of advocates of either side. No decisive evidence is furnished

1. "The formula 'creation from nothing' is not found in Scripture. Heb. 11: 3, means that the visible did not proceed from other things than appear. Ro., 4: 17, 'he rules over what is not, as what is.'" Julius Müller, *Analysis of Proof Texts*, trans. by Dr. H. B. Smith, § 34.—"We have been led from God's word as well as works, to conceive of Nature as God's initial work." "It is true the Hebrew word used in Gen., 1: 1, for *create*, does not signify, necessarily, creation out of nothing; yet, such an inference cannot be resisted without doing violence to the spirit of the text, and the fundamental laws of human belief." Prof. J. D. Dana, in *Bib. Sac.*, vol. 13, pp. 99, 103.—"There is no Hebrew word or root to convey the precise idea of creation out of nothing; there is none such in the old Shemitic language; and the reason is, there is no such idea (working, at least) in the old Shemitic mind. The root *bara* is ever a new *thing*, not new *matter*." Prof. Tayler Lewis, *Bib. Sac.*, vol. 13, p. 475. See his *The Six Days of Creation*. See also Max Muller, *Chips*, vol. 1, pp. 134-5, English ed., pp. 131-2, Am. ed.

in the Hebrew word *bara*, "created," in Gen., 1: 1, and yet from the phrase "in the beginning," which precedes it, and the words, "the earth was without form and void," which follow it, the thought of origination would seem to be most naturally conveyed. So also the most natural interpretation of Heb., 11: 3,¹ would seem to be that which makes it expressive of creation out of nothing, though another sense is not impossible. Ro., 4: 17, from the uncertain meaning of "callesth," cannot be appealed to with any confidence. In 1 Cor., 8: 6; it may be doubted if the phrase "by whom are all things,"² has any bearing on the creation of matter out of nothing, since it may have been intended only to affirm that the universe as it now is, had its origin in the creative power and will of God.

2. Metaphysical argument has been resorted to with confidence, both by those who affirm and those who deny the eternity of matter.³ Metaphysical reasoning, however, on this subject, as on all others, grounds itself necessarily in the conditions of thought, and these again in the conditions of our being. And inasmuch as matter, already existent and fixed in its laws, conditions all human existence and thought, metaphysical argumentation can throw no light whatever on its origin.⁴ But because the origin of matter is inconceiv-

1. "The words certainly contain the idea of a creation of the world out of nothing." Meyer, *Commentar uber d. Heb.*

2. The phrase, "all things," *τὰ πάντα*, as used by Paul, is synonymous with "the heavens and the earth" in the first verse in Genesis.

3. There is good reason for believing that all the ancient philosophers supposed matter to be eternal. See Plato, *Timæus*, § 9. Aristotle, *Physics*, 8, 1. See Cudworth, *Intel. System*, note by Mosheim, vol. 1, p. 301; also Archer Butler, *Lectures on Ancient Phil.*, series 3, lect. 1. Comp. Fichte's *Werke*, vol. 5. For opposite conclusions by some modern writers, see Turretine, *Theol.*, l. 5, q. 3.—Cudworth, *Intel. Syst.*, vol. 3, ch. 5, sec. 2.—Clarke, *Being of God*. Dick, *Theol.*, on Creation. The argument of Moleschott, Vogt and Buchner for the eternity of matter on the ground of indestructibility and indissoluble unification with force, are in fact metaphysical (See Buchner, *Kraft und Stoff*, chaps. 1 and 2); and whoever will compare their argument with the words of Cicero, *Academica*, lib. 1, cap. 6, beginning "De natura autem ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in res duas," will find a curious coincidence.

4. On the difficulties in metaphysical reasoning on this question, see Sir Wm. Hamilton, *Phil. Discus.*, Am. ed., pp. 574-5, and *Lects. on Metaphysics*, lect. 40.—Calderwood, *Phil. of the Infinite*, pp. 355-361. Comp. Cousin, *Introd. to the Hist. of Phil.*, lect. 5. "God cannot but create."

able, we are not therefore warranted in concluding it to be eternal, unless we be first warranted in the assumption that the laws of thought in us are commensurate with the laws of action and being in God.

If it be a law of our minds, as it undoubtedly is, that we must attribute all phenomena to adequate causes,¹ then it is impossible for the mind to contemplate the organic forms of matter, and not recognize in them the embodied thought of creative will.

3. Evidence from Physical Science. It must here be premised that the question of creation, in the sense of origination of matter, lies beyond the reach of physical science. Its sphere is the observation of processes, and never of originations. Of the phenomena with which it busies itself, it knows no beginning and no ending; attempting to speak of their origin, or of their termination, it ceases to be science, and becomes either faith or speculation.² As invalidating its supposed evidence for the eternity of matter it may be stated:

(a.) Matter is to us indestructible, but indestructibility is not identical with eternity—does not warrant the inference of eternity. This can be inferred only from the assumption that physical force, the invariable concomitant of matter, is identical with creative force, which is the very thing to be proved.

(b.) The elements of matter are not only indestructible, but are compounded in such quantities and numbers—the forces evolved are so adjusted to each other—that a stability of equilibrium exists, a stability that would be overthrown by the disturbance of a single force, or the loss of a single element; such stability forces on the mind the idea of adaptation and design, and thus the belief in creation.

As regards the bearing of evidence from natural science on the creation of organisms, physicists are themselves at vari-

1. See above, pp. 50, 51; also Porter, *The Human Intellect*, § 590.

2. Büchner, in the preface to the first edition of his *Kraft und Stoff*, claims to have built on an "empirical basis furnished by modern science," and yet the first chapters of the book, on which all that follows rests, are purely speculative.

ance; one class maintaining that facts establish a belief in "special creations;"¹ another, that facts warrant the theory of "evolution," "whereby phenomena progress continually from a state of comparatively indefinite and incoherent homogeneity to one of comparatively definite coherent heterogeneity;"² the latter class subdividing itself again into "heterogenists" and "pan-spermists,"³ the former of whom hold to the spontaneous generation of low forms of life, and the latter to the existence of living germs or ova, but both alike maintaining that either from spontaneous products or from living germs come all existing organisms by evolution and natural selection.

Spontaneous generation, however, towards a belief in which there is at present a strong tendency among certain physicists, does not necessarily preclude the idea of a creative will,⁴ which works by natural law and by secondary causes. As against the idea of spontaneous generation, in

1. See Dana's articles in *Bib. Sac.*, vol. 13, and Agassiz's *Contributions to Nat. Hist.*, vol. 1, pt. 1, ch. 1. Such were the views of these naturalists a few years since, but Dr. Childs in his *Essays on Physiological Subjects*, p. 152, tells us, "it is impossible to deny that an evolution theory is gaining ground daily among scientific men."

2. Darwin, Wallace, Lyell, Huxley, Lubbock, Herbert Spencer, and many other naturalists, German and American. Prof. Owen, repudiating "evolution" by "natural selection," finds an origin of species in "derivation" through "an innate tendency to deviate from parental type." *Comparative Anatomy*, vol. 3, § 426, 427.

3. MM. Pouchet and Pasteur have become identified with these two theories; the former claiming by his experiments to have demonstrated "heterogeny," and the latter by his, to have demonstrated "pan-spermism." Darwin, under the term "pangenesis," gave in his adhesion to the latter theory, as apparently did Huxley and Spencer. Dr. Beale, a distinguished microscopist, in his recent book on *Protoplasm*, declares as the result of his investigations, p. 75, "It must then be regarded as a fact, that living beings spring from pre-existing living beings, and that there is no such thing as spontaneous generation." On the side of the former, numerous naturalists, English, French, German, Italian and American have arrayed themselves. See Child's *Essays*, p. 104, and Owen, *Comp. Anat.*, vol. 3, §§ 426-428.

4. Prof. Owen, in common with Huxley, scouts the idea of "life" or the "vital principle" as an "entity," regarding it as only a "mode" of "physical and chemical force," and yet recognizes a "CAUSE which has endowed His world with power" capable of convertibility into "forms or modes of force," including "the vital mode." See vol. 3, p. 819.

the sense of a purposeless, mechanical production of life by undirected forces, it must be remembered,

(a.) That the forces of inorganic matter are antagonistic to those of organic or living. Organic matter forsaken of life begins at once to decompose and become inorganic.

(b.) The molecular waste accompanying the exercise of physiological functions requires constant reparation from the organic or vitalizing principle of life, which, even if acting through the mechanical and chemical forces¹ of nature, is manifestly distinct from, independent of, and dominant over them.

(c.) So far as observation goes, the forces of nature are plainly enough seen to be efficient in the increase of bulk, in the acceleration of momentum, and in the change of the combinations of elements, but they have not yet been *proved* to be equal to the production of even the lowest forms of life.

(d.) An organism embodies an idea, exists on a plan, is always related to a wider plan of which it is a part. Idea and plan necessitate the conception of a purposed existence, and consequently of a creation.²

Most of the advocates, however, of "heterogeny," ("epigenesis,") and "pan-spermism," alike recognize in the universal order and adaptations of nature the evidence of an original creative mind, and are opponents, not of the idea of creation itself, but only of the special and immediate, or "miraculous," creation of existing forms of life. Of the beginnings of life—of creation in the sense of origination, whether of matter or of its organic forms, physical science confessedly knows nothing.³ Of the processes of nature it is competent to speak, and against its teachings respecting these there is no need that theology should set itself in hostility.⁴

1. "It cannot be said that life works *with* physical and chemical forces, for there is no evidence that this is so. On the other hand it is quite certain that life overcomes, in some very remarkable and unknown manner, the influence of physical forces and chemical affinities." Dr. Beale, *Protoplasm; or Life, Matter and Mind*, 2d. ed. p. 117.

2. For accumulated evidence on this point, see Agassiz, *Contributions to the Nat. Hist. of the U. S. of A.*, vol. 1, pt. 1, ch. 1, sec. 32.

3. See Tyndall, *Fragments of Science*, pp. 91-93; 119-122.

4. See Mivart, *The Genesis of Species*, ch. 12, specially pp. 279 and ff.

§ 18—*Final Cause of the Creation.*

If the Cosmos has been created, then there must have been some final cause for its creation. Rational beings act for rational ends.

It is expressly stated in the Scriptures that God "made all things for himself," "for his pleasure," Prov., 16: 4; Rev., 4: 11; that he continues to act in his government of the world "for his own sake," Is., 37: 35; 43: 25; 48: 11; Dan., 9: 19; Ps., 79: 9; 109: 21; Is., 48: 9; Ezek., 20: 9; and, in varying forms of phraseology, "for his glory," 1 Pet., 4: 11; Ro., 9: 23. Comp. Ps., 145: 10, and 72: 19. Christ recognized the glory of God¹ as the final cause of all things in the opening words of his last prayer with his disciples—"Father glorify thy name," John, 12: 28, and in the closing words of the prayer in the garden—"Thy will be done." The Apostle Paul makes the same recognition, in representing the glory of God as the end to be sought in every act of the Christian, 1 Cor., 10: 31; as the end actually accomplished by the Christian church; Eph., ch. 1, and 3: 10; Phil., 1: 11. Comp. Eph., 3: 20, 21; as the end which even the "wrath" and wickedness of man are made to subserve, Ps., 76: 10. Comp. Acts, 4: 26-28. God is glorified by being made known to rational beings, and his glory is in proportion to the completeness of the manifestation of his character.

But that the highest welfare, and consequent happiness of his creatures,² is included in God's supreme end in the crea-

1. The "glory of God" denotes either the infinite perfections of his being, or that manifestation of his perfections by which he is made to be correctly apprehended. It is in its latter sense only, that the glory of God can be said to be the final cause or ultimate end of God's actions. He is glorified only as he is correctly represented and justly apprehended. The old, but now neglected distinction between essential and declarative glory, is still worth preserving.

2. The assertion that the creation of God was for the highest happiness of all his creatures, manifestly cannot be sustained. Both Scripture and fact contradict it. The highest happiness of all is not secured. To suppose this to have been either the sole or the highest end, is to suppose God to have failed in his pur-

tion, is evident: from the subordination of universal nature to the good of man; from the direct aim and actual achievement of Christianity foretold in the angelic song at the birth of Christ, Luke, 2: 14; and from the incompleteness of the divine glory without the welfare and happiness of man.

Thus the final cause of the creation, according to the Scriptures, is unquestionably in God himself, but this cause is not exclusive of human happiness. It is a matter of indifference, therefore, whether we say that God created all things for his own glory, securing thereby the highest good of his creatures; or that he created all things for the highest good of his creatures, accomplishing thereby his own supreme glory as the final cause of all. The whole creation may have been destined for the highest happiness of which intelligent creatures are capable, yet this highest happiness is possible only in the glory of an all-originating Creator.

It is no valid objection to the evidence adduced, that it relates not so much to the creation as to the divine government, and specially to the work of redemption. The creation and government, inclusive of redemption, proclaim one and the same God and Father of all, Ro., 10: 17, 18; the ideas of origination and government of the universe are not to be disjointed; whatever is evidence of the final cause of the one must be also of the other.

Nor is it unworthy of God to make himself his own end.

(a.) It is both unworthy and criminal for a finite creature to make himself his own end, because it is an end that can be reached only by degrading self and wronging others; but,

(b.) For an infinite Creator not to make himself his own end, would be to dishonor himself and to wrong his creatures; since, thereby,

(c.) He must either act without an end, which is irrational, or from an end which is impossible, without wronging his creatures; because,

pose, and consequently to be neither omnipotent nor all-wise; but to suppose God to have been his own infinite end, this end including the highest happiness of the largest number of his creatures, consistent with the rational conditions of moral happiness, is to suppose that which accords with both what we see around us and with what we are told in the Bible.

(d.) The highest welfare of his creatures, and consequently their happiness, is impossible except through the subordination and conformity of their wills to that of their infinitely perfect Ruler;¹ and,

(e.) Without this highest welfare and happiness of his creatures, God's own end itself becomes impossible, for he is glorified only as his character is reflected in, and recognized by, his intelligent creatures.²

§ 19 — *Conservation and Government.*

According to the Scriptures the same power that created the Universe still sustains and controls it. This double office of divine support and divine guidance resolves itself into Conservation and Providence.

1. Conservation. The Scriptures teach that there is nothing in nature, animate or inanimate, that is self-sustaining. The inspired writers, fixing their attention on the source of all power, recognize no intermediate or secondary causes, but ascribe a continuous upholding of the universe to direct divine agency. All things are upheld by the immediate power of God, Heb., 1: 3. Comp. Neh., 9: 6; 2 Pet. 3: 5-7. In Col., 1: 17, all things are said to "consist," that is, to continue to be, "in Him," through or by whom they are just before said to have been created. Every animate object is said to be dependent on the upholding will of God for the continuance of its life. Ps., 104: 27-30; Luke, 12: 6, 7, 22-28. Comp. Acts, 14: 17.

1. Modern theology is disposed to drop inquiries into the final cause of the universe and to concentrate attention on the nature and destiny of man; but no one can fail to observe the uniform exaltation of God's sovereignty in the Scriptures, or to foresee the type of piety that in due time must result from any departure from this scriptural teaching.

2. See Jona. Edwards, Sr., "*The End for which God Created the World,*" *Works*, vol. 2. *Princeton Essays*, 2d series, es. 2.

Physical science, fixing its eye on phenomena, sees in them nothing but the mechanical action of physical force.¹ In the co-existence of matter and force, it finds the secret of the constitution of nature; in the correlation and conservation of force, the conservation of the Universe of both matter and mind.

The Christian theist, accepting the biblical statement that God is the upholder of all things and the continuator of all life, sees in the mechanical action of physical forces the fitting instruments through which he works; in the uniformity of his working, discerns the fixedness of his purposes and the stability of his government.

The Scriptures represent the destiny of man as an essential thought in the conservation of all things, and the volitional power, with which man is endowed, as a force which is often in collision with the immediate designs of the almighty Preserver; hence,

2. The Providence of God, or that controlling oversight and government, by which all events, phenomena of matter as well as of mind, are made to occur according to his prevision and prearrangement. Divine Providence is implied:

(a.) In every worthy conception that we can have of a personal God;

(b.) In any and every conception that we can form of a divine creative purpose;

(c.) In the manifest coördination of forces, and the harmonious conjunction of ends which are subserved in the various departments of nature.

(d.) It is affirmed by the mental and moral constitution of man; in the mental, as discerning a purpose in the stability and order of the Universe, and in the moral, as enforcing obedience to the will of the supreme Disposer.

(e.) It is explicitly taught in the Scriptures—not in isolated texts, but as an ever present truth in every part of the

1. See Grove, *The Correlation of Physical Forces*; Carpenter, *The Correlation of the Physical and the Vital Forces*; or both these and various other papers in *The Correlation and Conservation of Forces*, by Prof. Youmans.—Owen, *Comp. Anat.*, vol. 3, §§ 427, 428.—Dr. Holmes, *Mechanism in Thought and Morals*.—Tyndall, *Fragments of Science*, essays 1-4, 6; and writings of Huxley, Bain, Spencer and others.

Scriptures. The very idea of a supernatural revelation, such as the Bible gives to men, implies a Divine government which that revelation makes known and helps to administer. The Bible, accordingly, is full of declarations of God's use of natural phenomena in the furtherance of his designs, and of his active oversight and control of both nations and individuals. The relation of the divine government to minute events and to the personal guidance of individuals, belongs to the doctrine of

3. A Special or Particular Providence¹. By this is meant a providence which provides, with minutest particularity, for every event that can occur in the operations of nature, and a special adjustment of every event to the minutest requirements of every living being. Such providence has been supposed to be inconsistent with the acknowledged immutability of physical laws, but is vindicated by the following considerations.

(a.) If there be a general providence, there must be a special. The general necessarily includes the particular; a whole is made up of parts. That would be an impracticable government which should be so general as to take no cognizance of particular events and acts.

(b.) If there has been such coördination of ends in the history of individuals, of nations and groups of nations, as warrants confidence in a philosophy of history, then there must have been a special providence in those incidents and conjunctures of minute events, in the lives of both individuals

1. Any distinction between particular and special which restricts the latter to those events only which have an evident moral design, is especially objectionable, as assuming to interpret both the design and the method of special providences, see, e. g. *Bib. Sac.*, 12, p. 196, ff., and so to interpret as to put them *de facto* in the category of miracles, see Mozley, *Bampton Lect., On Miracles*, p. 9, ff. Trench's *Notes on the Miracles*, Preliminary Essay, American edit. p. 19. The strongest objection in many minds to the doctrine of a special providence lies in this assumption of a Divine design which man can interpret, and which can be brought about only by a special interruption and deflection of the ordinary courses of nature, see Tyndall, *Fragments of Science*, Am. ed., p. 47, ff. But to suppose that a special providence and a miracle involve the same means and ends, is strangely to misunderstand and misinterpret both of them. See next article.

and nations, on which momentous and far-reaching events have been made to turn.

(c.) Special Providence is taught in the Scriptures, emphatically, and by a great variety of methods :

(aa.) As a history, the Bible, from the first of the patriarchs to the last of the apostles, is a continuous record of special providences.

(bb.) A special providence is implied in the minute agreement of a large part of the New Testament history with the Old Testament prophecies and predictions.

(cc.) It is implied in the innumerable injunctions to put our trust in God and to pray to him for guidance and gifts. Prayer becomes an absurdity if there be no special providence ; even granting its chief benefit to be its reflex influence, that influence is lost if special attention and aid to individuals be regarded as impossible.

(dd.) It is explicitly stated. "A man's heart deviseth his way ; but the Lord directeth his steps." "The lot is cast into the lap ; but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord." Prov., 16 : 9, 33. See also Pss., 37 : 23, 31-33. Pss., 91 throughout. Pss., 139 : 16. Mat., 6 : 25-33 ; 10 : 29-31. Acts, 17 : 24-28. Ro., 8 : 28 ; 11 : 36.

What the Scriptures thus teach, science cannot disprove¹. And inasmuch as from science we learn that mind and matter, phenomena and life, are so conjoined that the connection can be ignored in no complete history of either individuals or nations, we must conclude that God's special providence surveys universal nature, foreseeing, pre-adjusting and controlling every event, purpose and act, even to the minutest.

The question still remains : How can providence be special and law be immutable ; by what method can God accomplish his will and the order of nature still be main-

1. "The phenomena of matter and force lie within our intellectual range, and as far as they reach, we will, at all hazards, push our inquiries. But behind, and above, and around all, the real mystery of this universe lies involved, and, as far as we are concerned, is incapable of solution," Tyndall, *Fragments of Science*, Amer. ed., p. 93.

tained? A question which it is so well-nigh impossible to answer satisfactorily, were not well raised, had not the doctrine of special providence been assailed with objections which rest exclusively on assumed theories of its method—theories which rest in turn on preconceived notions of God's relation to the material Universe.¹ But this relation is both unknown and unknowable; science, necessarily limited to the mere observation of phenomena, knows nothing of it; and the Bible, its object requiring only the ascription of phenomena to the will of God, throws no light on it whatever. Our only safety, therefore, in a question lying so entirely outside the range of both revelation and observation, is in refusing to trust implicitly in any theory.

1. One of these is the Epicurean or Deistic notion of a Universe created, but abandoned by its Creator to the action and reaction of its own forces; another, is that of the Positivists, who, regarding matter and force as coëxistent and indivisible, recognize no God but natural law; another still, is that of the Pantheists, who, identifying God with Nature, can discern in the world's processes only evidences of a self-evolved intelligence.

2. Even Christian writers, however, have persisted in theorizing on it. Thus with one class, physical phenomena are the products of God's direct personal efficiency, law denoting nothing more than his uniformity of action:—a theory which is objectionable, as being pantheistic; as degrading to God, since many physical forces are subject to the manipulations of man; as contrary to the analogy seen in God's method of accomplishing moral ends through second causes; and as contrary to the observed fact that physical force is the necessary product of matter under given conditions;—but it is a theory which had its mediæval and earlier Protestant advocates; was adopted by Emmons; has been maintained and ascribed to most of the earlier Reformed theologians by the pantheist Schweizer, in his *Glaubenslehre d. Ref. Kir.*, §§ 52, 60-63; with such modification as their use of it in the defence of miracles required, has been defended by Tulloch in his *Theism*, Amer. ed., p. 93., and by the Duke of Argyle in his *Reign of Law*, 4th Eng. ed., pp. 122, 123; and recently has found emphatic expression with the naturalist Wallace in the concluding chapter of his *Contribution to the Theory of Nat. Select.* Another class, recognizing the efficiency of second causes in both matter and mind, supposes such a concursus of the Divine energy with these as not only imparts to them their own efficiency but secures its subserviency to the Divine will:—a theory resting on purely verbal distinctions, without a shadow of fact to appeal to, and contradicted by what we know of the physical world from observation and of ourselves from consciousness;—but a theory which was accepted by Augustine and Aquinas, was elaborately explained and defended by nearly all the principal Protestant writers of the 17th and 18th centuries, and perhaps more than any other, underlies the existing popular theological conception of a special providence.

But as repudiators of the doctrine of providence have propounded theories which exclude alike all thoughts of prayer, of divine interposition, superintendence, or foresight even, counteractive theories have very naturally and properly been propounded by Christian writers. Of these we enumerate the following as among the most noteworthy of those now defended.

The oldest and most prevalent, is that which supposes God to arrest the ordinary course of events and, by interposition, to produce extraordinary results, whereby his special ends are accomplished. Of the holders of the theory, some, regarding matter as inert, and ascribing all phenomena to God's immediate agency, mean by special providence only special methods of divine working¹; others, believing in the existence and the efficiency of physical forces, attribute special occurrences to the direct interposition of divine power, either in the suspense, deflection, or re-combination, of existing forces², or in the origination and introduction of new and special causes³.—But interpositions of the kind contemplated in this theory, and equal to the production of all the events that may justly be regarded as special providences, would result in an instability and uncertainty in the order of events which would be fraught with inconceivable disorder and mischief.

In reaction from the preceding theory, another has been propounded, which, asserting the invariableness and inviolability of physical laws, and attributing all physical phenomena, excepting authenticated miracles, to the unalterable laws of matter, insists that special interpositions must be confined to the influence of the Spirit of God on the spirit of man⁴.—This theory accepts the teachings of Scripture as to

1. See the first class of theorists mentioned in note two on preceding page.

2. See the second class of theorists, note two, preceding page.

3. See Mansel on Miracles, in *Aids to Faith*, § 15. He is treating only of miracles, it is true, but they who thus explain special providences regard these providences as a species of lesser miracles. See Mozley, *Bampton Lect.*, p. 9.

4. See Prof. Geo. I. Chace's *Discourse before the Porter Rhetorical Society of Andover Theo. Sem.*, Aug., 1854, on The Relation of Div. Prov. to Physical Laws. Comp. Art. 7, July No., of the *North American Rev.*, for 1855.—

the facts of a divine providence, and of God's immediate action on the hearts of men; but, to adjust these to the invariability of physical laws, it transfers the sphere of divine agency from the obscure region of matter to the obscurer realm of spirit, restricting it to the latter alone. Its only advantage over the first theory is, that it removes the difficulties to be accounted for still farther from the scope of man's knowledge. But if we infer uniformity of law in one unobserved field, we are equally bound to do the same in another. If the inviolability of physical laws be requisite to the pursuits of man and the stability of society, the invariableness and inviolability of the laws of mind are none the less indispensable in the acquisition of virtue and the intellectual and moral progress of the race. Matter, in the compound nature of man, is subject to mind; why the material universe should be excluded from subjection to the authority and control of God, it is difficult if not impossible to show.

A third theory, recognizing the immutability of all laws, physical and moral, and yet discerning in every phenomenon, however insignificant it may apparently be, the evidences of divine purpose and plan, supposes the Creator to have provided, by prevision and prearrangement, for every emergency that can arise, and to have adjusted, at the outset, the working of all forces to the bringing about of every event, at the desired moment, as directly and specially as if he should interfere on each occasion by his almighty power.—The most formidable objection to this theory is the apparent countenance it lends to the doctrine of necessitarianism. But if it presupposes the free actions of moral and accountable agents to have been explicitly taken into the account and to have constituted an integral part of the plan, it cannot easily

Balen Powell, who regards miracles as "objects not evidences of faith" says, "No extent of physical investigation can warrant the *denial* of a *distinct order* of impressions and convictions affecting that portion of our compound constitution which we term the moral or spiritual. That impressions of a spiritual kind may be made on the internal faculty of the soul, is an admission which can contravene no truth of our constitution, mental or moral," *Order of Nature*, *ess.* 2, § 3.

be shown to be false. It conflicts neither with reason nor with Scripture, but on the contrary accords with our necessary conceptions of the omniscience and eternal purposes of God. If it be supposed to be inconsistent with the duty of prayer,¹ a little reflection will show it to be no more so than is human freedom with divine sovereignty, or individual responsibility with decretive purposes.

The attempts of scholastic theologians, both mediæval and later, to adjust God's active providence to the free activity and responsibility of man, through conceptions of various kinds of *concursum*,² can never satisfy, for they rest on theories of God's relation to both matter and mind of which we know absolutely nothing.³ The most that we can attain to with certainty, by the aid of Scripture and consciousness, is, that our acts are our own, to the extent

1. Dr. Chalmers, in his *Nat. Theol.*, b. 5. c.2, §§ 22-28, suggests, in explanation of the consistency of prayer with the immutability of physical laws, that possibly prayer forms a subtle cause in the production of events; or, that there may be a divine interposition with the operation of physical causes in a region and at a point too elevated and remote to admit of our observation. Both his suppositions seem to proceed upon the assumption, that those events alone are answers to prayer, and are specially providential, which are aside from the ordinary operations of nature and are in fact miraculous: his first theory, if logically carried out, can be maintained only on the sub-theory, either of fatalism, or of a causative force in the human will independent of God: and the second, is open to all the objections that can be alleged against the first general theory above noticed.

2. See Thos. Aquinas, *Summa*, p. 1, questiones 103, 104, where, without the word, we plainly have the idea; as representative of Protestant writers, see Quenstedt, *Theologia*, de Providentia, sec. 2, ques. 3.—Turretine, locus 6, questiones 4-7, in whom we have *concursum physicum* and *concursum moralis*, *mediatus* and *immediatus*, *prævius* and *prædeterminans*, *simultaneus* and *concomitans*, etc.—See also, Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, vol. 1, pp. 226-32.

3. Any explanation that can be given of God's relation to the forces of nature, whether physical or vital, must be purely hypothetical; dogmatic assertion respecting them is mere presumption. Matter and physical force are indissolubly one, and every form of life has been endowed by its Creator with the power of self-perpetuation through the production of seed after its own kind; but what may be the relation of the activities of these forces to the Divine efficiency, in the conservation and progressive movement of the world, or what the connection of human volitions with the Divine Will, it is worse than idle to inquire. We only know that God rules over all, and that all forces and wills, in the end, are made to subserve his immutable purposes.

that we alone are responsible for them, and that our responsibility is not annulled by the sustaining providence through which we act.

It is to be remembered, finally, that theories in explanation of God's inscrutable plans and methods, are never to be proposed as trustworthy bases of human action. They are to be resorted to only in self-defence, and as furnishing a ground on which to rest our replies to objections furnished by counter theories. If the doctrine of a minute and special provision for every event in nature, and of a particular care for every one of our race, be clearly established, it is unreasonable to make our acceptance of the doctrine dependent on our comprehension of the method by which the providence is exercised. A devout man sees the divine hand in each event of his life, and, seeing it, can no more doubt the special guidance of his steps, than he can the existence of the Being in whom he trusts. His own experience is a sufficient answer to all objections to the fact, and his inability to explain the process only drives him to a more implicit trust in the invisible Father who cares for and guides him¹.

§ 20—*Miracles.*

Miracles are introduced at this point, not because they properly belong here, but, partly, because many dogmatic theologians have persisted in treating of them in this connection, and, chiefly, because in their treatment they have made special providences and miracles to differ only in the incidental circumstances that accompany them. A just

1. Opposed to the doctrine of providence, see Comte, *Positivism*, translated and condensed by Harriet Martineau.—Buckle, *History of Civilization in Eng.*—Draper, *Intel. Development of Europe*; and the writings of J. Stuart Mill, Bain, Spencer, Tyndall, and others. In support of the doctrine, see McCosh, *The Divine Government, Physical and Moral*, specially book second.—Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural*, specially ch. 9.—Ulrici, *Gott und Natur.*, abs. 5, § 3. For a comprehensive historical statement of the doctrine as held by Calvinistic writers, see Ehrard, *Dogmatik*, §§ 280-83.

idea of miracle will show that it agrees with special providence only in the single particular, that both proceed from the immediate will of God; but in point of design, they are evidently dissimilar, and in method of production it is assumption to assert that the causative agency is the same in each'. Providence, for aught that we know to the contrary, may always turn on appointed conjunctions of natural causes, and miracles on the introduction of "special causes." At any rate we should be careful not to vindicate providence at the expense of miracles.

DEFINITION. Our knowledge of miracles is from the Bible alone; it is only from this knowledge, to the exclusion of all *a priori* principles and theories of God's relation to nature, that our definition must be constructed. And inasmuch as it is with the reality and evidential value of the miracles that accompanied the first age of the Christian religion that this age is most directly concerned, our recourse should be at once to the New Testament. Of the four well-known principal terms there employed in the designation of miracles, the two most important², and the two which are essential to be taken into account in a definition, are *σημείον*, which points out their design, and *δύναμις*, which indicates their source or cause. Within these two terms, when taken in the connections in which they occur, we have all the materials requisite for a definition. From these materials we gather, that a miracle is a phenomenon aside from due course of nature and adduced as a special sign from God in authentication of one's claim to be divinely sent; or, in fewer words, a special sign from God authenticating the claim of one of his messengers. To define a miracle as "an event which only the intervention of the First

1. According to Mozley, *Bamp. Lects.*, p. 9. "A special providence differs from a miracle in its evidence, not in its nature; it is an invisible miracle, which is indirectly traceable to some remarkable concurrences in the events before us." The former furnishes "mere surmises of a Divine origin;" the latter "gives proof" in "the most complete and decisive kind of coincidence."

2. It is one of the fatalitics of theological nomenclature that the Latin translation (*miraculum*,) of the most insignificant of the four, (*τίρας*,) should have come to stand for the meaning of all the others.

Cause is adequate to produce¹;" or, as "an event, in the external world, brought about by the immediate efficiency, or simple volition of God²," is to omit from the definition that which is the chief characteristic of the miracle, viz. its significancy or purpose, and is to confound miracles with all other extraordinary and inexplicable occurrences. Definitions which, like these, do not recognize both the efficient and the final cause of the miraculous event are faulty by deficiency, omitting what is absolutely essential to its completeness; and a definition which, like the last named, assumes to state the relation of the event to natural law and second causes, is faulty by excess, being encumbered by a notion wholly foreign to itself. Definitions that, on the one hand, omit the final cause of the miracle, lead very naturally to that confusion of ideas which makes an extraordinary providence to be a subordinate kind of miracle³; and those which, on the other hand, encumber the miracle with arbitrary notions regarding the method of its production, needlessly expose it to the objections of cavilers.

POSSIBILITY. Science may be competent to show the impossibility of a miracle according to a certain conception of it, by shewing that the conception involves a theory of nature which is plainly contrary to facts, as for instance, the impossibility of a miracle which, in any proper sense of the word, either violates or suspends a law of nature. But if science assumes to declare it to be impossible for the author of nature to notify us of his presence and will, by any variation from his established order of natural phenomena, it assumes to assert what it can never prove—it takes its stand on unsupported theories. If natural law be mere uniformity of sequence under uniformity of conditions, then no one can prove that when the conditions are varied, by the

1. See Fisher, *Essays on the Supernat. Origin of Christianity*, p. 477.

2. See Dr. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1, p. 618. Mozley, in his *Bampton Lect. On Miracles*, which have been so much lauded in England, defines more correctly, p. 6, as a "visible suspension of the order of nature for a providential purpose," though here as elsewhere in the Lectures, he confounds providential with revelational purpose.

3. Comp. Trench, *On Miracles*, Preliminary Essay, pp. 18, 19.

introduction of a personal or interposing will¹, there may not also, without the slightest interference with the uniformity of law, be a miraculous variation in the phenomenal results. The personal will of man, even limited as it is to the use of second causes, is perpetually producing phenomena that are quite aside from the established order of nature ; it surely is not impossible for the infinite power of the personal God to make such use as he chooses of the forces, physical and vital, of which he is himself the Creator, or, even, if need be, to modify their action altogether by the putting forth of a new and overriding force of will.

PROBABILITY. A miracle, in itself considered, must be confessed to be strongly improbable. Its *prima facie* improbability is an essential element in its evidential force. The extreme disinclination of men to believe in any current, or ecclesiastical miracle, is evidence of a deep-seated conviction that the ordinances of nature are unchangeable—that “the world is established that it cannot be moved.” If God, for sufficient ends, does interpose, the interposition becomes all the more startling, and the ends the more conspicuous. And furthermore, if it be worthy of God to interpose in behalf of his rational creatures by a supernatural revelation of truth, there is no improbability in the supposition that such a revelation would be accompanied with supernatural phenomena. If we bear in mind how indissoluble is the union of the physical and the spiritual in our own personal constitution, as well as in all our earthly relations, it is hardly conceivable that there should be communications from the Divine mind to the minds of men, without some such notifications of the fact as should proceed from the Divine power and address themselves to both the understandings and the moral intuitions of men.

CREDIBILITY. This resolves itself into the two-fold inquiry, whether miracles were credible to those who wit-

1. Any controversy about the impossibility of miracles either with an atheist, or with a pantheist, or with any one who denies the personality of God, is idle : the question in dispute with such an one lies far back of this of miracles. To introduce him at this point, is to bring him into a court which has no jurisdiction over his case.

nessed them, and whether they can now be made credible on the report of the witnesses. The abstract question of the credibility of the miracle as such, may be ruled out as purely speculative, and of no account beside the simple question of fact, whether miracles were believed in by those who saw them, and can now be accepted on the strength of their testimony. According to that testimony the miracles of Christ were scrutinized and criticised; the issue was, that by some they were rejected, and by others accepted. But there is nothing, either in the intimated grounds of acceptance and rejection, or in the subsequent conduct of the two parties, which warrants us in believing that the rejection was the result of careful examination and the acceptance the dictate of superstition. On the contrary it is very apparent that the main cause of rejection was superstition and bigotry, and the decisive reason for acceptance the recognized power of God. The credibility of these miracles to us, aside from the antecedent probabilities of the case, must depend on the trustworthiness of the witnesses who have reported them to us. But if we accept the New Testament as genuine and authoritative, then we can reject its testimony in support of miracles only on the ground either of the credibility, or of the knavery of its writers—grounds which are absolutely untenable to any reasonable mind that knows anything of their writings.

REAL OFFICE. This is very distinctly implied in the idea which the Scriptures give us of the miracle. It is a certification by supernatural phenomenon, of one's claim to be a messenger from God. But the certification is not a demonstration. Miracles were not, and, from the nature of the case, could not be, in any strict sense of the word, *proofs* of a divine mission. The conviction produced by them always depended, primarily on the congruity of the miracle with the character of the worker of it; and, secondarily, on the congruity of the miracle with the character of the witness of it¹. No amount of miracle could convince a good man of the

1. Hence the noticeably progressive types, and symbolical significance, of miracles at different periods of the biblical history.

divine commission of a known bad man, nor on the other hand could any degree of miraculous power suffice to silence the doubts of an evil minded man. The miracle is a certification to him only who can perceive its significancy. Its office is to relieve uncertainty and satisfy honest doubt; but to remove prejudice, to convict disbelief, and to subdue willfulness is no part of its function. Before these states of mind our Lord refused to exercise his miraculous power, Mark, 6: 5, 6. Luke, 11: 29, but for those whom it could help he exercised it freely.

The office of the miracle in relation to the truth taught, was not unlike its office, in relation to the divine mission of the teacher. It could no more be a proof of one than it could of the other. If the miracle could certify the commission of the messenger, it could so far forth certify the truth of his message, as that message was congruous with the known mind of God. No degree of miracle could certify the divine authority of a doctrine which contradicted the intuitive perceptions of truth, or an instinctive sense of right. Doctrines address themselves to the moral consciousness; miracles to the bodily senses. The latter can only by implication certify the divine authority of the former. Doctrines vindicate their authority by moral evidence, and that evidence is in their own witnessing in the heart¹.

As respects the present value of biblical miracles, two extremes of views have their advocates. According to the one, the external evidences of Christianity are its strongest defence, and of these its miracles are the chief; according to the other, its internal and moral evidences are its main support, and its miracles, so far from yielding defence, are one of its exposed points which requires special fortification.

1. Those writers who maintain that miracles could now be wrought but for insufficiency of faith, utterly misconceive both the office of the miracle and its relation to the faith of him who wrought it. Miracles occurred only at those epoch-making periods when new messengers, bringing new truths, needed miraculous attestation, the very communication to them of truth from God being accompanied with assurances that, in answer to their appeals the power of God should miraculously vindicate their claim to be heard, Ex., 3: 11. 20. Mark, 16: 17, 18; but truth once heard and obeyed thenceforward authenticates itself.

The truth seems to be, that miracles were for the special benefit of those who witnessed them. Their value as evidence to others, is weakened in proportion as the evidence of the fact of their occurrence is made dependent on testimony¹. As an integral part of the Gospel history they must stand or fall with that history; as evidence to us of the Divine origin and authority of the Christian Religion they are inferior to the existence and contents of the Religion itself. Even the resurrection of Christ, that climax in the series of his miracles, is to-day dependent, as evidence of the divine origin of the Christian Church, on the existence of the Church itself. Doubtless there had been no Church, had there been no resurrection of its founder; and yet the Church attests the fact of the resurrection, quite as much as the resurrection attests the divine origin of the Church.

§ 21—*Angels.*

Are they real beings, or are they creatures of the oriental imagination? The latter view, defended by rationalists, and apparently supported by natural science, which is supposed to know of nothing but matter and its self-adjusting forces, presents itself to many minds in our day with great plausibility. It is necessary, therefore, that we consider,

1. The evidence of their existence. This is primarily Scriptural, and is both abundant and decisive. Corroborative evidence is not wanting.

(a.) There is a descending series of existences, from man downward, from which by analogy it may be inferred that there must also be an ascending series, from man upwards.

1. Hume's objection to the value of miracles as evidence, on the ground of our confidence from experience, in the uniformity of nature, and of our want of confidence, from experience, in the trustworthiness of human testimony, is valid only against the notions, first, of miracles as violations or suspensions of the laws of nature, or secondly, of miracles as demonstrative *proofs* of a divine messenger and message. Against the idea and office of miracles as presented in the Scriptures, his objection is futile.

It is hardly to be supposed that man should be at the head of so vast a series as exists below him, himself dependent, and yet there be no order of intelligences above him.

(b.) Their existence may be argued from the infinite perfections of the Creator. Whatever may be conceived as prompting, in the mind of the Creator, the creation of intelligent beings at all, must be conceived as equally prompting the creation of orders and numbers superior to any found on this earth. The final cause of the existence of man, must have been still more fitting as a final cause for the existence of a higher order of beings than man: the higher the intelligence of the creature, the more readily the final cause must be accomplished.

(c.) The existence of lesser deities in all heathen mythologies, and the natural disposition of man, everywhere and in all ages, to believe in the existence of beings superior to himself and inferior to the supreme God, is a presumptive argument in favor of the reality of their existence.

(d.) Independent, but corroborative, of the abounding testimony of the Scriptures as a whole, may be specially mentioned the teachings of Christ, who frequently and distinctly recognized the existence of angels, Mat., 12: 10. 24: 36. 25: 31. 26: 53. Mark, 12: 25. Luke, 20: 36, and this, not in accommodation to a popular prejudice, but in the presence, and in direct contradiction, of the Sadducees who denied their existence. Comp. Mat., 22: 30, with Acts, 23: 8.

2. Classes—contrasts and resemblances. There would seem to be, according to the Scriptures, two general classes of angels; the first, known as "the angels of God," "the holy angels," "the elect angels;" the other, as "the devil and his angels," Mat., 25: 41. Rev., 12: 7, as "spiritual wickedness," or more properly, "wicked spirits," Eph., 6: 12¹.

1. As examples of the way in which even honest men may deal with Scripture, when a pet theory dictates, see DeWette, *Dogmatik*, th. 2, § 49, and Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural*, pp. 128-132. The former, holding that the essence of sin is in the predominance of sensuousness, affirms that "the doctrine of evil angels should be *wholly* rejected, since the idea of a purely evil spirit is self-destructive;" the latter, holding moral evil to be a neces-

The first class is so often referred to, especially in the New Testament, that a citation of texts is unnecessary: the second is spoken of in 2 Pet., 2: 4. Jude, 6, as "the angels that sinned," "that kept not their first estate." Comp. 1 Tim., 5: 21. Whether the "demons" of the Gospels were fallen angels, is a disputed question, though there seems a preponderance of evidence that they were. The words of Christ, "if Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself," Mat., 12: 26, taken in connection with Luke's designation of demoniacs as those "oppressed of the devil," Acts, 10: 38, and John's declaration that Christ "was manifest that he might destroy the works of the devil," 1 Ep., 3: 8, make it certain that demons were the "devil's angels," and strongly probable that they were the fallen angels spoken of by Peter and Jude.

The two classes, thus standing in moral antagonism with each other as "holy" and "wicked," are also presented in Scripture as sustaining contrasted relations with our race, and as busied in the performance of the most opposite offices. One ministers to man as protectors and helpers', Heb., 1: 14. Acts, 12: 7-15. Luke, 22; 43. Acts, 27: 23. Comp. 2 Kings, 6; 17, and Ps. 34: 7; the other seduces, 1 Tim., 4: 1. Acts, 5: 3, pursues, and, if possible, destroys him, 1 Pet. 5: 8. Eph., 6: 12. Their opposite offices and spirit were specially manifest during the personal history of Christ on earth; the one ever ready to aid him, the other to oppose, Mat., 4: 1-11. 26; 53. Luke, 22; 43. The very appellatives, "tempter," "satan" or adversary, "devil" or accuser, and "unclean spirits," are descriptive of the nature and employment of the fallen angels.

sary "condition privative" of all finite beings as such, believes that "good angels have all been passed through and helped up out of a fall, as the redeemed of mankind will be."

1. It is a mooted question whether the New Testament teaches that individuals have their guardian angels. Calvin denied, but Stuart, Alford, Meyer, Stier, have affirmed that it is so taught in Mat., 18: 10, and Acts, 12: 15. Hackett and Gloag maintain that, in the latter text, "the idea appears, not as a doctrine of the Scriptures, but as a popular opinion, which is neither affirmed nor denied."

The points of resemblance between the two classes are numerous. (a.) Both are spirits, Heb., 1: 14.—Mat., 8: 16. 10: 1. 12; 43—45. Mark, 9; 25. Luke, 10: 20. Eph., 2: 2. 6: 12. (b.) Both are beings of superior intelligence and interested in human affairs—one as the sympathizing helpers of man, the other as his malignant enemies. Luke, 15: 10. Eph., 3: 10. Heb., 12: 1. 1 Pet., 1: 12. Comp. Mat., 24: 36.—1 Pet., 5: 8, 9. 1 Tim., 4: 1. Rev., 16: 14. (c.) Both have a power superior to man's¹, 2 Pet., 2, 11. 2 Thess., 1: 7.—Acts, 10: 38. Col., 2: 15; and a certain kind of power over man, Luke, 1: 20. Acts, 12: 7—11.—Luke, 13: 16. Acts, 10: 38. 1 Pet., 5: 8. 1 John, 5: 19; but their power over man appears to be always limited by the laws of his nature, and specially by his moral disposition; it being to saints only that good angels minister, Heb., 1: 14. Ps., 34: 7, and only to men ready to be tempted, that the machinations of Satan are dangerous, Eph., 4: 27. 1 Pet., 5: 9. James, 1: 14. (d.) Both classes are numerous, though the good seem greatly to surpass the evil in numbers, Ps., 68: 17. Dan., 7: 10. Mat., 26: 53. Heb., 12: 22. Jude, 14. Rev., 5: 11. Comp. the Old Testament phrase, "Lord of hosts."—Mark, 5; 9—13. Luke, 8: 30. Eph., 6: 12. Col., 2: 15. (e.) Both are graduated into ranks, Eph., 1; 21. 3: 10. 1 Pet., 3: 22.—Mat., 25: 41. Col., 2: 15; and each has at its head one who is superior to all the others of the class, Gen., 16: 7. 22: 11. Ex., 23: 20, 21. Josh., 5: 14, 15. 6: 2. Is., 63: 9. Dan., 10: 21. 12: 1. Mal., 3: 1².—John, 12: 31. 2 Cor., 4: 4. Eph., 2: 2. Heb., 2: 14. Whatever

1. Whether angels can affect the working of natural laws, either in the physical world or in human society, has been answered with two extremes of view: the one denying to them any power except under law, the other ascribing to them an agency and efficiency little less than omnipresent and all-controlling. The truth is, we know nothing of the mode of their connection with man, or with nature, and can predicate nothing of their existing relations to this world with any degree of certainty.

2. Even supposing "the angel of the Lord," "the captain of the Lord's host," "the angel of his presence," "Michael," "the messenger of the covenant," mentioned in these texts, to have been our Lord Jesus Christ in his pre-existent state, neither his divinity nor his "proper Deity" are thereby compromised. As mediator he could still stand at the head of the angelic hosts.

may be the obscurity of Scripture as to the leadership of the unfallen angels, there would seem to be no good ground for doubt as to its conception of the headship of the fallen powers. Satan is their "prince" and leader.

PERSONALITY OF SATAN. In respect to Satan, three explanations have their advocates—the one, that the conception of him as personal, together with the whole doctrine of angelology, was borrowed by the Jews from the dualism of the Persians, during the Babylonian captivity—another, that the name is an oriental personification¹ of the principle of evil—and the third, that Satan is a real existence, a personal being who, sometime in the past, lapsed from an original sinlessness. The sufficient answer to the first explanation, is the existence of all that is fundamental in the biblical angelology, Satan included, in those portions of Scripture which were undoubtedly written before the Babylonian exile. As respects the second explanation, the considerations that show its untenableness will, at the same time, make apparent the truth of the third or last.—That the name Satan is not a personification, but designates a real being, seems evident from the following considerations :

(a.) This is implied in the various titles given him in the Scriptures. He is "the tempter," "the adversary," "the accuser," "a murderer," "the god of this world," "the prince of the power of the air," etc., all of which are much more naturally understood as descriptive of a personal being than as personifications.

(b.) It is incredible that the sacred writers, with all their diversities of training and mental habits, should have persisted, through more than fourteen centuries and under the most diverse civilizations, in adhering to a personification without so much as once dropping it or giving even a passing hint of its use.

1. Dr. Bushnell, in his *Nat. and the Supernat.*, pp. 134-5, affirms that "Satan is not the name of a particular person, neither is it a personation (?) of temptation, or of impersonal evil * * * but is a name that generalises bad persons or spirits, with their bad thoughts and characters, many in one." "it designates the all or total of bad minds and powers."—What else than personification is here meant, is not so apparent as it should be.

(c.) The Scriptures ascribe attributes and purposes to Satan, which by no laws of language are properly predicable of a principle. To substitute the phrases, "principle of evil," or "total of bad minds and powers," in the passages where Satan, or evil spirits are spoken of, would make strange confusion of thought, and in most of them downright nonsense. See, for example, the 3d ch. of Gen., Mat., 4: 1. John, 8: 44. 14: 30. 2 Cor., 11: 3, 14, 15. Eph., 6: 11, 12. 1 Pet., 5: 8, 9. 1 John, 3: 8. Rev., 2: 10. 3: 9. 12: 7. 20: 10.

(d.) Christ distinctly recognized the existence of Satan as a person,¹ Mat., 13: 19, 38. 25: 41. Mark, 4: 15. Luke, 10: 18. 22: 31. John, 8: 44. 14: 30; and must have done so, either from ignorance, or from accommodation to a vulgar prejudice, or from actual knowledge of truth in the case. The supposition of ignorance is inconsistent with the spirit and scope of his other teachings; that of accommodation, is contradicted by his frankness in dealing with other and less significant errors, such as the Pharisees' faith in the efficacy of ceremonies, or the Sadducees' denial of a future life.²

(e.) The temptation of Christ in the wilderness is involved in inextricable difficulties, except on the supposition that Satan is a real being³. The temptation consisted not merely of ends proposed, but of considerations suggested in support of them. And the considerations must either have been evolved from the mind of Christ by reflection—in which case they were not so much an evidence of temptation to evil as they were of a susceptibility, and even predisposition, to evil—or they must have been suggested from without by a personal being; and this personal being must either have been a Jew, such as, at the outset of the temptation, Jesus possibly may have supposed him to be, or the personal Satan,

1. See C. F. Schmid, *Biblische Theologie d. N. T.*, Lehre Jesu, § 23, p. 204.

2. See Neander, *Life of Christ*, § 103.

3. See Neander, *Life of Christ*, §§ 46, 47.—Ullmann, *Sinlessness of Jesus*, pt. 3, ch. 8, sec. 3. Supplement, ch. 2.

which from Mat., 4: 9, 10, it is evident that Jesus clearly saw that he was.

(*f.*) The progressive enmity and rage of Satan against God, Christ, and man, discoverable in Scripture between his first appearance at the temptation of Adam in the garden and his final overthrow as depicted in the Apocalypse, 7: 10, cannot be so satisfactorily explained on any other supposition as on that of his personality.

To what extent our race is at present exposed to evil influences from Satan and other evil spirits, is a question on which it is easy to err. The manifestly natural inference, from various Scripture teachings, is, that he is still active among men; see, Mat., 13: 39. Mark, 4: 15. Luke, 22: 31. Acts, 5: 3. 2 Cor., 2: 11. 4: 4. Eph, 4: 27. 6: 12-18. 1 Pet, 5: 8; but, that if we "resist him he will flee from us," James, 4: 7. 1 Pet., 5: 9¹.

1. On the Doctrine of Angels, see Bretschneider, *Dogmatik*, §§99-111.—Twisten, *Vorlesungen über Dogmatik*, vol. 2, p. 305, ff.; or in English, *Bib. Sac.*, vols. 1 and 2.—Mayer, *Bib. Repos.*, vol. 12, pp. 356-388. Prof. Stuart, "Sketches of angelology," *Bibliotheca Sacra*, pt. 1, art. 2, (a preliminary vol. of the periodical).—Arbp. Whately, *Revelations of Scripture concerning good and evil Angels*.—Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, vol. 1. Zweite Lehrstück.

The question whether the demoniacal possessions of the Gospels were real or imaginary, has a more than speculative interest. The possessions, in themselves considered, might not unreasonably be ascribed to popular superstition; but no such explanation can be reconciled either with a Divine authority in the teachings of Jesus, or with any kind of inspired guidance of the evangelists in writing the Gospels. Accepting the Bible as the Book of God and Jesus Christ as a Divine Teacher of absolute truth, we must admit the reality of the demoniacal possessions. And it is no valid objection to their reality, that they do not now occur. Nor, again, is it a reasonable objection to the supernatural origin of the demoniacal phenomena that what in them was due to second causes, was perhaps sometimes ascribed to supernatural agency—that, in fact, men in every age have been superstitiously disposed to ascribe occult diseases, which may have a purely natural origin, to supernatural causes—any more than it is now a sound objection to the reality of the divine efficiency in nature, that many natural phenomena were once ascribed to the immediate agency of God which are now traced to the purely mechanical forces of nature. No one may possibly and safely assert what even now is, or is not, the connection of supernatural beings with those mental and physical diseases, whose seat is in a moral obliquity of will.

ANTHROPOLOGY,

OR

DOCTRINE OF MAN.

§ 22—*Creation and First Estate of Man.*

1. CREATION OF MAN. It is the teaching of Scripture that man came into being by the immediate power of God. There is a noticeable difference between the biblical phraseology descriptive of the origin of man, and that descriptive of the origin of other forms of organic life. In the latter, the mandates to "the waters" and "the earth" to "bring forth," seem to point to the use of some kind of creative agency with which nature had been endowed; man alone is the immediate creature of God, and the bearer of his image, Gen., 1 : 26, 27. Is., 45 : 12. Mark, 10 : 6. Acts, 17 : 28.

Nor is this teaching of Scripture contradicted, as yet, by any trustworthy authority of physical science. The conclusions of science may require us to modify our conceptions of the mode of man's creation, but they cannot disprove the fact of his creation; they may compel us, contrary to the Jewish apprehension, to recognize the intermediation of second causes, but they can determine nothing respecting the presence of the personal agent who gives to second causes their efficiency. The most that the Darwinian theory, or that any other theory, of evolution, has yet accomplished, is to show the possible method of the Divine procedure in the creation of man; it throws no light whatever on the causative power that used the method and wrought the result. Science, here as elsewhere, can observe phenomena,

1. According to the Jewish interpreter, Maimonides, God by his mandate caused the earth to bring forth of itself, but when man was to be made, he said to Nature "let us make man in our image." See note by Tayler Lewis, in *Lange's Commentary on Genesis*, p. 173.

and trace processes, and discern means, it can catch no glimpse of the invisible energy and creative Will that directs and controls in them all.

But in ascertaining the Scriptural conception of the origin of man, it is necessary that the two accounts of his creation in Gen. 1 : 26, 27, and in 2 : 7, be compared. It is in the latter passage and in the words, "the Lord God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life and man became a living soul," that, according to the commentators¹, we have an account of the origin of the "immortal principle"—the indestructible spirit of man. And yet, from Gen., 1 : 30, and 7 : 22, it is evident that no such meaning can be attached to the phrases "breath of life" and "living soul." Comp. Is., 2 : 22. 1 K., 17 : 17. Job, 27 : 3. Physiology, furthermore, gives no warrant to the thought that the origination of the soul is subsequent to the organization of the body. The truth seems to be, that in Gen., 1 : 27, we have the origin of the personal spirit, which alone bears the image of God, and whose origin is there specially distinguished from that of the sentient existence of all other animals ; whereas in Gen., 2 : 7, we have an account of the origin and composition of man as a material organism, and of that Divine act by which, respiration being made to begin, he came to a sentient or psychical existence². The first passage relates specially to the origination of what we call the human soul or spirit ; the second, to the formation of that physical structure or organism, which the soul, as a divinely empowered second cause, was enabled to take to itself out of earthly elements³—the same elements that enter into the organization of other animal as well as vegetable

1. See, besides the older authors, the later *Commentaries on Genesis* by Murphy, Bush, Keil & Delitzsch, and Lange ; also Delitzsch, *Bib. Psychologie*, 2, §3, and Heard, *Tripartite Nature of Man*, ch. 3.

2. That this passage contains any allusion to the origin of the "indestructible spirit" of man, is more than doubtful ; its "breathing into the nostrils," if any exact interpretation must be given to the words, would more properly express the mechanical act of *inflating the lungs*, through which, respiration beginning, man awoke to the consciousness of a sentient and personal existence.

3. It is noteworthy also that *bara* is the verb used in the first passage, and *yatsar* in the second.

structures. The residuum of this organism, when decomposed, is simply "dust," and hence the propriety of the biblical statement that the body of man was formed "of the dust of the ground." Gen., 2: 7. Comp. Job, 10: 9. Ecc., 12: 7. 1 Cor., 15: 47.

2. THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN. It is plain from the Bible that while man in himself is a unity, he is also a compounded being. He has at least a two-fold nature by which he is allied to two worlds, sustaining at once relations to the brute below him and to the angel above him. He is the only being, so far as we know, who forms in himself a tangential point between the two worlds of spirit and of matter.

Of how many parts is man's nature composed? Is it dichotomous, consisting simply of soul and body? or is it trichotomous, consisting of spirit, soul, and body? Looking casually at Gen., 2: 7. Ecc., 12: 7. Ps., 104: 29, one would be led to say that man consists simply of body and soul—that the triple phrase spirit, soul, and body, is intended simply to be exhaustive. And the impression that dichotomy is the teaching of Scripture derives some support from the great latitude of meaning in which the word *ψυχή*, soul, is used throughout the New Testament, denoting, sometimes merely natural life, sometimes the sentient or sensuous nature, sometimes the immortal or indestructible principle in man¹. But if we look more closely at Luke, 1: 46, 47. 1 Thess., 5: 23. Heb., 4: 12. Comp. 1 Cor., 2: 14, we find some ground for supposing that Luke, Paul and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, recognized in the nature of man three component parts.

On the supposition of trichotomy, the further question arises, whether the *ψυχή*, as distinguished from the *πνεῦμα* denotes the sensuous existence which is the product of the union of the *πνεῦμα* and the *σῶμα*; or whether, as Neander² supposes, the *πνεῦμα* denotes the soul in its elevated and normal relation to God and divine things, and the *ψυχή*, the same soul in its lower relation to sensuous, and perhaps

1. See Robinson's *Lexicon of the N. T.*

2. *Planting and Training of the Chr. Ch.*, p. 394.

sinful, objects of this world; or with Delitzsch³, that the *ψυχή* is an emanation from the *πνεῦμα*, and is distinct from it in substance but not in nature; that the *ψυχή* springs from the essence of the *πνεῦμα*, but is not identical with it in substance—just as the Son and the Spirit are of one essence with the Father, and yet are different hypostases²; that “the *pneuma* is the inbreathing of the Godhead and the *psyche* is the outbreathing of the *pneuma*.”

That some kind of trichotomic division of the nature of man was in the minds of several of the writers of the New Testament, particularly of Luke and Paul, there would seem good reason for believing; but just what their conception was, it is plain cannot with certainty be determined. To propose any theory of it, therefore, to which our theology is to be conformed, would be to build upon a basis of conjecture³.

3. THE IMAGE OF GOD in which man was created; in what did it consist? Was it, as the Socinians⁴ and Arminians⁵ affirmed, man's dominion over this lower world? But this is to mistake an effect for its cause, or to confound a function with its organ.

Shall we with the older Protestant theologians⁶ find it in the moral perfection or holiness of man? This answer would seem to be supported by the New Testament use of the phrase “image of God.” Christ is called the image of

1. *Bib. Psychol.*, 2, § 4.

2. The Rev. J. B. Heard in his *Tripartite Nature of Man*, though acknowledging in the Preface his “deep and constant obligations” to the *Bib. Psychologie* of Delitzsch, makes “body, soul, and spirit” to represent “the bodily organism, the intellectual faculties, and that higher spiritual consciousness by which we know and serve God,” and these “are not separable natures, but separate manifestations of the one nature.” “The Trinity is three persons in one nature or substance—the trichotomy is three natures in one person.” pp. 119, 120.

3. For illustrations of theories applied, see Heard's *Tripartite Nature of Man*.—Essays on The Scriptural Anthropology, by Dr. G. D. Boardman, in the *Baptist Quarterly*, vol. 1.

4. See Faustus Socinus, *Prælectiones Theologicae*, ch. 3, in *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*, vol. 1.

5. See Limborch's *Theologia*, lib. 2, cap. 24, § 2.

6. Calvin, Turretine, and Calvinists generally, and Gerhard, Quenstedt, and most Lutherans.

God, 2 Cor., 4: 4. Heb., 1: 3. Col., 1: 15; Christians are said to be "conformed" to the image of Christ and thereby to the image of God, Rom., 8: 29. 2 Cor., 3: 18. Col., 3: 10; and Christians are enjoined to strive after complete resemblance to the Divine character, Mat., 5: 48. Eph., 4: 22-24. But examination of these texts, as well as of the general teachings of Scripture, shows that it was not in his moral perfection that man's likeness to God consisted; on the contrary, it is evident that,

(a.) It was not the mere restoration of a lost image which the work of Christ proposed, but the carrying of man forward towards the realization of an ideal perfection to which he was destined, but with which he was not at the first endowed—it was, in fact, the production of a new and higher type of man than the original, 1 Cor., 15: 47-49. 1 Pet., 1: 15, 16. 1 John, 3: 1-3.

(b.) Moral perfection was not implied in the words "very good," which were spoken of the whole creation as well as of man, but simply, fitness to the ends had in view in the creation.

(c.) Moral perfection, moreover, as the possession of a free agent, cannot be the work of direct creation, but must be the product of discipline and of volitional action.

(d.) It is not taught in the Scriptures that the distinctive image in which man was at first created, was lost in the fall. So far from this being implied in Gen., 5: 1-3, a comparison of the first of those verses with the last naturally suggests a transmission of the original image. It is in other texts clearly intimated that the original image still survives. See Gen., 9: 6. Acts, 17: 28, 29. James, 3: 9. Comp. 1 Cor., 11: 7.

In what then consists the image or likeness of God in man? Doubtless in that assemblage of qualities which constitutes the immutable distinction between man and the brute creation—in other words, in his personal existence as a rational, moral being¹. And with this interpretation agree both the account of man's creation in Gen., 1: 26, 27, and

1. See definition of personality, p. 62.

the dominion over the lower creation, with which, in consequence of his divine likeness, he was entrusted¹.

4. THE ORIGINAL CONDITION OF MAN. On this point the Scriptural data are few and of uncertain import. Upon these data have been put interpretations the most diverse and even opposite²; and the light that, at present, falls on them from the Natural History of the race, does not contribute towards a conclusive determination of their meaning.

Man as the completed work of God was pronounced, in common with all the rest of the creation, "very good,"—that is, he was in all respects fitted for every relation he was to sustain, and qualified for every office he was to perform. Each instinct and attribute or endowment, of heart, mind and body, was in perfect harmony with all the others, and exactly fitted to its functions. As a moral being, he must have been innocent and sinless; as a rational intelligence, either an infant, and thus needing watch-care and nurture³, or gifted with some degree of maturity, and accordingly with ideas and some kind of language which are necessarily co-existent.

Two extremes of theory as to man's primal condition now challenge attention: one, the traditional orthodox theory of Protestant theology⁴, which ascribes to Adam a state of perfect holiness; the other, the so called scientific, which

1. See Augustine, *De Trin.*, 12, 7.—Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, vol. 2, pp. 350–54, Urwick's trans.—Nitzsch, *Chr. Lehre*, § 391. Comp. Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, vol. 1, p. 248, ff. According to Delitzsch, *Psychologie*, 2, § 2, "The Scripture nowhere says that the fallen man possesses the image of God in living reality." "Personality is only the basis of the contents of the image, but is not the image itself."

2. See Wiggers' *Augustinism and Pelagianism*, ch. 8. Comp. Romanist and Protestant views, Möhler, *Symbolism*, bk. 1, pt. 1.

3. No animal is so helpless at its birth as man; none so dependent on the nurture which intelligence alone can provide. See Argyle, *Reign of Law*, quotations from Guizot, pp. 28, 289, 290.

4. For the Catholic doctrine of a *supernaturale donum*—*donum superadditum*, by which Adam was endowed with original righteousness, see Bellarmine, *De Controversiis*, lib. 1, c. 4, 6.—Möhler, *Symbolism*, bk. 1, pt. 1, § 1.—*Roman Catechism*, pt. 1, ch. 2, ques. 13. For the Pelagian view, see Augustine's *De Gestis Pelagii*, ch. 11.—Wiggers as above.—F. Socinus, *Prælect. Theo.*, ch. 2.—Sheldon's *Discourses on Sin and Redemption*.

makes man to have arisen from the lowest barbarism, and to have been originally not only a congener of the ape, but the offspring of still lower animals. But it is equally doubtful whether a just interpretation of Scripture warrants the theological view on the one hand, or the real facts of science the scientific view on the other. That man, according to the Bible, was immature and untried at the outset, and consequently at the best only sinless, seems clearly enough implied in the garden that was prepared for him; nor is there anything in the New Testament implying that his first estate was more than that of innocence. And since civilization, in any just conception of it, can be only the product of human experience, his civil and social condition must have been of the humblest. But on the other hand, the supposition of an original savage condition, but little if any removed from the level of the more intelligent brutes, is a mere conjecture, unsupported by any decisive evidence¹, besides being wholly contrary to the Scriptures.

§ 23—*The Fall of Man.*

The New Testament never directly asserts that man was originally a sinless being, but everywhere takes for granted as an admitted and well known fact, that he is not now what he was at the beginning. See John, 8: 44. Ro., 5: 12-14. 1 Cor., 15: 21, 22. 2 Cor., 11: 3. 1 Tim., 2: 14. Comp. Heb., 2: 7. The doctrine of a fall from primitive innocence was not called in question by those for whom the New Testament was specially written. The Gospel, furthermore, is a provision for the race as it now is, and a provision available to those only who are conscious of their need of it, and have faith in its power to deliver them; consequently,

1. Reasoning from metaphysical premises and a priori principles, on either side of this question, will no longer suffice; it must be settled, if at all, by a wide range of facts. Nor will it suffice to treat it as Sir John Lubbock has done in his recent book, *The Origin of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man*; a crude mass of unsifted testimonies, such as he has raked together without discrimination, be it ever so vast, cannot furnish grounds for safe induction.

Christ and his Apostles were always more intent on awakening a sense of guilt and need, than on reiterating the admitted fact of a lapse.

And that human nature has thus lapsed from its original moral state—that every one comes short of the realization of the typical ideal which lies at the basis and constitutes the groundwork of his personal existence, is universally and unequivocally proclaimed in the moral consciousness of the race. All languages and religions¹ testify, in one way or another, not only to a non-attainment of the ideal stage of which we are capable, but to a non-compliance with those constituent laws of being without which there could be no human personality and no human responsibility. The fact of sin, in other words of a lapse of our nature from a primeval status, is one of which our nature, by its very constitution, is forced perpetually to remind itself.

But in this original state there could have been no knowledge of moral evil as such, nor of good as the contrast of evil. Originally faultless as the work of God, all man's spontaneities must have been right, and yet to develop these spontaneities into consciously elective and determinative principles of character—to secure personal worthiness to individuals, it was necessary that there should be volitional action. It was necessary that what was man's by gift of creation, should become his by personal appropriation; that the capabilities of his nature should be developed into actualities of character. And in order to this it was requisite there should be tentation or trial. This tentation of the primitive man, (temptation in the good sense of the word,) was just as necessary to his maturity, and was just as much a cause of gratitude or joy with him, as trial now is with every truly christian man. See James, 1: 2. But temptation in its bad sense, and a fall from innocence, were no more necessary to the perfection of the first man, than a marring of any one's character is now necessary to its completeness.

It is at this point that we encounter the chief difficulties in the doctrine of a fall, and discover the most plausible grounds

1. See Hardwick, *Christ and other Masters*, vol. 1, pt. 2, § 2.

for a denial of the fact. It is perfectly intelligible that free personality involves the power of choice between opposites, and that one condition of perfection of being, may have been the possibility of sinning. But any explanation that can be given of its possibility, leads directly and necessarily to an inquiry for explanation of its actuality; and any explanation that can be given of it as fact, must in the end prove to be its justification. Sin explained is sin defended.

Four distinct methods of explanation have been attempted:

1. That which finds a solution in the original compounding of man as matter and spirit—as body and soul, and traces the origin of moral evil to the antagonism between flesh and spirit. It supposes the beginning of sin to have been in the succumbing of the spiritual nature to the sensuous. But the explanation rests upon a Manichæan notion that sensuous activities are in themselves sinful¹; it overlooks the fact that the spiritual may dominate the sensuous completely and yet sin still rule in the soul; it does not recognize the truth, that some of the most damning sins of man have no connection with his bodily or sensuous nature; and the explanation finds no support in Paul's metaphorical use of *σάρξ* as synonymous with sin, a close scrutiny of his use giving no warrant to the conjecture that he ascribes the origin of moral evil to the triumph of the senses over the spirit².

2. Another theory is that which, building on the analogical argument from contrast sin nature, makes moral evil to be a necessary condition of development for both the individual and the race³. Its error is in confounding temptation or trial with temptation or seduction to evil. It falls into

1. This was specially true of the older monastic advocates of the theory; but with its abler and later defenders, like DeWett and Rothe, it is only in the preponderance of sensuousness that sin begins.

2. Neander, *Planting and Training of the Ch.*, p. 385, and ff.—Müller, *Doctrine, &c.*, bk. 2, ch. 2, § 5. Comp. Tholuck, *Stud. u. Keit.*, 1855, h. 3, ab. 1.

3. See Müller, *Doct. of Sin*, bk. 2, ch. 4. This theory as expounded by Hegel, is applied in extenso by Baring Gould in his *Origin and Development of Relig. Belief*. Comp. Birk's *Difficulties of Belief*, ch. 2, and Mozley, *Bampt. Lects.*, lect. 4. who declares evil to be "a necessary contingency attaching to trial, a necessary fact for discipline."

the radical vice in argument of supposing that man's experience, by which all his logic is limited, has been the only one possible for him; in other words, it assumes necessitarianism, and can be maintained only on the ground either of dualism or of pantheism; and its conclusion makes moral evil to be one stage of virtue, and the fall to have been upward rather than downward¹.

3. A third theory, traces evil to the metaphysical imperfection of man as a limited or finite being. Finiteness of existence is conceived of as in itself privatively evil—as a privation of good; and the choices of finite intelligences are regarded as being, on account of their finiteness, imperfect, and, as such, evil. This is virtually the explanation of Leibnitz in his *Theodicy*², and of Bushnell in his *Nature and the Supernatural*³. But it is difficult to see how moral evil can be due to the limitations, either of the nature or of the choices, of the creature, and not thereby be traceable either to the will, or to some limitation in the sovereignty, of the creature's Creator⁴. The evil, moreover, of finiteness, whether of a person or of an act, is merely a metaphysical conception—an abstraction in thought, whereas the moral evil that is supposed to spring out of it, is both apprehended by the conscience, and dealt with by moral laws, as something which is intensely real and is the culpable product of direct volition.

4. A fourth explanation of the origin of evil ascribes it, directly or indirectly, to the will of God. This is the view, in one aspect or another of it, which has generally been taken by Calvinistic theologians; a few of whom have

1. This is actually maintained by L. A. Sawyer, in his *Reconstruction of Bib. Theories*, chh. 7, 8.

2. *Theodicięe*, pt. 1, §§ 34, 64.

3. Ch. 4.

4. Dr. Bushnell's "condition privative," which he supposes to attach to all creatures, angels and men, "involves their certain lapse into evil,"—"the certainty of their sin is involved in their training as powers;" and he supposes the same "condition privative" to be "a bad possibility that environs God from eternity, waiting to become a fact and certain to become a fact whenever an opportunity is given. See *Nat. and the Supernat.*, pp. 107, 134. Comp. Henry James, *The Nature of Evil*, p. 71 and ff.

ascribed its origin to the more or less immediate efficiency of God¹; others to his mediate² agency; while the great majority have supposed the divine connection with the existence of moral evil to be only that of permission; but all have united in regarding it as one of the means by which, in the divine economy, the character and glory of God are specially manifested³.

Against the notion of a divine efficiency in the origin of evil, stands the most indubitable evidence that God is an infinitely holy and just Being; he cannot have been the author of that which is absolutely opposed to himself. Nor is divine authorship defensible on the ground of the necessity of divine support in human action. To sustain a finite and free being in existence, and thus make his activities possible, is not to necessitate his actions, nor to approve them, nor yet to determine their moral qualities. The scholastic theory of a divine *concursum* throws no light on the relation of God to evil, unless, distinguishing between the material and the formal of an action, and ascribing the latter alone to man, we make him responsible for the mere shell of his acts, and God for that which alone makes them to be acts at all.

Nor yet is the objection removed by ascribing its origin to God's mediate agency. The distinction is merely verbal.

1. The earlier Reformed theologians denied that God was the direct author of the fall and yet maintained that it was divinely decreed—that God “willed” it—that he permitted it, non invitus vel nolens sed volens. Calvin, *Instit.* 3, 23, 7, says, Deum Adamæ casum arbitrio suo dispensasse.—Beza, *Quæ. et Resp. libellus*, 1, 103, says, Omnia, ut ipse Deus ab eterno decrevit, efficacissimo causas omnes intermediarias disponens, ut ad destinatum finem necessario, quod ad ipsum decretum attinet, ferantur.—Emmons, Sermon, on Nature of Sin, *Works*, vol. 2, ed. '60, p. 683, says, “there is but one true and satisfactory answer to the question which has been agitated for centuries, *Whence came evil?*—and that is, *it came from the great First Cause of all things.*” Comp. pp. 263, 441 and vol. 4, pp. 272, 366, 382. See also, *Am. Theol. Rev.*, Jan. '62.

2. The word “mediate” may not inappropriately represent the Reformed distinction implied in a *permissio non otiosa sed negotiosa vel efficax*, which was at the same time non efficiens. See Schweizer, *Glaubenslehre d. Evan. ref. Kir.*, § 50, and Ebrard, *Dogmatik.* §§ 265, 337.

3. Wollæbius, *Theol.*, 67, Peccatum Deus noluit et voluit; noluit quatenus peccatum est, voluit quatenus est medium patefaciendæ gloriæ, misericordiæ et justitiæ. See als, Sam'l Hopkins, *Works*, vol. 1, pp. 90, 100, vol. 3, 735, 736.

It matters not whether the divine will be effected by an immediate first cause, or by a mediate second cause; or whether the mediate cause be one, or a ten thousandth, remove from the Divine Being himself. He is the direct author of whatever he really causes, whether that causation be immediate, or be transmitted through the created agency of intermediate beings.

Nor yet again are the difficulties attendant on this explanation really removed by the theory of a permissive authorship. If the permission were on account of the good ends which moral evil might be made to subserve, it is impossible to understand how this can consist with the divine character, or how it can be right for God to do evil that good may come, any more than for man. If the permission were unwillingly (*involunté*) yielded, it is impossible to understand how this can consist with the infinite attributes of Godhead. And no aid is rendered to our understanding of the matter, by an attempt to distinguish between the will and the wisdom of God,—the former being regarded as opposed to, and the latter as coöperating in, the introduction of moral evil: a God thus divided against himself is not the God of the Bible.

But on the other hand, God was the Creator of man; was the author of that free-will, through abuse of which man fell; and though the bestower of gifts is no way responsible for abuse of them, yet the Creator made his creature capable of falling if tempted, and placed him where he was not only to be tried by divine tests, but to be solicited to evil by an overmastering tempter. The result could not have been purposed, nor yet unforeseen, nor yet again beyond the power of God to prevent¹. The origin of evil is an insoluble mystery².

1. The majority of later writers on Theodicy,—like Young, in his *Mystery of Evil and God*, see pt. 3, c. 1, sec. 4. Birk's *Difficulties of Belief*, ch. 2, and Bushnell,—are disposed to repudiate indignantly the conception of a Divine permission of evil, and to refer its existence to a volitional power in man, which, Omnipotence could not control. The question, however, is, whether a different constitution and conditioning of man at the outset, were possible for Omnipotence, and not, whether constituted and conditioned as man was, Omnipotence could have prevented his fall.

2. The attempt of Origen, *De Principiis*, 1, 2, 8, of Julius Müller, *The Chr.*

Our only resource then is, while we admit the inexplicability of the existence of moral evil, to affirm, with the Scriptures, that, as the work of God, man was sinless and endowed with free-will; as such, he could have resisted temptation and moved ever onward in normal development. Uninfluenced from without, he might, or rather, so far as any analysis of his actions is for us possible, he must have remained an unfallen being.

How, even under temptation, he could have so willed against his nature, as by volition to have changed the nature itself, is absolutely inconceivable. But that he was capable of such volition, and, by its exercise fell from his original sinlessness, is plainly taught in the Scriptures, and the reproaches of the individual conscience for personal obliquities, even amid the darkness and ruin of the fall, seem to be conclusive evidence of the same great fact.

§ 24—*Consequences of the Fall; or Man as he now is.*

The consequences of the fall of man are sometimes divided into those which resulted immediately to our first parents, and those which have resulted to their descendants; but whatever befel the progenitors of the race, their descendants have inherited. By the fall, there was lost an original righteousness which, but for its loss, would have been the birthright of every one of the race, and in its stead there were incurred certain positive evils which, to every one, have been a heritage of woe.

The distinction between penalty and consequences,—guilt and liability, so much insisted on in modern theology, can be maintained only, by limiting our knowledge of moral law to the mere statutes of the Bible; by restricting human

Doct. of Sin, v. 2, b. 4, c. 4, and of Edward Beecher, *The Conflict of Ages, passim*, to push the origin of sin back into a preëxistent state, admits its inexplicability by assuming that its origin must have been in a previous state of being, of which we can, necessarily, neither know anything nor form any justifiable conception.

guilt to the violation of those statutes; and by so distinguishing between Nature and Revelation as most unwarrantably to separate them. But if God be the author of the constitution and course of nature, if the office of the formal revelation of the Bible be to supplement and to supplant the earlier revelation of Nature, then all painful consequences of wrong acts must be as distinctly penal as if they had been formally threatened.

What were the consequences of the Fall? Turning to the Scriptures, we find that the special consequence of disobedience, of which, according to Gen., 2: 17, particular forewarning had been given, and which, in Ro., 5: 12, 14, and 1 Cor., 15: 22, is said to have been incurred, is death. Adam and death are so intimately and constantly associated in the New Testament as to teach, beyond a doubt, that death has been the chief consequence of his fall. But the word death has at least two meanings in the Scriptures; the first, that of separation of the soul from the body¹; the second, the soul's separation from God². In which sense of the word has death, as the great penalty for sin, been a consequence of the fall? Preëminently, though not exclusively, we think, in the latter; and for the following reasons:

1. The penalty was explicit; "in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." But man did not die, in the literal sense of the word, on the day of his transgression, nor until very many years thereafter; according to Gen., 3: 8, 16-19, he did die, in the second or metaphorical sense of the word, immediately—on the very day of his transgression. Nor is it anything else than puerile trifling with language, to say that Adam *began* to die on the day of his transgression, by becoming mortal—by having the seeds of disease planted within him.

2. Science confirms the view. Geology assures us that death, as cessation of animal life, existed in this world

1. "Decessus animi a corpore."—*Cicero*.

2. Eternal death, the "second death" of Rev., 2: 11. 20: 6, 14. 21: 8, has been very generally regarded as a third meaning; but instead of a third meaning, the epithets "second" and "eternal" seem rather to convey the idea of a continuance of spiritual death in another and timeless existence.

untold ages before man's appearance in it—thus furnishing a most decisive argument against the supposition that temporal death was the chief penalty threatened¹; and Physiology, teaching that all vital organisms, both vegetable and animal, have their stages of inception, growth, maturity, decay and dissolution, destroys the supposition that the body, without some great change or transformation, could have been immortal. Just what provision, for arresting the tendency to decay and dissolution in the body of man, may have been intended in the paradisiacal "tree of life," it is impossible to say.

3. Merely physical death would have been wholly inadequate as a punishment for the enormity of sin². So far from being a penalty, it is often sought as a refuge from inevitable ills. Multitudes have seized it as a blessing. Almost every passion in the human heart has conquered the fear of it³. Cæsar, according to the historian Sallust⁴, thought it an insufficient punishment for Catiline.

4. The contrasts in the New Testament between the persons and the natures of Christ and of Adam, imply the latter to have been naturally mortal. See, for instance, 1 Cor., 15 : 45-49. The antitheses, in these verses, between *πνευματικός* and *ψυχικός*, *ἐπουράνιος* and *χοϊκός*, plainly imply a natural perishableness in the body of man.

5. The contrast between Adam and Christ in Ro., 5 : 12-19, and in similar passages, requires that death, as a consequence of the fall, be understood preëminently in its figurative sense. The blessings Christ bestows are preëminently spiritual, and so are the curses or penalties that he removes. He that believes on Christ, is never to taste death—to see death ; for him, Christ has abolished death.

1. The notion that the existence of death in the world prior to the appearance of man, was a proleptic penalty, an "anticipative consequence" of sin, is one of those expedients for meeting a difficulty from physical science, which so often and so justly invoke on theology the sneers of scientific men.

2. See Hopkins, *Works*, vol. 1, pp. 187, ff.

3. See Lord Bacon's *Essay on Death*.

4. *Catilina*, § 51.

6. Christ saves no one, and promised to save no one, from physical death, though he came to destroy death, the consequence of sin, by destroying sin itself. The salvation he bestows on every believer is commensurate with the ruin of the fall, but not to the extent of relieving any one from temporal death. Had temporal or literal death been the specific penalty for sin, then the literal death of Christ should have destroyed the penalty, otherwise the salvation he procures is not the restoration of something lost, but the bestowment of something wholly additional to man's original gifts.

7. With the idea of spiritual death as the penal consequence of sin, agrees the constant New Testament use of the word "death" as synonymous with the Divine displeasure—with the whole range of penal consequences of moral evil; and of the word "life," as synonymous with the Divine approval—with that comprehensive blessedness which is the reward of fidelity to God.

Yet it is not to be denied that, according to the Scriptures, natural death, as it now occurs, is, in some sense, a consequence of the fall of Adam¹. Nor have we any knowledge by which it can be conclusively shown that death, in its present form, would have been the inevitable lot of man, had he never sinned. We know not what changes may have taken place in man's surroundings in this world; what provision there may have been in "the tree of life" for transforming his body and for imparting to it that sublimated, spiritualized, condition which was requisite to its immortality, and now is attainable only through the process of dissolution and resurrection. Nor yet, on the other hand, is there anything in the Scriptures positively requiring our belief in the natural immortality of the body of Adam; intimations to the contrary, as we have seen above, seem to be clearly and variously given.

1. There are single texts in the writings of Paul, e. g. Ro., 5: 12, in which the chief meaning of *θάνατος* as a penalty for sin may be literal death, just as there are other passages, e. g. 2 Cor., 4: 10, 11, 12, in which the predominant meaning of *ζωή*, as the reward of righteousness, is literal life. Compare the use of *ψυχή* in the Gospel of Matthew. For the different interpretations of *θάνατος*, in Ro., 5: 12, see Schaff's ed. of Lange, *Com. on Ro.*

Our conclusion, then, must be that, according to the Scriptures, man was constitutionally mortal, though provision was made for his immortality; by the fall he became necessarily and painfully mortal; by the death and resurrection of Christ, a blessed immortality is conditionally restored to him; but the death which came upon him as a penal consequence of transgression, and which now lends to death its punitive qualities, was that confusion and corruption of the moral elements of his being, which has alienated him from God and made him the prey of remorse¹.

FREEDOM OF WILL was also lost, as a consequence of the fall. Will is the central principle of personality—"is conscious self-determination, the self-determination of an *ego*;" as innate faculty, it is potentiality of being; as elective force, it is the soul in movement. Freedom of will has been conceived of, (*a.*) as the absence of outward constraint; (*b.*) as a state of equilibrium or equipoise; (*c.*) as a necessary condition of rational existence; (*d.*) as a harmonious working of all the faculties of one's being. Outward constraint and a state of equilibrium are inconceivable as belonging to any state of moral being: the former conception is excluded by the very idea of will²; and the latter³ is conceivable as possible only for a being who is not moral—is a state of indifference, from which there could be escape only by the aid of external causes, or by an irrational arbitrariness of self-determination, either of which destroys the very idea of volition and morality. There remain, then, as descriptive of freedom of will in the ideal man, the two following conceptions,—one, that of a power of mental self-determination, which is necessarily coëxistent and commensurate with the faculty of discrimination; the other, that of the concurrent and harmonious

1. On this whole question see Calvin, *Instit.*, bk. 2, ch. 1, s. 5.—Hopkins, *Works*, vol. 1, pp. 212, ff.—Bellamy, *Works*, vol. 1, pp. 227, ff.—Bretschneider, *Dogmatik*, § 122.—Hitchcock, *Religion and Geology*.—Tayler Lewis, *Genesis and Geology*.—Müller, *Chr. Doct. of Sin*, bk. 4, ch. 2, § 6.—Delitzsch, *Bib. Psychol.*, 3, § 2.

2. "Voluntas quæ potest cogi et cogitur, non est voluntas sed noluntas."—Luther.

3. For a discussion of this notion of freedom, see Edwards' *Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will*, pt 2, sec. 7.

action of all the powers that properly make up the human personality. The one still survives in all men; the other was lost in the fall. The first is involved in the very idea of personality. Intelligence, conscience and will, which together constitute personality, can coëxist only on condition of the freedom of each in its own sphere. An intelligent will, if its choices are to be subject to the review of conscience, must be a free will. This freedom, sometimes denominated "formal," in contradistinction from "real," freedom, is, therefore, necessarily conceived of as the inviolable endowment of personality in any state of being.

Both conscience and Scripture recognize formal freedom as an inalienable birth-right, for the possession and exercise of which man is still responsible. The economy of law, whether of Judaism or of Nature, implies its continued existence. Those alternatives of choice so frequently presented in the Old Testament history, Deut., 30: 15, 16; Josh., 24: 15, 21, 24; 1 Kings, 18: 21, and in the present daily experience of all men, appeal to it as still existing. The New Testament also represents salvation as conditioned on our voluntary acceptance of it, Matt., 7: 7; 11: 12; Luke, 11: 5-13; Heb., 3: 8, even while it represents our choice to be only a compliance with the suggestions of the divinely constraining Spirit, John, 6: 44; Ro., 9: 16; Phil., 2: 13; and declares the gospel to be ineffectual with some, because, in the exercise of their own free will, they choose to reject it, Matt., 23: 37; John, 5: 40; Acts, 7: 51. But the freedom thus recognized by Scripture and conscience, is a freedom to discern and to elect, but not to appropriate, the right; is a possession so much encumbered, that, without superhuman aid, it can be of little avail to us; the recognition of it is for the purpose of teaching us, that, though still consciously free to choose between good and evil, we actually appropriate evil in the end, unless the *real* freedom of our nature, now lost, has been restored to us¹.

1. As Delitzsch expresses it, man as he now is, is *wahlfrei aber nicht machtfrei*.

2. Fischer, *Der Untersuchung üb. d. Spekula. Begriff d. Freiheit*.—Müller, vol. 2, bh. 3, pt. 1, c. 1.—Luthardt, *Lehre vom freien Willen*, § 2.

There yet remains to be considered the last and profoundest meaning that has been attached to the phrase, Freedom of the Will. This conceives of man as an ideally perfect being, in whom all the functions of his nature are in absolute accord. What his will demands, all the higher powers of his nature approve; and what these higher powers command, his will spontaneously elects¹. He instinctively chooses the good, and his whole nature conspires towards the realization of his choice. Such an one must be the possessor of *real* freedom—a freedom which is the noblest distinction and the crowning glory of a personal existence; and such is the freedom, the freedom of a perfectly well-balanced nature, which the unfallen or ideal man must be supposed to have possessed². But from this original estate

1. The seventh chapter of Romans describes the condition of one in whom reason and conscience have begun to resume their rightful authority, but in whom the once enslaved will, now partially released, has not yet been completely set free.

2. If it be said that this is only a freedom to act out one's nature, and that a thoroughly bad man would be just as free in his activities as a thoroughly good man would be in his, it must be remembered that the basis of all personal being is in itself good, and that no amount of wickedness can so completely corrupt the reason and conscience, that they will not at times come into violent collision with the erring will. It is this collision that reveals to the bad man the enslavement of his will.

Much confusion on this whole subject will be avoided, if we bear in mind the evident distinction that exists between will as the central determining power of the individual, (arbitrium,) and that by-play of the will's elective force, (voluntas,) which may be toward a good or bad object, according as its movement may have been at the dictate of a higher or of a lower impulse of our nature. The eddies of a stream should not be confounded with its general current. Stapfer says: "Per vocem *arbitrii* auctores latini denotant potentiam ac voluntatem eligendi. Per *libertatem* vero intelligimus facultatem animæ nostræ ex pluribus contingentibus sponte eligendi id, quod optimum judicat. Si ergo duas has nationes simul sumamus, *liberum arbitrium* cam denotat animæ rationalis facultatem, qua, si omnia ad agendum adsint requisita, potest agere vel non agere, hoc vel illud agere. Si ergo homini in statu corruptionis liberi arbitrii vires superesse negamus, hoc volumus: Eam animæ ipsius deesse facultatem, in spiritualibus nonnisi ad bonum sese determinare illudque agere potest. [Notandum hic non negari homini voluntatem, sed ejus facultatem nonnisi ad bonum sese determinandi; unde si nonnulli veteres ecclesiæ doctores homini etiam irregente liberum arbitrium tribuerent, ipsi non hanc voluntatis facultatem, sed nonnisi ipsam hominis intellexerunt voluntatem"—]. *Institut.*

both conscience and Scripture now declare man to have deeply fallen; John, 8: 34; Ro., 3: 11-18; 6: 16; 7: 14; Eph., 2: 2, 3. His moral being is in a state of anarchy; his affections are corrupted; his understanding is darkened; his will rebels against the higher powers of his soul; he is in bondage to the spirit of evil that has usurped the control of him. He has lost his *posse non peccare*, and must now be described as *non posse non peccare*¹.

The office of CONSCIENCE was also affected by the Fall. The word conscience is ordinarily used in two senses; the one denoting a faculty; the other a function. As a faculty, conscience is that original endowment² by which man neces-

Theol., vol. 4, cap. 16, § 34. Comp. also *idem*, vol. 1, cap. 3, §§ 721, 723, 724. "Quando intellectus hominis sibi aliquid ut bonum representat, appetitus oritur, qui si intellectum ducem sequitur et rationalis est, nominatur voluntas. Quoniam itaque voluntas sequitur representationem intellectus, et id tantum appetit, quod intellectus sub specie boni cognoscit, hinc cogi non potest. Et cum cogi nequeat, anima vel ad volendum vel nolendum seipsa determinat." For a different use of voluntas and arbitrium, see Shedd, *Discourses and Essays*, pp. 241-248.

1. The interminable controversies that have agitated the church on the question of free-will, have been between the advocates of the exclusive truth of either a real or of a formal freedom; and a manifest solution of the whole problem would be reached, if by any means it could be demonstrably shown that both are true and reconcilable with one another. The controversy has been the same, whether between Augustine and Pelagius, and their successors through the middle ages, or between Luther and Erasmus, or between Calvinists and the Arminians among all the subdivisions of the Protestant churches, or in this country between Jonathan Edwards and his innumerable critics; on the Augustine side, the existence of a formal freedom was, until later years, almost ignored, New England writers half recognizing it in their factitious distinction between natural and moral ability; on the Pelagian and Arminian side, by exclusive appeal to consciousness, the biblical idea of real freedom has been persistently overlooked. See Luthard, above referred to. The literature on the subject is commensurate with that on Psychology and Theology. The standard treatise in English, on the Augustinian side, is Edward's *Inquiry*, to which unsatisfactory replies have been written by Tappan, Bledsoe, Wheedon and others. One of the latest and ablest of American writers on the anti-Edwardean side, is Hazard, *Freedom of Mind in Willing*. See also his *Two Letters on Causation and on Freedom of Mind in Willing*, addressed to J. Stuart Mill.

2. The notion that the conscience was not an original endowment of the unfallen man but was a product of his fall,—see *Gewissen*, by Schenkel, in Herzog, *Real Encyclopäid.*, vol. 5, specially p. 136—can be entertained only on the assumption, that the exclusive office of conscience is the ministration of condemnation and not of approval as well.

sarily pronounces judgment on the moral quality of his actions; as a function, it is that self-approval or self-condemnation, of which every one, in view of his actions is more or less conscious. The faculty, like every other original endowment, is inalienable; its functions may be more or less disturbed, according to one's moral tastes, enlightenment and habits.

The evidences of a present functional disturbance in the action of conscience, are too clear and too numerous to be set aside. It is only too evident that its actual decisions are strangely erroneous. The faculty, which in a normal and ideal state of existence, should, and undoubtedly always would, render right decisions, and invariably guide in the right path, now often renders false judgments, and positively misleads. It matters not what may be our explanation of these erroneous decisions; whether we may suppose the judgments to be intuitive, and that the intuitional perceptions have been darkened; or whether we may suppose the judgments to be in accordance with certain imaginary obligations, which the whole mind has been schooled into regarding as divinely authoritative¹, the fact of erroneous rulings by the conscience is none the less real; and the fact of a functional disturbance in its action, seems none the less indisputable. Whatever may be the skill of the conscience in deciphering the unwritten, but obscured, law of the heart, Ro., 2: 14, 15, it is only when that law has been reëngraved on the heart, Heb., 8: 10, and the conscience by reënlighment has been rescued from its deadly mistakes, Heb., 9: 14, that the traces of the fall begin to be effectively removed, and the extent of the injury it has suffered in the fall to become really apparent.

So also there has been lost to our race a freedom from the perverting influence of evil example; a wrong tendency has

1. On the opposing theories of intuitional and derivative judgments of the conscience, see Whewell, *Hist. of Moral Phil. in Eng.* Introduct. Lect.—Garbett, *Bampt. Lects.*, *The Dogmatik Faith*, lect. 7.—Leckey, *History of European Morals*, ch. 1. Compare also the views of Dr. Rudolph Hofmann, in his *Die Lehre von dem Gewissen*, and Martin Kehler in his *Die schriftgemässe Lehre vom Gewissen*.

been given, both by example and by corruption of will, to the whole current of human life; human society has become organically evil. The whole world now lieth in wickedness—under dominion of the evil one, and all men are enslaved, until reëndowed with the “liberty of the children of God;” 1 John, 5: 19. John, 6: 44. Ro., 8: 21.

§ 25—*Sin.*

1. DEFINITION. Theologians have differed so widely in their definitions of sin¹ that we must betake ourselves at once to the Bible. We there find that the two words most

1. Thomas Aquinas: *Peccatum est actus voluntarius malus * * * actus devians ab ordine debiti finis contra regulam naturæ, rationis vel legis eternæ.*—*Summa*, pars 1, ques. 71.

Melanthon: *Peccatum est defectus, vel inclinatio, vel actus, pugnans cum lege Dei.*—*Locis*, de peccato.

Calvin: *Concupiscentia, totum hominem non aliud ex seipso esse quam concupiscentiam. * * * Peccatum est adversus Dei voluntatem rebellio.*—*Instit.*, lib. 2, c. 8, sec. 59.

Quenstedt: *Peccatum esse illegalitatem seu discrepantiam a lege Dei; non omne peccatum sit voluntarium.*—*Theologia*, pars 2, p. 968.

Van Maastricht: *Peccatum esse aliquid privativum quod consistat in solâ avoia; seu absentia rectitudinis moralis, in subjecto capaci—privatio rectitudinis moralis, adesse debite.*—*Theol.*, lib. 4, c. 2, § 21.

Buddeus: *Abstracte spectatum, defectus conformitatis cum lege divina; concrete spectatum, subjectum illud, cui defectus ille seu privatio inest.*—*Theol.*, lib. 3, c. 2, § 2, note.

Pictet: *Discrepantia a lege et privatio rectitudinis quæ deberet inesse creaturæ rationali secundum præscriptum legis.*—*Theologia*, lib. 5, c. 3, § 6.

Stapfer: *Si peccatum, sive malum morale, definire velimus, dicimus; illud esse absentiam relationis actioni debite inesse.*—*Institutiones*, vol. 1, § 842.

Reinhard: *Quævis absentia convenientiæ cum lege divina.*—*Dogmatik*, § 77.

Westminster Assembly's Catechism: *Any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, any law of God given as a rule to the reasonable creature.*

Nat. Emmons: *All sin consists in the free, voluntary exercise of selfishness, cannot be transferred from one being to another.*—*Sermon on Native Deprav.*, vol. 4, 1st ed., pp. 502, 508. “Sin consists in sinning.”

Moses Stuart: *A voluntary transgression of a known law, by a rational, free, moral agent.*—*Bib. Repos.*, 2d series, vol. 1, p. 279.

Prof. E. A. Park: *Sin consists in the choice or preference of that which the conscience requires us to refuse, or in the voluntary refusal of that which the conscience requires us to prefer.*—*Bib. Sac.*, vol. 8, p. 626.

commonly employed to denote sin, in its generic sense, are, in the Hebrew, *חָטָא*, and in the Greek, *ἁμαρτανῶ*, both of which signify, primarily, to miss, or come short of, one's aim. The underlying thought in these words, as used in the Scriptures, is, doubtless, that of a voluntary departure from known divine requirements; and the same thought is the controlling, if not exclusive, one, in all the other Hebrew terms relating to sin, as well as in the corresponding Greek words in the Septuagint. To the Jewish mind, sin, ordinarily,—possibly not always, see Ps., 19: 12. Ps., 51: 5, 10,—was a transgression of the Mosaic law. But the same Greek words which, in the Septuagint, denote violations of positive enactments, have in the New Testament, another and profounder meaning. No longer restricted to the narrow sense of mere offenses against positive precepts, they often imply transgressions of the hidden laws of being, of which the precepts are merely representative. This is specially true in the Pauline use of the generic word *ἁμαρτία*; and the same reach of meaning is only less apparent in his use of the words *ἀδικία*, *ἀσέβεια*, and in John's use of *ἀνομία*, 1 ep., 3: 4. Thus Paul in his argument for the universal sinfulness of our race, in the passage beginning Ro., 1: 17. and ending 3: 20, assumes in 2: 12, comp. 5: 13, that there is sin, and also its penalty, even where there is no published statute; that the sinning heathen were the transgressors of the laws of their own being, and that their own consciences had notified them of their guilt, Ro., 2: 14, 15. Paul tells us also that the positive Mosaic law was given for the special purpose of accomplishing what the natural law of our being could not accomplish, viz.: to bring to light and condemn the latent but deadly power of moral evil—a power that, having seated itself in the human heart, can be effectually evoked and destroyed only by the aid of a written law, Ro., 3: 20. 7: 7-11, 13. Gal., 3: 19.

Now sin, which thus rules as a deadly force in man, is represented in Scripture as shewing itself in single acts, which are denominated sins, transgressions, iniquities, etc.; is also depicted as a principle which reigns in the soul with the

uniformity of law, John, 8: 34. Ro., 5: 21. 6: 12-14. 7: 8, 9, 11, 13., and determines the guilt of the soul's actions, Ro., 7: 17, 23, 25. 8: 2.; and finally, is said to be at once an effect and cause of a corrupt state of the heart, and to constitute in itself a permanent state of guilt, Matt., 15: 18, 19. Luke, 6: 45. Ro., 5: 12, 21. 6: 6. 7: 14-17, 24. Eph., 2: 3.

Sin, then, may be comprehensively defined as follows: as an act, it is a transgression of God's law; as a principle that determines the guilt of acts, it is opposition or hostility to God; as a state or nature, it is moral unlikeness to God¹.

2. The ESSENCE of sin; in what does it consist? By this is meant to inquire, what it is in sin which makes it to be (*esse*) sin. The question is not identical with that of the origin of sin, though closely akin to it². If the origin of an act or a state were in itself alone, then its cause and its essence might be one; but the principle of life and its cause are not more clearly distinct from each other than are the essence and the cause of sin. No answer that can be given to the inquiry respecting the origin of sin, can be of any service to us in dealing with sin itself; but on our answer to the inquiry into its essential nature must depend our conceptions of both the remedy that has been provided for it, and the method by which that remedy may be made available.

A. Is the essence of sin in Sensuousness? *i. e.* is it in the soul's voluntary surrender of itself to the dominion of the senses, and so, finally, to the control of the bodily impulses and appetites? To the affirmative of this question, it must be admitted that certain words and phrases in the epistles of Paul lend apparent support. He contrasts *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα*, the *σαρκικοί*, (*σάρκινοι*), and the *πνευματικοί*; he designates sinful desires as *ἐπιθυμίαι σαρκός*, comp. 2 Pet., 2: 18. 1 John, 2: 16; and he uses *σῶμα* and *μέλη* to denote the

1. Nichts ist gedankenloser, als behaupten. Sünde sei jedesmal nur einzelne That, und das Wort *ἁμαρτία* könne nur diese eigentlich bedeuten. Nitzsch, *Chr. Lehre*, § 106, anmerk. 2.

These two questions are not always kept sufficiently distinct by Müller in bk. 2 of his *Doct. of Sin*.

instruments of moral evil in man ; the impression is naturally received, that he looked upon the love of sensuous gratification as the very soul and centre of all sin. But careful examination reveals the falsity of the impression.

(a.) The terms *σὰρξ* and *πνεῦμα*, in the Pauline phraseology, do not represent an antagonism between the body and the soul of man, but between fallen human nature and the Holy Spirit¹, Gal., 3 : 3. Ro., 8 : 1-13. 1 Cor., 3 : 1.

(b.) The essence of the sin of wicked spirits could not have been regarded by him as consisting in sensuousness ; and some of the most defiling sins which he enumerates, and of which our nature is capable, have no relation whatever to the sensational nature, Gal., 5 : 20, 21. 1 Cor., 3 : 3, 4.

(c.) There were sufficient reasons for Paul's selection of his terms to symbolize the hidden power of sin, without supposing that his choice was determined by any theory respecting the essential nature of sin². All our words descriptive of mental and moral acts and states, those of the most literal as well as those of the most metaphorical meaning, have been derived from sensational experiences, and nothing was more natural than that the nomenclature of an orientalist, in describing the subtle power of evil, should have been suggested by that portion of our two-fold nature in which that subtle power most conspicuously shows itself. Sin, furthermore, in the Apostles' day made special display of itself in the grossest forms of sensuality, and it was through the extermination of these, in the persons of the first converts to Christianity, that the power, and thus the divine origin, of the Gospel, was most readily apprehended by outward observers. More than all, the great source of the Apostle's power, as a herald of the Gospel, was in the efficient agency of the Holy Ghost ; *πνεῦμα* and its derivatives, were, therefore, already and necessarily in hand, and, as the only possible antitheses to these, he had no alternative but to take *σὰρξ* and its coördinate terms.

1. See Schaff & Riddle's ed. of Lange, *Com. on the Romans*, pp. 284, 288.

2. For an explanation of this choice, see Neander, *Planting and Training*, p. 385, ff.

(d.) An argument, finally, against the notion that the essence of sin consists in sensuousness, is found in the mischievous consequences to which it naturally, and by logical necessity leads. If the vital force of sin lies in the usurped dominion of the bodily senses over the spirit of man, then, the conclusion is, the more completely the body is subdued the more complete is the victory over sin; hence the maltreatment of our physical nature, with the vain hope of high spiritual culture, but with the sure result of fostering some of the subtlest and most damning sins that lurk in the human heart. A lingering notion, that both the source and vital energy of sin are in the body rather than in the soul of man, still perpetuates an asceticism which too often cuts off the superficial excrescences of sin only to cherish the more carefully the deadly virus that hides within¹.

B. Is the essence of sin in Unbelief²? A few texts of Scripture seem at first glance to require an affirmative answer. Men are condemned for not believing on Christ, John, 3: 18. 16: 9; evil men, in New Testament phraseology, are "unbelievers;" and the ground of the final condemnation of the wicked, it is intimated, will be their unbelief, Heb., 3: 18, 19. 4: 11. Rev., 21: 8. A very little reflection, however, in connection with a brief examination of the Scriptures, suffices to show that unbelief is not the real procuring cause of man's condemnation, but only its secondary and intensifying cause. Christ Jesus came into the world to save men who were already and justly condemnable on account of their own personal unworthiness.

1. The theory that the seat of sin is in the sensational nature, and consists in sensuousness, was generally adopted by the older rationalists, was continued by Bretschneider, *Dogmatik*, § 120, and by Usteri, *Entwicklung Paulinischen Lehrbegriffs*, abs. 8, B.; has in later years been defended by Baur of Tübingen, by Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, ed. '52, p. 471, by Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, and even by Meyer, 4th ed. *Com. ü Römer*, see ch. 5: 14 chh. 6-8, *passim*. Opposed to this theory are Neander, *Planting*, &c.; Julius Müller, *Doct. of Sin*; Philippi, *Com. ü Römer*; Schmid, *Bib. Theol. d. N. T.*, pp. 499, 502; see also the *Dogmatik* of Thomasius and of Ebrard, the *Chr. Lehre* of Nitzsch, and the *Bib. Psychol.*, 3, § 1, of Delitzsch. Comp. Tholuck, *erneuerte Umtersuch. &c. Stud. ü Krit.* 1855, hft. 8.

2. Unbelief, not in the sense of no-belief, but of disbelief.

Their unbelief was only the natural product and sure criterion of an already existing sinfulness. Their unbelief reveals, and at the same time heightens, their sinfulness, but can in no proper sense be regarded as the ground of it, Heb., 10 : 28, 29.

If unbelief were the essence of sin, then belief should be the essence of personal righteousness. But the life principle of righteousness is love, and faith is only the medium through which righteousness exists and is matured—"by grace are ye saved," made fit to be saved, *διὰ πίστεως*—and so unbelief, in the broad sense of the term, is the medium through which sin exists, thrives, and reaches its consummation.

Nor does any analysis that we can make of sinful acts shew their damning quality to consist in unbelief. A man's life, including his acts, is always determined by his moral affections; and these are already in control of him, and determine his belief or unbelief whenever it comes into exercise. And so of the first transgression, of which an account is contained in the beginning of the biblical records, no conception that we can form of it, will warrant the assumption that either its origin¹, or its essential guilt, lay in unbelief. The assurance of the tempter to Adam was, that the words of God were not true, and that the threatened penalty would not be executed. But it does not necessarily follow, that distrust of God and belief in the tempter originated and animated the transgression. The tempter's assurance in Gen., 3 : 4, and promise in verse 5, doubtless originated the thought that led to the sin; but the beginning of the guilt, and the animating principle, the *esse*, of the transgression, were not in unbelief, but in the desiring and the resolving, to know what the Satanic thought had suggested. Adam disbelieved God because he had first desired what Satan had promised. Both his will and his confidence were the offspring of his desire. The essence of his sin was not in

1. Infidelitas radix defectionis fuit, hinc emersit ambitio et superbia.—Calvin, *Institutiones*, lib. 2, cap. 1, § 4.

his unbelief, but in that of which his unbelief was the natural product, and the sure criterion¹.

C. Is the essence of sin in Selfishness? *i. e.*, in an inordinate self-love and self-seeking. The inquiry implies that a certain degree of self-love is allowable. A certain degree is also made necessary by the instinct of self-preservation; and the repeated injunctions of Scripture to make our self-love the standard of our love to others, Matt., 22 : 39. Ro., 13 : 9. Gal., 5 : 14. James, 2 : 8. Comp. Eph., 5 : 28, 33, gives due sanction to some measure of self-regard. But all love, to self or others, is legitimate, only as it is subordinate to, and purified by, an intelligent and all-inclusive love to the common Father of all. All love becomes sinful, selfish, idolatrous, in proportion as its object is isolated from God. The degree of self-love that becomes sinful—becomes selfishness, is that which substitutes self-will for the will of God. He has reached the culmination of wickedness who “opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped,” 2 Thess., 2 : 4. That the vital power of sin is in selfishness, seems evident from the following considerations :

1. Whatever there is in sensuousness, or in unbelief, apparently warranting the conclusion that in these lies the essence of sin, leads directly to the further conclusion that its seat is in selfishness alone. Sensuous indulgence is itself always selfish; and selfishness is always the parent of unbelief².

2. It is evident from the nature of virtue and of its rewards, that the central principle of virtue is in unselfishness. True virtue consists in seeking and attaining to right

1. The pantheistic notion that the essence of sin consists in deficiency or defect, Spinoza, *Ethices*, p. 4, prop. 20, is widely different from the supposition that it consists in unbelief. Unbelief is something positive and quantitative; deficiency is mere nihilism, and in itself, inconceivable. It is nothing surprising that with the holders of such a theory, power should be identical with virtue, and religion should consist in “Hero Worship.”

2. The love of the world, the *Weltliebe*, in which certain German authors find the essence of sin, is, when analyzed, found to be only one form of selfishness.

ends. Virtue sought for any reason centering in ourselves, or in any other object than itself, is never acquired. Itself is its own reward. The benefits it confers are never secured if sought for their own sake. Unselfishness is the soul of virtue, and selfishness is the vitalizing principle of every vice and of every variety of sin.

3. The two fundamental principles of true religion are, a supreme regard for the Supreme Being, and a regard for our fellow beings equal to that which we cherish for ourselves. On these two hang all the law and the prophets, Matt., 22 : 36-40. Mark, 12 : 29-31. The one principle that is directly opposite to these, is supreme regard for self ; on this principle hang all irreligion and sin.

4. The examples and the teachings of both Christ and his Apostles imply that the essence of all sin is in selfishness. (a.) Christ, who came into the world for the express purpose of saving men from sin, by living and dying for them, declared the ruling principle of his life and death to have been supreme regard for the will of God, John, 5 : 30. 8 : 50. 14 : 31, and that the same unselfish regard for his will, and thus for that of the Father, is the one organic principle around which all personal righteousness is formed, Matt., 16 : 24, 25. Mark, 8 ; 34, 35. Luke, 9 : 23, 24. John, 12 : 25. (b.) The Apostles counted not their own lives dear unto them, Acts, 20 : 24, and taught the duty of self-sacrifice for the good of others, 1 John, 3 : 16. Throughout their epistles they teach, that love to God and men is the essential and determinative principle in the personal salvation which they were sent to proclaim—a salvation from the dominion of selfishness, Ro., 14 : 8. 1 Cor., 8 ; 13. 1 John, 4 : 19-21. 5 : 1-3 ; that unselfishness is the distinguishing characteristic of good men, and selfishness, of bad men, Ro., 14 : 7. Phil., 2 : 3-8. 1 Cor., 10 : 24, 33. 2 Tim., 3 : 1-5.

5. Universal experience teaches, that we first become fully aware of our own sinfulness, by becoming aware of a conflict between the requirements of moral law, Ro., 7 : 7, 8, and of our own selfishness, and that it is the same indwelling principle of selfishness which stands ready, at any given

moment, to betray its possessor into overt acts of transgression, James, 1 ; 14.

6. The agreement of so many theologians in the recognition of selfishness as the essence of sin—even of theologians, the fundamental principles of whose systems are at the widest remove from each other, is a strongly corroborative evidence that their view is both taught in the Scriptures, and confirmed by the facts of consciousness. *Superbia*, in which Augustine¹, Aquinas², Calvin³, and others, have found the root of sin, is only another name for selfishness,—is in fact one of the most immediate manifestations of selfishness, and is very naturally identified with it. All modern theologians of the Augustinian type of doctrine⁴, and, in this country, of the most divergent schools⁵, unite in referring sin to the principle of selfishness.

§ 26—*Kinds of Sin.*

ACTUAL AND ORIGINAL SIN. We have already seen, in determining our definition of sin, that we must distinguish between sin as an act and sin as a state of being. About this distinction there would seem to be no reasonable ground for dispute : but whether the sinful state of individual men shall be regarded as primarily a cause or an effect of sinful acts—whether, in short, sin can have any other origin than that of individual volitions, has been, especially in this

1. *De Civitate Dei*, 1. 14, c. 13, 14. *Enchir.*, c. 45.

2. *Summa*, pt. 2, ques. 84, art. 2. -

3. *Institu. Chr. Relig.*, 2. 1. 4.

4. See Müller, *Doct. of Sin*, bk. 1, pt. 1, ch. 3.

5. Old School and New School are agreed on this point. See also, Bellamy, *Works*, vol. 1, pp. 138-150. Hopkins, *Works*, vol 1, pp. 235-241. Emmons, *Works*, 1st ed., vol. 4, ser. 39. The younger Edwards, *Works*, vol. 2, Essay On Self-love. Prof. Finney's *Lects. Syst. Theol.*, Eng. ed., lect. 33.—N. W. Taylor, *Revealed Theol.*, 2. 1.

country, a much mooted question¹. It will be necessary that we examine somewhat carefully, into the distinction between actual and original sin.

The existence of ACTUAL SINS is recognized by all parties. The only query that arises, is the unimportant one relating to the justness and value of those distinctions among actual sins, of which dogmatic theologians once made so much account. Thus we have (*a.*) the Romish distinction between sins venial and sins mortal,—between sins which are *reparabilia* and those which are *irreparabilia*². Its error is in its conception of sin as an objective act, separate from the

1. Jonathan Edwards had made true virtue to consist in the "love of being in general," and had propounded in his treatise *On Original Sin* a doctrine of identity, and in his treatise *On Freedom of the Will*, a distinction between natural and moral ability, which Sam'l Hopkins carried to conclusions that in turn were developed by Emmons into his Exercise Scheme. Emmons recognized no sin but action, to which Smalley strenuously objected,—see his *Works*, vol. 1, ed. 1803, pp. 179–190, 420 ff.—Leonard Woods, (Hopkinsian,) of Andover.—see *Works*, vol. 4,—engaged in a controversy with Henry Ware of Cambridge and the Unitarians (Pelagians) and with N. W. Taylor of New Haven (New School or Semi-Pelagian.)—see his *Concio ad Clerum*, and the *Sermons* of Dr. Fitch of N. H. Opposed to Taylor, see *Lects.* of Bennet Tyler of E. Windsor, Drs. Alexander and Hodge, controverted the views of both Andover and New Haven.—See Stuart and Hodge, *Comms. on Romans*.—Barnes' *Comm. on Romans*.—Stuart, articles on Sin, in *Bib. Repos.*, 2d series, vols. 1, 2,—*Princeton Rev.*; *Chr. Specta.*; and *Spt. of the Pilgrims*, 1829–1833.—Prof. Finney, *Sermons and Lects. on Syst. Theol.*—Dr. Shedd, *Essays and Discourses*, and *History of Docts.*—Controversy between Dr. Hodge and Prof. Park; Hodge's *Essays* and *Bib. Sac.*, vols. 7 and 8. See also several articles in the *New Englander*, since 1866, by Prof. Fisher.

Dr. Taylor affirms that "Sin is predicable only of that state of mind which we call *preference or choice*," and maintains that "moral character consists in a man's governing purpose,"—that, "strictly and properly speaking, the governing principle itself constitutes moral character,"—*Revealed Theol.*, 2, 1. Prof. Finney asserts that men "become morally depraved by yielding to temptation to self-gratification. Indeed it is impossible they should become depraved in any other way,"—*Lects. on Syst. Theol.*, Eng ed., lect. 41. Comp. Prof. Park, *Bib. Sac.*, vol. 8, p. 626, ff.

2. Aquinas, *Summa*, pt. 2, ques. 88, art. 1. The *irreparabilia reparari non potest per aliquod principium intrinsecum, sed solum per virtutem divinam*. What Aquinas means by principium is explained in pt. 2, ques. 72, art. 5, where he says, *principium totius ordinis in moralibus est finis ultimus—unde quando anima deordinatur per peccatum usque ad aversionem ab ultimo fine, scilicet Deo, cui unitur per charitatem, tunc est peccatum mortale; quando verò fit deordinatio citra aversionem à Deo, tunc est peccatum veniale*. See also Bellarmine, *De Controversiis*, contro. 2, lib. 1, cc. 2, 3. The older theologians while rejecting the Roman distinction still retained the term mortal as applicable to the sin against the Holy Ghost, and quote also 1 John, 5: 16.

actor, and for which an objective quantitative equivalent is to be paid ; whereas, every sinful act is alike mortal, James, 2 : 10, because proceeding from a sinful heart, which itself is to be changed if the penalty of its acts is to be escaped, Matt., 12 : 35. 23 : 26. (b.) Sins of ignorance and of knowledge :—a distinction plainly taught in the Scriptures, Luke, 23 : 34. John, 15 : 22, 24. Acts, 17 : 30. 1 Tim., 1 : 13, and by our own instinctive sense of justice ; but a distinction which neither rests on, nor warrants, the notion that impunity attaches to sins of ignorance, and guilt to sins of knowledge alone. All sins, by the divinely ordained laws of being, bring their own penalties ; but there is, in the very nature of the case, an element of remorse in sins of knowledge which cannot exist in sins of ignorance. (c.) Sins of infirmity and of malice. The justness of this distinction depends on the origin and nature of the infirmity. Natural incapacity to distinguish between right and wrong, excuses just so far as it incapacitates for natural penal consequences ; but for an infirmity which is the effect of prior sins of malice, the guilty subject of it is alone responsible, as well as for all the subsequent and multiplied sins of malice—the Apostle's "sin unto iniquity"—which flow from it¹.

ORIGINAL SIN. By this is meant a sinfulness which belongs to us by virtue of our descent from Adam—a sinfulness which we bring with us into the world as possessors of human nature. The truth of the doctrine has been denied by Pelagians², Socinians³, and Rationalists⁴ generally, on

1. Various other distinctions have been made, some of which are practically convenient, though very few, if any of them, represent any real or essential difference. Thus we have sins of omission and commission, while in fact a duty omitted is always a sin committed ; sins against God, our neighbor, and ourselves, while, in strictness of speech, every sin is equally a sin against God, antagonism to his will being itself essential to the very idea of sin ; sins of disposition and of act, which together represent mere stages in the progress of sin ; and actual and reigning sins, which simply distinguish between isolated and habitual acts. For still further distinctions, see Bretschneider, *Dogmatik*, theil 2, kap. 4, § 119.

2. See Wiggers, *Augustinism and Pelagianism*, trans. by Emerson.

3. See *Cat. Racov.*, ques. 423.—F. Socinus, *Prælect.* c. 4.—Ware, *Letters to Woods*, and most Unitarian literature since.

4. See Wegscheider, *Instit. Theol.* §§ 115–118.

the ground that the fall of Adam could have affected neither the status nor the nature of his descendants in any other way than by the evil of his example; by semi-Pelagians and Arminians¹, and by the later New England or so-called New School theologians² of this country, on the ground that sin is only and always a voluntary act, and that though an original vitiosity of nature, which is the source of actual sin, has doubtless been derived from Adam, yet this vitiosity can, in no Scriptural or just sense of the word, be called sinful. This was also the view of Zwingle³.

On the other hand, the doctrine of original sin has been maintained by all theologians of the Augustinian type, both Romanist and Protestant. The grounds on which it has been maintained have varied with varying theories of Adam's relation to his descendants. Thus Augustine⁴, Anselm⁵, Aquinas⁶, and the Reformers⁷ except Zwingle, held that, through the Adamic unity of the race, human nature by the first sin of Adam was corrupted in his person, and that, as all mankind were potentially, though not personally, in him, so from him has descended to every individual of the race a vitiosity and a guiltiness of nature⁸. Since the middle of the 17th century the defence of original sin has

1. See *Confessio Remonstrantium* c. 7, and *Apol. pro Confess. Remon.*, c. 7. in Episcopius, *Opera*, 2.—Limborch, *Theol. Chr.*, lib. 3, c. 4.—John Taylor, *The Script. Doct. of Orig. Sin.*

2. See Emmons, *Works*, "Systematic Theol." pts. 10 and 11.—N. W. Taylor, *Rev. Theol.*, pt. 2, "Human Sinfulness."—Prof. Finney, *Lects. on Syst. Theol.*, lects. 27, 88–41, Eng. ed.—Stuart, and Barnes, *Comms, On Ro.*, ch. 5. See other writers referred to p. 146.

3. See Zwinglii *Fidei Ratio*. 4, in Niemeyer's *Collectio Confessionum*, and *De Peccato Orig. Declaratio*, Zwingle's *Works*, vol. 3.

4. See specially, *De Peccatrou Meritis*, lib. 1, cc. 10, 15. lib. 13, c. 14. *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 13. 3. 14. *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, lib. 2, c. 5. See other references in Wiggers, *Augustinism, &c.*, Emerson's trans.

5. In his *De Libero Arbitrio*, and *De conceptu virg. et orig. peccato*.

6. *Summa*, pt. 2, quests. 81–83.

7. See Niemeyer, *Collectio Confessionum*.—Hase, *Libri Symbolici*.—Melancthon, *Loc.*, c. 6.—Calvin, *Instit.*, lib. 2, c. 1–3,

8. *Hæreditarum vitium*, is with these writers synonymous with *hæreditaria corruptio*, and with *peccatum originale*. Aquinas, *Summa*, pt. 2, ques. 81, Art. 1, uses with emphasis the phrase *peccatum naturæ*.

almost universally been made to rest on sharply defined theories of imputation. With mediate imputationists¹, original sin is the guilt of Adam imputed to his descendants on account of a depravity of nature which they in some way inherit from him; with immediate imputationists, original sin is the punishableness of Adam imputed by covenant to his descendants, who, though in themselves innocent, become, in consequence of the imputation, personally depraved and thus deservedly punishable. The imputation is regarded as strictly in compliance with the terms of a covenant with Adam, according to which the merit or demerit of his actions should descend to his posterity.

§ 27—*Conflicting Views of Original Sin.*

The views respecting original sin now prevalent, especially in this country, may be stated as follows: 1. A broad denial of any depravity or guilt in human nature, inherited or imputed. 2. A recognition of hereditary depravity, but a distinct denial of its guilt. 3. The affirmation and maintenance of the punishableness and guilt of human nature, on the nominalistic ground of a covenanted transfer of Adam's punishableness, and thence, by consequence of the corrup-

1. Placæus, (died 1655,) with whom the phrase mediate imputation originated, (Turretine ascribes to him the origin of both the terms, mediate and immediate, as applied to imputation, see *Institutio Theol.*, locus 9, questio 9, §§ 4-6,) taught that Adam's guilt is imputed to his posterity in consequence of their actual inheritance of his depraved nature: Stapfer, and Jona. Edwards, taught that there was an imputation of the guilt of both Adam's first act and of his depraved nature, because it was foreseen that the depraved nature would by natural generation be inherited. Placæus fixed the eye on the guilt of the sinful nature only; Stapfer and Edwards on the guilt of the first sin and the sinful nature induced by it. See Stapfer, *Instit.*, vol. 4, c. 17, § 78.—Edwards, *On Orig. Sin*, at the beginning of the treatise, and near the close of pt. 4, ch. 3. Comp. Anselm quoted by Schaff in his edition of Lange, *Comm. on Ro.*, p. 192. Immediate imputation, as elaborated by Heidegger and Turretine in opposition to the mediate imputation of Placæus, makes hereditary depravity to be strictly a CONSEQUENCE of the imputed guilt of Adam's first sin. This is also the Princeton doctrine, see *Princeton Essays*, Dr. Hodge's Controversy with Prof. Park.

tion and guilt of his nature, to his posterity. 4. The affirmation and maintenance of hereditary depravity and personal guilt, on the realistic ground of the organic unity and community of human nature—the solidarity of the race—which nature and race were both potentially in Adam and have been actually derived from him. A brief glance at these different views will assist us in reaching some definite conclusions of our own.

I. There are several grounds on which the first view—that of the old Pelagians and modern rationalists, is now maintained¹, viz.: (*a.*) that human nature is just as pure and sinless to-day as it ever was, that in fact it has constantly improved rather than deteriorated:—a position which fails duly to recognize the manifest hereditary predisposition of tribes and nations towards degeneracy, and especially fails to take into account those moral and intellectual appliances, by which, whatever their origin, the race has, under given circumstances, been gradually elevated. (*b.*) That individual men are responsible for their own acts alone:—an assumption that arbitrarily isolates the individual from the mass, and does despite to the analogy of that natural law by which, when a community or a nation suffers, every individual member suffers with it. (*c.*) That the idea of innate depravity reflects on the character of God:—an objection which is just as valid against the supposition of an innate sinlessness, as it is against that of an innate depravity of nature. Every one, to absolute certainty, commits actual sins; it matters not whether the acts proceed from a nature or from external conditions, for both these must alike precede individual volitions. (*d.*) That innate depravity is inconsistent with the free-agency of man:—an objection which forgets that free agency, in the only sense in which it can here be used, is freedom to do as one pleases, and that to do as one pleases, is to give free play to one's moral affections whatever they may be; the only trouble is, that one's affections are evil instead of good. (*e.*) That native depravity is not

1. See the writings of the American Unitarians; of Athanase Coqueril; and the treatises of the German rationalists on Dogmatik, from Wegscheider down to our own day.

taught in the Scriptures :—an argument which rests, not so much on a misinterpretation of single texts—an interpretation contrary to the conviction of a vast majority of commentators—as it does on a misunderstanding of the whole scope and tenor of the Scriptures¹.

II. Some of the principal grounds on which New School men reject the doctrine of original sin, are the following : (a.) That all sin, in order to be sin, must be voluntary, whereas native depravity is involuntary and cannot therefore be sinful² :—But this is to distinguish arbitrarily, and most unwarrantably, between volition and nature, volitions being in truth only the nature in movement—the nature expressing itself ; it is to refer volitions to an imaginary state and sphere which precede the existence of all moral character in the volitional agent, whereas no state, nor act, of consciousness, and no degree of subtlety in analysis, will warrant us in any attempt to distinguish between nature and the personal self. (b.) That there can be no sense of responsibility, no consciousness of guilt—no remorse—for inborn sin, and consequently no guilt, no just punishableness on account of it :—But it certainly will not be maintained that there can be no punishment without remorse ; without consciousness of ill-desert it may be that punishment is impossible ; and doubtless the two ingredients, conscious ill-desert and remorse (the reproach of conscience,) together constitute, in personal suffering, the consummation of punishment. But more than all, this objection overlooks the fact that every person of moral intelligence, in dealing with himself, goes behind his acts to his heart—to his moral nature, from which self is indistinguishable, and for which, as the guilty source of his wrong doing, he necessarily holds himself responsible. (c.) That a hereditary predisposition to sin, which is common to all men, is calamitous, but cannot be in itself penal ; or, if it be penal cannot in

1. For one of the latest popular attempts to evade the force of Scriptural teaching on the doctrine of original sin, see the general argument in Matthew Arnold's *St. Paul and Protestantism*.

2. See specially Profs. Stuart, Taylor, Finney, and Park, as before referred to.

itself be also punishable; penalty, it is claimed, is inflicted, and in fact can be inflicted, only for wrong personal acts, whereas the first sin of Adam can in no just sense be said to have been the act of his descendants, and the moral disorder or depravity which his act has entailed on his posterity, can be attributed only to the sovereign purpose of God:—Two assumptions underlie this argument: first, that the only moral laws to which man is amenable, and the only penal sanctions to which he is exposed, are those contained in the formal statutes of the Bible, thus overlooking the undoubted truth that all moral consequences are just as clearly the fulfilled sanctions of moral laws, as if the sanctions had been written out under the accredited hand of a prophet; the other assumption is, that every individual of the race is an independent personality, whose volitions, responsibilities, and moral qualities, originate, centre, and terminate, in himself alone, whereas every individual, after granting the utmost of independency that consciousness can demand for him, is yet but an intermediate link in that indissoluble chain of volitional forces, mutual dependencies, and personal characters, which, in the aggregate, make up the unity and the identity of human nature and the human race. (*d.*) That the idea of hereditary sin as both penal and in itself punishable, impugns the character of God; if Adam's sin is punished by hereditary depravity, which is itself sin, then God is the author of sin:—But it is impossible to show that this objection is any more valid against a hereditary depravity which is sinful, than it is against a hereditary depravity which is sinless. The authors of the objection admit that human nature was vitiated by the fall—that this vitiation is transmitted, in the divine constitution of things, by natural descent, and that this vitiation, though in itself sinless and uncondemnable, leads invariably to actual sins¹. The difference between being the author of a constitution of things by which individuals are born with a vitiated and condemnable nature, and the author of a constitution of things by which every one is born with a nature which, though not necessarily,

1. See Taylor, *Rev. Theol.*, 2, 8.—Finney, *Lects.*, lect. 39.

yet invariably, without a solitary exception in the race, leads to actual and condemnable sins, is more metaphysical than real. God can be made the author of sin in the one case and not in the other, only by a pure fiction of a power of contrary choice—a power which no mortal exercises, and which no one can be shown to possess. (e.) That the doctrine of innate sin is contradicted by our innate sense of justice:—The objection would be valid if nature and personality were two distinct entities; but moral nature is only a mode of personal existence, and can no more be separated from the personal self, either in consciousness or by logical analysis, than can one of its natural affections or any of its inborn faculties. Our innate sense of justice repudiates responsibility for whatever is alien to us, but a moral nature of some kind, so far from being alien, is that substratum in which personality inheres, and without which it has no existence. (f.) That innate sinfulness is not really taught in the Scriptures:—This is a matter of biblical criticism, which is not to be disposed of by a single dictum, and on which a diversity of opinions may be recognized as reasonably entertained; but it must be admitted, that a great majority of the most competent commentators, differ as they may in the interpretation of the Scriptural accounts of the fact, recognize, nevertheless, in the accounts themselves the doctrine of a hereditary sinfulness of nature. See Schaff's edition of Lange's Commentary on Ro., 5: 12-21, and Philippi, Meyer, Alford, Wordsworth, on Romans, and Harless on Eph., 2: 3.

III. The third of the views named as now prevalent, and the one which claims to be preëminently orthodox, is that of a covenanted imputation of guilt, and a consequent inherited corruption of nature¹,—a system first fully elaborated by Heidegger² and Turretine³, and compounded of the

1. See *Princeton Essays*, 1st series.—Hodge, *Comment. on Ro.*, ch. 5; and his *Essays and Reviews*; also *Outlines of Theol.*—*Princeton Review*, various articles from 1839 to the present time.—Dr. Thornwell in the *South. Pres. Rev.*

2. See *Me vulla Theol.*, locus 10; also drawn by him, Formula Concensus Helvet, arts. 9, 10 in Niemeyer's *Collect. Con.*

3. *Institut.*, locus 9, ques. 9.

covenant or federal system of Cocceius and the immediate imputationism which Heidegger and Turretine adopted in opposition to the mediate imputationism of Placcens. The theory is open to various and insuperable objections. (*a.*) It is too artificial and mechanical to be true, and is wholly unsupported by analogy in the constitution and course of nature. God's method in nature is by a concatenation of direct and invariable causes and effects; no effect is ever made to follow from other than its own unvarying cause; the notion of "counting" or "imputing" an effect without an adequate cause, is absolutely without the shadow of support from analogy; and bears the unmistakable stamp of artificiality. (*b.*) The notion of imputation by covenant, when analyzed, is found to be in fact nothing but sovereign purpose. The thought of an intelligent contract on the part of Adam in behalf of his posterity, is simply preposterous; the only meaning that can be attached to the word covenant, in this connection, is a constitution of things in accordance with which God has dealt with the human race; and the origin of this constitution must have been in the sovereign purpose of the Creator. But if God, by sovereign act, imputes guilt to the innocent, as this theory asserts, then, (*c.*) The theory confounds justice with sovereign power. It makes the "Judge of all the earth" an arbitrary ruler, who treats the absolutely innocent as if they were really guilty; the omniscient and holy God who sees all things as they really are, and is himself the Source and Standard of justice to the Universe, is made to subordinate justice and immutable right to the demands of a legal fiction. (*d.*) One of the essential elements of this theory is a sheer assumption respecting the origin of the human soul. It is assumed that each soul is immediately created—an assumption, which is supported neither by psychology, nor by physiology, nor by Scripture; an assumption which makes a dualism of human nature, and is contradicted by all analogy as derived from propagation in both the vegetable and the animal kingdoms¹. (*e.*) This theory can justify itself only by giv-

¹ See *infra* § 29, Origin of the Soul.

ing a literal and exact meaning to purely metaphorical terms. To Jews, who held to the Abrahamic promise (covenant) on the one hand, and to the Mosaic law on the other, nothing was more natural than the federal and forensic imagery adopted by Paul. But to transform these metaphors into a scientific basis for dogmatic theology, is to misinterpret Scripture, as well as to misrepresent the facts of nature. And this misinterpretation and misrepresentation is all the more apparent, when it is observed that the metaphors are transferred from their appropriate Scriptural relation and arbitrarily applied to Adam and to Christ¹. It is evident that the word covenant, thus applied, can be only a strained metaphor, and mean nothing more than a sovereign mode of procedure—a “dispensation”—an “economy”—which God for infinitely wise reasons has adopted²; and the whole fabric of a legal, a covenanted imputation, whether of sin, or of righteousness, proves to be purely fictitious.

1. The sheer arbitrariness of the “Covenant system” becomes specially apparent in the hopeless disagreement of the holders of it respecting the contracting parties in the “covenant of grace.” Thus with Cocceius, the originator of the system,—see *Summa Doctrinæ de Fœdere*, &c., cap. 1, 5,—and with Burmann, one of the ablest of the immediate followers of Cocceius,—see *Synopsis Theologicæ* locus 8, c. 2. locus 11, c. 12–15—the covenant of grace was between God and the elect, the office of Christ being merely that of a mediator; with Witsius, the covenant of grace was, primarily, an eternal covenant between God the Father and Christ the Son, and secondarily, a covenant between God and the elect—see *Oeconomia Fœderum*, bk. 2, c. 1–3, and bk. 3, c. 1–3; while with the advocates of the covenant-imputation scheme—see Turretine and Hodge—the contracting parties, in the “covenant of works,” were God and the first Adam, and, in the “covenant of grace,” God and the second Adam. A system so uncertain in its fundamental principles, can be neither Scriptural nor philosophical.

2. It is perfectly certain that Jonathan Edwards did not hold the doctrine of immediate imputation, and there is no decisive evidence that he held to the mediate imputation of Placcæus. He believed in “a real union between the root and the branches of the world of mankind established by the Author of the whole system of the universe;” “the full consent of the hearts of Adam’s posterity to the first apostasy. And therefore the sin of the apostasy is not theirs, merely because God *imputes* it to them; but it is *truly* and *properly* theirs, and on that *ground* God imputes it to them,” *Original Sin*, pt. 4, c. 3. This looks very much like the Augustinian doctrine of organic unity. Samuel Hopkins, the immediate disciple of Edwards, rejected imputation in toto. See his System of Doctrines, *Works*, vol. 1. specially pp. 218, 230.

And, finally, (*f.*) The rigid theory of covenant-imputation has no real Scriptural basis. The texts cited in its support are irrelevant¹.

IV. According to the fourth view, human nature is a common nature, of which every individual of the human race is a partaker, and is a nature which received a bias toward evil, and itself became depraved and condemnable, in the person of the first of the race from whom all are descended; all men are sinners in the sight of God in consequence of an inborn sinful nature. This view, with proper explanation of the words sinful and sinners², seems of all others most defensible. It may justly be claimed that analogy, history, physiology, psychology and Scripture, all lend it support. But a proper discussion of this view requires that it be resolved into the three following questions: Has human nature been morally vitiated? If vitiated, is its vitiosity transmissible by natural descent? If the vitiosity exists and be transmissible, is it also in itself punishable, guilty, and sinful?

1. That human nature has been morally corrupted, seems evident: (*a.*) From the predisposition, the strong bias towards evil, which history and observation alike shew to be the invariable characteristic of every human being. Nor is the truth of the universality of the bias, in any way affected by the capacity for marked virtues which may sometimes accompany it. The underlying vitiosity is sure, sooner or later, in one way or another, to reveal itself. (*b.*) The moral consciousness of the best men, in all ages and among all nations, has testified with uniformity to the inward vitiosity of their common nature—a vitiosity, to the existence of which even in the meanest men, their conduct, if not their consciousness has always given the clearest testimony. (*c.*) The evidence from history, observation, and experience has led heathen historians, philosophers, and poets, to state,

1. See Schaff's ed. of Lange, *Comm. on Ro.*, note on pp. 178, '79.

2. The word sin, as we have already seen in § 25, is applied to a state of man as well as to his acts. His nature, which determines his acts and their moral qualities, must be either good or bad,—he could not be a moral being if it were not—and as such must be, in a sense, either holy or sinful.

in the most decisive manner, their belief in the depravity of human nature¹. (*d.*) The Scriptures teach the depravity of human nature: (*aa.*) In the extended passages, like the first three chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, and in the single texts, like Gen., 8 : 21. Job, 14 : 4. Ps., 143 : 2. Eph., 2 : 3, which assert the universality of the depravity of man : (*bb.*) In the sharp and uniform contrast which, throughout the Bible, is kept up between mankind as a whole and those of the race whom God has brought under the dominion of his truth and Spirit : (*cc.*) In the reiteration, both by Christ and his Apostles, of a necessity of moral regeneration on the part of every one of the race who would enter into the kingdom of God.

Nor is this body of evidence invalidated by our inability to account for the method by which the depravation of human nature has been brought about. The mystery that may attach to a fact cannot justly be allowed to affect the incontestable evidence of its reality.

2. Is this depravity of human nature hereditary? Controversy has made the question two-fold, viz. : is depravity innate,—inborn ; and, if innate, is it hereditary—transmitted by natural descent ?

A. That the depravity of man is innate, is proved, (*a.*) by whatever will prove anything to be innate. Universality, spontaneousness and absolute certainty of development, are regarded as demonstrative proofs of innateness. This is true of all those mental and moral faculties of man which, taken together, constitute the distinguishing attributes of man. Moral evil is so uniformly and spontaneously revealed in the hearts of all men from their earliest years, that, without the intervention of a miracle, its development in every individual of the race, may be predicated with absolute certainty. (*b.*) Its innateness is evident from analogy. Vegetable life never reveals, never contains, more than lies in the germ of the seed from which it springs. The moral qualities of the acts of a man can reveal nothing more

1. See Cicero, *Tus. Dispu.*, lib. 3, c. 1, and other citations by Tholuck in his *Lehre von der Sünde*, pp. 48, ff, 72, ff.—Knapp, *Theol.*, pt. 1, art. 9, sec. 74.

than lies in the man himself. His moral acts are nothing else than the unmistakable signs and products of his moral nature, Mat., 15: 18, 19. (c.) The Scriptures plainly teach that man is born with a corrupted nature. Whatever may be our rendering of Job, 14: 4, no other meaning can be extracted from it than that a corrupted nature is by every one, in some way, derived from his parents. David, in Ps., 51: 5, declares his nature to have been even sinfully corrupt from the instant of the origination of his existence. In John, 3: 6, Christ puts literal birth and spiritual birth in such antithesis as leaves no doubt, when the whole connection of his words is taken into the account, that he meant to represent all men as corrupt by birth, and as needing to be born again. In Eph., 4: 3, Paul declares himself, in common with all men, as by nature, *i. e.* by birth, under the wrath of God—a declaration which could of course be true only of men as being by birth corrupt, and as thereby justly provoking the divine displeasure.

B. But if depravity be innate, is it also hereditary? To this inquiry, both New School men and immediate imputationists reply, as respects the soul, in the negative, but, as respects the body in the affirmative; both regard the physical nature of man as alone transmitted by natural descent, and the soul of every one of his descendants as an immediate creation of God; both regard the soul as spotless, till thrust into conjunction with the vitiated physical nature, the New School regarding this treatment of the soul as the sovereign act of God, and the imputationists as an act required by the terms of the covenant with Adam; but neither of them reconciles his dualistic nature of man with that identity of body and soul, in both responsibility and ultimate destiny, so manifestly taught in every part of Scripture; and neither of them offers any protection against the thought of injustice toward the innocent, which their theories inevitably thrust on the mind. It is, of course, depravity in the soul which defiles and is punishable; but if the soul be an immediate creation of God, and its relation to Adam and his nature be only through the accident of the body, whether

by sovereign appointment or by covenant, then there is an appearance of arbitrariness and injustice about the whole procedure, which cannot but compel the conviction that neither of their theories can be true. The more rational view is, that depravity is hereditary; that the root of our sinful nature—of both the body and the soul which, as coeval quantities, together constitute the human being—was in the progenitor of our race; that in his fall we all fell, because we were all potentially—germinally, in him, and because of his entire nature we, by natural descent, are all partakers.

That depravity is hereditary, is evident from the following considerations: (*a.*) If it be innate, then, in the absence of positive testimony to the contrary, the supposition of its being hereditary is, as we have seen, more reasonable than any other. (*b.*) The evidence from analogy, if it lend any support, as it certainly does, to the theory of innateness, must be admitted to contribute equally in support of the theory of its being hereditary. The formative principle which determines the type of every species of plant or animal, reposes in the first of the series, and is transmitted in the life-germ of its seed, through an indefinite number of successions. (*c.*) As a matter of fact, we know, that the moral, as well as the intellectual and physical traits or qualities of men, are transmitted through successive generations of nations, tribes and families; and, inasmuch as the same traits of depravity have universally shewed themselves through countless successions of generations, the evidence is decisive that depravity is hereditary. (*d.*) This doctrine seems to be variously and explicitly taught throughout the Scriptures. (*aa.*) It is clearly implied in Job's declaration of impossibility, that any other than an impure nature could be derived from human nature, Job, 14: 4; and the contrast which Christ points out in John, 3: 6, between the nature which all men have by birth, and that renewed nature which every one must have in order to enter into his kingdom, implies that the depravity from which he saves, is inherent in the race, and is

transmitted by inheritance. (*bb.*) It is plainly taught in the Pauline parallelism between Adam and Christ, Ro., 5: 12-17. 1 Cor., 15: 21, 22. The most natural interpretation of these passages, and the one adopted by the best authorities, is that which makes them to affirm that, as from Adam we all have derived, by natural descent, a corruption of nature that has brought on us death and all our woe, so from Christ, by spiritual descent, we derive that renewal of nature, through which we receive the blessings of eternal life. (*cc.*) More specifically, in Ro., 5: 12, Paul, having spoken of Adam's transgression, and of death as its consequence, expressly declares that "all men died, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, i. e., because—inasmuch as, all men sinned." The interpretation of these words, required both by grammar and their logical relation, undoubtedly is, in the language of Meyer in his *Kommentar*, that "all men died, because, when Adam sinned, all sinned," i. e., in Adam's act of transgression and its consequences all men participated, because, as Meyer again expresses it, "all sinned in and with him." The only way in which, according to Scripture and the facts of nature, we can have become participators in Adam's nature and its penal consequence, death, is by natural inheritance. See, also, the Commentaries on the Romans, by Phillipi, Alford, Wordsworth, and Lange¹ as edited by Schaff.

3. We come now to the final inquiry, whether depravity, granting it to be innate and inherited, is also punishable and sinful. In answering this inquiry; the following simple, and perhaps self-evident, principles must be borne in mind: (*a.*) The government of God rests on the basis of immutable right, and renders to all men according to the realities of their being and not according to legal fictions, nor according to a State policy that determines its means and methods by its ends. (*b.*) All the invariable consequences of acts must be regarded as the sanctions of the laws involved in the acts—all suffering being, in a clear and definite sense, the penal

1. With the doctrine of this interpretation, though differing in their grammatical rendering, agreed Augustine, Calvin and Melancthon.

consequence of a violation of some law. (c.) The words sin and guilt, when applied to an inherited nature, must necessarily have a restricted meaning as compared with that which attaches to them when applied to our voluntary actions. In the consequences of all voluntary wrong acts there is mingled the element of remorse, which can never enter into the penal consequences of a state or of a nature. The word sin, therefore, necessarily cannot have the same depth and breadth of meaning in the phrase "sinful nature," that it has in the phrase "sinful act." The question, however, is not in respect to extent of meaning, but whether the word "sinful" is applicable to nature at all.

That natural depravity is in itself justly condemnable and punishable, because it is in a sense sinful and guilty, seems evident from the following considerations: (a.) All men do suffer, as a matter of fact, on account of an inborn depravity, and it is more consonant with an innate sense of justice that the suffering should be deserved, than that it should be undeserved. Nor does it relieve this sense of justice to remind us that native depravity is itself a penalty, and cannot, therefore, be punishable. The law of the formation of human character, as in universal nature, is that effects in turn become causes, through an endless series; the law of character always is, "sin unto iniquity" or "righteousness unto holiness." (b.) The inborn nature of a new born being must be either good or bad; if good—a belief which even the ancient heathen rejected—then, as Plato says, nothing more is needed in making good men, than protection of infants and gentle education of the good that lies within them; but if bad, as overwhelming evidence shows it to be, then it is condemnable; if condemnable, then punishable; and if punishable, then it is ill deserving, or in a qualified sense, is sinful and guilty. Nor is this conclusion justly evaded by an attempted distinction between nature and person; these are indissoluble, neither consciousness, nor logic, nor Scripture warranting any conception of one as separate from the other. (c.) The objection that conscience brings no charge of guilt against inborn depravity, however

true it may be of the nature in its passive state, is seen, when the nature is roused to activity, to be unfounded. This faculty, on the contrary, lends support to the doctrine it is supposed to overthrow. When the conscience holds intelligent inquisition upon single acts, it soon discovers that these are mere accessories to crime, while the principal is hidden away beyond the reach of consciousness. In following up its inquisition, it in due time extorts the exclamation of David, Ps., 51: 5, "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me." Conscience traces guilt to its seat in the inherited nature. Nor does it obviate this conclusion to affirm that conscience brings its accusation only against the will which has appropriated the nature; no clear conception can be formed of nature, which does not lie behind and direct the will; still less, is any conception possible of the will, as standing at some imaginary point, behind his own nature, and appropriating it—in other words, as lifting itself out of itself, by its own volition. (*Δ.*) The Scriptures seem very distinctly to teach the sinfulness of our hereditary nature. David declares in so many words, Ps., 51: 5, that he was born in sin. In Ro., 5: 12, it is expressly said that the death of all the race, (infants included,) is in consequence of the sin of all the race, (infants included). The best accredited interpretation of πάντες ἥμαρτον is, as we have seen, that which understands the sinful act of Adam to have been the act of the race, all sinning in and with him, because, when he sinned, all were potentially within him. In Ro., 5: 19, the phrase "all were made sinners," describes the state to which the disobedience of Adam reduced his descendants, just as the antithetic phrase, "were made righteous," describes the state to which the obedience of Christ exalts his followers. The sin is as real and personal in the one case, as is the righteousness in the other. According to Eph., 2: 3, all men are "by nature children of wrath," *i. e.* all men are objects of the divine displeasure—are punishable in the sight of God, in consequence of what they are by birth. That φύσει here means "by birth," seems evident from the connection, as well as from the use of the

same word in Ro., 2:14; Gal. 2:15; 4:8.¹ Such also is the view of Harless, Ellicott, Hodge, and others. From the foregoing considerations it seems impossible to evade the conclusion that we are all born into the world with a condemnable nature, a nature which in some true and Scriptural sense of the word, is styled sin.²

TOTAL DEPRAVITY. By this is meant that, without Divine assistance, all men are totally incapable of any affection, volition, or act, which is acceptable to God. This was all that Augustine, or the Reformers, or any orthodox Lutheran, or Reformed Confession, affirmed on the point. The popular theology of the pulpit, in this country, has sometimes conceived of a total depravity of character,³—of all men as equally depraved, and of every man as being as depraved as it is possible for him to be.⁴ The chief dispute, however, about total depravity in this country, is over the question whether every power of the soul is so depraved as to be in all its exercises displeasing to God, or whether the seat of depravity is in the affections alone and reveals itself only in the soul's elective preferences. It is noticeable that Old School theologians, by whom the first view is defended, are disposed to eschew the modern phrase, total depravity; while New School men, defending the latter view, are specially emphatic both in their use of the phrase and in their support of the doctrine. The doctrine, in any view that we can take of it, must rest on a theory of the will, or on one's

1. See also many pertinent illustrations of the same use from classical authors in Harless, *Commentar ü. Eph.*—Ellicott, and Hodge, *Comm. on Eph.*

2. "Every person born into the world has a sinful nature and a sinful heart, which, though it have not broken out in acts of sin, yet constitutes him a sinner, so that he may be said to 'have sinned.' It appears to me that our Church, (the Anglican), takes this view of the subject, and so, follows closely on the teaching of St. Paul," Edward Harold Brown, Bishop of Ely, *An Exposition of the XXXIX. Articles*, art. 9, sec. 2. § 4.

3. See also the loose language of N. W. Taylor, *Rev. Theol.*, Part 2, lect. 1, "men's first moral character wholly sinful."

4. "Every selfish being is, and must be at every moment, just as wicked and blameworthy, as with his light he could be," Prof. Finney, *Lects. on Syst. Theol.*, close of lect. 38.

classification and analysis of the active power of the soul. It is more than doubtful if anything further can be justly meant by the doctrine, than was intended by Augustine and the Reformers in their conception of moral inability.

§ 28—*Salvation of Infants.*

If every one inherits a depraved and condemnable, sinful, nature, the status of infants, and their destiny if dying in infancy, necessarily become subjects of inquiry. The Scriptures have not left us wholly in the dark as to the answers that should be given.

1. It is evident, from the Scriptures, that the moral status of infants, as infants, differs widely from that of adults.

(a.) Frequent and emphatic distinction is made between the condition of infants and adults, and great stress is laid on ability to distinguish right from wrong, as an indispensable condition of personal responsibility. Deut., 1: 39; Jonah, 4: 11; Ro., 9: 11. Comp. Is., 7: 16; Heb., 5: 14. In all these texts it is distinctly implied that infants are not responsible agents—are not amenable to law for their conduct, and must therefore be regarded as standing on different ground from that occupied by adults.

(b.) The Bible addresses men as rational beings, appealing to their reason and conscience, and requiring them to choose between right and wrong, between the will of God and their own selfish desires. Infants are incapable of such choice, and are not therefore so addressed; yet infants have the endowment of rational beings, though their reason is insufficiently developed to make them capable of choice and so of responsible action. It would be inconsistent with any conception of a worthy divine purpose in their creation, to suppose them to be annihilated in death;¹ and it would

1. Dr. Emmons believed that there is a period in which infants are not moral agents, but that they "become moral agents as soon as they become natural agents." Hence he says, "if children die before they become moral agents, it is most rational to believe that they are annihilated." *Works, Sermon on Native Depravity*, 1st ed., vol. 4, p. 510. Ed. Cong. Board of Pub., vol. 2, p. 615.

be inconsistent with the soul's constitutional laws of development to suppose them consigned to an eternal infancy; we are compelled, therefore, to believe that salvation is conferred on them, if conferred at all, by some method aside from that adopted in the divine dealing with adults.

(c.) Salvation is conditioned on faith. But infants are incapable of faith, and incapable, simply because they are infants. The condition is impossible, not by their own fault, nor by that of their first parent, but by the nature of things. We are consequently compelled to believe that salvation, if provided for them, must come by a method aside from that employed in the case of adults.

2. Both Scripture and reason require us to believe that infants, as such, are in a salvable condition, and that if they die in infancy they are saved.¹

(a.) The blessing of infants by our Lord, and his reference to them as examples of the state of mind requisite to entrance into his kingdom, imply their salvation. Matt., 18:14; 19:14; Mark, 10:14; Luke, 18:15-17. The primary reference in the first of these texts is, doubtless, to resemblance of disposition; but there is also, in some of them, a deeper and underlying meaning. The point of comparison is not, in either of them, between the sinlessness of infants and a needed sinlessness of those to be saved, but between the helplessness of infants, in their trust and submission in relation to their parents, who are their natural protectors, and the corresponding characteristics in adults in relation to God, their heavenly Father and only protector from evil; but the profounder meaning underlying the whole is, that infants are really to be saved. Suffer little children, says Christ, whose salvation is certain, ("of such is the kingdom

1. This, as is well known, was most earnestly denied by Augustine; has always been denied by the Roman Catholic church; is most distinctly, by implication, denied in the Baptismal service of the Anglican and American Episcopal prayer-books; is very clearly denied in the Westminster Confession, where it says, "*Elect* infants, dying in infancy are regenerated through the Spirit; so also are all other *elect* persons * * ; others *not elected* * * never truly come to Christ, and, therefore, cannot be saved." The London Baptist Confession of 1689 agrees precisely with the Westminster. See ch. 10. 3.

of heaven,") to come unto me, who alone can save them. The whole significancy of his blessing them is lost, if we suppose, either that they are not to be saved, or that their salvation is not procured for them by Christ.

(b.) The parallel between what Adam and Christ have respectively done for the race, and upon which Paul so much insists, seems also necessarily to imply the salvation of infants. The blessings which Christ procures for the race, it is implied, are fully commensurate with the curse which Adam has brought on it; and inasmuch as the curse falls alike on every one by birth, but may be alleviated or intensified by every one who comes to years of responsibility, according as his nature, which brings the curse, rules or is ruled by his reason and conscience, so the blessings are procured for all alike, but may be lost or secured according to the attitude of every one towards Christ, who alone procures them; to infants, as the curse came without their election, so in like manner comes its removal.

(c.) It accords with our innate sense of justice that evil, which has been involuntarily incurred, should also be removed by a remedy which is provided equally without the volition of the sufferer.

3. The most perplexing part of this subject relates to the method of infant salvation,—to the inquiry how the salvation which Christ provides can be made available for them. The diversity of answers that have been given, shows plainly the obscurity in which the question of method has been left in the Scriptures. Our answers to the question will depend on our views of the Church, and of the method by which the redemption of the world is to be accomplished.

If infants, however, are to be saved, it is plain that there must be with them, as with adults, a renewal of their moral natures—a gracious change of their moral affections. But by what means is this change effected? By infant baptism, is the answer of all Churchmen; by baptismal regeneration, says the high-church party; by infant baptism, as the sign and seal of covenanted mercies, says the low-church party; that is, with the high churchman salvation is

conferred by an external act, which is specially efficacious if performed by a divinely consecrated person, and is not inefficacious when, in case of extremity, it is performed by any one; with the low-churchman, the act of itself saves no one, and can become finally effectual only on condition of proper Christian training; while between the extremes of high and low, a vast intermediate body cherish the lurking conviction that baptism somehow secures, and the want of it somehow perils, the salvation of the infant.

It is an old, deep-seated and wide-spread notion, that infant baptism of itself removes original sin, and puts the infant, at once, in a salvable condition. With Romanists, and all other consistent high-churchmen, baptism regenerates, and there is no salvation without it;¹ but baptized infants, dying in infancy, let their baptism have been by whomsoever of the faithful it may, are saved by it. A discussion of the theory of the church on which this explanation rests will come up hereafter; but to the question how an external act, performed on an unconscious infant, can so affect it as to change its moral affections, no intelligent answer, supported either by Scripture or by common sense, ever has been, or can be, given. Among low-churchmen of the various grades and sects, there prevails, in regard to infant salvation, a great variety of views; at one extreme of which is the Pelagian notion of the inherent fitness of infants to be saved—a fitness which baptism recognizes and seeks to forefend against coming sin;² at the other extreme, is the conception of an innate depravity, which no baptism can remove, but which, in infants that die, is changed by an immediate act of the creative Spirit of God.³ Of the

1. This was the unqualified teaching of Augustine, *durus pater infantum*; see Wall, *Hist. Bapt.*, p. 2. c. 6.—Bingham, *Antiq. Chr. Ch.*, b. 10, c. 2, s. 24; it has always been held by the Roman Catholic church,—*fide Catholica tenendum est parvulos sine baptismo decedentes, absolute esse damnatos, et non sola celesti, sed etiam naturali beatitudine perpetuo carituros*, Bellarmine, *De Amis. Grat.*, lib. 6, c. 2; and such beyond dispute was the belief of the original authors of the formula of Baptism now used in the Episcopal Prayer-book.

2. See *Life of F. W. Robertson*, vol. 1, letters 76, 78. Comp. Miss Beecher's *Appeal to the People*.

3. The Princeton Divines.

Pelagian view, nothing need here be added to what has been said in the preceding article; and as respects the last named, since the Scriptures give no intimation that the Spirit ever changes the heart of any one, without the instrumentality of truth in the form of conscious thought, the notion of supernatural, spiritual, regeneration of infants, must be regarded as a sheer assumption. Nor does any church theory that attempts to mediate between the two extremes above named, rest on any other than an imaginary foundation; the Scriptures are profoundly silent on the method of infant salvation.

In a question on which, as on this, the Scriptures are thus silent, it would be safest perhaps to refuse to theorize at all; but to the demand, that if hereditary depravity be real, and infants are saved, some kind of explanation should be given of a possible method of their rescue, the following answer is not wholly unreasonable. Two things must be borne in mind: first, that it is Christ and his work which always serve as the means, and a right appreciation of Christ and his work which always constitute the turning point in the moral renewal of an adult; and secondly, that, in the conversion of children, the transition is often so rapid and quiet as to escape the notice of even the observing, while with adults there is more or less of moral convulsion, in proportion to their former course of life. The difference between the process of regeneration in an adult and in a child is one of degree and not of kind. It is the same Christ that saves in the one case as in the other; the relation established between the saved and his Saviour is of the same kind with one as with the other. To destroy the germ of evil in the heart of an infant, it must, somewhere and somehow, as well as children and adults, be brought to a knowledge and love of Christ; in order to this knowledge and love, while as yet the evil is undeveloped into habit, Christ needs only to be seen; and if Christ, who while on earth said, "suffer little children to come unto me and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of heaven," shall receive the little ones to himself on their entrance into

another life, it certainly is neither inconceivable nor improbable, that the undeveloped evil of their natures should give place at once to an implanted and all-controlling love for him, whom to know is life eternal.¹ This explanation, though conjectural, accords strictly with the known divine method of procedure in our renewal, and is not, like the notion of a saving efficacy in baptism, palpably contrary to both Scripture and reason; neither is it vague and mystical, resting on theories of arbitrary mercy and an artificial atonement, like the assurance, now so common even from professed Calvinists, that "in the universal sufficiency of the atonement, and by the infinite mercy of God, all children, dying in infancy, whether baptized or not, shall be saved."

§ 29—*Origin of the Soul.*

Out of the doctrine of the native sinfulness of man arises inevitably the inquiry, what is the origin of the human soul? The question was raised at a very early period in the history of the church; three widely different answers have had their advocates. One answer is, that all souls have existed elsewhere, and in this world enter on a new state of probation—the theory of Preëxistence;² another is, that each individual soul is an immediate creation of God—Creationism;³ and a third is, that the soul as well as the body is propagated, that is, is derived *ex traduce* from the parent, and thus, by successive descents, from the first of

1. If this may be true of infants, why not also of adults? The inborn depravity of an adult, having by voluntary action become incorporated into his personal character, has put him into a different condition from that of an infant, and a condition from which only the recreative power of the Spirit, through the process of conviction, faith and repentance, can rescue him.

2. Defended by Origen among the fathers, and, in later years, by Edward Beecher, in his *Conflict of Ages*, and, under a modified form, by Julius Müller, in his *Doct. of Sin*.

3. The general belief of Calvinists.

the race—Traducianism.¹ The last of these seems the most defensible, and on the following grounds :

(a.) The soul, if preëxistent, must come into the world either with a pure or a corrupt nature. But to suppose a pure soul to be thrust into a body that inevitably corrupts it, does not comport with the attributes of God : or to suppose, as the advocates of this answer really do, that every soul having fallen in a previous state of being, and forgotten both that state and its results, is here put on a new state of trial, is not to suppose an improvement in its probationary conditions, but a cumulation of its calamities, by burdening an already perverted will with a corrupted and corrupting physical organism. In like manner, souls, if immediately created, must have come from the hand of their Creator either corrupt or pure. The first supposition is not to be thought of ; and the last, like that of a preëxistent soul thrust, in its purity, into a depraved body, does not consist with the character of God. Nor does this latter supposition derive any support from the Edwardean theory of the identity of human nature. That theory supposes all matter to be of itself inert, and all causation in nature to be the immediate creative efficiency of God—the identity of the child's nature with that of its parent, or of the nature of the same person at any two given instants of time, being the direct result of the sovereign will of the Creator ; but the theory, besides being unsupported by Scripture, and contradicted by consciousness as well as by every known fact in nature, actually encumbers what it was intended to relieve ; consistently maintained it cannot stop short of all the worst conclusions of pantheism.

(b.) Traducianism seems to be supported by the analogy of nature. Every species of animal, or of vegetable, life, is endowed with a seminal principle whereby it multiplies individuals of the same species. It matters not to what the origin of a given species of animal may be attributed, whether

1. Defended by Tertullian among the fathers,—probably believed in, though not avowed, by Augustine, see Wiggers, *August. and Pelag.*, p. 281,—adopted by many Lutherans, and now being rapidly recognized alike by physiologists, psychologists, and theologians, as the true view.

to a law of natural development, or to an immediate creative power; let only the first of the species be in existence, and we have a procreative power adequate to the production of every individual of the series that may follow. So also of man, whether his origin was by development or by creation, let only the first of the race be in existence, and so far as the analogies from vegetable and animal life throw any light on the question, there exists in him a self-perpetuating power equal to the mediate creation of all that have descended from him. Nor is the force of the argument evaded by an alleged distinction between the spirit (*νοῦς, πνεῦμα*,) and the animal life (*ψυχή*,) of man. If by this distinction be expressed the notion that spirit and animal life are two separate entities, either one of which exists without the presence of the other, then it is a notion to which neither Scripture, physiology, nor consciousness lend the shadow of support. Any attempt to reason in support of Creationism on the basis of such a distinction, brings us to a—

(c.) Third' argument against Creationism, and in support of Traducianism, viz: that the former resolves the constituent elements of man's being into an antagonizing dualism, while the latter recognizes and builds upon the manifest unity of the human personality. Nothing is plainer than that the spirit and body of man are component parts of one whole, neither of which is complete without the other. A belief in the creation of the spirit, either at the moment of, or at some period subsequent to, the origination of the material from which the bodily organism springs, has no other foundation than that of the imagination. The doctrine of the resurrection of the body is stripped of more than half its meaning by such a difference of origin. But if we recognize the manifest coördination and combination of all the elements of man's being into the simple entity known as his personality; if we bear in mind the powerful sway of the spirit over the body, and, in turn, the almost resistless influence of the bodily functions over the spirit's activities, the conclusion seems inevitable that the body and spirit of

man are one and indivisible in their origin, in the development of their powers, in the exercise of their functions, and in their ultimate destination.

(*d.*) Traducianism is the only legitimate conclusion from the unvarying uniformity of moral nature in the race—the identity of human nature—in every age and under all conceivable conditions of life. No other adequate explanation can be given of this identity than that which regards it as a uniform secondary creation through natural generation.

(*e.*) The propagation of intellectual and moral traits in families, tribes and nations, through successive generations, cannot be so naturally accounted for as on the theory of Traducianism. To attribute these to the physical constitution of man, is to admit the validity of one of the chief arguments of materialists, is to compromise the benevolence of God, and to excuse the culpability of sin, by transferring its source and seat from the personal will to the physical organism.

(*f.*) It is worthy of notice, also, that the Scriptures, after the statement of the creation of man, contain no intimation whatever of the origination of the soul as something distinct from the origination of the body, while on the other hand, they constantly refer to men as “begotten,” leaving the inevitable impression that their spirits, as well as their bodies, are originated by generation. The words in Ecc., 12: 7, “Then shall the body return to the earth as it was; and the spirit to God who gave it,” and the phrase, “Father of our spirits,” are none the less significant on the theory of a secondary creation by natural generation, than on the theory of immediate and miraculous creation. It is observable also, that all those texts before cited as teaching a hereditary and sinful depravity, also necessarily teach, by implication, and thus the more emphatically, the doctrine of Traducianism.

(*g.*) The Bible represents God as instituting, at the close of the periods of original creation, a Sabbath or period of rest. If this Sabbath still continues,—and there is no reason to believe the contrary,—then souls are not immediately

created, but come into being by the agency of natural generation.¹

The objections to the doctrine of Traducianism are chiefly of two kinds: the materialism supposed to be involved in it, and the absolute impossibility of forming any kind of conception of the method of the soul's generation, or even of its relation to its own body. Materialism, however, is involved in it, only on the supposition that the soul is the product of matter, rather than, as we have every reason to believe is the truth in the case, that the body is the organized product of the soul. The supposed distinction between a vital principle as the organic power of the body, and a rational soul as an independent personal entity, can adduce in its support no decisive physiological facts, and only far-fetched meanings of Scripture. And the impossibility of understanding the method of the soul's origination, is no more valid against the fact of its generation² than the impossibility of understanding the relation of the soul to the body, or of understanding the soul's processes of thought, are valid as objections against the reality of the soul's existence or of its mental processes.³

§ 30 — *Inability and Responsibility.*

If depravity be hereditary and total, if by birth we bring with us into the world a nature which is of itself condemna-

1. The argument of Delitzsch in support of Traducianism, *Bib. Psychologie*, 2, § 7, from the Biblical account of the creation of Eve, is valid only on his theory of the origin of the soul of Adam by the inbreathing of God—a kind of Divine emanation—to which other parts of the Scriptures lend no support; no breath of life, it is said, was breathed into the nostrils of Eve, therefore her soul was derived from Adam. Delitzsch does not succeed in relieving his argument from the objection that, if it be valid, the origin of Eve was not by descent—by traduction—but by subdivision.

2. See Froschammer, in *Contemporary Review*, March, '71, p. 562, ff.

3. In support of Traducianism, see Froschammer, *Ueber den Ursprung der Menschlichen Seelen.*—Delitzsch, *Bib. Psychol.*, 2, § 7.—Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, ch. 11.—Shedd's *Hist. of Chr. Doctrine*, bk. 4, c. 1.

ble, and out of which there invariably proceed condemnable acts, can we be said to be responsible moral agents? Can we with any propriety be summoned on penalty to a service, to which we are by nature disinclined, and of which we are naturally incapable? Is it safe to teach any kind of inability to do what God requires?

To these inquiries an emphatic negative is given by all that mixed class of persons¹ who assume that an inalienable endowment of every man is a real freedom of will, to the extent of a power to the contrary, and that in the very nature of things ability must be commensurate with responsibility; while, on the other hand, an equally emphatic affirmative is given by all those who affirm that, real freedom of will having been lost by transgression, the real ability of man falls far short of actual responsibility; that all men have lost the original freedom and ability, but that the personal guilt of every one is proportioned to actual opportunities for personal enlightenment. Which of the two answers shall we adopt?

Three sources of information are open to us on this question, viz: the Scriptures, Consciousness, and Experience.

1. Nothing is more evident than that the Scriptures, in every part of them, address us as free moral agents who are strictly responsible for all that we do; and it is scarcely less apparent, that the same Scriptures everywhere assure us that, if left to ourselves, we are incapable either of pleasing God or of satisfying our own consciences. We find Christ asserting most explicitly, "no man can come unto me, except the Father who hath sent me, draw him," and so asserting, when he was urging faith in himself as the one all-inclusive requirement of God, John, 6: 44. Comp. verses 29, 35. The apostolic declarations of this inability are no less explicit, and they abound in their writings. Ro., 8: 7; Eph., 2: 8; 1 Cor., 2: 14; 2 Cor., 3: 5.

1. Pelagians and semi-Pelagians of all times, including the Unitarians; Arminians of various shades, including the Methodists (see *Doctrines of Methodism*, by Whedon, *Bib. Sac.*, April, '62); many Lutherans; Broad Church Anglicans; many New School Congregationalists and Presbyterians.

2. What the Scriptures thus affirm respecting our free-agency, consciousness corroborates; and what respecting our responsibility, conscience reiterates. Consciousness and conscience alike assure us of our possession of that formal freedom in our choices which constitutes the distinguishing and inalienable birth-right of our personal being; and experience none the less conclusively assures us of the truth of those other declarations of the Scriptures, that without divine aid our choices of the right are inoperative; that conscience and reason, with all their authority, are too often impotent before the hidden power of evil that rules in the will.

The two testimonies of consciousness and experience should be carefully distinguished. The spheres in which they are competent witnesses are very widely separated. Consciousness is as wholly incompetent to testify of inability, as is experience to testify of personal responsibility. Our inability is our disinclination, our dislike of what God enjoins; and that dislike is seated in the central and controlling power of the soul. The dislike acts spontaneously, is the power which directs the will, is one of the constituent elements of the will itself; the will in its generic sense—the sense here contemplated—is only the heart's revelation of itself, is the moral nature in movement. Consciousness can, therefore, take no cognizance of the dislike as a force which is in any manner separable from the spontaneous action of the will itself. Hence the most enslaved will can never make its slavery cognizable in consciousness, as any thing distinct from its own volitional force. The inability is simply the free spontaneous disposition of the soul to do wrong. Its primary choices of right, in obedience to the dictates of reason and conscience, are consciously free volitions, and its ultimate choices of wrong, in obedience to the dictates of the heart, are in consciousness equally free volitions. Experience, on the contrary, knows nothing of freedom of will, except at second hand from consciousness. But to the truth of the Scripture declarations of moral inability its witness is ample and decisive. We may with

conscious freedom choose an undesired moral end, but experience proves that an undesired moral end is an end unattainable. We may freely elect what our reason and conscience approve and our heart rejects, but experience shows that our heart controls us—that our moral inability is certain to thwart us at the last.

3. The testimonies of Scripture, consciousness, and experience, in respect to inability and responsibility, can be safely adduced only as an indivisible whole. Confining ourselves to one set of Scripture texts and the data of experience, we must come, in the end, if we are logically consistent, to supralapsarianism in doctrine, and fatalism in practice; accepting exclusively another set of texts and the data of consciousness, we enter on a line of argument which, logically followed out, has no proper terminus short of a limitation of omnipotence and a deification of man. Our only safety is in always regarding the total teachings of Scripture, and the united testimonies of consciousness and experience, as reciprocally interpretative, and mutually complementary. From their united evidences the conclusion is inevitable that the ability of man is not equal to his responsibility.

NATURAL AND MORAL INABILITY. Does the supposed distinction between the two kinds of ability require a modification of the foregoing conclusion? Since the time of the elder Jonathan Edwards, great importance has by many been attached to this distinction as furnishing a solution to the whole problem of an ability which is incommensurate with responsibility. All men, it is said, have a natural ability, which is fully equal to their moral obligations; but to the fulfillment of their obligations they are morally disinclined, and their disinclination is their moral inability; they cannot, because they will not, fulfill their obligations.

Now, so far as the phrase, natural ability, corresponds to the formal freedom, of whose existence both Scripture and consciousness so clearly assure us, and the phrase, moral inability, corresponds to that want of real freedom, of which the same Scriptures so emphatically remind us, just so far the distinction is well founded and throws light on the ques-

tion of responsibility. But such are not the meanings most commonly attached to the phrases. Whether Edwards¹ and his faithful expounder, Andrew Fuller², would have accepted the views or not, it is evident that many, who since their day have most vaunted the phrases, have had wider meanings in mind. With them, will is something independent of the moral affections, lying behind them and capable of controlling them; natural ability, with power to the contrary, can exist only as the will is independent of, and stronger than, the heart, i. e. as the will is something different from, and stronger than, the will itself.

The distinction between natural and moral ability is objectionable on a variety of grounds:

(a.) It is a purely metaphysical distinction which has no basis whatever of reality, is unsupported by consciousness and unattested by experience. Ability is something the possession or want of which can be proved only by experience, but in the very nature of the case a natural ability to the degree of a power to the contrary can never be tested by experiment.

(b.) The distinction is irrelevant and wholly fails to meet the difficulty it was intended to remove. The Divine requirements are not such as natural ability is sufficient to fulfill, but are precisely those of which, in ourselves, we are morally incapable. If our natural ability be equal to the requirements, it is idle to speak of any kind of inability in the case; and if there be a moral inability which only supernatural grace can overcome, then it is worse than idle to talk of natural ability.

(c.) The distinction is harmful, and proves itself, when logically carried out, to be mischievous, by its tendency to encourage self-confidence and self-complacency.

1. "We are said to be *naturally* unable to do a thing when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most commonly called *nature* does not allow of it, or because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is intrinsic to the will, either in the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects." "Moral inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination." Edward's *Freedom of the Will*, pt. 1, sec. 4, § 3.

2. Natural inability is "the want of rational faculties, bodily powers, and external advantages." Andrew Fuller, *Gospel Worthy of all Acceptation*, pt. 3, or vol. 2, p. 376. A. B. P. So. ed.

(*d.*) It introduces into theology a disastrous confusion of thought, by requiring the word natural to be used in an arbitrary and uncertain sense.

(*e.*) It can adduce no support from the Scriptures. The Bible no where tells man that he is naturally, that is of himself, equal to all his moral obligations, but, in enjoining his duties, every where assures him that his "sufficiency is of God."

(*f.*) To awaken in man a pungent and effective conviction of his coëxistent responsibility and inability, is the initiatory step in his salvation. His salvation is already begun when, convinced alike of his inexcusableness and helplessness, he accepts the divinely proffered relief. The most direct means to produce the conviction is not to tell him of a natural ability to do all that is required of him.

(*g.*) The very essence of true piety, in beings who have been rescued from the dominion of moral evil and are being developed under the tuition and example of Christ, consists in a two-fold sense of personal inability and an unfailling Divine sufficiency. That sense can neither be awakened by, nor coëxist with, a conviction of natural ability which is commensurate with obligation.

All parties agree in a recognition of free-agency and of the responsibility of man for his volitions ; but as respects the volitions themselves, these are on the one side regarded as the free acts of the self-determining, originating will, and on the other as the free acts of the personal self which always chooses according to its moral nature ; the former holding that the moral nature is determined by the choices, and the latter that the choices are determined by the moral nature. The controversy is purely a metaphysical one ; is common alike to philosophy¹ and theology ; and in the nature of the case can never be decided. Any system of theology that builds on the conclusions of either party to the controversy, is justly open to the suspicion of somewhere doing violence to the facts either of consciousness or of experience.

1. See Hamilton's Notes to his edit. of Reid's *Works ; on the Active Powers*, 1788. 4, and Note U, vol. 2.

SOTERIOLOGY.

§ 31—*Origin and Nature of the Plan of Salvation.*

Man as we have seen, is by nature and by practice at variance with his Creator, Ro., 5: 10. 8: 7; as a consequence, ruin and spiritual death have befallen him, from which, of himself, he is incapable of escape, Ro., 7: 14, 24, 25. To rescue him from his disobedience and ruin, a supernatural deliverance was provided, and the Divine method of its application was historically revealed; to accomplish his redemption, Jesus Christ came into the world, John, 18: 37. 1 Tim., 1: 5, and was "appointed heir of all things," Heb., 1: 2.

The historical beginning of the immediate work of redemption may be referred, according to our point of view, either to the birth of Jesus, to the beginning of the prophecies of his coming, to the special calling of Abraham, or to the very beginning of man's disobedience; but the origin of the thought and plan of human redemption was not in time. Salvation by Jesus Christ was not an afterthought of the creation; an expedient to remedy an unexpected disaster. The scheme of redemption and the scheme of creation were coëternal purposes, 1 Cor., 2: 7. Eph., 1: 4. 3: 9, 11. Rev., 13: 8.

The nature of the plan thus originated, and the method of its execution, can be determined only by careful scrutiny of the facts embodied in the history of its introduction and progress among mankind. Attempts to determine beforehand what this plan must be, or to compress it, with all the fulness and freeness of its spirit, within a system shaped by an underlying human philosophy, must result in the pro-

duction of a scheme too narrow and rigid and artificial, to correspond with the Divine reality. A scheme that shall embody that reality, in anything like the freedom of its actual method, must accept the simple teachings of the Bible as paramount in authority to any metaphysical postulates and to all systems of psychology.

§ 32—*Preparation for the Coming of Christ.*

This preparation may be viewed in two aspects, which, though wholly distinct, are yet closely related. The one presents the origination and convergence of natural causes that facilitate the introduction and diffusion of Christianity among men; the other shews these natural causes grown into formidable obstacles which supernatural power alone could overcome, and, in overcoming, could transform into higher than original uses. And it will become noticeable as we go on, how preparation in the first sense became, under an overruling Providence, preparation in the second sense; how obstacles apparently insurmountable were made in turn not only to develop the supernatural resources of the religion they threatened to obstruct, but in the end were compelled effectually to advance it in its work.

Preparation in the first sense was of three kinds; and to reverse, in the enumeration, the order of both their importance and their beginning, may be said to have consisted: partly, in providing for the spread of the gospel among peoples and nations the most dissimilar and alien; partly, in demonstrating to the human mind its need of a supernatural Deliverer; and partly in training a single nation to be the medium of conveying the blessings of that Deliverer to mankind.

The first kind of preparation was secured by the wide extension of the Roman Empire, and the subjection of many hostile nations to a single government and to one system of laws; and by the wide diffusion, even to Judea on the one

hand and to Gaul on the other, of the Greek language¹, which of all the tongues spoken among men, was the best fitted for the service it was to render.

The second and the third were secured by the widely different modes of procedure adopted by the Divine Ruler, in his government of the world under its two great divisions of Gentiles and Jews², the worshippers of false gods and the worshippers of Jehovah.

Thus the second kind of preparation was accomplished, by exhibiting the helplessness of gentileism or heathenism through the futility of the best products of its philosophy³ and its natural religion⁴. The unaided mind of man could go no further in its attempts to solve the problems of the universe than it had gone in Greek philosophy; its highest achievement was the discovery of needed help from above⁵ and the erection of an altar to the unknown God. Other nations, also left to themselves, shewed in their several ways, by their idolatries and vices, Ro., 1: 21-32, their need of Divine interposition; and by so shewing, prepared the way for making interposition effectual, Acts, 17: 29-31. 1 Cor., 1: 21.

A third means of preparation for the introduction of the gospel, was in the Divine method of dealing with the Jewish nation⁶. God selected Abraham and gave him a distinct and comprehensive promise; setting at work within him that fundamental principle of Christianity, and of all true, or Christian character, faith, Ro., 4: 15-22. Gal., 3: 6, 7,

1. See Hug's *Introduction to the N. T.*, pt. 2, ch. 1. § 10.—Conybeare and Howson, *Life and Epistles of Paul*, vol. 1, p. 15.—Dominicus Diodati, a Neapolitan, in a treatise published in 1767, and entitled *De Christo grace loquente Exercitatio*, defends the position firmly, that Christ and his Apostles must have both read and spoken Greek. See specially pars 2 and pars 3, cap. 1.

2. See Neander, *Planting and Training*, bk. 6, ch. 1, § 3.—Schaff, *Hist. Apost. Ch.*, §§ 39-53.

3. Döllinger, *The Gentile and the Jew*, bk. 5, vol. 1. bk. 8, vol. 2.

4. Döllinger, bk. 2-4, 6, vol. 1. bk. 7, vol. 2.

5. See Ackermann, *Christian Element in Plato*, pt. 2, ch. 5, 6.

6. See Kurtz, *Hist. of the Old Covenant*, vol. 1.—Dean Stanley, *Hist. of the Jewish Ch.*, lects. 1, 2.

He made him the first recipient of the Gospel and its blessings, Gal., 3 : 8, 9.

To secure in the descendants of Abraham a right appreciation and acceptance of the gospel, there were instituted, through Moses, those minute requirements, moral, ritual, ceremonial, civil, which together constitute the Jewish νόμος or Law¹, Gal. 3 : 23, 24. 4 : 3-5. The law thus given, so far from annulling the promise or Gospel announced to Abraham, (compare *διαθήκη, ἐπαγγελία, νόμος* and *εὐαγγέλιον*) was only one stage in the revelation of it, and an exhibition of that side of it which is always apparent to the unbelieving and the disobedient, Gal. 3 : 17-24. The same eternal principle of law, whether embodied in the written word of the Bible, or in the ethical convictions of mankind, still prepares the human heart for the reception of its Deliverer.

Contributory to the same end was the office of the Prophets². The νόμος of Moses, by its inexorable demands, shut men up to a consciousness of ill desert, and thus to the necessity of looking for a Savior. The prophets, abating not a jot of the demands of the law, whether of ceremony, of sacrifice, or of claim on the heart, only pointed the more earnestly to the Savior whom they saw in the distance. The prophets were the proclaimers of the Gospel to the men of their day. They kept the people's eye on the Abrahamic promise, or the Gospel side of the νόμος, as Moses himself had done in his promise of the great Prophet who should afterwards come, Deut., 18 : 15-19. Acts, 3 : 22-25. And hence Christ in Matt., 5 : 17, speaks of the law and the prophets as a united testimony which he had come to fulfill, comp. Ro., 10 : 4 ; and hence also Christ pronounced John the Baptist the greatest of prophets, Matt., 11 : 11. Luke, 7 : 28, not because John foretold more than any other concerning the Redeemer, but because more distinctly than any

1. See Kurtz, *Hist. of the Old Cov.*, vol. 3, pt. 1, sect. 1.—Stanley, *Hist. Jewish Ch.*, lect. 7.

2. See Hengstenberg, *Christology*, vol. 1, c. 5.—J. A. Alexander, *The Earlier Prophecies of Isaiah*, Introduction.—Wines, *Commentaries on the Laws of the Anc. Heb.*, ch. 9.—R. Payne Smith, Bampton lects., *Prophecy a Preparation for Christ*.

other he was permitted on the one hand to proclaim, and in his own person exemplify the inexorability of the νόμος, and on the other to announce, and even point out personally, the Deliverer so long expected.

But the three foregoing classes of preparatives for the introduction of Christianity became, through the perversity of man, the most formidable obstacles to its progress. The Roman power, by uniting the most distant and hostile nations in a single empire, made it possible for Christianity to be carried into all the world, but it also put to death the Founder of Christianity, as well as his chief apostles and thousands of the early disciples. Philosophy, which had so filled the heart of Plato with yearning for the Divine aid it had assured him would some time be granted, became to the Greek a touch-stone by which the Gospel was rejected as foolishness, 1 Cor., 1: 22, 23. The Jewish διαθήκη, or Old Testament dispensation, with its precepts and promises on the one hand, and its prophetic visions of the future on the other, so engrossed the attention of the Jew that he forgot "the further looking hope" without which half the meaning of his religion was wanting. He was too much pleased with the shadow to see any beauty in the substance; the type usurped in his mind the place of the antitype. And to this hour, what was intended to be transient and preparatory he persists in regarding as permanent and ultimate. He sees in the language of his prophets, not a higher and more spiritual religion,—not a foreshadowing of the teachings of Jesus,—but only a splendor that is yet to come to the religion which his fathers received as an eternal possession from Moses. Salvation by a crucified Christ is to him a fatal stumbling block.

Manifestly, then, if Christianity was to accomplish its work among men, some power superior to natural causes and able to overrule and subordinate their action must interpose; that power accompanied the introduction of the Gospel. The Roman arm could lay in the grave the Founder of Christianity, but it was impotent to hold him; unwittingly and involuntarily it fulfilled the Divine behests.

It could slaughter Christians, but by slaughtering multiplied their numbers. Unable to arrest the progress of the Gospel, the more it endeavored to hinder, the more the Divine energy of the Gospel was illustrated and its progress hastened. Greek philosophy could look down with scorn on the thought of a crucified Saviour, but in his Gospel was a power and a wisdom before which philosophy was compelled to bow. The higher its pretensions, the more earnest was the search in it for the light and life which the heart craved; and the more complete the recoil from it to the Gospel which alone could satisfy¹. Judaism could spurn the Messiah, but could not suppress the testimony of the Scriptures to his Messiahship; it could denounce him as a destroyer of Moses and the prophets, but it could not turn aside the irresistible evidence that the prophecies of its prophets found in him a marvellous fulfillment; that the eternal principles of its moral law were by him expounded with a clearness and enforced with a pungency to which Moses and the prophets were alike unequal. Thus the religion that was intended of God to prepare his chosen people for the reception of his Son when he should come, but was made the chief ground for his rejection, became, and in its sacred Scriptures must ever continue to be, a standing testimony to the Divine origin of the religion of Jesus. The Old Testament and the New together constitute an indivisible whole; each is unintelligible without the other; the law and the Gospel, which they represent, are the complements each of the other.

Foremost among the methods of preparation was the Jewish *διαθήκη*. Through Heathenism came a knowledge of the wants and helplessness of the race; through Judaism, the distinct annunciation of a coming Deliverer, and of hopeless condemnation without that Deliverer's aid. The office of Heathenism was accomplished by the unaided powers of man; that of Judaism, by a many-sided and supernatural enforcement of Law; and hence *ὁ νόμος* is sometimes used

1. See Neander on the Relation of the Grecian to the Christian Ethics, trans. *Bib. Sac.*, vol. 10, pp. 476, ff., 789, ff.

as synonymous with the whole Jewish economy¹. (Rom., 10 : 4. Heb., 7 : 12. 10 : 1.)

The Scriptures nowhere make those distinctions commonly maintained by theologians between law of nature and positive law ; between laws civil, ceremonial, ritual and moral. All are alike parts of The Law ; but evidently it is the idea of moral obligation and its fulfillment that runs through, and gives unity to, them all. Every other species of law contained in the Scriptures was manifestly for the special elucidation and enforcement of eternal moral law. The whole round of Jewish rites and ordinances was, on the one hand, but a rigid and minute enforcement by symbolical requirements of what was taught in the moral law, and on the other, a typical proclamation of that Redemption which the ritual law and the moral law (the ten commandments,) were alike designed to usher in upon the world, Heb., 9 : 8-12. 10 : 1-3. Comp. Acts, 15 : 10. Nor were the various statutes of Judaism that accompanied the moral law, capriciously enacted, or arbitrarily enforced ; they were real, obligatory, authoritative and capable of enforcement, because they were grounded in realities and supported by the inexorable necessities of nature and condition.

If the nature and office of law, especially of the Old Testament νόμος, and of its relation to Christianity and the Salvation it offers, be as described, then a somewhat careful analysis and examination of the nature and offices of law seems at this point to be requisite.

1. The government of the world under the two great divisions of Heathenism and Judaism, and the preparation of mankind thereby for the introduction of Christianity, represent all that can justly be included under the phrase "Covenant of Works," of which Federal theologians have always made so much account. God's method of dealing with mankind is always to treat them according to their knowledge and opportunities, and that method is his covenant (διαθήκη) with man ; and when by special revelation, as to the Jews, his will and their duties are minutely made known, the special relations thus created are most aptly represented by the emphasized metaphor of a "covenant."

§ 33—*Moral Law.*

I. THE IDEA OR DEFINITION OF LAW. For popular use, the definition of law as "a rule of action," is sufficiently accurate; or more comprehensively, as well as more accurately, stated, law is that in personal existence, a due recognition and observance of which, is requisite to the full perfection of its being; and moral law is a principle of action, a full compliance with which by the personal will is indispensable to the realisation of the ideal type of moral being. The first definition conceives of law as a statute, as a formal, external requirement, and as a restraint upon the will of a subject by the will of a sovereign; the second conceives of law as a part of the very nature of the being to be regulated—as a constituent principle of essential being¹. Law as applied to physics, is used metaphorically, and, comprehensively defined, denotes a rule according to which a given class of phenomena is observed to occur. Inseparably connected with the idea of moral law, is our conception of

II. ITS ORIGIN². This is not adequately represented when

1. *Lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ faciendæ sunt, prohibetque contraria. Eadem ratio quum in mente hominis confirmata et connecta. Lex est. * * * Lex est neque hominum ingenis excogitata, nec scitum aliquod populorum, sed æternum quoddam, quod universum mundum reget, imperandi prohibendique sapientia. Lex non tum denique incipit lex esse, quum scripta est, sed tum, quum orta est. Orta autem simul est cum mente divina. Quamobrem lex vera atque princeps apta ad jubendum et ad vetandum, ratio est recta summi Jovis. Cicero, *De Legibus*, lib. 1, cap. 6. lib. 2, cap. 4.*

*Lex est mensura et regula actuum agendorum. Est quædam ordinatio rationis ad bonum commune, ab eo, qui curam communitatis habet, promulgata. * * * Æternus divinæ legis conceptus habet rationem legis æternæ, secundum quod a Deo ordinatur ad gubernationem rerum ab ipso præcognitarum. Thos. Aquinas, ps. prima secundæ, ques. 90, art. 1, 4. ques. 91, art. 1. See the well known words of Hooker in his *Ecclesiastical Polity*, bk. 1, ch. 16. 8.—Kant, *Metaphysic of Ethics*, Trans. by J. W. Semple, p. 169 ff.—Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, lib. 1, c. 1.—The Duke of Argyle, *The Reign of Law*, ch. 2.*

2. This is one of the points at which the paths of the moral philosopher and of the theologian intersect. The inquiry into the ground of moral obligation may in Ethics be made a further reaching question than is legitimate in theology; but the inquiry in both domains is identical, so far as it relates to the

referred to the sovereign will of God¹. To this explanation there are grave objections. If it be true, then: (a.) The distinction between right and wrong may be arbitrary, or, had God so willed, good might have been evil and evil good. (b.) God may, or may not, himself be what he requires us to become, and, so far as his law throws any light on the question, he may be directly the opposite of holy in his own moral nature. (c.) Had he chosen to give us no law, then, so far as we know, since conformity to law is holiness and nonconformity to law is sin, we should have been equally incapable of holiness or of sin. (d.) It is fatal to this explanation that, in vindicating the law of God as holy, just and good, we always refer to something else than itself as a standard or test, i. e., to something which is independent of his will as expressed in law, and something by which the will itself is vindicated. It is evident that God, though a sovereign, always acts for wise reasons; that his laws are not arbitrary enactments—not mere decrees irrespective of the nature and necessities of man; and that thus, something must lie behind and determine his will. Nor does it relieve this explanation from objection to affirm that the divine will enacts laws for benevolent ends²; if ends

motives to moral conduct which spring from the will of a personal God. There may be conjectural grounds of moral obligation in Ethics, which can furnish no such motives; but the sanctions of moral law, without which it does not exist, force on the mind the inquiry into its origin, and as a consequence, into the nature and ground of its authority.

1. The doctrine of Hobbes that law rests on power—"where there is no common power there is no law; where no law, no injustice." See his *Leviathan*, pt. 1, ch. 13. *Works*, p. 115. Molesworth's ed., and *Leviathan passim*,—was at bottom this theory of law. But the ascription of law to the mere will of God, clearly propounded by Ockham, defended by Descartes in his *Meditations*, and afterwards advocated by Waburton,—see his *Divine Legation of Moses*, bk. 1, sect. 4. (Comp. the notes of Edmund Law to his translation of Archbp. King's *Origin of Evil*, pp. 254, 259, 274, ed. 4, Camb., 1758,)—has had many advocates among theologians and has influenced many a theological system. See this theory of law refuted by Cudworth, *Immutable Morality*, pt. 1, ch. 3.

2. This was virtually what Paley did in his famous definition of virtue. The first half of the definition made virtue to consist in "obedience to the will of God;" and the second half in doing that will "for the sake of everlasting hap-

determine the laws, then these and not the will of God, are their source, and contain the ground of obligation.

2. The origin of law is not found in a regard for the happiness of man¹. His happiness is doubtless dependent on the administration of a wise and just government, but there is no proof that the government exists for that end alone or for that end chiefly. Beneficent to man as all the laws of God undoubtedly are, no theory in explanation of their origin can be adequate, which refers them to the happiness of man as their final cause; and for the following reasons: (a.) If this explanation were the true one, the very end which the law contemplated would itself be unattainable. He who seeks happiness for its own sake never finds it; it is he only who, for righteousness sake, is willing to *lose* his life—his happiness, that eventually finds it. (b.) The mind, immediately and without calculation, recognizes the obligation of moral law, and no amount of regard for self-interest can stifle the sense of obligation when its commands are once understood. It is inconceivable that the requirements of moral law could be reversed, or in any degree deflected from our innate sense of right. The origin of law therefore must have been in some anterior necessity of being quite independent of the incident of happiness. (c.) The end for which the law was made should evidently be the end we seek in endeavoring to fulfill it; but if the law was made for our happiness as its end and addresses its motives to our self-love, then supreme selfishness must be the highest virtue and disinterested benevolence an absurdity.

3. Was the origin of law in the nature of things? To the affirmative of this question many writers, repelled by inherent difficulties from both the preceding solutions, have felt

piness." This explanation of law underlies several forms of the New School theology. For a revival of it in a new shape, see Pres. Hopkins' *Lects. on Moral Science*, and *The Law of Love and Love as a Law*. It is virtual Utilitarianism.

1. Of all the theories this has been favored by more and by abler political and ethical writers, in Eng. literature, than any other; in theology it has received comparatively but little favor. For a somewhat comprehensive but unphilosophical survey of these writers, see Lecky, *Hist. of Europ. Morals*, vol. 1, ch. 1.—Comp. Whewell, *Lects. on the Hist. Moral Phil. in Eng.* For one of the ablest of later writers, see Austin, *Lects. on Jurisprudence*.

themselves compelled to assent. To the phrase "nature of things," however, two widely different ideas have been attached by different writers. The one class understand by it an "eternal fitness of things¹;" the other, an existing and created relation of the Creator to his rational creatures, and of rational creatures to one another². By the first class, moral law is conceived of as something uncreated and eternal, lying behind and controlling the authority of God himself; by the second class, moral law is conceived as something made to meet the requirements of created relations; the views, therefore, of the second class are identical with that explanation of law which refers it directly and simply to the sovereign will of God, and need not here be further discussed. But the supposition of an eternal fitness of things which itself constitutes moral law, and to which the will of God is subject, is equally objectionable with either of the preceding explanations. (a.) It assumes that our finite conditions of thought are identical with the infinite conceptions of God; that our circumscribed experience is adequately representative of the divine activity in the origination of the scheme of his creation. (b.) This theory, consistently applied, would overthrow the very foundations of the Divine authority, and destroy the vital principle of all true piety. (aa.) It would strike a fatal blow at the argument from conscience for the existence of God,—it would not be the existence of God, but an eternal fitness of things of which conscience would assure us. (bb.) By thrusting an abstraction into the place of God, an abstraction before which God himself is supposed to bow, it would reduce religion and piety from a loving service of the archetypal

1. See Samuel Clarke's Boyle Lects., *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, prop. 12, §6, and bound in the same vol., his Boyle Lects. *Concerning the Unalterable Obligations of Nat. Religion and the Truth and Certainty of the Christ. Relig.*, prop. 1-3. Clarke's Lects. were directed against the views of Hobbes; and Cudworth, whose "Immutable Morality" was written for the same object, had preceded him in placing the ground of moral obligation in "the nature of things." See his *Immutable Morality*, bk. 1, chh. 1, 2, or *Works*, Harrison's ed., vol. 3, p. 525, ff.

2. See Dr. Wayland's *Elements of Moral Science*, bk. 1, ch. 3, sect. 1.

Father of our race to a cold and monotonous contemplation of a mere idea. And (*cc.*) if there be anything superior to the infinite God, it would seem to be the dictate of wisdom to worship it as supreme; but it would be a worship that, intelligently offered, would end sooner or later in fatalism.

4. The real source of moral law was the moral nature of God; and inasmuch as the original, typical man was created in the Divine image, the law is also a summary of the constituent principles of the unfallen nature of man. Moral law, therefore, was not *made*, neither arbitrarily nor for definite ends, but was simply *revealed*. It embodied in code what from eternity had been embosomed in God. The revelation and codification may have been for beneficent ends, but the law itself was as eternal as God, and must remain, regardless of ends, as immutable as his immutable nature. That this is the true view is evident:

(*a.*) From the power which moral law, especially as it is expounded in the ethical teachings of Jesus, possesses over the moral nature of man. No sooner are its claims understood, than consciousness acknowledges and conscience enforces them. In the moral law, as the portraiture both of the character of God and of the ideal personal self, is recognized, at once, the type of what we originally were, of what we were designed to be and must become or perish. Thus law, as objective statute, is able to enforce itself, because it embodies the immutable principles of the subjective being; just as civil laws become living and perpetual statutes in proportion as they represent the constituent principles of the society they regulate.

(*b.*) The actual product of law, as it is fulfilled in the personal character, is a resemblance to God—a reproduction of that Divine image presented in the person of the typical and ideal man Jesus; and it is such because objective moral law embodies the subjective principles of the moral being of both God and man.

(*c.*) All there is of truth in either of the other explanations of the origin of law, is traceable directly to the nature of God. The will of God is the source of moral law, if by

will be understood the Divine nature expressing itself; the law of God obeyed secures the happiness of man, simply because the one condition of his happiness is resemblance to the character of God and a corresponding harmony with his will; and moral law is congruity with the nature of things, because the origin of the nature of things was in the eternal nature of God; the moral universe is constituted as it is, and our intuitive moral convictions are what they are, because the universe, ourselves included, is the reflex of the unchanging moral nature of its Creator.

(*d.*) That the source of moral law is the moral nature of God, is evident from the nature of rewards and penalties. These do not consist of arbitrary bestowments and inflictions, but of natural and inevitable consequences—of resultant states and conditions of being, which are as natural and uniform as are the laws whose violations or fulfillments they invariably follow. A good man's reward consists, pre-eminently, in his conscious harmony with the infinitely holy God, and a bad man's penalty in the consciousness of his hopeless antagonism with a Being whom his conscience upbraids him for opposing. The mutual attraction of good men is itself blessedness, and the mutual reaction and repulsion of the bad and the good is to the bad a perpetual wretchedness; and this is so, because the moral laws whose sanctions are thus enforced are only the transcripts of the immutable principles of moral being.

(*e.*) The true source and ground of moral law must be the ultimate ground of the Divine authority. But the ultimate ground of the Divine authority is neither in the power nor in the sovereign will of God. His sovereign will and power brought us into being, but in creating us rational beings in his own image, he thereby endowed us with rights which he infinitely respects. He never rests his right to our service on his sovereign pleasure and power to enforce it; in other words, moral law which proclaims his right is not an expression of arbitrary will but of the unchangeable requirements of moral being. Nor again is the ultimate ground of the Divine authority in the benevolence of God.

Gratitude should be to us a motive to obedience,—ingratitude is a base sin—but the bestowment of gifts can be no ground for authority ; it does not comport with our ideas of honor, either in man or in God, to lay us under obligation for the purpose of afterwards controlling us. But it does comport with our ideas of all that is noble and divinely authoritative to think of a Being whose infinitely holy nature controls alike the exercise of his power, will, benevolence, and every other attribute ; this gives to his government over men an authority which conscience and reason immediately recognize, whatever may be the opposition with which the will may resist it. The moral nature which thus lies at the foundation of the Divine authority, manifestly must also have been the source of his moral law.

Nor is the position that moral law thus represents the moral nature of God, identical, as it has sometimes been asserted to be, with the position that the ground of all law is the sovereign will of God. The will of God, in its comprehensive or generic sense, is undoubtedly the expression of the Divine nature, and, in that sense of the word will, the two positions are plainly identical ; but that is not the meaning of the word will when it is objected to as being the source of moral law ; the great objections are, that to ground law in the sovereign pleasure of God is to make might the basis of right—that is, it conceives of will as sovereign and not as the expression of nature ; and, above all, it is said to rob law of the highest motive that can be adduced for obeying it. But the highest motive to obedience that man can know, must be the motive by which he can realize the typical ideal of his being, and thus please and honor the Being who is at once his Creator, Archetype and Ruler ; and that motive is clearly furnished in the moral law as grounded in the moral nature of God.

Thus moral law, viewed in its relation to God, is a transcript of his character ; viewed in its relation to man, it is an outline delineation of ideal or perfect humanity. As objective requirements and written statutes, moral laws state preceptively the universal facts of moral life, the eter-

nal truth pertaining to both God and man, the fundamental facts of moral being, the laws written on the heart of mankind, Ro. 2 : 14, 15. Even positive laws represent some latent but inexorable necessities of state, condition, circumstance, or habit. No law of God seems ever to have been arbitrarily enacted, or simply with a view to certain ends to be accomplished ; it always represented some reality of life, which it was inexorably necessary that those who were to be regulated should carefully observe.

III. OFFICES OF LAW. These are manifold, and differ according as law is viewed objectively as statute, or subjectively as principle¹ ; they have also, in the past, been the subject of protracted but useless controversies². The offices may be stated as follows :

1. The Law, as objective statute, had no independent office, Ro., 5 : 20. Gal. 3. 19 ; was not given that men should be saved by obedience to it, Gal., 3 : 21 ; but was strictly pedagogic, 3 : 23, 24, its special office ceasing for those who were led by it to put their trust in the Being who in his own person fulfilled every one of its requirements, Ro., 3 : 13, 25, 26. 5 : 1.

2. But the Law, as subjective principle of being, embodied in the eternal nature of God and reëmbodied in the created

1. See Neander, *Planting and Training*, bk. 6, ch. 1. The Pauline Doctrine.

2. The Antinomian controversy originated by John Agricola, a contemporary of Luther, (see his sentiments condemned in the *Formula Concordiæ*, 6, de tertio usu legis,—comp. *Confessio Helvet*, 12,) has always continued in the church, though carried on at different periods with different degrees of zeal. The Sermons of Tobias Crisp in England, in defence of Antinomianism, at the beginning of the 17th century, (see his *Christ Alone Exalted*, ed. by Gill, 1791, 2 vols., and his *Christ Made Sin*, late ed., 1832, 2 vols.,) drew many to his side, and called forth a host of opponents, who continued to refute him long after he was dead. The results of the sharp controversy about the offices of the law, between the extreme Calvinists and the Arminians, represented by Toplady on the one side, and by Fletcher of Madely Chapel, on the other, (see their *Works*,) still linger in the popular theology of Methodism. Both the earlier Antinomian and the later Arminian controversies, however, turned on a theory of the Atonement and of a Covenant with Christ, that he should suffer only for the sins of the elect. No writer has rendered more effective service in the overthrow of popular Antinomian ideas, among English speaking Christians, than the plain and unlettered Andrew Fuller.

nature of man, is as immutable as God; and, in its demands on man, is as immovable as the throne of God, Mat., 5: 17, 18.

3. Since Law, as subjective principle, is immutable, and Law, both as subjective principle and objective representation requires an obedience which none have ever succeeded in rendering, Ro., 3: 20. Gal., 2: 16. 3: 10-12, 21, it follows that, without divine interposition, there remains for us nothing but hopeless condemnation. To make aware of this condemnation, is one office of the published law, Gal., 3: 10, 13.

4. Since the dealings of God with the race in preparing for the introduction of Christianity, were not unlike his dealings with an individual in preparing him for a personal reception of his Redeemer, it follows that the present office of written or published Law cannot differ essentially from its office in the Mosaic dispensation. As the laws embodied in the moral nature of man, and variously represented and illustrated in the enactments of the Jewish religion, prepared the way for Christ to come to the race, so the same Law, embodied in the individual and still more clearly illustrated and enforced by the teachings of Christianity, now prepares the way for Christ to take up his abode in the individual heart. As the Theocracy, with its Law in varied forms, prepared the way for the kingdom of God in the visible Church, so the kingdom of God in the Church, with Law still more clearly and effectually enunciated, now prepares the way for the spiritual rule of God in the heart of the believer. But in doing this, the published Law

5. Reveals the presence and nature of Sin, Ro., 7: 7-14. Without the Law, sin may lie dormant in the soul, unrecognized by conscience, Ro., 7: 7-10, and yet be none the less destructive or punishable, Ro., 5: 13, 14; the Law reveals the presence of sin, and by dragging it into the light of consciousness discloses its exceeding sinfulness, Ro., 7: 13.

6. Another office of the Law is, to show us our own helplessness, and so to conduct us to the Deliverer without whose offices every office of the Law becomes abortive, Ro., 7: 24. 8: 3. Gal., 2: 16. 3: 21, 24. Christ, in all his teaching

and enforcement of Law, said nothing implying that he regarded man as capable of so obeying Law, that, by his own obedience, he can attain to the true end for which he is created, Mat., 5 : 3-10. 19 : 16-26.

7. Every man, whatever the stage of his progress in the Christian life, or the completeness of his character, always needs the monitory and disciplinary office of the written Law; partly, to make him aware of the defects of the most exalted virtues and the deficiencies of the completest character, and partly, through his progressive perception of the breadth and subtlety of the Law's requirements, to lift him ever upward in his apprehension of that perfection of being of which he is capable¹. No finite creature can ever cease to be subject to Law. None can ever outgrow his need of objective norms or statutes, by which the movements of his will are to be regulated. Every one, at the successive stages of his progress, may outgrow his sense of the restraining power of the mere letter of special Laws, but he outgrows this sense of restraint, only because he penetrates more deeply into, and his heart becomes more completely in harmony with, the very spirit of the Law itself; his obedience becomes spontaneous. The more profoundly Christian he becomes, the more strictly observant is he of Law. Christianity, so far from abolishing Law, incorporates it into the very being of the Christian, Heb., 10 : 16². Ro., 3 : 31.

8. There can, therefore, properly be no such contrast between the preaching of the Law and the preaching of the Gospel as is often popularly represented. To preach the Gospel properly to the disobedient, is to preach the Law. By just so much as the Gospel is a clearer revelation of the character of God than the Law was, by just so much is the Gospel, to the disobedient, a severer condemnation than

1. See Tholuck's *Predigten in dem akadem. Gottesdienste*, etc. vol. 4, p. 54, ff., or trans. by Prof. Park in *German Selections*, p. 115, ff.—Calvin's *Institu.*, b. 2, c. 7, § 12.

2. Observe the significance of the New Testament phrases ὁ νόμος τοῦ θεοῦ, Ro., 8 : 7—τοῦ χριστοῦ, Gal., 6 : 2—τοῦ πνεύματος, Ro., 8 : 2—τοῦ νόμου, Ro., 7 : 28—πίστεως, Ro., 3 : 27—νόμον τέλειον τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, James, 1 : 25.

the Law ; and to those who in the spirit of loving obedience, are consciously striving to conform themselves to the will of God, the Law is a source of satisfaction and an object of love. Law and Gospel are only the two sides of the one object, the highest glory of God as including the highest welfare of man¹.

§ 34—*The Person of Jesus Christ.*

It is evident that throughout the sacred Scriptures the central object of thought is Jesus Christ, and it is this thought which, amid all the intellectual diversities of the writers, secures to their writings the unity of design and the harmony of execution which so clearly distinguish them. It may be granted that the conceptions of the earlier writers were vague, and, of all the writers, were sometimes formed from opposite points of view, but their conceptions were never contradictory. It was always one and the same Christ, though in manifold offices and in the most dissimilar estates. But it is particularly evident that the sacred writers, specially of the New Testament, are accustomed to speak of him in language which cannot be consistently interpreted on the supposition, either that he was not properly man, or that he was not incomparably more than a mere man. There are many passages which are unintelligible except upon the supposition that he possessed a two-fold nature, and that, by virtue of his two-fold nature, he sustained relations of equal intimacy with the absolute Godhead on the one hand, and with our oppressed and tempted humanity on the other, Luke, 1 : 35. John, 1 : 14. 10 : 30. 14 : 1, 9. Ro., 1 : 3, 4. 9 : 5. Phil., 2 : 6-11. Heb., 2 : 14. 5 : 7, 8. From the earliest age of the Church until now, the coëxistence and relation of the two natures, a

1. See Calvin's *Institu.*, b. 2, c. 7, § 11.—The Symbol, Repetitio Anhaltina, Niemeyer, *Collect. Confess.*, sects. 5, 6.—Vinet's Sermon on Law and Gospel in Turnbull's *Montaigne: the endless Study, &c.*

Divine and a human, in the person of Christ, have been subjects of most earnest discussion ; the discussion still continues with fresh vigor ; and, as our view of the redemptive work of Christ must depend not a little on our conceptions of his person, these conceptions should be most carefully formed.

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§ 35—*The Human Nature of Christ.*

There are numerous passages of Scripture in which Christ is simply and specially styled man¹, John, 8 : 40. Acts, 17 : 31. Ro., 15 : 5. 1 Cor., 15 : 21. 1 Tim., 2 : 5. Comp. Is., 53 : 3. Dan., 7 : 13. Men are called his brethren, Heb., 2 : 17. He was subject to the ordinary laws of human growth, both in body and mind, Luke, 2 : 52. He is spoken of as having been subject to all the temptations, trials, wants and sufferings of humanity. He was susceptible of the emotions of joy, grief and displeasure like other men, Luke, 10 : 21. John, 11 : 35. Luke, 22 : 42, 44. Mark, 11 : 15 ; and finally suffered a violent death, like any ordinary man².

1. The distinction between being "man" and "a man," is too great to be overlooked. Had there been a man Jesus whose origin was by supernatural generation, then it might be proper to speak of him as a man ; but the supernatural origin of the manhood of Christ removes him from the company of mere men as they now are, though not from a community of human nature as it may and ought to be.

2. The proper humanity of Christ is not that side of his person which just now needs vindication. One of the good results of Unitarian criticism, as well as of all the long list of modern attempts to write the Life of Christ, has been to give a reality to the human life of our Lord, which brings him into actual brotherhood with mankind. That Romish notion which lifts him so far away from us as to require the intervention of Mary and the saints to reach him, is happily fast yielding to juster and more Scriptural views ; all, similar Church notions of a needed priesthood to give efficacy to the sacraments, must yield in due time to the clear and biblical teaching that Jesus Christ is ever with us, and in himself is immediately accessible to every human heart. Liddon, in his Bampton Lects, on *The Divinity of our Lord*, with all his churchism, is compelled to give emphasis to our Lord's true humanity, though entirely too much after the traditional modes of conception.

§ 36.—*The Divinity of Christ.*

Jesus Christ was also more than man. It is impossible to read any continuous portion of the New Testament and not see very clearly, that He was a unique person; and it is equally impossible to read the New Testament as a whole, and not discern that all its writers agree in regarding Him, not only as more than human, but as distinctively and truly Divine¹.

The evidence for the Divinity of Christ, which is chiefly though not exclusively Scriptural, is yet so ample and varied in its details, that only specimens of its various kinds can here be presented². We will begin with that which is the basis of all the others, viz. :

1. The Testimony of Christ concerning himself.

(a.) As respects his preëxistence. He speaks of himself as "coming down from heaven," and "from God," when he "came into the world," John, 6 : 38. 8 : 42. 16 : 28 ; as "ascending up where he was before," John, 6 : 62 ; as being restored to "the glory which he had with the Father before the world was," John, 17 : 5. Mere preëxistence however, does not necessarily imply proper Divinity ; but when Christ says, "before Abraham was, I am," John, 8 : 58, the "I am" affirms an eternal preëxistence, and eternal preëxistence is consistent only with real Divinity.

(b.) Christ designates himself as the Son of God, and as Lord. He seems to have preferred to call himself the Son of Man ; but he also refers to God as in an exclusive sense his Father, and to himself as, in an equally exclusive sense, the

1. The Arian distinction between the "Divinity" and the "Deity" of Christ, upon which certain modern Unitarians are disposed to lay so much stress, need not interfere with our use of the words Divine and Divinity, in the clearly established sense of Godhead.

2. For this evidence in detail, see J. Pye Smith, *Scripture Testimony to the Messiah*, 2 vols.—*Scriptural Evidence of the Deity of Christ*, by D. B. Ford, *Bib. Sac.*, July, 1860.—Stanley Leathes, Boyle Lects. for 1868, 1870, *The Witness of the Old Testament to Christ*; and *Witness of St. John to Christ*.—Liddon's Bampton Lects, *Divinity of our Lord*.

Son of God¹. It is abundantly evident that by the title Son of God, the Jews understood him to "make himself equal with God," and to "make himself God," John, 5: 18. 10: 33; and it is just as evident that he uttered no word in correction of their interpretation of his language². He also applied to himself the title Lord, Mat., 22: 43. Mark, 12: 35-37, and emphatically recognized the propriety of its application by others, John, 13: 13. Luke, 6: 46. But the Septuagint Scriptures had made the Jews familiar with this title as a special designation of God, and as the translation of the word Jehovah³. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that there was a purposed significance, both in the use of the term in the Septuagint and in its appropriation by Christ; and that we are thereby assured of the identity, in essential nature, of both Jehovah and our Lord Jesus Christ.

(c.) The relations he sustained to God in the exercise of his power, both towards his disciples and others, imply his Divinity. In John, 10: 28-30, he declared that no one should pluck his sheep out of his hand, and gave as his reason for their absolute security the omnipotence of God, immediately adding, "I and my Father are one." As Meyer says, the Arian understanding of a mere *ethical harmony* as taught in the words "are one" is unsatisfactory, because irrelevant to the exercise of power, but that the orthodox supposition of a oneness of essence, though not contained in the words themselves, is, by the necessities of the argument, presupposed by them. In John, 5: 17, he

1. "The two titles 'Son of God' and 'Son of Man,' therefore, bear evidently a reciprocal relation to each other. And we conclude as Christ used the one to designate his human personality, so he employed the other to point out his Divine; and that as he attached a sense far more profound than was common to the former title, so he ascribed a deeper meaning than was usual to the latter."—Neander's *Life of Christ*, § 59.

2. See Archbp. Whately, *Kingdom of Christ delineated*, essay 1.

3. It is of course well known that the Jews, in a spirit of misguided reverence, refused to pronounce the original of the word which is now translated Jehovah; that they transferred to it the vowel points of the word Adonai or Lord; that the Septuagint translated it by *κύριος*, (Lord,) and that in the New Testament this latter term is Christ's most common designation.

says, "My Father worketh hitherto and I work;" and he justified his healing on the Sabbath by affirming, as is evident from the connection, his oneness and equality with the Father in the exercise of Divine power. Comp. John, 5 : 21.

(*d.*) He asserted his possession of the prerogatives of Godhead. (*aa.*) He claimed authority over the Sabbath which God had instituted, and the observance of which, accordingly, God alone could modify. Comp. Gen., 2 : 2, 3, and Mark, 2 : 28. Luke, 6 : 5. (*bb.*) He forgave sins, Mat., 9 : 6. Mark, 2 : 10. Luke, 5 : 20-24. 7 : 48 ; but it is the Divine Being against whom sin is committed, and with the Divine Being alone, therefore, is the prerogative of forgiveness, Ps., 32 : 5. (*cc.*) He, without rebuke, and even with approval, received worship which belongs only to God, Ex., 20 : 2, 3. Is., 42 : 8. Mat., 4 : 10. Not all the expressions in the Gospels relating to the conduct of others towards Christ, which may properly be translated by the word worship, need necessarily signify the offering of religious homage, but there are passages in which homage seems to be clearly implied, as in Mat., 14 : 33. 28 : 9. Luke, 23 : 42. John, 9 : 38. 20 : 28. The last of these passages, containing the exclamation of Thomas, as Alford conclusively shews, cannot justly have any other meaning.

(*e.*) He declared his possession of all power in heaven and on earth, Mat., 28 : 18 ; power to lay down his own life and to take it again at will, John, 10 : 18 ; power to give life to the spiritually dead, John, 5 : 26 ; power or "authority" to execute judgment, John, 5 : 27 ; power to bring forth all the dead from their graves, John, 5 : 28 ; power to send forth angels, Mat., 13 : 41 ; and finally, to send to his Apostles and the Church the Holy Ghost, or the third person in the Trinity, John, 14 : 15, 16. Acts, 1 : 4, 8.

(*f.*) Christ represents himself as the final judge of mankind, which according to Jer., 17 : 10, is a prerogative of Godhead, Mat, 21 : 41. 16 : 27. 24 : 31. John, 5 : 27.

(*g.*) The tone of authority with which he everywhere speaks ; his use of the first person in referring to the Mosaic institutes, in enforcing moral law, and in proclaiming his

own kingdom, are inexplicable except upon the supposition of his proper Divinity.

II. Testimony of the New Testament writers respecting the Divinity of Christ. This differs from the testimony of Christ concerning himself, in so far as we may be able to distinguish between the account which Christ gave of himself and the revelations otherwise made of him through those who were divinely employed to write about him.

1. These writers ascribe to Christ the attributes of Deity. (a.) His Eternity is distinctly taught by John in the first verse of his Gospel. When the Universe, or time, began to be, the unincarnate Logos *was*; that is, his existence being timeless, must have been eternal. The same thought is expressed in 1 John, 1: 1¹; and in modified phraseology in Rev., 1: 8, 11, 18.—Paul, also, in Col. 1: 17, declares Christ to have existed before the Universe; that is, to have been eternal in his existence. The Epistle to the Hebrews applies directly, and without qualification, to Christ, certain Old Testament declarations of the eternity of Jehovah, 1: 10–12. Comp. 13: 8. (b.) Omnipotence, or absolute control of the Universe, of both matter and beings, is ascribed to Christ by both Paul and Peter, Eph., 1: 21, 22. Phil., 3: 21. 1 Pet., 3: 22. (c.) Omniscience is ascribed to him by Paul and John, Col., 2: 3. Rev., 2: 23.

2. The works and prerogatives of Deity are attributed to Christ. (a.) He is Creator of the Universe, John, 1: 3. Col., 1:

1. "The expression ἀπ' ἀρχῆς is not substantially different from the expression ἐν ἀρχῇ, (John, 1: 1); ἀπ' ἀρχῆς is used here by John, because, bearing in mind his own having seen and touched the Incarnate Lord, he transfers himself into the *subjective* position of his own experience, and from that point of view would declare that He, whom he had beheld, had already been from the beginning. In the Gospel, c. 1: 1, on the other hand, John begins *objectively* to unfold the eternal being of the Logos, and therefore can write only, "In the beginning was the Logos."—Ebrard's *Commentary on 1st John*.

2. The traditional argument for the Divinity of Christ from his miracles is manifestly worthless. His miracles were simply designed to prove his Divine mission and thus his Messiahship. He reiterated that he could "do nothing of himself," John, 5: 19—"the Father, that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works," 14: 10. The words of Jesus at the grave of Lazarus, John, 11: 41, 42, "Father I thank thee that thou hast heard me. And I knew that thou hearest me always;

16. Heb., 1 : 2, 10. (b.) The author of all life, natural and spiritual, John, 1 : 4. (c.) The sustainer of all things, Col., 1 : 17. Heb., 1 : 3. (d.) The universal judge, Acts, 10 : 42. Ro., 14 : 10. 2 Tim., 4 : 1. 1 Pet., 4 : 5. (e.) The perfecter of the final cause of the creation, Eph., 1 : 10. Col., 1 : 20.

3. The titles of the Supreme Deity are given to Christ.

(a.) He is expressly called God : "The Word was God," John, 1 : 1, that is, the Logos was consubstantial, but not identical, with the Father¹. "This is the true God and eternal life," 1 John, 5 : 20. To refer these words to God, the Father, seems unnatural, since he had twice before, in the preceding sentence, been called "the true;" to apply them to Christ is strictly in accordance with John's prevailing conception of him². The words of Thomas, "my Lord and my God," John, 20 : 28, are also evidently understood by the Evangelist to have been a devout recognition of the Godhead of Jesus. In Ro., 9 : 5, we have the words, "of whom (the Israelites,) as concerning the flesh Christ came, who is over all, God blessed forever." The evident antithesis between the first and the second of these clauses, forces on us the conviction that Christ is here called God. To understand the last clause as a doxology to God, is not only to destroy the antithesis, but to suppose an unnatural and un-Pauline abruptness of thought³.—There are other texts

but because of the people which stand by I said it, that they may believe that thou hast sent me," shew conclusively that his miracles, wrought by the power of God the Father, were proofs, not of his own Divinity, but of his divine mission from the Father.

1. The use of *Θεός* without the article, so far from being an argument against this interpretation, makes it to be the only defensible one. See Meyer, Tholuck, and Alford *in loco*.

2. The opposite reference of these words to God the Father and to Christ, is maintained by different writers with equal firmness. Julius Müller, who throws out John, 1 : 2 from his collection of the proof texts in which Christ is called God, as "doubtful on critical grounds," accepts 1 John, 5 : 20, as one of the unquestionable proofs. Neander, DeWette, Winer, and Meyer refer the last clause unhesitatingly to God the Father. As to the use of the article in 1 John 5 : 20, and its omission in John, 1 : 2, Ebrard says: "in declaring *what* any one is, the predicate must have no article; in declaring *who* any one is, the predicate must have the article."—*Commentary 1st Epistle John*.

3. This is another of the texts in which Müller regards it as "certain" that Christ is called God. With this interpretation agree Tholuck, Stuart, Hodge, and Alford. DeWette and Meyer regard the last clause as a doxology to God.

in which Christ has been supposed to be called God, but about which there has been good ground for doubt as to the accuracy of the interpretation or else of the textual reading. Thus in Acts, 20: 28: "the Church of God which He purchased with His own blood," the question is, whether the true reading is "Church of God" or "Church of the Lord." The majority of the manuscripts have favored the latter reading; but it is now ascertained that both the Vatican and the Sinaitic, two of the three oldest and most authoritative of the manuscripts, have the reading "Church of God." The phrase "Church of God" furthermore is common with Paul, whereas "Church of the Lord" occurs nowhere else in his writings. This text, therefore, is certainly not wholly without weight in the argument for the Divinity of Christ.—1 Tim., 3: 16. "God was manifest in the flesh." Hallowed as these words may be in our minds, and natural as they may appear in their connection, they must at least be set aside in this argument as a doubtful reading, the great majority of the best manuscripts sustaining the reading, "*who* was manifest in the flesh¹"—Titus, 2: 13, "the glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ." The point of dispute in this passage is whether the rendering should be "the great God *and* our Saviour Jesus Christ," or "the great God *even* our Saviour Jesus Christ." In support of the first of these renderings, is pleaded Paul's habitual distinction between the Father and the Son, and his use of the copulative conjunction in the association of their names; while in support of the latter it is maintained that the word "appearing" is never applied to the Father, but often is to the Son; and that the epithet "great" as applied to God would be feeble and unmeaning while specially pertinent and significant as applied to the Son. Aside from theological considerations the preponderance of evidence seems to be in favor of the latter

1. In the Vatican codex, as is well known, the Pastoral Epistles are wanting; the Sinaitic undoubtedly reads *ὁ*; and the Alexandrian is doubtful. On the reading of the last named codex, see Scrivener, *Introduction to the Criticism of the New Testament*, ch. 9, § 20, or pp. 453-454.

rendering, and Christ seems in this text to be clearly called the great God¹.

(b.) Christ, furthermore, is called LORD, in the preëminent sense of that term, by all the New Testament writers², a title with which the Septuagint had made the Jews familiar as the Greek term for Jehovah, and which throughout the New Testament is used in designation of God the Father. Old Testament texts in which Jehovah is thus translated Lord, are frequently quoted and applied to Christ. Comp. Mark, 1: 2, 3, with Mal., 3: 1. Is., 40: 3.—John, 12: 38, 41, with Is., 6: 1-3.—Ro., 10: 13, with Joel, 2: 32.—Ro., 14: 11, with Is., 45: 23.—Heb., 1: 10, with Ps., 102: 25. The free and unrestricted use which James in his Epistle makes of the word Lord, in designation alike of both God and of Jesus Christ, is noticeable even to superficial readers; and is all the more worthy of notice from his relationship to Christ and from the strong hold on him which his Jewish habits of mind seem always to have retained.—Now it is inconceivable that the New Testament writers, with their deep and settled convictions of the absolute unity of the Godhead, should have so applied the title Lord, without qualification, to God the Father and to Christ alike as to occasion this ambiguity, unless it was in obedience to incontestable evidence that Christ and God the Father were, in some way, so related in the essence of their personalities as to warrant the ascription of supreme Lordship and Divinity alike to both.

(c.) Other common titles are also applied indifferently to God and to Christ. Thus both are called Saviour, (*Σωτήρ*.)

1. See this exegesis defended by Ellicott and Alford. De Wette and Meyer defend the other view. This text is not a solitary instance in which the rendering is doubtful, see Eph., 5: 5. 2 Thess., 1: 12. 2 Pet., 1: 1. Jude, 4, and others. In all such texts as 1 Thess., 3: 11. 2 Thess., 2: 16, in which the phrase *ὁ Θεὸς καὶ Πατὴρ ἡμῶν* occurs, there can be no question that the rendering of *καὶ* should be *even*.

2. On the use of the word *κύριος* in the New Testament, particularly by Paul, see article by Moses Stuart, in the *Bib. Repository*, vol. 1, pp. 733, ff. Stuart says, "that in nearly *all* of the two hundred and forty-six instances in which *κύριος* is used by Paul, to designate Christ or God, independently of quotations from the Old Testament, it is applied to Christ, p. 770.

comp. Luke, 1 : 47. 1 Tim., 1 : 1. 2 : 3. 4 : 10. Titus, 1 : 3. 2 : 10. Jude, 25, with Luke, 2 : 11. Acts, 5 : 31, and the New Testament *passim* ; Judge (*Κριτής*), comp. Heb., 12 : 23 and Pss., 7 : 11. 50 : 6, with Acts, 10 : 42. 2 Tim., 4 : 8. James, 5 : 9 ; *τὸ ἄλλα καὶ τὸ ὦ*, comp. Rev., 1 : 8, 11, 18 with each other and with 21 : 6. That this community of titles may be in part accounted for by the community of ends for which God the Father and Christ the Son coöperate, and the community of offices which they fulfill in the world, is undoubtedly true ; but the offices and ends are not separable from the essential nature of their persons, and are common only because of their possession of a common Divine essence.

4. The Divinity of Christ is implied in his special designation as "the Son of God." Not only was this, as we have seen, the understanding of the contemporaries and enemies of Christ, but the Apostles and other sacred writers evidently understood that Christ, as the Son of God, was also of the same essential nature—consubstantial—with the Father. That an eternal sonship, or that an eternal generation was either implied by Christ himself, or believed in by the Apostles, there seems to be no good reason for believing ; these conceptions, derived in part from a too literal interpretation of Scripture, and in part from the Neo-Platonic philosophy¹, are foreign to the thought of the New Testament. According to that thought, on the contrary, Christ became both "the Son of Man" and "the Son of God" by becoming incarnate ; before his incarnation he was the eternal Logos, "with God" and "in the form of God." Becoming incarnate, he was first proved to be "of the seed of David according to the flesh," and then, by his own words and works as well as by the Almighty "power" that raised him from the dead, was "declared to be the Son of God," Ro., 1 : 3, 4. With such evidences of Christ's relationship to the Godhead before them, it was no

1. See Neander, *Hist. of Chr. Dogmas*, trans. by Ryland, vol. 1, pp. 146-148.—*Hist. of the Chr. Church*, trans. by Torrey, vol. 1, pp. 568, 588-590.—Gieseler, *Eccle. Hist.*, § 61.

wonder that the New Testament writers should speak of him as "the only begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father," John, 1: 18; as "the brightness of God's glory and the express image of his person," Heb., 1: 3; or that, moving backward beyond the beginning of his incarnation, they should say of him, he "was with God and was God," John. 1: 1; and should speak of him as one, "who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God," Phil., 2: 6. To read what is thus said of Christ, and at the same time to hold to that first and fundamental truth of all true religion, the unity of God, there must be a recognition of some kind of community of essence between God the Father and his Son Jesus Christ, and a consequent belief in the Divinity of Christ.

5. It is evident from the New Testament, that its writers; in common with all the first Christians, paid divine honors to Christ in religious worship. According to the Scriptures—see among other texts Ex., 20: 2, 3. Is., 42: 8. Mat., 4: 10—God alone is to be worshipped. But according to a great variety of Scripture teachings, including the authority of Christ himself, he is entitled to worship. (a.) All the angels were expressly commanded to worship him, Heb., 1: 6, and it is declared to be the purpose of God that every created intelligence in the Universe shall bow the knee to him in homage and service, Phil., 2: 10, 11. comp. Eph., 1: 20-22; comp. also, Ro., 14: 10, 11, where the same language is employed to express God's purpose to bow every knee to himself in homage, thus showing that the same worship is to be offered to God the Father and to Jesus Christ his Son. (b.) There are many instances in the New Testament of actual worship offered to Christ after his resurrection and ascension; immediately after his resurrection, by the Apostles, Mat., 28: 9, 17; by the same, immediately after his ascension, Luke, 24: 52; at the choice of an Apostle to fill the place of Judas, Acts, 1: 24; Stephen at his martyrdom died "calling on" the Lord

1. For the reasons for believing that the *κύριε* here addressed is the Lord Jesus Christ, see Hackett, *Comm. on the Acts. in loco*.

Jesus, the connection shewing plainly that *κύριε Ἰησοῦ* was the object of his address¹. So universal was the custom of offering prayer and worship to Christ among the first Christians, that the earliest designation by which they were known was as "callers on the name of the Lord," or as worshippers of Jesus Christ, Acts, 9 : 14, 21. 22 : 16. 1 Cor., 1 : 2. The chanting of a hymn to Christ as God, it will be remembered, was one of the chief characteristics of the early Christians mentioned by Pliny in his well known letter to Trajan².

It may be objected that the worship, which, according to the foregoing evidence, should be offered to Christ, is not supreme adoration, but a species of subordinate homage; such as the Arians and some of the earliest, as well as certain of the latest and living, Unitarians³ have taught, should be paid to him. But to this it must be replied, that God and Christ are, throughout the New Testament, so associated as to make it evident that what is offered to the one is also equally to be offered to the other. (a.) In the epistolary salutations, blessings are equally invoked from both, Ro. 1 : 7. 1 Cor., 1 : 3. 2 Cor., 1 : 2. Eph., 1 : 2. Gal., 1 : 3. 2 John, 3. (b.) Both are invoked as disposers of events, sometimes the name of the Father standing first, 1 Thess., 3 : 11, 12, and sometimes that of the Son, 2 Thess., 2 : 16, 17.

1. "As the dying Saviour said to the Father, 'Into thy hands I commend my spirit,' so the dying Stephen said now to the Saviour, *δέξαι τὸ πνεῦμά μου.*" —Hackett.

2. See *Plinii Epis.*, lib. 10, epis. 97—*essent soliti stato die, ante lucem, convenire, carmenque Christo quasi Deo dicere secum invicem*—

3. Faustus Socinus, as is well known, believed and taught that Jesus Christ was to be truly worshipped, (see *Biblioth. Frat. Polo.*, t. 1, de Justif., p. 601,) and the same is most clearly taught in the *Catechesis Racoviensis*, see questiones 183, 184, 211, 236, 237. So emphatically is the duty of worshipping Christ taught in this Catechism that, in the answer to ques. 246, they are denied to be Christians who refuse to adore him. But in answer to ques. 245 we are told that between the worship due to God as supreme and to Christ as subordinate, there is discrimen permagnum. The reasons assigned for the difference are, *nam adoramus et colimus Deum, tanquam causam primam salutis nostræ; Christum tanquam causam secundam; aut, ut cum Paulo loquamur, Deum tanquam eum ex quo omnia, Christum ut eum per quem omnia, see Cat. Racov. seu Liber Socin. primarius*, ed. G. L. Oederus.

(*c.*) Doxologies are addressed, sometimes to God alone, 1 Tim., 1: 17. 6: 15. Heb., 13: 20. 1 Pet., 1: 3. Rev., 7: 12, sometimes to both the Father and the Son, Rev., 5: 13. 7: 10, and sometimes to Christ only, Ro., 9: 5. 2 Pet., 3: 18. Rev., 5: 12. (*d.*) Benedictions are pronounced, in which, sometimes God alone is mentioned, Ro., 15: 33. 2 Cor. 13: 11. Phil. 4: 20, sometimes both Christ and God are mentioned, 2 Cor., 13: 14, and very often Christ only is named, Ro., 16: 20, 24. Phil., 4: 23. Gal., 6: 18. 1 Thess., 5: 28. 2 Tim., 4: 22. Rev., 22: 21. (*e.*) In Baptism there is assumed the same allegiance to the Son as to the Father, Mat., 28: 19. (*f.*) It is, as we have seen, the divine purpose that all men should honor, or worship, the Son even as they honor the Father, John, 5: 23, and that supreme homage should be paid him by the whole universe of created beings, Heb., 1: 6. Phil., 2: 10; this supreme homage is represented as spontaneously offered by all the inhabitants of heaven, Rev., 5: 11-13.—The only legitimate conclusion from all these facts is, that Jesus Christ is to be supremely adored with the same kind of divine worship as that which is offered to God the Father.

III. Certain portions of the Old Testament also, according to interpretations of them by writers of the New, plainly teach the Divinity of Christ. The interpretation may differ from that of pre-christian times and still be true. It is of the very nature of prophecy that succeeding ages should discern profounder meanings in the language of preceding times than could have been apparent when it was first employed; and it is specially the office of the Omniscient Spirit to explain the significancy of symbols, which, under its guidance the writers of preceding centuries had adopted. It need not surprise us then that Christ, in Luke, 24: 27, and his disciples in all their writings, should enable us to see in the Old Testament the preëxistent or divine Logos in his manifold offices preparing the world for his own coming in the flesh.

Thus, throughout the Old Testament are recorded instances of the appearances and messages of a special divine person-

age, who is styled the Angel of Jehovah. This Angel speaks sometimes in the name of Jehovah and sometimes in his own name; and the sacred writers, in continuing their narratives of events connected with his appearances, not unfrequently speak of him simply as Jehovah, thus showing that while they distinguish between Jehovah and his special Angel, they nevertheless attribute, without discrimination, the same prerogatives and offices to each. There are many accounts in the book of Genesis of these appearances to the Patriarchs, see Gen., 18: 14, 17, and 19: 1, 24. (Comp. also 16: 7-13. 21: 17, 18.) 22: 1, 11, 13. 48: 16. This Angel appeared also to Moses, Ex., 3: 2-16, and accompanied him in his journeyings with the Israelites, 14: 19. 23: 20; to Joshua, 5: 14, and to Gideon, Judges, 6: 11, 12. In Is., 63: 9, the Angel of Jehovah, who thus guided the Israelites, is called the "Angel of his presence¹;" and according to 1 Cor., 10: 4-9, this Angel who guided and bore with them, was Christ. John in his Gospel, 12: 41, tells us that Jehovah, whom Isaiah saw in his vision in the temple, 6: 1-3, was the Lord Jesus Christ. Interpreting the Old Testament under this light of the New, the most natural explanation of the Angel of Jehovah is, that he was the preëxistent Logos².

So also in many of the Psalms, and in Messianic passages of the prophets, declarations are made respecting the predicted Messiah, which can be consistently interpreted only on the supposition of his real Divinity. From many of these passages quotations are made in the New Testament, when Christ's divine nature is referred to, as from Pss., 2. 22. 45. 72. 110. Is., chh. 7-9. Micah, 5: 1-5. Dan., 7: 9-14³; and are evidently made as authoritative proofs of Divinity.

1. In Mal., 3: 1, the same Angel seems to be referred to, as "the Messenger (Angel) of the Covenant."

2. See on this subject, Hengstenberg, *Christology*, vol. 1, ch. 3.—J. Pye Smith's *Script. Test. to the Messiah*, bk. 2, ch. 4, sects. 33, 34. For conflicting Patristic opinions respecting the Angel of Jehovah, see Liddon, *Bapt. Lects.*, p. 55, ff.

3. On these texts, see Hengstenberg, *Christology*; on the Psalms, the *Commentaries* of Hengstenberg, Tholuck, J. A. Alexander, Perowne; on Isaiah, the *Commentary* of J. A. Alexander.

IV. There is also a class of arguments, aside from the direct teaching of the Scriptures, which are not without their weight; they are derived in part from the consciousness and the literature of the Church, and in part from the philosophy of Christianity as a remedial scheme. They may be stated briefly as follows:

(a.) To become a Christian, is to be born into a consciousness of relations to God, Christ, self and fellow-beings, which is distinctively Christian¹; a consciousness which began in the person of Christ, was reproduced by Christ in his disciples, and to this hour has continued by transmission to be the common and invariable possession of all true believers in him. The affirmation of this consciousness is, and always has been, that Jesus "is the Christ, the Son of the living God;" that "this (He) is the true God, and eternal life." The believer has no surer test of the genuineness of his Christian life than his participation in this common consciousness of loyal regard for Christ.

(b.) The Divinity of Christ has been one of the most conspicuous doctrines in the uninspired Literature of the Church, and can be conclusively proved to have existed from the first until now. The occasional dissentients from the doctrine have been just numerous and demonstrative enough to shew the universality and tenacity with which it has been held. The beginnings of this literature were with men who lived while some of the inspired writers of the New Testament still lingered on earth; the supposition that the doctrine could, at some point, have been foisted into the general belief, or could have had some other origin than in the person and words of Christ himself, is without foundation. The doctrine is common alike to the creeds, the hymns², and the homilies of the Church, and common to

1. The first formal appeal to "the Christian consciousness," in the sense and for the purpose here intended, was made by Schleiermacher, (see his *Chr. Glaube*, passim); and whatever may be our estimate of the value of his Christology as a whole, there can hardly be any just ground for disputing the validity of the argument. See also Neander, *Life of Christ*, § 2, note.

2. See Schaff's *Christ in Song: Hymns of Immanuel, selected from all ages, with notes.*

every stage in the historical growth of each. The germ of all creeds was doubtless in the primitive confession of faith in Jesus as the Messiah¹, which involved the whole doctrine of his divinity; and the origin of all Christian hymns² was in those doxological expressions with which the first Christians, in imitation of the Psalms, gave utterance to the spontaneous praise of their Redeemer—a praise which carried in it from the first a distinct recognition of his truly Divine nature.

(c.) If Christ be not a Divine Being and entitled to divine homage, then the agencies and the process of individual salvation are in the highest degree unphilosophical. Constituted as man is, it is impossible that he should be brought into relation with Christ as his personal Saviour, and not find his sense of gratitude and every noble impulse of his nature prompting him to devout worship and to the surrender of his whole being in unselfish service. If this worship and service be undesigned and contrary to the will of the Supreme Being³, then Christianity is itself an insoluble enigma and strangely unphilosophical in method.

1. On this first confession of faith, see Neander, *Planting and Training*, bk. 1, ch. 2, at the beginning, or pp. 20, 21.—Comp. Schaff, *Hist. Apost. Ch.*, § 142; who says, “the first confession of Peter, Mat., 16: 16, and then the baptismal formula, 28: 19, would very naturally be taken as the basis of this confession, and from it grew in the course of the second and third centuries, in a truly organic way, and from the consciousness, not of an individual but of the whole church, the so-called Apostles’ Creed.” p. 508.

2. On the origin of the hymns of the Church see Schaff, *Hist. Apost. Ch.*, § 141. “In all probability the epistles in several instances contain fragments of such primitive songs; as is indicated by the poetical, and sometimes by the metrical form of expression, see for example, Eph., 5: 14. 1 Tim., 3: 16, (especially if, according to the best authorities, we here read *ὅς*; for this reading is most naturally explained on the supposition of the passage being a fragment of a hymn, which, in six parallel stanzas in melodious rhythm, contain a Christology *in nuce*; 2 Tim., 2: 11, (where the *γάρ* indicates a quotation, and the parallel and rhythmical structure of the passage a poetical quotation); and Jas., 1: 17, (where the words from *πάντα τοῦ τέλειον*, form a hexameter).” p. 504. Compare Liddon’s *Bampton Lectures*, lect. 6, pp. 327, 328; lect. 7, p. 385, ff.

3. Respecting the worship of Christ in the authorized services of the Anglican church, see Dean Stanley, *Essays on Church and State*, 333-335, and Liddon’s *Bampt. Lects.*, *The Divinity of Christ*, note D, lect. 7, p. 514.

§ 37—*The Two Natures of Jesus Christ.*

If Christ united in himself the natures of both man and God, the question at once arises, what was the relation of these, the one to the other? The question was one of the first to be propounded in Christian Theology, and yet is being rediscussed in our day with all the interest of a new inquiry. But, from the very nature of the case, no full and final answer to it can ever be reached. The mode of the union of the two natures will necessarily remain an inscrutable mystery; neither Scripture nor consciousness can supply the requisite data for its solution. The most that we can now do is, by recounting some of the commoner errors into which inquirers have fallen in the past, and are always in danger of falling, to guard ourselves against them, and then by careful notation of all the facts and teachings of the Scriptures on the question, to assure ourselves how very slender is the sum of all our knowledge respecting it. At various periods there have been those who not content with the silence of the Scriptures, have sought to make them testify, either in accordance with some traditional notion or in obedience to some supposed principle of ontology or fact of psychology, to one or another of the following theories¹.

(a.) That of the Humanitarians, or of those who have given undue preponderance to the human side of Christ, regarding him as the promised Messiah, but as merely a man. This error was probably first maintained by the Ebionites², and has since been taken up by the Socinians and by the great body of modern Unitarians. It can be more effectually defended by any other method than by an appeal to the Scriptures.

1. On these theories, see the *Church Histories* of Neander, Guericke, Schaff:—Shedd, *Hist. of Chr. Doctrine*, bk. 3, ch. 5, § 1; Walch, *Historie der Ketzerien, Spaltungen*, etc.

2. See Dorner, *On the Person of Christ*, div. 1, vol. 1, First Period, ch. 2. 1. or p. 188, ff.

(b.) That of those who have given undue prominence to the Divine side of Christ; who have recognized in him the Divine Logos in a merely human form, or at most as tenanted a human body. Under this are to be reckoned the Docetic¹ sect of the Gnostics, as well as the Monarchians, Patripassians, Sabellians, and the Manichæans, of the earlier centuries; and here belong all those sporadic cases of error, in which certain persons, like Justin Martyr and Apollinaris of the early church, holding to the trichotomy of human nature, supposed that the Divine Logos supplied the *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα* in the man Jesus.

(c.) Subordinationism, or the theory of those who recognize in Christ a true humanity, but only a subordinate and created Divinity. Here belong the Arians and Semi-Arians of all time, as well as some of the latest Unitarians.

(d.) Monophysitism, or that theory which supposes such a union of the human and divine as was equivalent to a commingling of the two natures. Here belong the Euty-chians, and some of the older Lutherans².

(e.) Nestorianism, or that theory which, propounded by Nestorius with a view to recognize the completeness of both natures, was carried by his followers to the extreme of making Christ to consist of two conjoined personalities, and not of two united natures.

Thus the relation, both quantitative and qualitative, of the two natures in Christ, was in the earlier centuries what it still is, a *questio vexata*. One cause, and not a slight one, of diversity and sometimes absurdity among the earlier views, was in a confounding of person with nature, the assumption that Christ, if human, must either have possessed a distinct human personality as distinguishable from a Divine personality, or else that the two natures and thus two personalities were so united that a single nature, and so a single personality, was the result. The same cause produces like results in our day; there still exists, as ever, a swinging between the extremes of monophysitism and

1. Dorner, *ibid.*, ch. 2, p. 218, ff.

2. Dorner, *div.* 2, vol. 2, pp. 53, ff. 209, ff. 286, ff.

dyophysitism ; between the conception, on the one hand, of two natures commingled into one, or on the other, two natures so distinct and individualized as to make a double personality. While the great body of leading theologians have only held by implication, some have distinctly asserted, with John of Damascus in former¹, and with Ridgely² in later days, that there were necessarily two wills as well as two natures in Christ, though the human was ever in subordination to the Divine. It was one of the formulas of the Damascene, that "as in the Trinity there are three persons with one will manifested in diversity of acts, so in the person of Christ there were two wills manifested in unity of acts."

One of the chief sources of error in this doctrine, is in the assumption that if two natures, the Divine and the human, were united in Christ, some definite conception of the mode of the union is both possible and necessary. Hence the appeal to analogies, like that of the heated iron, and specially to that oldest and most commonly used, the constitution of man. The formula is, that "as the reasonable soul and body is one man, so God and man is one Christ³." If by this is merely meant that, as what is peculiar to the body and what to the soul of man are alike said to belong to the unit man, so what is peculiar to the Divinity and what to the humanity of Christ, are said alike to belong to the one person Christ, then as a commonplace illustration it is unobjectionable ; for more than this it is unsafe and misleading. There is no analogue in the case, unless Monophysitism, or at least Apollinarism is true. The attributes of both body and soul unite to constitute the one human nature ; whereas in the person of Christ it is two distinct natures which, possessing each its own unchangeable and incommunicable essence, united to constitute, not a third nature, but a single and unique personality.

1. See Dörner, *Hist. of the Doct. of the Person of Christ*, div. 2, vol. 1, pp. 216, ff.

2. See his *Body of Divinity*, vol. 1, p. 394, or questions 36, 37.

3. See Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*, lib. 2, c. 7. Comp. *Formula Concordiæ*, 8, 19 ; the *Athanasian Creed*, and the *XXXIX Articles*.

In respect to the relation of the two natures, the Confessions of the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches have widely differed. The Lutheran theory of consubstantiation necessitated the theory of a communication of the Divine attributes to the human¹, in order to provide for the ubiquity of the body of Jesus ; while the Reformed church insisted, that of the two natures each was in itself perfect and distinct, though both were united in the formation of the single personage Jesus Christ. But among both Lutheran and Reformed, there has prevailed great diversity of opinions in the interpretation of their confessions. This is specially true of the Lutherans, some of whom in later years have, in their scientific Dogmatics, departed widely from the sharply defined views of their Confessions².

The doctrine received as orthodox, alike by Lutherans and the Reformed, declares that both natures, the Divine and the human, were so united in the person of Christ, that each was preserved in the fulness of its essential perfections. He was very God and very man. This we may also regard as the general Creed of Christendom. But in verifying this doctrine from the Scriptures we shall find,

(a) That the personal Logos was not so associated and conjoined with a personal Jesus as to produce a kind of double personality ; but that the pre-existent Logos became flesh (John 1 : 14), was made in the likeness of men (Phil. 2 : 7), and took on him the seed of Abraham, (Heb. 2 : 7) ; i. e. the pre-existent Logos assumed, by supernatural generation, from the Virgin Mary, a true human nature, though not, as distinct from himself, a human personality. Nature, as com-

1. "Communicatio idiomatum" was the phrase of Luther; "communio idiomatum" and "communicatio naturarum" represented the extremes of views in subsequent discussions. See *Formula Concordiæ*, 8. See Hein. Schmid, *Dogmatik evan. Luth. Kirche*, §§ 32, 33. Comp. Krauth, *The Conservative Reforma., and its Theol.*, pp. 476-481.

2. Thomasius, in his *Christi Person und Werk*, and Hofmann, in his *Schriftbeweis*, both theologians of Erlangen, are notable examples. The treatises of Liebner and Gess, (see the latter, reproduced by Reubelt in his *Scripture Doct. of the Person of Christ*, Andover, 1871,) belong to the same general school of Kenotists. See also, article by Tholuck, trans. in the *Amer. Pres. Rev.*, Oct., 1869.

pared with person, is that substratum or condition of being which determines the kind and attributes of the person, but is clearly distinguishable from the person itself. Christ assumed human nature, but he did not assume a human person; and the two natures were so conjoined as to constitute a single personality.

(b) In taking human nature he took the common nature of the race; not the nature of the unfallen Adam; nor yet a new-created nature different alike from Adam's and our own; but the nature of those whom he came to save. He came to save our fallen race who "are partakers of flesh and blood," i. e., of human nature, and "he also himself likewise took part of the same," Heb. 2: 14. Our race and nature were sinful, and God "sent his own son in the likeness of sinful flesh to condemn sin in the flesh¹," Ro. 8: 3; and yet in his own person he was absolutely sinless, and could save others from sin only because he was sinless. But if the human nature of Christ was not our nature with the exception of its hereditary depravity, which in his case was cut off from transmission by the supernatural method of assuming it², then his temptation in the wilderness loses all its significancy for man, and the assurance that he was tempted in all points like as we are, yet without sin, becomes unmeaning. No truth is more plainly, continuously and variously taught in the New Testament than the perfect sinlessness³, the unapproachable moral perfection of Jesus

1. It is alike destructive to the force of *ὁμοιωσις* in this passage to give it either the sense of absolute identity with, or the Docetic interpretation of mere resemblance to, simple flesh. See De Wette, *Commentar*, in loco; comp. Alford.

2. Sin is properly predicable only of personality; the hereditary depravity of man is derived by the natural descent of personal life from Adam; Christ did not derive a personal human life ex traduce from Adam, but took our human nature by a supernatural act which cut off its hereditary guilt though not the hereditary consequences of its guilt. The notion that Christ in taking our nature must have taken a "sinful nature," (see J. G. Reiche, *Erkl. d. Briefe an d. Röm.*, Ro., 8: 3, and Ed. Irving, *The Doctrine of the Incarnation*, Sermon 8, *Collected Writings*, vol. 5, p. 114, ff.) is utterly without Scriptural support. For more rational, though not entirely satisfactory, views see, Robt. J. Wilberforce, *The Doct. of the Incar. of our Lord Jesus Christ*, ch. 3.

3. See Ullmann, *The Sinlessness of Jesus*.—Schaff, *Moral Character of Jesus*.—Dorner, *Sinless Perfection of Jesus*, trans. in *Amer. Pres. Rev.*, April, 1863.

Christ ; and his sinlessness was all the more conspicuous and marvellous that it was maintained under the load of a fallen nature, and in the midst of a sinful race, with whom he had so closely identified himself.

(c) Jesus, notwithstanding the nature he had assumed, and the race with which he had allied himself, could preserve his sinlessness, because the basis of his personality was his Divine nature and not the human. In becoming incarnate he assumed human nature in its completeness and yet so assumed it as completely to control it ; whereas, in the birth of individual men, human nature simply assumes the form of personal life which it completely controls. Christ was conscious of the infinite purity of his own person, because his consciousness was grounded in the Divine nature which underlay and conditioned his whole personal being.

(d.) If the Divine Logos assumed true human nature, he must have assumed it under all those limitations and laws of being by which alone it could remain human nature. The attributes of the Divine nature were thus circumscribed, restricted, and limited in their exercise by the limiting conditions of the human nature¹ with which it had allied itself ;

1. It is on this point that the modern Christology deviates most widely from that of the older Protestant Confessions. These Confessions, both Lutheran and Reformed, regarded the Divine in the person of Christ as having concealed itself within the human, (see *infra*, p. 223,) but the new Christology supposes it to have been limited by the conditions of the human. This latter view, (with of course considerable diversity of opinion in the explanation of details, see Dorner, *div. 2*, vol. 3, period 3,) is now held alike by leading Lutheran and Reformed theologians. Among the Lutheran, see Hofmann' *Schriftbeweis*, 1 Abtheil, v. 2.—Thomasius, *Christi Person u. Werk*, vol. 2, § 47, ff.—Martensen, *Dogmatik*, §§ 129-147.—Delitzsch, *Bib. Psychol.*, 5, § 1.—Gess, *Christi Person und Werk*, and the same as *trans.* and modified by Reubelt, *Scripture Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, Andover, 1871 ; and for many others, see Dorner, *Person of Christ*, *div. 2*, vol. 3, period 3, sec. 2, and note 36.—Among the Reformed, see Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, vol. 2, §§ 361-390 ; and Lange, *Dogmatik*, p. 780.—See also, Nitzsch, *Syst. Chr. Lehre*, § 127.—J Müller, *Analysis of Proof Texts*, *trans.* by H. B. Smith, §§ 73-75. As holding this view may be mentioned, Oosterzee of Holland ; Pressensé of France ; Bishop Ellicott and Dean Alford of Eng., and many others.

This view of the relation of the Divine to the human in the person of Christ, is not to be set aside on the mere charge of being speculative, and pantheistic. Whatever may have been its connection with any school of pantheistic phi-

so in like manner the attributes of the human nature, by its union with the Divine, were all enlarged in scope and intensified in action; the attributes of each nature being modified by the new conditions assumed, while the essence of each was retained in its integrity. Hence the indications in Scripture of a knowledge and power which were evidently superhuman in origin, (Mat., 9: 4. 12: 25. Luke, 6: 8. John, 1: 48. 2: 25. 6: 8, and Mat., 9: 6, 8. John, 10: 18,) and yet of a knowledge and power which were always restricted in their exercise by the limiting conditions of the finite human nature, Mat., 24: 36. Mark, 13: 32. John, 5: 19, 30.

(e.) The two natures united in the person of Christ constituted a single Theanthropic personality. This personality appears in the New Testament in two ever-shifting lights, corresponding to its two unmixed natures and their unblended but interpenetrating and mutually modified attributes; but always as one and the same person with one consciousness and one will. Those opposite sayings of his in the Gospels, and declarations respecting him in the Epistles, which present him now in a Divine and now in a human aspect, are not to be referred, the one to the man Jesus and the other to the Divine Logos, as if the consciousness and will of one nature were sometimes in the ascendancy, and sometimes those of the other. On the contrary, Jesus Christ was a single person, one Divine-human being, the Godman, who, with one undivided consciousness and a single unvarying will, contemplated, sometimes his earthward relations and humiliations, and sometimes the pre-existent position he had temporarily forsaken, but to which he was soon to return. It was but one and the same indivisible person and will that said, "I and my Father are one," and "my Father is greater than I:" "no one (*οὐδεὶς*)

osophy and with the Christology of Schleiermacher, it must now be tried by biblical tests. On the Christology of Schleiermacher, see Dorner, *div. 2*, vol. 3, pp 165-213, and for the wide difference therefrom in the views of later writers, see the same volume. For a clear statement of the pantheistic and the Schleiermacher Christologies, see also, D. F. Strauss, *Chr. Glaubenslehre*, vol. 2, §§ 64-66.

takes my life from me, but I lay it down of myself," and "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me :'' who could say with authority to the dead, "come forth," and himself in dying agony exclaim, "my God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" A variable union of the Divine with the human, or a union consisting of mere superintendence of the human by the Divine, or any other union than that of a combination of the two natures into one indivisible and mysterious person, is neither warranted by Scripture, nor reconcilable with any clear and rational conception of personality.

Now it is solely from the teaching of the New Testament that we arrive at the knowledge of the coëxistence of two natures in the person of Christ ; but from this teaching it becomes evident, that the Divine Logos in becoming man did not cease to be Divine, and that the human, in being united to the Divine, did not cease to be human. The assurance of this rests exclusively on the facts of the Gospels and the interpretation of these by the Apostles ; no trustworthy *a priori* argument¹ can be constructed in support of the doctrine of the two natures. But now that the doctrine of the incarnation is established, and the fact of the Godman is accepted, it is easy to discern,

THE GROUNDS OF THE NEED OF HIS TWO-FOLD NATURE.

A. There was need of a Divine nature :

(a.) To vindicate Christ's claim to be an object of trust to men. Every mere man had shared in the common ruin of the race and cannot become an object of trust to his fellows. Human philosophers had failed alike to fathom the depth of human sin and to provide a remedy for its curse, 1 Cor., 1 : 21. The wisdom and power of Christ were demonstrably shown to be equal to the salvation of himself, and by

1. The belief of many modern Germans that the incarnation did not have "its sole ground in sin," but sprung also from "an eternal and abiding necessity in the wise and free love of God," (see Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. 2, vol. 3, p. 236, ff.) rests on a species of *a priori* argument founded on the relation of man to God, and on the nature of piety. It would be difficult to shew that the like method of argument from *a priori* premises will not equally avail to prove sin to have been a necessary part of the scheme of the creation.

his exaltation and the founding of his church, have been proved to be equal to the salvation of every one that trusts in him.

(*b.*) The end to which Christ devoted himself both required, and was worthy, the interposition of the Godhead. The end required Divine interposition, for man unaided had shewn himself incapable of attaining it; and if it were worthy of God to create man in the Divine likeness, it is not unworthy the Creator to interpose for the rescue of man by assuming his likeness.

(*c.*) The interposition of Godhead for our rescue by assuming human nature, is in strict accordance with every other part of the scheme of man's redemption. Christianity, as a Divine philosophy and a power of endless life, is dependent on its fundamental truth of Emmanuel, or God with us.

B. Christ needed a human nature :

(*a.*) To accommodate himself to our necessary modes of thought. All our conceptions of God are necessarily grounded in our own experiences—are necessarily anthropomorphic and anthropopathic. Christ accommodated himself to this necessity.

(*b.*) To personate and illustrate the moral law. Moral law consists of the ethical principles embodied in the moral nature of God. Christ embodied these principles in his own person and made them vital and real to men.

(*c.*) To fit him to mediate between the infinite Creator and finite creatures. As a Priest he was to represent and transact for man, which he could do only by allying himself with them through assumption of their nature, 1 Tim., 2: 5. Heb., 2: 16, 17; and as the Redeemer from sin, he could destroy its power in the heart of man only by becoming in human nature a sacrifice for sin, and, in that same nature, an object of universal trust, by rising from the grave when the penalty of sin had been paid.

(*d.*) To fit him to be a sympathising friend and an imitable example. Christ fitted himself by his experience of human trials and sorrows to sympathise with us, Heb., 2: 10. 5: 7-9; and in his whole life gave an example which we can appreciate and never exhaust by our imitation.

(e.) To fit him to be our judge, by carrying the conviction into our hearts that he, not only as Divine knows our responsibilities, but as human understands and can rightly estimate all that in our weakness may extenuate our guilt, John, 5: 27. Comp. Dan., 7: 13. 12: 2. Mat., 25: 31, 32.

§ 38—*The Two States of Christ.*

Christ is pictured in the Messianic prophecies, and historically presented throughout the New Testament, in two strikingly contrasted conditions. The prophets foresaw and described him as subject to the greatest indignities and as seated on the most exalted of thrones. Some of the Jews, unable to reconcile these contrasts, were disposed to believe in two Messiahs. In the minds of the contemporaries of Jesus, one strong objection to regarding him as the Messiah was founded on his humble condition. It is worthy of notice how much his humiliation was intensified by the rejection of him which it had caused; and it will be worthy of notice, when we come to speak of his exaltation, that the reason assigned for it was the very humiliation to which he had been subjected, Phil., 2: 9. Heb., 2: 9.

A. THE HUMILIATION OF CHRIST.

All that will need to be said on this point may be included under the two-fold inquiry: To what did the humiliation pertain, and in what did it consist? The answer to the first half of this inquiry must also, by necessary inference, supply an answer to the second; and our answers to both will be determined by our understanding of the relation of the two natures in the constitution of the person of Christ. If with the Lutherans¹ we hold that the Divine nature in the

1. In the Formula Concordiæ, ch. 8, (see Hase, *Libri Symbolici*) a unio et communicatio divinæ et humanæ naturæ is continually affirmed and it is said that these two natures in unam personam conveniunt et commiscentur. And according to the same Formula, not only is Christ's human nature now endowed, at the right hand of God, with an inalienable Divine majesty, but eam majestatem statim in sua conceptione, etiam in utero matris habuit; sed ut Apostolus,

person of Christ communicated itself and its attributes to the human, then the humiliation must have pertained to the human nature alone, and consisted in the non-revelation and non-recognition of that nature's infinite endowments¹. If with the Reformed confessions we hold that both natures in the person of Christ retained in their entirety the attributes and essence of each, unaffected by the union²; then we may also hold that the Divine nature humbled itself, but if we are consistent, we must, with some of the Reformed, suppose the real humiliation of Christ to have pertained to the human nature,³ and to have consisted in all that he endured as man; and with the more discriminating of the Reformed theologians, we should also distinguish between the exinanition⁴ (condescension) and the humiliation of Christ, regarding the former as consisting in a merely temporal concealment of the Divine glory⁵, and the latter as consisting of an humble condition in life and of the privations, duties and sufferings to which the human nature abased

(Phil., 2: 8,) loquitur, seipsum exinanivit, eamque, ut D. Lutherus docet, in statu suæ humiliationis secreto habuit, neque eam semper, sed quoties ipsi visum fuit, usurpavit. Hase, *Libri*, p. 767.

1. See Quenstedt, *Theologia*, pars. 3, ch. 3, mem. 3.—Buddeus, *Institutiones*, lib. 4, cap. 2, § 20.—Reinhard, *Dogmatik*, §§ 97, 3.

2. See Confessio Belgica (Niemeyer, *Collectio*, &c.) art. 19.—Repetitio Anhaltina, cap. 8. 1.—Westminster Confession, ch. 8, § 2.

3. Leonh. Ryssenius in his *Summa Theol.*, which he tells us, on the title page, was compiled from the most distinguished theologians, specially Francis Turretine, says, exinanitio spectat ad naturam humanam quæ mutationis capax est, passione depressa.—Quoad divinam autem naturam, exinanitio ei tribuitur quoad occultationem et inhibitionem gloriæ. See quotation in Schweizer's *Glaubenslehre*, § 91.

4. Exinanition, derived from "exinanivit," the vulgate translation of ἐκένωσε, Phil., 2: 7, is made to denote that state of inequality with God which was assumed in the incarnation; and humiliation, from trans. of ἠταπείνωσε, Phil., 2: 8, is made to denote the abasement of the man Jesus even to the death of the cross. In exinanitione est non esse instar Dei; cum incipret esse in similitudine hominum, idque propter servitutem et obedientiam. In humiliatione vero plus est, nempe obedientem se præstare usque ad mortem, mortem vero crucis. Heidegger's *Corpus Theolog.*, locus 18, § 3. See also Ridgeley's *Body of Div.*, ques. 46-48.—Dick's *Theol.*, lect. 60.

5. Gloriæ et majestatis suæ divinæ ad tempus occultatione, is the common representation.

itself. Or if we hold that in the incarnation, the Divine Logos assumed the limiting, depotentiating conditions of the finite human nature, then we must believe the humiliation to have pertained primarily, and chiefly, to the Divine nature, and secondarily, to the human as a constituent part of the theanthropic personality; and to have consisted in taking human nature, and specially in taking human nature as he found it, and for the offices which he performed in it.

The difference between the Lutheran and the Reformed conceptions of the humiliation of Christ is in fact more apparent than real¹. According to the Lutheran view the Divine in Christ imparted of its essence and attributes to the human, but the Divine thus imparted was not exercised and consequently was not recognized²; according to the Reformed view the Divine was humbled and its humiliation consisted in its concealment, *sub velo carnis imbecillæ*³; in either case the humiliation turned on the concealment of the

1. The real difference between the Lutherans and the Reformed pertained to the relation of the two natures of Christ in his heavenly rather than in his earthly estate. Thus certain Lutherans believed in an eternal preëxistent God man hood and all Lutherans maintained, and still maintain, that Christ's exalted human nature is as ubiquitous as his Divine, and that the Godman exalted and glorified now belongs to the Trinity; whereas the Reformed insisted that the *λόγος ἄσαρκος* alone was preëxistent, and that the exalted human nature of Christ is now localized and restricted in its attributes, while the Divine alone is omnipresent. The Lutherans insisted that *humana natura est capax divinæ*: the Reformed that *finitum non est capax infiniti*. On the views of the German Reformed Church in this country, see J. W. Nevin, *The Mystical Presence*, Phila., 1846, and an article by E. V. Gerhart, in *Bib. Sac.*, Jan., 1863: on those of the Lutheran Church, see Krauth, *The Conservative Reformation and its Theology*, Phila., 1871.

2. *Exinanitio est ea Christi conditio, in qua attributorum divinorum usu, dum inter homines viveret, carere voluit.*—Reinhard's *Dogmatik*, p. 370. Comp. Gerhard's *Loci*, ed. Cotta, tom. 3, p. 562, § 29. On the controversy between the Kenotists of Giessen and the Kryptists of Tübingen, which turned on the question whether the Divine attributes were laid aside or only concealed during the incarnation, see Dorner, *loc. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 282–302.

3. Wytttenbach, *Tentamen Theol. Dog.*, vol. 2, locus 8, § 897.—Turretine says that exinanition should be properly attributed to personality only, adding, et ad utramque naturam referri, sed magno discrimine. Ad naturam humanam quidem quod realem depressionem—; ad divinam vero tantum ratione occultationis, et manifestationis, relate ad carnem tanquam velum, quo tegebatur, et unde sese probebat. *Theol.*, locus 13, ques. 9, § 7.

Divine, on the non-exercise of its attributes before men, and the humiliation really pertained to the human and consisted in what it endured. The underlying assumption which determines both the Lutheran and the Reformed view is, that the Divine nature of Christ must, as such, have been immutable and impassible, and that the obedience and suffering to which Christ as a Divine person humbled himself, and by which he redeems us, were only the obedience and suffering of his human nature. But on this assumption no clear conception can be formed of what the humiliation of the Divine could have consisted in ; and, in proving the human to have been humiliated, it becomes necessary to dwell on those particulars in the life of Christ, such as his humble birth, poverty, subjection to law, the mere accidents of life, which only revealed a dignity which could not be humiliated. The error of supposing it to be humiliating to obey law is too radical¹, and the practical mischief attendant on representations of humble birth and the lack of riches as humiliating, is too evident to require a special refutation of the theory of which they are an essential part.

If now, turning from the earlier Protestant creeds to the Scriptures, we inquire, under the light of modern exegesis, for their teaching on the question before us, we shall find that they represent the humiliation of Christ to have pertained mainly, though not exclusively, to his Divine nature ; and to have consisted in His assumption of human nature with all the limitations and environments which it necessi-

1. That Christ was humiliated by his obedience to the law, is one of those Romish medieval notions which was made necessary by the Church theory of an inexhaustible store of merit accumulated by Christ while on earth and to be drawn on by the priesthood for the benefit of believers. The notion itself rests on the assumption that law was by the arbitrary appointment of God, an assumption to which neither Scripture, science, nor common sense lend a shadow of support ; and can be maintained only on the ground that the Lawgiver is not bound by his own law, a sentiment worthy of Hobbes, or a defender of absolutism, but not of a believer in the immutability of God and of moral law. The sentiment of Frederick the Great was incomparably more just, when his sturdy subject and neighbor, the miller, whose windmill he attempted to remove, having beaten him in a law-suit, the thwarted monarch exclaimed, "thank God, there is law in Prussia."

tated, and in voluntarily bearing in that nature all the penalties that hung over it. Thus, in Phil. 2: 6-8, we are told that Jesus Christ existed before He was born into this world, and that in his pre-existent state he was in the "form of God," i. e., that he possessed in himself the infinite attributes of Godhead; that though thus in himself equal with God the Father, he did not regard his equality as a thing to be eagerly insisted on, but voluntarily abandoned (exchanged) it for the "form," i. e. for the state and attributes "of a servant," in other words, for the actual condition of man, the servant of God; and that having become man, he continued his descent until it was terminated, in the fulfillment of the object of his incarnation, by his death on the cross. Now in the passage thus briefly paraphrased, it is evident that he, whose two states of being, a pre-existent and an earthly, are contrasted in the first half of it, continues to be the one who is spoken of in the last half of it; there is not the slightest intimation of a change of persons, or that he who "took upon him the form of a servant," and in taking it "emptied himself" of the "form of God," is not the same person who, "being found in fashion as a man, humbled himself," "even unto the death of the cross." On the contrary, the manifest gradations of descent implied in the words, "form," "likeness," "fashion," "emptied himself," "humbled himself," show plainly that He who made the first measureless stride in passing from Deity to humanity, was the same being that continued to take all the successive and lesser steps, even to the last¹.

So also in 2 Cor., 8: 9, when we are told of "our Lord Jesus Christ that, though he was rich yet for our sakes he became poor," the contrast manifestly is between the pre-existent, proprietary Lord of the universe and the limited, dependent Christ; and the poverty to which he subjected himself must have consisted in the assumption of human nature, a state of being in which the attributes of Divinity were necessarily restricted in their exercise.

1. This is substantially the view that is critically deduced from the passage, in the *Commentaries* of Meyer, Ellicott, Alford, and Lange as edited by Hackett.

In like manner when John, after having affirmed in the proem of his Gospel the proper Divinity of the preëxistent Logos, tells us, 1: 14, that this Logos was made flesh, he manifestly means that we shall understand all the remainder of his Gospel to be descriptive of the career of this incarnate, humbled, suffering Being, whom he had previously described as the Creator of the Universe. It is in strict harmony with this impression of his Gospel as a whole, that he represents our Lord as praying to be restored to the state and glory which he abandoned in becoming incarnate, John, 17: 5.

Thus it seems to be evident that the humiliation of Christ, to which the Scriptures direct our attention, is his humiliation as a Divine person; and that they set forth this humiliation as consisting in the assumption of the finite conditions of human existence, and especially in his identification of himself with a race so resting under the Divine displeasure that he could not unite himself with it without an assumption of the penal consequences of its guilt. And it seems but a necessary inference from the teaching of Scripture as a whole, that the preëxistent Logos, in working out our redemption in the flesh, must, in some way to us inexplicable, have participated¹ in the trials and sufferings of the human nature he had assumed, even from the cradle to the grave—in his temptations, his deprivations, and in his agony both in the garden and on the cross, John, 12: 27. Phil., 2: 8. Comp. Luke, 24: 26.

This view of the humiliation of Christ seems to accord better than any other with certain facts recorded respecting

1. The old question whether Christ suffered in his human nature only, or in his Divine nature as well, was revived in this country a few years ago with considerable zeal, but moderate ability and less learning. The discussion opened with a book, *The Sufferings of Christ*, by "A Layman," 1845, (Geo. Griffin, a lawyer of New York,) on the affirmative side of the question, was continued by a reply on the other side in another book, *The Sufferings of Christ*, by Dr. Bennet Tyler, of E. Windsor, Ct., 1847. Several articles also appeared in the Quarterlies. For one of the last, though not the ablest of these, see *Bib. Sac.*, April, 1850, or vol. 7, p. 205, ff. Dr. Bushnell, adopting the Schleiermacherian-Sabellian theory of the Trinity, took the affirmative side, to the degree of Patripassianism, in his *Christ in Theology*, Hartford, Ct., 1851.

him in the Gospels, and with his relation to us as our Saviour.

(a.) It accords more readily than any other, with the account of his temptation in the wilderness. If the attributes of his Divine nature were unrestricted in their exercise; if his Divinity was not conditioned by the humanity with which it was united, then no intelligible conception can be formed of that temptation. Omniscience cannot be tempted; and his human nature had no existence aside from the Divine, which had assumed it.

(b.) No rational account can be given of Christ's prayers, on any other explanation of his humiliation than the one here stated. The supposition of an unlimited and unconditional Divinity praying, is preposterous: and it is unnecessary to dwell on the absurdity of supposing the human nature of Christ to have prayed without the cognizance and participation of the Divine.

(c.) On no other, can the propriety of our praying to Christ as a sympathizing Saviour, be satisfactorily explained. We certainly do not pray to the human nature of Christ alone, but to the Divine-human Person, Jesus Christ. It also is, surely, the Divine-human Person who sympathizes with and saves us; and it is nothing less than solemn trifling to say that the Divine in Christ, though free from all our experiences, can be touched with feeling of our infirmities, because even what pertained exclusively to the human on the ground of the association of the two natures in his person, is equally predicable of the Divine.

(d.) Christ is set before us in the Scriptures as an example, as well as a Saviour. But if the functions of the Divine in his person were not limited by the laws and conditions of the human, then the plane of his existence must have been so far removed from ours as to preclude the possibility of imitation.

B. EXALTATION OF CHRIST.

In immediate connection with the humiliation of Christ is mentioned in Scripture his exaltation, Phil., 2: 9, 10. Eph., 4: 9, 10. When he had reached the lowest depth in his

descent, then was his course suddenly reversed, and there began that ascent which carried him to absolute supremacy over every order of created beings in the Universe, Eph., 1 : 20, 21. Heb., 2 : 7, 9.

The principal points to be noticed in his exaltation are,

1. That as in the humiliation it was chiefly the Divine that was humbled in taking human nature and in descending in that nature to the lowest depths of suffering, so in the exaltation it was the Divine in conjunction with the human, which in its descent it had rescued, that was exalted to the highest conceivable dignity. It was the eternal Logos, become, by the incarnation, the God-man, who in the exaltation was restored to that glory which he had with the Father before the world was, John, 17 : 5. Comp. 6 : 62.

2. As the Divine came into the world in order that by revealing the Godhead to our race and allying itself with our nature, it might save us, John, 14 : 9, 16, 27, 28. 1 Tim., 1 : 15, so the human in Christ has been raised as the first-fruits and pledge of the final exaltation and glory of the redeemed, Acts, 26 : 23. 1 Cor., 15 : 20. Col., 1 : 18. Comp. John, 14 : 3. 17 : 24.

3. This twofold Being, the God-man, was exalted in his twofold nature to be the sole dispenser of the blessings of salvation, the sympathizing friend and guide of individuals, as well as the Head of the whole Church and the object of supreme worship throughout the universe, Matt., 25 : 31-33. 27 : 18. Heb., 3 : 15. 1 John, 5 : 14. Phil., 2 : 10. Col., 1 : 18.

4. This same Being, Jesus Christ, will come in his twofold nature to judge the world, and to distribute to the righteous and the wicked their final awards, Acts, 1 : 11. Matt., 16 : 27. 2 Cor., 5 : 10 ; one essential qualification for his judgship being his possession of human nature, John, 5 : 27. Acts, 17 : 31.

5. There is no good reason for supposing that this God-man, Jesus Christ, will not continue forever to be the communicator, (Logos, Word,) between the infinite God and his finite creatures. The delivering up of the kingdom, and the

subjection of Christ to him that put all things under him, 1 Cor., 15 : 24, 28, whatever these may mean, must manifestly relate to a surrender of office and not to a severance of natures.

§ 39—*The Holy Spirit.*

When our Saviour was about to withdraw from the earth he promised to his disciples a substitute for his personal presence, John, 14 : 16. 16 : 7,—a continuator and perfecter of the work he had inaugurated, John, 15 : 26. 16 : 13, 14. Ever associated, accordingly, with the name of Jesus Christ in the salvation of men is the appellative Holy Spirit. It was this Holy Spirit that, in fulfillment of promise, interpreted to the Apostles the meaning of Christ's words, the significancy of the facts of his life, and especially of his death which had so overwhelmed them, Acts, chh. 1, 2. It is appropriate, therefore, that before proceeding to a consideration of the work of Christ, we should inquire, What does the appellative Holy Spirit denote? an efflux, an influence of the Divine Being, or a personal existence?

I. PERSONALITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. The proof of this is found in the Scriptures only; but in collecting it we must not start with the assumption that the word Spirit in Scripture, like the words God and Christ, must always, if at all, designate a person. There are passages in which it occurs, sometimes by itself, and sometimes in such phrases as, "Spirit of God" and "my Spirit," particularly in the Old Testament, where it may denote simply Divine agency, Gen., 1 : 2. Job, 33 : 4. Gen., 6 : 3; just as in the New Testament there are numerous texts in which the phrase "the Spirit," and one, Ro., 8 : 9, in which "the Spirit of Christ" may denote, not a personal being, but that state of heart in man of which the personal Spirit is the author. This secondary meaning is natural, possibly necessary. God is a Spirit; and according to a well known grammatical law,

by which the name of an agent is transferred to his agency, or to his work, the phrase "Spirit of God" may be appropriately, if not necessarily, used to designate the power of God; and "the Spirit," "the Spirit of Christ," to denote the spiritual results produced by the Holy Spirit in the hearts of men.

That the Holy Spirit is a person¹ seems evident from the following considerations:

1. The Spirit is often spoken of throughout the Scriptures in such way as to require the supposition either of a bold personification or of a personal being. But the supposition of a personification, agrees neither with the frequency of its use nor with the calm tone of the narrative where it occurs. See its use in Isaiah, Ezekiel and Joel; in John, chh. 14 and 15. Ro., ch. 8. 1 Cor., chh. 2 and 12; also, Heb., 9: 14.

2. The title *πρωτόκλιτος* employed by our Lord, though most strikingly and comprehensively appropriate as a designation of a person, would have no pertinency as a personification of an abstract influence, or of a subjective state.

3. Christ's comparison of himself with the Holy Spirit, as his successor and representative in the world, necessitates the conception of a person. Christ was unquestionably personal, and he calls the Holy Spirit, in comparison with himself, "another Paraclete," John, 14: 16; he glorified God and says the Holy Spirit shall glorify him, John, 16: 13-16.

4. The New Testament ascribes to the Holy Spirit those acts, offices and attributes which belong only to personality. (a.) The Spirit teaches, guides, by his own knowledge reveals, and himself efficaciously helps us, Mark, 13: 11. Luke, 12: 12. John, 14: 26. 16: 13. Acts, 20: 23. 1 Cor., 2: 10-13. Ro., 8: 26: (b.) of his own will prompts to action, and "severally as he will" distributes of his gifts to men, Acts, 8: 29. 10: 19, 20. 1 Cor., 12: 4-11: (c.) possesses and exercises power, 1 Cor., 2: 4, miraculous, Ro., 15: 18,

1. His personality was virtually rejected by the Arians as it has since been by Schleiermacher; and has been positively denied by the Socinians.

19, regenerating, renewing, John, 3: 5-8. Titus, 3: 5, justifying and sanctifying, 1 Cor., 6: 11: (*d.*) possesses and exercises authority, commanding the ordination of Apostles, Acts, 13: 2, 3, and controlling the ministration of the Apostles and first preachers of the Gospel, Acts, 8: 29. 10: 20. 16: 6, 7, (*e.*) can be grieved, Eph., 4: 30, and offended, Acts, 5: 3, 4, 9. Comp., Matt., 12: 31, 32.

4. There are numerous passages in the New Testament in which the Holy Spirit is named in intimate connection with God the Father and Jesus Christ his Son; no interpretation of these passages is so natural and so strictly in accordance with the acknowledged laws of language as that which regards the Holy Spirit, equally with the Father and the Son, as a person. In Luke, 3: 22, the Father and the Son are both revealed to the senses of man and the Spirit takes bodily form. In the baptismal formula, Matt., 28: 19, the Spirit is so associated with the Father and the Son, that the only natural conclusion, without notice to the contrary, is that the Spirit is a person. In John, 14: 17, the Spirit is spoken of as "seen," "known" and as "dwelling with" us, and in 15: 26. 16: 7, 8, as being "sent" and as "coming," all of which imply personality. In Ro., 8: 26, the Spirit is said to help our infirmities and to intercede for us with inarticulate groanings, while in Jude 20, 21, we are enjoined to keep ourselves in the love of God by praying in the Holy Spirit and by looking for the mercy of the Lord Jesus Christ; all of which require us, if we regard God and Christ as persons, to recognize the Spirit also as a person. In Eph., 2: 22, the Church is said to be built together in Christ for an habitation of God through the Spirit, (*ἐν Πνεύματι*); the natural inference from this, as well as from other parts of Paul's writings is, that the Spirit is here also a person¹.

II. THE DIVINITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. Supposing it to be satisfactorily shewn that the Holy Spirit is a person, the question still remains, What evidence is there that he is a

1. On the personality of the Spirit, see J. Pye Smith, *Scripture Testimony to the Messiah*, vol. 2, appendix 3.

Divine Person? What is the proof of his proper Divinity? The proper Divinity of the Holy Spirit may be inferred from various considerations:

1. If the personality of the Spirit be admitted, his Divinity follows as a necessary consequence. The entire ground of the denial of his personality rests on the assumption that his various designations denote the mere presence and power of God; the frequent association of the Spirit with the names of God and of Christ clearly shewing, it is claimed, that the Spirit is only the invisible energy of God. But if the Spirit be a person, then the very designation of him as the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ requires, that we shall regard him as a Divine person¹.

2. His Divinity may be inferred from the frequent biblical ascriptions to him of the attributes and prerogatives of Deity. Of these attributes he has: Omnipotence, Matt., 12: 28. 1 Cor., 12: 11; Omniscience, 1 Cor., 2: 10; Omnipresence, 1 Cor., 12: 1-11. Of Divine prerogatives, he exercised absolute authority in commanding the creation and consecration to himself of new Apostles, Acts, 13: 2; in directing to what persons and to what regions the Gospel should be carried by the Apostles and others in the first days of the Church, Acts, 10: 19, 20. 8: 29. 16: 7; in the re-creation of the hearts of believers, John, 3: 5-8. Titus, 3: 5; in settling the affairs of the first churches, Acts, 15: 28; in the appointment of pastors of churches, Acts, 20: 28.

3. The Divinity of the Holy Spirit may be inferred from his association with the Father and the Son in the formulas of baptism and of benediction, Matt., 28: 19 and 2 Cor., 13: 13. Baptism is an assumption of allegiance to a Supreme authority, and the benediction is an invocation of Divine blessing; if allegiance is due to the Holy Spirit equally with

1. If to this argument it be replied that the phrase Spirit of God, in order to denote a person, must be the genitive of object rather than of subject, and so the Divinity of the Spirit be no more implied than that of an angel who is called the angel of God, a sufficient answer will be, that in that case the Spirit, if not a Divine person, would most naturally have been called the messenger (angel) of God.

the Father and the Son, and these be also conjointly associated in the bestowment of Divine blessings, the conclusion is inevitable, that the Spirit is a Divine personality.

4. If Christ be a Divine person, then the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete and his successor, whose presence in the Church was so much preferable to his own bodily continuance with his disciples—whose offices in completing the work of human redemption would be so much more effective than his own as humbled and incarnate on earth—must assuredly also be Divine.

III. OFFICES OF THE HOLY SPIRIT¹. What these may have been prior to the coming of Christ, must, for the most part, remain a matter of conjecture. One office, according to the New Testament undoubtedly was, the inspiration of the Prophets in their utterances; all beyond this is uncertain. If we assume that the phrase Spirit of God in the Old Testament always denotes the Holy Spirit, then we must include among his offices, the fashioning and garnishing of the material universe, and the bestowal of all the endowments, ordinary and extraordinary, of man. To these views it may not be sufficient to say, that no Old Testament writers in the texts cited in support of them, could have supposed he was distinguishing between the personal Spirit and the personal God, since the same is equally true of the Old Testament accounts of the appearances of the preëxistent Logos; but just how these ante-Christian offices of the Spirit can be reconciled with the creative offices of the preëxistent Logos, to which the New Testament so constantly refers, is by no means apparent. The ante-Christian relation of the Holy Spirit and the preëxistent Logos in the work of creation is too obscure to warrant, in respect to it, any explicit dogmatic statements.

But in respect to the economic offices of the Holy Spirit in the Christian dispensation², the New Testament Scriptures

1 See Julius Hare, *Mission of the Comforter*.

2 On the office of the Spirit in the supernatural origin of Jesus, see Pearson, *On the Creed*, art. 3, under the words "by the Holy Ghost." Moses Stuart maintained that *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* in Luke 1: 35, does not mean *the* Holy Spirit, but *a* holy spirit, see *Bib. Sac.*, vol. 7, 313.

are very explicit. Of these the first undoubtedly was to guide the Apostles and first Christians in organizing the Church, and to supply it with a completed body of truth for its guidance in all future time. To the Apostolic Church the Holy Spirit was an indwelling Power, an inspiring Life and a guiding Wisdom. See the promises of Christ in John, chh. 14-16, and the whole book of the Acts.

Another office of this indwelling Spirit in the Church, was and still is, to communicate of his own divine life to its individual members ("through sanctification of the Spirit,") and by the aid of that truth which himself had provided, to build up the collective brotherhood of the Church into a living temple and a habitation of God. The Spirit was given to the Church once for all, and his shrine is now neither in the heavens nor in the Bible, but in the hearts of all true children of God, Eph., 2 : 22¹.

It is also the office of the Holy Spirit, in the exercise of which the two preceding offices are presupposed, to subdue the world, through the ministries of the Church, to the authority of Christ; to renew the hearts of men, and, by planting in them the germs of righteousness which are afterwards to be developed into maturity of character, to carry forward that work for which all his offices exist, viz. : that of finally establishing in the earth a universal reign of righteousness.

§ 40—*The Trinity.*

The question here arises, if Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit be Divine persons, how can their Divinity be reconciled with the Unity of God. Is the Godhead simply and

1. It seems plain from Christ's promise of the Spirit in the Gospel of John, as well as from the whole scope of the New Testament, that the Holy Spirit dwells permanently in the Christian Church, performing in the hearts of believers on earth, offices corresponding to those which Christ performs for them with the Father in heaven. It is an unwarranted petition, therefore, which asks God to "pour out," or "send down," his Spirit from heaven.

absolutely one, or triune? A consideration of the doctrine of the Trinity, at this point, becomes a necessity. But the numerical Unity of God must at the outset be regarded as one of the most clearly established of biblical truths. Numerically, and in essence, God must be regarded as absolutely one; but if Christ and the Spirit be Divine, then, in the mode of his existence, God must be hypostatically or personally triune.—In the discussion of the doctrine we shall notice: 1. The objections alleged against it, and its inherent difficulties. 2. The proofs of the doctrine. 3. The relations of the three persons in the Godhead. 4. The practical bearing and significance of the doctrine¹.

I. OBJECTIONS AND INHERENT DIFFICULTIES.

A. Objections². (*a.*) The Trinity of the Godhead, it is said, is nowhere directly affirmed in the Bible, whereas its Unity is asserted most explicitly, emphatically and with reiteration in both Testaments. The absence of direct and explicit statements, however, is no real objection to the doctrine, provided it be otherwise plainly taught. The prevalence of polytheism and the constant exposure and proneness of the Jews to it, may explain the repeated affirmation of the Divine unity, while on the other hand, the religious economy under which they lived required no revelation of the Trinity; but when the economy of redemption was made known in Christianity, then the facts presented in the historical process of its introduction more clearly and emphatically revealed its existence than any words could

1. The literature of this doctrine is more ample perhaps than of any other in the whole range of Christian theology. Beginning in the early Patristic period, it rapidly swelled into large proportions. Out of the vast mass that has accumulated, the student of systematic theology will do well to consult, Augustine, *De Trinitate*.—Baur, *Die Chr. Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*.—Meier, *Geschichte der Trinitätslehre*.—Bull, *Defensio Fidei Nicenæ*.—Waterland, *Works*, several tractates.—Pearson, *On The Creed*.—John Howe, *Calm and Sober Inquiry*. For a full exposition of the Lutheran treatment of the doctrine, see Twisten, *Dogmatik*, v. 2, (trans. *Bib. Sac.*, vol. 3, p. 499, ff. and p. 760, ff.)

2. These may be gathered from the *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polono*. and from the scattered writings of modern Unitarians. Andrews Norton's *Statement of Reasons*, is occupied chiefly with arguments against the validity of the Scripture proof of a Trinity, and specially, of the Divinity of Christ.

have done, though special texts necessarily implying it are by no means wanting.

(b.) It is alleged that the doctrine of the Trinity was of slow growth; can be traced in its gradual formation¹; can be shewn to be the product of Platonism². But substitute some other philosophy for Platonism, and the objection is just as valid against any other sharply defined doctrine of Christianity as it is against that of the Trinity; the objection confounds the intellectual forces and philosophical method by which a doctrine was developed, with the biblical data on which it rested. That the Christian doctrine of the Trinity was not the product of Platonism, is evident from the very early existence of the anti-trinitarian Jewish sects, the Ebionites and the Nazarenes³—sects which preceded the introduction of Platonists into the Church and were manifestly antagonistic to the great body of believers.

(c.) It is declared to be an absurdity to say that one God is three persons and that three persons are one God. And it would be absurd to say that one man is three individual men and that three individual men are one man. But it is by no means so clearly absurd to say that one God, who in himself is to us in every way so inscrutable, may exist as three distinct and distinguishable subsistencies, and yet in his essence be absolutely and indivisibly one. The absurdity lies wholly in the meaning attached to terms—in giving to the term person (hypostasis) the same meaning it has when applied to individual men. The source of the difficulty is in the inconceivability of the mode of a triune existence; the absurdity itself lies wholly in the attempt to reduce a mode of existence which transcends all our knowledge, to the level of our finite experiences.

1. For a restatement of this traditional objection, see *New Discussions of the Trinity*,—a vol. containing a collection of essays and reviews called forth by the withdrawal of Dr. (now Bishop) Huntington from the Unitarians, pp. 82-85.

2. See Lamson, *The Church of the first three Centuries*, written for the express purpose of verifying this often repeated assertion.—James Forrest, *Some Account of the Origin and Progress of Trinitarian Theology*.—Norton, *Statement of Reason*, sect. 4.

3. See Neander, *Church Hist.*, vol. 1, sect. 4, Judaising sects.

(*d.*) The idea of Trinity, it is said, destroys the idea of God's absolute being, making him to be compounded,—to consist of parts, and thus to be dependent. The objection is founded on the assumption that distinction is separation. But the persons in the Trinity of the Godhead, though distinct and distinguishable, are not separate nor separable. Thus Christ, while distinguishing between himself and the Father, says, "I and my Father are one;" and the Apostles continually refer the same acts indifferently to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Peter speaks of the sin of Ananias as equally a lie to the Holy Ghost and a lie to God, Acts, 5: 3, 4.

(*e.*) The doctrine of the Trinity, it is asserted, is alike opposed to the real Divinity of Christ and to his real humanity¹. And against theories of the Trinity, which rest in turn on certain theories of the person of Christ, the objection is undoubtedly valid. Thus, as against the theory of eternal generation, or against that of a commingling of the two natures in the person of Christ, the objection has weight; but as against the historical fact that a Divine Hypostasis of the triune Godhead has so assumed real humanity as not thereby to surrender his Divinity, the objection is futile.

(*f.*) The doctrine of the Trinity, it has been said, "injures devotion;" and is unfavorable to piety². This objection founds an argument against the doctrine precisely where Trinitarianism rests one in its support. Trinitarians assert that the doctrine promotes piety, by bringing God near to man in the incarnation; and they appeal to the Christian consciousness and to Church history in support of their assertion. Which side is in the right, can be ascertained only by a careful analysis of the elements of devotion and piety, and by ascertaining, through an appeal to historical facts, who are the most devout and distinguished for their piety, the Unitarians or the Trinitarians. The argument, however, is too invidious to be pressed by either party in the discussion of the doctrine as a living issue.

1. See *New Discussions of the Trin.*, p. 85.

2. See Channing's *Works*, vol. 3, pp. 73-75. 170-172.

(g.) This doctrine, it is said, robs God the Father of the Supreme adoration due to his name, by encouraging the worship of the Spirit and the Son as distinct persons. The objection would be well-founded, if the economic offices of the Son and the Spirit did not distinctively and always lead to the Supreme adoration of God the Father. The Holy Spirit in us, is a "Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father," Ro., 8: 15; and we "confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father," Phil., 2: 11.

B. Difficulties. Some of these inhere in the nature of the subject; others have been added by attempts to formulate the doctrine authoritatively in sharply-defined phraseology.

(a.) There is a want on our part of all experimental knowledge of any trinity of being, from which the Scripture doctrine can be comprehensible to us, and from which we can with safety reason analogically in its support.

(b.) From our want of experience comes poverty of language, and the impossibility of finding terms by which to designate the distinctions in the Godhead. The terms *ὑπόστασις* (from Heb., 1: 3,) and *πρόσωπον*, employed by the Greeks, and the words *subsistentia* and *persona*, used by the Latins, were objectionable on account of their ambiguity, which was occasioned in part by their preoccupation with other meanings, and in part by their being used in very different, and even opposite, senses by different writers in speaking of the same distinctions in the Godhead¹.

(c.) There is extreme difficulty in giving any statement of a Tri-unity, which shall not verge upon Tritheism on the one hand or upon mere Modalism on the other².

1. On the senses in which these Greek and Latin terms were used by the Fathers and on the relations of these senses among different authors and at different periods, see Suicer, *Thesaurus Ecclesiasticus*.—Petavius, *Dogmata Theologica*, v. 2, de Trinitate.—Dean Stanley, *Contemp. Rev.*, Aug., '70, p. 140, ff., and Rev. Francis Gardin, *Con. Rev.*, Nov., '71, art. 2. Comp. Shedd, *Hist. Chr. Doct.*, vol. 1, bk. 3, ch. 3, § 5.

2. It was very natural that Calvin should be charged with Sabellianism, (modalism,) and John Howe, at a later day, with Tritheism.

(*d.*) There is extreme difficulty in giving any meaning to the titles of the three persons of the Trinity which shall consist with Trinity itself. Our actual knowledge of the Trinity is derived from the historical revelation in the New Testament of the several offices of the Father, Son and Spirit, in the economy of redemption. To suppose these economic titles to be exactly descriptive of immanent and eternal distinctions, is to conceive, not of a Trinity, but of graded personal distinctions in the Godhead; to regard the distinctions as purely economic and representative of nothing immanent or ontologic, is to conceive, not of a Trinity, but of an absolute and exclusive Unity.

(*e.*) To these inherent difficulties, others were gratuitously added by patristic speculations, specially in the Greek Church, and particularly by Origen: and by the attempts of ecclesiastical councils to determine by authority just what meaning should be attached to terms employed in the discussion of the doctrine, and just what the Church should believe in respect to the doctrine itself. In the progress of time, the meanings of terms once fixed by authority have so completely changed as greatly to enhance the original difficulty of any clear statement of the doctrine.

II. PROOFS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

A. From the New Testament.

1. We have already seen from the clearest and amplest evidence, that Jesus Christ is a Divine Being as well as human; that the Holy Spirit is also both personal and Divine; the distinct personality of the Father and the numerical unity of the Godhead being universally admitted, we must necessarily admit the doctrine of a Trinity.

2. Christ in the Gospels constantly speaks of God as specially his Father, and addresses him as distinct from himself, and as Supreme, John, 12: 28. Mat., 26: 39; the Father repeatedly acknowledges the Son as distinctively his well-beloved Son, and audibly responds to his petition, John, 12: 28; and the Father and the Son, unitedly, send the Spirit as distinct from themselves, Luke, 24: 49. John, 14: 26. 15: 26. At the baptism of Christ, Matt., 3: 16, 17,

he was audibly recognized of God as his well-beloved Son, and the Spirit visibly descended and rested on him. We have already seen that Christ and the Holy Spirit are throughout the New Testament so associated in the offices of redemption as to leave no doubt of their co-equal title to worship and honor, and so of their proper Divinity; the inference is inevitable, that the titles Son and Holy Spirit do neither represent merely different manifestations of one personality, nor three separate Beings, but three different subsistencies or personal distinctions in God, and thus require in us a belief in the Tri-unity of the Godhead.

3. In the accounts which the Apostles give of the different relations into which we are brought to the Father, Son and Spirit in the process of individual redemption, a Trinity seems to be very clearly taught. The difference in these relations is sometimes strongly marked by the different prepositions employed in speaking of them. Thus in Eph., 2: 18, it is to the Father (*πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*) that, in redemption we are brought, through Christ, (*δι' αὐτοῦ*), in or by one Spirit, (*ἐν ἑνὶ Πνεύματι*.) A similar distribution, though with change of cases and persons, occurs in verse 22 of the same chapter. In 4: 4-6 of the same Epistle, we have one Spirit by whom we are called; one Lord in whom we believe; and one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in us all. In 1 Cor., 12: 4-6, there are diversities of gifts but the same Spirit, and differences of administration but the same Lord, and diversities of operation but the same God, who worketh all in all. In Jude, 20, 21, we are exhorted to keep ourselves in the love of God by praying in the Holy Ghost, and by looking for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ. The most natural conclusion from these texts¹ is, that the unity of God must somehow consist with a tri-personality in the mode of his being.

4. The Trinity is plainly taught in the formula of baptism appointed by Christ, Matt., 28: 19; in the formula of benediction sometimes employed by the Apostles, 2 Cor.,

1. Many similar texts are scattered throughout the New Testament: as examples, see Ro., 15: 30. Acts, 7: 55-60.

13: 14, and in the opening words of his first Epistle by Peter. In the formula of baptism, Christ puts himself and the Holy Spirit on an equality with the Father, as severally administering in the work of our redemption, and as alike and equally to be honored and obeyed by us. To be baptised into the name of the Father, the Son and the Spirit, is to take on a vow of allegiance to each; and, in the benediction, equal Divine blessings are invoked from each, though from each severally according to his office in the Christian economy.

B. Proofs of the Trinity from the Old Testament.

It has been warmly disputed whether the Trinity is taught in the Old Testament. The Jews, however, from whom we have received the Old Testament can be clearly shewn to have known nothing of the doctrine.

(a.) The Unity of God was one of the most fundamental truths of their religion; and into this truth there plainly entered no other idea than that of unity of personality.

(b.) No Jewish author, subsequent to the writers of the Old Testament canon, presents any conception of such hypostatical distinctions in the Godhead, as the New Testament so conspicuously sets forth. The Logos of Philo was unquestionably impersonal, and most clearly distinguishable and different from the hypostases of the New Testament. And even such impersonal and ideal distinctions as Philo made, were confessedly Platonic and not Jewish in origin¹.

(c.) The irrepressible indignation of the Jews at Christ's assertion of his equality and oneness with the Father, (John, 5: 18. 8: 58, 59. 10: 30, 31,) shews the utter absence in their minds of all germinal conceptions, out of which the doctrine could have grown.

1. On the Logos of Philo, see Cudworth, *Intellectual System*, Harrison's ed., pp. 320-333, and the notes:—Grotius, *De Veritate*, lib. 5, sec. 21:—Bull, *Defensio Fidei Nicenæ*, pt. 1, ch. 1, sec. 13:—Semisch, *Justin Martyr*, vol. 2:—Ritter, *Hist. Anc. Philosophy*, vol. 4, ch. 8:—*Chr. Review*, Oct., '59:—Dorner, *On the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, vol. 1, Introduction:—Döllinger, *The First Age of the Church*, bk. 2, ch. 2:—Davidson, *Introduction to Study of New Testament*, vol. 2, Gospel of John.

(d.) The first Jewish christians were strongly indisposed to accept the Deity of Christ. There are traces of this indisposition in the Apostolic Epistles, Col., 2: 8, 9. 1 John, 2: 22, 23. 5: 9; which afterwards embodied itself in the heretical sects of the Ebionites and the Nazarenes, one of whose principal characteristics was a denial of the Deity of Christ.

(e.) The doctrine of the Trinity is still rejected by all Jews, as foreign alike to their Scriptures and all their traditions.

There are many passages, however, in the Old Testament from which, under the borrowed light of the New, some incidental proof of the Trinity may be gleaned. To this class of passages belong all those texts, (quoted under the Divinity of Christ,) in which the mediating Angel is so clearly distinguished from, and yet so closely identified with, Jehovah himself. Here also belongs Is., 6: 1-3, in which, according to John, 12: 41, the prophet, when he saw Jehovah, saw the preëxistent Logos. A hypostatical distinction between God and the preëxistent Logos, seems, from these texts, to be a necessary conclusion. Bearing this distinction and conclusion in mind, and reading in Is., 61: 1, comp. Luke, 4: 16-21, of the Spirit, God, and Christ as distinct and yet co-active, we find for the doctrine of the Trinity, which is elsewhere revealed, a kind of indirect, and perhaps not wholly worthless argument.

An argument is often drawn from the Hebrew plural, Elohim, for the name of God, and from the use which is sometimes made of plural pronouns, when God is represented as speaking of himself, Gen., 1: 26. 3: 22. 11: 7. Is., 6: 8. But these plural forms are too easily explained as the common language of sovereignty¹, (*pluralis majestaticus, excellentiæ*,) for much stress to be safely laid on the argument; or if we reject this explanation, there is still too much uncertainty in respect to the origin and significance of the word Elohim² to rest an argument on its use.

1. See Gesenius, *Heb. Grammar*, § 106.—Green, *Heb. Grammar*, § 201.

2. On the origin and significancy of Elohim, see Hengstenberg, *Genuineness of the Penteteuch*, p. 271, ff., trans. He makes the plural to express "intensity of idea," and to denote "infinite riches and inexhaustible fullness." J. A.

The triple blessing of Jacob in Num., 6: 24-26, Jehovah bless thee:—Jehovah be gracious unto thee: Jehovah give thee peace, too nearly accords with the several offices of the three persons in the Christian benediction, not to be suggestive of the Trinity. So also the triple repetition of the word holy, in Is., 6: 3, may have a significancy to one who is already a believer in the Trinity. But these are very slight premises from which to construct an argument. The most that we can with certainty affirm is, that the Trinity having been revealed in Christianity, there are various forms of speech in the Old Testament, where God is spoken of, or is represented as speaking, which seem to lend it support. And when we remember that all divine truth, as by an invariable law, has been revealed by successive types and progressive stages, we can readily understand how the doctrine of the Trinity may have underlain the Old Testament revelation, unperceived by its writers; how it may have first been recognized in the economic revelation of Christianity, and only been clearly enunciated in the necessary evolution of Christian doctrine.

C. Other than Scriptural proofs of the Trinity.

1. The doctrine receives confirmation from Christian experience. In the first awakened sense of accountability and guilt on the part of man, there is an apprehension of God as the Creator, Ruler, and Judge, but of God as remote, inaccessible, and justly displeased with us. But in the renewal and reconciliation wrought in us by the Gospel, God reveals himself in Christ Jesus as a sym-

Alexander regards it as used by ellipsis, (God of Gods,) see his *Commentary on the Psalms*, comment on Ps., 29: 1.—De Wette held, (see his *Introduction to the Old Testament*,) that it had a polytheistic origin; that Jewish monotheism in emerging from polytheism brought along with it the language of older religions. Ewald, who formerly agreed with DeWette, has in later days regarded it as a kind of collective noun which embodies all ideas of the Divine in one comprehensive term, but a term which approaches more nearly to an abstract than to a concrete conception. If any one still thinks an argument may be founded on the plural of Elohim, or of the pronouns, let him try the passage in Ps., 45: 7, 8, where, according to Heb. 1: 8, the Father as Elohim, addresses the Son as Elohim, and where both terms, if either, must furnish ground for inferring a Trinity.

pathizing Deliverer who rescues us, and in a special sense makes us his children ; to receive Christ as our Saviour, is to find in him God as our Father. And were this all, Christ, though divinely interposing in our behalf, and though containing in himself all the fullness of the God-head bodily, would still be to us an objective and external Being. Subsequent scrutiny of the inward process of our renewal and of its results reveals, the presence of an inward and invisible Power who, according to the Scriptures, led us, John, 15 : 13, and moulded us according to his own will, Ro., 8 : 14. 1 Cor., 2 : 10. 2 Thess., 2 : 13. 1 Pet., 1 : 2 ; and dwelling in us as his temples ever helps us in the Christian life, Ro., 8 : 16. A triune God thus accomplishes in man, through the three-fold but harmonious offices of the Father, Son and Spirit, the one comprehensive work of his moral renewal and final salvation.

2. Another method of argument in support of the Trinity has been called the philosophical, but is strictly psychological. It has taken various forms, but always assumes as its premises, either certain conditions of perfection of being in man, or the supposed process in the origination of self-consciousness, and the acknowledged conditions of its continuance in man.—Thus in the use of the first form, it is claimed that one requisite to perfection of being is self-consciousness and self-diffusion—a reflection of one's own image and an interchange of thought. This condition was not provided for in the Divine Being by created intelligences, since they began to be in time and were created by the Logos. If the Logos, therefore, was not an eternal subsistence or hypostasis, and if there was no communion of the Father and the Son through the eternal Spirit, then, until the beginning of the Creation, the Godhead was wanting in perfection of being¹.—In the use of the second class of premises, an argument has been constructed somewhat as follows : Without an "I" there can be no "thou," and *vice versa* ; the two terms being always correlative. Had

1. For a specimen of this form of the argument, see J. Pye Smith, *Script. Testimony*, vol. 2, append. 4.

Deity been from eternity an abstract unity, he could not have been an "I"—could not have been conscious of his own personality, and thus could never have come to the act of creation; hence the necessity of a "thou," or the "image" of Heb., 1: 3, as a condition of consciousness. Had there been, furthermore, only Father and Son, these would have been distinct and separate—a dual Deity. But God must know himself as Father and Son, and this self-knowing and communion of the Father and Son is the Holy Spirit. God, therefore, if self-conscious must be triune¹.—Pantheism in its use of the premises of this second argument finds a "thou" in the external creation, which reaches its highest product in the ideal Christ; and the only Holy Spirit which it knows is the totality of life among men².

III. RELATION OF PERSONS IN THE TRINITY.

Accepting now the doctrine of the Trinity as clearly established, there still remains the question of the mutual relations of the persons. What, then, shall we understand to be indicated by the titles Father, Son, and Spirit?

The first answer distinctly given, though not generally adopted, was that of the Patripassians; which doubtless had its origin in Jewish monotheism, and which finally took that definite form of Modalism known as Sabellianism. This conceives the three titles, Father, Son, and Spirit, to be merely the names of the three modes under which the one Divine Essence has manifested itself to man³.

The next answer, in reaction against Patripassian Modalism, was that of Subordinationism, (originated by Justin Martyr and distinctly enunciated by Origen,) which finally took the form of Arianism, making the Son to have been created out of nothing; to be subordinate to the Father and only in an inferior sense God.—Semi-Arianism, which

1. See this argument as stated by Tholuck, *Bib. Sac.*, vol. 1, pp. 564-5.—Comp. Martensen, *Dogmatik*, § 56. See the same, as elaborately stated in carefully selected phraseology by Shedd, in his *Hist. of Christian Doctrine*, vol. 1, pp. 365-368;—*The Jour. of Spec. Phil.*, Jan., '72, art. 3.

2. See David Friedrich Strauss, *Chr. Glaubenslehre*, vol. I, pp. 483-501.

3. This view is advocated by certain living Unitarians; by James Freeman Clarke, in his *Orthodoxy: Its Truth and Errors*, ch. 16, §§ 4, 5.

makes the Son to have been created out of nothing though of like substance with the Father, (*ὁμοούσιος*,) grew out of the struggles of Arianism with the decrees of the Council of Nice.—The older and Origenistic form of Arianism was during the last century revived and ingeniously defended by Samuel Clarke, who made the Son to have been derived from the Father, and to be a kind of secondary and subordinate Deity¹. Arianism, as represented in the Council of Nice, evaded the question of the Divinity of the Spirit; Semi-Arians denied his Divinity; but Clarke recognized the Spirit as proceeding from the Father through the Son, and so like the Son, as being in a subordinate sense Divine². Thus Clarke's Trinity is that of three graded Deities:

The answer that was first formally and widely adopted by the Church is found in the Nicene Creed, and has had of all answers incomparably the largest number of adherents³. According to this answer, the Son is consubstantial, (of the same essence, *ὁμοούσιος*,) with the Father, was eternally and necessarily generated from the Father. The Nicene Creed declares a belief in the Holy Spirit, but says nothing of his consubstantiality with the Father and the Son⁴.

1. See Clarke, *Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity*, pub. in 1712, §§ 12–14.

2. See *ibid.*, §§ 40–43.

3. The Nicene Creed has prevailed throughout Christendom; was formally adopted in the standard Confessions of both the Lutherans and the Reformed; and in the XXXIX Articles; and was virtually incorporated in the Westminster Confession. See also Calvin, *Instit.*, c. 13.—Bull., *Defensio Fid. Nicenæ*.—Waterland, *Works*.—*Princeton Essays*, 1st series, art. Sonship of Christ.

4. This point of consubstantiality was inserted in the Nicene Creed when it received its final revision at the council of Constantinople, A. D. 381. The phrase "and the Son," (*filioque*,) in this Creed as it now stands in both the Roman and the Episcopal services, was neither in its original form nor as it was amended at Constantinople. It is admitted to have been added at a later day in Spain. According to the famous Edmund S. Foulkes, in his *Letter to Archbp. Manning*, entitled *The Church's Creed, or The Crown's Creed?* it was first introduced by an obscure Spanish king named Reccared, A. D. 589; was adopted by Charlemagne, who in vain urged Pope Leo III to introduce it into the Roman use; and was finally adopted at Rome by Benedict VIII, in compliance with the wishes, or dictation, of Henry II, when he visited Rome to be crowned emperor in 1014. See pp. 9–15, ed. New York: Pott & Amery, Cooper Union, 1869.

Another view has been, that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit designate purely temporal relations; the Son having been created an extraordinary person, with supernatural endowments, and the Holy Spirit denoting a Divine influence or energy, bestowed on Christ and subsequently continued to the heralds of his religion. Such was the original Socinian view, and it is still held by some of the more conservative of modern Unitarians¹. It insists on the absolute unity of the Godhead, though it recognizes a kind of created divinity, distinguishable from proper Deity, in Christ, on account of which he is appropriately worshipped; and thus while rejecting the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, it holds to a species of economic Trinity, but of actual Duality.

Another was that propounded by Schleiermacher, who claimed it to have been the real view of Sabellius, making the terms Father, Son, and Spirit to denote distinctions in the Godhead, but only in God as revealed, and not in God as absolute and unrevealed, and even prior to the incarnation².

Another answer still, is that which regards the titles Father, Son, and Spirit as borrowed from relations that began in the work of human redemption, but as representing real and immanent distinctions in the Godhead, which had existed from eternity, and consequently were neither derived by generation nor by creation.

Which, now, of the foregoing explanations shall we adopt? The choice, we think, lies between the Nicene and the last named. Of these two, the former can plead great antiquity, the authority of successive councils, and of the confessions of all the great subdivisions of Christendom; the latter, however, though a growth of later years, is the product of a better understanding of the Scriptures.

1. See F. A. Farley, *Unitarianism Defined*. "A being may be Divine, without being the Supreme God, and such is Christ. Unitarians believe in his Divinity. They regard, honor and revere him, as the Lord and Head of his Church; second only to the Supreme Jehovah, &c." p. 66. *Comp. Catechesis Racoviensis*, quests. 181-184.

2. See the Essay containing the views of Schleiermacher, translated with comments by Moses Stuart, in *Bib. Repository*, vols. 5, p. 265, ff. and 6, p. 1, ff. This view was also adopted by Dr. Bushnell in his *Christ in Theology*,

As respects the Nicene statement of the relation of the persons in the Trinity, it must be admitted that no clear conception can be formed of eternal generation which does not necessarily imply derivation, subordination, and so a degree of inferiority; and inferiority is certainly inconsistent with proper Deity, and so with any true and proper Trinity¹. Nor is the objection removed by the assurance that the Origenistic conception of an "eternal generation" was in the minds of the Nicene fathers, in the construction of their creed; an eternal generation is necessarily an eternal subordination and dependence².

The texts commonly adduced in support of the eternal Sonship of Christ do not in fact prove it. Thus in Ro. 1: 4, which is confidently cited in this service, the comparison is between the two natures of the historical Christ, and not between the preëxistent relations of the Divine nature and the earthly relations of the human. The Apostle simply intends to affirm, that as the historical Christ was a lineal descendant of David, so by the resurrection he had been miraculously attested to be also a Divine being. To regard this text as teaching eternal Sonship, requires that *ὁμοθέητος* shall be understood as equivalent in meaning with *προορισθέντος*, *prædestinatus*,—an error of the Vulgate and Augustine, which all critical exegetes now reject. In John, 1: 18, Christ is designated "the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father." This language, it is claimed,

1. Prof. Moses Stuart has perhaps stated this more earnestly and clearly than any other writer. See *Bib. Repository*, vol. 6, p. 80, ff.—Stuart's *Miscellanies*, p. 54, ff.—*Bib. Sac.*, vol. 7, p. 313, ff.

2. This seems to be fully admitted, even by the most orthodox of the Anglican writers. Pearson says, "the communication of the Divine essence by the Father, is the generation of the Son; and Christ, who was eternally God, not from himself but from the Father, is the eternal Son of God." "The similitude, in which the propriety of generation is preserved, is that which consisteth in the identity of nature; and this communication of the Divine essence by the Father to the Word, is evidently a sufficient foundation of such a similitude," *Exposition of the Creed*, art. 2. Hooker says, "the Father alone is originally Deity, which Christ is not; whatsoever Christ hath common unto him with his heavenly Father, the same of necessity must be given, but naturally and eternally given," *Eccle. Polity*, bk. 5, ch. 54, 2.

taken in connection with the preceding account of the preëxistent Logos, teaches conclusively the eternal Sonship of the Logos. But this interpretation entirely overlooks the fact that Christ is carefully styled Logos, until in verse 14 it is distinctly affirmed that he became incarnate, and thenceforward, the title Logos having been dropped, the designation "Son" is uniformly employed by John throughout his Gospel. The Evangelist having introduced the Logos into the world in v. 14, merely emphasizes, in v. 18, the truth that he, who from eternity had been with God, (*πρὸς τὸν Θεόν,*) in becoming incarnate, became known to men as the only begotten Son of God, and is now¹ in the bosom (*ὁ ὦν εἰς τὸν κόλπον*) of the Father. The entire Gospel of John is an exhibit of historical evidence, not of the eternal Sonship, but of the Divine dignity and nature of the historical personage, Jesus of Nazareth. In Col., 1 : 15, Christ is called "the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature," (*πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως.*) The argument for eternal Sonship turns on the epithet "first-born;" if born before the "whole creation," or before "every creature," then, the inference is, he must have been eternally generated! But priority of existence is certainly not identical with eternity of existence. And besides, if *πρωτότοκος* implies Sonship in the sense of derivation of essence, it must also, as Arians affirm, imply origination or beginning of existence. The reference here, moreover, is not to the relation of the preëxistent Son to the Father, as claimed by defenders of eternal Sonship, but to the relation of the now exalted and glorified² Christ to the invisible Father on the one side, and to the created universe on the other. As respects the invisible God, Christ is his visible image; as respects the created universe he existed before it, (*πρωτότοκος,*) and was in fact, v. 16, himself the Creator of every

1. We prefer, with Meyer, to regard John as here having in mind the present and exalted Christ, than with DeWette and Alford, to regard him as using the timeless present.

2. Both Meyer and Alford shew conclusively that Paul here has in mind the Person of Christ as he now is, and not merely either the preëxistent or the historical Christ.

conceivable portion of it, animate and inanimate. In like manner, to cite the first chapter of Hebrews as proving eternal Sonship, because Christ is there called the Son of God, even when his superiority to angels is set forth, is to overlook the fact that the comparison is between the angels and the Christ incarnate and historical, and not between them and the Christ preëxistent. The truth is, that Christ in the Scriptures is called the Son of God, because of his supernatural origin in the incarnation, Luke, 1: 35; because of his resurrection, Acts, 13: 33. Ro., 1: 4, and of the subsequent Divine attestation of his Supreme majesty, Heb., 1: 1-4.

There remains to us, then, the last named of the foregoing explanations of the personal relations in the Trinity, viz: that the titles Father, Son and Holy Spirit, though derived from the historical facts of the Christian economy, do nevertheless represent eternal ontologic distinctions in the Godhead. This view discards all theories of the relations and rests content on the simple facts of the case. Thus it is evident that,

1. The Scriptures give us no information respecting these relations, except just so far as the ultimate end of Christianity makes necessary. They reveal a Trinity only just so far as they reveal the several steps in Christ's objective work of man's redemption, and in the subjective process of making this redemption available. In treating of this subject, as of all others, the terminology of the Scriptures seems to have been suggested by historical phenomena rather than by the eternal principles lying beneath and behind the phenomena. Hence

2. The names and representations of the persons in the Trinity are strictly economic. Derived from relations existing in time, they cannot be assumed to be exactly descriptive of the unknown relations of eternity, without some special authority of Scripture. That authority is wanting. If the titles "Son" and "Christ" are applied to the preëxistent Logos, it is because they are supplied at the point of departure by terminology derived either from the histor-

ical phenomena or the contextual thought. As preëxistent, Christ is the Logos, a title, the origin and meaning of which is not given in Scripture and can only be conjectured¹. Comp. John, 1 : 1-5 with 1 : 14, 18. 13 : 14. Phil., 2 : 6-8². 2 Cor., 8 : 9.

3. But it cannot be denied, that all our necessary conceptions of God must have some underlying and essential basis of eternal reality. We are not so constituted as to be necessarily deceived, though we may be so constituted as necessarily to have very imperfect conceptions. The phraseology of the New Testament is such as to have suggested to the universal Church the doctrine of original, personal distinctions in the Godhead, corresponding to the titles, Father, Son and Holy Spirit; and it is inconceivable that Christianity can be a true revelation from God and these distinctions in the Godhead not exist.

4. There must, therefore, be some ontologic or immanent, and consequently eternal, distinctions in the Godhead on which are grounded the economic titles and the conceptions of personality which they suggest. With these preëxistent distinctions correspond all those representations of Christ as the Sent of God, and the One by whom God made the worlds, Heb., 1 : 2. In the Godhead, then, we must infer that there were from eternity hypostatical distinctions which made it fit and necessary that, in the economy of redemption, one of these should be Father, another Son, and another Paraclete or Holy Spirit. But what these distinctions were, what their *modus existendi*, and what their common relation to the absolute oneness of the Divine essence, the Scriptures do not inform us, and it is idle to inquire³.

1. To reason from the title Logos in support of the derivation and subordination of the preëxistent Christ, is to repudiate his hypostatical preëxistence and, withal, to assume that there was a point at which the Logos *began* to exist in the consciousness of God.

2. On the phrase *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ* and its meaning, see Lightfoot, *Commentary on Phil.*, and pp. 108, 130, 131.

3. Notwithstanding the absence of all trustworthy data from which to reason in respect to the relation of persons in the Trinity, attempts are still made to construct the doctrine from the postulates of speculative philosophy. Mar-

IV. PRACTICAL BEARING OF THE DOCTRINE.

Whatever may be our explanation of the relations of the persons in the Trinity, we cannot fail, as Christians, to perceive the significance and appropriateness of the several offices which the persons represent. As dependent and accountable creatures, as alienated and condemned, as perverted and prone to err, we cannot but recognize the offices of the merciful heavenly Father, of the interposing Saviour, and of the indwelling and sanctifying Paraclete; each and all alike condescending to our condition and wants, and coöperating in our individual salvation. The office of each is stamped on every page of the New Testament; and the ministrations of each have contributed to the making up of every Christian's experience. Every normal Christian consciousness responds at once to the truth of the economic Trinity as taught in the New Testament¹. Christianity, both as a history and a life, rests on the doctrine of the Trinity. Deny that doctrine, and we rob the Gospel of the power by which it reclaims men; we reduce Christianity to a religious philosophy, and enter upon a line of thought which can logically end only in sweeping away all that is supernatural in its records, its methods and its results.

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§ 41—*The Offices of Christ.*

As Mediator between God and man, Christ has been commonly known under the three-fold offices of Prophet, Priest and King—corresponding to the three great offices of Prophet, High Priest and King, in the kingdom of Israel.

tensen is an example of this among theologians, see his *Dogmatik*, §§ 56, 57; for an attempt at an exclusively philosophical demonstration, see *The Journal of Spec. Philosophy*, Jan., 1872, p. 36-42.

1. Even James Freeman Clarke in his *Orthodoxy: its truths and errors*, admits that "there is an essential truth hidden in the idea of the Trinity. While the Church doctrine in every form which it has taken, has failed to satisfy the human intellect, the human heart has clung to the substance contained in them all," p. 436.

The titles are not merely figurative, but descriptive of the real and distinct offices of Christ in teaching, redeeming and controlling his people¹. But by this division is not meant that the earthly life and works of Christ can be distributed into periods and series of acts, in which he was now exclusively Prophet, and now Priest, and now King. The three offices were for a single end, and in fulfillment of that end were always conjointly exercised. He taught that he might redeem, and he redeemed that he might control, perfect and employ; but in becoming Redeemer, he did not cease to be Prophet, and in exercising the function of King, he does not cease to act as our High Priest, Mat., 28: 18. Acts, 2: 33. 5: 31.

In his PROPHEPIC office we are doubtless to understand that Christ is the communicator to man of the mind and will of God. Intimations of this office are very likely intended to be given in the title Logos, by which he is designated in the Gospel of John. It was he who made known the will of Jehovah to the patriarchs; who, according to Peter, 1 Ep., 1: 11, spoke through the Old Testament prophets; who, fulfilling in his own person the prophecies of preceding prophets, inaugurated new methods, and proclaimed new truths in religion; who, having returned to his original estate in heaven, still continued to be the instructor and prophet of his church, Acts, 2: 33. Gal., 1: 12; and who, judging from the past and from the measureless interval between finite man and the infinite God, will continue to be the eternal prophet and communicator between them.

Of the PRIESTLY office of Christ it will be necessary that we treat more at length. It is chiefly in this character that Christ is presented to us in the New Testament. Though the title Priest is specially applied to him only in the Epistle to the Hebrews, yet the idea involved in it is common to

1. Too much stress is, of course, not to be laid on these titles; they are metaphors which should not be literally interpreted; they nevertheless represent real offices of Christ which no other terms can so fitly signify, and are therefore not to be set aside.

the whole New Testament'. The Epistle to the Hebrews having been designed to exhibit the superiority of Christianity to Judaism by a comparison of the two economies, there was special pertinency in its designation of Christ as the High Priest; but another and broader design of the whole New Testament being to exhibit Jesus Christ as one who saves men by transacting for them in things pertaining to God, which is the essential idea of a priest, the idea of his priesthood necessarily underlies the whole structure of New Testament thought. In fact the whole circle of biblical ideas revolves around the central conception of one who, as the Son of God and the Son of Man, should appear on earth to transact for men with God, and who by his offices, particularly in that of suffering, even unto death, should prove himself to be the Saviour of the race. It was in recognition of the sacrificial sufferings of Christ as the crowning thought in the whole structure of prophetic ideas, that John the Baptist, who up to his time was at once the profoundest and most authoritative interpreter of Old Testament teaching, entitled Christ, at the very outset of his Messianic career, as the Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world. It was in recognition of the same thought, that Christ declared himself to have come into the world that he might "give his life a ransom for many;" and, when all had been finished, represented his sufferings, death and resurrection as fulfilling the Scriptures, and procuring remission of sins for the race, Luke, 24: 44-47; and that all the Apostles, both in their preaching as recorded in the Acts and in their Epistles as addressed to the churches, set forth Jesus Christ the crucified and risen, as the One by whom we are reconciled to God, are recreated in heart, and made heirs of eternal life. The whole New Testament, in short, was written for the simple purpose of exhibiting, in one form and another, the great truth, that Jesus Christ, by his priestly offices in our behalf, particularly by the offer-

1. Christ was not born a priest, but was a "High Priest after the order of Melchizedek;" that is, he was a kingly priest who had no lineal predecessor or successor.

ing of himself as a sacrifice for the race on the Cross, has become an Omnipotent Saviour to every one that will trust in him.

Of the KINGSHIP of Christ there is abundant testimony in the Scriptures. The glory of his kingdom is the theme of exultant praise with prophets, psalmists and apostles alike ; it is to be a kingdom without limit of extent, duration or of magnificence. But of the nature of his kingly office and of his kingdom it will remain for us to speak more fully and precisely, when we come to treat of the constitution and government of the Christian Church. It is in the Church that Christ preëminently reigns, and it is through the instrumentality of the Church that his empire is to become universal, and its glory to be specially manifest.

§ 42—*The Atonement.*

The priestly office of Christ has been exercised in making what in modern theological terminology, especially in that of the English language, is called the Atonement for sin. The word atonement has been used with great latitude of meaning ; to denote what the schoolmen meant by satisfaction and what the Scriptures mean by propitiation and reconciliation ; a two-sided word, representing, in respect to God, the expiation of guilt, and, in respect to man, his at-one-ment with God. This last named is its meaning in the single instance in which it occurs in our common English version of the New Testament ; Ro. 5 : 11. The term, therefore, when employed in designation of Christ's priestly office, must manifestly be understood to include, like his priesthood, all that he accomplished for us in his life as well as all that he procured for us by his death. The atonement of Christ was his whole objective work on earth, securing in those that believe in him their subjective renewal, and so their final salvation.

Nothing is more plainly or more emphatically taught in the Scriptures than that Jesus Christ died on the cross to procure for man his salvation from sin and its consequences. The saving efficacy of the death of Christ is the one idea that gives organic unity to the various writings which compose our New Testament Scriptures; and it is the appropriation of this idea in his individual life which makes a man to be distinctively a Christian. But as respects the method by which the death of Christ avails for our salvation, great diversity of views has existed even among those who are entirely agreed as to the fact. These views have taken definite form in what are known as theories of the atonement. No full and intelligent discussion of the doctrine of the atonement is now possible without an understanding of the origin and the nature of these theories. Any attempt to formulate a doctrine of the relation of Christ's death to man's salvation necessarily involves a theory of method. The oldest Church doctrine of satisfaction, claimed by its advocates to be exclusively orthodox, is preëminently theoretic; whatever the modifications to which it may have been subjected since its origin with Anselm in the eleventh century, it is still as purely a theory as any that has ever been propounded in its stead.

All existing theories of the atonement are reducible to three general classes. The old Patristic theory, that the death of Christ was a ransom paid to the devil, is now extinct, and here need be referred to only as a theory which, in a history of doctrines, cannot be classified with any now existing. It conceived of the human race as in bondage to the devil, and, though unjustly enslaved, as not to be rescued without a fair equivalent in the way of ransom. The misconception was natural to an age in which captives taken in war were uniformly enslaved, and were released only on payment of a ransom. God would not, even in the rescue of his own children, do violence to the supposed rights, however unjustly acquired, of their captor and owner. It is useless to deny that the Church Fathers held this theory; and something worse than useless to attempt, however hou-

estly, by a forced interpretation of the figurative language of Scripture which they use, to impute to them the satisfaction theory of Anselm. But, dropping the Patristic theory as a thing of the past, all existing theories of the atonement may be arranged under one or the other of the three following classes: The Satisfaction (substitutionary) or Anselmic theory; the Moral Influence, or Socinian theory; the Governmental (rectoral) or Grotian theory. It will be necessary to examine these theories somewhat carefully, and they may be taken in the chronological order in which they originated and are here enumerated.

I. THE SATISFACTION OR ANSELMIC THEORY.

This originated in an attempt—the first then made—to give a philosophical and systematic explanation of the relation of Christ's sufferings and death to the salvation of men. It conceives Christ to have suffered literally in our stead, and as our substitute to have made satisfaction or expiation for sin unto God. The theory was originated by Anselm, in the eleventh century¹, and under various modifications, has very generally, by Protestants, been regarded as the orthodox theory. The Anselmic form of it, reduced to modern modes of statement, would be somewhat as follows. The infinite justice of God, which is identical with God himself, required that sin should be punished; sin had robbed God of his honor; man as a sinner had contracted a debt to God which no being, unless equal in dignity to God himself, could ever repay; the God-man, Jesus Christ, by his two-fold nature was competent to pay for man to God a full satisfaction; himself sinless, by his voluntary sufferings, even unto death in the stead of sinners, he expiated, or made a sufficient atonement for, their sins; by thus making full satisfaction, he vindicated the character of God as both just and merciful in the remission of sins. The chief points of the theory are, that absolute justice required either the eternal punishment

1. Anselm began the writing of his *Cur Deus Homo*, in which this theory was elaborated, in England, but completed it in Italy, during his first exile, in the summer of 1098. A translation of this tractate may be found in vols. 11 and 12, or in the numbers for Oct. '54 and Jan. '55, of the *Bib. Sacra*.

of man or some adequate compensation for their release ; and that an infinitely holy Being, who was duly related to both God and man, and was at the same time free from all obligations on his own account, volunteered to put himself in the place of men, and make in their stead a full satisfaction for their sins¹.

The Anselmic theory was rejected by Abelard², for grounding the atonement in justice instead of benevolence, and for taking insufficient account of the power of Christ's sufferings and death in procuring a subjective change in man ; criticised by Bonaventure³ and Aquinas⁴, for making the necessity of the death of Christ to be absolute rather than relative ; opposed by Duus Scotus⁵, as limiting the sovereign power of God by grounding the necessity of the atonement in the immutable necessity of the Divine justice ; and was finally modified by its scholastic defenders to accord with their notions of an efficacy in the mass, and particularly in the good works of the redeemed. Protestantism restored to the Anselmic theory its conception of an exclusive sufficiency in the objective work of Christ, and, by acceptance of the Augustinian doctrine of predestination and prevenient, irresistible grace, provided for the subjective reconciliation of man through the renewing of the Holy Ghost and the active

1. That Anselm regarded the death of Christ as a vicarious punishment, as the Protestant holders of his theory have done, there is no good reason for believing ; on the contrary it seems evident that he regarded it as a voluntary sacrifice in compensation for which the guilty were released and justified. See *Cur Deus Homo*, lib. 2, cap. 18, 19.—also, Bellarmine, *De Christo*, 4, 8.—Neander, *Hist. Chr. Dogmas*, Bohn, vol. 2, p. 517, understands Anselm to teach "the necessity of a satisfactio vicaria activa;" and says. "we do not find in his writings the doctrine of a satisfactio passiva ; he nowhere says that Christ had endured the punishment of men;" comp. *Ch. Hist.*, v. 4, p. 500.—Baur, *Chr. Lehre von d. Versöhnung*, p. 156, ff.—Dr. Shedd, *Hist. Christian Doctrine*, 2, 282, thinks these authors have misunderstood Anselm.

2. See Neander, *Hist. of Dogmas* 2, 518, 519, Bohn.—Peter Lombard, (died, 1164,) in his *Liber Sententiarum*, 3, 19, ignores Anselm's view and restores the old Patristic theory of a compensation to the Devil,—a notion which, among theologians, seems to have ended with Lombard.

3. *Senten.*, lib. 3, dis. 20.

4. *Summa*, pars 3, ques. 46-49.

5. *In Senten. Pete. Lomb.*, 3. 19. 20.

principle of faith. Romanism, true to the later scholastic teaching, still continues to encumber the atonement with notions of efficacy in the mass and good works as procuring causes of redemption; while Protestantism, starting with the theory of Anselm, has been subdivided into the supporters, either of a theory which is essentially Anselmic; or of a theory founded on principles advanced by Abelard, (the moral influence theory); or of another, the fundamental principles of which were first defended by Duns Scotus, (the governmental theory).

As respects the nature and mode of the substitution and satisfaction of Christ, the Protestant holders of the Anselmic theory have not always been agreed. They have been unanimous in accepting the Augustinian doctrines of predestination and grace, but have divided on the questions whether the full and identical penalty due the redeemed was actually transferred to Christ; or whether Christ was made by imputation to endure such penal sufferings as were equivalent, in degree and merit, to what were actually deserved by the redeemed. Those who answered the first of these questions in the affirmative, holding rigidly to Anselm's view of sin as a debt, regarded the atonement as a strictly commercial transaction, in which Christ discharged the identical obligations of the redeemed; those taking the other side, insisted that Christ made a judicial or forensic satisfaction to the justice and law of God, by rendering an equivalent for all that justice and law would have required of the saved. The commercial view is, in our day, almost wholly abandoned; the forensic is still maintained with vigor and confidence.

The special form of the forensic theory which now claims to be exclusively orthodox, and with which in this country we are specially concerned¹, builds on the Coccejan theory of covenants, and affirms that Christ, by an agreement with the Father, took, in his death, the place of the redeemed, and in their stead suffered a punishment which, from the

1. See *Princeton Essays*; Hodge's *Essays and Systematic Theology*; Hodge's *Outlines*, &c.—Comp. Symington, *On the Atonement*.—Witsius, Turretine, Dick.

infinite dignity of his person, was fully equal to the deserts of their infinite guilt. The wrath of God towards sin was transferred to his Son from the persons of those for whom the Son died; and human guilt was thereby expiated and Divine justice satisfied. The death of Christ, according to this explanation, is supposed to avail for so many only as were included in the covenant¹.

But this literal forensic view of substitutionary satisfaction is justly open to several grave objections.

(a.) It gives a literal meaning to the words covenant, sacrifice, propitiation, atonement, and redemption, terms which, as applied to the redemptive work of Christ, are manifestly metaphors, though metaphors laden with the most weighty of meanings; meanings, also, which carry us beneath the machinery of government to the moral natures of Him who rules and of them who are ruled. But to give to these

1. Dr. Shedd, (see his *Discourses and Essays*, "The Doctrine of the Atonement,") quietly ignoring the notion of Covenants, revives what he understands to be the pure Anselmic theory, buttressing those points, however, the weakness of which has been exposed in various controversies. His fundamental positions are, that the justice of God and the human conscience implacably demand the punishment of sin; that Divine law and justice, and the human conscience, are absolutely unyielding, but that the Divine attribute of mercy can be exercised or not, as God wills; that God is his own propitiator—"the substitute is the punisher himself."—*Discourses and Essays*, 280. He assures us that, "so far as the guilt of an act,—in other words, its obligation to punishment,—is concerned, if the transgressor or his *accepted* substitute, has endured the infliction that is set over against it, the law is satisfied, and the obligation to punishment is discharged,"—p. 307. It seems to occur to him that this mode of reasoning involves a contradiction of his fundamental postulate of immutable justice, and so, in a foot note on the phrase "accepted substitute," he tells us that "the primal source of law has no power to abolish penalty any more than to abolish law, but it has full power to *substitute* penalty." What this "primal source," which he calls "it," may be, is not quite so apparent as is desirable in such an argument. It is not very clear what "power" an abstraction can have to change the sanction of an immutable law. The truth is, that any explanation, or defence, which can be given of a literal forensic substitution, necessarily involves in the end a contradiction of the idea of absolute justice upon which the whole theory rests; and Dr. Shedd's conception of an absolute justice in God which his voluntary mercy could satisfy or not, shuts us up to the alternative, either of a one-sided nature in God, or of an atonement which is stripped of every vestige of grace. An atonement made necessary to balance the character of God, could not be a gratuity to men.

metaphors a literal meaning, is to reduce the free moral government of God to a mere scheme of legal fictions—an empty mechanism of technical terms.

(*b.*) The method of a literal, formal, juridical transfer of moral penalty from the guilty to the innocent, is absolutely inconceivable. Moral penalty consists of mental and moral suffering, and to suppose that such suffering could either be voluntarily taken by one person from another, or be in any way actually handed over from the consciously guilty to the consciously innocent, is to suppose that which contradicts the very idea of penalty. The possibility of mental anguish as penal, is conceivable only as the correlative of some kind of consciousness of ill-desert.

(*c.*) The idea of a formal, juridical transfer of the penalty of sin to Christ, contradicts our innate sense of justice. The conviction is universal, immediate and ineradicable, that all wrong doing should be punished; the demands of this conviction are not satisfied by a theory of literal, objective, personal substitution of the innocent for the guilty, and can be fully satisfied only when penalty is so inflicted upon the guilty, in conjunction with his Deliverer, as that, by its infliction, he shall be rescued from his sin; but it is not satisfied in the unqualified escape of the guilty.

(*d.*) This theory contradicts the established order of moral sequence everywhere traceable in society and in personal character. According to that order, the penal consequences of violated law, moral, mental and physical, are invariable and inevitable; and the only method by which these consequences may be escaped, is in that remedial or redemptive process through which the effects of a law violated are overcome and finally eradicated by the beneficent working of a new law observed.

(*e.*) This theory is self-contradictory. It first insists that the punishment of sin, or, since sin has no existence aside from a personal being, the punishment of the sinner, is made absolutely necessary by the immutable justice of God; and then it maintains that, through an eternal, decretive purpose, this immutable justice of God is satisfied by a transfer of penalty from the guilty to an adequate representative

and an accepted substitute ; that is, immutable justice is so far mutable as to admit of a commutation both of persons and punishments.

(*f.*) This theory, by its abandonment of the strictly commercial view,—the conception of an exact *quid pro quo* in the sufferings of Christ, and by its admission that his sufferings are merely equivalent to the actual penalties deserved by the saved, forsakes the only ground on which it can rest. Its fundamental postulate is that of the immutability of the Divine justice ; the substitution of any other postulate, especially that of an equivalency of sufferings, is fatal to the theory itself¹.

But that we are saved through the sufferings and death of Christ as our representative and personal substitute before God, there seems to be the clearest evidence, both in the Scriptures and in Christian experience. As a more satisfactory explanation, however, of the method and nature of his substitution than is afforded in the theory of Anselm, we prefer that which is suggested by the simple facts of the Scriptures. According to these facts, our Lord in assuming human nature became subject to its laws, limitations, exposures and penal liabilities². Having taken our nature for the express purpose of interposing in our behalf, of becoming the representative of the human race before God, he actually suffered the woes which have come, or, without his interposing help, must come, on every one of the race. He bore these as the true penal sufferings for sin. They were not transferred by literal imputation, from the race, or from any individual of the race, to him, but as one of the race, as its interposing and recognized representative, he bore them, and in bearing triumphed over them. And to every one who has fellowship with him as a sufferer for sin, and faith in him as a personal Saviour from its power, it is divinely given to share in his triumphs.

Between a holy God and a sinful race there is a mutual

1. A recent author, of considerable learning and ability, Prof. Geo. Smeaton of New College, Edinburgh, has sought to defend, by critical exegesis, this form of the Anselmic theory, in two vols., entitled *The Atonement as taught by Christ*. 1868, and *The Atonement as taught by the Apostles*, 1870.

2. See p. 216, ff.

and ceaseless antagonism. The result of this antagonism is to man, through the action of his conscience and the effects upon his moral nature, the painful and inevitable penalty of his rebellion. Jesus Christ, having taken our nature, stepped between us and God as our representative and High Priest, bearing in his own person that Divine displeasure which goes forth upon the race with which he had allied himself. Identifying himself with the race, he took upon himself the penal burdens under which the race was suffering. He had assumed human nature for the very purpose of its rescue, and by virtue of his two-fold relation to the holy God and the sinful race, he could bear, and in bearing could exhaust, the full penalty of guilt under which human nature was struggling. As the well beloved Son of God, his communion with God was complete and uninterrupted; as the Son of Man his union and sympathy with mankind, whom he sought to save, was equally complete and continued. As infinite in his Divine nature and attributes, and at the same time as shut in by the circumscribed conditions of the guilty race whose nature he had assumed, he could at once consciously bear, in their fulness, our penal woes, and so bear as to exhaust and survive them. Unaided man, perverted in his moral affections, sinks helplessly and hopelessly under the ever accumulating weight of his sins and their consequences; our Lord, by his Divine will, could not only hold his human nature steadily to the fulfillment of every duty, even to the minutest, but could also endure and survive all that that nature had brought on the race. By his resurrection from the dead he gave fullest assurance to the Universe, that the whole penalty of sin had been exhaustively paid, and paid for every one who should believe on him.

It should be borne in mind, however, that we need not understand the sufferings of our Lord to have been identical with those which every, or in fact any, individual saved by him would have endured. There is doubtless an element in the penal suffering of every individual transgressor, which can be borne by no other than the transgressor himself. Indeed it is not possible to conceive how a consciousness of personal guilt, or the feeling of remorse, can coexist with conscious personal innocence. The dis

tinctive penalty, therefore, which our Lord bore, must have been that, and that only, which lies upon the nature he had taken and the race with which he had united himself. Having taken that nature, he was compelled either to hold it firmly to the fulfillment of its offices, and to redeem it by bearing its penalties, or be borne by it hopelessly downward into irretrievable ruin. As one of mankind, Christ, if he would save the human nature he had assumed, must have suffered what he did, whether all the race or none of the race were to be saved by him.

- A sense of personal guilt, however, for voluntary acts is an essential element in the penalty of sin; and though this sense of guilt is a personal possession which cannot be conceived of, either as being literally transferred, or as being voluntarily assumed by one for another, yet there is a clearly intelligible sense in which it may be said to have been imputed to Christ, and Christ may be said to have borne it. Thus, when a sinful man, burdened with a sense of ill-desert, finds himself consciously and peacefully trusting in Christ as his Saviour, so complete is the extinction of his feeling of remorse, that Christ may justly be said to have borne it in his stead. When the believer is enabled so to appropriate to himself the sacrifice of Christ, that he may be said to have eaten Christ's flesh and to have drunk Christ's blood, then is his sense of guilt so overborne and extinguished, by a new and more powerful consciousness of release from the dominion of sin and of reconciliation with God, that Christ may be said with propriety and emphasis to have borne all his punishment and to have expiated all his guilt.

It is by some regarded as not inconceivable that our Lord may have been conscious of personal ill-desert. F. W. Krummacher, even while holding to a rigid theory of forensic, objective imputation of guilt, maintained that our Lord "took the consciousness of our guilt upon him in another and more intimate manner than that of a mere objective representation". And when we remember how imma-

1. See his *Suffering Saviour*, p. 120, trans. Boston ed.—comp. Luther, *On Galatians*, ch. 3.—Tobias Crisp's *Christ alone Exalted*, Gill's 6 ed., Sermons, 17-22.

ment and universal in the race is the feeling of guilt before God, it is not wholly impossible that, in partaking of our nature, the Saviour may have also been made a partaker of this common feeling. But how this feeling could have been awakened by the juristic imputation of sin, and made to consist with a consciousness of perfect sinlessness, is beyond the power of human comprehension or conception.

Should it be said that, it is inconceivable how a personally innocent being like Christ could at all suffer spiritual anguish or moral penalty for sin, or how God could forsake his Son in the hour of extreme need, the most we can say is that, as a matter of fact stated in the Scriptures, Christ did suffer indescribable anguish, and that God did not interpose for his rescue. That his sufferings were on account of any personal sins of his own, is an impossible supposition; that they were produced by any objective, positive personal infliction, must be regarded as wholly unsupported and inconceivable; that they were unreal and only enacted for effect, is absolutely inadmissible; our only alternative is to regard them as the most awful and mysterious experiences of mental anguish ever witnessed on this earth. It was anguish that, gathering strength throughout the life time of the "Man of Sorrows," seems in its final outburst to have terminated his earthly existence¹. Anguish thus overwhelming and fatal to such a Being, could have sprung only from the nature he had assumed and the task of its redemption which he had undertaken. To redeem, and by redeeming to purify and thus rescue the nature, he must bear its penalties; and to bear its penalties, he must, in isolation and utter loneliness, without an angel to strengthen or God to comfort him, penetrate and pass through the gloom of spiritual death. And the spiritual death which he endured was, excepting the absence of remorse, the spiritual death of all lost men.

We need not tarry here to inquire into the grounds of this inexorable necessity for the penal sufferings of him

1. See Stroud, *The Death of Christ*, pt. 1, c. 4. The author's belief is, that the death of Christ was produced by a literal bursting of the heart from extreme anguish.

who was to be the Saviour of men. This will constitute a distinct topic of inquiry when we shall have first determined by adequate evidence, both the fact and the nature of the atonement itself. Of one thing, however, we may be certain, and that is, that no analogical argument of any avail against the necessity of penal suffering in the Saviour of men, can be drawn from what is proper in man to what may be supposed to be fitting in God. With man the forgiveness of a personal injury is a first duty. Man's convictions and perceptions of justice and its relation to ill-desert, though instinctive and ineradicable, are yet so subject to distortion from prejudice and the spirit of vindictiveness, that non-forgiveness of personal wrong is personally fatal to the heart that cherishes it. We are accordingly forbidden, in our individual capacity, even to judge, not to say punish, one another. But with God, justice is his infinite holiness in its relations to the moral characters of his creatures ; all his judgments are right, and his requirements established in infinite rectitude.

Neither need we be perplexed by the inquiry, how on any conception of substitution, especially of that here given, there can be scope for the exercise of the Divine mercy, or how sins can be said to be forgiven and salvation to be by grace. With the conception of a literal, formal substitution, it must be admitted that the ideas of forgiveness and grace are not strictly in harmony. For if Christ really paid our debts and bore our actual, personal penalties, then we have a right to what he has procured for us ; grace and mercy are relevant terms only as pertaining to what Christ has wrought for us in his own person ; salvation is bestowed on individual believers as a simple act of justice. But if, on the other hand, Christ by his obedience and sufferings has so fulfilled all the moral law, and borne all the penalties to which the race are liable, that every individual trusting in him shall find all his own personal obligations fulfilled, all his personal sins and their consequences taken away, and himself put upon a career that shall bring him into a full participation in the triumphant exaltation of his Saviour

and Lord, then is there abundant reason for speaking of the grace and mercy of God in the salvation of every one. The triune Godhead busy themselves in the reclamation of a man from the dominion of moral evil; and the change that is wrought first announces itself in consciousness by that sense of release or of forgiveness which always accompanies the breaking up and overthrow of any hated habit of soul; and which is itself both a foretaste and a pledge of the divinely communicated power of an endless life. Here then we have the abounding grace of God in Christ, first reclaiming a man from his sins, by imparting to him an abhorrence of moral evil and the feeling of deliverance from its hated dominion, and thus of forgiveness on account of it; and then starting him on that career of Christian living, which, through the exhaustless resources of Divine grace, shall gradually erase from his character the penal traces of his former estate, and thus carry him endlessly onward and upward.

That the foregoing explanation of the redemptive work of Christ is the true one, must be inferred alike from the plain teaching of the Scriptures and from all those principles of moral law, divine government, and human virtue, which it would seem that all believers in the Divine authority of the Christian Religion should accept as true and fundamental.

1. This explanation accords more fully than any other with the facts of Christ's life, sufferings and death as recorded in the New Testament. The facts were, that he came into the world for the purpose of human redemption; that in pursuit of his purpose he lived a spotless life, which was finally terminated after a most mysterious and awful mental agony. This agony could not have been on account of anything himself had done; it is impossible to conceive it as having been externally inflicted; our only alternative is to regard it as having had its origin in the nature he had taken, and in the burden of woes he had assumed in becoming man¹.

1. For various attempted explanations of the cause of Christ's agony, see Prof. Smeaton's *Doctrine of the Atonement as taught by Christ*, p. 116. ff.

2. This explanation agrees with what we have seen to be our necessarily fundamental conception of God as a Holy Being¹; and grounds the actions of God as ruler of men in the immutable purity of his nature and its inexorable requirements, rather than in a policy formed in view of ends to be secured by his government.

3. The view above taken of the expiatory work of Christ, regards the Justice of God as simply the necessary relation of his holiness to the actions of men—the out-coming of his holiness towards men as holy or sinful²; it recognizes no distinctions in kinds of justice, but insists that, in the nature of the case, justice must ever be the simple rendering to each one of his real deserts. A sinful person or a sinful race is, by the nature of sin and its penalties, separated from the holy God,—indeed the very essence of the penalty of sin is in the consciousness of this separation; Christ took the nature and the penal liabilities of our race, and in bearing the penalties he was consciously separated from, or forsaken of, God.

4. This view rests on just and defensible conceptions of Moral Law and Divine Government³. It conceives moral law to be, not the creation of absolute will, but a revelation of the constituent principles of moral being,—of the unvarying sequences of relations and acts; it regards the Divine government as a formal, objective recognition and proclamation of subjective, organic laws; it accounts the public enactments of moral law as only and partially representative, and by no means exhaustive, of the laws of moral being or of its relations; and it finds the final cause of legal sanctions, not in their reformatory uses, but in the very nature of human happiness, which can exist only in a complete observance of the laws of the moral nature which the sanctions represent.

5. The view of Christ's redemptive work here advocated, contemplates Sin, as not so much a violation of published statute as of inherent law of the moral nature; and its penalty, as an inevitable sequent attaching necessarily and

1. See pp. 77, 78. 2. pp. 80, 81. 3. p. 186, ff.

by transmission to the nature itself which it corrupts,—a nature which Christ assumed and whose penalty he encountered, endured, and exhausted ; it looks upon sin as deservedly punishable for what it is in itself, and not merely on account of its mischievous consequences. Christ took on him a nature in which sin had left its traces ; in that nature he transacted with God, both for the nature itself and for the race which it represented ; by these very acts of interposition he necessarily assumed the penal woes of the race, of which he had become one and for which he transacted.

6. This view harmonizes fully with the Christian idea of Virtue¹. According to that idea, virtue consists in supreme love of the infinitely holy One—of God as the infinitely best Being ; the ground of moral obligation lies in the infinitely holy nature of God. He, by the eternal necessities of his own nature as God, and as the archetypal Father of the race, being the source of all law, authority and justice ; and virtue is obligatory, not because it promotes our happiness and welfare, but because the requirements of the infinite holiness of God, in its relation to his creatures, are as unchangeable as God himself ; virtue being right and obligatory, not because it promotes our happiness, but promoting our happiness because it is right. According to the view of Christ's expiatory work which is here advocated, his death was in obedience to a supreme regard for the infinitely holy God which hesitated at no conceivable degree of self-sacrifice ; his sufferings and death were the product of that antagonism which exists between the infinitely holy God and his unholy creatures ; and the one all-inclusive aim of Christ, both in his teachings and example, is to impart to his disciples a purity of heart and a personal righteousness without which they can have neither peace with God nor happiness in themselves.

7. The vicariousness of the sufferings of Christ as herein explained, is supported by the Propositions employed in many passages of the Scriptures which speak of his atoning

1. pp. 187-192.

work for man. In not a few of these passages, it may be freely admitted that the chief, and in some instances the exclusive, reference is to the subjective effect of Christ's redeeming work in the heart of believers, while in others, it is equally clear from the connection that the chief and primary reference is to that objective, voluntary substitution of himself as a sufferer, through which our subjective redemption has become possible. Thus in a very large class of texts, like Ro., 5: 6, 8. 8: 32. Eph., 5: 2. 1 Thess., 5: 10. Tit., 2: 14. 1 John, 3: 16. 1 Pet., 2: 21. comp. 3: 18, in which Christ is said to have done, or to have suffered, what he did, "for us," *ὑπέρ ἡμῶν*, the preposition *ὑπέρ* may undoubtedly be rendered "in behalf of," and the idea conveyed be rather that of the final object of his death than of the method by which it avails for our salvation. The same may be true of the preposition *περί* in Gal., 1: 4, and of both *ὑπέρ* and *περί* in 1 Pet., 3: 18. But in Gal., 3: 13, where Christ is said to have been "made a curse for us," even *ὑπέρ* seems to convey the idea that the curse was in consequence of his standing in our place as our representative: and in 1 Tim., 2: 6, where it is said, Christ "gave himself a ransom for all," *ἀντίλυτρον*, coming in connection with *ὑπέρ* seems necessarily to impart to it something of the idea of substitution. And that this is the correct interpretation, seems almost certain when we hear our Lord, Matt., 20: 28, say of himself, that he "came to give his life a ransom for many," the true meaning of *ἀντί πολλῶν* undoubtedly being "instead of many;" that is, to as many as will avail themselves of Christ as a Saviour, his death will be found to have been instead of their own. Compare, on the meaning of *ἀντί*, Luke, 11: 11. 1 Cor., 11: 15¹.

8. The relation which the New Testament writers everywhere recognize as subsisting between the Jewish sacrifices and the death of Christ, plainly require us to regard the latter as vicarious. Many of the Jewish sacrifices were unquestionably expiatory and vicarious, in the sense that the offerers of them, placing their hands on the heads of the

1. See Winer's *Grammar of the New Testament*, ch. 5, §§ 47-52.

victims, presented them in sacrifice to God as substitutes for the penalties which they themselves deserved¹, Lev., 1 : 4. 4 : 1-13. 7 : 7. 16 : 5, 9, 10, 21, 22. 23 : 27, 28. Ex., ch. 12. Deut., 16 : 5, 6. comp. 9 : 13, 22. But sacrifices atoned, in the sense of satisfying the penalties of sin, for those only who had complied with the required imposition of hands on the victims they offered ; and even then, the penalties removed were only such as pertained to external life, and never to the inner life of the soul. What Jewish sacrifices, continually repeated, thus accomplished ceremonially and externally for the Jew, the sacrifice of Christ, offered once for all, accomplishes actually and within the heart for the Christian. The first was merely a type of the second, Heb., 9 : 9, 26. 10 : 1, 4. 1 Cor., 5 : 7. Eph., 5 : 2. Gal., 3 : 23, 24. Heb., 10 : 5, 7, 12.

9. A belief in the vicariousness of Christ's death, as here explained, is apparently supported by many of the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament. That the Prophets saw a suffering Messiah, seems evident from Pss., 16, 22, 40, from Is., chh. 42, 49, and Dan., 9 : 24-26 ; that the design, as well as the time of the sufferings, engaged the attention of the prophets, is evident from 1 Pet., 1 : 10, 11 ; and that they regarded the sufferings as vicarious, would seem to be plainly taught in the fifty-third of Isaiah. That such is the New Testament explanation of the significancy of Christ's death, is evident from the words of John the Baptist, last and greatest of the prophets, John, 1 : 29, and of Christ himself, Matt., 20 : 28. Luke, 24 : 44-47, as well as of his Apostles, Acts, 10 : 43. 26 : 22, 23.

10. If the significancy of Christ's sufferings and death was not in their being vicarious for all those whose faith brings them into saving fellowship with him, then it is impossible to understand the remarkable prominence every-

1. See Jahn, *Bib. Archaeology*, § 378. It is of the very idea of a sacrifice that the victim shall be presented directly to God and in the presentation shall be destroyed. See *ibid.*, § 373.—Magee, *On Atonement and Sacrifice*, specially illus. and explanatory diss. No. 38.—Kurtz, *Sacrificial Worship of the Old Testament*, specially bk. 2, pt. 1.—Tholuck, *das Alte Test. im N. Test.*—"Opfercultus des A. T." in Herzög's *Realencyclopädie*.

where given by the Apostles to the cross of Christ, that significant symbol of all his sufferings, and to our faith in him as the One who has died for us, that *sine qua non* in the salvation of every one. No one can read the addresses of the Apostles in the Acts, or their Epistles to the churches, without observing how invariably they refer to the cross of Christ as the procuring cause of the salvation we derive from him. But if Christ saves us by his example of self-sacrifice, as the holders of the moral influence theory affirm, or by assuring us of the Divine mercy in which we are to trust, as the governmentalists assert, then why the incessant reference to the cross? Why was so much prominence given to that single event in the career of Christ which was so specially offensive to both Jew and Greek? Why was not the watchword in the preaching of the Apostles, either the example of Christ, or the mercy of God? Or if Christ be a literal covenanted substitute for the elect only, then why the stress which is laid on faith, without which salvation is possible for no one? The truth seems to be, that without the interposition of a suffering and triumphant Redeemer, to whom we come as our only, but all-sufficient, Helper, there is no release from the dominion of sin, (no purging of the conscience from deadly works, Heb., 9: 14,) and no transforming power in the heart by which it may attain to deliverance ("remission of sins") from the habits and penalties of evil.

11. The vicarious nature of Christ's sufferings, seems to be clearly implied in the figurative language employed in the descriptions of his work for man. Thus he is called a lamb, a ransom, a redeemer, a propitiator, a sacrifice, a reconciler, a deliverer, &c. The underlying conception in all these metaphors, is that of a Mediator who has interposed in our behalf, by putting himself in our place. Of the metaphors themselves, there are two principal classes; the one borrowed from the transaction of buying off a captive or slave; the other, from the offices of a friend who seeks to reconcile two alienated parties by making reparation for the offender. Many of the passages in which the metaphors occur, may, doubtless, be satisfactorily explained as refer-

ring to the subjective influence of Christ's work in the heart of the believer; but this is not an exhaustive explanation of all. Important and prominent in the Scriptures as is the idea of subjective redemption, it is always coupled more or less closely with the idea of an objective ransom. Indeed the subjective redemption is effected solely through the inward assurance of, and experimental acquaintance with, the objective interposing Ransomer who places himself between us and the objective wrath of God, Eph., 1: 7. 1 Tim., 2: 6. Heb., 9: 12. 13: 12. 1 Pet., 1: 18, 19. Christ is also entitled our passover, 1 Cor., 5: 7,—he is the slain lamb by whose blood we are sheltered from the sword of the avenger; that is to say, Christ, by his life and death, becomes, to every one who in loving sympathy and faith obeys him, not only a Deliverer from the dominion of sin now, but from its penalties hereafter forever.

Thus Christ is a Saviour to all who will be saved by him; and a Saviour, not by any formal imputation of our sins to him, or of his righteousness to us, but solely through that control which he exercises over us whenever we come to understand him as the One who has borne all our woes, and so borne them as both to make full satisfaction to God and to impart to all, who will lovingly trust in him, an everlasting salvation.

II. THE MORAL INFLUENCE OR SOCINIAN THEORY.

This theory may be called Socinian, not because there are no traces of its existence in the mediæval period, or in the earlier Protestant literature, but because Socinus' first reduced it to a formula and attempted a logical defence of it. In mediæval times, it existed rather as a sentiment in devotional writings than as a dogma in theology, and formed a part of the pantheistico-mystical ideas of God which were then not uncommon. It regarded salvation as consisting in a union of man with God—it dwelt more on the attractive power of Christ than on the redemptive efficacy of his death.

1. *Prælectiones Theologicae*, 16-29.—*Bibliotheca Frat. Polono.*, vol. 1, pp. 506-600.—See also a collection of tractates in a volume entitled *The Atonement*, published by the Amer. Unitarian Association.

In the first days of Protestantism, nothing was more natural in the general revolt against the authority of Church dogmas than a disposition to reduce the whole doctrine of the atonement to a simple subjective process. But the doctrine of redemption by an expiatory sacrifice was too deeply rooted for the disposition to prevail.

Socinus held that in the salvation of man, nothing more is needed than to win him from the dominion of moral evil to the love and practice of righteousness; that the work to be wrought by Christ was the reconciliation of man to God; that God needed no other propitiation than the repentance of man, and that to bring man to repentance and piety nothing more is needed than the moral teachings and the spotless character of Jesus of Nazareth. Christ died, not as a sacrifice for sin and a propitiation to God in expiation of human guilt, but as a martyr to the truth. Christ now saves men solely by the persuasive power of his truth and his example. God is a sovereign who can enforce or remit the penalties of his laws as he wills; but the dominant principle of his moral nature is benevolence, by which his will is always controlled.

This general theory, slightly modified to bring it into harmony with the Divinity of Christ, is in reality embodied in that conception of the redemptive work of Christ, which supposes it to have consisted in the origination of a new species of religious life in the earth,—in the awakenment of a distinct consciousness of the presence and power of God in the individual soul and among men. As thus modified it is not inappropriately termed the Life Theory. The modification originated with Schleiermacher¹; variously phrased, it has been held by many of his disciples², as well as

1. His theory is explained in *Der Christliche Glaube*, &c., 2, §§ 125-129, or aug. 2. 103, ff. 139, ff.

2. Both Nitzsch and Neander, however, make special recognition of an expiatory office in the death of Christ; the former in his *Christliche Lehre*, § 135, emphasising expiation, (*ἱλασμός*, 1 John, 2: 2,) as the counterpart of reconciliation, (*καταλλαγὴ*); the latter, in his *Planting and Training*, pp. 412-418, giving prominence to the Scripture idea of an objective, punitive wrath of God towards moral evil, which must be borne and removed before there can be a reconciliation between God and man.

by others who have differed widely from his general views; and to persons who are devout in spirit but rationalistic in understanding, has been specially welcome as enabling them to retain their faith in a Divine Redeemer, even when they had lost their faith in the inspired authority of the records of his life.

Here also should be classed all those explanations of Christ's atoning work as consisting in an exhibition of the self-sacrificing condescension of God, and as being effective in winning man to righteousness through appeal to his sympathies and by awakening within him the love of gratitude to his Deliverer. Such are the explanations of the atonement made by Maurice¹, F. W. Robertson² and others of the Broad Church party in England³; by John Young⁴ of Scotland; and by Dr. Bushnell⁵ of this country. They suppose the incarnation, sufferings and death of Christ to be effective in rescuing from moral evil, solely by means of the moral power which they exert over the minds and hearts of men.

Now, it will be seen at a glance, that the three schools of thought above classified as holding the Moral Influence Theory, while differing in their accounts of the practical appropriation of Christ's work for men, are agreed in the re-

1. *Doctrines of Sacrifice, and Theological Essays*: essay 7.

2. *Sermons*.

3. Extremists of the party, repudiate the doctrine of the atonement as founded in a perversion of Jewish phraseology, and as unauthorized by the teaching of Christ. As a sample, see Jowett, *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians and Romans*, vol. 2, p. 547. On Atonement and Satisfaction.

4. *The Life and Light of Men, An Essay*: by John Young; London and New York, 1866. The author's view may be summed up in the three statements: spiritual laws are immutable; the attribute of mercy is superior to that of justice in God; and sin is destroyed in the heart by the self-sacrificing love of God in Christ. The principles of the book involve the doctrine of the final restoration of the wicked,—a conclusion to which the author is said to have subsequently come.

5. *The Vicarious Sacrifice, grounded in principles of universal obligation*. The author in his Introduction, p. 32, calls his, "the moral-power view." Its fundamental principle is, the self-sacrificing love of God. Justice, law and penalty are very flexible in this author's hands. Dr. Bushnell is heartily endorsed by James Freeman Clarke in his, *Orthodoxy: its truths and errors*, ch. 10, § 13.

jection of the thought of expiation. With Socinus, Christ saves by the power of his truth and example ; with Schleiermacher, by a divine life transmitted through the Church ; with Robertson, Bushnell and Young, by the persuasive influence of self-sacrificing love ; but with all alike, it is the moral influence alone of Christianity and Christ that saves us, and not an expiatory sacrifice to God in the death of Christ on the cross.

But in respect to this theory it must be observed,

1. That the change to be wrought by Christ is evidently, as the theory claims, in man and not in God. The appearance of Christ on earth was of itself proof of the earnest desire of God to bestow salvation on man. It is possible also to exhaust the meaning of a large proportion of the Scripture representations of Christ's work for men, by restricting their application to the subjective process of recreating the moral affections ; but to rest a theory on this class of representations alone, is to build on one half of the biblical truth ; is to overlook all that large class of Scripture passages which dwell on the relation of Christ's life and death to the moral law and the moral nature of God. Gal. 3 : 13 ; 1 Pet. 2 : 24 ; Ro. 3 : 25, 5 : 9 ; Eph. 5 : 2 ; Heb. 9 : 14. Of that side of the work of Christ which these passages set forth, the moral influence theory can give no satisfactory account.

2. The fundamental postulate upon which this theory rests, viz : that the mercy or the benevolence of God is more central in his nature, and more determinate in his action, than his justice, can be defended only by assuming that justice, law and penalty, are strictly decretive ; for if controlled by his benevolence they must be creations of his will. But law, as we have seen, is not a creation—it is a revelation of constituent principle ; and justice is not something purposed—it is the natural and unvarying product of the holiness of God coming into relation to other beings.

3. This theory fails of a due recognition of that deep-seated, universal and innate sense of ill-desert, which in all times and everywhere has prompted men to aim at some

kind of expiation of their guilt. For this sense of guilt and its requirements, the moral influence theory makes no adequate provision, either in Christ or in those whom Christ saves. Supposing Christ's redemptive work to consist merely in winning man to the practice of righteousness, it takes no account of penalty, either as the sanction of law, as the reaction of the Divine holiness against sin, or as the upbraiding of the individual conscience.

4. The theory, fully stated, is self-contradictory. It rejects expiation as not only a heathenish idea which is unworthy of God, but as something which it is impossible that one being should render for another. It insists that every one must, in the strictest sense of the words, receive for himself from God, according to his own deeds; and yet that God is ready to grant forgiveness of sins to every one on condition of repentance. It first insists on the inevitability of moral sequences in the conduct of every moral agent; and then insists that, on a given condition, the penal sequences of transgression may be arrested by almighty fiat. A similar contradiction shows itself historically between the rigid legalism of the earlier Unitarians of both England and this country, and the laxer notions which have prevailed among their descendants in later years. The self-contradiction of the theory as manifest in the Unitarian handling of it, is none the less apparent in the form into which it has been manipulated by its later advocates; in any mode of stating it, law and penalty are unwieldy factors; no office can be ascribed to the sufferings and death of Christ at all commensurate with the importance which is everywhere ascribed to them in the New Testament.

5. This theory can make no adequate provision for the repentance which itself prescribes as the indispensable condition of forgiveness. Repentance certainly is not the product of the immediate volition of the repentant; the spotless example of Christ repels rather than attracts an evil-minded man; impersonating law, it speaks nothing but condemnation to every one not already in harmony with it. It may awaken the conviction of ill-desert, which is only one, and

the lesser, element of repentance ; but the new mind, which is the other and distinctive element of repentance, it is not within the power of a mere example to produce. Each individual must recognise in Christ his personal Saviour from moral death, or the love of gratitude, that transforming principle which brings us into sympathy with Christ, and thus gives to his example a moulding power over our hearts, will never be awakened. But Christ, believed in as one who has died in our stead, becomes to us thereby a loved example and a sympathising friend, into whose likeness we are progressively transformed.

6. This theory, finally, reverses the Scriptural relation of the Divine forgiveness and an amended life. According to that relation, forgiveness is on Christ's account and not on account of any amendment of ours ; our amendment is, as before stated, the product of the new relations into which we are brought, and of that loving trust which has been set at work within us. In technical theological phraseology, justification, in the Scriptures, always precedes sanctification, and never the reverse. 1 Cor. 6 : 20 ; Eph. 2 : 10 ; Titus 2 : 14 ; Heb. 9 : 14 ; 1 Pet. 1 : 18-20. There is no form in which the moral influence theory can be put that does not reverse this Scriptural relation¹.

III. THE GOVERNMENTAL OR GROTIAN THEORY.

This was propounded in professed opposition to that of Socinus, but in fact mediated between the Anselmic and the Socinian theories. The Socinian originated, and has con-

1. Dr. John McLeod Campbell, (recently deceased,) in his book entitled, *The Nature of the Atonement and its Relation to Remission of Sins and Eternal Life*, and for which he was expelled from the Scotch Established Church, repudiates the idea of "penal suffering" and makes the atonement to have consisted in Christ's "expiatory confession" to God of the sin of man, whose nature he had taken and whose brother he had become, pp. 146, 147. "The necessity of the atonement was moral and spiritual," pp. 186-7. His, is essentially the moral influence theory, though he avows "much more sympathy" with the Anselmic theory "than with the teaching that makes rectoral justice or public justice the foundation of its reasoning. For of this I feel quite certain, that no awakened sinner, into whose spirit the terrors of the Lord have entered, ever thinks of rectoral justice, but of absolute justice, and of absolute justice only," p. 144.

tinued its existence, solely in reaction against the rigid satisfaction theory of Anselm. Grotius, professing to defend the orthodox or Anselmic theory against Socinus¹, so far changed its legitimate grounds of defence as to originate a new and middle theory.

As stated by Grotius, this theory started with the fundamental conception of God as a Sovereign Ruler²; as Sovereign, he could enforce, or, if for good and sufficient reasons he chose, he could relax the penalties of his laws³; but the stability of his government, and the welfare of the governed required that his laws, if violated, should be vindicated and some kind of penalties inflicted, though not necessarily inflicted on the transgressors themselves⁴; as Sovereign Ruler, he has the right, in view of a sufficient penal example, to acquit and forgive the guilty⁵. Grotius regarded the sufferings of Christ, not as a real satisfaction, or as an exact equivalent for the sins of the redeemed, but as an accepted or a practical equivalent, on account of which penalty could be safely remitted⁶. The theory, as modified by other Arminians, laid stress on the death of Christ as a sacrifice to God⁷. Grotius had made the effect of Christ's death to be, not retroactive and towards God, but prospective and towards the Divine government and the governed; they regarded the death as a sacrifice which God accepted in the place of the penalty of the saved. With the exception of the idea of sacrifice, however, the theory known as the Arminian was essentially the Grotian. The Arminian modification has perpetuated itself among Wesleyan advocates of the theory.

1. The title of his book was *Defensio Fidei Catholica de Satisfactione Christi, adversus Faustum Socinum*.

2. *Defensio*, cap. 2.—3. *Ibid*, cap. 3-4.—4. *Ibid*, cap. 4-6.—5. *Ibid*, cap. 7, 8.

6. According to Grotius, the death of Christ was not an expiatory sacrifice to God, but a penal example, in view of which there could safely be a *relaxatio seu dispensatio legis*. Anselm had defined justice as *non aliud quam ipse Deus*, (*Cur Deus Homo*, lib. 1, cap. 13); Socinus had said that justice is *non qualitas Dei, sed effectum tantum voluntas ipsius*; Grotius evaded the question of justice, by conceiving God as only a Ruler whose positive laws can be relaxed and their penalties remitted in consideration of a satisfactory equivalent.

7. Limborch, *Theologia Chr.*, lib. 3, cap. 22, § 1.

This theory, as revived and re-stated in this country by the younger Jonathan Edwards¹, a little less than a century ago, turned on various distinctions in justice, and maintained that the death of Christ made satisfaction to demands of general or public justice, but not to the distributive justice of God. The Edwardean exposition of the theory, with slight and varying modifications of it by different authors, has determined its distinctively American type². Its fundamental conception of God is that of an infinitely benevolent Being, whose creation and government of the world was determined by the highest welfare of his creatures. Law was enacted and its penalties enforced, only because required by the welfare of man: all penalties would be remitted if the best interests of man would permit. The sufferings of Christ were merely a governmental expedient for securing the greatest amount of happiness; the need of the atonement was in the necessities of the government, and the necessities of the government were determined by the highest happiness of the governed.

There is no one sect by whom the theory is exclusively held or by whose name it can be designated. Its advocates are found among all existing denominations; many holding it, not as distinguishable from any other theory, but simply because, through popular literature and the preaching of our time, they have become familiar with the general conception of it; while others, again, have been led to adopt

1. *The Necessity of Atonement and the Consistency between that and Free Grace in Forgiveness*. Three Sermons. *Works*, vol. 2.

2. The rise of "the Edwardean theory," and its progress in the hands of various authors till about the close of the first quarter of the present century, may be found in a volume entitled, *The Atonement, Discourses and Treatises by Edwards, Smalley, Macey, Emmons, Griffin, Burge, and Weeks, with an Introductory Essay by Prof. Edwards A. Parks*. The theory has been advocated by Prof. Finney, in his *Systematic Theology*; by Dr. Taylor, of New Haven, in his *Moral Government of God*; and by Drs. Beman and Barnes in special treatises.

Among English advocates of the theory, in its American form, may be mentioned Andrew Fuller, in various parts of his *Works*; J. Pye Smith, *Four Discourses on the Sacrifice*, &c.; Geo. Payne, *Theo. Lectures*; T. W. Jenkyn, *On the Extent of the Atonement*; Ralph Wardlaw, *Discourses on the Nat. and Extent of the Atonement*.

it, because on the one hand it seemed to embody some of the best features of the moral influence theory, and at the same time on the other to reject some of the more objectionable features of the theory of satisfaction.

But the governmental theory, in any form yet given to it, is open to many and grave objections. It more than any other rests on certain assumed principles, both ethical and theological, and, by virtue of its ethical principles, more than any other affects the type of the piety of its holders. The grounds of objection to it are found alike in its fundamental principles and in its practical effects.

1. It is erroneous in its fundamental conceptions of God. (*a.*) It merges the attributes of God as a Being and as the Father of the race in his duties and functions as a Ruler; subordinating his convictions and nature as God to his policy as Governor of the Universe. (*b.*) Like the Socinian theory, it makes the ground principle in the nature of God to be his benevolence rather than his infinite purity or holiness. But both Scripture and conscience, as we have seen, make holiness to be that fundamental principle. God has provided an atonement, not so much because he seeks the happiness of men, as that, being in himself infinitely pure in nature, he seeks the reconciliation of men to himself by imparting to them a corresponding purity, and thereby the only possible condition of happiness.

2. It rests on false views of justice. (*a.*) It arbitrarily distinguishes between kinds of justice, as if diversity of objects to which justice is applied, necessitated a difference of kind in the principle itself; as if public justice did not, as well as justice distributive, demand a rigid rendering to each one according to his just deserts; as if justice could ever be otherwise than exact right!. (*b.*) It makes the justice of God to be the mere requirement of his wisdom and benevolence, rather than a revelation of his infinite purity or holi-

1. Even J. McLeod Campbell, with his moral influence theory, affirms: "Rectoral justice so presupposes absolute justice, and so throws the mind back on that absolute justice, that the idea of an atonement that will satisfy the one, though it might not the other, is a delusion."—*The Nature of the Atonement*, p. 81.

ness in its relation to the moral conduct and character of his creatures; punishment being regarded as a politic chastisement for state purposes, rather than as a necessary "reaction of the Divine holiness" against sin.

3. This theory involves erroneous views of sin. (*a.*) It regards sin merely as a violation of statute or published law, and its penalty as an objective infliction, which it is elective with God to impose or withhold as his wisdom or benevolence shall dictate; whereas sin and its penalty are, by the very laws of moral being, related to each other as invariable and necessary antecedent and consequent. (*b.*) It subtracts from the heinousness of sin, conceiving it to be odious to God and requiring the sufferings of Christ, not because in itself hateful and punishable, but because of its injuriousness to the Divine government and consequently to the welfare of the governed. But the Bible and the human conscience everywhere represent sin as something that in itself is loathsome and abominable, and therefore damnable. It is punishable because abhorrent to God and to all right-minded beings, and not simply because it is contrary to the Divine government and the public welfare.

4. This theory rests on ungrounded views of Law and Divine government. (*a.*) It conceives of Law as an objective rule of action which God has prescribed in view of certain ends to be obtained or avoided,—a rule which he can suspend or enforce as his wisdom or benevolence shall dictate¹; whereas Law is simply a revelation of immutable reality, each special requirement being a verbal statement of the constituent principles of the being of God and man and of the inevitable relations of the one to the other. As a necessary consequence of this misconception of law, arises, (*b.*) an unwarrantable distinction which this theory makes between God and his government, or since government is only another name for law, between God and his law². The government or law of God, is, as we have seen, only a repre-

1. *Lex non est aliquid internum in Deo, aut ipsa Dei voluntas, sed voluntatis quidam effectus. At voluntatis divinæ effectus mutabiles esse certissimum est.* Grotius, *Defensio*, 2d ed., 1617, p. 52.

2. See pp. 190-193.

sentation of invisible but actual and immutable verities or realities. Whatever, therefore, honors the law honors God, and whatever dishonors one dishonors the other. Whatever was the effect of Christ's death on the one, was the effect of Christ's death on the other. And as the law of God can no more change than God himself, so we must admit, if the penalty of the law was borne by Christ, then has the wrath of God himself been also borne by him; and if Christ has made atonement to the law or government of God, he must also have made atonement to God himself. (c.) The theory erroneously implies that the published enactments of God—his objective government—are exhaustively representative of Divine law. It is true, as the theory maintains, that the death of Christ honors legal penalty¹, and in so far as it does this, may be regarded as in support of the Divine government, Ro., 7: 6. 8: 3, 4. 10: 4. Gal., 3: 13. 4: 5. But there is also a displeasure of God, in other words there are laws of God, underlying these enactments and farther reaching than their published sanctions, Ro., 2: 4, 5, 8, 9. 3: 5, and of which the published enactments and sanctions are but expressions that are necessarily imperfect, because falling far short both in degree and number of the realities they represent, Heb., 10: 28-31. The theory is thus false by deficiency in one of its radical principles. (d.) The theory also conceives the design of legal sanctions, and the end for which the Divine government is maintained and administered, to be strictly reformatory,—a conception totally inconsistent with any just ideas of the nature and design of law; destructive of the significancy and solemnity of penalty; and fatal to all true virtue. "To conceive of punishment as merely reform-

1. Beman, in his *Christ the Only Sacrifice; or the Atonement in its relations to God and Man*, maintains that Christ's sufferings were not penal, but substituted for the penalty, which, in the forgiveness of sin, is not abolished, but only suspended. Barnes, in his treatise, *The Atonement in its relations to Law and Moral Government*, while perpetually denying that Christ suffered the literal penalty due to sinners, and affirming that his sufferings were substituted for their penalty, leaves us in the dark as to what the sufferings of Christ really were, or how they accomplish their design. The theory in his hands is rigidly forensic, without the basis of immutable justice to rest on.

mental theory, moreover, the notion of an infinite guilt in finite acts is absurd, unless the government to be vindicated is itself infinite.

7. If the sufferings and death of Christ were merely for governmental ends, it is difficult if not impossible to see how the Socinian charge of cruelty and injustice on the part of God can be repelled. It is assumed by governmentalists that there was nothing in the Divine Being inconsistent with the unconditional forgiveness of sin. The sole obstacle was in public justice; in the requirements of government and in the general welfare of the governed. An exhibition of God's wrath towards sin was necessary in order to make it safe for him to exercise his clemency in forgiving it. It is not pretended that a due exhibition of the Divine wrath is not made in the punishment of guilty men; but the sufferings of the Son of God, it is claimed, were a fitter example of his wrath than could have been presented by any degree of suffering in any number of finite sufferers; that is, the only reason for the unspeakable agony of Christ was its fitness to an end, which, according to the theory itself, God had both the power and right to accomplish without the suffering of any one, or which he could, at least, have accomplished with the same kind, though not with precisely the same degree, of fitness by the sufferings of actually guilty men.

8. If to the last named objection, it be replied that the necessity of Christ's death was not grounded in the immutable nature of God, nor in the conscience of man, but in the need of a fitting spectacle to move the hearts of men to penitence, then the governmental theory is thereby transformed into the theory of moral influence, without the power which that theory supposes for moving the heart; the agony of the garden and the cross, are resolved into a mere species of scenic representation, suited to affect the hearts of beholders—a supposition which at once robs Christ and his sufferings of all power to accomplish the very ends for which it is claimed that he and his sufferings have been presented to men. It is unnecessary to dwell on the type of religion which such a theory must inevitably produce,

or on the stress which it lays on emotions and agencies in the propagation of Christianity.

9. This theory is objectionable, as requiring different counsel to be given to an inquirer after the way of life from that which the New Testament gives. The Apostolic direction to the inquirer is, to believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and to believe on him, *i. e.* heartily to trust in him, as one on whom the believers' iniquities have been laid; as one who, in his own body, has borne our sins, and by whose stripes every one who will trust in him may be healed. But the holders of this theory, to be consistent, must, as many of them do, point the inquirer to Christ, not as to a personal Redeemer, but as to one who by his sufferings has made it consistent for God to exercise his compassion in listening to the supplications, and in forgiving the sins, of the penitent. Whoever will be saved, is to trust in the mercy of God for his salvation, though he is to recognize his indebtedness to Christ for assurance of mercy: advice which, to say the least of it, does not savor of the gospel as preached by Christ and his Apostles.

10. The governmental theory manifestly rests on the uncertain foundation of other mere theories of justice, law, government and virtue, and not on the broad basis of Scripture and the answering facts of Christian consciousness and Christian experience'. Its biblical argument is only an attempt to show that the Scriptures will admit of the interpretation it puts upon them. It bears in itself the unmistakable traces of human ingenuity, and of a careful study of human governments and of the speculative principles of ethical philosophy; but it is at the widest remove from the free method of that infinite Life which everywhere breathes through the New Testament, and from the conformity to fact and reality which everywhere shews itself in the teaching of the Apostles.

1. The most noticeable features of all the treatises on this theory, from that in which it was first elaborated down to the latest in its support, are the extreme care with which the theories of law, justice, and virtue, on which it necessarily rests, are stated and defended, and the unsatisfactoriness of the arguments from the Scriptures.

§ 43—*Necessity of the Atonement.*

The possibility of release from the power and penalty of sin, by the atoning sufferings and death of a Saviour, is pre-eminently a doctrine of Divine revelation. Without the demonstrable fact of such release, we could know nothing of its possibility; and without the express assurance of revelation, little, if anything, of its necessity. But now that both the fact and the necessity of an atonement by Christ have been revealed, various considerations combine to make its necessity specially apparent. The various senses in which it was necessary¹ may be specified as follows:

1. It was necessary as a fulfillment of those prophecies and types relating to the death of Christ, which so greatly abounded in the Old Testament Scriptures. Thus the New Testament declares, in the most positive terms, a necessity that Christ should die in fulfillment of what had been foretold of him, Matt., 26: 54. Mark, 8: 31. Luke, 24: 7, 26, 44. John, 3: 14. Compare the language of our Lord in the garden, Matt., 26: 39; also, Heb., 8: 3. 9: 22, 23. The words *δεῖ* and *ἀνάγκη*, used in these passages, express, as unequivocally as any Greek words can, an inexorable necessity. But this, after all, was only a necessity which had been intelligently and purposely induced. Behind all was a profounder and farther-reaching necessity, which, through the Holy Spirit, controlled both Moses in his institution of the ritual and the Prophets in their utterances. Thus,

2. A necessity of the atonement is found in its complete fitness as means to the ends it accomplishes. These ends are, to honor God by enforcing moral law and its penalties,

1. It will be remembered that the chief objections to the Anselmic theory by mediæval critics, turned on its postulate of an absolute necessity of the atonement founded in the inexorable demands of absolute justice,—see p. 258, and Baur, *Die Chr. Lehre von d. versöhnung*. pp. 189-269.—Shedd, *Hist. of Chr. Doct.*, bk. 5, ch. 2.—Oxenham, *The Catholic Doct. of the Atonement*, ch. 4. The same question respecting absolute and relative necessity underlies all modern controversies about the atonement. On the different kinds of necessity, see Fleming's *Vocabulary of Philosophy*.

and to save men by securing their personal righteousness. Christ by his life and death fulfilled the law, obeying it both in the letter and in the spirit, as well as enduring its utmost penalty ; and he secures a corresponding obedience to law on the part of those who are saved by their trust in him. In proportion to its fitness as means to ends was there a necessity for the atoning work of Christ. But the necessity of fitness to ends, points to another and a higher necessity,

3. In the Government of God. There can be no government without law, and no law without penalty ; and a remission of penalty by fiat, or a universal pardon, would not only be fatal to any government, but inconsistent with any fundamental and just conception of law. If the Divine government is to exist, its laws must be enforced ; the exactly just penalties of its laws must be allowed to take their course. It is the imperfection of human governments that their clumsy laws can deal only with overt and clearly detected acts, and that the penalties of their laws can be adjusted with only proximate, and often with painfully deficient, degrees of accuracy to actual deserts ; but in the infinitely perfect government of God, moral laws carry with them their own inevitable sanctions, which God never arbitrarily arrests either by fiat or by force. There is a necessity, therefore, in the Divine government, that penalty should fall either on guilty man alone, or on some Deliverer competent to interpose effectually in his behalf.

4. The death of Christ in atonement for sin, was made necessary by having been included in the original plan of the creation. The fall of man and the consequent sinfulness of the race, were as distinct to the Divine mind before man's creation, as they have ever been since. Man, therefore, must either have been knowingly created of God to a destiny of sin and hopeless ruin, or the mediatorial and atoning death of Christ must have stood from eternity in the Divine mind, as a central thought and an essential provision in the eternal purpose of the creation itself. Hence the Apostolic

1. Lord Bacon, in his "Confession of Faith," says—"neither angel, man,
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declarations of an election of the redeemed "before the world was," Eph., 1: 4. 1 Pet., 1: 20. Rev., 13: 8. What was thus an integral part of an eternal purpose, must have occurred by an inevitable necessity.

5. The necessity of the atoning death of Christ, may also be inferred from the fact of its occurrence. Both the government of God and the original scheme of the creation, which that government protects and fosters, must have been founded in infinite right. But the death of Christ was an integral part of that scheme, and so itself was grounded in infinite right. And whatever is infinitely right in the Divine mind, is infinitely imperative. The reason of God is infinitely perfect, and, as such, whatever proceeds from it must be regarded as proceeding from infinite necessity. But as both the government and the immutable purposes of God can be adequately explained only by reference to his eternal nature, so,

6. A final ground for the necessity of the death and the atonement of Christ can be found only in the immutable nature of God. In his nature we find alike the origin of the original moral nature of man and of all moral law, as well as of all moral sanctions. The whole scheme of the creation itself, including its final cause, together with the laws and methods by which that cause is to be realised, are simply the revelations of the eternal nature of God. Whether as Creator or as Father and Ruler of his creatures, he is infinitely holy; and his infinite holiness in its relation to man is infinite rectitude or justice, and carries by its own natural action, to every rational being, strictly according to his deserts. God as holy, necessarily repels all sinners from his presence, and by the very act of repulsion punishes them. Whoever, therefore, should assume our nature and take his place among us as one of our race, and take it

nor world, could stand, or can stand, one moment in God's eyes without beholding the same in the face of a Mediator; and therefore, that before him, with whom all things are present, the Lamb of God was slain before all worlds; without which eternal counsel of his, it was impossible for him to have descended to any work of creation." "Theological Essays," *Works*, Montague's ed., Pha., vol. 2, p. 407.

for the express purpose of redeeming us from sin and reconciling us to God, would be under the inexorable necessity of so confronting the Divine repulsion as to remove it or he could not achieve our redemption. Nor does it avail to attempt to distinguish between the justice and the mercy of God. The nature of God is not divided against itself. Justice and mercy are not separable principles in the Divine Being, though for convenience sake they may, in the limitations of our thought, be spoken of as separate; but whatever honors the one, necessarily honors the other. God is always justly merciful and mercifully just. The all-inclusive necessity of the atonement is in the infinite perfections of the Divine nature¹.

§ 44—*Requisites in the Atonement.*

If the death of Christ was an actual and necessary atonement for sin, the question still recurs, What do the Scriptures teach to have been requisite in Him who would undertake, as our Representative and Redeemer, to transact for us with God: and particularly in Him who is to become "the Power of God and the Wisdom of God" to all those who are to be personally saved by him. It is evident that,

1. He must sustain, both in nature and office, a two-fold relationship; being at once the God-Man in his person and the communicator between God and man in his office. The notion that an infinite guilt attaches to the sin of man because it is committed against an infinite Being, and that therefore only a Being of infinite dignity and worth can atone for it, is one of those traditional absurdities

1. Every attempt to find an ultimate basis of necessity for an atonement short of the immutable nature of God, leaves unanswered the question, why a plan of the creation should have been adopted in which that necessity was involved? and no answer can be given which does not, by direct and inevitable steps, bring us to the eternal nature of him whose immutable counsels are what they are because his eternal nature is what it is.

that may be allowed to drop without argument¹; but if Christ Jesus our Lord is to treat with the two parties, God and man, who are concerned in the work of an atonement, then must he be capable of sympathy with both, and consequently be a partaker of the natures of both.

2. Our mediating High Priest must also prove himself competent and fit for his office; must endure the trials and temptations to which the race, for whom he acted, are exposed, coming forth from them unstained and triumphant; and must be subject to that perfect law of God of which he was himself the only complete expounder in words, and the only absolutely perfect example in life. A test of his own faultless obedience, both in vanquishing temptations and in the fulfillment of all practical duties, were alike requisite to make him a faultless, and so an inexhaustible, pattern for all men everywhere, and to prove that the sufferings he endured were not the penal consequences of his own wrong doing. Had he suffered for his own malefactions, and had any suspicion of personal guiltiness attached to him, in vain had he invited men to come to him as a Saviour. It is just because of the assurance we have that his sufferings and death were the penalties of the nature he had assumed, and of the race with which he had identified himself, and not of anything himself had done, that he becomes the Author of eternal life to all who will humbly and lovingly receive it from him, Heb., 5: 8, 9. 7: 26-28.

3. The representation and mediation must be voluntary on the part of the sufferer who makes an atonement. Compulsory assumption of our nature and its penalties, would have been gross injustice; and an assumption volunteered under a sudden gush of generous emotion, might have resulted not only in injustice but in utter failure and disaster. But we know that Christ contemplated from eternity

1. The notion that the qualities of a finite act can be infinite—that its qualities are derived from the person towards whom the act is directed rather than from the motives that prompt it, needs no refutation. The notion itself, one of the bastard thoughts of mediæval metaphysical theology, has maintained its position in respectable society solely by the service it has been regarded as capable of rendering.

what he undertook ; from the first step of his boundless descent in taking our nature, to the end of his great agony, all was voluntarily, patiently, and steadfastly endured on our account, Ps., 40 : 6-8. John, 10 : 17-18. Phil., 2 : 6, 7. John, 12 : 27, 28. 18 : 4, 5. Comp. Tit., 2 : 14.

4. Our Redeemer must harmonize, both in his person and plans, with the Divine counsels and methods ; and he must do no violence to the laws of the mental and moral nature of man. To deliver man from the penal consequences of sin, be these consequences the positive inflictions of Divine wrath, or the merely natural effects of transgression, it was necessary that the Saviour should be at once wholly acceptable to God and fully acquainted with man. The salvation of man by an atoning sacrifice was, as we have already seen, an integral part of the original scheme of the creation. Thus Christ transacted for God as well as for man ; and to succeed in his offices, he must be in his person and plans approved of God, as well as able to act for mankind. The approval of God was both audibly certified from heaven, and visibly set forth in miracles ; his competency to act for the race may be gathered from what he has actually accomplished for it.

5. He who is to make an atonement for sin, which shall at the same time be an at-one-ment of man with God, must give proof of his ability to bear our penalty, and, in bearing, to survive it. Without proof of this he never could secure to himself that trust on the part of his disciples, which transforms them into the likeness of their Lord. The proof was given in his resurrection from the dead. Without his resurrection, it would not have been known whether he had conquered sin and death, or had himself been overwhelmed ; without it, he never could have become that objective ground of trust, from which alone he could exert a subjective and transforming power in the heart. He, therefore, " who was delivered for our offences, was raised again for our justification," Ro., 4 : 25,—was " declared " to be the Divinely appointed Deliverer, Ro., 1 : 4. Acts, 13 : 33, and capable of fulfilling the promises he had given.

6. It was requisite that man's Redeemer should honor God and his law, as much as if the full penalty of transgression had rested on the redeemed themselves. It was necessary that God should be "just," as well as "the justifier of him who believeth in Jesus," Ro., 3: 26. Justice in God could no more be arbitrarily relaxed than the essential being of God could be changed. It was, accordingly, necessary not only that Christ should honor God and his moral law by a life of spotless purity, but also that, by virtue of the union of his people with himself, he should enable them to bear, and so to bear as that, through the saving faith and the expulsive power of the new affections he awakens in them, they should survive and escape from, the penal consequences of their sins.

7. The substitution which takes place in the intervention of Christ for the salvation of men, must be of such a nature as to secure an actual personal righteousness on the part of the redeemed; in other words, the substitute must himself be security for the good conduct of those whose place he takes. The moral sentiment of all men would cry out against any scheme which should absolve men from the obligations of moral law, or of personal responsibility to God. In fact, that would be but half a redemption, if indeed a redemption at all, which should propose to deliver man only from a present sense of ill-desert and the penalties of past offences, and make no provision against the resumed control of his evil affections. But Jesus Christ has provided for every necessity. Having put himself in our place and died that we might live,—having purchased us with his own blood, he by his gracious Spirit enables us to eat his flesh and drink his blood and thereby to be partakers of the life everlasting. He implants within us, and by his never ending mercies, and the indwelling Spirit, keeps alive, the love of gratitude, that purest, most abiding and most transforming of the principles that can rule in the heart. Setting that principle into active exercise, he binds to himself, by ties stronger than the love of life, "a peculiar people zealous of good works," whose personal character he is

ever moulding into growing resemblance to his own. And with this requisite in mind, it is noteworthy how manifold are the provisions in Christianity for supplying it. No page of the New Testament is wanting in warnings and safeguards against moral evil, or in motives and stimulating thoughts towards moral good.

§ 45—*Extent of the Atonement.*

Our view of this will depend necessarily on our conception of the atonement itself. If Christ was appointed as substitute to pay simply the debts of the elect, bearing strictly and literally their penalties, then his sufferings and death could avail only, and only by rigid expiation avail, for the sins of the elect¹. Or if Christ was the covenanted substitute to bear a punishment which, though not strictly identical with that due to the elect, was yet equivalent to it, then we may conclude the atonement made by Christ to have been *sufficient* for all men, but *efficient* for those only who were predestinated to receive of its benefits². Or if Christ's death was simply for governmental ends, then its sufficiency as a means, which is all that can here be meant, may be regarded as unlimited ; but its availability must be

1. Bucanus, *Institutiones*, locus 23, ques. 22, says "although Christ might have been a sufficient price for the sins of all men, yet he died actually and effectually for the sins of his own elect only." See also quotations from Van Til and Wendelius in Ebrard's *Dogmatik*, § 48 and vol. 2, p. 284. Wendelius is quoted as saying, *Christus non pro omnibus et singulis hominibus, sed pro solis electis divinæ justitiæ satisficit.*

2. This view, held by the vast majority of Calvinist authors, differs from the preceding by its conception of a divinely purposed limitation of efficiency, as distinguished from a divinely purposed limitation of sufficiency. It supposes that the death of Christ, from the infinite dignity of his person, could have availed for the sins of all men, if it had so pleased God. Turretine assenting to this distinction says, (*Institutio*, locus 14, ques. 14, § 9,) that the death of Christ sufficientissimam fuisse ad redemptionem omnium et singulorum, si Deo visum fuisset illum ad totum mundum extendare. With Turretine agree Symington, *On the Atonement*, and Howard Malcom, *The Extent and Efficacy of the Atonement.*

conceived as depending, according to one's theory of the will, either upon the self-determined choice of the redeemed, or upon the sovereign elective purpose of God¹. Or if we suppose the whole object of Christ's life and death to have been the persuasion of men, by moral influence, to lives of piety and obedience to God, the idea of an atonement proper being abandoned, the question of its extent also necessarily ceases.

But if, setting aside all formal theories of the atonement, and recurring to the simple facts of the Gospels and the plain language of the New Testament, we find that the sufferings and death of our Lord were the natural and inevitable consequences of the nature he had assumed, and of the position he had taken, in becoming one of our race, and find, more than all, that he came into the world for the very purpose of suffering as he did, that thereby he might release from like mental sufferings all who would be saved by him, then the conclusion is inevitable that the sufferings were an actual atonement for sin, and that he made in his own person a real satisfaction to moral law and to God. What our Lord thus accomplished was just as much for the benefit of one as of another of the race. Its real availability for the personal salvation of any one, must depend on those agencies by which the heart is brought into relation to Christ himself. Its efficacy for all who choose to avail themselves of its benefits, is as universal as the race; the specific appropriation of its benefits in individual salvation, is as limited as is the action of the sovereign grace of God in the hearts of men. It is only by confounding atonement as the endurance of penalty (satisfaction to God) with atonement as reconciliation with God, that there can be any controversy whatever in respect to its extent. The best solution of the question is in careful definition.

1. Consistent advocates of the governmental theory, regard the atonement as unlimited both in efficiency and sufficiency, the limitation being only in the appropriation of its benefits, and the appropriation being determined either by free will, (Bushnell and Young, for example,) or by sovereign grace, (Edwards and Jenkyn.) Andrew Fuller advocates the governmental theory, but strangely enough attempts to combine with it the notion of a limitation of design in the death of Christ, *Works*, A. B. P. So. ed., p. 373, ff., 692, ff.

§ 46—*Justification.*

Thus far in the treatment of the work of human redemption, our attention has necessarily been confined to that part of it which was achieved by the sufferings of Christ. "Christ died for our sins;" but his death simply made possible for us a salvation which can become actual only through a subsequent process, one of the successive steps of which is known as justification.

This doctrine is the counterpart to that of the atonement; our views of that will necessarily determine our views of this. But all parties, whatever their diversities of view, are agreed in recognizing justification as attainable solely through faith in Christ; the chief point in dispute turns on the relation to Christ into which faith is supposed to bring the believer, and on what it is in that relation which constitutes the real ground of the believer's justification.

The word justification, it must be borne in mind, is a strictly forensic term, and carries along with it the associated ideas of law, condemnation, and acquittal. It had its origin in the Jewish conviction that the destiny of mankind was to be determined strictly by their compliance or non-compliance with the published law of God. It was in combating this conviction that the Apostle Paul, in his Epistles to the Romans and Galatians, elaborated the doctrine of justification, by setting forth faith in Christ crucified as the only, and the divinely appointed, method of salvation for all men. The doctrine conceives man to be amenable to law, and to have justly incurred its penalty from which Christ alone can procure his release and vindicate his right to be absolved.

Of the views of justification now generally prevalent, may be mentioned: first, that of the principal Protestant Confessions, and which regards the meritorious life and death of Christ as the sole ground on which God pronounces guilty men acquitted and justified; the righteousness of Christ is supposed to be transferred and accounted as the

personal righteousness of the saved; their salvation being given them on Christ's account exclusively, and in no respect on account of any thing that in themselves they have become or can do. This view makes a broad distinction between justification and sanctification; the former being regarded as the act of God conferring salvation, the latter as the act of God preparing for the salvation he has conferred¹.

A second view, and widely different from the first, is that which the Roman Catholic Church formally adopted at the Council of Trent, and which has since been often explained and defended by the writers of that Church. It repudiates the Protestant distinction between justification and sanctification, claiming that the two terms are only different names for one and the same thing²; and insists that the believer is, through the sacraments, brought into such relation to Christ as to become in himself personally righteous or sanctified, and to possess in himself, as well as in his good works, a meritorious ground for the bestowment of Divine blessings.—It was but a slight modification of the Roman view which the Anglican Tractarians maintained, when they affirmed that “good works done before justification, do dispose men to receive the grace of justification,” and that good works done after justification are rewarded of God, “according to their degrees of excellence³.” The lineal descendants of the Tractarians, the Ritualists of to-day, are in full accord with the Romish view.

1. *Confessio Augustana*, art. 8, in Hase's *Libri Symbolici*, p. 10.—*Apologia Confessionis*, Hase, p. 87.—*Formula Concordiæ*, 3; or Hase, p. 682, ff.—*Confess. Helvetica post.*, art. 15.—*Confess. Gall.*, art. 18.—*Westminster Confess.*, c. 11, § 1.—*The XXXIX Articles*, art. 11. Comp. Calvin, *Instit.*, 3; 11, 2.

2. See *Canones Concilii Trid.*, sess. 6, cap. 7.—Möhler, *Symbolism*, ch. 3. Catholic writers prior to the Reformation, as is well known, held distinctly to the office of good works in procuring justification with God. See Baur, *Chr. Lehre von d. Veröhnung*, pp. 350, 351.—Preuss, in his edition of Winer's *Comparative Darstellung des Lehrbegriffs*, says p. 93, Nach evangelische Lehre ist die Rechtfertigung ein *Akt* (u. zwar ein Akt Gottes), nach römischer ein prozess.—Die Rechtfertigung nach ev. Lehre est ein *richterlicher Akt*, nach römischer die Mittheilung oder Eingießung einer Substanz.

3. See *Tract No. 90*, § 3, or p. 16. Comp. the Appendix to Newman's *Lectures on Justification*, 2d ed.

Differing from both the preceding views, is that of the Unitarians, who maintain, according to their underlying conceptions of moral law, either, that every one is treated strictly according to his personal worth, being acquitted or condemned at the last just as he deserves ; or that, in the clemency of God, sin is forgiven and salvation bestowed wherever there is a disposition of heart warranting the exercise of the Divine mercy.

Differing from all the preceding views seems to be the plain teaching of the New Testament. According to that teaching, justification, so far as it is conceived of as a juridical act, rests beyond doubt, exclusively on the procuring efficacy of what Christ has wrought for us. In ourselves alone, every one of us is guilty and hopelessly condemned ; in Christ, through faith in him, sin is blotted out for us both as a power and a penalty. Thus it is Christ alone that saves us ; our justification is solely on his account ; metaphorically expressed, his righteousness is imputed to us, and through faith in him and in his sacrifice of himself for us, we are accounted righteous ; but the literal fact is, that our relation to him as a living personal Saviour imparts to us a new religious life and a personal righteousness, without which salvation is impossible, and which in reality are the constituents elements of the salvation itself. Christ alone has conquered sin ; and by bearing its penalty, death, and triumphing over it, has acquired the power of conferring a like victory upon all who, through loving trust in him as their personal Saviour, will receive it at his hands. Thus the Scriptural doctrine of justification will be found in its completeness to consist of three distinct but inseparable ideas :

(a.) Its ground idea is, that all men, in themselves considered, are justly under condemnation--are personally disposed to evil, and perpetually falling into acts of transgression ; in short that without supernatural help they are a lost race ; but that Christ Jesus by his interposition has furnished a common ground on which God can render the needed help to man, and man, through the divinely communicated power,

can help himself. In Christ, man finds himself pardoned—his sense of guilt removed ; and God gives him assurance of a full acquittal from all his offences.

(*b.*) And always associated in the Scriptures with the idea of acquittal is that of approval ; the forgiven sinner is taken into the Divine favor ; the acquitted offender is made a son and heir of God. Justification, in the Pauline conception of it, includes the bestowment of the highest conceivable blessings.

(*c.*) But forgiveness and promotion, to the morally unworthy, would prove, instead of blessings, the direst of curses. A third concomitant of justification, therefore, is the actual production of a personal fitness—not a self-justifying worthiness of character—but a personal suitableness, to be justified. The redemption which Christ has procured for us, takes effect in our personal justification only by the implanting of a germ of personal righteousness. Forensic justification, with Paul, includes that moral change by which the justified becomes personally just in Christ.

Now it is to be observed that the doctrine of justification, though made up of the three distinct thoughts above mentioned, may be comprehensively defined as God's merciful treatment of the ill-deserving ; but to be fully understood, it must be contemplated not only as God's act *for* man, but also as God's act *in* man. It must be viewed in its relation to God, or on the Divine side of it ; and none the less in its relation to man, or on the human side of it. Looked at exclusively on either side, we see but half the truth. With our eye fixed only on the objective work of Christ, our salvation becomes a purely juridical act, irrespective of the moral character of the saved ; confining our attention to the subjective change of the redeemed, no satisfactory explanation can be given of its connection with the penal sufferings of Christ. But with our minds on both the death of Christ, the objective procuring cause of our salvation, and the moral renewal or subjective effect of that cause in the hearts of the redeemed, we may comprehend the Pauline idea of justification. Viewed on the Divine side of it, it is

simply God's act of reckoning to us a righteousness which is not our own; considered as the act taking effect in us, in other words, as being an act in reality, it is the impartation to us of a vital principle, which, however feeble in its beginning, waxes, in due time, into an actual righteousness. Justification, in the comprehensive sense of the term as Paul uses it, is God's method of so dealing with men, through Jesus Christ, as to make them personally just.

But these two sides of the Scriptural doctrine of justification have not always been kept in mind. Those who have agreed in attaching great importance, and even a literal interpretation, to the forensic imagery, have not agreed in their estimate of the subjective change which it implies. Partisan theologians have persisted in fixing their eyes exclusively on one side or the other. Roman Catholics and Socinians, looking only at the human side, discover, as they think, a collateral ground for justification, in the meritorious works of the justified; and ultra Protestants, looking only at the Divine side, see nothing but the unconditional act of justification on Christ's account. The Catholic confounds the accompanying effect with the procuring cause; the unguarded Protestant honors the cause to the exclusion of the effect. The former identifies and confounds justification, which is an act, with sanctification, which is a process; the latter so distinguishes these as not only to make them chronologically separate but casually distinct. The truth is that actual justification never exists without actual regeneration. Evidences of the existence of the latter certify the existence of the former. Justification, as a method of salvation, always includes the impartation of a new divine life to the justified, Ro., 5: 18. 6: 17, 18.

That the explanation now given of justification accords with the Scriptural conception of it, may be seen from a brief examination of the words which the Scriptures employ in their account of it. These words are, in the Hebrew, the verb קָדַשׁ, and the noun קֳדָשׁ; in the Greek, the verb δικαίω, the nouns δικαίωσις, δικαίωμα, δικαιοσύνη, and the adjective δικαίος. Both the Hebrew words are used, some-

times in the sense of declaring or counting one to be righteous, and sometimes in the sense of making or causing one to be righteous. Thus the verb in Is., 5: 23, and the noun in Gen., 15: 6, are used in the first sense; and the same words in Is., 53: 11 and 54: 14, are used in the second sense.

In the New Testament, the Greek verb *δικαιῶ* is commonly, if not uniformly, employed to denote God's act for us rather than in us, and the noun *δικαίωσις*, which occurs but rarely, is always restricted to this meaning. But in the use of the words *δικαίωμα*, *δικαιος*, and *δικαιοσύνη*, there is no uniformity. Each and all are used, as the convenience of the writer may require, to express either a procured or an imparted righteousness. Thus in the use of *δικαίωμα*, the translators of our English Bible have recognized distinctions in meaning, translating it justification in Ro., 5: 16, and righteousness in Ro., 5: 18, and Rev., 19: 8. The adjective *δικαιος*, is employed to designate, sometimes those who are simply declared to be just, and sometimes those who are actually made in themselves righteous,—an instance of the first use occurring in Ro., 1: 17, and several instances of the second, in Matt., 13: 43. 25: 46. Ro., 2: 13. 5: 19. But the most important word is *δικαιοσύνη*, which in our English Bible is always translated "righteousness." The most cursory examination will suffice, however, to show that the righteousness spoken of, is sometimes that which is procured for us and presented to us in the person and offices of Christ, and sometimes that which, through our trust in Christ, becomes personally our own. Thus, it is in the first of these senses that the word is used by Paul in Ro., 4: 11, 13. 5: 17, 21. 2 Cor., 3: 9 Gal., 2: 21; and in the second, in Ro., 6: 16, 18. 8: 4. 1 Cor., 1: 30. Comp. Matt., 25: 46. Luke, 1: 75. James, 3: 18. The first meaning is very nearly synonymous with that of *δικαίωσις*, and indicates the righteousness made possible for us through faith in Christ; the second is very nearly synonymous with *ὁσιότης*, (see Luke, 1: 75. Eph., 4: 24,) and denotes the personal righteousness which it is the object of the Gospel

to secure in us. So also there are various passages in which both meanings are so plainly centered in the single word, as to make it quite possible to translate correctly either by "justification," or by "righteousness." As examples see Ro., 3: 21. 5: 17, 21. 10: 3. 2 Cor., 3: 9. Gal., 2: 21. 3: 21. 5: 5. In like manner in Ro., 1: 17, which announces the theme of the whole Epistle, the phrase *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, undoubtedly denotes both the righteousness which God requires of us and that which he has provided for us and desires to communicate to us through our Lord Jesus Christ. The Epistles to the Romans and the Galatians, which alone discuss the forensic idea of justification, were written expressly to prove that man by his own unaided efforts never could fulfill the Divine requirements,—never could attain to an actual personal righteousness; but that, in and through Jesus Christ, Divine law could be fulfilled, and an actual personal righteousness be acquired.

Now in the words thus employed in treating of justification, there is evidently the presentation of two sides of one idea. That idea is the salvation of condemned man; and its two sides are what is done for him by Christ, and what is wrought in him by the Holy Spirit; the first making his salvation possible, and the second making it actual. Of both these offices, God the Father is the originator, and Christ his Son the agent. The salvation is a pure gratuity; no one can save himself; Christ alone can save any one.

But to all this the popular method of Jewish thought was wholly opposed. To the Hebrew mind, the Mosaic economy was a finality, and salvation was possible only by compliance with the immutable statutes of God. To show the impossibility of being thus saved by law, and the necessity of being saved, if at all, by the grace that is in Christ, Paul wrote his epistles to the Romans¹ and the

1. It is of course not forgotten here that the question is still an open one, whether the Church at Rome was composed mainly of Jewish or of Gentile christians. Neander, (*Planting and Training*, p. 263, ff.) decided for Gentile predominance, and Tholuck, Philippi, (*Commentaries on the Romans*) and Hofmann, (*Schriftbeweis*, vol. 1, p. 543-552,) agree with him; Baur, of Tübingen, (*Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1836, pt. 3, and *Paulus, der Apostel Jesu*

Galatians. The object of the Apostle determined both the nature and the scope of his argument; and it is only by remembering the former that we can understand the latter. The Israelite, believing that by the law, including its ritualistic as well as its moral precepts, every one was to be finally judged, and Paul's object being to show him that, judged by his law, no human being could be saved, the forensic form of conception was already furnished to the Apostle's hand; both his argument and his terminology naturally and necessarily followed.

The truth seems to be, that when Paul addressed himself to those who trusted in their own legal righteousness, he presented salvation as attainable alone through trust in another; he preached the dogmatic doctrine of justification through faith in Jesus Christ; but when he addressed himself to Gentiles and others who were conscious of their need of a helper, the forensic imagery is not employed. Scarce a trace of it appears in his discourses as recorded in the Acts, and it is noticeably absent from the other epistles than those addressed to the Galatians and the Romans. But when he writes to the Judaisers and the churches tinctured with their notions, he takes them on their own forensic ground, and nothing can be more distinct than his enunciation of objective, judicial justification as possible for any one solely on account of the gracious work of Jesus Christ; and nothing can be more unequivocal than his maintenance of the doctrine that no one can be saved except through faith in Jesus Christ the crucified.

Christi, p. 375, ff.,) declared for Jewish and Baumgarten-Crucius, (*Hist. of the Ch. in the Apos. Age*, Clark,) agrees with Baur. The argument as between Neander and Baur has been well summarised by Jowett in *The Epistles of St. Paul*, &c., Intro. to the Epist. to the Romans, vol. 2, p. 4, ff. But the Epistle to the Romans is itself the best possible evidence that, so far as its forensic conception of justification is concerned, it was specially addressed to Christians of Jewish extraction and of a Jewish style of thought; but so far as the grand sweep of his argument is concerned, it covers the premises of both the Jew and the Gentile. Routing the Jew from his legal standing ground, the Apostle proves that the eternal Moral Law, which the Jew and Gentile alike regarded as obligatory, (Ro. 2: 14-18,) can find its fulfillment only in the man whose trust is in Christ.

Thus justification, regarded as a judicial act and from a legal point of view, is solely on Christ's account. Every man, in himself considered, is always and in his best estate condemnable, and in justifying any one on Christ's account God is said to justify the ungodly, Ro., 4: 5. But God does not justify the ungodly as such, *in* his ungodliness. He cannot approve sin; the procuring cause of his judicial act of approval is wholly aside from anything in the justified, yet as an act completed and made known, it is always simultaneous with, and inseparable from, a change in their affections and conduct. So in respect to Paul's doctrine of justification, forensically speaking, it is a "free gift" bestowed in reward for the obedience of Christ, Ro., 5: 15; comprehensively stated,¹ it is being made "alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord," Ro., 6: 11,—it is having "the righteousness of the law fulfilled in us," and it is being enabled to "walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit," Ro., 8: 4.

In support of the explanation now given of the Pauline doctrine of justification, is the Apostle's uniform connection of justification with faith. But faith with the Apostle is not mere intellectual assent to a dogma, but a loving, controlling trust in the personal Christ; it is much more a state of the heart than it is an act of the mind. To be justified by faith, therefore, is to be made possessor of "the righteousness which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith," Phil., 3: 9. Hence the absurdity of the "eternal justification" once so much insisted on by the Antinomians. Doubtless there was in the

1. Justification in its exclusive forensic sense is laid down in all the earlier leading Protestant Confessions, and has been elaborately expounded and defended by the chief Protestant theologians, Lutheran and Reformed. Owen, Waterland, and Edwards followed in support of the same view. Emmons' notion that justification consists in pardon alone, is this view logically applied. Augustine was much nearer the truth when he maintained that, in being justified, *justi efficiuntur*. See quotations from Augustine in Wiggers, *Augustinism and Pelagianism*, p. 201. See also Neander's understanding of Paul's doctrine, *Planting and Training*, pp. 417-421, 430. As an illustration of a mind struggling against the rigid theory of an exclusive juristic justification, and discerning much of the truth, yet hampered with the cords of Romanism which finally held it firmly, see Newman's *Lectures on Justification*.

Divine mind an eternal purpose of justification in the case of every individual saved, Ro., 8 : 29, 30. The infinite pre-science of God implies it. But predestinating purpose is not justification, and is not to be identified with an act in time. It can only result in utter confusion of thought to speak of man as justified from his sins before he had committed them, and as saved before he was born.¹

Justification, in the fullness of Paul's meaning, is God's method of making men just, or righteous, through faith in Christ and by the renewing of the Holy Ghost. It comprehends the whole of that gracious work which the triune God accomplishes through the instrumentality of truth in the hearts of believers. Contemplated only in the literal meaning of the narrow forensic image, it is God's act on Christ's account; unfolded in its broad, Pauline compass of meaning, it is God's method of giving personal righteousness to men;² and Paul's unfolding of it in the Epistle to the Romans, brings under survey the whole Divine plan of salvation from its inception in the eternity of the past to its completion in the eternity of the future. Its causal connection with the Divine will and the whole Christian economy is thus clearly laid before us. We are made to see, that its originating cause is God, 3 : 25 ; 8 : 33 ; its procuring or meritorious cause, is the obedience, both active and passive, of Jesus Christ, 3 : 24, 25 ; 5 : 19 ; 8 : 34 ; its immediate or creative cause, is the Holy Spirit, 5 : 5 ; 8 : 1-4 ; its mediate or instrumental cause, is Christ, in his person and work, 3 : 22 ; 9 : 33 ; its formal or conditional cause, is faith, 3 : 26, 28 ; 5 : 1. The evidence of its existence is the inward witnessing of the creative Spirit with the spirit of the believer, 8 : 16 ; and its immunities are present peace with God, 5 : 1, and an assured hope of every conceivable blessing hereafter, 5 : 2 ; 8 : 32.

1. Crisp says, "the Lord hath no more to lay to the charge of an elect person, yet in the height of iniquity, and in the excess of riot, and committing all the abomination that can be committed; * * than he hath to the charge of a saint triumphant in glory," *Sermons*, vol. 1, ser. 23.

2. What Paul means by justification John expresses in the words, "the blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth (*καθαρίζει*) us from all sin," 1 Epis., 1 : 7,— "from all unrighteousness," v. 9. Comp. Heb., 9 : 14.

From the view now given of justification it is easy to see its connection with other doctrines of grace,—with effectual calling, regeneration, repentance, faith, and all the others. No one of the whole series of Divine acts and human states represented by these doctrines can exist except in connection with every other; all are but parts of one whole, constituting so many aspects under which the one renewed man may be variously contemplated. It is unscriptural, as well as contrary to reason, to speak of a man as justified while yet unregenerate, or as repentant while yet unbelieving. The truth is, that to be justified is also to be regenerate, and to be regenerate is also to be repentant and believing. The objective act of justification never exists without the subjective change of regeneration, and regeneration never exists without repentance and faith.¹

1. It is a strange disregard of logical relations exhibited by many who insist most strenuously on the pure objectivity of the Pauline doctrine of justification, and yet persist in treating of regeneration before they treat of justification. That this order should be adopted by a sacramentalist with whom regeneration is a state into which it is the prerogative of the Church to introduce him, would be natural; but how any one who regards regeneration as the direct work of the Spirit should adopt such an order is unintelligible, except upon the supposition of a latent feeling that, after all, justification, in the scriptural sense of it, does include a subjective change. Nitzsch, in his *Chr. Lehre*, very noticeably treats of Justification, with other doctrines, under the heading "Of Regeneration," § 145-151.

The *ordo salutis* by which is meant the several steps through which the Holy Spirit is supposed to take us in accomplishing our salvation, (defined by Reinhard, *Dogmatik*, § 133, as *modus impetrandæ salutis sempiternæ, a religione christiana præscriptus*.) has been a disputed question. The first Protestant theologians gathered all around the offices of faith; but their successors soon began to analyse and classify more accurately. Lutherans and Reformed naturally differed widely on the question of order. Lutherans have also disputed over it among themselves; beginning uniformly with *vocatio* they have differed as to both the facts and the designations of the subsequent steps. The order of Quenstedt seems the most natural and just of all: *vocatio, regeneratio, conversio, justificatio, pœnitentia, unio mystica, sanctificatio*. See Hase, *Hutt. Rediviv.*, locus 18, § 111. The Reformed have been much more uniform. Wendelius may be taken as a fair representative; who says: *gratia, qua Deus nos regenerat et sanctificat, ab orthodoxis theologis secundum scripturas quintuplex constituitur, præparans, operans, cœoperans et perficiens*.

§ 47—*Calling and Election.*

To make man avail himself of the salvation provided for him, and to apply to him the method of justification which has now been considered, it is necessary that an influence go forth from God to draw him and to change his moral affections. No one avails himself of what has been divinely provided, unless he be divinely constrained, John, 6:44. To be thus constrained is, according to frequent language of the New Testament, to be "called" of God. This calling has been distinguished as general or outward, and as special or inward; the former being regarded as effectual only when accompanied by the latter.

The distinction between a general and a particular call is as clearly established, notwithstanding the objections often made to it, as is the distinction between natural and revealed religion, though the distinctions are not commensurate one with the other. But it certainly is unreasonable to restrict all calling from God to the formal proclamation of the truths of a written revelation.¹ The will of God made known to us in his moral laws, through whatever channels and by whatever processes, is a call from God to his service. The Scriptures abound in their recognitions of ineffectual calling through the sources of natural religion,—through the works of creation, Ps., 19:1-6; Ro., 1:20; of providence, Matt., 6:26, 30; Ro., 1:18, and of conscience, 1:19; 2:15; and by verbal messages, Prov. 1:24-30; Jer., 7:13, 25; 26:5; Matt., 20:16; Luke, 14:16-24; Ro., 10:18. The whole Jewish religion and nation were also employed of God to warn and call the surrounding Gentiles to his service and the blessings of his grace; and the Chris-

1. The restriction has been maintained, however, by Calvinists and Lutherans alike; the former insisting, in strict harmony with their doctrine of Divine sovereignty, that salvation is attainable solely through a formal reception of the Gospel of Christ, and without this no heathen can be saved except by miracle; the latter affirming, in spite of their *gratia universalis*, by which the salvation of all men is possible, that the *vocatio* is always *per verbum*.

tian church is now made to address, with greater distinctness, a more intelligible call to the surrounding world.¹

But by the phrase inward or effectual call, it will at once be seen that something very different is meant from a mere revelation of Divine will by the voices of nature, or even by the messages of prophets and apostles. It includes these and a great deal more. There is not only an outward warning and offer of salvation, but an inward preparation and constraint of the heart to receive it. In a mere outward call, addressed to all men in common, it may not be given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, Matt., 13: 11; comp. 11: 25-27; but in the effectual call it is given to know the hidden wisdom of God, 1 Cor., 2: 11, 14. All men are blind and in darkness; but in the effectual call their eyes are opened, Acts, 26: 18; comp. Ps., 119: 18. The hearts of men are preoccupied with self, and closed against God; the effectual call opens the heart to attend to the truth, Acts, 16: 14, and gives "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God," 2 Cor., 4: 6. Men are dead in trespasses and sins; in the effectual call there is a re-creation of the moral affections and the impartation of a new life, Eph., 2: 1, 5, 10. "Many are called but few are chosen."

Whether the difference between the general and the specific call is one of kind, or of degree only, it is not easy to determine. It need not be necessarily inferred that in the first no other influence is exerted on the heart than that which emanates from the inherent force of truth, while in the latter the truth is accompanied and made effectual by the creative energy of the Holy Spirit, Tit., 3: 5. According to the Scriptures, the Holy Spirit himself, whose office it is to convict the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment to come, does act on the hearts of many who are not effectually called; may be resisted and finally repelled, Acts,

1. To carry the distinction between the general and the particular, the common and the special, methods of Divine dealing with men farther than is here done, and to distinguish between common and special grace in the operations of the Spirit through the ordinary ministrations of the Gospel, is to build up an artificial scheme, and to lay unnatural stress on the merely incidental phraseology of the Scriptures.

7:51; while in the call which saves men, the Spirit not only enlightens and convicts, but also renews and enables to become the sons of God, John, 1:12; Ro., 1:16. The difference, therefore, cannot be clearly proved to be in kind. Is it one of degree? Judging from certain texts, in which the power of God is specially dwelt on as exerted on the believer, the difference would seem to be in the degrees of Divine energy put forth, 1 Cor., 1:18; Eph., 1:19; 3:7, 20.¹

But there is also another class of texts in which the difference between efficacious and common grace is apparently made to lie in the dispositions of the called, rather than in the degrees of energy with which they are acted on. Thus, it was to those already disposed to "receive" Christ, that power (ability) was given to become the sons of God, John, 1:12; it is to him who already hath that special grace is granted, Matt., 13:12-15; and it is implied in the blame, which in the New Testament is everywhere attached to a rejection of Christ, that the true cause of blameworthiness is the heart of the unbeliever, and not the absence of a power which he cannot control. Yet these texts throw no light on the origin of the predisposition of heart, which they are supposed to set forth as the requisite condition to the bestowment of supernatural and efficient grace. Seemingly, it is implied that this requisite condition is the product of free will; but how will can originate a new disposition, or how it can be other than the expression of the disposition itself, is inconceivable. If, on the other hand, the predisposition be inborn, or inbred, or the product of a latent *gratia præveniens et præparans*, then, however blameworthy might be the want of it, its presence could be no cause for commendation. Both the salvation and the condition of its bestowment would be by grace.

1. Col., 2:12, is also often cited as proving that saving faith is the product of the immediate power of God. DeWette, Hodge and others so interpret. But Meyer, Alford and Ellicott maintain that τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦ Θεοῦ, is not a genitive of cause but of object, and that the rendering should be, "through faith in the operation of God who raised him (Christ) from the dead."

But the Scriptures do indubitably teach that, in becoming Christians, men are moved, controlled, and transformed by a power of will superior to their own, John, 3: 5, 6; Phil. 2: 13; 1 Thess., 1: 5; James, 1: 18; and that in thus transforming them the Divine will simply executes its own eternal purpose, Ro., 8: 28-30. Christians are everywhere spoken of in the New Testament as the chosen, the elect, of God, Mark, 13: 20; 1 Peter, 2: 9; 2 Thess., 2: 13; and the implication everywhere is, that the choice is determined by no merit in the chosen, but solely by the good pleasure or sovereign purpose of God, John, 15: 16; Eph., 1: 5, 9, 11; Phil., 3: 12; 2 Thess., 1: 11. Thus the doctrines of effectual calling and of personal predestination are the counterparts of each other; "whom he did predestinate, them he also called." What he had in eternity purposed, in time as a sovereign he performed,¹ Ro., 9: 11, 23; 2 Tim., 1: 9. Whom he eternally predestinated to be saved by Christ, them he has historically chosen out, or elected, from the rest of mankind.

Election is God's sovereign use of efficacious grace in the salvation of a portion of mankind in contradistinction from the whole. Election differs from predestination as a completed purpose differs from a purpose which is only in the mind; and as a doctrine it differs from that of effectual calling, only as a bare statement of fact differs from an explanation of its causes. Election simply denotes God's sovereign choice of one man, rather than of another, to be saved; effectual calling (efficacious grace,) expresses the sovereign method by which this choice takes effect. Effectual calling, therefore, is only a fuller statement, and a kind of explanation, of the fact of election. The discussion of one necessarily involves that of the other.

1. From one point of view, the Augustinian doctrine of irresistible grace is unquestionably true. What God has purposed he infallibly accomplishes. But this is only the divine side of the question. On the human side of it, both Scripture and consciousness assure men that they do resist the Holy Ghost, and that if not saved, the fault will be exclusively their own. Nor is the apparent contradiction removed by the assumption that only common grace, *i. e.*, grace not intended to be efficacious, can be successfully resisted; it is an attempt to evade a Scripture difficulty by an unscriptural distinction.

The objections to the doctrine of effectual calling and election have, through successive generations, proceeded from the same general causes and rested on the same general principles. Pelagians, Scotists, Lutherans and Arminians, while differing widely among themselves as to their positive views of grace, have been agreed in their opposition and objections to the doctrine of a grace efficacious.¹

1. One deep, common source of objection has been in the conviction that if elective and efficacious grace be assented to, the doctrine of reprobation must also be admitted. And if by reprobation be meant merely the condemnation of the non-elect for their own personal unworthiness, the aban-

1. Pelagianism regards all men as possessed of an inherent power to save themselves, but looks upon the assistance rendered by revealed truth and the gracious guidance of the Holy Spirit, as greatly facilitating the process. Man's right use of the natural power of his will secures the Divine favor and assistance. See Münscher, *Dogmengeschichte ed. by Von Cölln*, vol. 1.—Wiggers, *Augustinism and Pelagianism*, ch. 19.—Neander, *Hist. of Dogmas*, and *Hist. of the Church*, vol. 2, p. 578, ff.—Shedd, *Hist. Chr. Doct.*, bk. 4, ch. 4, vol. 2, p. 98, ff. For corresponding Socinian views see *Cat. Racov.*, qu. 428-430.

The Scotists opposed the Thomists. The latter, notwithstanding their notions of sacramental efficacy, held the Augustinian doctrines of sin and grace; the former, resting all their doctrinal conceptions on the postulate of the absolute will of God, made grace to be necessary, not because of any need in man, but because of the sovereign will of God. See Neander, *Hist. of Dogmas*, vol. 2, p. 590.—Herzog, *Realencyclopädie*, art. Duns Scotus.

Both Luther (*De Servo Arbitrio*) and Melancthon (first ed. of his *Loci Communes*), as is well known, at first took high Augustinian ground on the doctrines of sin and grace. But Melancthon adopted a theory of the will which admitted a conception of man as coactive in the work of grace (synergism). Under his guidance the Lutheran church diverged from its earliest confession, the Augsburg, which contained nothing contrary to the Calvinists; but the Formula of Concord (art. 11, Hase, *Libri Symbol.*, p. 617, ff.) distinguishes between predestination, which is active toward the elect only, and foreknowledge, which alone is active in the case of the lost. With this agree the Lutheran theologians. Grace is of course resistible; and the Calvinistic distinction between the external and the internal call is rejected. See Winer, *Comp. Darstellung*, p. 89.—Schmid, *Dogmatik d. evan.-luth. Kirche*, § 44.—Heppe, *Dog. d. deutschen Protest. im 16 Jahrhundert*, locus 11, vol. 2, pp. 1-49. *Comp. Bib. Sac.*, July, '68, p. 454, ff.

Arminians, of all shades, have always maintained that election rests on the foreknowledge of God; that the salvation of every man depends on his own free will; and consequently that grace is resistible. See Winer, *Comp. Darstel.*, p. 88.—Limborch, *Theol. Chr.*, lib. 4. *Comp. art. on "The Doctrines of Methodism"* in *Bib. Sac.* for April, '62, p. 265, ff.

donment of them to their own chosen fate,¹ the objection is of but little account. For certainly the whole race might, without injustice to any one, have been left to the consequences of their own wrong doing; and it is no injustice to any one that some of the race are not thus left. But reprobation, in the sense of absolute predestination to sin and eternal damnation,² is neither a sequence of the doctrine of election nor the teaching of the Scriptures. That the Scriptures do teach the absolute sovereignty of God in the administration of his government of the world, there can be no doubt—history and observation teach the same; that his sovereignty does so control both the elect and the non-elect as to make the salvation of one and the damnation of the other absolutely certain, is also taught with equal plainness; but that this sovereignty includes the eternal predestination of the non-elect to the choice of evil, in the same sense that it does the predestination of the elect to the choice of good, the Scriptures nowhere teach. It is not taught even in Ro., 9: 16–24.³ When it is there said of God that “whom he will he hardeneth,” it is not meant that whom he will he predestinates to wickedness, but that when he chooses so to deal with men as to intensify and expose their wickedness, and thereby reveal the character of both himself and his government, he does it as a sovereign and gives no account of his proceedings. No thought is more frequent or more variously reiterated in the Scriptures than that God will have all men to be saved and to come unto the knowledge of the truth, 1 Tim., 2: 4; comp. John, 2: 2.

2. The doctrine of effectual calling is objected to as throw-

1. Infralapsarianism.

2. Supralapsarianism.

3. Few truths are more conspicuously set forth in the New Testament than that of God's sovereign and minutely providential government of mankind. The individual acts and destinies of good men and of bad men alike, are all of divine appointment, 1 Cor., 4: 9; 1 Thes., 3: 3; 5: 9; 1 Pet., 2: 8; Jude, 4. It is useless to attempt to prove or disprove, by minute criticism of certain texts, that God does not eternally predestinate the wicked to their wickedness. The thought itself is contrary to the whole spirit of Christianity and of the New Testament. And it seems equally idle to attempt to distinguish between the election of nations and of individuals, admitting the first but denying the second: the providence of God is particular as well as general.

ing discredit on the sincerity of God in the outward calling. If the former alone can save men, how can the latter be sincerely made? God cannot trifle with men.

(a.) The objection proceeds upon the assumption that the outward call is made upon men without object, whereas there is the same purpose in it that there is in the revelation of moral law in God's natural government of the world and in his supernatural communications by prophets and apostles. The proclamation of moral law with its accompanying assurances of rewards and penalties, is intended to restrain from evil, to prompt to good, and, above all, to awaken that moral consciousness of needed succour without which the offices of the Holy Spirit in effectual calling are impracticable. Outward calling, therefore is in the highest degree sincere and in earnest.

(b.) Salvation is positively promised in outward calling to every one who will comply with the Divine requirements — to obey is to live; and the Holy Spirit's assistance is assured to every one who will ask it, Luke, 11: 9, 13. It is incredible that the promise and assurance are insincere.

(c.) Those who reject the outward call are everywhere in Scripture earnestly warned and represented as chargeable with great guilt for their disobedience, Prov., 1: 29-31; Matt., 11: 20-24; John, 3: 19; 5: 40; 16: 9.

(d.) All men are conscious of choosing freely in their compliance or non-compliance with the offers of God as presented in outward calling, and all men know that with themselves alone remains the responsibility of their choice. The consciousness of guilt in incurring the penalties of non-compliance is universal, bespeaking alike the sincerity of God and the criminality of man.

3. The doctrine of effectual calling has been opposed on the ground of its injurious influence.

(a.) The doctrine, it is said, warrants the conception of God as arbitrary and partial. But absolute sovereignty and arbitrariness are not identical. Men are arbitrary, when they act in defiance of law; God is absolute sovereign when, in the execution of his infinite purposes, he acts from con-

siderations immeasurably beyond the reach of our knowledge. Reasons unknowable and unintelligible to finite minds may lead infinite wisdom to confer blessings on some which are not conferred on others, and yet no one be wronged, nor God chargeable with partiality. Finite minds may be partial, not infinite wisdom. It surely is God's right, and it is just in him, to bestow his own gifts where his perfect wisdom and will may dictate.

(*b.*) Effectual calling, it is claimed, involves necessitarianism.¹ If no one can choose, it is said, under the influence of the motives of common grace, to accept salvation, unless constrained to do so by a sovereign personal act of God on the soul, then it is not man who chooses, but God; and man in becoming a Christian ceases to be a free moral agent. While it is true, however, that in man's becoming a Christian the initiative is not with himself but with God, John, 15: 16; while it is also true, that God so efficiently "works in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure" that we are called "his workmanship;" yet the Divine power so acts, and the Divine will is so fulfilled, in our becoming Christians, that we are as conscious of the freedom of our own volitions and actions as if all had proceeded from ourselves alone. The Divine influence on our wills, whatever it may be, is always so strictly accordant with our own mental and volitional processes as to render it impossible to detect the slightest infringement on their freedom. Not a choice made in the entire series that results in our spiritual transformation can be recognized as constrained. When the change has been completed, taught by the Scriptures, we can plainly see that God's hand has led us, and God's power has moulded us. But surely that is no loss of freedom of which none can ever become aware, and only an imaginary compulsion to which no one can ever convince himself that he is subject.

And withal, grace efficacious no more infringes on the

1. The third and fourth of the famous "Lambeth Articles" read: "the number of the predestinated is fixed, and cannot be lessened or increased; they who are not predestinated to salvation shall be necessarily condemned for their sins."

freedom of the will than does any other species of grace. Be the grace common or special, efficacious or not, its aim is to bring man and the right objects of his choice into such congruity that he shall choose them heartily and they shall move him effectively. If the aim be accomplished, the grace is of course efficacious and not otherwise; the point in dispute is, whether the efficacy depends on the will of man or on the will of God. But manifestly, grace, according to any conception that we can have of it, is God's will seeking to control the will of man; and if the Divine will be accomplished through the consciously free will of man, it matters not whether the gracious influences that constrain him be weak or strong, special or common—the Divine will is fulfilled, and the fulfillment is by man's free, voluntary act.

(c.) Nor is there any just ground for the charge, that belief in efficacious grace is destructive of a sense of responsibility, and so of the activity that springs from it. The truth is, no man has any right to suppose himself the recipient of efficacious grace, unless there is a voluntary coöperation of his will with the Divine—unless he is conscious of an inward and earnest direction of the whole force of his moral nature towards a fulfillment of Divine requirements. Nor on the other hand can any one, with any degree of justice, conclude that because there can be no salvation without efficacious grace, therefore nothing is to be done till this grace has demonstrably begun to work within him. If, as we have already seen, no one be reprobated, in the sense of being predestinated to unbelief, and the freedom of no one's will is invaded in effectual calling, then certainly no one has any right to infer that a grace, which may be efficacious if he will but accept it, is not proffered him every moment of his existence.

This doctrine in fact can prove injurious only when thrown out of its due relations to the other truths of Christianity. A dislocated or distorted truth is always one of the most dangerous of errors. The doctrine of effectual calling may be so apprehended as to be grossly false, and so believed as to

be seriously mischievous; but the doctrine itself, in its true relations and proportions, is neither harmful nor of little importance. Any system of doctrine from which it is left out, will necessarily be one-sided and minister ruinously to the pride of man. The type of piety to which it contributes no formative influence, manifestly is not the type of the New Testament. History vindicates both its power for good and the interpretation of Scripture which claims for it the authority of God.

§ 48—*Regeneration.*

The moral change wrought in man when he is effectually called and justified in Christ, is technically known in theology as Regeneration. Even Protestant theologians, however, have not been agreed as to what the term should signify. With all the Reformers its meaning was vague and unsettled. Luther and Calvin seem to have identified it with sanctification.¹ Orthodox Lutherans, with mixed ideas of justification by faith and of sacramental efficacy in salvation, have perpetuated a loose and uncertain use of the word.² The first Calvinist writers persisted with Calvin in an identification of Regeneration with Sanctification; others confounded it with conversion;³ but after the Federalist school had made a distinct doctrine of it,⁴ Cal-

1. Luther's *Catechismus minor*, art. 8, Hase *Libri Symbolici*, p. 371.—Calvin's *Institutiones*, lib. 3, § 9. Uno verbo pœnitentiam interpretor, regenerationem, cujus non alius scopus nisi ut imago Dei quæ per Adæ transgressionem fœdata, et tantum non obliterata fuerat, in nobis reformetur. Comp. Turretin, *Institu.*, loci 16, 17,; Pictet, *Theol. Chr.*, bk. 8.

2. See Formula Concordiæ, 3, Hase, *Libri*, p. 583, ff.—Bretschneider's *Dogmatik*, § 178.—Heinrich Schmid, *Die Dogmatik d. evan.-luth. Kirche*, § 46.

3. See Ebrard's *Dogmatik*, § 451. This identification with conversion has been common with later Calvinist writers: see below.

4. Cocceius, *Summa, Doctrinæ de Fœdere et Test. Dei*, cap. 7, § 223, says, Alterum, quo adducimur ad fœdus, est regeneratio efficax Spiritus vitæ in Christo, quæ et conversio dicitur.—Witsius *Economia Fœderum*, makes a distinct doctrine of regeneration and gives to it an entire chapter, vol. 1, b. 3, c. 6.

vinists came gradually and very generally to treat of it as such. Special importance is now attached to it as one of the essential doctrines of Soteriology.¹ In treating of it, we may conveniently consider, first, What it is; second, The agent and instrument by which it is wrought; third, Its necessity; and fourth, The evidences of its existence.

I. What is regeneration? The word regeneration (*παλιγγενεσία*) occurs but once in the New Testament, Titus, 3:5, in the sense now attached to it in systematic theology, viz.: that subjective change of which "the washing" (baptism) is the visible representation, just as the "renewing" is the invisible effect of the inwardly working "Holy Ghost;" in the only other passage where it occurs, Matt., 19:28, it denotes the final restitution or restoration of the moral order of the universe which will accompany the final consummation of the Messiah's kingdom. But other words from the same root are used, and the idea conveyed by the term regeneration is of very frequent recurrence in the New Testament. With Peter, 1 Epis., 1:23, James, 1:18, and John, his Gospel, 1:13; 3:3, 5, 6; 1 Epis., 2:29; 3:9; 4:7, "begetting" and "birth" are favorite metaphors; while Paul's chosen imagery is that of a "renewing" and a recreation, Ro., 12:2; Titus, 3:5; 2 Cor., 5:17; Gal., 6:15; Eph., 2:10; 4:24. The Pauline imagery is equally explicit in its expression of the truth that man in becoming a Christian and the possessor of eternal life, becomes the subject of a radical moral change.

As respects the nature of this moral change, it is now agreed on all hands, among those who believe in its existence as a distinct and determinable event in the life of man, that it is not a change either in the substance of the soul or

1. It is very noticeable how generally, almost universally, the Protestant preachers of our day direct their attention to the subjective change of heart, regeneration, rather than to the objective change of status, justification, which must take place in every one who would be saved. Even the Churchism of Lutherans, German Reformed, and Episcopalians, takes on the popular style. For some curious comments by several German Reformed clergymen on this style, see *Trecentenary edition of the Heidelberg Catechism*, Historical Introduction, p. 118, ff., Scribner, 1868.

in the nature or number of its original endowments and faculties. Whether the change be regarded objectively as an act of God, or subjectively, as an event, in man, it is clear that no new faculty is given, no old one is lost or modified.¹ But as respects the positive nature of the change, there has been a diversity of views. To the first Protestant theologians, not then free from Romish notions of churchly and sacramental efficacy, it was only a state into which man was brought by the Church's means of grace. But with the decay of confidence in priestly functions came clearer apprehensions of the work of the Spirit in the heart, and of the nature of regeneration. In due time followed the recognition of the biblical truth, that to be a Christian is to be born of the Spirit and not of any priestly power. Since the great religious revivals under the elder Edwards and the Tennents in this country, and under Whitefield and the Wesleys in England, the doctrine of spiritual regeneration has been fully established.

Within the past three-quarters of a century, however, considerable diversity of view has existed in this country as to what the spiritual change consists in. By one class it has been vaguely said to consist in the implantation of a principle of holiness,—no one, of course, ever being able to tell just what was to be understood by an implanted principle. By Emmons,² true to his "exercise scheme," it was said to consist in the exercise of the gracious affection of love—in the Holy Spirit's "production of love" in the heart; *i. e.*, there is no change in the regenerate man himself, but only in the products of the "Divine efficiency" in him; or if there be any change in the man himself, then Emmons' definition confounds regeneration with the first gracious act of the regenerated, and mistakes the evidence

1. Christian faith is sometimes said to be a "new sense" which is given in regeneration. The language is inaccurate; no new sense is given; all men have faith in some object or end of life; but the terminus in quo of the Christian's faith is so entirely new, and the results are so remarkable, that the epithet "new" is very naturally, though not the less erroneously, applied to the essence of faith itself.

2. *Works*, vol. 5, sermon 51, 1st ed.; or sermon 62, vol. 3, p. 90, ff., 2d ed., Cong. Board of Pub.

of the existence of a state for the state itself—an effect for its secondary cause. With Dr. Woods, who advocated the “taste scheme,” it is a change “in man’s moral disposition, in his governing inclination or propensity—in his taste;”¹ this, like the explanation of Emmons which it opposes, involves a psychological theory, and fruitless speculations on the relation of the moral taste to the will. Dr. Hodge regards regeneration as an immediate and absolute creation of God—the origination of “the principle of the spirit of life” just as literal and real as the origination of the principle of natural life;² but this explanation does strange violence to language which is unquestionably figurative, overlooking the undoubted truth that the change accomplished in regeneration is an exclusively moral one. The truth seems to be, that no satisfactory psychological explanation of the change in regeneration is possible, because, if for no other reason, the change can be known to us only in its fruits, the source of which is in the will; and the action of the will is of all psychological problems the most insoluble.

The most that we can determine from Scripture, as interpreted by itself and such help as consciousness and experience may render, is, that regeneration consists in a divinely wrought change of the moral affections; a change so great that he in whom it is accomplished is said to have become a new creature—a new man. The central controlling force of one’s spiritual being becomes radically changed; his moral aims wholly reversed. What the change in the soul itself may be, it is idle to attempt to say. The most we can safely affirm is, that the soul’s directive, ruling power, the will, the heart, is so thoroughly changed, Gal. 5:15; Eph., 4:24, that a new man, with absolutely new moral acts, is the result.³

1. *Works*, vol. 2, p. 539.

2. *Systematic Theology*, vol. 2, p. 700, ff.

3. Ebrard *Dogmatik*, § 453, vol. 2, p. 326, says: Nicht an der Peripherie des Menschen, sondern am Centrum, wo Seelisches und Geistiges ihren untrennbar gemeinsamen Focus haben, wird die Wiedergeburt vorgenommen, damit von diesem Centrum uns nicht eine neue *φύσις* allein, noch eine neue Gesinnung allein, sondern ein ganzer neuer Mensch sich bilde.

While man in all the original faculties of the soul continues the same being after regeneration as before, he is neither the same in his power over his faculties, nor in the actual use which he makes of them.¹ In these respects he has been renewed. There has been a thorough change in the products of his being. Whereas he was once selfish, afraid of God and an enemy to him, he now distrusts himself, trusts in God and loves him supremely.

Regeneration then, defined with a view to its cause or author, is God's re-creation of man's moral affections; defined with a view to its effect in man, it is a radical change in the moral tastes, in the dispositions, in the heart, *i. e.*, in the ruling power, or will, of the soul.

The word conversion is sometimes used as synonymous with regeneration. This is manifestly incorrect, except on the principle that by an allowable figure of speech an effect is sometimes put for its cause. A man is not properly said to be converted until after he is regenerated. Conversion is much more nearly synonymous with repentance than with regeneration. Regeneration is by an act of God on the soul, but the consequence or result of that act is a turning about or a conversion of the regenerate. Regeneration expresses a change in view of its sovereign cause, conversion in view of its completion in men. In regeneration man is passive, but in conversion the will of man, turned, purified, and harmonized with the will of God, is itself by divine energy made efficient and co-operative. This distinction should not be obscured. Losing sight of it, men have sometimes ascribed to regeneration what is true only of conversion, have attributed to man an agency in regeneration which has no foundation in fact, and, as a necessary consequence, have led inquirers to place a dependence on instrumentalities and on exertion of their own, which has resulted in self-deception and serious mischief. In answer to the question, what is regeneration? we should

1. We must guard against any definition of regeneration which implies a change in man's being or increase of mental power. Regeneration does not necessarily clarify the mind. If, however, it produces a harmonious working of man's faculties which before worked in discord, regeneration may be said to add to his ability.

not say that the change is in the character,¹ but that it is in the disposition, heart or will. Regeneration is not a remaking of a man conceived of as a rational existence, but of a man conceived of as a thinking, choosing, responsible, moral being.

II. By whom and by what means is regeneration produced? The first part of this inquiry has been partially anticipated and sufficiently answered in the views that have been taken of effectual calling and of the motive of regeneration itself. Regeneration has been described as a change in man, of which change God is the author. We need here only glance at additional evidence of such authorship, noticing briefly the connection of the author with the use of instrumentalities.

In proof of the divine authorship of regeneration it may be said :

1. Man cannot regenerate, *i. e.*, radically change, himself. He may change in many respects his outward deportment; he cannot, *i. e.*, will not, of himself change his moral dispositions or tastes. It cannot be said that by the mere use of the means of grace man can attain to the needed change; by the use of these he may awaken transient emotions, but he cannot change the controlling principle of his soul. That principle is selfishness. Sin is essentially a substitution of self in the place of God. Selfishness must itself use the means of grace if they are used by the sinner, and by the use of these selfishness must either be strengthened or weakened. But what strengthens cannot destroy, and what resists and weakens and threatens to destroy would, without the sovereign controlling grace of God, be instinctively abandoned. Such we find to be the case. When unrenewed men attempt by the mere use of the means of grace to regenerate themselves, they end either in Phariseeism or in skepticism.

2. The metaphorical designations of the state of man previous to his regeneration teach the doctrine. According to these man is blind and dead. But blind men do not give

1. The statement that regeneration is "change of character" may imply too much, for this change involves a growth of the disciplinary habits of life, and cannot be affected by a sudden process. It is nearer the truth to say that regeneration is giving to a man germinally absolute character, or that it is the impartation to a man of organic force which ultimately reconstructs his character.

themselves vision, and dead men do not raise themselves from their graves.

3. The metaphorical terms which designate the act itself, such as regeneration, renewal, re-creation, distinctly declare the change to be wrought by some power outside of man's own will. The changed man is said to have been born again, to have been raised from the dead, to have been renewed, as the workmanship of God to have been created anew, Jno., 3: 7; Eph., 2: 6, 10; Rom., 12: 2; Col., 3: 10. These are figures of speech which, if language has meaning, must denote the putting forth upon man of a controlling power from without and above.

4. In the Scriptures God is represented, though sometimes in one person of the Trinity and sometimes in another, as the all-producing agent in regeneration. Sometimes the change is ascribed to both God the Father and Son, as in Jno., 5: 21; sometimes to God only, Rom., 4: 17; Eph., 2: 4, 5; sometimes to Christ only, 1 Cor., 15: 45; sometimes to the Spirit only, Jno., 3: 5, 6; Titus 3: 5. These, as well as many other passages, clearly indicate the divine authorship of the change. The work of regeneration is apparently ascribed indiscriminately to any one, or to all the persons of the Trinity; but the reasons for this are sufficiently evident. The whole Godhead is engaged in regeneration, so that, when the work is ascribed to God only, it is so ascribed as an act springing from the one will of God the Father; and when ascribed to Christ, it is to Him as the occupant of the mediatorial office, without which there could neither be redemption nor regeneration; and when ascribed to the Holy Spirit, it is to him as the immediate agent in the heart of man by whom the creative act takes place. But if we take into account with this last consideration, the fact that Christianity is the dispensation or ministration of the Spirit, Jno., 14: 16-18; 1 Cor., 2: 12-14; 2 Cor., 3; and still further that both God the Father and God the Son are said to accomplish their purposes and will in man by the Spirit, 1 Cor., 6: 11; 2 Thess., 2: 13; 1 Peter 1: 11; Jno., 14: 16-18 and 16: 13, 14; 1 Cor., 2: 10-14, there will be seen to be a special propriety in ascribing the work of regeneration directly and preeminently to the

Holy Spirit. We accordingly find in the Scriptures that evidences of regenerate life are called "fruits of the Spirit," Gal., 5: 22; Eph., 5: 9; cf. Rom., chap. 8; that the regenerating change is ascribed to the direct agency of the Spirit, Jno., 3: 5; Titus 3: 5; 1 Cor., 6: 11; 2 Thess., 2: 13; 1 Peter, 1: 2; and that Christians are called *πνευματικοί*, or spiritual, with special reference both to the agent and the nature of the change that has been wrought in them.

Use of Means. In regard to the employment of means in regeneration it should be said:

1. The Scriptures distinctly and emphatically teach a direct influence of the Holy Spirit on the heart of man in regeneration, Luke, 24: 45; *δήνοξε* Acts, 16: 14. Compare also Rom., 8: 11, 16, 26; 15: 13; Eph., 1: 13; 2 Thess., 2: 13. Paul also distinctly recognizes this influence on the heart in affirming the dependence of the apostles on the Holy Spirit for the increase or success of the word spoken by them, 1 Cor., 3: 6, 7; 1 Peter 1: 22.

2. It is not to be overlooked that the Scriptures with equal distinctness affirm that the Spirit in his work makes use of the instrumentality of truth or, in the concrete, of Christians. The Spirit might, for aught we know to the contrary, accomplish his purpose by an absolute and immediate act of creation; but such act would have been contrary to all known laws of psychology. It has been ordained that faith should come by hearing, and hearing by the word of God, Rom., 10: 13-17; cf. Luke, 8: 15; 1 Cor., 15: 1, 2; 1 Thess., 2: 13, 16: and so men are said to obey the truth through the Spirit, and to be born again by the word of God, 1 Peter, 1: 22, 23, and to be begotten with the word of truth, Jas., 1: 18; cf. 1 Cor., 4: 15; Jas., 1: 21; Rom., 6: 17. Christ prays that his disciples may be sanctified through the truth.

3. We may conclude that according to the Scriptures the Spirit first moves directly on the heart to incline it, and to bring it under the power of truth; and then by some process of the nature of which neither revelation nor consciousness informs us, brings our minds and revealed truth, or Christ, into such juxtaposition and contact, through an accompanying divine energy, as to transform our moral taste, or create within

us new hearts, awakening within us the emotions of penitence, and planting within us the germ of a new life. Results are thus arrived at which the truth alone however, employed by the unaided will, could never produce; and which the Holy Spirit, without the instrumentality of truth, might not so easily, or in a way so strictly accordant with our mental and moral constitutions, accomplish. There is doubtless in revealed truth, *i. e.*, in the person and work of Christ, a divine adaptation to this its great end, being only the embodiment, or picturing, of the most momentous realities, such as the character of God and the destiny of man. Revealed truth furnishes the Spirit's fittest instrument. Powerless of itself to renew, it becomes, in the hands of the Spirit, a weapon for the slaying of his enemies, Eph., 6: 17; Heb., 4: 12, energy for their regeneration (see Peter and James before quoted), and a sanctifying power for their edification, Jno., 17: 17; cf. Jno., 8: 31, 22.

Action of the Holy Spirit upon the Human Spirit. In relation to the question whether the Spirit's power be not always exerted on the truth rather than on the soul, the answer has been sufficiently indicated, *viz.*, that the Spirit first puts forth his energy on the spirit of man to render him capable of being affected by the truth, then, by the truth as an instrument, transforms him into the likeness of Christ, Rom., 6: 17. In support of this view notice:

1. The difficulties to be overcome and the change to be wrought by regeneration are not in the truth but in the human soul. It is man, who is alienated from God, and not the truth which is obscure. The truth is obscure because the heart of man is darkened. Truth is of itself fitted to both the intellect and the heart, and can by no change in itself be better fitted or made more effective.

2. It is by no means so intelligible how the Spirit can influence the truth, as it is how the Spirit can influence the soul. Truth is an embodiment in words of the exact idea of some reality or fact. A declaration or doctrine can be true only as it accords with reality; and so, revealed truths are only representations of truths before unknown. How the Spirit can so affect these truths as to change their relation or intelligibility to men does not appear. A truth cannot be made

to be more than true; but an influence of the Holy Spirit on the spirit of man, though mysterious, may be easily conceived of and seems not improbable. Spirit, as such, has natural affinity with spirit. Truth is fixed and immutable, but man is changeable and may be modified both in his perceptions of truth and in his regard for it.

III. Necessity or need of regeneration. To show this necessity after what has been said of its nature and cause, little or nothing more is needed than the briefest indication of proofs. It is taught:

1. By explicit declaration in the Scriptures, Jno., 3 : 5, 7; Rom., 8 : 6-8; Gal., 6 : 15. In the first of these verses, *ἐὰν μὴ τις γεννηθῆ* asserts the universality of the need in order to salvation; and in the second verse we find the word *δεῖ*, one of the most decisive of the Greek language in expression of necessity. In the passage from Romans the race is divided into two classes corresponding to the regenerate and to the unregenerate, the first of which alone can please God. According to the passage from Galatians only a "new creature" can be saved.

2. By implication from the uniform representation in the Scriptures of the natural man as wholly offensive to God, as destitute of spiritual life, and as irretrievably ruined without an inward renewal, *i. e.*, a regeneration and a reconciliation with God.

3. By whatever in the Scriptures teaches that man, so far from regenerating himself, is entirely dependent in his renewal on the power and the grace of God. If God's interposition is requisite there must be imperative need of it. All those texts which speak of the power of God on the heart of the believer are applicable here.

4. By absolute need of regeneration in the sinner in order to his being effectually influenced by the motives of the gospel. Without such motives there can be no Christian character, and without that character no evidence or certainty of salvation.

5. By the impossibility, without such a change, of man's enjoying either in this life or the next the distinctive blessings of the gospel. Neither the society of Christians as such,

nor the joys of heaven as holy, can be relished, or even endured without pain, by the unregenerate.

IV. The evidences of regeneration. Strictly speaking there can be no evidence of regeneration. Regeneration must first become conversion before it can be tested. The regenerate himself cannot become conscious of his change until his will, having been turned, has begun to move in the new line of action; neither can an observer detect regeneration without those outward manifestations which only the converted man can exhibit. But regeneration regarded as conversion may be abundantly tested. The tests are numerous, explicit, and scattered throughout the New Testament. They are so generally and clearly understood by Christians that their specific mention is unnecessary. A single caution is important. No single test for self-application by the believer should be so earnestly and constantly urged as that which springs from the consciousness of a present inward relish alike for the personal character, the blessedness, and the employments of Christians. The indispensable necessity of active piety must be often reiterated, since it is only by our fruits that we can be known either to ourselves or to others. But the subjective evidence for the believer himself must be frequently and carefully analyzed.

§ 49 — *Repentance and Faith.*

These are inseparable in Christian experience from regeneration. This is therefore the place for their consideration. They are also so associated in the Scriptures and in the progressive life of the believer as to make it proper that they be treated together. Repentance and faith were announced by Christ and his apostles as the first indivisible requirement of God. Paul in his address to the Ephesian elders summed up the substance of the gospel as repentance toward God and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ. Repentance also, whatever view we may take of it, can have no place in the heart

without faith, through which alone are apprehended the truths that instrumentally produce repentance.

Repentance is put before faith, in the Scriptures, not because of any precedence it has either in the way of causation or in the order of time. If either is entitled on these grounds to precedence it must be faith. But since repentance is that which is most readily detected by the observer, and since it is that which is most distinctly cognizable to the believer himself, it is naturally and appropriately placed first. There is no sufficient reason for the reversal of the scriptural order.

Two words in the New Testament are translated repentance. The first and least used of these, *μεταμέλομαι*, expresses a change of mind in respect to some special act for which there is seen to be reason for regret and a change, Matt., 21: 29; 27: 3; 2 Cor., 7: 8; cf. Heb., 7: 21. The other word, *μετανοέω*, denotes a change of mind, not so much in its mode of contemplating single acts, as in its general current and the course of its hope toward God. It denotes a change in the habits of the repentant. This last and more common word is the one always used to express what is usually denominated evangelical repentance.

Evangelical repentance will be found to consist of two things, or to contain two elements. There is first a sorrow, or grief, arising from a view of sin as something to be abhorred and to be forsaken. There can be no repentance until the thing to be repented of has been seen in a light that startles and distresses us. This sorrow, it is true, is in one or two places in Scripture, particularly 2 Cor., 7: 9, 10; Acts, 2: 37, 38, presented as if it were the cause of repentance; but in the first of these texts sorrow is so presented only to guard against the danger of regarding sorrow, a single element of repentance, as the whole of repentance. In the second of these texts, the sorrow implied in being pricked in the heart was only that state of mind commonly known as conviction for sin, and was not *λύπη κατὰ θεόν*, grief toward God. In both these passages there is a marked distinction between that preliminary grief consequent upon a perception of ourselves as sinners, and the matured repentance of one who has seen and received Christ as his personal Saviour; and this distinction should be con-

stantly and carefully made. There is no little danger that it be lost sight of and that two things very distinct be, as they doubtless are, often confounded.

Hence, we mention as a second element in repentance, a view of Jesus Christ as our personal and merciful Saviour. Repentance is, as we have said, sorrow before God as one whom we see to be justly offended at us, but always a sorrow accompanied with an active trust in Christ as an appointed deliverer. Thus *μετάνοια* signifies not only a change of mind but of conduct in consequence of a new belief, and a surrender to a new power; a belief and surrender possible to him only to whom has been given a new heart, Matt., 3 : 2, 11 ; 4 : 17 ; Mark, 1 : 15 ; Acts, 2 : 38 ; 2 Cor., 7 : 10.

Thus repentance consists of sorrow and an amendment of life, grief and an abandonment of that which has caused the grief. It is what the etymology of the word denotes, an after-mind, a changed mind in the sense of a changed life. The first element of sorrow arises from a view of sin as something to be repented of, a view occasioned always and only by a perception of God as hating sin and as holy. Hence the phrase "godly sorrow." Accordingly the second element of repentance is a prompt and hearty abandonment of that life which has caused us our sorrow. There is a moral revulsion of the soul from the whole spirit and aim of our past life. The two elements are clearly and forcibly exhibited as the constituent parts of repentance in the parable of the prodigal son, Luke, 15 : 17-19.

The necessity of repentance, to which only mere allusion need here be made, is not founded in any supposed punitive or purifying power of godly sorrow. The sin of the believer is fully and freely forgiven for Christ's sake, in and by the power of Christ. The necessity of repentance is found in its relation to that practical reform of life to which the whole of Christianity aims, and which is wrought through faith in the heart of the believer. Sin must be seen and felt by the believer to be loathsome, before he will forsake it and betake himself to the service of God.

Repentance, as already indicated, is inseparable from faith. As there can be no repentance without a perception of sin as

abhorrent, and of God as abhorring it, so there can be no such perception without confidence in God and in the truth of his word. We must first believe what God has said to us, and have some view of himself as he is, before we can feel that godly sorrow or repentance which God requires, which invariably accompanies true regeneration, and which by his gospel he aims to produce in us.

We come then to a consideration of Faith. In treating of faith it is first to be noticed that the word *πίστις* in the Scripture has several distinct meanings. Sometimes it means fidelity or faithfulness, Matt., 23 : 23. Paul not infrequently so uses the word, Gal., 5 : 22; 2 Tim., 2 : 22; Titus, 2 : 10. Sometimes the term stands for the object of faith, *i. e.*, for the gospel or Christianity, Acts, 6 : 7; Rom., 16 : 26; Gal., 1 : 23; 3 : 25; Jude, 3. Sometimes it expresses the general idea of faith as belief in God's existence and in the trustworthiness of his declarations, Mark, 11 : 22; Heb., 6 : 1; Jas., 2 : 19.

We have here especially to do with faith that accompanies and conditions salvation — with it as an invariable concomitant of repentance. What is this faith? In the most elementary conception of it, faith is simply crediting the divine declarations as true. This view of faith is illustrated throughout the four gospels. In Heb., 11 : 1, we have a definition of faith in its generic sense, of faith in the completion and perfection of the idea of faith. The historic illustrations of faith adduced by the writer of that epistle are examples, however, not so much of the degree of faith which the definition contemplates, as of the principle which it contains. Each worthy there mentioned accepted the promise made to him and acted on it, and thus exhibited the principle of faith to the degree of which he was especially capable.

Another and more specific use of the word is that in which it denotes a confiding trust in Jesus as the Redeemer of the soul; and of this saving faith there are various stages or degrees, from the outcry "Lord, save or I perish," up to the confident assertion, "I know in whom I have believed." It is this last stage of faith which the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews refers to as his definition. This capacity of faith for growth is recognized in Col., 1 : 23; 2 Thess., 1 : 3; 2

Peter, 1 : 5. Thus the grand idea of faith is confidence in what God has said. To this fundamental meaning of the word, whatever may be its special significance or degree of strength, reference must always be had.

A complete definition of faith,¹ therefore, requires a recognition of the assent of the understanding, or intellect, to all the divine declarations, and a consent of the heart to all the divine requirements. And faith specifically in the New Testament or Christian sense is a hearty, living trust in Jesus Christ as our personal Redeemer.

Theologians² have generally recognized three other distinctions of faith, not founded on the meaning of *πίστις* now mentioned, such as faith temporary, miraculous, and historical. The first of these rests on the temporary improvement of the stony ground hearers in the parable of the sower, Matt., 13 : 20 ; the second rests on our Saviour's declaration that faith

1. Among definitions of faith are the following:

John Howe, " Faith is a vivid, lively, operative assent, insuring an appropriation of God in Christ as ours."

Wm. Bates, " Divine faith is a firm hold of the mind to things on the authority of divine revelation."

Samuel Hopkins, " Saving faith is an understanding, a cordial receiving of divine testimony, concerning Jesus Christ and the way of salvation by Him, in the heart, according to and conforming with the Gospel."

Reinhard, two kinds, " Generalis et Specialis."

The younger Edwards, " Faith is a firm belief of the report and doctrine of the Gospel and of the character, offices and sufferings of Jesus Christ as a Saviour, and a cordial complacency in Him as a willing sacrifice and revealer of the way of salvation through him. Assent of the understanding and consent of the will."

Vinet, " In the act of faith, for it is an act and not a state, the soul is in some sense creative. If it does not create the truth, it draws it for itself, appropriates and realizes it."

Ncander, " Faith presupposes a revelation from God in direct relation to man, and faith is the reception and vital appropriation of this divine revelation by virtue of a receptivity for the divine in the human disposition. The object of knowledge presupposes a certain tendency or disposition in order to its being known and understood."

Chalmers, " Faith, whether in a proposition or a person, is the reckoning him or it to be true, and is nothing more."

Wayland, " Faith is a temper of the mind."

Wm. R. Williams, " Faith is but a hearty assent to the whole testimony of God."

2. Gerhard, Turretin, Dick.

could remove mountains, Matt., 17 : 20, and Paul's allusion to such faith, 1 Cor., 13 : 2 ; and the third rests on James' use of the word *πίστις* in his epistle, 2 : 17, 19, 24.

Of these distinctions the first, of temporary faith, rests on no use of the word *πίστις* whatever, but is purely arbitrary. To speak of a temporary faith would seem to be but little, if any, less inaccurate than to speak of a temporary repentance. Sorrow under the apprehension of danger may, as we have seen, be confounded with repentance, and so may the apprehension be easily confounded with faith.

The distinction of faith as miraculous, it is true, rests on a use of the word *πίστις* that would seem to imply the existence of a distinctive faith in the worker of miracles, Matt., 17 : 20 ; 1 Cor., 12 : 10 ; cf. 12 : 9. That something else than the existence of that faith, which is the common possession of all Christians and an invariable requirement of salvation, is intended, is evident. What that something is which *πίστις* alone could express, it may not be easy to determine. But evidently the miraculous power itself was not in the faith of him through whom, or on whom, the miracle was wrought, but in the divine energy which worked through the agent on the subject. Possibly miracles were impracticable without a special kind of faith ; possibly the degree of faith required in the performer was different from that requisite in him who would receive salvation at the hands of Christ, or in the ministering servant who would proclaim to the recipient hearer the words of life ; yet it is by no means clear that the change in respect to miracles since the days of the apostles has any connection whatever with a change either in the kind or the degree of faith. Miracles have ceased, not because of any change of faith, but on account of a change in the manifestations of the power of the Holy Spirit. They have ceased not for a lack of trust or confidence, but because, in the economy of God, they are no longer needed.¹ We may therefore

1. It has been supposed that sufficient faith could produce ability to perform miracles. According to the Scriptures faith had some connection with miracles. But it was not faith that wrought the miracles, either the strength of faith in the worker or in the recipient. The miracle was primarily the work of God. Faith called forth the miracle as the attestation of the messenger.

set aside the distinction of miraculous faith as irrelevant in the discussion of faith as a requisite of salvation and the inseparable accompaniment of repentance.

As to the distinction of historical faith, two remarks will suffice. The mere conviction of God's existence and veracity, which is what James means in the texts alluded to, is a part of the generic idea of faith already specified and needs no distinct recognition. The common meaning, and the only proper one, of historical faith, which is the mere assent of the understanding to the credibility of the Scriptures as God's word, is in no respect a scriptural use of the word and is here irrelevant.

If now, rejecting the three theological distinctions last mentioned, we recur to the first mentioned as the scriptural representation of faith, it will be seen that there are three distinctions which are both scripturally warranted and theologically appreciable. The first is the general, or generic, idea of faith as a belief in God and his known declarations; the second a specific idea of faith as an active trust in Christ for the salvation of the soul; and the third the assured and loving confidence of the established Christian whose will has become one with Christ.¹ But since faith in its more general sense can avail nothing without faith in its limited and specific sense; and since faith in its specific sense must always, sooner or later, eventuate in a full and all comprehending confidence in God and invisible things, we may properly give chief attention to that faith which justifies or saves.

Yet it must not be understood that faith in the third sense specified is of little consequence. So important is it that Christianity itself, contemplated in its practical relations, might not inappropriately be styled faith *versus* sense; and the need of the believer's attaining to the largest possible measure of faith can hardly be too strongly urged. Reasons enough are adducible in evidence of the original propriety of so constituting man and adjusting his relations to invisible things and a future existence as to make his whole line of conduct dependent on his faith. It may be easily shown that faith as a controlling

1. Calvin's *Institutes*, Book III., Chap. II., Sec. 15, and the word *πληροφορία* which Calvin comments on.

power of the soul is more effective than any of the senses ; that invisible things are too refined and vast to warrant a revelation of them through the senses ; and that whatever will warrant the use of the principle of faith at all will warrant the strengthening of it to the highest degree. The New Testament is full of considerations and inducements urging to the maturity of its strength.¹

But we must give particular attention to faith in the more limited sense of belief in Christ. This may be styled either saving or justifying faith, according as it is contemplated in respect to its ultimate end, or as a means to the attainment of that end. Thus faith is spoken of in its relation to salvation, the end of the believing, in Heb., 10 : 39 ; 1 Peter, 1 : 9 ; cf. Mark, 16 : 16 ; and the same faith is contemplated in its relation to justification as means to an end, Gal., 2 : 16 ; 3 : 24 ; Eph., 2 : 8 ; Rom., 3 : 28 ; 5 : 1. The distinction now indicated is not, however, always maintained in the gospel, nor need it always be in theology. The end of believing is the salvation of the soul, and the only way of obtaining that salvation is by faith in Jesus Christ. The means without the end avail nothing, and the end without the means is unattainable. It is accordingly of but trifling importance here how we designate our faith, whether we refer to its instrumentality or to its results, whether we call it justifying faith or saving faith.

It is to be noticed that the phrase "justifying faith" is sometimes used with a marked specialty of meaning. It is the meaning derived from viewing each individual's salvation as a forensic act of God, an act by which the divine Being, in consequence of, or in consideration for, the sufferings of Christ, discharged from a final condemnation every repentant believer. It was in this light that redemption was viewed by Paul when arguing with the self-righteous Jews, and this is the view which should always be taken of the matter in arguing with those who are disposed to aim at salvation by their own works rather than by trusting in Christ. But this is not the one danger of all men at all times. It may be more common than any other, yet it is not the only and the all inclusive danger.

1. Dick's *Lectures on Theology*; Lecture on Faith.

Salvation from the present power of sin and its future consequences is needed by all, and to make all conscious of this need is the aim of the gospel. The phrase "saving faith," which is more comprehensive than "justifying faith" and includes it, may therefore most commonly be used. The dependence of our salvation upon the condition of faith is too constantly taught in the Scriptures to require a citation of texts. No one will deny this dependence; but of the connection of faith with salvation, or of the way in which a believer is saved by his faith, the views of men are neither harmonious nor altogether clear and well defined.

There are two extremes, to the one or the other of which men are disposed to diverge. The one is that which directs attention to faith chiefly, if not exclusively, in the objective view of it; which insists on the necessity of faith not for any inherent fitness to its end, but because God has appointed it, and which so exalts faith as a condition of salvation as unduly to depress the condition of an amended and a holy life. The other extreme in regard to faith is that which, losing sight of the divine appointment, fixes its eye on the subjective, descants on the fitness of faith as a principle, and of Christ and his atonement as objects of faith, to move the heart and win the affections; and which so represents faith in its relation to a change of heart as not to make faith a medium through which that change is wrought by the renewing Spirit, but confounds faith with love, as a mere effect or phase of confounding justification and sanctification.

Within these two extremes lies the true doctrine of salvation by faith. There is doubtless truth in either extreme so long as it is held in union with the other. It is literally and unqualifiedly true that we are justified by faith in Christ irrespective of any meritorious work or character of our own. But it is equally true that the appointment of God is not arbitrary, and that we are not justified by faith which does not result in a radical transformation of our characters and consequently of our works. But these two views have not always been kept in union. There has been a constant disposition to regard one as the opposite of the other; and it has been with one or the other of these exclusively in mind that

men have been wont to find an irreconcilable discrepancy between the teachings of Paul and James. Thus Luther rejected the epistle of James from the canon.

The truth seems to have been that, while Paul confined his attention to faith as a medium of justification in opposition to the legalism of the Jews, James on the other hand directed his attention with equal singleness of aim to the effects of faith as the inseparable concomitant and indispensable evidence of the faith that justifies. Beyond reasonable doubt what each relied on was real and trustworthy. Paul argued the necessity of faith as God's appointment in opposition to those who substituted for it a scheme of their own. James argued against those who, accepting the necessity of faith as divinely appointed, quite forgot the good works or fruits of that faith, so essential to genuineness. But, if any suppose that Paul's argument was intended either to deny the necessity of good works or even to intimate that they are not indispensable to him who would be saved, let such an one consult Rom., 2 : 6-13 ; Gal., 6 : 4, 7-9 ; or if any suppose that James differed from Paul as to the necessity of faith, let him consult Jas., 1 : 6-8.¹

If now the two views of faith before indicated, the objective and the subjective, be carefully distinguished, and yet neither of them be set in opposition to the other, and if they be not separated from each other, we shall follow the teachings of Scripture. The necessity of faith in the objective sense of it, as an invariable condition of salvation irrespective of anything done by the sinner, is constantly taught both by Christ and his apostles, and the maintenance of this doctrine, as opposed to the Socinian and papal theories, is of the greatest practical importance.

Of the particular bearing of justification by faith in its subjective relations it is desirable to speak more at length. This special aspect, it is to be confessed, has failed to receive from Protestant theologians such attention as both practical godliness and a due deference for the Scriptures require. The new creation of the soul, which is always inseparable from faith

1. See Neander's *Commentary on James*; also Neander's *Planting and Training*; Article on the alleged disagreement between Paul and James, *Bib. Sac.*, Vol. IX.

and is a necessary condition of salvation, has been in danger of being thrust from its true position and that marked prominence which the Scriptures give it.

The importance of attention to faith regarded subjectively, appears from the following considerations:

1. The nature of saving faith. A faith that saves is not merely our assent to the truth of the Scripture; it is more than a bare acknowledgement of Christ as a Saviour of men; it is a distinct apprehension of Christ in his mediatorial and atoning office, a confiding personal trust in him as the soul's Redeemer; in other words, the subjective appropriation of Christ as an objective Saviour.

2. Faith is not the instrument of justification but its medium. The instrument of justification is the doctrine of a crucified and risen Saviour, in other words, a living Christ. Faith in the original conception and meaning of it, (though not in the fullness of the scriptural idea), is to the soul what vision is to the body. But a conviction or an emotion wrought in man by the sight of an object is not so strictly said to be caused by vision as by the object which the vision reveals to man. So faith is not the instrument but the medium of salvation, the medium through which the famishing soul discovers the Saviour whose flesh it is to eat and whose blood it is to drink. In the meaning of the fullness of Scripture, faith is both seeing and appropriating. Thus without the subjective element, faith has no subjective or renewing effect.

3. Faith does not distinctly and appreciably precede regeneration, but accompanies it. It is not an instrument, a cause, or an effect of regeneration, but an invariable concomitant or condition of its process. Regeneration, as we have already seen, is God's sovereign act, accomplished through the agency of the Holy Spirit and the instrumentality of truth. To suppose that justifying or sovereign faith is an effect of regeneration, or that, according to Andrew Fuller, it must arise from a disposition of the heart and can come only from a holy heart,¹ is to suppose not only that a man may be regenerated without

1. Andrew Fuller's *Works*: The Gospel Worthy of all Acceptation, Vol. II., p. 400, Philadelphia Ed. Cf. Emmon's *Works*, Sermon on The Order of Gracious Exercises in the Renewed Heart, Vol. III., Edition, Cong. Board. of Publication.

the instrumentality (*i. e.*, without truth which can effect him only through faith, may be created anew otherwise than in Christ Jesus); but that, being regenerated, he may yet be under condemnation, and the wrath of God may still be on him until his new disposition shall lead him to faith in Christ. But that faith accompanies regeneration, and the latter does not occur without the former, is evident when we remember that we are begotten, *i. e.*, regenerated, "by the word of truth,"—language which can have no other meaning than that we are changed by the instrumentality of truth applied through the medium of faith. That such is the true relation of faith and regeneration seems to be taught clearly in Jno., 3: 5, 6, 10–15. This is clearly exhibited in 2 Peter, 1: 3; cf. 1 Jno., 5: 1. If such is the true relation of faith to the heart, then the subjective view should not be lost sight of.

4. The objects of faith are fitted to influence our hearts and to change our moral affections. These objects are the triune God and the things revealed and pronounced of him in the Scriptures. A clear view of God, as in Isaiah, chap., 6, or of Christ, as in Luke, 5: 8, may overwhelm the soul with a sense of its unworthiness. By faith in the divine promises we are made partakers of the divine nature, 2 Peter, 1: 4. The fitness of Christ crucified to move the heart is fully apparent. The same is true of his promises.

That the special design of Christ's death in its relation to men was to effect a change, in other words that the great instrumentality in man's regeneration is the doctrine of Christ crucified, is declared in all the Scriptures: 1 Peter, 2: 24; 2 Cor., 5: 14, 15; Gal., 6: 14; Jno., 3: 14–16; Rom., 3: 25; 5: 5, 6; 1 Cor., 2: 2. If we examine carefully these several texts (and their number might be greatly increased), there will be recognized in the truths they teach a fitness not only to the production of one particular species of emotions and affections, but of all that are called Christian. Thus we are at one time said to be saved by faith, at another by hope, because the objects of faith are such as to awaken in the believer an earnest longing, a constraining hope, to possess them. So also the faith that saves is said to accomplish its end in working by love, and we are said to believe with the heart unto

righteousness. A faith that thus works should be contemplated in its subjective relations.

5. Faith is a work of the Spirit in man, Eph., 2: 8; 6: 23; 2 Thess., 1: 3, 2: 13. Consequently faith must be studied in its subjective relations. Faith in Christ has been said to consist of two parts, perceiving and trusting, or assenting and consenting. We cannot perceive Christ as our Saviour until the Holy Spirit helps our spiritual vision which sin has obscured; the eye of our understanding (heart) must be enlightened, Luke, 24: 45; 1 Cor., 2: 14, 15; Eph., 1: 18. Nor can we trust in Christ until the Spirit, reproving us of sin, has forced us into a consciousness of living death, Rom., 7: 24, and thus has compelled the surrender of ourselves to him; nay, till the Spirit by his own active power has, through a sight of the Crucified, given us a desire, a constraining love, for him, and thus has brought us to an active trust in him as our personal Redeemer. He who would so preach Christ as to lead to such a faith in Christ must ever so present Christ the object of faith, as to move man, the subject of faith.

6. The evidences of faith to an individual are all subjective, and should remind us of a need of a subjective view of faith. The fruits of the Spirit, and hence of faith, are such as reveal themselves in the spirit and temper of the heart, 1 Thess., 1: 3; 2 Thess., 1: 3, 4; Gal., 5: 22, 23.

7. Saving grace brings us into a personal union with Christ and hence should be viewed subjectively. The often recurring phrase, ἐν Χριστῷ, and its correlative, "Christ in us," cannot be satisfactorily explained by the interpretation which makes them to consist in the mere influence of truth. Such explanation does not accord with the intimacy of relationship between Christ and his disciples so often dwelt upon and so variously illustrated by Christ and the apostles, Jno., 15: 5; Rom., 8: 1; Gal., 2: 20; Eph., 3: 17-19.¹

1. Thos. Scott, on the Necessity of Repentance

§ 50 — *Sanctification.*

Sanctification, *ἀγιασμός*, in the New Testament sense denotes sometimes consecration to God in the sense of objective dedication to him, Matt., 23 : 17; 24 : 15; Jno., 10 : 36; sometimes in the sense of inward purification or personal holiness, 1 Thess., 5 : 23; 1 Jno., 3 : 3, and sometimes perhaps in combination of both these senses, Jno., 17 : 17; 2 Thess., 2 : 13; 1 Peter 1 : 2. The second is the sense which we have specially to consider.

Sanctification may be treated as a wholly distinct doctrine, or as synonymous with and supplementary to some other, as justification or regeneration. To those who conceive of justification in an exclusively forensic sense, the first method will seem the only legitimate one. Those who conceive of justification as subsequent to regeneration and conversion adopt the latter plan.¹

But supposing justification to denote not only the judicial act of God, but to include a conception of a divinely provided condition of spiritual renewal, a *making* just, sanctification is distinguished from justification only as expressive of difference in degree. Both imply the agency of God, and represent that agency in different stages of its application, or operation. In the two-fold and inseparable act of justification and regeneration there is implanted in the soul the germ of a new life. Sanctification is the nurturing of that germ into flowering and fruitage. It means what Peter calls growing in grace.

The duty of sanctification, whether regarded as a subjective culture of the heart or the objective consecration of our whole being to God, is uniformly and emphatically inculcated in the Scriptures. No inconsiderable part of the preacher's task is to unfold and apply the motives and the means of sanctification. The edification of the body of Christ is the

1. Moehler's *Symbolism*, Book I., Chap. III., Sec. 14. Emmon's *Works*, Vol. III., p. 150, Edition, Cong. Board of Publication.

most direct way of evangelizing the world, Eph., 4: 11-13; Matt., 5: 14-16.

It has been a question of some dispute to determine to what degree of sanctification a man is capable of attaining in the present life. In considering the question, it is requisite to distinguish between perfection as maturity of Christian character, 1 Cor., 2: 6; Eph., 4: 13; perfection as the consummation of the divine work within us, Col., 1: 28; 2: 10; and perfection as exact fulfillment of all divine requirements, or absolute holiness. The first of these is possible as well as obligatory; the second is certain, because involved in the divine purpose; the attainment of the third is disputed. Of those who affirm it, some distinguish between the possible and the actual, insisting only on the possibility and so on the obligatoriness of it,¹ while others assert the obligatoriness of actual achievement. Of those thus asserting, some maintain this obligation on the ground that, since sin is only a voluntary transgression of known law, the will is capable of being trained into voluntary obedience to known law; others hold that there has been a modification and lowering of obligation, of the requirements of law, by our adoption into the family of God;² others assert that in consequence of our fall, and in simple justice to our enfeebled condition, the divine requirements have been lowered to our actual necessities.³

The one idea of perfection held amid all these shades of opinion is that of perfect fulfillment of all God's present requirements. The one fundamental and fatal error in the whole is an utter misconception of law. The entire published law of God is not exhaustive of all our obligations; much less is our imperfect and limited knowledge of that law, as published, commensurate with our obligations or responsibilities. Just so far as we fall short of a complete realization of a perfect ideal of our being do we come short of God's requirements, and so fall short of perfection.

1. Mahan on *Christian Perfection*, and Reply to a Review, *Biblical Repository*, Oct., 1840.

2. The view of prominent Methodists. See Wesley on *Perfection*; also Peck, *Scripture Doctrine of Christian Perfection*.

3. Finney.

But here it may be asked, do not the Scriptures contain explicit commands to make ourselves possessors of the highest conceivable perfection? Matt., 5 : 48 ; doubtless, and for many plain reasons. Every man ought to be perfect in his native sphere, and is condemnably if he is not. But neither the command to be perfect, nor man's guilt in failing to comply with the command, can be conclusive proof that we do keep, or ever have kept, or ever can keep it. Ability is not commensurate with obligation. The commands of God have not all been given with the expectation that we would keep them, Gal., 3 : 21 ; but that we should ever be kept mindful of our fallen, helpless condition, and so led to our Almighty Redeemer, Gal., 3 : 22-24. And even an infinite standard is set before us because, ceaselessly progressive as we are, an infinite standard is required ; and because, still more, an imperfect, even in the sense of a limited or deficient, standard, for beings whose moral tastes have been perverted, would inevitably be imitated in its defects rather than in its excellencies.

In reference to existing controversies, there should be extreme caution lest, in opposing the doctrine of perfection, we lower beyond warrant the true ideal of Christian character. All controversies tend to extremes. Every "new man" ought to be perfect as a moral being, and he is condemnably if he is not. The command is to be perfect (in one's native sphere) as God is perfect.

§ 51.—*The Kingdom of Christ.*

Thus far we have contemplated Christ, the Saviour, only in the offices of prophet and priest. But his office of king is equally prominent in the Scriptures.

The second and the one hundred and tenth Psalms, Isaiah, 9 : 6, 7 ; Dan., 9 : 25 ; Zech., 14 : 9 ; Ezek., 37 : 24, in their prophecies ; Christ in his triumphal procession into Jerusalem, and in his admission to Pilate at the trial ; Paul in his

letters, Eph., 1 : 22 ; Phil., 2 : 9-11 ; 1 Tim., 1 : 17 ; 6 : 15 ; and the writer of Rev., 17 : 14 ; 19 : 16 ; all alike seem intent upon proclaiming Christ's kingly supremacy and his rightful authority.

The idea of a kingdom of Christ was not new to the Jews at Christ's advent. Their theocracy was a type of it. The Messiah's reign was the "kingdom to come" or "the world to come," Heb., 2 : 5 ; and, though misunderstood in its nature, was not unlooked for at its advent. Thus the annunciation, in the Gospel, of Christ's coming, was the announcement that the Kingdom of God, or of Heaven, was at hand. It was sometimes spoken of as the reign of God in the soul, Luke, 17 : 21 ; 18 : 21 ; Mark, 10 : 15 ; Jno., 3 : 3-5 ; sometimes as the collective body of people, the invisible church, Matt., 13 : 24-30 ; Mark, 4 : 30-32 ; Luke, 13 : 18-21 ; and sometimes as a dominion to be completed in another state of existence, Matt., 13 : 43 ; Mark, 14 : 25 ; Luke, 22 : 29, 30. The same divisions are also recognized by the apostles. For examples of the first, see Rom., 14 : 17 ; 1 Cor., 4 : 20 ; of the second, 1 Thess., 2 : 12 ; Heb., 12 : 28 ; of the third, 1 Cor., 6 : 9, 10 ; Gal., 5 : 21 ; Eph., 5 : 5 ; 2 Tim., 4 : 1 ; 2 Pet., 1 : 11 ; Jas., 2 : 5.

Between the kingdom of God, in the several stages, and the church of Christ, there is implied an intimate and indissoluble connection, Gal., 4 : 26 ; Heb., 12 : 22-24 ; Rev., 21 : 2. Indeed, the ideas of the church, in their comprehensive sense, are, as above indicated, frequently blended. The church of Christ is to us the only visible exhibition of this kingdom. Christ is the Head of the Church and King in Zion.¹

1. The author taught Church Polity and Pastoral Theology in connection with Systematic Theology. At this point in the course he was accustomed to give instruction concerning: The Constitution and Government of the Church; The Origin of the Church and its Name; Councils; Officers of the Church and their Appointment; Induction to the Pastoral Office; The Authority of the Pastor; The Authority of the Church; The Ordinances and Institutions of the Church.

Three contributions of Dr. Robinson to subjects related to Ecclesiology have been printed, viz : The Relation of the Bible to the Church, *Madison Avenue Lectures*, pp. 387-419, Am. Bapt. Pub. Soc'y, also revised and reprinted as a pamphlet; Ritualism in the Church of England, *Bapt. Quarterly*, Jan. 1869; The *Yale Lectures on Preaching*, delivered in Jan. and Feb. 1882, and published by Henry Holt & Co., 1883. — Ed.

ESCHATOLOGY.

§ 52.—*Doctrine of Last Things dependent upon Revelation.*

Christianity reveals the coming of a period when the purposes of God in the creation and redemption of man shall be consummated. That period is called "the time of the restitution of all things," Acts, 3 : 21 ; and "the appearing of the Lord Jesus Christ," 2 Tim., 4 : 1.

Thus far, in treating of Christian Theology, we have given attention only to those doctrines which treat of God, of man, and of the salvation which God provides and bestows on man. There remains the doctrine which treats of man's transfer to another state of existence, and of those events which are to occur hereafter and to determine the final and fixed conditions of men. The doctrines hitherto discussed rest on historical and admitted facts. The doctrines of eschatology rest on simple declarations of Scripture, most of which pertain to events yet to be, and hence are, in a sense, prospective. We may, therefore, here expect greater diversity of views, and on some points be unable to speak with any degree of positiveness.

§ 53.—*Death, and the State of the Soul immediately after Death.*

Death, as separation of the soul from the body,¹ is certain to all, but possible only once. To a believer, to whom its power has been abolished, death is simply a transition to a higher state. To the unbeliever it is the conclusion of hope and the consummation of evil.

1. "Discessus animi a corpore."—Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, 1, 9, 18.

There are three classes of views relating to the state of the soul after death:

1. That according to which the soul is ushered immediately, consciously, and irrevocably into a state of blessedness or woe; supposed to be taught by Christ's words to the thief on the cross, Luke, 23: 43; by the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, Luke, 16; and by Paul's language to the Corinthians, 2 Cor., 5: 6-8; and to the Philippians, Phil., 1: 21-23; see also Acts, 1: 25. This seems to be the true Scriptural view.

2. A second view is that souls at death enter into an intermediate state, indicated by the words Sheol, Hades, and Gehenna, found in the Hebrew, the Septuagint, and the New Testament. Romanists, with their *limbus patrum*, *limbus infantum*, purgatory, etc., many English churchmen, and individuals of all sects, hold to this theory. Some hold to a conscious intermediate state, on the ground of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, and on the doubtful language of Peter that Christ went and preached to the spirits in prison, 1 Pet., 3: 19; others hold to an unconscious intermediate state, chiefly on the ground of the metaphorical use of the term death, as a sleep, and of the inconceivableness of mental consciousness without an organism or a brain.

3. A third view is that of annihilation. It regards death as an extinction of being. The dissolution of the body is the dissolution of the soul.¹ That eternal life which Christ gives is not alone spiritual life and blessedness, but literal immor-

1. The doctrine of the annihilation of the wicked at death has been largely supplanted, either by the view that, after a period of positive, conscious punishment after death, the wicked will be judged and annihilated; or by the view that the powers of the wicked will be gradually enfeebled, until they cease to exist.

In recent years Edward White, author of *Life in Christ*, has been regarded as the ablest advocate of the doctrine of conditional immortality, or the ultimate annihilation of the wicked. That doctrine has been opposed by C. M. Mead, *The Soul Here and Hereafter*; W. G. T. Shedd, *Doctrines of Endless Punishment*, and *Dogmatic Theology*; Fyfe, *The Hereafter*, (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh).

Among many other recent works on Eschatology are Farrar, *Eternal Hope*; and in reply to Farrar, Pusey, *What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment?* Dörner on *The Future State*, edited by Newman Smyth, and *System of Christian Doctrine*; G. F. Wright, *Relation of Death to Probation*.—ED.

tality. This view interprets the death and destruction denounced against sin as annihilation, and pronounces it alike inconsistent with the omnipotence, righteousness, and benevolence of God that sinners should be punished with unending woe.¹

Without examining arguments in detail, suffice it to say :

(a.) The theory overlooks the broadly marked scriptural distinction between body and soul, and rests on the materialistic assumption that man is dependent for his consciousness on his present bodily organization.

(b.) The interpretation of the eternal life which Christ bestows on the redeemed as literal immortality is totally unwarranted. That life is, in all its elements, simply and exactly the opposite of the death from which the saved are rescued. As the unbelieving are dead in sin, so the believing are made alive in Christ. The believer now hath, not will have, eternal life.

(c.) The supposition that perpetuation of existence is the chief end, or even a subordinate end, of Christ's teachings and sufferings, is totally irreconcilable with the whole scriptural representation of the design of his death, as well as the method by which that design is made available for us. Its principle of interpretation introduces interminable discord into the New Testament.

(d.) If the everlasting destruction of the wicked be annihilation, then the epithet everlasting, and all other adjectives affixed to it representing destruction, are strangely tautological. It is incredible that such tautology should pervade the whole New Testament.

(e.) It is a most unwarrantable assumption that any of the attributes of God are compromised by the doctrine of an unending consciousness of suffering in the punishment of sin. The doctrine no more reflects on the omnipotence of God than does the existence of sin. The supposition of its inconsistency with divine righteousness rests on the false assumption that punishment is in some sense arbitrary, rather than the natural result of the constituent laws of moral being; and

1. Dobney, *Future Punishment*.

that its perpetuity depends on the divine will, rather than on the immutability of moral law.

The supposition that the divine benevolence is compromised, is possible only on the theory that punishment is reformatory, and chiefly so to the transgressor, instead of being the just desert of wrong doing; and it proceeds on the radical error that love, the sole principle whence springs all true reforms, is the product of suffering.

(*f.*) Such texts as Matt., 24: 45-51; Mark, 4: 24; Rev., 20: 9-20, cf. 14: 11; are totally irreconcilable with the idea of the annihilation of the wicked. The only natural interpretation of Matt., 25: 46, and Luke, 16: 26, is that the righteous and the wicked alike live forever, though in wholly different conditions.¹

§ 54.—*The Final Personal Coming of Christ.*

The Scriptures, in both Testaments, abound in prophetic announcements of divine manifestations which are to be concluded by a final consummation in the personal and permanent appearance of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. The announcements are made in such phrases as, "the end of the world," "coming," "appearing," "revelation," "the day of the Lord," "the last day," "the great day," "that day." The prophecies themselves cover a vast extent of time, and apparently relate to a great number of religious epochs. The observance of what may be called prophetic perspective makes it extremely difficult, if not simply impossible, fully to interpret the prophecies until after their fulfillment. We know that the phrase "end of the world" was applied by the apostle to the end of Judaism and the introduction of the gospel, 1 Cor., 10: 11; Heb., 9: 26; and was also used by our Lord to denote the period of his final appearing, Matt., 13: 39; 24: 3, 6, 14. We know that the phrase,

1. Hovey, *The State of the Impenitent Dead.*

“coming of the Son of Man,” is in the twenty-fourth chapter of Matthew referred, both to the destruction of Jerusalem, and to the literal end of the mediatorial dispensation and of the present cosmical constitution. And we know also that Peter applied to the Pentecostal miracle the language of Joel, which cannot be regarded as exhausted by anything less than that final catastrophe in this world’s affairs which is now ordinarily denoted by the phrase “end of the world.”

We need not wonder, therefore, that though there is a very great degree of unanimity among theologians regarding the fact of the final personal coming of our Lord, there yet exists great diversity of views regarding the preliminaries and adjuncts of that coming.

The most that we can venture to say with confidence is, that, prior to the personal coming of Christ, the gospel will have achieved its widest and ablest possible results under the dispensation of the Spirit. The Jews, as a nation, will have been made partakers of the blessings of Christianity, which itself will have come into a deadly and final conflict with error and irreligion; then Christ will suddenly, unexpectedly, but unmistakably, appear; and his appearance will be followed by a simultaneous resurrection of both the righteous and wicked dead, with an instantaneous change of all the living, and by a final and an irrevocable dismissal of the righteous and the wicked to their final and irrevocable estate.

§ 55.—*The Resurrection.*

Attendant on the final coming of Christ is to be the resurrection of the dead, the completion of that work of which the raising of the Lord from death, Jno., 5 : 21, 25 ; Eph., 5 : 14, is at once both the beginning and the pledge, Jno., 5 : 28 ; Rom., 6 : 5 ; 8 : 11.

The resurrection is not, however, the mere development of the existing forces of Christianity, but is attributed directly to supernatural intervention, and to the exercise of a divine

power at the final coming of Christ, Phil., 3 : 20, 21 ; 1 Thess., 4 : 16 ; and this divine power will call forth from the grave both the righteous and the wicked, Dan., 12 : 2 ; Jno., 5 : 29 ; Acts, 24 : 15.

The assurance of a resurrection is based, in the Scriptures, on the fact of the resurrection of Christ, Rom., 8 : 11 ; 1 Cor., 15 : 12-20 ; Col., 1 : 18. That Christ himself was raised from the dead was made certain by apostolic testimony, "witness of the resurrection ;" by Paul's argument in 1 Cor., 15 : 3-8 ; and by the existence of the Christian church, which cannot be accounted for except from the actual resurrection of Christ.¹

Objections to the resurrection have originated chiefly in misconception. The resurrection is the action of that organic principle which reconstructs to itself a body out of available elements, but not necessarily out of the identical particles of matter which previously composed the human body, 1 Cor., 15 : 35-38.² "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God," 1 Cor., 15 : 50. The body raised will be a purified, a spiritual, and an incorruptible body. It is not the planted kernel, as Paul reminded the objector of his day, which itself springs up again, but God giveth to it a body as it pleaseth him, and to each kernel its own body, 1 Cor., 15 : 38.

§ 56.—*The Last Judgment.*

This is closely allied to the doctrine of the coming of Christ. The judgment began with our Lord's first advent, Luke, 13 : 34, 35 ; Jno., 3 : 18, 9 : 39 ; has been continued in the successive manifestations of power and of grace in salvation, Jno., 5 : 21-27 ; 2 Cor., 2 : 16 ; and will be completed, as

1. See on Christ's resurrection, Neander, *Life of Christ* ; also Hase, *Life of Jesus*.

2. There will be the restoration of an organism ; of what kind we do not know. The language of Scripture is figurative imagery ; but imagery is not fiction.

confirmed and irrevocable decision, at our Lord's last appearance, Matt., 25 : 31-33 ; 1 Cor., 4 : 5 ; Rev., 20 : 11-13.

All judgment is committed to Christ, because in him, as the God-man, the human heart recognizes through consciousness of mutual ties, the touchstone, or discriminating force of the Judge, by whom, through the natural operation of our own conscience, we are consigned to our own sphere of blessedness or woe, Jno., 5 : 22-27 ; Acts, 17 : 31 ; Rev., 1 : 7 ; 6 : 12-17. The last is a text which, relating to the events in the historical progress of the church, is only a stronger proof of the effect of Christ's presence at the final judgment.

By this, however, we would not mean to imply that there will not also be, at the conclusion of our world's affairs, some sort of formal, visible, and universally recognized adjudication of the two great divisions of our race to their ultimate and opposite destinies ; but that the instinctive cooperation of conscience will necessitate, expedite, and sanction the great and irresistible discrimination or judgment to which all will be subjected.



§ 57.—*Final State of the Righteous and the Wicked.*

All who accept the New Testament as revelation from God, agree in the recognition of a state of future blessedness as awaiting all true disciples of Christ. There is also a very good degree of unanimity in regarding this state as to be realized in a definite locality. Christ's promise of many mansions, and his declaration that where he is his disciples are also to be, as well as the apocalyptic description of Heaven, are supposed to indicate decisively a place. Where this place is, or is to be, is uncertain. While a few minds have concluded from such texts as Rom., 8 : 18-23 ; 2 Pet., 3 : 10-13 ; Rev., 21 : 1-5 ; that this world, purified of evil and renovated, is to be the abode of the righteous, others find nothing in Scripture determinative of locality. Concerning the nature

of future blessedness, we must suppose that whatever is in itself pure and noble, and is ennobling to a rational and immortal being in this life, will form an ingredient of his happiness in the next; though, in so saying, we would not exclude the provision of new and positive sources of satisfaction of which we can now form no adequate conception.

As respects the punishment of the wicked, this, like the blessedness of the righteous, will to a great extent be the natural result of those principles, unrestrained, that have ruled the heart in this life, though not to the exclusion of positive penalties supernaturally inflicted. There is also a place, or locality, to which the wicked are to be restricted. There is no evidence whatever that the punishment of the wicked is to be corporal, *i. e.*, referable to the nervous system, in any degree.

As regards the duration of future punishment, if the Scriptures teach an eternity of blessedness of the righteous, they also teach, with equal explicitness, the eternity of the wretchedness of the finally impenitent.

The phraseology respecting duration is strictly parallel in all those passages which relate to the two classes and their final estates. The Scriptures are wholly irreconcilable with the whole scheme of universalism, or ultimate restoration.¹ To maintain either of these doctrines is not so much to misinterpret special texts, as to contradict the whole New Testament, and to subvert the whole system of Christianity. And they can be maintained speculatively only on the theory of pantheism.² It is futile to rest a defense on the basis of

1. Moral penalty is grounded in moral constitution. Penalty is eternal, *i. e.*, remains so long as a man himself remains. Maurice held to restorationism. This contradicts the whole New Testament and subverts Christianity. Is it impossible, in the endless resources of God, that there may be *some* restoration for the lost? We do not know. It is sufficient for us to say that God is infinitely just. Regeneration in this world is accomplished through persons, not through abstract truth. Here, when all are wicked, all intensify each other. Evil reacts and intensifies itself. Is it impossible that God may establish some means by which this may be overruled? We do not know. It is utterly idle and useless to speculate about it.

2. The author regarded the *dogmatic assertion* of the salvation, or ultimate restoration, of all men, as irreconcilable with the Scriptures, and logically connected with pantheism. He believed in continued personal existence after death, and in the

divine power, since mere power without those appliances possible only through the presence of righteousness, can never produce personal virtue. It is equally idle to rest on the divine justice, since the duration of future punishment is not so much determined by the divine decree, is not so much an arbitrary purpose, as it is the natural and unchangeable result of the principle of evil which, in its reacting, reduplicating power, makes itself the eternal and self-avenging heritage of the lost.

The divine benevolence is not impugned by the doctrine of eternal punishment. That is the most beneficent and benevolent government which most effectively suppresses evil, and fosters and promotes the good; and that government is one which shuts up sin to the inworking and outworking of its own deadly but deathless energy, while it secures to its opposite the self-renewing and self-perpetuating principle of holiness, the infinite reign of an immortal blessedness.

continuity of personal character. As a theological instructor, he neither adopted nor favored the effort to attain that "higher unity" into which some, induced by metaphysical speculation, attempt to resolve the radical antagonism of good and evil. He repeatedly indicated, as in the text, the logical relation and alliance between doctrinal theories which are not supported either by revelation or experience, and what seemed to him to be a false philosophy.

Among his significant oral statements in the class-room, are the following: "The tendency of the time is to make religion a philosophy. Theology has to do with revealed facts." "Beware of a complete eschatology. It is easy to construct a system which shall tell us all about 'last things;' but such systems are worthless when made." "The New Testament is intended for our present use and our present needs; the future is God's alone, and he will take care of it. Avoid eschatological theories. Time is too short to waste on such questions as have no foundation of Scripture." "A man must interpret Scripture, not according to some philosophical theory, but according to the common sense meaning of words."—ED.

APPENDIX

EXPERIMENTAL THEOLOGY.

AN INAUGURAL ADDRESS

Delivered at Rochester, N. Y., July 13, 1853,

BY REV. E. G. ROBINSON.¹

THE service that has brought us together on this occasion must turn the first thoughts of most of us to one, who a twelve-month ago was in life and among us, but who to-night sleeps with the dead. And, surely, it is fitting, that in passing to the reflections of this hour, we take his resting place in our way. The thoughts that are to engage us will take a sober coloring from eyes that have but glanced at the tomb, especially the tomb that conceals from us so much of intellect and piety. It might be profitable even to linger here in our meditations; it would strengthen our courage to look steadily at the example of one, who, while compelled, his life long, to defend himself against the attacks of disease with the one hand, could yet, with the other, accomplish so much for the Master.

But he needs no memorial at our hands; and least of all, in this place where genius and sanctified friendship have already presented one inimitable in its beauty and eloquence. Indeed, he had engraved a memorial for himself on the spirits of his pupils. He had erected to himself a monument in every mind that had felt the power of his influence. The monuments of his worth, and witnesses of his toils, are here, and are scattered throughout our land. His works will be still praising him.

But to stand in his vacant place, and take up his work where he left it, is certainly no idle undertaking. You know how sad and solemn is the task laid on him who is made to lift, with untried hand, the staff that dropped from the hand of such experience. Your sym-

¹NOTE.—This address was originally printed as a pamphlet by Lewis Colby & Co., 122 Nassau street, New York. In the spring of 1853, Dr. Robinson became the successor, as Professor of Biblical Theology, at Rochester, N. Y., of Rev. John S. Maginnis, D. D., to whose death, in October, 1852, reference is made in the opening sentences of this address. The discourse, commemorative of Dr. Maginnis, was delivered by Rev. William R. Williams, D. D., of New York.—ED.

pathies and prayers, I am confident, may be relied on for the future; for the present, your kindly attention is bespoken, while a delineation is attempted of the need and the advantages in our day of what, for the want of a better phraseology, may be denominated *Experimental Theology*.

We have theologies, systematic and biblical; and theologies, philosophical, historical, dogmatic and practical. We hear, with acknowledged propriety, of our need in theological studies, of systematic arrangement; of biblical exegesis; of a philosophical spirit; of a knowledge of history and a regard for practical piety. It is with equal propriety, I trust, that we dwell at this time on our need, in the study of Theology, of earnest regard to that experimental knowledge of the doctrines of Christianity, which, if Christianity is to be of any practical avail to us, must always be found in the heart of the believer.

Theology has been denominated a science, and so denominated, perhaps, with correctness. The work of the theologian, as such, is scientific. It is to prove the doctrines he teaches to be true, and if he will, to classify and arrange them in a system. But there is danger lest the scientific spirit of the theologian should degenerate into the mere spirit of science; lest the doctrines of Theology should come to be regarded, not as containing those great truths without which there is no help for man in this life or the next, but as mere dogmas to be tested by logic, and adopted or rejected as they survive or fall in the trial. Against this danger, protection may be found in ever keeping in mind the relation of Theology to the heart. Every doctrine of Theology has such relation, which can not be overlooked with impunity. Let, then, our need of ever bearing this relation in mind be the topic that shall now engage our attention.

1. This need, we think, may be seen first, by a recurrence to the mode by which Christian doctrines have been revealed to men. These were not taught dogmatically from heaven. For aught that we know, they might have been reduced to strictest forms of logic, and been given to the race, as was the decalogue, an unchanging creed for all times. But such was not the divine plan. Christ himself did not so teach. Even he in whom dwelt all the fullness of the Godhead bodily, who was God manifest in the flesh, though he spoke as never man spake, restricted himself for the most part in his teachings to the exposition and enforcement of those truths, which were already so familiar to men as to be styled by him, the "earthly things" of his religion. To those profounder and more mysterious truths, the "heavenly things" of his system, it is true, he made allusions not infrequent, but allusions in parables and in forms of speech unintelligible to the hearers at the time of their utterance. Not until the Spirit had come to guide into a knowledge of all truth, and the apostles had inwardly felt what they had failed to under-

stand, was that language made intelligible. To the apostles, then, was it reserved to complete a revelation; to give to man an exposition of the profounder and more mysterious doctrines of the cross.

To inquire into the reason for reserving to mere apostles a revelation of truths so momentous, when God himself had once tabernacled among us, and spoken to man from the lips of a man, would be to turn too widely aside from the object before us. Of one thing, however, we may be certain, the doctrines of the apostles were not, what the Deists of a former age and the Rationalists of all ages have asserted, the mere inventions of men. Such a notion is refuted by the very doctrines themselves; is utterly irreconcilable with the whole spirit and tenor of the apostles' lives. But it is not impossible, perhaps I should say, is not improbable, that the apostles were appointed to be the revealing mediums of the last and most important truths from heaven to man, because it was indispensable that all truth designed to be practical, as was Christianity, should first be presented to man in its concrete or actual form, and afterward in its abstract or verbal formula. Every truth designed to be practical must have the basis of fact; must, in a word, be but the description or definition of a fact. Thus, God revealed himself to the patriarchs and to Moses—became actual or real to their senses, and then came the truth of his existence. Jesus Christ, who was the incarnation of the doctrines he taught, first lived and died, and then came the doctrines of his divinity, atonement and intercession.

And so of those truths and doctrines which are descriptive of the great spiritual facts of man's inward experience, and are designed to be perpetually reproduced in the experience of men; all these did God first make to be actual or real in mere men like the apostles. They, gifted with the spirit of inspiration to preserve them from error, as well as favored by the personal instructions of Christ himself, have given us the doctrines which they experienced, and which must be reproduced in the experience of all true believers.

Thus, the origin of those doctrines revealed through the apostles, was in the highest sense supernatural or divine; while, at the same time, the mode of their evolvment was equally natural or human. Doctrines were not revealed through them as passive, unconscious beings. The Holy Spirit did not play on them as the musician plays on his instrument, eliciting sweet music by breath and dextrous fingering of keys. Nor yet, did the apostles arrive at their doctrinal conclusions by the deductions of reason. Their doctrines were in no sense the results of ratiocination. They were not reasoned out, but *felt* out. They were the thoughts of God made actual to their souls by experience. They were the bringing forth into light, and clothing in the language of men, the most solemn and deliberate convictions of their hearts. Thus, the doctrines of the apostles became the

exponents of their experience, signs of the hidden power in their souls, daguerreotype images of inward emotions caught by the intellect and set in the frame-work of human language. Such was the origin of the doctrines of John, of Peter, and of Paul.

But the doctrines of the apostles, we have intimated, were to be re-experienced in the hearts of believers; were, so to speak, to be reoriginated in the consciousness of all who should receive them. They were to be felt out by each individual believer, not as independent truth, but as the only revealed truth from God to man. Christians were first to derive their creeds from the Bible only, and then test the truth of their creeds, the validity of their experience and the genuineness of their emotions, by recurrence again to that same authority, the Bible. What the inspired apostles felt and wrote as doctrines, the Holy Spirit designed to be the unchanging type of all Christian experience, his own chosen instrument in the work of both the renewal and the sanctification of man, to the end of the world. The Holy Spirit, taking the mysterious and half-understood words of Christ, and making clear to the consciousness of the apostles the divine depth of their meaning and power, enabled them to write out, in language, an exposition of that meaning and power, in the doctrines which they have left us. And in all time since, the same Spirit, no longer inspiring men to originate new truth, but dwelling in them as a sanctifying presence, re-enacts in the believer, by the words of the apostles, what he wrought out, at the first, through the apostles' experience. So that a Christian's experience, if it be genuine, will not only be in harmony with the word of God, but will be a reproduction of that word. His creed, should he attempt to express it, will be, so far as it goes, just what the Scriptures show us to have been the creed of the apostles.

Thus, a man's *real* creed will always be just what he has experienced, and no more. The formulæ of his faith will be just what his intellect has gathered from his heart. If his heart bears the image of Christ, so will his creed. Creeds that *are* creeds, *always* mirror the hearts that believe them. What are our creeds but attempted representations, by symbols, of a common experience? And what are Systematic Theologies, but attempted classifications of these mirrors or types of an age?

The forms of Christian doctrines, it is true, may vary with the ages, and have sometimes been in the same age discordant and antagonistic. The difference of philosophy, and the difference of constitutional temperaments and of intellectual endowments, are all traceable in the different forms of Christian doctrine. The philosophy of a man always gives its coloring to the lenses through which he looks in upon the interior of his soul. The same truth may spring forth from different hearts, with form and feature so unlike as to escape recognition

among the most scrutinizing. But, be form and feature what they may, the prevailing doctrines of an age are always exponents of the prevailing experience; and, while the theologian is to test the truth of all doctrines by Scripture, it is none the less his duty, making allowance for the influences of his age, to keep steadily before him the relation of the doctrines to the heart.

2. Again, another reason for ever bearing this relation in mind is discernible, I think, in the weight which always attaches to the evidence of experience in our decisions on the truthfulness of doctrines. To have experienced the power of a doctrine in the soul, is to have passed through the twilight of doubt into the field of open day and of clear vision.

The truths of exact science, of all philosophies, address themselves solely to the intellect. It is on the intellect alone that they exercise their power. But the truths of Christianity are addressed to the affections as well as to the intellect. The heart is the seat of their throne in the soul. No one of them becomes practically believed—becomes an actualized reality—till the heart has felt its power. But when that power has been felt, the soul has reached the highest point in the scale of evidence. A direct revelation from heaven could hardly add weight to the proof of its truth. He has “tasted the good word of God and the powers of the world to come.” Instead of hearing of God only by the hearing of the ear, the eye now sees him. The soul, in exultation exclaims, “I know in whom and in what I have believed.”

Thus the last, best, and always conclusive evidence of the truth of a doctrine is, that we have felt its power. Reason as we may from the exposition of particular texts, or from scriptural induction, the end of all controversy, to a real Christian, about the proper Divinity of Jesus Christ is, that he has been up, alone, in silence and amid the awful gloom of conscious guilt, to the mount where, with Moses and Elias in full view, he has seen his Saviour transfigured before him. It was then and there, that the listening ear caught, in the calm atmosphere of a heavenly peace, the assuring words, “This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased; hear ye him.”

It is true that in ascending the mount of transfiguration there may be many a dark and bitter hour. Darkness always lies about its base. The letter always killeth; it is the Spirit only that giveth life. The first work of the doctrine of Christ is to lay the soul low in the grave where Christ lay, crucified with him; that “like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life.”

And such is the office of every distinctive truth of Christianity. All are humiliating and crucifying. There is not one, but in its first stern grapple with the soul, forces the exclamation, “Lord, help or I

perish." But when the doctrine has completed its triumph, and the vanquished soul, all trembling and helpless, sinks beneath its power, then it is that, as with Jacob of old, "the day breaketh," and the soul in astonishment exclaims, "I have seen God face to face, and my life is preserved." Such is the experience of him who has felt the power of a Christian doctrine. And such, too, must ever be the experience of one who would know Christian doctrines in the plenitude and saving efficacy of their power. And such, still more, is the experience, which the theologian, in this age of Christian instability, of changing creeds and spurious charity, should ever aim to produce, bearing steadily in mind the connection that subsists between his theology and the heart.

3. The real authority of doctrinal formulæ or creeds, is another reason for carefully attending to this connection. I say *real* authority, because a false has often been attributed to them, and because all authority has sometimes been denied them. At one time, creeds have been foisted into the place of God's word. Bigots, all forgetful of the truth that,

" Who would *force* a soul, tilts with a straw
Against a champion cased in adamant,"

have branded men as heretics for non-submission to them, and consigned them to torture, death and damnation eternal. And then again, on the other hand, shallow impertinence, with impudence equaled only by its ignorance, has fulminated its denunciations of all creeds and formularies, as of the devil, and to be burned. Yet creeds have an authority; an authority not difficult to define, and easily traced to its seat.

A Christian doctrine, it will be admitted, has authority with him who believes it. It is an authority derived, as we have before seen, from the double source of God's word and his own experience. And it is an authority that is ever gaining weight. Every fresh recurrence to the word of God strengthens it. Every new experience heightens it.

Experience, it is true, has not like the Bible, an authority of its own. Indeed, it has no authority at all, except what it borrows from the Bible. To secure for itself a hearing, it must first prove itself the offspring of an authenticated doctrine. But, once in existence, it gives weight, in return, to the authority of the very doctrine which first gave it its own.

In our first acquaintance with a doctrine we may be quite unconscious of the infinite might that reposes in it. But it is of the word eternal; it is a thought of God, and like God is infinite. The more intimate our acquaintance with it, and the profounder our experience of its power, the more profoundly we reverence it, and the more implicitly we obey it. I say obey it, because a doctrine is but a precept

in the style of a proposition ; and a precept is but a doctrine in the form of a command. The one may be translated into the other by a change of phraseology—the doctrine into precept and the precept into doctrine ; but the soul of the truth in each is ever and immutably the same. It is the same spirit now commanding and now asserting. It is the same spirit of truth, alike pervading and alike active in every part of the system. Each particular truth, whether in doctrine or precept, is but a disintegrated fragment of an infinite whole, which surrounds and envelopes us in our finiteness, like infinite space. But let one truth come in contact with the soul ; let its secret power be felt, its hidden light be seen, and a clue to the whole system is laid hold of ; a door is at once opened into the very presence chamber of the Eternal. To have experienced that power is to have heard the voice of Jehovah. And thenceforward the representative of that experience—the doctrinal formula—stands before the soul speaking on the authority of the Most High God. Such may be the authority of a doctrine to an individual soul.

But doctrines are gathered into creeds, which become the exponents of the faith of a sect. And these creeds become invested with a species of authority which no reflecting man will be in haste to impugn. That which may have guided giant minds and heroic hearts safely amid the perils of life, and been to them a pillar of fire in the night of their distresses, will not be flippantly spoken of, or lightly esteemed by the earnest and the thoughtful. Yet varying creeds can never take the place of the unvarying word which endureth forever. That, only and always, is the ultimate appeal. By that let all creeds be tested. If they stand not the trial, it is because there is no truth in them. But if the Scriptures sustain them, let their truth be acknowledged, though they belie our experience. "Let God be true and every man a liar." Let the theologian abandon his creed, and examine anew his experience in the light of the Scriptures. Let him study his Theology in connection both with God's word and his own experience.

4. Again ; another reason for carefully attending to Experience in the study of Theology, is found in the personal peril of him who overlooks it. The doctrines of Theology all have, what may be called, their moral power. It is the possession of this power which distinguishes Theology from all human science. It is a failure to recognize this distinction which constitutes the peril. Philosophy may be studied for the sharpening of the intellect, or for the settling and arranging of principles. We may resort to physical science for knowledge, or for amusement. We are at liberty to enter any field of mere human inquiry, and toil as long and laboriously as we will, for public or private ends, and no law of science need be broken ; no tie that binds us to man be sundered ; no element of our own moral constitution be

disturbed. But the domain of Theology belongs solely to God. It is his garden. Its trees are trees of his planting; and "all the trees of the Lord are full of sap." Every revealed truth of God is a principle of life. His words are spirit and life; and they are addressed to spirits, and have to do with life. They are designed to affect our moral natures; to transform and make them meet for the presence of God; and constituted as we are, that which is intended to bless will bless, or it will curse; and the greater the blessing unimproved, the greater the curse incurred. Theology must be to him who studies it, either a savor of life unto life, or of death unto death.

5. Another inducement for ever keeping in mind the influence of our Theology on the heart, may be found, I apprehend, in the dissatisfaction with old forms of faith, so strikingly displayed in our day, by the numerous desertions to one or the other of those antipodal parties, the Papists and the Spiritualists. Is not the real explanation of these religious apostasies, these ecclesiastical gallopades, to be found in the utter oversight and neglect, in the beginning, of the spiritual significancy—the actual influence on the heart—which the creeds they abandon were designed to represent? Is it not, indeed, an intolerable conviction of the shameful disagreement between their actual experiences and the import of their creeds, which impels to the desertion? Animated with the vain hope of relief from change, they cast away one creed, and hastily seize another,—

"They change the place, but keep the pain."

And surely, it is a most noteworthy sign of these our times, that so many men, from stately bishops to flippant shop-boys, are ready to join in the insane cry of "dead orthodoxy," "dead orthodoxy," and forthwith betake themselves with shameless haste, the one to a church so exacting in its demands as to deny the right of private judgment, and the other to a multitude whose only bond of union is an agreement to discard all authority in religion, and sit each an obedient listener to the lying oracle in his own bosom. To evangelical religion, the numerous affinities of the papists and the infidels make them one in their common hostility. Both reject the Bible as an ultimate authority. Both assert an irreconcilable disagreement between the requirements of the Scriptures, and the existing piety of the Protestant church. To both these classes of enemies our sufficient reply is to be sought, not so much in the reiteration of "the Evidences," as in a growing conformity of life to the doctrines we profess to believe. We must prove to them by the superior type of our piety that "their rock is not as our rock, our enemies themselves being judges." We must live our religion rather than talk of it. And while the papist mumbles his prayers and kisses his crucifix, and the atheist raves his maudlin blasphemies, let us not forget that the

disease which destroyed them is contagious and mortal. Let us guard against its first infections, remembering how much easier it is to forestall a disease than to attempt its removal when seated.

The cause of these changes and apostasies, as we have intimated, lies in the neglect, in theological studies, of that very thing which is now engaging our attention. Against the first approach then of that cause we cannot guard with too watchful a jealousy. It may be entirely overlooked and forgotten. One may proceed in his investigations and reflections in Theology, just as the student in Natural History proceeds, when he shuts himself up to the study of the dried specimens before him, quite forgetful of the functions of life which they all once performed. Closely examining the structure of each doctrine, and determining its species and genus, and carefully affixing its label, he may arrange his theological cabinet with artistic skill and imposing effect. But his studies are ever among the dead. He, on the contrary, who would have this study become to him, what it should, an engrossing and life-giving pursuit, will behold in each doctrine he examines a form where reposes, or once reposed, a power that can comfort, or could comfort, it may be, the hearts of weary millions. He will examine every doctrine with a view to its influence on the heart. The very atmosphere around him will be refreshing; his own heart ever redolent of life. The all-quickening Spirit will dwell in him and, through him, proclaim again, with life-giving power, the same truth which he dictated of old in the days of inspiration.

6. And here let me mention, as yet another reason for the study of Theology in the manner I have described, the influence of the Holy Spirit on the heart; his influence both in the beginning of the heart's renewal and in its progressive conformity to the mind of Christ. It is the office of the Holy Spirit to enlighten the eye of the understanding that we may see the beauty of the truth; to open our hearts that we may receive the truth in the love of it; to renew a right spirit within us, that is, give us new spiritual tastes; to help our infirmities, making intercessions for us with groanings which cannot be uttered; to make us temples for himself to dwell in; to sanctify us unto God that, at last, we may be presented faultless in the presence of his glory with exceeding joy. It is of the Spirit that we are born; by the Spirit that we believe; by the Spirit that we hope; by the Spirit that we pray; by the Spirit that we love; by the Spirit that we grow in grace; and it is by the Spirit that we are to enter, at last, into rest.

It is true, that the Scriptures speak of the word of God as the instrument through which the Spirit accomplishes his work. It is by that word that the Spirit begets the believer to a new life, and by it that he sanctifies him. But the active agency, the power, is *alone*

with the Spirit. The glory of our salvation can no more be attributed to the word of God only, than the glory of a Praxiteles or a Canova can be ascribed to the chisel or mallet with which they wrought into beauty their immortal creations.

Yet the word of God has its office, and an office which cannot be too much magnified by him who first does homage to the all-creating Spirit. The word of God is the sword with which the Spirit slays us; it is also, according to Paul, a form or mold into which he delivers us when he creates us anew; it is a transcript of the divine Mind, a locket-picture of the Deity, which the Spirit holds before us, changing us into the same image from glory to glory.

But while we thus recognize the position and the priceless value of the truth; while we admit, as we have done, its eminent fitness to man's moral nature, and its exact adaptation to the office which it fills; yet never should we forget its utter inability to save us, except in the hands of the eternal Spirit. Never should we cease to remember that the word can become effective for us, and its divine beauty be revealed to us, only in the heart, the Spirit's inner sanctuary. And, assuredly, we should not forget that what is true of the word of God, is equally true of our theologies, and our theological doctrines. It is the heart which the Spirit sways and sanctifies by the doctrines, and it is with an eye to its influence on the heart that the doctrine should be studied.

7. But the doctrines of the Bible are to be proclaimed to the race; let, then, what may be regarded as the divinely appointed mode for the diffusion of the gospel among men, supply us with another and our last argument for an Experimental Theology. What that mode is, may be learned, in part, from the work which Christianity proposes to accomplish for us, and in part, from the examples of Christ and his apostles as they proceeded in the beginning to effect it.

Christianity proposes the salvation of men. "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners:" but not to save them irrespective of their fitness for salvation. He came to make men "*meet* for the inheritance of the saints," to make them *new creatures* in himself. His mission was to establish a new spiritual lineage, and found an empire in the souls of men that should run through time and eternity.

And how did Christ proceed in his work? Did he begin by propounding the more mysterious doctrines of the gospel, and by laying down a code of laws which men must comprehend and subscribe to, before becoming his disciples? Did he not rather first gather about him, from the most uncultivated district of his native land, a band of men into whom he breathed, out of his own bosom, the spirit of his religion, and whom he afterwards sent forth to multiply his disciples in other lands? Was it not by direct personal contact and out of the Spirit that "God gave not by measure unto him," and that himself

after his ascension, so copiously poured forth at the Pentecost, that he imparted to his apostles the self-disseminating life of his church for every age and among every people?

Christ Jesus came to our earth, it is said, to suffer and die that we might live. But why lingered he for three weary years and a half after he had entered on his official work? Was it to multiply disciples? Many an illiterate servant of his has won for him more, and in far shorter time than he won for himself. Was it not, rather, to introduce a new life among men by direct spiritual contact with himself, the fountain of all life; to beget, like a second Adam, by his quickening Spirit, a spiritual race that should be perpetuated by his Spirit to the end of the world?

With what tenderness and patience did Christ's love hover over the apostles! With what untiring assiduity was infused into their bosoms that inner life of the soul which has been the unchanging inheritance of the church in all time since! That life the apostles conveyed to their successors, who again transmitted it to others, and these to others still; a true spiritual lineage—the only apostolic succession known in the Bible, thus being kept incorruptible among the people of God.

And in this way has the gospel always been propagated. It has been by contact of soul with soul. And in this way must its propagation continue. He who would seek the salvation of the dead in sin, must do as did Elisha by the dead son of the Shunammite; "put his mouth upon his mouth, his eyes upon his eyes, and his hands upon his hands." The "shrine" of the Spirit is in man, not in the Bible or in books. The Bible and books may be instruments in the Spirit's hands, but not its chief instruments, nor such as it will employ without the use of an intermediate agency. It is man whom the Spirit uses for the exertion of his power on man. It is by the spirit of man that he will act on the spirits of men. Hence the command, "Go, preach."

The press has its service to render in the kingdom of Christ, but a service that is always subordinate to that of the living ministry. We hear much in our day of the power, the "omnipotence," of the press; we hear much ascribed to the press which can be warranted neither by Scripture, by facts, nor by common sense. The world is not to be converted by steam presses. Space (as the hyperbole is) may be "annihilated" by steam, but not human depravity. You may cover the whole heathen world with printed pages of the Bible, and of religious tracts and treatises, and yet, without the presence of living Christians, the nations be as ignorant of practical redemption by Jesus Christ, as they are at this moment while hurrying amid the dew and sunlight of their early morning, with offerings to idols which their own hands have made. There were Bibles and religious books enough in

Geneva when Haldane first visited it, but no life in the church there till he carried it. And it may be questioned whether those among the heathen who are said to have become new creatures in Christ from the mere reading of the Bible, have not had presented to them in some form, either in person or by oral description of living witnesses, the realized idea of the living Christian man. But it is beyond a question true that no people has ever yet been evangelized by any instrumentality whatever, short of the personal agency of the living ministry; without the presence of the only shrine of the acting, speaking, sympathizing Holy Spirit. It is not the word that is the light or the salt of the earth, but the church.

And need I tarry here to inquire if this office of the church is as clearly perceived and as vividly realized in our day, as its relation to Christ and the world would require? May I not ask if that motto of Protestants, so often on our lips—the Bible the Religion of Protestants—is not in danger of degenerating into another—the Bible the Church of the Protestants? May I not ask if Bible Societies, and societies for the publication of tracts and books, useful and indispensable as they may be, are not in danger of being put in the place of the church? God forbid that one syllable be uttered by me to lessen our reverence for the Bible. But God equally forbid that we be left to the foolish attempt to transfer from ourselves to the Bible those offices which the Bible can perform only through the spirits of men. I love the Bible more than language can express. I reverence it more than I can tell, as the only inspired word of the one living and true God; but it is because I thus love and reverence it, that I would not see it thrust unaccompanied into the world, with the vain expectation of its fulfilling that command which has been addressed to the church only, “Go ye, and preach the gospel to every creature.”

It is, then, by the contact of a living church with the dead world, that the world is to be saved. And especially is it by the voice of the church in the proclamation of the gospel from the tongue of her living ministry, that the world is to be aroused from its death-sleep and made acquainted with its Redeemer. Such is the divine appointment. The all-quickening Spirit, appropriating and sanctifying to himself every attribute of the soul he renews, employs each and all in the furtherance of his purposes; but his chosen method is, to make his way from heart to heart through that mightiest instrument of man—his “chief glory,” the tongue; yet not the tongue as the servant of his own reason, and the herald of his own imaginings, but the faithful expounder of the teachings of Christ.

It is not by the arguments, nor by the eloquence of man, that the Spirit does his work. It has not often been that the mighty men of eloquence have been the mighty men of God. God, in olden time, gave not his glory to graven images, neither now does he give it to ideal idols. He will not suffer the glory of his grace to be dimmed.

Eloquence delights in the outward and the objective. It revels in the dramatic and the picturesque. It assails the outer man, and carries by storm, and with ease, its entire line of defense; but to unlock the door of the inner sanctuary, and kindle a new fire on the altar of the heart, is not within the range of its power. The converting Spirit is not in the fire, nor the wind, nor the earthquake, but in the still small voice.

The tongue which the Spirit most honors and ever delights to employ, is his whose heart knows by experience the power and saving efficacy of the doctrines he preaches. It is not the tongue which, parrot-like, glibly prates other men's thoughts and experiences, or echoes the contents of "Pulpit Encyclopedias," and "Assistants," and "Manuals." If there be any one practice among preachers more belittling to the mind, more disgraceful to the ministerial profession, and more dishonoring to the office of the Holy Spirit, than any other, it is that of relying in preparations for the pulpit, on those misnamed "Assistants," which the greed of compilers and publishers is so liberally supplying, and the shameless indolence of too many pastors is so readily seizing. Preaching, if it is to avail anything, must come from the depths of the heart. No man can preach a doctrine effectively, till in himself he has felt its power. He must know whereof he affirms; he must believe that he can not but speak. The pent-up fire must blaze out in spite of himself. The doctrines of his creed must possess and sway him as an irresistible, though invisible agency. With such an experience, preaching can not but be effective. And how can such experience be so readily attained, and the gospel thus effectively diffused, as by the study of Christian doctrines in the manner that has been advocated?

And where, let me ask, in conclusion of these thoughts, shall the fittest place and most favoring circumstances for this mode of study be found, if not in a Theological Seminary? Shall it be in the active ministry, where the ever-widening fields and ever-whitening harvest beckon the reaper to redouble his energy; in the pastoral office, whose never-ending duties leave little leisure, to inexperienced minds, for that calm study of the Bible and its doctrines, so requisite to ministerial success? Is it not rather in the place, where, with congenial minds to sympathize, and associations and duties to stimulate, the youthful preacher can study, not so much for the sermon of the coming sabbath, as for the great work of his whole after life?