

THEOLOGIA

OR

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD

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OUTLINE NOTES
BASED ON LUTHARDT

BY

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PREFACE.

All the various sciences in Positive Theology naturally arrange themselves under four main departments,—exegetical, historical, systematic, and practical theology. In general, *exegetical* theology corresponds to philology and comprises all that relates to the exposition and elucidation of the Holy Scriptures,—as the sciences of Sacred Philology, Biblical Archæology, Biblical Introduction and Canonics, Biblical Criticism (Higher and Textual), Hermeneutics, and Exegesis proper; *historical* theology corresponds to history and has to do with the sciences of Sacred History, Biblical Theology, Church History, History of Doctrines, History of Confessions, Ecclesiastical Archæology, and kindred historical sciences; *practical* theology corresponds to art and embraces the theory of the activities of the Church, and includes the sciences of Catechetics, Evangelistics (Foreign Missions), Diaconics (Home and Inner Missions), Liturgics, Homiletics, Pastoral Theology, and Church Government.

In *Systematic* Theology, however, we have the highest form of theological science. In it we have to do with a scientific and connected presentation of Christian doctrine in its relation to faith and morals. For its successful study a previous culture is demanded, of an exegetical, historical and philosophical character. It naturally comprises the sciences of Apologetics, Dogmatics and Ethics.

Apologetics properly precedes the treatment of purely dogmatic topics, and is often regarded as an independent introduction to Dogmatics. It may be defined as a scientific vindication of the truths of Christianity, in its two-fold aspect of defending the truth and of showing the falsity and error of opposing views. It differs from *Polemics* in that the latter is the science of theologic warfare directed against error *within* the Church, and from *Irenics* which seeks to present the points of agreement among Christians with a view to ultimate union.

Dogmatics and Ethics have usually been regarded as parallel sciences. The first gives an answer to the question, What thinkest thou of Christ and the teachings of the Word of God? The second to the question, What thinkest thou of the true character of the Christian upon earth? This division is rather of convenience, resulting from the vast range of their subjects, than one made necessary by the nature of the case, but is favorable to the full and clear treatment of both.

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Dogmatics itself is the science which presents in their connection and mutual relations the doctrines or dogmas, which it is its aim to reproduce from the religious faith of the Christian himself, in harmony with the Scriptures and the teaching of the Church. It is the sum of the truths embraced in the Christian faith in their organic connection with the facts of religious truth. It aims so to present revealed truth as to commend the contents of Christianity to the mind, conscience, and heart of man. It derives its confessional character (as Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinistic, Arminian, etc.,) from the polemic tendency it manifests.

It is probably best to arrange the whole subject-matter of Dogmatics proper under seven heads: *Theologia* or the Doctrine of God, *Anthropologia* or the Doctrine of Man, *Christologia* or the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, *Soteriologia* or the Doctrine of the Work of Christ, *Pneumatologia* or the Doctrine of the Work of the Holy Spirit, *Ecclesiologia* or the Doctrine concerning the Church, and *Eschatologia* or the Doctrine of the Last Things.

In a former volume (*An Introduction to Dogmatic Theology*, second revised edition, 1895) we have discussed all topics which naturally belong to a full treatment of the Definition, the Contents, the Method, and the History of Dogmatics, and in this volume we take up those topics which in a restricted sense belong to *Theologia*, or the Doctrine of God.

Although Christian Dogmatics presupposes the truth of Christianity in general and accepts the fact of Christianity as of divine origin, in these days of inquiry and doubt, we cannot keep the evidences of Christianity so distinct from its contents as was common formerly, and it is necessary in the discussion of almost every topic to unite more closely the sciences of Apologetics and Dogmatics,—and this explains largely the Apologetic aspect of many of the discussions. Although we everywhere assume the absolute authority of Scripture, and must in every case make the final appeal to Scripture alone, it is wise, wherever it is possible, in order to satisfy the sceptical and rationalistic spirit of the age, to adduce also the proofs arising from the contemplation of nature, experience and history. And although Dogmatics is not obliged to prove the existence of God, we nevertheless take up the slender thread which runs through the history of the human race which inquires after God, and point out the various forms of argument (cosmological, teleological, historical, ontological, moral and religious), by which man has sought to prove His existence. So likewise although Dogmatics takes for granted the truth of the Supernatural revelation of God, we discuss very fully, from an apologetic standpoint, the necessity, possibility, actuality and truth of Revelation, and

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nearly all topics are fully presented both from an apologetic and Scriptural standpoint.

In the discussion of the various topics included under the Doctrine of God, much stress has been laid upon the distinctive teaching of the different portions of Scripture and the progressive development of particular doctrines, and the aim has been to incorporate the best positive results of the science of Biblical Theology. For in a certain sense the modern science of Biblical Theology is the exegetical foundation for Dogmatic Theology, because it furnishes the material with which the latter science builds. There is this difference, however, that while Biblical Theology aims to represent the religious ideas and doctrines of the Bible, Dogmatics as a historico-philosophical science aims to unify and systematize the results, and also largely acts as a corrector of the seemingly diverse results obtained by Biblical Theology, because, as a rule, the latter is based only upon certain parts of Scripture, and its method is fractional, and it is far easier to introduce subjective individual opinions into a part of the Bible, than in the systematized teaching of the whole Bible.

Much stress has also been laid upon the development of doctrine during the various periods of Church History, upon the teaching of the great dogmaticians of the various historical Churches, Roman Catholic or Protestant, and upon the views held in modern times as influenced by various phases of philosophical thought or by negative criticism. In the discussion, therefore, of a special doctrine the methods of presentation will generally follow this special form—1) the teaching of the Old Testament, 2) the teaching of the New Testament, 3) the teaching of the Church in the various periods of her history, 4) the teaching of the Dogmaticians, 5) modern criticism of the doctrine.

These *Outline Notes* aim, in a condensed form, to present a full discussion, in all their bearings, of all the subjects treated under the Doctrine of God as presented in a systematic form by modern Theologians of the Positive School. They contain all the thoughts from which as a basis or thesis the whole subject can be more fully elaborated. These notes are such as a professor of theology would dictate to his class, and on the basis of which he would deliver oral lectures. They are the result of twenty years' discussion in the class room, and have gradually assumed the present form. Though professedly based upon Luthardt's *Kompendium der Dogmatik* (for his headings and his subdivisions are retained, and his presentation in general is followed), still this work cannot in any way be regarded as a translation, much less an abridgment, for it is much fuller in many points,—but rather as an adaptation of his method of presentation to the needs of Protestantism in this country.

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In the select literature cited at the end of each section the attempt has been made to give references to the best works on the special subject discussed, representing all the various Protestant denominations, both in this country and in Europe.

These notes are printed for the use of such students, both clerical and lay, who wish to examine more fully the foundations of their faith, and to learn what the Bible and the original Protestant Church of the Reformation teach concerning the great doctrines of revealed truth. The examination questions and the Index at the end of the book aim at making this small work more serviceable to all who wish to become acquainted with its contents.

R. F. W.

*Chicago Lutheran Theological Seminary,
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SYLLABUS.

PART I.

THEOLOGIA, OR THE DOCTRINE OF GOD.

SEC. 1. *The Treatment of the Doctrine of God in Dogmatics.*

1. We cannot truly know God outside of His revelation of Himself in His Word.
2. We can only truly know God as He has revealed Himself in Christ as the God of our salvation (John 17:3).
3. The true God is the God of life and consolation, of righteousness and goodness, as he has vouchsafed his presence in a special manner as the God of His Church.

SEC. 2. *The Natural Revelation of God and its Limits.*

I. The Significance of Revelation.

1. All religions appeal to and rest upon revelation.
 - 1) The idea of religion is closely united with that of revelation.
 - 2) Religious life would never have arisen without a revelation of God to and in man.
 - 3) All religion has its origin in original revelation.
 - 4) Religion itself is the fruit and evidence of an original revelation of God.

II. Definition of Revelation.

1. It is only in later times that the topic of Revelation in general is treated separately.
2. The doctrine was formerly discussed along with that of Holy Scripture.
3. The word revelation denotes "becoming manifest," as well as "making manifest."
4. Revelation is an unveiling, an imparting, a making known of what was not known before.
5. God reveals Himself not according to what He is for Himself, but to what He is for us.
6. Revelation is undoubtedly brought about by psychological means, and supposes receptivity on the part of him to whom it is made known.
7. But this receptivity or subjectivity is, under no circumstances and in no possible way, the source of the revelation of God.
8. We must carefully distinguish between External and Internal Revelation.
 - 1) External revelation is that act of God by which He makes known objectively what was not known before.
 - 2) Internal revelation is that act of God by which He takes away the veil which subjectively prevents us from seeing the truth,

9. We must also distinguish between General and Special Revelation.

- 1) General revelation is given to all men, without distinction of time or place.
- 2) It is God's witness and communication of Himself to the world for the realization of the end of creation.
- 3) Special revelation is given to us in Holy Scripture alone.

10. We may also distinguish between revelation by History and by Word, but this occurs only in the sphere of the special revelation given in Scripture.

- 1) A constant relation exists between the revealing history of salvation and the revealing word, inasmuch as each divine fact is preceded by the word which discloses the counsel of God (Amos 3:7).
- 2) Special revelation and sacred history are, therefore, not to be separated.

III. General Revelation.

1. In the sphere of general revelation God testifies to man in a three-fold form:

- 1) In nature—the creation makes us see the Creator. Ps. 19:1; Isa. 40:21-26; Rom. 1:19, 20.
- 2) In the historical guidance of mankind—for a God who lives and rules makes Himself known by His acts. Ex. 9:16; Acts 14:15-17; 17:25, 26.
- 3) In each man's conscience. Eccl. 3:11; Acts 17:27, 28; Rom. 2:14, 15.

2. The natural knowledge of God is therefore either innate (*insita*) or acquired (*acquisita*).

- 1) The proof for the existence of an innate knowledge is drawn from Rom. 1:19; 2:14, 15.
- 2) The acquired knowledge is proved from Rom. 1:20; Acts 17:27.

3. In general we may assign as the subject matter of General Revelation:

- 1) The certainty of God's existence as the Creator of all things;
- 2) The majesty of His being;
- 3) The holiness of His claims.

4. Nevertheless, the true living God remains a hidden God to the natural man in all his searchings. Isa. 45:15; John 1:18; 1 Cor. 2:14.

5. Such natural knowledge is always imperfect, or weak, and at best is only "a partial knowledge concerning the being of God, His power, wisdom, goodness and providence" (*Gerh.*).

6. It is not sufficient to secure salvation, or even to prevent condemnation, for it knows nothing of reconciliation. Acts 4:12; Gal. 4:8, 9; Eph. 2:12; 4:18; John 17:3.

7. The reason why our natural knowledge of God is obscured lies in the sad effect of sin.

8. Valentine sums up "the confession of Natural Theology" as follows:

- 1) It can give only a partial and incomplete view of God's character.
 - 2) It leaves us in the dark as to man's specific end in life, and how he may accomplish it.
 - 3) Its intimations, though they suggest hope for the future, yet fail to bring immortality to full light.
 - 4) It does not explain the existence of sin and the depravity of our race.
 - 5) It furnishes no remedy for sin—no way of forgiveness or salvation from sin.
 - 6) When left to the mere light of nature and reason men hold low and inadequate conceptions of God.
9. The use of the natural knowledge of God, according to Calovius, is:
- 1) Pædagogical, for seeking after the true God.
 - 2) Pædeutical, for directing morals and for external discipline.
 - 3) Didactic, because it illustrates the Scriptures if rightly employed.
10. Natural revelation is of importance to the cause of religion and of Christianity, for it is the ground on which special revelation is sown.

11) The relation between general and special revelation is such that the former is the continual basis of the latter, while the latter is the aim and completion of the former.

12) Scripture passages to be memorized: John 17:3; Ps. 19:1; Rom. 1:19, 20; Acts 17:26-28; Rom. 2:14, 15; John 1:18; I Cor. 2:14; Acts 4:12; Eph. 2:12; 4:17, 18.

13) *Literature*: Luthardt, *Kompendium*, 9th ed., sec. 22, 23; Weidner, *Biblical Theol. of O. T.* (Oehler), 2nd ed., sec. 6, 7; Martensen, *Dogmatics*, sec. 4-9, 43; Schmid, *Theol. of the Lutheran Church*, 2nd Eng. ed. (6th German), pp. 113-120; Hase, *Hulterus Redivivus*, 12th ed., sec. 29, 30; H. B. Smith, *Introduction to Christian Theol.*, pp. 84-92; Valentine, *Natural Theology*, pp. 1-9, 270; Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, sec. 29; Barry, *What is Natural Theology?* Lectures I, II, and Summary; Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural*, Lectures III, IX; Butler, *Analogy of Religion*, Part I; Christlieb, *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, Lecture II; Flint, *Theism*, Lecture X; Cunningham, *Theological Lectures*, Lectures IX, X; Auberlen, *The Divine Revelation*, Introduction, pp. 29-34; Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths of Christianity*, Lecture VII.

SEC. 3. *The so-called Proofs of the Existence of God.*

I. Belief in the existence of God.

1. Every human being is conscious of the idea of God.
2. This universal consciousness of the idea of God is innate in man, and is still a remnant of the image of God in which man was originally created, even as conscience is.
3. The existence of God is the primal truth.
4. It is a universal truth.
5. It is a necessary truth. We cannot think of Him otherwise than as existing.
6. There can be no demonstration of the existence of God by man, for that only can be proved which falls within the sphere of finite comprehension.
7. Its certainty does not grow from, but precedes and conditions all observation and reasoning.

8. It is not derived from revelation, for our acceptance of a revelation presupposes belief in the existence of God.

9. The existence of God is an intuitive conviction of the human mind. The fundamental presupposition of our own personal existence, and personal self-consciousness, is the existence of the Divine Personality.

10. Although we cannot by argument prove that God exists, and can become perfectly certain of it only through revelation, the human mind has sought to present proofs to confirm this innate idea.

11. Gerhard gives three reasons why this is justifiable:

- 1) For the confutation of those who deny that there is a God;
- 2) For the confirmation of our faith;
- 3) For the perfecting of our natural knowledge of God.

12. The philosophic proofs for God's existence, properly speaking, do not belong to the sphere of Christian Dogmatics.

13. But Dogmatics ought not to overlook the importance of these philosophic proofs:

- 1) Because the statement that God's existence cannot be demonstrated is often understood and applied in a way which promotes unbelief and scepticism.
- 2) Properly presented and suitably combined these proofs are powerful enough to offer a scientific defence for faith in God, and to brand as inexcusable sin and deplorable folly unbelief in God (Ps. 14:1).

14. The arguments are in the largest and truest sense cumulative,—the proof does not depend upon any one argument.

15. These arguments are but stages in a single rational process, parts of one comprehensive argument, naturally and organically related, supporting and strengthening one another.

16. A man may be strong enough to break each rod separately, but quite unable to break a bundle of rods firmly bound together.

17. As presumptive evidence in favor of Theism, Valentine lays stress upon four considerations:

- 1) The universality of the idea of God in the human mind. It is no exception to this universality that in many places the idea is crude, gross, and false.
- 2) The religious instinct of the race. The human heart is not satisfied until it finds God.
- 3) The benign influence of belief in God is a natural sign of its truth.
- 4) All the facts, phenomena, and appearances of the world are best explained and harmonized under the belief of the existence of God.

18. The arguments for the existence of God may be reduced to six, arranged under two general heads:

- 1) Arguments derived from the contemplation of the world.
 1. Cosmological; 2. Teleological; 3. Historical.

- 2) Arguments derived from the contemplation of man himself.

1. Ontological; 2. Moral; 3. Religious.

II. The Cosmological Argument.

1. This argument lays stress upon the existence of the external world, and draws its evidence from it.

2. Beginning with the finite and the relative, it would lead to the infinite and the absolute.

3. The argument may be stated as follows:

Every event, or contingent phenomenon, must have a cause sufficient and pre-existing.

The universe consists of a system of changes.

Therefore there must be some self-existent, necessary Being the cause of all this.

4. Objections have been raised against the validity of the conclusion:

1) By those who claim that the universe itself may be infinite and eternal (*Martineau*).

2) By those who claim that the principle of causality leads only to the existence of an ultimate force, "and no mere force, however great or wonderful, is worthy to be called God" (*Flint*).

3) It has been objected that our "causal judgment" rests solely on experience which gives only invariable sequence, and not efficiency. It demands that we should assign a cause, but not a first cause. (*Mill*)

But the mind can rest only when it has reached ultimately an uncaused first cause.

4) It is impossible to show that this cause is not finite, like the universe itself.

5. *Valentine*: It is to be conceded that the cosmological proof lacks in direct force for the establishment of the personality of the self-existent first cause. But this argument goes far toward the proof of personality:

1) By necessary conception a First Cause is one, not many.

2) The First Cause must be a *free* cause, truly unconditioned, self-existent, and self-determining.

3) A Free Cause must be an *intelligent* cause; for a self-determining being is necessarily conceived of as mind or intelligent will.

6. The ablest exponents of the cosmological proof have been Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibnitz and Ulrici.

7. The cosmological argument is implied in Rom. 1:20; Heb. 3:4. Passages like Ps. 90:1, 2; 102:25, 26; Heb. 1:10-12 have also been referred to as anticipations of the argument.

III. The Teleological Argument, known also as the physico-theological proof.

1. *Kant*: The physico-theological proof must always be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest and simplest proof of all, and never fails to commend itself to the popular mind.

2. This argument has been elaborated ever since the time of Socrates.

3. Although subjected to the severest criticism, the argument remains essentially unimpeached.

4. It is commonly known as the argument from design, or final causes.

5. It reasons from clear indications of plan and design in nature to the existence of an intelligent cause.

6. The reasoning employed is analogical and inductive.

7. The statement of the argument.

Whatever exhibits marks of design implies an intelligent author.

The world exhibits such marks.

Therefore it has an intelligent author.

8. Formerly the *minor* premise was disputed, but most objections are now made to the *major* premise, especially by some who would substitute the doctrine of "the survival of the fittest," or of evolution, for that of "design."

9. The teleological argument is very fully developed in Valentine's *Natural Theology*.

10. Though this argument cannot prove a personal God, nor enlighten us with reference to the unity, eternity, and infinity of God, it takes us a step further than the cosmological.

11. *Martensen*: The cosmological argument conducts us to a God who is mere power and necessity; the teleological argument glorifies this power and necessity into freedom and intelligence.

IV. The Historical Argument.

1. The historical argument uses the evidences of moral design which are seen in the general course of history to prove the existence of a supreme, wise and righteous God who governs the world.

2. Christianity first recognized the idea of a divine government in history.

3. This is especially brought forward in the writings of Paul.

4. Jesus Christ is the centre of the world's history.

5. Even philosophers who have acknowledged no personal God (Fichte), and men like Strauss maintain a moral government of the world.

6. But this is only another word for God, for an unconscious government, according to moral laws, is impossible.

7. This argument is closely related to the teleological and moral arguments.

V. The Ontological Argument.

1. The proofs so far discussed have been mainly *a posteriori*, reasoning from observed facts, from effect to cause.

2. The ontological proof is an *a priori* argument for the Being of God. It is a reasoning from intuitive truths,—from those anterior to experience.

3. The argument is that there are certain necessary ideas

in the human mind from which we may infer that an infinite, personal cause of all things exists.

4. This proof, although the germs of it appear in Plato and Aristotle, in Athanasius and Augustine, belongs chiefly to modern times, and has been presented in different forms.

5. Some philosophers lay the greatest stress upon this method of proof, regarding it a complete proof, "the only possible argument," while others regard it as one of the least satisfactory and serviceable of the various theistic proofs.

6. We will present three typical forms of the argument:

1) *Anselm*: All men have the idea of God, and this idea of God is the idea of a being absolutely perfect, one whom we cannot imagine to have a superior ("*quo majus cogitari non potest*"). The idea of such a being necessarily implies existence, otherwise we might imagine a greater being.

2) *Descartes*: "The idea of a most perfect being is not adventitious (from experience) nor factitious (invented); hence it is innate, God given."

Descartes presents three proofs of the Being of God (summary by H. B. Smith).

a) We are imperfect, yet have the idea of a perfect being; only a perfect being could give us this idea.

b) We are dependent; there must be a perfect being, independent. (Leibnitz called this a form of the cosmological argument).

c) We have the idea of a perfect being. In the idea itself of a perfect being *existence* must be included. (This last proof Leibnitz elaborated, and Kant regards this proof as *the* ontological argument).

3) *Cousin*: The very idea of God implies the certainty and the necessity of the existence of God. The idea of the finite implies the idea of the infinite as inevitably as the idea of the "me" implies that of the "not-me."

7. There may be serious defects in the ontological argument, considered as a formal demonstration, and yet the conclusion may be in no way compromised.

8. The *a priori* arguments may be faulty as logical evolutions of the truth of the Divine existence from ultimate and necessary conceptions, and yet they concur in manifesting that, if God be not, the human mind is in its very nature self-contradictory. God can only be disbelieved in at the cost of reducing the whole world of thought to a chaos (*Flin!*).

VI. The Moral Argument.

This argument may be stated in two forms:

1. Conscience testifies to the existence of a moral law. This implies a lawgiver, which is God. The *fact* of the existence of conscience thus proves the existence of God. Melancthon and Calvin made use of this argument.

2. We find that here on earth virtue is often unrewarded and vice unpunished. This requires an adjustment hereafter, and proves that there is a righteous governor and judge. This is Kant's famous argument, who maintains that there are *three* postulates of Pure Practical Reason, *immortality, freedom and the existence of God*, and that these postulates are not theoretical dogmas, but presuppositions which are practically necessary.

3. We must here refer to Butler's famous chapter on "The Moral Government of God" in his *Analogy of Religion*.

VII. The Religious Argument.

1. This is the proof derived from personal experience in the religious life of the reality and power of God.

2. In some respects it can be more readily applied than any other.

3. The certainty of God's existence is manifested not only in the intellect, but in the feelings and the will.

4. This proof finds its full force only where there is a receptive heart.

VIII. *Literature*: Luthardt, *Kompendium*, sec. 24; *Fundamental Truths*, Lecture III.; Kant in Watson's *Selections from Kant*, pp. 195-225, 296-299; Mulford, *Republic of God*, pp. 7-21; Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion*, Lecture II.; Martensen, *Dogmatics*, sec. 37-41; A. H. Strong, *Systematic Theology* (1886), pp. 39-50; Jacobs, *Elements of Religion* (1894), pp. 33-38; Flint, *Theism*, pp. 59-447. The notes pp. 364-447 are very valuable and contain references to the best recent literature. Fisher, *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief*, Chapter II.; Janet, *Final Causes*, Book II.; Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, Chapter V.; Stearns, *Present Day Theology*, Chapter 1.; Valentine, *Natural Theology*; Descartes in Veitch's translation of *The Method, Meditations*, etc. (1890), pp. 34-37, 201-203, 271, 272; Lotze, *Philosophy of Religion*, sec. 5-20; *Microcosmus*, Vol. 2, pp. 659-688; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Vol. 1, pp. 212-343; Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, Vol. 1, pp. 221-243; Hodge, Art. on *God* in Johnson's *Cyclopedia*; H. B. Smith, *Introd. to Christian Theology*, pp. 84-133; Ebrard's *Christian Apologetics*, Vol. 1, sec. 95, 96; Bruce, *Apologetics*, pp. 149-163; Barry, *What is Natural Theology?* Lectures III.-VIII.; Butler, *Analogy of Religion*, pp. 105-127; Norris, *Rudiments of Theology*, pp. 1-19, 241-254.

SEC. 4. *The Supernatural Revelation of God.*

I. The reality of revelation.

1. Christianity declares itself to be the fruit of a special revelation, of which the historic Christ is the living centre.

2. He who denies to Christianity this character, even if he calls himself a Christian, has virtually no claim to the name.

3. Revelation is its own witness, for it is most clearly known by its fruits.

4. It is not dependent upon anything outside of itself for its authentication, for it has proofs abundantly in itself.

5. As the sun is known by its shining, so revelation is recognized by its own light.

6. Supernatural revelation has no need of criteria or proofs; it does not even give a place for them. If there is a living God, he will act and speak. If there is an actual revelation, it must be supernatural.

7. "Revelation springs immediately from itself, and while it gives to the world a new idea of God, it is itself resplendent with evidence. If once the idea of revelation exists in the world by revelation, it must then prove itself by itself" (*Rothe*).

8. The recognition of the reality of revelation depends ultimately upon moral conditions,—a holy love of truth, a personal need of light and life in God, deep moral earnestness.

9. "Where this disposition is wanting, there men reason about, for and against the truth, without understanding it, as a blind man would reason about colors" (*Van Oosterzee*).

II. The Definition of Supernatural Revelation.

1. We must draw a sharp distinction between *natural* and *supernatural* revelation.

2. The tendency of modern theology is to limit the idea of revelation as much as possible to the *inner* life of man, making revelation to consist essentially in a divine "self communication through men inspired of God."

3. They are afraid of laying stress upon the objective personal self-presentation of God which the Bible undoubtedly asserts, for fear of approaching too closely to the sphere of the miraculous.

4. We must draw a clear distinction between the outward *objective* self manifestation of God, and the inward *subjective* illumination of the human intellect.

5. "When God speaks and acts we call it revelation. For as a man in his actions and words reveals his inward being, so also God" (*Auberlen*).

6. Our older theologians are nearer the truth in their definitions than our modern.

7. *Quenstedt*: "Supernatural revelation is that external act of God by which he makes himself known to the human race, through His Word, in order that they may have a saving knowledge of him."

8. *Hollaz*: "Supernatural revelation is twofold, immediate and mediate. The Holy Spirit immediately illuminated the prophets and apostles. . . . At the present day God reveals himself and his will to the human race through means of the word written by the prophets and apostles."

9. There are different modes of revelation, Heb. 1:1.

a) Objectively.

- 1) The word is the most general form; even the audible voice is spoken of (Deut. 4:12).
- 2) The immediate view of God with which Moses was favored (Num. 12:6-8).
- 3) By the Angel of Jehovah (Gen. 16:13; 18:20, 26; 22:14; Ex. 3:6; etc.)
- 4) By means of angels (Matt. 1:20; etc.)
- 5) By means of Urim and Thummim (Num. 27:21; 1 Sam. 28:6).
- 6) By means of the Son of God (Heb. 1:1, 2).

b) Subjectively, through psychical states in which the reception of revelation may take place.

- 7) By dreams or visions, presented to the minds of the sleeping, (Gen. 28:12; Dan. 2:19; Matt. 2:13).
- 8) By ecstatic visions of the waking (Dan. 10:5; Acts 10:10, 11).
- 9) By the immediate illumination of the intellect (2 Pet. 1:21; Gal. 1:11, 12).

III. The Constituent Parts of Revelation.

1. The question of revelation is closely connected with that of miracles and prophecy.

2. God, revelation, miracle, sacred history, illumination, prophecy, are closely related conceptions.

3. The essential parts of revelation as manifested in sacred history are manifestations of God, miracles, and prophecy.

4. The manifestation of God culminates in the Incarnation of the Son of God.

5. Jesus Christ is the centre of Sacred History, "the mystery of godliness; He who was manifested in the flesh." (1 Tim. 3:16).

6. A miracle is an evidence of the indwelling of divine power in history.

7. The conception of sacred history is inseparable from that of miracles.

8. In miracles God reveals Himself in the form of divine action, in external facts, in objective history.

9. Prophecy is an evidence of the indwelling of divine knowledge, and is revelation in the form of word and doctrine.

10. The Bible lays great stress upon the fact that God has made a revelation of saving truth. (Matt. 11:25; 16:17; 1 Cor. 2:10; Eph. 3:3-5; 1 Pet. 1:12).

IV. The Contents of Supernatural Revelation.

1. The contents of revelation is the divine will of salvation as manifested in Christ Jesus.

2. It is not a revelation simply of certain truths and abstract propositions.

3. It is a revelation of God himself, of His own being and will, of His nature and character, of His love, holiness, and righteousness.

4. Its contents especially consists in a revelation of the divine fullness in the person of Christ; of His redemptive work in Christ, as prophet, priest, and king;—"the mystery of Christ." (Eph. 3:3).

V. *Literature*: Luthardt, *Kompendium*, sec. 25; Mulford, *Republic of God*, pp. 85-89; Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, vol. 1, pp. 121-124; Schmid, *Theology of Lutheran Church*, pp. 36, 37; Weidner, *Bibl. Theol. of O. T.*, sec. 58, 66.

SEC. 5. *The Necessity, Possibility and Actuality of Supernatural Revelation.*

I. The Necessity of Supernatural Revelation.

1. We maintain the necessity of revelation on psychological grounds.

- 1) It is a need of man's intellectual nature.
 - a) It is a need of our thinking mind. To find God, He must first reveal Himself.
 - b) Reason cannot give an answer to the deepest problems of life.
 - c) We need revelation on account of the corrupted condition of our reason.
 - 2) It is a need of man's moral nature.
 - a) On account of the corruption of our will, through sin.
 - b) We need revelation to give man a firm and well-grounded faith.
 - c) To reveal truths which man could not otherwise know, such as the doctrine of the atonement, forgiveness of sin, etc.
 - d) We need it to strengthen and raise feeble, sinful man.
 - e) To prescribe a rule to regulate his conduct and govern his passions.
 - f) The life of man has not its perfect satisfaction in the finite.
2. We maintain the necessity of revelation on historical grounds.
- 1) The general history of religions proves the necessity of a special revelation.
 - a) All religion rests ultimately upon a primitive revelation, a conviction maintained by Plato, Aristotle and Cicero.
 - b) *Cicero*: "Nature has given us but small sparks of knowledge, which we quickly corrupt and extinguish by our immoralities, faults and errors, so that the light of nature nowhere appears in its brightness and purity" (*Tusc. III., 1, 2*).
 - c) Man's condition, where the consciousness of God is obscured, both in ante-Christian and modern heathen lands, has sunk to the extreme depth of moral depravity.
 - 2) The history of philosophical thought proves the necessity of special revelation.
 - a) The conflicts of systems and schools.
 - b) The utter powerlessness of the best results of philosophy to satisfy the deepest needs of the individual.
 - 3) Even Christian philosophy is not ashamed to confess "that we might as well try to run without feet, as to know the divine without a revelation from on high" (*Clem. Alex.*).
3. The necessity of revelation cannot be proved to anyone who ignores the power of sin and the necessity of redemption.
- 1) *Sartorius*: He only, who self-righteously denies the sinfulness of the natural man, can dispute the necessity of a supernatural revelation.
 - 2) *Van Oosterzee*: The principle of its denial was

stated centuries ago in the words, "They that are whole have no need of a physician, but they that are sick" (Matt. 9:12).

4. Historical Sketch.

- 1) In the Greek Church more stress was laid upon the intellectual necessity of revelation, in the Western Church on the ethical need.
- 2) Augustine laid stress upon the necessity of grace and faith for salvation.
- 3) Deism and rationalism deny the necessity.
- 4) Of the older Deists, some considered the Scriptures a helpful book, others directly attacked them, trying to impugn their divine character and their infallibility.
- 5) To the rationalist reason is the sole judge. To him Scripture is like any other book. He does not grant it any authority, and accepts it only when it agrees with his own opinions.

II. The Possibility of a Supernatural Revelation.

1. Pantheism and Materialism both necessarily exclude the supernatural and all possibility of revelation. A God distinct from the course of nature has no existence on these theories.

2. Deism believes in a Supreme Being distinct from the world, but denies all revelation. God made all things so good at first, that the best thing He can do is to let the world alone.

3. The objections raised against the possibility of revelation arise from materialistic, pantheistic, and deistic tendencies.

4. There is no novelty in these objections, Epicurus having already taught "Dei humana non curant."

5. Christian Apologists for centuries have had to resist this denial in various forms.

- 1) The possibility of revelation would imply an imperfect creation of the world.
 - a) But the point at issue is not an improvement of God's works, but the wants of us poor sinful men.
- 2) The absolute and infinite cannot communicate itself to the finite.
- 3) God is immutable,—“but such an isolated act of God in time contradicts the idea of his unchangeableness” (*Strauss*).
- 4) It degrades and materializes the idea of God.
 - a) But, with reference to the last three objections, it is not the inner nature and essence of God that is in any way changed.
 - b) We do not insist that we can comprehend the infinite God perfectly (1 Cor. 13:9).
 - c) God still remains the infinite, incomprehensible, unchangeable, and spiritual, even while revealing Himself to man.
- 5) If we accept the possibility of revelation, then we must also accept the possibility of miracles, but miracle is excluded as unnecessary and absurd.

- 6) If we accept the possibility of the self-manifestation of God in revelation, then the self-manifestation of God in the incarnate Christ follows.
 - a) The last two objections touch the very life of the whole subject at issue.
 - b) The question as to revelation is properly the question as to miracle, and to Christianity itself.
- 7) The possibility of revelation would imply that the human mind is imperfect.
 - a) The self-conceit of modern enlightenment denies largely all revelation except by inward mental processes, and relegates all external manifestations of God to the realm of fable.
- 8) Our intellectual progress shows that everything occurs naturally, and modern scientific thought largely rejects the notion of a revelation as wholly absurd.
- 9) Granted the possibility of revelation in the abstract, how are we to distinguish between an objective divine communication and a merely subjective operation of our own intellect?
 - a) This last is the argument of Kant and Fichte.
 - b) According to this, belief in any supernatural revelation is but a piece of self-deception on the part of the undeveloped human consciousness.
 - c) Those who hold the last three views decline to accept any religious truth except by a process of rational induction.
 - d) They maintain that revelation must be the product of the internal working of a man's own spirit.
6. We maintain that revelation is possible for these reasons:
 - 1) No logical difficulty, from any side, can be brought against the idea of a revelation *per se*. (*Van Oosterzee*).
 - a) It is not in conflict with the laws of nature.
 - b) Nor with human reason.
 - c) Nor with conscience.
 - 2) It is possible so far as God is concerned.
 - a) It is metaphysically possible, for God is distinct from and above the world.
 - b) It is dynamically possible, for God is the Absolute and the Infinite.
 - aa) Our very idea of a living personal God implies that He must be able to reveal Himself.
 - bb) We must deny God himself, if we deny that He can reveal Himself or perform miracles.
 - c) It is ethically possible, for God is a personal God.
 - aa) *Luthardt*: Could He who is the Life be the unmovable; He who is Love be the silent one?
 - 3) It is possible so far as man is concerned.
 - a) He has the capacity to receive such a revelation.
 - b) It is not in conflict with his intellectual nature, for man is imperfect.

- c) Nor with his moral nature, for man is sinful.
- d) Man is inclined to expect such a revelation.
- e) Man is made for God, and as such, a revelation is possible to him.

III. The Relation of Reason to Revelation.

A. Presentation of Luthardt (*Lecture VII., Fundamental Truths*).

1. Revelation certainly goes *beyond* reason, and cannot but do so.

- 1) What is the meaning of a revelation which reveals nothing? (*Lessing*).
- 2) Reason must make a confession of its limits.
- 3) To comprehend our origin, our life, our destiny, is utterly denied us. (*Goethe*).
- 4) All knowledge rests ultimately upon the postulate of something believed.
- 5) The deeper anyone goes in his search after knowledge, the more humble and modest he becomes.
- 6) Man has ever sought to penetrate this world of mysteries, but revelation alone has given us any information, and faith is the only organ by which we have any knowledge of it.
- 7) God far surpasses the limits of our natural reason.
- 8) He who, in matters relating to God, believes nothing but what his own reason can fathom, dwindles the idea of God. (*Leibnitz*).
- 9) If this applies to God, generally speaking, it does so in a twofold degree to the divine counsels for our redemption (1 Cor. 2:11).

2. Revelation in many things is also *contrary* to our reason.

- 1) Revelation tells us that we have no merit at all before God,—that we can only live by grace,—this is certainly contrary to our natural reason.
- 2) It points to salvation in Christ alone, as our Redeemer,—to salvation by faith alone,—and this stands opposed to our natural ideas.
- 3) The apostle emphatically asserts that to the natural man the Gospel revelation is foolishness (1 Cor. 1:18).
- 4) There is nothing more paradoxical to the reason than revelation. But the question is, on which side does truth lie?
- 5) It is only by the deepest submission and humility that receptive minds can enter into the sanctuary of God, while the non-receptive, the self-satisfied and the proud are moved to opposition and enmity (*Julius Mueller*).
- 6) This very opposition is a proof in favor of revelation, and not against it.
- 7) The only science (Christianity) which is contrary to general reason and to the nature of man is the only one which has endured throughout all ages (*Pascal*).
- 8) The opposition of revelation to proud and self-exalting

reason, and the necessity it lays on us of renouncing this reason, is a proof in favor of revelation.

3. Revelation is not merely *beyond* and *contrary* to reason, but in a certain sense also in agreement with reason.

1) For even in this self-exalting reason there is found a conviction that we are made for God, and an inward consciousness that we are sinners, and in need of mercy.

2) "Reason is the human preface to divine revelation."

4. Reason is also the organ for the perception of revelation.

1) As is the relation of the eye, made for the light, to the sun, so is the relation in which reason stands to divine revelation.

2) But to see the light the eye must be opened.

3) Moreover, we must be willing to have our reason enlightened.

4) Things human must be known to be loved; things divine must be loved to be known (*Pascal*).

B. Presentation by Christlieb (Lecture II, *Modern Doubt*)

1. There is no antithesis between faith and knowledge.

1) For all knowledge is, in the last instance, conditioned by faith, and faith is the preliminary and medium of every act of intelligence.

2) The usual rationalistic axiom is just the reverse—that everything must first be proved and known before it can be believed.

3) But every act of knowledge is based upon the belief that we *are*, and that we *think*.

4) The certainty of our thinking depends simply on an act of belief.

5) He who believes nothing, knows nothing.

2. Scripture also teaches that there is no antithesis between faith and knowledge.

1) It recognizes no true knowledge except such as is grounded on belief (John 6:69).

2) True faith conducts the soul not only to peace and joy, but also to light and truth (John 12:36, 46).

3) It is not therefore knowledge but unbelief which is opposed to faith.

3. Reason stands in need of the guidance, regulation and assistance of revelation.

1) "As the law was given to the Jews not to make them righteous, but to convict them of unrighteousness, so in the same way reason was given to our race, not to make us wise, but to convict us of our own ignorance." (*Hamann*).

2) The act of submission brings with it the reception of light. "For when I am weak, then am I strong." (2 Cor. 12:10).

4. So far, therefore, from faith being unreason, it is in truth the highest form of reason, and the only way to progressive perfection of the intellect.

1) When reason and revelation diverge from each other,

rationalism would make reason the superior judge, and accept only that which can be logically demonstrated.

- 2) The true view is to subordinate reason to revelation.
- 3) "To improve religion by means of reason appears to me just as if I were to try to set the sun by my old wooden clock."

C. Historical Sketch.

1. The Greek Church laid stress on the harmony between reason and revelation, Christianity being regarded as the true philosophy.

2. In the Western Church more stress was laid on their antagonism.

3. Augustine knows of no other religion than positive Christianity, and insists that reason should submit to it.

4. John Scotus Erigena was the first who manifested a leaning towards rationalism, considering the true religion and true philosophy as one and the same thing,—but he did not deny the necessity of a positive revelation coming from without.

5. Abelard also finds a harmony between philosophy and Christianity, in that the truths of reason are confirmed and enlarged by the higher authority of revelation.

1) After man has done his part, divine love assists and grants what cannot be acquired otherwise.

2) He distinguishes between *credere*, *intelligere* and *cognoscere*; through doubt we come to inquiry, through inquiry to truth.

6. To Bernard of Clairvaux the rationalism of Abelard seemed to be in contradiction not only with faith, but also with reason.

7. Anselm asserts that it is first of all necessary to receive by an act of faith the truth of revelation. *Credo ut intelligam, non quero intelligere ut credam*, is the principle on which he proceeds, and after him this has become the principle of all orthodox Theology.

8. Thomas Aquinas sought to establish for the science of theology a position of superior dignity and importance over the science of philosophy, and endeavored to prove that the doctrines of Christianity, on the one hand, may be apprehended by reason, but, on the other, are above reason. The truths of revelation, however, though going beyond reason, do not contradict it.

9. The proper relation of philosophy to theology lay at the bottom of the contests during the Middle Ages between the Scholastics and the positive theologians.

10. Among the Scholastics themselves the struggle between the Realists and Nominalists had its influence upon theology.

11. The Reformation was strongly opposed to the then dominant philosophy.

12. Luther spoke with special violence against the Aristotelian philosophy, and perverted reason and barren speculation in general.

13. Luther called reason, by which he meant what is often called philosophy, the old woman who makes weather, the mother of vapors.

14. Our Lutheran dogmaticians since Gerhard's time distinguish between the formal and the material principles of reason.

- 1) The formal principles of reason, as an instrument, no one rejects.
- 2) Its material principles, as a rule and a judge, no wise man accepts (*Quenstedt*).

15. We admit the organic or *instrumental* use of reason, in the interpretation and exposition of Scripture, in refuting the arguments of opponents, in discussing the signification and construction of words, figures and modes of speech (*Quen.*).

16. We repudiate the *normal* use of philosophical principles when they are regarded as principles by which supernatural doctrines are to be tested (*Quen.*).

17. Reason is not a leader, but an humble follower of theology. Hagar serves as a handmaid of her mistress, she does not command. When she affects to command she is banished from the sacred home (*Hollaz*).

18. We must distinguish between contrariety and diversity. Philosophy and the principles of reason are not indeed contrary to theology, nor the latter to the former; but there is a very great difference between those things that are divinely revealed in Scripture and those which are known by the light of nature (*Quen.*).

19. We must distinguish between reason in man *before* and *since* the fall. The former, as such, was never opposed to divine revelation; the latter was very frequently thus opposed through the fault of corruption (*Gerh.*).

20. Natural human reason since the fall is:

- 1) Blind, darkened by the mist of error, exposed to vanity, Rom. 1:21; Eph. 4:17, 18;
- 2) Unskilled in perceiving divine mysteries and judging concerning them, Matt. 11:27; 1 Cor. 2:14;
- 3) Opposed to them, Rom. 8:7; 1 Cor. 2:11, 12; 1 Cor. 3:18, 19; 2 Cor. 10:5;
- 4) And we are commanded to beware of the seduction of reason, Col. 2:8 (*Gerhard*).

21. Mixed articles of faith may, in some measure, be known by the principles of philosophy. But the pure articles of faith can be learned and proved only from Scripture as the appropriate, fundamental, and original source (*Hollaz*).

22. The articles of faith are not contrary to, but merely above reason, since reason before the fall was not yet corrupt and depraved; but after the fall they are not only above but also contrary to corrupt reason (*Gerhard*).

23. We must also make a distinction between the reason of man *unregenerate* and *regenerate*, between reason partially rectified *in this life* and that which is fully rectified *in the life to come* (*Gerhard*).

IV. The Actuality and Truth of Revelation.

A. The proof of the reality and actuality of revelation is an historical one.

1 No man of any note denies that Jesus of Nazareth lived, and died on the cross.

2 The resurrection of Jesus Christ is a fact. From this central truth Apologetics will always have to start (1 Cor. 15:14). Deny this truth and the existence of the Christian Church remains an enigma. It is the great theme of Apostolic preaching. Christ, the crucified and risen, is the foundation of the Christian Church.

3 The conversion of St. Paul and the revelations he received. The whole historical position and importance of St. Paul rest upon actual facts and events. Otherwise his whole life would be an enigma. In Paul all essential forms of supernatural revelation are attested. If the miracles of Paul are historical, and as his testimony stretches back to the very beginning of the Old Testament, then we have no good reason to doubt those of Moses, Elijah, or Elisha.

4 The successful extension and beneficent influence of Christianity is a proof of the genuineness of revelation.

5 The very existence of the Church, and the spirit which animates it, prove the divine nature of the revelation in Christ, upon whom the church is built.

6. The Testimony of Miracles.

1) The writers of the New Testament declare plainly and boldly that Jesus and the apostles performed miracles.

2) The actual existence of this supernatural gift was accepted by all who received the Gospel (1 Cor. 12: 10, 29; Heb. 2:4; 2. Cor. 12:12).

3) We must either accept the fact that God revealed himself in Christ, and gave the apostles power to perform miracles, or else explain Christianity away as a monstrous deceit.

4) This is not the place to discuss the doctrine of miracle: 1) its idea, 2) possibility, 3) necessity, 4) recognizability, 5) reality, etc. We here presuppose their truth and credibility, but will have to discuss their demonstrative value at the close of this section.

7. The testimony of Prophecy.

1) Prophecy is an evidence of the indwelling of divine knowledge, and this action of God is manifested in word and doctrine.

2) Prophecies have the same relation to history that miracles have to nature.

3) We must be on our guard against two extremes, 1) that of the older supranaturalism limiting the office of the prophet to prediction, unexpectedly confirmed by the event, and 2) that of modern naturalism, which will admit nothing which cannot be explained by the prophet's environment.

4) Prophecy is a heavenly light which God lets fall in

the dark paths of history, to point out whither they lead. God knows the beginning, middle and end of all history, and the prophet sees just so much of this as God reveals to the eye of the spirit (*Delitzsch*).

5) This argument is a growing one, stronger now than formerly, and ranges over a vast extent.

8. The general statement of the argument is (*H. B. Smith*): Future events which God only could know, having respect to Christ and Christianity, and to the fate of nations standing in certain relations to the true religion, are predicted in the Old and New Testament, and have been fulfilled.

1) The whole of the Old Testament is really a prophecy of the New.

2) Specific Old Testament prophecies were already fulfilled before Christ's time.

a) The plagues of Egypt, the destruction of the house of Eli, the anointing of Saul, the prolonging of Hezekiah's life, the seventy years of captivity, etc.

3) Specific Old Testament prophecies about Christ and his work were fulfilled in the New Testament.

4) The predictions about foreign nations and kingdoms have been fulfilled. Babylon, Nineveh, Tyre, Egypt, etc.

5) The predictions concerning the Jewish nation.

The condition of the Jews is an evidence of the truth of revelation.

6) The predictions of Christ concerning his kingdom, especially as delineated in his parables.

7) Christ's predictions of the destruction of Jerusalem.

8) The entire course of prophecy proves that the revelation of which prophecy is an integral part is from God.

9) The whole of prophecy discloses one system of divine dealings and one plan, running through all history.

10) Prophecy has a progressive development, and the fulfilment is still going on.

11) The Christian religion here stands alone. The oracles of the heathen were dark and vague, and never dreamed of disclosing the course of events.

B. The proof of the truth of revelation is a moral one. It is an internal proof derived from the contents and effects of revelation itself. If a man do the will of God, he shall know of the teaching, whether it is of God or not (John 7:17; 8:47).

1. Attention has been specially called to the *impression* made by revelation upon the human mind (*Van Oosterzee*).

1) A sublimer thought than the kingdom of God as founded by Jesus Christ has never sprung up in any human heart. This can be historically proved—such a thought has never arisen in the heart of philosopher, poet, lawgiver or king.

2) No less impression is aroused in the truth-loving soul by the *self-witness* of Christ. Historical and

psychological reasons forbid us to think here either of self-deception or of fanaticism.

- 3) Equally powerful is the impression made by the whole personality of the Lord.
 "The impossibility of inventing such a personality as that of Christ overcomes every doubt" (*Lavater*).
 Jesus Christ is the miracle of history.
- 4) The impression produced by the moral and religious contents of revelation proves the truth of revelation. A system of faith and morals, so well suited to man, and yet so little according to man's nature, could not have had its origin in man.
2. The effects produced by the Gospel are a proof of the truth and genuineness of revelation.
 The foolish become teachers of the world (Rom. 1:14-16; 1 Cor. 1:27; 2:6; 4:15);
 Sinners become saints (Eph. 2:1-6; 4:12);
 Enemies become friends (Eph. 2:14; Gal. 3:28);
 The world becomes the temple of God (Eph. 2:15; 5:27).
3. As a moral and internal evidence we must also refer to the testimony of the Holy Spirit.
 - 1) This imprints a divine seal on that which the intellect and heart have recognized as divine truth.
 - 2) There is full certainty where the Holy Spirit has made the truth inwardly known.
 - 3) This is the very highest kind of evidence, a supernatural testimony, which takes away every doubt of the truth of revelation.
 - 4) Paul considers it desirable and possible that faith should stand, not in human wisdom, but in the power of God (1 Cor. 2:4, 5), and knows of an internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, which agrees with the Christian's own consciousness (Rom. 8:16).
 - 5) This testimony of the Holy Spirit, though closely allied, is not quite the same as the so-called proof by *experience* of the truth of revelation.
 - 6) The testimony of the Holy Spirit is the Christian internal certainty, produced by God himself, concerning the divinity of the revelation in Christ, unfolded in Holy Scripture.
 - 7) In the great witnesses of the faith during all ages, we meet with such a certainty of faith, that they would sooner have doubts as to their own existence, than as to the reality and truth of eternal things.
 - 8) The testimony of the Holy Spirit is no convincing argument for others, but a seal of the truth for ourselves.
 - 9) By it the believer is so surely convinced of the truth of revelation that to the question, "Whence knowest thou that?" he can with Luther answer, "Because I hear it in the Word and Sacraments, and because the Holy Spirit also testifies to it in my heart."
 - 10) This certainty of faith men cannot possibly give to

themselves; it is not gained at the beginning, but only when some progress has been made in the way of faith. (John 7:17).

11) This testimony is not perceived *before*, but *after*, we believe.

4. The true force of the maintenance of the Christian faith in revelation lies in a combination of the historical and the moral proof. (*Van Oosterzee*).

- 1) It is precisely by this combination that the intellect and the heart are at the same time satisfied.
 - 2) It is especially needed in these days when such a sharp distinction is drawn between historical and religious truth, and when the latter is even put in opposition to the former.
 - 3) Where in Scripture is "religious truth" presented to us apart from "historical facts"? Christianity is an historically revealed religion, which must establish itself as such by historic methods.
 - 4) It is difficult to decide whether we ought to lay more stress on the historical Apologetical method, or the more psychological and moral.
 - 5) To the believer himself the moral or internal proof has the highest import, and this has at all times been urged with zeal, and specially advocated by such great names as Tertullian, Athenagoras, Clemens Alexandrinus, Augustine, Luther, Pascal, and Frank.
 - 6) In general, however, it seems preferable to place the historic arguments in the foreground, and support the force of these by moral ones.
 - 7) This is in complete accord with the historical character of Christianity.
 - 8) It must not be forgotten, however, that belief in the truth of revelation is in no degree the natural product of a sum of well-arranged proofs.
 - 9) The believer generally comes to his conviction, not by the way of a logical process of thought, but by a psychological process of life.
 - 10) The proof is not the source of belief, but its support, and its justification, in so far as it points to its irrefragable ground.
5. We wish at the close of this section also to discuss briefly the evidential value of miracles and prophecy.
- 1) The earlier Apologists were in the habit of proving the truth and divinity of revelation or Christianity mainly from miracles and prophecy.
 - 2) They appealed, especially, to Christ's prophecy respecting the destruction of Jerusalem, to the fate of the Jews, to the judgment visited upon the Roman world, and to the triumphant spread of the Gospel.
 - 3) This method in later times has been deemed too external, and it has become necessary, from the character of the assaults on Christianity, not so much to find proofs *from* the miracles as to find proofs *for* them.

- 4) The position has been taken by many that miracles were adapted much more to the wants of the first beholders than to those of later times.
- 5) So already *Luther*: Such miracles were done that the Christian Church might be founded, established, and accepted. But these are unimportant when compared with the sublime wonders which Christ unceasingly works in his church.
- 6) So in general our later Dogmaticians, and the idea has become general that the argument from miracles can no longer form the foundation or even the starting point for Christian Apologetics.
- 7) It is true that miracles and prophecy are no proofs for revelation, when added to it from without, but are rather co-elements of revelation itself, which in their way testify to the divinity of its origin and contents.
- 8) There is no reason, however, to estimate the value and evidential force of miracles at so low a rate as has been done by many in our days. *Bruce*: Men do not now believe in Christ because of His miracles; they rather believe in the miracles because they have first believed in Christ.
- 9) He who asserts that Christ himself attached only little import to His miracles, has certainly never studied carefully such expressions as those in Matt. 11:4, 5, 20-24; 12:28, 39, 40; John 5:36; 10:25, 37, 38; 11:41; 14:11; 15:24. (*Van Oosterzee*).
- 10) The miracles of Jesus must be decidedly regarded as revelations of His glory (John 2:11), and at the same time, as striking symbols of the salvation which He proffers and promises.
- 11) Although originally adapted to the wants of the first witnesses, these miracles retain their high value for all time, for they furnish very important evidence in regard to Christianity and its origin.
- 12) The philosophic objections against the so-called evidential force of miracles fall away when the theistic conception of God is satisfactorily maintained.
- 13) If the experience of the present time teaches that an appeal to miracles is often a hindrance rather than a benefit to the sacred cause of faith, this indeed is a charge against the spirit of the time, but by no means against the miracles themselves.
- 14) The historical objections against the evidential force of miracles rest largely on exaggeration and misunderstanding.
 - a) For the sacred writers do make a distinction between the ordinary and extraordinary operations of God.
 - b) They do not suffer themselves to be carried away by their love for the miraculous.
 - c) The fact that there are false miracles does not prove that there are no true miracles.

- d) With reference to the so-called miracles of the Middle Ages and of the Romish Church, blind belief is as unsuitable as a systematic unbelief, and what is needed is a careful investigation.
- e) As yet we are waiting till such narratives of miracles are supported by proofs as clear as those which support the narratives of the New Testament.
- 15) On the whole, therefore, the argument from miracles remains substantially in all its strength. The proof *for* miracles becomes at the same time a direct proof *from* miracles.
6. With reference to the possibility and evidential value of prophecy we may remark:
- 1) The possibility of prophecy lies in the very existence of God. If God is omniscient, and there is a revelation, He can reveal to man whatever may be pleasing to Him. The human spirit has the capacity, for it has also an organ for the future, as well as for the past.
 - 2) That prophecies really exist, have been fulfilled, and are still in the course of fulfilment, does not require demonstration.
 - 3) The evidential value of prophecy to prove the reality of revelation is twofold.
 - a) It proves that the prophet is a messenger from God, and his word a divine word.
 - b) The fulfilment of prophecy in the person and work of Jesus Christ constitutes for belief a clear proof that Christ is really the Messiah promised in the Old Testament.
 - 4) The evidential force of prophecy, superior in this respect to that of miracles, increases as time progresses, and brings to light new proofs of the truth of revelation.
 - 5) The proof from prophecy thus remains substantially in all its strength.
7. Scripture passages to be memorized: 1 Cor. 13:9, 10; 1 Cor. 1:18; John 12:36, 46; Matt. 11:27; 1 Cor. 2:11, 12; Rom. 8:7; 1 Cor. 3:18, 19; 1 Cor. 15:13, 14; John 7:17; 1 Cor. 2:4, 5; Rom. 8:16, 17.
8. *Literature*: Luthardt, *Kompendium*, sec. 26; also *Fundamental Truths, Lecture VII*; Auberlen, *Divine Revelation*, pp. 35-79; Van Oosterzee, *Dogmatics, I*, pp. 112-165; Schmid, *Theology of the Lutheran Church*, pp. 36-48; Christlieb, *Modern Doubt*, pp. 94-135; H. B. Smith, *Introduction to Christian Theology*, pp. 162-167; Butler, *Analogy*, part II., chapter VII; Strong, *Systematic Theology* (1886), pp. 58-69.

SEC. 6. *God as the Absolute Personality.*

I. The Question as to the Knowableness of God.

1. That God is incomprehensible has been recognized and confessed, in accordance with the teaching of Scripture, by the Christian Church at all times.

2. Two extreme positions have been taken by many: *a*) that God is wholly unsearchable and incomprehensible, (1) because of the inner, inexhaustible riches of the Divine Essence, (2) because of the finite capacity of the human mind; *b*) that God can be fully and completely known.

3. In opposition to these two extremes we maintain that we can have a *true* though not a *perfect* knowledge of God.

4. God is capable of being known, in so far as He allows Himself to be known and reveals Himself, and in so far as the receptive faculty of man for such knowledge extends.

5. The more fully we believe God's revelation of Himself in His Word, and in proportion as faith itself becomes more steadfast and devout, the more extended and clear, will become our knowledge of God.

6. Our Dogmatists maintain that we cannot give a definition of God in the strict sense: (1) from the want of a genus; (2) from the divine perfection; (3) from the lack of sufficient enumeration (*Gerhard*).

7. We know God, indeed, but we do not comprehend Him, i. e., we do not perfectly know Him, because He is infinite (*Gerh*).

8. Our older theologians prefer the definition—God is an Infinite Spiritual Essence (Cal., Quen., Kœnig), or—God is an Independent Spirit (Baier, Holl.), while our later Dogmatists describe God as the Absolute Personality.

9. *Luthardt*: In this statement—God is the Absolute Personality—are involved the two ideas of Spirituality and Unity. We are not only assured of His Absoluteness on the ground of our restriction as His creatures, but also of His Personality on the ground of our personal relation to Him.

II. Definition of the Absolute and of Personality.

1. The idea of the Absolute implies "being freed from all conditions," absolutely independent, unconditioned, unlimited, self-existent, the unconditioned infinite.

2. The idea of Personality includes in it the idea of self-consciousness and self-determination.

3. Pantheism has always objected that the ideas "absolute" and "personal" contradict each other,—but this contradiction does not really exist.

4. Pantheists apply the idea of external infinitude, of extensive absoluteness, instead of the idea of intensive central absoluteness to God,—and all the objections brought against the Personality of God converge at last in the irrational requirement that God shall be Himself the Universe, instead of being its Lord (*Martensen*).

III. The Personality of God.

Belief in a Personal God is absolutely demanded (1) by our reason, (2) by our conscience, (3) by our heart, (4) by religion itself, and (5) by the fact of human personality.

1. Reason demands that Personality be ascribed to the Perfect Being.

Finiteness is a hindrance to the development of our personality. The highest Personality must be Infinite. Where there is perfect consciousness of self, and perfect power over self, as in the Infinite God, there must be Personality. Pantheism *contradicts reason* for it speaks of God, and yet denies Him Personality.

2. Our Conscience demands belief in a Personal God.

For our conscience demands the supremacy of moral law, and the supremacy of moral law demands a personal God. Moral law is eternal, and its author is the Eternal God. It is upon this alone that its inviolable authority depends. God alone can be the supreme lawgiver; He alone can be the supreme judge.

3. Our Heart demands belief in a Personal God.

We are created for devotion, faith, love, hope, happiness. Faith, love, devotion, are personal relations; we were made for personal relations. All earthly love points beyond itself. Love to God can alone satisfy the heart. Love to God demands a personal God.

4. Religion itself demands belief in a Personal God.

Pantheism annihilates religion; it abolishes the very postulates of morality. The God of Pantheism is not a personal God whom I can love, in whom I can trust, to whom I can pray.

5. My own personality demands belief in a personal God.

He who says, I am, must also say, O God, Thou art. By annihilating the personality of God, Pantheism annihilates human personality. Perfect personality is to be found only in God.

IV. Pantheism and Theism.

1. In reality there can be only two religious and two scientific systems—the Pantheistic and the Theistic,—the former having for its highest, the derived absolute, the universe; the latter being based on the original Absolute, that is God.

2. The antagonism between the two is a *religious* antagonism, and our deciding for pantheism or theism depends not merely on thought, but also on the entire tendency of our inner life,—on the conscience. Where the mind is unduly absorbed in physical or metaphysical pursuits, the tendency of the inner life is pantheistic; where, on the contrary, the *ethical* is recognized as the fundamental task of existence, the tendency of the inner life is theistic (*Martensen*).

3. The pantheistic theory of the universe is in deadly antagonism to Christianity at all points. It negatives all the cardinal Christian ideas—the personality of God, the creation of the world, the freedom of man, the reality of sin, providence, redemption, immortality. The radical principle of the theory is that God and the world are one. It denies to God any being distinct from the world, and to the world any being distinct from God. . . . God may be conceived

as spirit or as substance; in the one case there results an idealistic form of pantheism, in the other a materialistic. . . . To all practical intents the two are one (*Bruce*).

4. Pantheism is strictly anti-theism, rather than atheism. It was originally a religious, not a philosophical system, and underlies polytheism and all the systems which are the deification of nature.

5. Pantheism existed in pre-Christian times; it produced the dreamy and imaginative views of the philosophy of India, and founded also a philosophical school in Greece—the Eleatic.

6. The father of modern European pantheism is Spinoza (*d.* 1677).

7. To the pantheist the physical universe is the reality of God, to the materialist it is the reality *without* God. Pantheism attracts the subtler, less practical intellects. It has a charm for metaphysicians. Materialism is the temptation of physicists and physicians.

8. The fascination of pantheism for the intellect lies in its imposing conception of the universe as a unity; its fascination for the religious feeling lies in its doctrine of divine immanence; its fascination for the heart lies in its doctrines of necessity and of the perishableness of all individual life (*Bruce*).

9. Although Pantheism is weak on its speculative side, its weakness on the moral side is most easily discerned. Wherever the pantheistic theory is accepted, polytheism, in a more or less refined form, prevails.

10. Luthardt proposes a two-fold division:

- 1) The Oriental type, which loses the world in God—acosmism. One only being exists, whose modifications are the individual phenomena (the Eleati, Spinoza).
- 2) The Occidental type, which loses God in the world—atheism. This view totally denies the substantiality of God,—it is evolution, not being,—process, the absolute in the way to being (Heraclitus the Stoic); God is the moral order of the world (Fichte); the absolute is God implicit, the world is God explicit (Schelling).
- 3) Hegelianism, in one of its developments, has given the most perfect philosophical shape to pantheism,—though Hegel himself claimed to be a defender of the Christian faith, and regarded his philosophy as a translation into the forms of speculative thought of what he regarded the articles embodied in the Christian creed.

11. Pantheism seems to be the natural religion of man,—for the myths and philosophical notions current among nations without the revealed Word of God, have their root in pantheism.

12. Theism owes its vitality, vigor and fulness, to the idea of God as the God of the Church.

V. The Non-Biblical History of the Notion of God.

1. The history of the notion of God apart from revelation is a history of its depravation and corruption.

2. A clear and explicit answer is given by Paul in Rom. 1:21-23.

3. The history of natural religions corroborates that this history is one of corruption.

4. The special sins of heathenism are ingratitude and the denial of the true God (Rom. 1:21).

- 1) It denies His Personality (Pantheism).
- 2) It denies His Absoluteness (Polytheism).
- 3) It denies His Spirituality (Mythology).

5. We can derive some knowledge of God from the names of God.

- 1) The Latin *Deus* and Greek *Theos*, have been commonly derived from the Sanscrit *div*, "to give light," but Curtius and others derive it from *thes* in *thessasthai*, "to implore." *Theos*, then, is "He to whom one prays."
- 2) The English word "God" and the German "Gott," are not in any way related to the English word "good" or the German "gut," but both are derived from the Gothic "gutha," "to sacrifice." God thus designates the One to Whom sacrifice is offered.

VI. The Biblical Notion of God.

1. God is life (1 John 5:20), and has life in Himself (John 5:26).

2. God is a Spirit (John 4:24).

3. God is light or holiness (1 John 1:5).

4. God is love (1 John 4:8, 16).

5. God is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ (Rom. 15:6; 2 Cor. 1:3; etc.), and of all those who belong to His kingdom (Rom. 8:15, 16).

6. The very names of God also give us a knowledge of the nature and being of God.

- 1) *El* is the oldest Semitic name of God. Its original sense is "the powerful, the strong."
- 2) *Eloah*, the singular of *Elohim*, designates God as the powerful one which awakens terror.
- 3) *Elohim* is the most common designation of God in the Old Testament. The plural form signifies the infiniteness of the might and power which lies in the Divine Being, and thus passes over into the intensive plural. As the name of the *true* God, *Elohim* is regularly joined with the singular.
- 4) *El-Elyon* is the God Most High (Gen. 14:18).
- 5) *El-Shaddai* characterizes God as revealing Himself in His might (Gen. 17:1).
- 6) *Jahweh* designates God as "He who is what He is" (Ex. 3:14). God is *Jahweh* in as far as He has entered into an *historical* relation to mankind, and in particular to the chosen people Israel. The name carries us into the sphere of the divine *freedom*. It expresses the absolute *independence* of God in His dominion, as well as the idea of the absolute *immutability* of God, and implies the invariable *faithfulness* of God.
- 7) From the idea of *Jahweh* we can immediately derive certain attributes of God. 1) *Jahweh* is an *eternal* God, the Everlasting God, as Abraham addresses Him

in Gen. 21:33. God's eternity is involved in His absolute independence. 2) In the word *Jahweh* is also involved the idea that He is a *living* God (Gen. 16:14; Deut. 5:26).

- 8) *Jahweh* is the Lord,—my Lord (*Adonai*). This word *Adonai* implies a consciousness of standing under the immediate guidance and protection of God.

VII. The Notion of God in Christian Theology.

1. The Early Church, being influenced by Neo-Platonism laid stress on the existence of God as an absolute Personality, "He who is" (Ex. 3:14; John 1:18).

2. Justin Martyr and the apologetical writers who followed him, especially the Alexandrine school, emphasized, with Plato, God's transcendence above nature.

3. The anthropomorphic representation prevalent in the Christian Church found its extreme expression in Tertullian, who even spoke of a body in connection with his idea of God (*Quis negabit Deum corpus esse, etsi spiritus est*).

4. Augustine was the first in the Western Church to concern himself with the scientific investigation of the divine nature. He laid stress upon the self-conscious personality of God, as the basis of the doctrine of the Trinity.

5. Scholasticism was under the immediate influence of Augustine and his definition of God.

6. Anselm, following Augustine, emphasized the intelligence or the self-consciousness of God.

7. Thomas Aquinas said God was not the essence of finite things, but their final cause and original moving principle.

8. Duns Scotus, on the other hand, insists that God from the beginning exercised volition, but this will was essentially absolute and arbitrary.

9. Eckhart, as the representative of mysticism, finds the aim of life to be to lose one's self in God.

10. The Reformers emphasized the proposition that God is the God of redemption, who subordinates everything to His purpose of saving the lost.

11. The dogmatic divergencies of the Lutheran and Reformed Confessions point back to different conceptions of God's nature. The Reformed theologians emphasized more strongly God's sovereignty and the eternal decree by which He rejects a portion of the race,—but against this Lutheran theology guards.

12. Luther especially emphasizes the idea that God is love, and that God has decreed that He will be unknowable and unapprehensible apart from Christ.

13. Since Gerhard's time our Dogmaticians, following Thomas Aquinas, in their definitions, have emphasized the existence of God. God is an Infinite Spiritual Essence (so Calovius, Quenstedt, Koenig, Schmid); God is an independent Spirit (so Baier and Hollazius).

14. Our more recent Dogmaticians proceeding from the attribute of *Aseity* (having existence and life in Himself, underived and inexhaustible), in substance, agree in their definitions, that

God is the Absolute Personality,—some laying more stress on the Will others on His Essence and Spirituality.

VIII. *Literature*: Luthardt, *Kompendium*, sec. 27; *Fundamental Truths*, Lecture III.; Thomasius, *Christi Person and Work*, sec. 8; Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, Index; Martensen, *Dogmatics*, sec. 42, 43; Bruce, *Apologetics*, chap. III., Philippi, *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, Vol. 2, pp. 17-21; Weidner, *Biblical Theology of the O. T.* (Oehler), sec. 35-42; Schmid, *Theology of Lutheran Church*, pp. 120-125; Frank, *System der christ. Wahrheit*, sec. 12, 13; Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 299-365; Christlieb, *Modern Doubt*, Lecture IV., pp. 210-240; Dörner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Vol. I., sec. 16, 32; Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 178-194; Mulford, *Republic of God*, pp. 22-32.

SEC. 7. *God as Holy Love.*

The recognition of the God of salvation as the God of Love embraces three elements, 1) that of Essential Goodness, 2) that of Perfect Holiness, and 3) that of Perfect Love.

I. God is Essential Goodness.

1. God alone is the original and unconditioned true and good. "None is good, save one, even God" (Mark 10:18; Luke 18:19; Matt. 19:17).

2. He could not be the alone Good, if He were not the perfect personality

3. It has been asked if the Good is good because God *wills it*, or if He wills the Good because it *is in itself good*.

4. The Scotists in the Middle Ages maintained the first, but this may lead to the denial of God's ethical personality.

5. The second view was maintained by Plato and by Thomas Aquinas, but this may also lead into error, for there can be nothing external to God which is absolute good in itself.

6. The solution of these difficulties must be sought in the conception of personality itself, and the two theories must be recognized as expressing two sides of absolute Personality.

7. God wills the Good because it is good in itself, not as something which is external to Himself, but because the Good is His own eternal essence (*Martensen*).

8. God cannot do otherwise than will His essential nature, and so we may also say, the Good is good because God wills it, for the idea of the Personality of God is not merely to concur, but to originate; not merely *to be* the Good, but also *to produce* the Good (*Martensen*).

9. Goodness therefore belongs to God not only *absolutely and in itself*, which is His very perfection, or the essence of God (Matt. 5:48), but also *relatively*, or in relation to creatures, since He efficiently produces every created good (James 1:17). (*Baier*)

10. As God is good in Himself, God is holy; as He is good to others, God is love.

II. God is Perfect Holiness.

1. God is *kadosh*, the Holy One, "glorious in holiness" (Ex. 15:11).

2. God's holiness is God's self-preservation by virtue of which He remains like Himself in all relations (Isa. 6:3; Ps. 99:5).

3. It is absolute separation and freedom from all evil and any

sinfulness of the creature, an absolute perfection of life, but essentially in an ethical sense.

4. Absolute holiness is the very essence of the Divine Nature, and from this center the ideas of His unapproachableness, incomparableness, and glory irradiate (*Delitzsch*).

5. The notions of divine holiness and glory are related. We may say with Oetinger, holiness is hidden glory, and glory disclosed holiness.

6. The symbolical designation of the divine holiness is, that God is *light* (Isa. 10:17; 1 John 1:5).

7. There are three statements made by John which stand alone as revelations of the nature of God,—“God is Spirit” (John 4:24), “God is Light” (1 John 1:5); “God is Love” (1 John 4:8, 16).

8. These sayings are unique, and are probably the nearest approach to a definition of God that the human mind can attain.

9. No figure could give the idea of absolute perfection so clearly and fully as light.

10. It suggests ubiquity, brightness, happiness, intelligence, truth, purity, holiness (*Plummer* on 1 John 1:5).

III. God is Perfect Love.

1. We may draw this distinction, that in relation to the universe the communication of the divine life is goodness; considered in relation to personality, it is love. For all creatures participate in the goodness of God; but personal creatures alone can be considered partakers of His love (1 John 4:8, 16). (*Martensen*).

2. Of the three great truths that God is Spirit, is Light, is Love, this last is the chief, for the other two ideas are incomplete without it.

3. If this one thing only were all we were told by the voice of the Spirit of God, that *God is love*, nothing more ought we to require (*Augustine*).

4. All the divine attributes are combined in love, as in their center and vital principle.

5. This unity of the divine nature is more than a moral union, it is one of essence, it is one of holiness.

6. God is Holy Love. All His properties must be regarded as the attributes of love. God's power is thus the power of love; God's knowledge the intelligence of love; God's righteousness the righteousness of love (*Van Oosterzee*).

7. “God is Himself Love, and His nature is nothing but pure love; so that if any one would paint and set forth God, he must draw such an image as should be pure love, representing the Divine nature as the furnace and burning point, of that love which fills heaven and earth” (*Luther*).

8. To the question, *What* is God? the answer is, God is Spirit; His nature is purely spiritual. But to the question, *Who* is God? in regard to His inner being, the ideas of light and love have their application. The Infinite Spirit is equally the one and the other—spotless light, because He is Holy Love (*Van Oosterzee*).

9. The older theologians well perceived that the fundamental axiom, that God is love (1 John 4:16), contained the entire knowledge of God. Gerhard calls it a practical, ethical, active definition of God.

10. *Gerhard*: The God of revelation is rightly defined as Love, because He does everything in and from love—from love proceed all the works of God. . . . So also does the practical knowledge of God consist in love. It profits nothing to dispute with subtlety concerning God, and meantime to be without love to that Highest Good, that Essential Love.

IV. *Literature*: Luthardt, *Kompendium*, sec. 28; Sartorius, *Doctrine of Divine Love*, pp. 3-20; Weidner, *O. T. Theology*, sec. 44-48; Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, Vol. 1., pp. 61-75; *Dogmatics*, sec. 51; Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, sec. 50; Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology*, pp. 222-229; Strong, *Systematic Theology*, pp. 127-130, 140-143; Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, sec. 16, 26; Frank, *Wahrheit*, sec. 16, 19.

SEC. 8. *The Doctrine of the Divine Attributes.*

I. Definition of the Divine Attributes and their Relation to the Divine Essence.

1. The divine attributes do not denote anything superadded to the divine essence, but are only inadequate conceptions of an infinitely perfect essence (*Quenstedt*).

2. These attributes, however, are not merely different conceptions in our minds, but different modes in which God reveals Himself.

3. Considered in and of themselves, they are really and absolutely one with the divine essence. The attributes cannot be separated from God, since they are the very essence of God (*Gerhard*).

4. These attributes are called *affections*, because they treat of and designate the divine essence; they are called *attributes*, because they are attributed to God by our intellect; and are called *perfections*, because they most perfectly declare God's essence.

5. Although we may in a certain sense make a distinction between essence and attributes, this is only a *formal* distinction, one in thought, not in fact. *Hollaz*: "Divine attributes are distinguished from the divine essence and from each other, not *nominally*, because divine attributes imply distinct conceptions, nor *really*, because the divine essence is most simple, destitute of all real composition, but *formally*, because we form single conceptions of the operations of the single attributes, although they do not exist separately in the divine nature."

6. The attributes of God are not merely our subjective conceptions of God, as the Pantheists and Nominalists maintain, "but have existed in essential objectivity in God, before all activity of the distinguishing human intellect was called into existence" (*Rothe*).

7. We teach, therefore, with the Realists (of one class), that the attributes of God are objectively true as revealed, and have therefore their ground in the divine essence (*Martensen*). They have an objective existence.

8. The divine attributes belong to God, not as though they

made up His nature, as though His whole being consisted only of the combination of the same; but because they are the *forms* and *outward* expressions, in which His Essence is revealed and becomes manifest" (*Bruch*). They manifest the Divine Essence.

II. Methods of Determining the Divine Attributes.

1. Two ways have been used in times past to obtain a knowledge of the attributes of God, 1) by combining the statements of the Bible, as perfectly as we can, and 2) by the reason attempting to enumerate all the perfections of God.

2. The Scholasticism of the Middle Ages, adopted by our older Dogmaticians, sought to determine the Attributes of God in a three-fold way, —1) of eminence, 2) of negation, and 3) of causality.

3. The *way of eminence* ascribes to God, in the highest sense, all the perfections which we can discover in His creatures. Whatever exists in an effect, pre-exists in the cause.

4. The *way of negation* removes from our conception of God all imperfections which we observe in creatures, and attributes to Him all the opposite perfections. There is no defect in Him who is supremely perfect. *Hollaz*: Relying upon this principle, we call God independent, infinite, incorporeal, immense, immortal, incomprehensible.

5. The *way of causality* recognizes from the effects an efficient first Cause, and predicates of God those attributes which are necessary to create, preserve, and govern, the world of nature and mind.

6. Though this three-fold method seems valuable, it has its limitations, and promises far more than it really gives.

7. "Infinitely preferable to the method of an arid reasoning is the thoughtful observance of God's *revelation* of Himself, in His Word, works, and ways, which rival each other in their unceasing manifestation of His attributes" (*Van Oosterzee*).

III. The Classification of the Divine Attributes.

1. Various classifications have been proposed, the object in view being order and clearness of presentation, as *negative* (unity, simplicity, immutability, infinity, immensity, eternity) and *positive* (life, knowledge, wisdom, holiness, justice, truth, power, goodness), the former denying certain imperfections, and the latter affirming perfections, concerning God.

2. Instead of using the terms negative and positive, many distinguish them as absolute and relative (that is, attributes which express the relation of God to Himself, and His relation to the world), immanent and transitive (the former relating to God as He is in Himself, the latter referring to actions outside of Himself), or quiescent and operative.

3. All these terms do not express different modes of classification, but simply different modes of designating the same classification.

4. Philippi adopts a three-fold division: 1) of Absolute Being; 2) of Absolute Personality; and 3) of Holy Love. If we regard God as the Absolute Being in His relation to the world, we obtain the attributes of eternity and omnipresence; if we conceive of God

as the Absolute Person, we obtain the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience; if we conceive of God as Holy Love, we obtain the attributes of divine wisdom, divine justice, and divine goodness. From the contemplation of these attributes we derive all the other attributes of God.

5. Luthardt adopts the following classification:

I. Relation of God to the natural world—

- 1) Absolutely.—Eternity, immensity, immutability.
- 2) Relatively.—Omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience, wisdom.

II. Relation of God to the moral world—

- 1) Absolutely.—Holiness, justice, truth.
- 2) Relatively.—Love, goodness, grace, mercy, faithfulness.

6. We prefer the following classification:

I. Attributes of Divine Essence.

Aseity, infinity, unity, eternity, immutability, immortality, spirituality, simplicity, invisibility, immensity, omnipresence, goodness, blessedness.

II. Attributes of Divine Knowledge.

Omniscience, wisdom.

III. Attributes of Divine Will.

Omnipotence, holiness, justice, faithfulness, truth, goodness, grace, mercy.

IV. The Particular Attributes.

1. By *aseitas* or self-existence is meant that attribute of God by which He is the *cause of Himself*, self-existent, complete in and of Himself, not dependent on any other being. Acts 17:24, 25. "For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counselor?" Rom. 11:34.

2. God is *infinite*, because no limitation can be assigned to His essence, either of time, or place, or of anything else. He is exalted above all we can know or think. "His greatness is unsearchable." Ps. 145:3.

3. *Unity* is that attribute of God, by which we conceive the divine essence to be absolutely single. "The Lord our God is one Lord" (Deut. 6:4), "there is none else beside him" (Deut. 4:35). Mark 12:29; 1 Cor. 8:4; Eph. 4:6.

4. *Eternity* is that attribute by which God is freed from all succession of time, without beginning or end, and contains in Himself the ground or reason of time. Isa. 44:6, "I am the first, and I am the last; and beside me there is no God." To Him, past, present, and future are *one eternal now*, for with God there is no time.

5. In the conception of eternity is involved also the notion of the *immutability* of God, which consists in this, that God is liable to no change either as to His essence, or as to His will or purpose. Ps. 102:27, "Thou art the same"; James 1:17, "with whom can be no variation." Mal. 3:6, "For I the Lord change not."

- 1) When in Scripture (Gen. 6:6) repentance is ascribed to God, this must be explained in the light of Num. 23:19, for this does not imply any change in God, but in His relations to men.

- 2) When prophecies are not fulfilled, this can be explained from the conditional nature of prophecy. See *Jonah* 3:4, 10; *Jer.* 18:7, 8.
- 3) In the Incarnation there is no change in the divine nature, but in the divine mode of manifestation. This has a bearing on the Kenotic theory.
- 4) The immutability of God is consistent with His activity in nature and grace.
6. To the eternal God are also ascribed the attributes of life or *immortality* and incorruptibility (*Rom.* 1:23; *1 Tim.* 1:17).
 - 1) God is life 1) essentially, having life in Himself and of Himself, by His own nature and essence (*John* 5:26); and 2) effectively, because He is to all the cause and origin of life, not formally, but causally (*Acts* 17:28). (*Quenstedt*).
 - 2) When God is described as incorruptible, the idea is that He is the Imperishable One, because His nature is unchanging and based on itself, and is equivalent to "He only hath immortality" (*1 Tim.* 6:16).
7. *Spirituality*. God is absolute, pure immaterial Spirit (*John* 4:24). Negatively, materiality is excluded; positively, God's essence is Spirit.
8. Involved in the divine spirituality is the attribute of *simplicity*, by which God is not compounded of matter and form, of integral parts, either as to His nature or substance. *Ex.* 3:14, "I AM THAT I AM." This attribute implies His indivisibility.
9. The immateriality and spirituality of God implies His *invisibility*. "The invisible God" (*Col.* 1:15).
10. The infinity of God, with respect to time, is eternity, and with respect to space, is *immensity*. This attribute of *immensity* includes the idea that the essence of God 1) is not subject to limitations of space, and 2) is above all space, being Himself the cause of space. Space itself is a creation of God *Rom.* 8:39, "nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature."
11. From the immensity of God follows 1) the attribute of *illocality*, that God is absolutely everywhere, and 2) that of *omnipresence*, by virtue of which God is present to all His creatures.
 - 1) This presence of God is not simply one of *effectual operation*.
 - 2) Nor one only by *sight* and *knowledge*.
 - 3) But God in His entire *essence* is present at the same moment everywhere.
 - 4) This is not a local or *circumscriptive* presence, as if God could be comprehended or circumscribed.
 - 5) Nor a *definitive* presence, in the way angels are present, who are present somewhere, without the local occupation of space.
 - 6) But a *repletive* presence, which belongs to God alone *per se* and essentially, by which God, being confined to no place because of the immensity of His essence, fills all space.
 - 7) But this omnipresence is not of necessity, which is the

fundamental error of Pantheism, but the free act of God's will. Though God is immanent in the universe, He is also transcendent.

8) The omnipresence of God is taught especially in Ps. 139:7-12; Jer. 23:24; Isa. 66:1; Acts 17:24, 27, 28; 1 Kings 8:27.

9) *Martensen*: "As the bird in the air, as the fish in the sea, so do all creatures live and more and have their being in God . . . God is present in one way in nature, in another way in history; in one way in the Church, in another way in the world. He is not, in the same sense, present alike in the hearts of His saints, and in those of the ungodly, in heaven and in hell. . . . That which chiefly concerns us is the special presence of God in His Church, and not merely that universal presence by which all creatures alike are embraced."

12. The *goodness* of God as an attribute of the divine essence is that by which of Himself and by Himself, He is supremely good, Matt. 19:17; Mark 10:18 (*Quenstedt*).

13. *Blessedness* as an attribute of the essence of God describes the inner life of perfection which God lives, in total independence of His creation, in triumphant prospect of the completion of His perfected kingdom (*Martensen*).

14. *Omniscience* is that attribute of God, by which He, through one simple and eternal act of the intellect, knows Himself and all things whatever have been, are, and shall be, or even in any way can be. He knows not only all things absolutely, but also that which is conditionally future or possible, and He is acquainted even with those things which are impossible. 1 Kings 8:39; Ps. 139:1-6; Matt. 10:30; Acts 15:8; Rom. 11:33; Heb. 4:13 (*After Quenstedt*).

1) We may distinguish between the natural, the free, and the mediate knowledge of God.

2) The *natural* knowledge, called also necessary, abstract, indefinite, is that act of simple intelligence by which God knows Himself and all things out of Himself. 1 Cor. 2:11.

3) *Free* knowledge (or of free vision, called also intuitive and definite) is that by which God truly knows all things as they actually come to be, as past, present, and future, both in Himself as the universal cause, and in their proximate causes and in themselves. Isa. 29:15, 16; Matt. 6:32.

4) *Mediate* knowledge (known also as the hypothetical knowledge of the conditional future) is that, according to which God is acquainted with those things which can exist, with the condition interposed that it is limited to that which the creatures, if created with certain conditions, would be free to do, or would be allowed to effect (*Quenstedt*). 1 Sam. 23:10-13; Jer. 38:17-20; Ezek. 3:6; Matt. 11:21-24.

5) *Quenstedt*: Natural knowledge precedes every free act

of the will; free knowledge is said to follow a free act of the will; mediate knowledge is said indeed to precede an act of the will, yet in such a manner that it sees something as future only on the hypothesis of such will.

- 6) *Martensen*: God knows the possible as possible and the actual as actual; He knows the necessary as necessary, and the free under the conditions which He Himself imposed on freedom.
- 7) This knowledge of God is 1) *intuitive*, not discursive, but simple and immediate; 2) *simultaneous*, not successive, for all that occurs in all times is in the divine knowledge at once; 3) most *distinct* and exact; 4) most *true* and perfect; 5) *eternal*, as comprehended in one timeless act of the divine mind.
- 8) The distinction made by some who aimed to comprehend all aspects of divine knowledge, past, present, and future, under the three terms, Remembrance, Vision, and Foreknowledge, does not aid much, for with God there is no time, and all things are intimately present to His eternal knowledge.
- 9) God has a intimate knowledge of all things which are still future to us. We speak of the *foreknowledge* of God from a human standpoint, for with God there is really nothing future, all things are present to Him, not indeed actually by way of existence, but objectively.
- 10) Humanly speaking all future things or events are 1) future necessary things,—those which occur according to natural law; 2) future conditional things,—those which will be, under certain conditions; 3) future contingent things,—those events which are dependent on free will.
- 11) All these things are most absolutely known by God, who in His *foreknowledge* sees all things most absolutely in a perpetual, abiding, and immutable now.
- 12) *Hutter*: Every object is foreseen or foreknown by God as it is in its own nature, and according to its results, so that this foreknowledge depends upon the event, but the event does not depend upon the foreknowledge.
- 13) *Gerhard*: Things either present, or past, or future, do not depend upon the knowledge of God, but His knowledge depends upon the thing and event which is foreknown as just such as it is, so that if it would not have been, this very thing also would have been foreseen by God.
- 14) The foreknowledge of God does not limit the free actions of His creatures.
- 15) The problem of the foreknowledge of God and the freedom of the will was already discussed by Aristotle and Cicero.
- 16) These are not inconsistent and contradictory ideas; the antithesis is not real, but only seeming.
- 17) The Socinians maintain that God becomes cognizant of the free actions of man only after they take place,

because they cannot be certainly foreknown. So in general the Arminians. *Daniel Curry*: "The denial of absolute divine foreknowledge is the essential complement of the Methodist theology without which its philosophical incompleteness is defenceless against the logical consistency of Calvinism."

- 18) As Socinianism would solve the problem by denying foreknowledge, so Absolute Predestination seeks to solve it by denying the Freedom of the Will.
 - 19) We cannot accept the doctrine of determinism, for this would finally lead to fatalism, pantheism, and to the doctrine of fate.
 - 20) We must strictly maintain God's perfect knowledge of the future free acts of His creatures. "Knowledge of contingency is not necessarily contingent knowledge."
 - 21) God does not foreknow free acts *mediately*, by foreknowing merely the motives which induce acts, but *immediately*, by pure intuition, inexplicable to us.
 - 22) So great and deep is the knowledge and understanding of God that it is unsearchable and incomprehensible. Job 11:7; Isa. 40:28; Rom. 11:33.
15. "The *wisdom* of God signifies that most accurate judgment of God, by which He knows how to dispose and ordain all causes and effects in a most admirable manner for the attainment of His end. Job. 12:13; 28:20; Rom. 11:33" (*Baier*).
- 1) This attribute is closely related to the divine omniscience.
 - 2) Martensen calls *wisdom* the practical, teleological knowledge of God.
 - 3) God produces the best possible results with the best possible means.
 - 4) Scripture lays stress upon the wisdom of God as displayed 1) in Creation (Ps. 104:24; Prov. 3:19); 2) in Providence (Dan. 2:21); and 3) especially in the plan of Redemption (Eph. 3:10; Col. 2:3).
16. *Omnipotence* is that divine attribute "by which God independently, through the eternal activity of His own essence, can do absolutely everything that does not involve a contradiction. Matt. 19:26; Luke 1:37; 18:27; Eph. 3:20" (*Quenstedt*).
- 1) Divine power may be distinguished as *absolute*, by which God can most absolutely effect whatever can exist; and *ordinary*, by which He governs the universe. Creation, miracles, inspiration, regeneration, resurrection, etc., are to be referred to His absolute power, and all works of providence to His ordinary power.
 - 2) By this absolute power God can do many things, which, nevertheless, He does not do by His ordinary power (*Quenstedt*).
 - 3) It is an erroneous conception of divine power to maintain that God can do only what He actually brings to pass.

- 4) By His absolute power He can do all possible things except those which involve a contradiction.
- 5) *Quenstedt* speaks of two general exceptions: 1) Such as have no mode of existence,—thus God is unable to render a deed undone; and 2) Such as imply a fault or defect,—for God is unable to lie, or sin, or die.
- 6) In this connection we must also discuss *the will* of God.
- 7) The will of God is either *natural* or *free*. By His *natural* will God is said to will Himself, and that which He is not able not to will. By His *free* will God wills all created things, and that which He is able also not to will, or to will the opposite.
- 8) The free will of God may be distinguished (*Baier*):
 - (1) Into *efficacious*, by which God wills something to be effected, which will may be *absolute* (without a condition) or *conditioned* (under a condition),—and *inefficacious*, by which something in itself pleases God, although He does not intend to effect it.
 - (2) Into *absolute*, by which God wills that something be effected by His own absolute power, and *ordinate*, by which God wills that something be effected by His ordinary power as bound to second causes and to means appointed by Himself.
 - (3) Into *antecedent*, by which He wills something from Himself alone, without any regard to the circumstances, and *consequent*, by which He wills something with a consideration of the circumstances.
 - (4) Into *hidden* and *revealed*. This refers to what God keeps in His own counsel, and to what He has communicated to us. Deut. 29:29; Rom. 11:33.

17. "The *holiness* of God is the supreme purity in God, absolutely free from all stain or vice, and requiring due cleanliness and purity in creatures" (*Quenstedt*).

- 1) *Hollaz*: God is holy, 1) *independently*, and by His essence; 2) *immutably*, inasmuch as the holiness of God cannot undergo a change, James 1:17; 3) *efficiently*, because He is the author of all holiness, 1 Thess. 5:23; 4) *by way of example*, Lev. 11:44; 1 Pet. 1:15, 16; 5) *objectively*, because the holiness of God must be sacredly recognized by us, Isa. 6:3."
- 2) God's holiness is God's self-affirmation and self-preservation, by virtue of which He remains like Himself in all relations which either are in Him or on which He enters in any way.
- 3) It may be defined concretely as an absolute perfection of life, but essentially in an ethical sense. Holiness is hidden glory, and glory disclosed holiness.
- 4) It is the clearness and purity of the divine nature, which excludes all communion with what is sinful. In this sense the symbolical designation of the divine holiness is, that God is *light* (Isa. 10:17; 1 John 1:5).

- 5) It thus implies 1) entire freedom from moral evil, and 2) absolute moral perfection.
- 6) It is because of His holiness that God is a consuming fire.
- 7) We may therefore define holiness as the purity of God's essence and the purity of His will,—purity willing itself.

18. *Hollaz*: "Justice (or righteousness) is that attribute by which God wishes and does all those things which are conformed to His eternal law (Ps. 92:15), prescribes suitable laws to creatures (Ps. 19:7), fulfils promises made to men (Isa. 45:23), rewards the good (Rom. 2:5-7; 2 Thess. 1:6, 7), and punishes the wicked (Ps. 119:137; Rom. 1:32; 3:8; Acts. 17:31; 2 Thess. 1:6)."

- 1) Divine justice reveals itself 1) in physical laws; 2) in the general ethical law governing society; 3) in the individual conscience; and 4) in Scripture.
- 2) This justice is both *legislative* and *distributive* (judicial or executive).
- 3) The holiness of God manifests itself towards man as *legislative* justice, through conscience and through Scripture, requiring of man godliness, purity, and righteousness (Tit. 2:12).
- 4) In the idea of divine holiness is included that God is a jealous God (Ex. 34:14; Deut. 6:15). The divine zeal is the energy of the divine holiness. The divine jealousy manifests itself as divine wrath against every violation of the divine will. For the divine wrath is the most intense energy of the holy will of God, the zeal of His wounded love. This manifestation of divine wrath has its origin wholly in the person who sins and is the result of sin.
- 5) The *distributive* or judicial Justice of God is either *remunerative*, rewarding the good (Rom. 2:7, 10), or *punitive*, punishing the wicked (2 Thess. 1:8, 9).
- 6) The four attributes of divine holiness, righteousness, faithfulness and truth are very closely connected (Deut. 32:4), and this makes manifest to us the "true and righteous judgments" of God (Rev. 15:3, 4; 16:5, 7; 19:2).
- 7) The *holiness* of God displays itself as a wrath against sin, His *righteousness* requires that guilt be punished or expiated, His *faithfulness* demands of Him that He fulfill all His promises to those who trust in Him, and His *truth* that in His judgments upon the wicked He be true and righteous.
- 8) The *punitive* justice of God has therefore not as its principal aim 1) the reformation of sinners, as held by Pelagians, Socinians, Universalists, and Rationalists in general; nor 2) simply the prevention of crime (the common doctrine of jurists), accepted by Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen, Grotius, and others; nor 3) the general welfare of men, as if happiness were a higher end than holiness; but 4) the promotion and the preserva-

tion of the holiness of God,—for sin in the sight of God is such a violation of God's holiness that the intense energy of His holy will manifests itself as wrath, and the justice of God demands that sin be punished or expiated.

- 9) The doctrine of the punitive justice of God is corroborated 1) by the testimony of conscience; 2) by the religious experience of believers; and 3) is most clearly taught in Scripture.
- 10) It is in this connection that we must also solve that important question as to the Ground of Moral Obligation or the Ultimate Rule of Right.
 - (1) The ground of moral obligation does not lie in the power of civil law, for might does not make right. The civil law is not the recognized standard of right or wrong (Hobbes).
 - (2) Nor does it lie in the public sentiment of society (Adam Smith and in general the evolutionary theory of Ethics held by Bain, Spencer, and others).
 - (3) Nor does it lie in the arbitrary will of God. Upon this view, right and wrong are variable quantities,—right is right simply and solely because God wills it; it would also imply that might is right.
 - (4) Nor does it lie in something inherent in the nature of things,—fitness of things (S. Clarke), relations of things (Wayland), abstract right (Haven, Alexander), for this nature of things is not ultimate but has its origin and ground in the nature of God.
 - (5) Nor does it lie in utility or in the tendency to promote happiness. (We find here many modifications constituting distinct systems, as the selfish scheme of Paley, the Subjective Happiness theory of N. W. Taylor and Mill, the Greatest Good theory of Edwards, Bentham, Dwight, Finney, Fairchild, Hopkins.) This view implies that God is holy only for a purpose. This theory is closely related to that advocated by Shaftesbury, Hume, Herbart, and others who would trace the ultimate rule of right to an inner moral sense.
 - (6) Nor is it to be traced to the moral reason in man, as advocated by such great writers as Cudworth, Price, Reid, Dugald Stewart, Hamilton, McCosh, Calderwood, Hickok, and others.
 - (7) Nor does it lie in the practical reason, as held by Kant and his followers.
 - (8) But according to the Scriptures the ground of moral obligation lies in the nature of God, in His holiness, the moral perfection of His Being (Gregory, Wuttke, Chalmers, Strong, Dorner, and Lutheran Theologians in general). 1 Pet. 1:16; Matt. 5:48.

19. By *faithfulness* is meant that attribute of God by which He is trustworthy in the very highest sense. He will fulfill all His promises to His people, and bring to a completion the whole scheme of redemption. Num. 23:19; Tit. 1:2; Rom. 3:3.

20. By *truth* is meant that attribute of God by which He says only what He really means, and what He says will surely come to pass. Rom. 3:4.

21. *Goodness* is that attribute of God which leads Him to communicate of His life and blessedness to those who do not reject His grace.

22. The *grace* of God is His goodness and free love as displayed towards the sinner as a transgressor of the law and guilty before God (John 1:14; 3:16).

23. The *mercy* of God is His love as displayed towards the sinner as subject to sorrow, misery and death (Luke 1:72, 78; Tit. 3:5; 1 Pet. 1:3).

V. *Literature*: Luthardt, *Kompendium*, sec. 29; Schmid, *Lutheran Theology*, sec. 18; Weidner, *O. T. Theology*, sec. 42-48; Hase, *Hutterus Redivivus*, sec. 59-63; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, sec. 46-51; Philippi, *Kirch. Glaubenslehre*, Vol. II., pp. 18-117; Baier, *Kompendium* (Walther), Vol. II., pp. 11-45; Nitzsch, *System of Christian Doctrine*, sec. 61-80; Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, Vol. I. sec. 10, 11; Dörner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Vol. I., pp. 248-343; Frank, *Wahrheit*, Vol. I., pp. 229-294; Vilmar, *Dogmatik*, Vol. I., pp. 201-231; Mulford, *The Republic of God*, pp. 32-39; Loeber, *Dogmatik*, pp. 164-184; Candlish, *Christian Doctrine of God*, pp. 47-56, 80-91; Hall, *The Doctrine of God*, pp. 97-116; Strong, *Systematic Theology*, pp. 115-143; H. B. Smith, *System of Christian Theology*, pp. 12-47; Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, Vol. I., pp. 250-271; Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 334-392; Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I., 366-441.

SEC. 9. *The Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity.*

1. The doctrine of the divine persons follows the doctrine of the divine attributes.

2. The Trinity is taught in Scripture only in connection with the progress of the trinitarian revelation of God in the history of salvation as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

3. The doctrine is only completely unfolded and clearly revealed in the N. T.

4. This doctrine is based on the revelation of Scripture alone.

5. So great is this mystery that it cannot be proved by reason, either *a priori* or *a posteriori*, for it transcends the comprehension of reason.

6. In the entire universe, nothing can be found to express the mystery of the adorable Godhead.

7. In the analogies suggested by heathen writers, the points of unlikeness are greater than those of likeness.

8. The Triad of the ancient systems of philosophy is only a philosophical statement of the pantheistic theory which underlies all the religious systems of antiquity.

9. In all these systems (Brahmanism, Buddhism, Platonism) we have no analogy with the Scriptural doctrine of the Trinity, but simply a Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis.

I. The Doctrine of the Old Testament.

10. Though we must not read the N. T. doctrine of the Trinity into the O. T., it is yet undeniable that we find the doctrine of the Trinity really and plainly implied in the Old Testament.

11. God and the Spirit are already distinguished in Gen. 1:2, and it is clearly to be seen that we find the way to the N. T. doc-

trine of the Trinity already prepared in the doctrine of the *Angel of Jehovah* and of the *Spirit*, and in the prophecies of the future coming of Jehovah (Micah 4:7; Isa. 60:1; Mal. 3:1), as also in the types and prophecies of the Messiah (Ps. 110:1, 2; 45:6, 7; Isa. 11:3, 4; 9:6; Zech. 12:8, 10, etc.).

a) *The General Teaching of the Old Testament.*

12. God has made Himself known in the O. T. in a *special* way by means 1) of the *divine name*, 2) the *divine presence*, and 3) the *divine glory*.

13. God names Himself, not according to what He is for Himself, but according to *what He is for man*; and therefore every self-presentation of God in the world is expressed by a corresponding name of God (*El, Eloah, Elohim, El-Elyon, El-Shaddai, Jehovah*).

14. That by which God is present among His people is described as the *divine countenance* or *presence* (Ex. 33:14-16). Deut. 4:37, "He brought thee out with His *presence*, with His great power, out of Egypt."

15. For the *divine name* and *countenance* the expression *glory of Jehovah* is also used, which denotes the special majesty of God's revealed Being, the perfect fulness of His Godhead. Ex. 40:34, "The glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle."

16. That the doctrine of the Trinity is already implied in the O. T. can be seen from the following passages (so Gerhard, Quenstedt and Hollaz):

- 1) By those in which God speaks of Himself in the plural number. Gen. 1:26, "Let *us* make man in *our* image"; Gen. 3:22, "Behold, the man is become as one of *us*"; 11:7; Isa. 6:8
- 2) By those in which the plural *Elohim* is construed with a singular verb (in Hebrew) to denote the unity of the divine Essence (Gen. 1:1; 2:5, etc.), or sometimes with a plural verb or adjective to emphasize the plurality of persons (Gen. 20:13; 35:7; Deut. 5:26).
- 3) By those passages in which Jehovah is expressly distinguished from Jehovah, as subject and object. Gen. 19:24; Ex. 34:5; Ps. 110:1; Hos. 1:7.
- 4) By those passages in which mention is made of the Son of God, as in Ps. 2:7.
- 5) By those passages in which the three persons of the Godhead are distinctly named. See Ps. 33:6; Isa. 42:1; 48:16; 61:1, etc.
- 6) By those passages in which God's name is thrice repeated in one connection.
The Aaronic blessing. Num. 6:24-26.
The Trisagion of the seraphim. Isa. 6:3.

b) *The Doctrine of the Angel of Jehovah.*

17. The doctrine of the Angel of Jehovah is one of the most important and difficult points in the O. T., on which, even from the time of the early Church, there have been various views.

18. The principal passages bearing on this point are Gen. 16:7-14; 18:1-33 (in verses 20, 26, etc., one of the three men

(angels) is expressly distinguished as Jehovah); 22:11, 12; 31:11-13, where the *Angel of Jehovah* calls Himself "the God of Bethel"; 32:29-31; 48:15, 26, where God is identified with the Angel; Ex. 3:2, 6, etc., where the Angel of Jehovah is identified with Jehovah and Elohim; Ex. 13:21 compared with Ex. 14:19; Josh. 5:14, 15; 6:2, etc.

19. Two main views are to be distinguished.

20. The one is that the *malach* or angel is not Jehovah Himself, but a created angel in whom Jehovah is and of whom God makes use as the organ of His self-manifestation.

21. The ancient Synagogue accepted this interpretation and regarded the angel of God as a finite spirit, a created angel.

22. This view in the ancient Church is found only in the *Clementine Homilies*, then suggested by Augustine, Jerome, Gregory the Great, and advocated by Theodore and Theodoret. In later times defended by Grotius, Calixtus and others, and in modern times held with various modifications by Hofmann, Kurtz and Delitzsch (with much indecision).

23. The second view is that the Angel of Jehovah is a self-representation of Jehovah, making Himself visible as an angel.

24. This seems to be the true view, for the angel is explicitly called *Jehovah* (Gen. 18:33; Judg. 6:12, 14; Zech. 1:12, 13; 3:1, 2, etc.), and *God* (Gen. 32:29-31; Hos. 12:4, 5), and is designated as the God of salvation (Gen. 31:13; Ex. 3:2, 6, etc.). A careful study of all the passages already cited shows that to this angel are also ascribed divine attributes, divine works and divine worship.

25. This was the view of the Early Church, which sees in this angel the *Logos*, or the Son of God, in the form of an angel, the *second* person of the Godhead in the sense of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

26. This was the view of most of the Greek Fathers, of Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, Cyprian and Eusebius. At a later period this was the view of the Lutheran theologians, and is defended in modern times by Hengstenberg, Keil, Lange, Hævernick, Wordsworth, Candlish and others.

27. From the standpoint of the N. T. (1 Cor. 10:4), it is the *Logos*, the Son of God, through whom revelations to Israel are made. But nowhere in the N. T. is the Son of God so identified with the Malach or angel as if His Incarnation had been preceded by His *permanently* becoming an angel.

c) *The Doctrine of Wisdom.*

28. Though *wisdom* in the O. T. appears principally as an *attribute* of God, passages like Prov. 8:22-36 and Job 28:12-28, go further.

29. In these chief passages Wisdom is personified, and we have here an unmistakable germ of the ontological self-distinction of the Godhead (*Nitzsch*).

30. How closely the O. T. borders upon actually regarding Wisdom as a personal existence, is shown more especially by the remarkable passage in Job 15:7, 8.

31. How are we here reminded of "the one who is in the

bosom of the Father" (John 1:18), and how justly has Ewald found in this passage an echo of the subsequent idea of the Logos.

d) *The Doctrine of the Spirit.*

32. In the O. T. the Spirit as *Ruach* Jehovah only acts in the sphere of revelation, and as the Spirit of Revelation produces in particular the gift of prophecy (Num. 11:25).

33. In the Psalms the Spirit is first spoken of as the principle of sanctification in the pious (Ps. 51:10-12; 143:10).

34. In the Prophetic Scriptures we learn that the Spirit is imminently present in the Godhead (Isa. 59:19), and at the same time is promised and communicated by God to men (Isa. 44:3).

35. The genuine prophets are anointed by the Spirit (Isa. 61:1), but a greater outpouring of the Spirit is reserved for the later times (Joel 2:28, 29).

36. The doctrine of the Holy Ghost is not so clearly revealed in the Old Testament.

37. We may, therefore, conclude the presentation of the Old Testament doctrine of the Trinity with the caution given by Gerhard: "The clearer revelation of this mystery is reserved for the N. T., and in a discussion with an obstinate adversary we should not make a beginning with the more obscure statements of the O. T. Nevertheless we can and ought to cite some testimonies from the Old Testament in the presentation of the doctrine of the Trinity, since God always from the beginning revealed Himself thus."

II. The Doctrine of the New Testament.

a) *Presentation of the older Dogmaticians (Quenstedt).*

38. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity, that God, one in essence, subsists in three persons, truly and really distinct from each other, is proved:

1) From the wonderful theophany at the baptism of Christ, where the three persons of the Godhead are manifested (Matt. 3:13-17; Mark 1:9-11; Luke 3:21, 22).

2) From the solemn formula of baptism given by Christ (Matt. 28:19). We are to be baptized *into the name* (not names) of the one God, in three divine persons, "of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost."

39. The true divinity of each person is proved because to each person of the Godhead are ascribed 1) divine names, 2) divine attributes, 3) divine works, and 4) divine worship.

40. That this is true of the Father no one questions.

41. Jesus Christ is true God, because to Him are ascribed:

1) *Divine names.*

a) Divine essential names.

John 1:1, "The Word was God"; 20:28, "My Lord and my God."

1 John 5:20, "This is the true God, and eternal life."

Titus 2:13, "Our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ."

Acts 10:36, "Jesus Christ, He is Lord of all."

b) Divine personal names.

Rom. 8:32, "God spared not *His own Son*."

John 1:18, "The only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father."

John 3:16, "God gave His only begotten Son."

2) *Divine attributes.*

Eternity, John 1:1; Col. 1:17; Heb. 13:8.

Omnipresence, Matt. 18:20; 28:20; John 3:13.

Omnipotence, John 10:28; Phil. 3:21.

Omniscience, John 2:24, 25; 21:17; Matt. 9:4; Col. 2:3.

Glory, 1 Cor. 2:8; 17:5.

3) *Divine works.*

Creation, John 1:3; 1 Cor. 8:6; Col. 1:16; Heb. 1:2, 10.

Preservation, Col. 1:17; Heb. 1:3; John 5:17.

Raising the dead, John 5:21, 28, 29; 6:40, 54; 11:25.

Redemption, Matt. 20:28; Gal. 3:13; 1 Cor. 1:30; Gal.

4:4, 5; Heb. 9:12.

4) *Divine worship.*

John 5:23, "That all may honor the Son, even as they honor the Father."

John 14:1, "Ye believe in God, believe also in Me."

Acts 7:59, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit."

1 Cor. 1:2; Phil. 2:10; Heb. 1:6; Rev. 5:9-12.

42. That the Holy Ghost, the third person of the Trinity, is truly divine, true God, of the same essence as the Father and the Son, is proved from the fact that to Him are ascribed:

1) *Divine names.*

He is called *God*, Acts 5:3, 4; 2 Pet. 1:21; 1 Cor. 3:16;

1 John 5:7, 9.

He is called *Lord*, 2 Cor. 3:17; 1 Cor. 12:4, 5.

2) *Divine attributes.*

Eternity, Heb. 9:14; omnipotence, 1 Cor. 12:11; Rom.

8:11; 15:19; omniscience, 1 Cor. 2:10-12; omnipresence,

1 Cor. 12:13; Rom. 8:26, 27; etc.

3) *Divine works.*

Miracles, Acts 10:38; Matt. 12:28; 1 Cor. 12:9-11;

regeneration, John 3:5; Tit. 3:5; sanctification, Rom.

15:16; 1 Pet. 1:2, etc.

4) *Divine worship.* Rom. 9:1; 2 Cor. 13:14; Matt. 28:19.

43. A careful study of these Scripture passages proves:

1) That there is one God, subsisting in three persons;

2) That the Father is divine and a distinct Person;

3) That the Son is divine and a distinct Person from the Father;

4) That the Holy Ghost is divine and a distinct Person from the Father and the Son.

44. In the presentation of the New Testament doctrine of the Trinity it is probably best to trace it in its historical development and discuss 1) the self-witness of Jesus to His divinity; 2) the Apostolic declarations concerning His divinity; 3) the New Testament doctrine of the Holy Ghost, and 4) the co-ordination of the Three Persons.

b) *The Self-witness of Jesus.*

45. Jesus calls Himself *the Son of Man* about fifty times. This title designates His close relation to humanity and His distinctness from it, even as man. Our Lord evidently intends His hearers to recall to mind the Son of man in Dan. 7:13, 14, and regards Himself as the one indicated by that passage.

46. An antithesis is implied in the expression, Son of Man; for Christ also frequently calls Himself the Son of God.

47. Jesus speaks very frequently of God as His Father (Matt. 7:21; 10:32, 33; 18:19, 35; etc.); in Matt. 11:27; Luke 10:22, Jesus calls Himself the Son, and ascribes to Himself exclusively as the Son adequate knowledge of the Father, thus expressing His unique personal relationship to God the Father—a relationship not simply of inward intimacy, but also of essence.

48. This expression *Son of God* does not point to a physical relationship, with reference to His supernatural birth (Beyschlag); nor to an ethical one, marking the exceptional perfection of His moral nature (Hase, Baur, Ewald); nor to an official one, signaling the God-Man as the Messiah (Weiss), a relationship originating at the Incarnation (Moses Stuart, Adam Clarke), or at the exaltation of the God-Man (Pfleiderer); but has reference to His *metaphysical* relation to the Trinity, and is descriptive of the *essential* relationship subsisting between the divine and pre-existent nature of the Son of God and the Father (so Gess, Godet, Luthardt, and others).

49. This is proved by the passage known as the Great Sonship Confession (Keim): "No one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him" (Matt. 11:25-27; Luke 10:21, 22). These words allude to a Sonship not merely temporal, official, and external, but to one that is eternal, personal, and essential.

50. John 10:15, "Even as the Father knoweth me, and I know the Father," and the "all things" of Matt. 11:27 point to equality with the Father in respect of power and knowledge, and this power which the Son of God possessed from eternity has also been given to Him according to His human nature; the mutual knowledge which the Father and Son possess of each other is such as could only spring from community of nature and essence.

51. Although in the Fourth Gospel the self-witness of Jesus as to His *pre-existence* as the Son of God, possesses a richness and fullness (John 3:13, 31; 6:38, 62; 8:23, 38, 42, 58; 16:27, 28; 17:5, 8, 24, 25; etc.) which are wanting in the three Synoptists, yet even in the latter we have clear statements to prove that Christ believed Himself to have existed antecedently to His coming to the earth. Compare Luke 4:43, "For therefore was I sent." He often speaks of the Son of Man as having come (Matt. 20:28; Mark 10:45; Luke 19:10); and of His having been sent by God (Matt. 10:40; 15:24; etc.).

52. The question, "If David then calleth Him Lord, how is He his Son?" (Matt. 22:45; Mark 12:37; Luke 20:34), could only point to His supernatural origin and His pre-existence, since, if

David in the Spirit called Him Lord, He must at least in David's time have already been in existence.

53. Christ also, under oath, avowed Himself the Son of God before the high priest (Matt. 26:63, 64; Mark 14:61; Luke 22:70).

54. Christ also claims to perform, in His own name and by His own power, works which God alone can perform, as 1) to control the powers of nature (Matt. 8:26, 27) and of the spirit world (Matt. 12:28); 2) to raise the dead (Matt. 9:24, 25; etc.); 3) to forgive sin (Matt. 9:6; Luke 5:24; 7:48); 4) to bestow salvation and eternal life (Matt. 11:28; Mark 10:30); etc.

55. The position Christ assigns Himself in the baptismal formula (Matt. 28:19), placing His own name of *Son* exactly between that of the Father and the Spirit, shows that He regarded Himself as one in essence with the Father.

56. The expression *the Son of God* is therefore that title of the Messiah which denotes His relation to God. The title implies: 1) that the *Man* Christ Jesus is the Messiah, elect and chosen of God; and 2) that a relationship of the Son to God, previous to His Incarnation, lies at the foundation of His Messiahship.

c) The Teaching of the Apostles.

57. Peter in the *Acts* maintains that Christ's resurrection was the decisive proof of His Messiahship (Acts 2:32; 3:15; 4:10; 5:30; 10:40, 41). He designates Him as *the Lord* (Acts 2:36; 11:23, 24), the Lord Jesus (Acts 1:21; 4:33; 11:20; 15:11), in such a way that only a Divine Being, God Himself, could receive.

58. So likewise in his two Epistles Peter takes it for granted that Christ is truly God—in all essential respects co-ordinate with the Father. In his First Epistle he ascribes to Him divine names (1:3; 3:15) and divine attributes (2:3, 4, 6, 7), and in his Second Epistle Christ is directly called God (1:1).

59. Especially rich is the doctrine of the Trinity as presented in Paul's Epistle to the Romans.

a) Paul makes many explicit statements concerning God the Father. He sent His own Son (Rom. 8:3) and delivered Him up for us all (8:32), and raised Him from the dead (4:24; 10:9). It is the Father who is the origin of all grace (1:7, 16; 5:15; 6:23; 11:23), who also calls us (1:6, 7; 8:28, 30; 9:24), who declares the believer just for Christ's sake (8:30, 33). That the Father is true God is shown by the fact that to Him are ascribed:

1) *Divine names.* Rom. 1:1, 7, 8, 18, 19, 20, 21; etc.

2) *Divine attributes.* Incorruptibility, Rom. 1:23; blessedness, 1:25; eternity, 16:26; incomprehensibility, 11:33-36; etc.

3) *Divine works.* Creation, 1:25; 4:17; 11:36; providence, 11:36; resurrection from the dead, 4:17, 24; 10:9; etc.

4) *Divine worship.* Rom. 1:8, 9, 21, 23, 25; 15:6.

b) Equally explicit is Paul's teaching in Romans that Jesus is true God. For to Him he ascribes:

1) *Divine names.* Son of God, 1:3, 4, 9; 5:10; 8:3, 32;

Lord, Rom. 1:4, 7; 4:24; 5:1, 21, etc.; God blessed forever, 9:5.

- 2) *Divine attributes.* Omnipotence, 9:5; 10:12; Lord of both the dead and living, 14:9; etc.
- 3) *Divine works.* Creation, 11:36; preservation, 11:36; redemption, 8:32; judgment, 14:9; etc.
- 4) *Divine worship.* Rom. 10:12, 13; 15:30; 16:18.

c) Equally explicit is Paul's teaching in Romans to the personality and true divinity of the Holy Ghost. It is God the Holy Ghost who sheds abroad in our hearts the love of God (Rom. 5:5), who dwells in and leads believers (8:9, 11, 14), who bestows righteousness, peace and joy (14:17), who helps our infirmity (8:26, 27), who bears witness with our spirit (8:16), working within us (15:13, 19), and sanctifying us (15:16). The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, for He is called the Spirit of the Father (8:9, 11, 14), and from the Son, for He is also called the Spirit of Christ (8:9). That the Holy Ghost the Third Person of the Trinity is true God, of the same essence with the Son is proved from the fact that to Him are ascribed:

- 1) *Divine names.* Holy Ghost, Rom. 5:5; 9:1; 14:17; 15:13, 16, 19; Spirit of God, Rom. 8:9, 14.
- 2) *Divine attributes.* Omnipotence, Rom. 8:11; 15:13, 19; omnipresence, Rom. 8:9, 11, 14, 16, 26, 27; omniscience, 8:27.
- 3) *Divine works.* Resurrection of the dead, Rom. 8:11; bestowal of righteousness, 14:17; sanctification, 15:16; etc.
- 4) *Divine worship.* Rom. 9:1; 15:30; etc.

60. Equally clear and explicit is also Paul's teaching concerning the Divinity of Jesus Christ as given in the Epistles written during his first captivity, especially as developed in his Epistle to the Colossians.

Jesus Christ is true God, because to Him are ascribed:

- 1) *Divine names.* Son of the Father, 1:3, 13, 19; Lord, 1:3, 10; 2:6; 3:13, 17, 20, etc.; the mystery of God, 2:2; the hope of glory, 1:28; etc.
- 2) *Divine attributes.* Pre-existence, 1:15-17,—the first-born of all creation (1:15), begotten before all things (1:15, 17), absolutely pre-existing before all things (1:17); omnipotent (1:13, 16); omnipresent (1:17); the source of life (1:18); etc.
- 3) *Divine works.* Creation, 1:16; preservation, 1:17; redemption, 1:14; giver of life and grace, 2:13; etc.
- 4) *Divine worship.* Is to be believed in, 2:5, 8; to be received by faith, 2:6; to be feared, 3:22; to be pleased, 1:10; 3:20, 23; to be served, 3:23, 24; is our Master in heaven, 4:1.

61. Especially important is the passage Col. 1:15-20. In 1:15-17 the reference is the *Pre-incarnate* Son of God in relation to God and to His own creatures, while in Col. 1:18-20 the

reference is specially to the *Incarinate* and now glorified Son in His relation to His Church.

62. We have here to do with Col. 1:15-17.

a) In His relation to God the Father.

1) According to His divine nature, as the Son of God, He is the very image of the invisible God (Heb. 1:3; 2 Cor. 4:4; Col. 1:15), in perfect equality with the Father in respect of His essence, nature and eternity.

b) In His relation to Creation.

2) The Son is here solemnly defined as *the first-born of all creation* (1:15), *before all things* (1:17)—the word *only begotten* (John 1:14, 18; 1 John 4:9) defining more exactly His relation to the Father.

3) Paul here declares the absolute pre-existence of the Son; for it is a false interpretation to infer from the expression *the first-born of all creation* that the Son was a created Being, though the earliest, for in 1:16, 17, we have an explanation in what sense the Son of God is the *first-born*.

4) In Col. 1:16, 17 the wonderful statement is made that the Eternal Son of God according to His divine nature has the same relation to the universe as the Incarnate Christ (1:18), the God-man has to the Church.

aa) The Son of God, *i. e.* Jesus Christ, according to His divine nature is the *conditional* Cause of creation,—the act of creation depends on Him, "for *in* Him were all things created" (1:16);

bb) He is the *instrumental* Cause of creation,—*i. e.* "all things have been created *through* Him" (1:16);

cc) He is also the *ultimate* Cause of creation,—*i. e.* "All things have been created *unto* Him" to enhance His glory.

dd) When Paul in 1:17 so emphatically says: "He is before all things," the *He* emphasizes the Son's personality, and the *is* His *pre-existence*.

63. The true divinity of Christ is most clearly set forth by John in the Prologue to his Gospel (1:1-18). In John 1:1-5 he treats of the Logos *before* the Incarnation.

a) *The relation of the Logos to God* (1:1, 2).

1) The Logos was *in the beginning* before all creation, *pre-mundane* and *before time*, consequently eternal.

2) The Logos is *God*, of one essence with the Father. In the sentence "the Word was God," the word *God* must be taken as the predicate, in the sense of *true* God, not merely "godlike, divine."

3) The Logos is *personally distinguished* from the Father. He was *with* God, more accurately "toward (*pros*) God," His look ("*into* the bosom of the Father," 1:18) was directed to God; His fellowship

was a communion with God. The personal distinction between the Logos and the Father is stated here as definitely as His unity of essence with God the Father.

b) *The relation of the Logos to the world* (1:3-5).

1) The Logos is the *Mediator of creation*, "all things were made *through Him*" (1:3); the negative antithesis, "without Him was not anything made that hath been made" (1:3), purposely excludes the eternity of matter.

2) With respect to the world of humanity, the Logos is *the source of life and light* (1:4, 5).

64. John likewise in his First Epistle and in the Apocalypse everywhere distinguishes between the three Persons of the God-head. Compare especially Rev. 1:4, 5; 1 John 1:3; 2:1; 5:6, 7; etc.

d) *The New Testament Doctrine of the Holy Ghost.*

65. That the Holy Ghost is a Person is proved from the following facts:

1) Personal pronouns are applied to Him. John 14:16, 17, 26; 15:26; 16:7, 13, 14; etc.

2) Personal qualities are ascribed to Him.

He knows and searcheth all things, 1 Cor. 2:10, 11;

He works according to His own will, 1 Cor. 12:11;

He can be grieved, Eph. 4:30, and resisted, Acts 7:51;

He can be blasphemed and lied against, Matt. 12:31, 32; Acts 5:3, 4.

3) Personal acts are ascribed to Him.

He teaches all things, John 14:26; He guides into all

the truth, 16:13; He helpeth our infirmity, Rom. 8:26;

He convicts the world of sin, John 16:8; He sanctifies

and bestows spiritual gifts, Rom. 15:16; 1 Cor. 12:11;

He seals, Eph. 1:13; 4:30; He comforts, John 14:26; 15:26; Acts 9:31; etc.

66. The inner distinction and the relation of the Holy Ghost to the Father and the Son may be expressed by the phrase "eternal procession."

a) *The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father.*

1) It is so stated in express words, John 15:26;

2) Christ says the Father will send Him in His name, John 14:26;

3) He is called the Spirit of the Father, Matt. 10:20.

β) *The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.*

1) Because He is sent and given by the Son, John 15:26; 20:22;

2) Because He is called the Spirit of the Son, Gal. 4:6;

3) Because He is called the Spirit of Christ, Rom. 8:9; Phil. 1:19; 1 Pet. 1:11.

67. As Christ's substitute, the Holy Ghost is throughout represented by Christ as a person, just as much as Christ represents Himself as a person. He is the other advocate, or *paraclete*, who carries forward His work in believers, and who stands in a position of complete equality with Christ.

e) *The Co-ordination of the Three Persons.*

68. That there is a Trinity in the Unity is also shown by the fact that the Three Persons of the Holy Trinity are often mentioned together:

- 1) As in the baptismal formula, Matt. 28:19; and the apostolic benediction, 2 Cor. 13:14.
- 2) Such passages as John 14:26; 15:26; Rom. 8:11; Eph. 3:14-16; 4:4-6; Heb. 9:14; 1 Pet. 1:2; etc.

III. *Literature:* Luthardt, *Kompendium*, sec. 30; Schmid, *Theol. of Lutheran Church*, sec. 19; Weidner, *Bible Theol. of O. T.*, sec. 59, 60, 65, 237; Weidner, *Bible Theol. of N. T.*, sec. 18, 56, 125, 138, 153, 177, 178; Baier, *Compendium* (Walther), Vol. II, sec. 28-30; Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, sec. 12, 13; Philippi, *Kirch. Glaubenslehre*, Vol. II., pp. 117-224; Vilmar, *Dogmatik*, Vol. I., sec. 29, pp. 275-291; Gerhart, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, sec. 81-92; Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 432-448; Liddon, *The Divinity of our Lord*; Norris, *Rudiments of Theology*, pp. 20-39, 70-89; Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 255-292; Smith, *System of Christian Theology*, pp. 48-72; Strong, *Systematic Theology*, pp. 144-157; Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, Vol. I., pp. 272-284.

SEC. 10. *The Church Doctrine of the Trinity.*

I. The History of the Doctrine.

1. The doctrine of the Trinity is the doctrine of primitive Christianity. The belief in God *the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost* had its foundation in the baptismal formula (Matt. 28:19), and in such passages as 2 Cor. 13:14; Rom. 11:36.

2. This doctrine "was essential to the Christian consciousness and therefore has existed from the beginning in the Christian Church" (*Neander*).

3. The doctrine was already taught in the early baptismal confessions, which finally took the form of the *Apostle's Creed*, and in the *Rules of Faith* which finally, in the Eastern churches, became substantially the same as the *Nicene Creed*.

4. The various heresies which arose during the first four centuries helped to develop the Church doctrine of the Trinity.

5. The earlier type of Ebionism (Pharisaic), as known to Justin Martyr (165 A. D.), Irenæus (202 A. D.), and Tertullian (220 A. D.), held that Jesus was a mere man, the son of Joseph and Mary. They denied therefore Christ's birth of a virgin, and His pre-existence and divinity.

6. Among the Gnostics, the Rationalistic scholars of the first three centuries, two tendencies predominated. While they combined their idea of the Logos with their fanciful doctrine of emanations and æons, and thus held to a kind of speculative mythology, some more especially denied the divinity of our Lord, while others refused to acknowledge the true humanity of Jesus (*Docetism*).

7. In opposition to these Ebionitic and Gnostic speculations the Apostolical Fathers lay stress upon the practical, religious value of the doctrine of Jesus as the Redeemer, but do not make any use of the peculiar doctrine of the Logos, adhering to single, undeveloped declarations about the divine dignity of Christ.

8. Justin Martyr identifies the Logos, by whom God has created the world, with His incarnate Son, even Christ Jesus.

Apol. II. 6, "And His Son, who alone is properly called Son, the Word, who also was with Him and was begotten before the works, when at first He created and arranged all things by Him, is called Christ, in reference to His being anointed."

9. Clemens Alexandrinus (202 A. D.) treats more clearly of the doctrine of the Logos than all the other fathers of this period. God has created the world by the Logos; yea, the Logos is the Creator Himself. He is the face of God, by which God is seen.

10. Tertullian uses the word *Son*, instead of *Word*, in order to denote the personal existence of the Logos.

11. Irenæus of all the Early Fathers holds fast most firmly to the Trinitarian faith of the Church as the direct expression of the Christian consciousness. The Son is in every respect equal to the Father; the Father is the invisible of the Son, and the Son the visible of the Father.

12. Origen (254 A. D.) was led to the idea of an *eternal* generation of the Son, but this idea was not consistently carried out. "As the will of man proceeds from his reason, and the one is not to be separated from the other, so the Son proceeds from the Father;" "as light cannot be without its brightness, so God can never have been without the Son, the brightness of His majesty." On the other hand, Origen prominently brought forward the *subordination* of the Son, and this together with the stress laid on the personality of the Son, forms the characteristic feature of Origen's doctrine. This view of *Subordination* led to new misunderstandings and wide-reaching controversies.

13. The two antagonistic principles 1) the unity (*monarchia*) of God and 2) the distinct personality and the perfect equality of the Three Persons of the Godhead, were not clearly defined until after the councils of Nice (325 A. D.) and Constantinople (381 A. D.).

14. The Monarchians abandoned the *personal distinctions of the Three Persons* in order to hold fast to the unity (*monarchia*) of the Godhead, and thus exposed themselves to the charge of denying the divinity of Christ (*Unitarianism*) or of confounding the Persons (*Patripassianism*).

15. The history of Monarchianism is very obscure. We may distinguish between *Dynamic Monarchianism* and *Modalistic Monarchianism*.

16. Dynamic Monarchianism is represented by the Alogians, Theodotus the Leather-dealer, and Paul of Samosata. The *Alogians*, according to Epiphanius, denied that Jesus Christ was the eternal Logos as taught in John 1:1-14; Theodotus held that Jesus had been a man like others, though one of the highest virtue and piety, and that the divinity of Christ was only a power communicated to him. This view was also held by the Artemonites (250 A. D.). The views of Theodotus and Artemon were afterwards more fully developed by Paul of Samosata, "the Socinus of the third century." Paul taught that "Christ was not before Mary, but received from her the origin of His being." Although he called Christ God it was not as God by His nature, but by progressive development. The Deity of Christ grew by gradual prog-

ress out of the humanity. As the Logos is not a Person, so also the Holy Spirit is impersonal. Paul was excommunicated at Antioch, 269 A. D.

17. Modalistic Monarchianism was the most dangerous opponent of the Logos-Christology from 180 to 240 A. D. In the West it was represented by the *Patripassians*, and in the East by the *Sabellians*. These identified the Father and the Son and represented them as one person under two different aspects. If Christ was the same as the Father, then the Father had been born, had suffered, had died. Whence the name Patripassianism, which was in fact but the Western name for the Sabellian heresy viewed from this particular point of view. Here belong the names of Praxeas, Noetus of Smyrna, and Beryllus of Bostra, the last forming a connecting link between the Patripassians and Sabellius. The principal tenet of Sabellius was that the Father is the same as the Son, and the Son the same as the Spirit, and that there are three names, but only one being. Nevertheless Sabellius taught that God was not Father and Son at the same time; that God was active under three successive forms of energy,—as the Father from the creation of the world; as the Son, from the incarnation in Christ; and as the Spirit, from the day of Ascension. Christ possesses personality only during His historical appearance in the flesh. That personality neither existed previous to His incarnation, nor does it continue to exist now in heaven. Tertullian, Origen, and Hippolytus wrote against these false views.

18. While the Monarchians of every kind maintained the principle of the divine unity at the expense of the principle of distinct personality and equality of the three Persons, the Arians and the Semi-Arians maintained the principle of the distinct personality of the divine Persons, at the expense of their unity and equality.

19. Arius denied the eternal deity of Christ and His equality with the Father, holding that Christ was of a different essence (*heter-ousia*), and a creature of the Father, though created before the world. The Semi-Arians, in opposition to the strict Arians, asserted that the Son was of *like* or *similar* essence with the Father (*homoi-ousia*). At the Council of Nice (325 A. D.) a confession of faith was adopted, in which it was held that the inviolable doctrine of the Church is, that the Son is of the *same* numerical essence with the Father (*homo-ousia*). All three parties were represented at the Council, the Arians being led by Arius, the Semi-Arians by Eusebius of Cæsarea, and the orthodox by Athanasius.

20. The Nicene Creed decided nothing concerning the Holy Spirit, as it did not appear wise to complicate matters by contending about the divinity of the Spirit at that time. But Athanasius taught the divinity of the Holy Ghost, maintaining that we only completely renounce Arianism when we hold that in the Trinity there is but one essence, common to all Three Persons of the Godhead. He was followed by Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa. Basil maintained that the name *God* should be given to the Spirit, and appealed both to Scripture in

general, and to the baptismal formula in particular. Through the influence of Gregory of Nazianzus the Council of Constantinople (381 A. D.) adopted more precise definitions concerning the Holy Ghost, especially in opposition to the Macedonians or Pneumatomachians, who denied the deity of the Holy Ghost, as did the strict Arians and the Semi-Arians.

21. The formula of the Council of Constantinople (381 A. D.) prepared the way for a further definition of the doctrine. It declared that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, but left the procession from the Son an open question. Athanasius (373 A.D.), Basil the Great (379 A. D.), and Gregory of Nyssa (395 A. D.), taught the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father, without denying that He also proceeds from the Son. But it was Ephiphanius among the Greek Fathers who first taught that the Holy Ghost proceedeth from both the Father and the Son, and among the Latin Fathers, the great majority, and especially Augustine (430 A. D.) in particular, taught the procession of the Spirit from both the Father and the Son. In the West this doctrine became firmly established, and at the Council of Toledo (589 A. D.), the clause *filioque* was added to the confession of faith of the Council of Constantinople (381 A. D.), and so the basis was laid for the schism between the Eastern and Western Churches, for the Greek Catholic Church rejects the *filioque* clauses to this day.

22. This developed doctrine of the Church concerning the Trinity was restated with consummate skill in the *Symbolum Quicumque*, commonly known as the Athanasian Creed,—and the doctrine of the Trinity as confessed in the three Early Creeds, the Apostles', the Nicene and the Athanasian, has been adopted by all the historical Churches.

23. Thus after generations of discussion the doctrine of the Trinity was fully developed and thetically stated, and no further progress in the statement of the doctrine has been made since.

II. The Dogmatic Formulation.

24. In the presentation of this doctrine we must ever bear in mind that its sublimity and mystery exceeds all comprehension, and that the reason the Church doctrine is presented in terms not found in Scripture, is because heretics were accustomed to use the same Biblical language as the Church, and yet believed and taught differently.

25. Luther and the Reformers did not attempt to explain the doctrine of the Trinity, but insisted that we should accept the plain teaching of Scripture. Luther: "Like little children, we should stammer out what the Scriptures teach: that Christ is truly God, that the Holy Ghost is truly God, and yet there are not three Gods, or three Beings, as there are three men, three angels, three suns or three windows. No, God is not thus divided in His Essence; but there is only one divine Being or Essence. Therefore, although there are three Persons, God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Ghost, yet the Essence is not divided or distinguished; since there is but one God in one single, undivided, divine Essence."

26. So important is this doctrine, that every one who wishes

to be saved must believe the mystery of the Trinity as revealed in Scripture. See John 17:3; Acts 4:12; 1 John 2:23.

27. The Church doctrine comprises three points: 1) There is a unity of essence; 2) there is a plurality of persons; 3) there is a diversity of personal peculiarities.

a. *There is a unity of essence.*

The essence of the three Persons of the Godhead is one and undivided.

28. *Hollaz*: "The essence of God is God's spiritual and independent nature, common to the three divine persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost."

29. *Gerhard*: "This essence is one in number and undivided, which does not exist partially in the three persons, so that a part of it is in the Father, a part in the Son, and a part in the Holy Ghost; but because of infinity and immateriality, is entire in the Father, entire in the Son, and entire in the Holy Ghost."

30. *Baier*: "By the name *essence* is meant the divine nature, as it is absolutely in itself, all of which, *with its attributes*, is most simply one and singular, and, thus, also of the three persons the essence is only one; so indeed, that there is only one intellect of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, by which they understand; one will of the three, by which they wish; and one power, by which they operate outside of the divine essence."

31. There is a difference between the essence of God and that of man, because God's nature is one *numerically*, while that of man is one *in kind*.

32. *Gerhard*: "The reason lies in the infinity of the divine essence. In three human individuals the essence is one only in species, not one in number; but in the three persons of the Godhead there is an essence one in number and absolutely undivided."

33. In the Trinity there is only one undivided essence, of which all the three persons partake, and the one, undivided essence is entire in each person, so that where the Father is, there is also the Son (John 14:10), and where the Son is, there is also the Father (John 8:29; 10:30; 17:21), and where the Holy Ghost is, there is also the Father and the Son; for the three persons of the Trinity do not differ in time, in will, in power, or in working, and where one person is, there because of their undivided essence, the other two persons also are,—not subsisting separately alongside of one another, but by virtue of the unity of essence within another (John 14:11; 17:21.)

b. *There is a plurality of Persons.*

The three persons are truly and really distinct from each other.

34. This plurality is not one of *essence*, for in essence God is one; nor is it one of *accident*, as if personality was something added to the being of God, for God is most absolute and simple; but is one of *persons*, for the person of the Father is one, the person of the Son another, and the person of the Holy Ghost another. We say therefore that God is *triune*, but we dare not say that God is *threefold*, composed of three.

35. The term *person* or *hypostasis* is here used in a different sense from its common usage.

36. By *person* or *hypostasis* is meant "an individual, intelligent, incommunicable substance, which is not sustained, either upon another or by another" (*Chemnitz*). It is that independent subsistence in which an intelligent nature subsists completely and incommunicably.

37. The subsistence of one person cannot be communicated to another person, on account of the distinction of persons, because the Father does not communicate His hypostasis to the Son, or to the Holy Ghost, but each person has His own peculiar subsistence and being, although *essence* itself is said to be communicable (*Selnecker*).

38. *Chemnitz*: "If any one would cavil that the terms *essence* and *person* are not sufficiently peculiar to designate this hidden mystery of unity and Trinity, he has this reply of Augustine: 'Human language labors from its absolute great poverty. Nevertheless the term *three persons* has been adopted not for the purpose of expressing this mystery, but so as not to keep altogether silent concerning it. For by this term, the eminence of an unspeakable matter cannot be expressed.'"

c. There is a diversity of personal peculiarities.

The three persons are truly and really distinguished from one another by their own personal properties.

39. The personal properties are distinguished as *internal* and *external*. To the *internal* personal peculiarities there are corresponding *internal acts* which refer to the peculiar mode of subsistence by reason of which each person is distinguished from the other (*opera ad intra*). To the *external* personal peculiarities or properties there are corresponding *external actions* (*opera ad extra*) which "relate to an object outside of God, and produce or leave an effect outside of God" (*Quenstedt*).

aa) The opera ad intra.

40. The *opera ad intra* are divided, because they are not common to the three divine persons, but are peculiar to only one person or to two persons.

41. The personal acts or *opera ad intra* are two: *generation*, that internal act by which God the Father, from His own essence, from eternity, produces or begets the Son; and *spiration*, that internal act by which God the Father and the Son, from His own essence, from eternity, as the common breath of both, produces or breathes the Holy Ghost.

42. The *relative personal properties*, which have distinct reference to another person, and are founded upon the personal acts, introducing a distinction from another person, are three: *paternity* in the Father, *filiation* in the Son, and *procession* in the Holy Ghost.

43. As personal *conceptions*, in the wider sense, including the personal *properties*, by which, in general, one person can be recognized as distinct from another, our dogmaticians name five: *agennesis* (innascibilitas), the not having been begotten, and

paternity, in the Father; *spiration* or breathing, in the Father and the Son; *filiation* or Sonship, in the Son; *procession*, in the Holy Ghost.

44. Our Dogmaticians ascribe *eternal active generation* to the Father, and *eternal passive generation* to the Son, not as if there were two generations, for the generation is one and the same.

45. The nature of this *generation* is described more fully:

- 1) The generation of the Son of God is not *improper* and *metaphorical*, but *proper*, *true* and *essential*;
- 2) not *accidental*, as is the regeneration of sinful men;
- 3) not *physical*, but *hyperphysical*, which occurs without any succession of time, matter and change, and which consists alone in the communication of essence;
- 4) not *temporal*, but *eternal*, for it is "an unceasing emanation, like which there is nothing to be found in nature, for God the Father from eternity beget, and always begets, and never will cease to beget His Son" (*Quenstedt*);
- 5) not *external*, but *innermost*, for the Son is always in His Father's bosom (John 1:18);
- 6) not *voluntary*, but *natural* and *necessary*, "for if the generation of the Son of God were called forth by an act of the will, and were free, and were not necessary or natural, the Son would not be equal and *homo-ousios* to the Father, for the Son exists necessarily and cannot not be" (*Quenstedt*).

46. Our Dogmaticians also ascribe *eternal active spiration* to the Father and the Son, and *eternal passive spiration* to the Holy Ghost, not as if there were two spirations, "but the spiration is one and the same, which, with respect to the source, breathing and producing, is called *active spiration*, and with respect to the end attained is called *passive*. In other respects the emanation of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is most absolute" (*Hollaz*).

47. The nature of the *spiration* is described more fully by Hollaz:

- 1) It is not *external*, like the breathing of Christ upon His disciples (John 20:22), but *internal* and *immanent* since it occurs within the very bosom of the Godhead;
- 2) It is not *transitory* and *evanescent*, as is that of breathing men, but *eternal* and *permanent*, for the Holy Ghost proceeds from eternity from the Father and the Son, and always proceeds and never will cease to proceed;
- 3) It is not *accidental*, but an *essential* spiration, of the very essence of God.

48. From the distinction of persons arises their order both in subsisting and working. *Quenstedt* discusses this most fully:

- 1) "We must distinguish between the order of nature, of time, of dignity, of origin, and of relation."
- 2) "Among the divine persons, there is not an order of nature, because, they are *homo-ousioi*, of the same

essence; nor of *time*, because they are co-eternal; nor of *dignity*, because they have the same honor."

- 3) "But there is among them an order of *origin* and of *relation*, because the Father is of no one, the Son is of the Father, and the Holy Ghost is of both."
- 4) "For if the Father proceeds from no one, but has His essence of Himself, as the fountain and source of the Holy Trinity, and the Son has His essence of the Father by eternal generation, and the Holy Ghost has the same of the Father and the Son by eternal procession, it follows that the Father is the first, the Son the second, and the Holy Ghost the third person, and this order fixed in nature itself and unchangeable, is clearly shown in the formula of baptism" (Matt. 28:19).

49. Our Dogmaticians, in opposition to Arianism and modern Socinianism, maintain, therefore, that there is *no subordination* in the *passive sending forth* of the Son of God into the flesh.

- 1) For this sending forth does not remove equality of persons, but only presupposes an order of *origin*.
- 2) The Son of God was not separated from the Father.
- 3) It was not an *imperious sending forth*, but one of free consent (John 4:34).

50. So likewise the *temporal sending forth* of the Holy Ghost differs from the eternal procession from the Father and the Son, and does not introduce a subordination or inferiority, but only presupposes an order of origin and operation.

51. To indicate both the *unity* and the *distinction* of the three persons, the Church, since the Council of Nice (325 A. D.) uses the word *homo-ousia*.

- 1) "The term *homo-ousios* embraces both ideas, that the Son is a distinct person from the Father, and that He is of the same essence with the Father. For the Father and the Son are not *heterousioi*, of different or diverse essence; they are not *sunousioi*, as men who have one common essence; nor only *homoiousioi*, of like essence, but *homo-ousioi*, having the same essence, eternity, will, work, power and glory" (*Gerhard*).
- 2) This is affirmed not only of the Son, but also of the Holy Ghost.

52. To indicate that by virtue of the unity of essence the three persons do not subsist separately alongside of one another, but within another, our Dogmaticians, with Church usage, use the expression *perichoresis*.

- 1) By the *essential perichoresis* is meant that mutual and most peculiar inherence and immanence by which one divine person, by virtue of the unity of essence, is within another.
- 2) When we come to treat of the intimate union between the divine and human natures in the person of Christ we will speak of the *personal perichoresis*.

bb) *The opera ad extra.*

53. The *external actions (opera ad extra)* of God, which refer to objects outside of God, and are performed outside of God, are three: *Creation, Redemption and Sanctification.*

54. *Gerhard:* "The *opera ad extra* are *undivided*, because in them the three persons are together and work together."

55. By one person, named in *works ad extra*, the entire Trinity is meant, the order and distinction of persons being preserved, "for inasmuch as the Father has an essence of Himself, therefore He also acts of Himself, the Son acts and works from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both, John 5:19" (*Quenstedt*).

56. The order *in working*, and the relation in which the three persons stand to a *work ad extra*, our Dogmaticians find most clearly stated in Rom. 11:36, where they refer of *Him* to the Father, *through him* to the Son, and *unto him* to the Holy Ghost.

57. Hollaz gives the following definitions of the three persons of the Godhead:

- 1) *Deus Pater* est prima divinitatis persona, nec genita nec procedens, sed ab æterno gignens Filium substantialem sui imaginem, et cum Filio ab æterno spirans Spiritum Sanctum, creans, conservans, et gubernans omnia, mittens Filium redemptorem, et Spiritum Sanctum sanctificatorem, generis humani.
- 2) *Filius Dei* est secunda divinitatis persona, ab æterno a Patre genita, ejusdem cum Patre essentiæ et majestatis, quæ cum Patre ab æterno spirat Spiritum Sanctum, et in plenitudine temporis humanam naturam in propriam hypostasin assumpsit, ut humanum genus redimeret et salvaret.
- 3) *Spiritus Sanctus* est tertia divinitatis persona, ejusdem cum Patre et Filio essentiæ, quæ ab æterno procedit a Patre et Filio, et ab utroque in tempore mittitur ad sanctificandum corda hominum salvandorum.

III. Explanatory Analogies and Scientific Deductions.

58. Although nothing can be found in nature to express the mystery of the Trinity, many have sought by analogies drawn from the sphere of human knowledge to illustrate the doctrine.

59. The Church Fathers sought for traces of the Trinity in the creature, and found *reflections* of it in intellectual and rational creatures, and *traces* of it in irrational creatures.

60. Augustine sought to illustrate the doctrine in two ways: 1) by seeing a reflection in the reason of man, *memory, intelligence, and will*; and 2) from the idea of *love*, distinguishing in God—the Father, as He who loves; the Son, as He who is loved; and the Holy Ghost, as the bond of love between the two—*amans, amatus, and mutuus amor*. Athanasius speaks of the fountain, the rivulet, and the river.

61. The Scholastics as a rule preferred the illustration of the *intellect, the feeling, and the will.*

62. Melancthon, following in the footsteps of Augustine,

sought to illustrate the doctrine by *thought*, *will*, and *love*, and also suggests the metaphysical unity of subject, object, and subject-object.

63. The modern theologians lay stress upon *love* as the most fitting analogy. *Martensen*: "If God reveals Himself to us in a threefold personal form, as Father, Son, and Spirit, He must also be from eternity manifest to Himself, and must love Himself, in the threefold relation of Father, Son, and Spirit." So Sartorius, Julius Mueller, Schoeberlein, Kahnis, Nitzsch, Dorner.

64. Philosophers like Schelling and Hegel sought to explain the doctrine speculatively, and the latter assigned to the dogma a first place in his system.

65. But none of these speculative deductions can be regarded as the basis of the revealed doctrine of the Trinity.

66. Our Dogmaticians maintain that all these analogies and deductions:

- 1) do not prove the doctrine, but only illustrate;
- 2) do not generate faith, but only instil human opinion;
- 3) do not convince an adversary, but only delight the believer;
- 4) present more unlikeness than likeness;
- 5) are to be used with great prudence and caution.

IV. Attacks upon the Church Doctrine of the Trinity.

67. Anti-trinitarianism is the general name given to the view which opposes the doctrine of the Trinity, and includes the Monarchianism, Patripassianism, and Sabellianism of the Nicene Age, as well as of later times, and particularly the Socinianism, Unitarianism, Swedenborgianism, and Rationalism of modern times.

68. Socinianism (Faustus Socinus, *d.* 1604) teaches that the doctrines of the Trinity, and of the divinity of Christ are contrary to reason, and therefore irrational and incredible. Christ was a mere man, endowed with extraordinary gifts, and afterwards elevated to heaven, and the Holy Ghost is a personal divine energy.

69. Unitarianism, in modern times, is the name given to that system of theology, which rejects the doctrine of the Trinity. It includes not only the Unitarians proper, but the Universalists, and such sects as the Christians (so-called), the Orthodox Friends, and the Hicksite Quakers.

70. *The Importance of this Doctrine for Practical life.*

- 1) It gives us a deeper insight into the full glory of the Divine Being;
- 2) In opposition to an arid Deism, and a dreamy Pantheism, belief in the Triune God, is also a recognition of His Transcendence above the world as well as His Immanence in the world;
- 3) Even if the intellect can never penetrate this mystery, this fact only establishes the truth of God's absolute incomprehensibility.
- 4) The confession of the Trinity points to a God who is not only exalted infinitely *above* us, but in Christ is

with us, and in the Holy Spirit will dwell in us, leading therefore to our illumination, consolation and sanctification.

- 5) Every presentation of this doctrine in a popular way should aim rather at the warming of the heart and the sanctifying of the life, than the enlightening of the intellect.

- V. *Literature.* Luthardt, *Kompendium*, sec. 31; Schmid, *Theology of Lutheran Church*, sec. 19; Kurtz, *Church History*, sec. 33, 50, 91, 148, 163, 171; Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, sec. 40-46, 87-97, 169, 170, 234, 295; Neander, *History of Christian Dogmas*. Vol. I., pp. 130-176, 285-316; Vol. II., pp. 435-437, 497-500, 562-564, 645-651; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, sec. 52-58; Frank, *Wahrheit*, sec. 14-16; Vilmar, *Dogmatik*, sec. 30; Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, sec. 14, 15; *Dogmengeschichte*, Vol. I., pp. 160-283; Hodge, *Systematic Theology*. Vol. I., pp. 448-482; Bull, *Defence of the Nicene Creed*; Waterland, *On the Trinity*; Dorner, *History of the Person of Christ*; Pearson, *On the Creed*; Smith, H. B., *System of Christian Theology*, pp. 73-90; Crippen, *Popular Introduction to the History of Christian Doctrine*, pp. 35-53; Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 292-333; Strong, *Systematic Theology*, pp. 157-170; Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, Vol. I., pp. 284-294; Christlieb, *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, pp. 240-284; Hase, *Hutterus Redivivus*, sec. 70-72; Percival, *Digest of Theology*, pp. 51-55; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Vol. I., pp. 361-465; Sartorius, *Doctrine of Divine Love*, pp. 3-22; Twisten, *Dogmatik*, Vol. II., pp. 179-304; Schoeberlein, *Die Geheimnisse des Glaubens*, pp. 24-45; Candlish, *The Christian Doctrine of God*, pp. 102-142.

SEC. II. *The Doctrine of Predestination.*

I. The Scripture Doctrine.

1. The most important Scripture passages bearing on the doctrine of Predestination are Rom. 8:28-30; 9:11-18; and Eph. 1:3-11.

2. In the discussion of this subject four words require a special study and examination:

- 1) The *purpose* (*prothesis*) of God, Rom. 8:28; 9:11; Eph. 1:11; 3:11; 2 Tim. 1:9. Believers are called according to the *purpose* of God (Rom. 8:28); this calling is not according to our works, but according to God's own *purpose* and grace, which was in Christ Jesus before times eternal (2 Tim. 1:9), an *eternal purpose* which He purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord (Eph. 3:11). This *purpose* is not grounded in our works (Rom. 9:11; 11:6), but is of pure grace (9:16; 11:5, 6), after the counsel of His will (Eph. 1:11). This *purpose* of God is, that in Christ Jesus our Lord (Eph. 3:11), all who believe in Him (Eph. 1:13; 3:12) and love Him (Rom. 8:28) shall be saved (1 Tim. 2:4).
- 2) The *foreknowledge* (*prognosis*) of God, Acts 2:23; Rom. 8:29; 11:2; 1 Pet. 1:2, 20. The word *foreknowledge* is not to be taken in the sense of *predestination* or foreordination, but in its true sense of *prescience*. In Acts 2:23 we must carefully distinguish between the "determinate counsel" of God that Jesus should be delivered up, and the *foreknowledge* that this would really take place. The verb is also used in the same sense in 1 Pet. 1:20; Rom. 8:29; 11:2.

We speak of the *foreknowledge* of God from a human standpoint, for all things are most absolutely and intimately known to God, who in His *foreknowledge* sees all things in a perpetual, abiding and immutable *present*. From a human standpoint the *foreknowledge* of God is eternal. God intimately knows from eternity who will continue to abide in Christ unto the end (Rom. 8:29; 11:2).

- 3) The foreordination or *predestination* (*pro-orismos*) of God, Acts 4:28; Rom. 8:29, 30; 1 Cor. 2:7; Eph. 1:5, 11. "Whom God foreknew, He also foreordained to be conformed to the image of His Son, and whom He foreordained, them He also called" (Rom. 8:29, 30); having foreordained us unto adoption as sons through Jesus Christ unto Himself, according to the good pleasure of His will (Eph. 1:5), according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of His will (Eph. 1:11).
- 4) The *election* (*ekloge*) of God, Acts 9:15; Rom. 9:11; 11:5, 28; Eph. 1:4. The *election* of Rom. 9:11; 11:5, is a choosing in Christ before the foundation of the world (Eph. 1:4). The *elect* are the personal objects of *election*, those who by faith have renounced all merit, and in whom God's saving purpose of free grace in Christ has been realized (Matt. 24:22, 31; Luke 18:7; Rom. 8:33; Col. 3:12; 2 Tim. 2:10; 1 Pet. 1:1, 2).

3. The election and the predestination of the believer are coincident in time, *predestination* being the mode in which this *election* takes place (Eph. 1:4, 5).

4. There is no conflict when it is stated in 1 Pet. 1:1, 2 that the rule or standard according to which *election* takes place is the *foreknowledge* of God, and when, on the other hand, Paul makes the rule or standard of *predestination* "the good pleasure of His will" (Eph. 1:5), "the purpose of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11), for the divine decree of Predestination is based 1) upon the eternal *purpose* of God in Christ Jesus (Eph. 3:11), and upon His *foreknowledge*, "for whom He foreknew, He also foreordained" (Rom. 8:29).

5. God does not deal in any arbitrary way, for election takes place through *predestination* according to the foreknowledge of God the Father (1 Pet. 1:1, 2),—a foreknowledge of *what* is not stated by Peter or elsewhere in the N. T., but it is clearly implied in Scripture,—a foreknowledge that the grace of God offered in Christ Jesus through the call (Rom. 8:28; 2 Tim. 1:9), would not be rejected.

6. It is arbitrary to maintain that in this foreknowledge of God there can be no reference whatever to the faith of believers,—but we must also, on the other hand, carefully guard against the error of supposing that our foreseen faith moved God to predestine us to salvation. So far from *our faith* being the *ground* of our predestination, it is definitely stated in 1 Pet. 1:1, 2, that faith is the *result* of our election, *elect unto obedience*, where obedience

most assuredly includes faith in Christ ("the obedience of faith," Rom. 1:5).

7. The decree made from eternity necessarily finds its temporal realization. The *purpose*, the *foreknowledge*, and the *decree* are to be viewed as *pre-temporal*; on the other hand, the calling, the justification, and the glorification (which, though still future, is so certain that Paul speaks of it as already having taken place), are to be viewed as *temporal* acts of God (Rom. 8:28-30).

8. The *origin* of the election of believers is the purely gratuitous grace of God (Rom. 11:6); the determining *ground* or the meritorious cause of our election lies in Christ (Eph. 1:4); the *rule* or standard according to which it takes place is the *foreknowledge* of God (1 Pet. 1:1, 2); the *time* of the election is given as taking place in Christ "before the foundation of the world" (Eph. 1:4), "from the beginning" (2 Thess. 2:13); the *mode* in which this election takes place is by *predestination* (Eph. 1:4, 5).

9. It is the clear teaching of Scripture that it is God's gracious will that all men should be saved, and that He has sent His Son into the world that He might procure salvation for all men without a single exception, Ezek. 33:11, "as I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way and live: turn ye, turn ye, from your evil ways; for why will ye die?" So also Ezek. 18:23, 32; especially John 3:16; 1 John 2:2, "Jesus Christ the righteous is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the whole world"; 1 Tim. 2:4, "God willeth that all men should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth"; Tit. 2:11, "For the grace of God hath appeared bringing salvation to all men"; Rom. 11:32, "For God hath shut up all unto disobedience, that He might have mercy upon all"; Acts 17:30, "God commandeth men that they should all everywhere repent"; 2 Pet. 3:9, "The Lord is longsuffering to you-ward, not wishing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance."

10. *Hollaz*: "This *universal* will and benevolence of God is that act of divine grace by which God, having witnessed the common misery of fallen men, is moved not only earnestly to desire the salvation of them all, but also to give Christ as Mediator for its accomplishment, and to appoint appropriate and efficacious means with the intention that all men should use them, obtain through them true faith in Christ, and possess and enjoy eternal salvation, procured through Him to the praise of the divine goodness. . . . However the merciful will of God to confer remission of sins and eternal salvation is not absolute, but relative and limited by justice. Because it has respect to the satisfaction of Christ, by which divine justice was satisfied. . . . God wills, through the ordinary means, the Word of God and the Sacraments, to confer saving faith upon all men."

11. Our Dogmaticians sum up the Scriptural statements concerning *the universal will of God* under the following heads:

- 1) It is gratuitous and free (Gal. 3:22; Rom. 11:32; 8:32);
- 2) impartial (Rom. 3:22); 3) sincere and earnest (Ezek. 18:23, 32; 33:11); 4) efficacious (Rom. 2:4); 5) not

absolute, but ordinate and conditioned (John 3:16; 1 Tim. 2:6; Rom. 5:8; 1 John 1:4, 9, 10).

12. The main passages upon which the strict Predestinarians rely, who maintain that there is a particular election of some individual men to salvation, and of others to reprobation, and who deny the *universality* of grace, are Matt. 13:14, 15 (Mark 4:12); John 12:40; Acts 13:48; Rom. 8:28-30; Rom. 9:11-16, 18, 22, 29; 1 Pet. 2:8.

- 1) Matt. 13:14,15; Mark 4:12; John 12:40. The whole context proves that this hardening of the Jews was the result of their own sin in wilfully rejecting Christ. Sin begets hardness and blindness of heart. God permits men to fall into greater sin, and this permission or withdrawal of God's grace, is the penalty and punishment of sin. God was willing to heal them, and they could have been healed, if they would have turned from their sins.
- 2) Acts 13:48, "And as many as were ordained to eternal life believed." It is altogether arbitrary to maintain that this passage teaches *absolute predestination*. This *ordaining* (*tetagemnoi*) of God was in accordance with His *purpose* to save all who believe in Christ, and in accordance with His *foreknowledge* that the persons here referred to, would not reject the offered grace. Verse 46, immediately preceding, plainly shows that there is no reference here to an *absolute* decree.
- 3) Rom. 8:28-30. This passage manifests the wonderful goodness of God. From eternity (Eph. 3:11), after the counsel of His will (Eph. 1:11), out of pure grace (2 Tim. 1:9), God *purposed* in Christ Jesus our Lord (Eph. 3:11), to save all who believe in Christ. From this *purpose* of God the *calling* follows, hence believers "are called according to His purpose." Whom God from all eternity *knew* would accept the salvation which is in Christ and perseveringly abide therein, He also *foreordained* to salvation, "to be conformed to the image of His Son." The *purpose*, the *foreknowledge*, and the *decree* itself, are pre-temporal; and this *decree* finds its temporal realization in the *calling*, the *justification*, and the *glorification*.
- 4) Rom. 9:11-16, 18, 22, 29. Some, who would take these passages by themselves, severing them from the context, and who do not take into consideration the drift of the Apostle's argument, nor the analogy of faith, maintain that Paul here teaches, especially in verses 11 and 17 the doctrine of *absolute* predestination, and the supralapsarian view of a predestination to condemnation. But Paul is here contrasting the supremacy of God with the arrogance of man. The purpose of God to save all who will perseveringly believe on Christ depends not on works, nor on merit, but on the grace and will of God that calleth. The *election* is on God's

part simply the outcome of free love, freely choosing its object, and excludes all legal claim on the part of its object. As Israel does not surrender itself thus to the election, but raises claims of its own, it puts itself out of connection with the divine election (Rom. 9:30-33). This is the substance of the whole argument of these three chapters. The doctrine of *absolute* predestination has merely a possible and apparent, not a necessary and actual, basis in the present verse.

When in Rom. 9:18 it is said that God "*hardeneth* whom he will," this is not to be taken causally, as if God was the cause and author, sending hardness into the hearts of unbelievers, but is to be taken *permissively* (God justly permits the impenitent sinner wickedly to rush into greater sins) and *judicially* (for God forsakes the sinner by withdrawing his grace from him). In Rom. 9:19-24, Paul is contrasting the supremacy of God with the arrogance of man; and the Apostle here vindicates for God as the Creator the absolute right to make and prepare one man for salvation and the other for destruction; *but he does not say that God has done so*. On the contrary, by the use of the adversative *de* (*but*, translated in R. V. *what*), he puts the actual dealings of God in express contrast with the absolute right vindicated for God in the abstract (9:22). Paul does not say that God has "*fitted unto destruction*" "vessels of wrath"—but that, though almighty in His power, He has till now "*endured with much long-suffering* vessels of wrath fitted unto destruction"—(which vessels fitted themselves unto destruction by their own guilt and scornful rejection of Divine grace). So also Paul does not say that God has *created* "vessels of mercy," but that He "*afore prepared*" them "unto glory." In this last verse (9:23) a *predestination to eternal life* is distinctly asserted in express words; but nowhere is an *absolute* predestination taught, nor a *predestination to condemnation* affirmed.

- 5) I Pet. 2:8, "for they stumble, being disobedient to the word; whereunto also they were appointed." This does not mean that they were appointed *unto disobedience*, but all who do not believe on the word are appointed unto *stumbling*. This is the moral order of the universe (Rom. 1:24, 26, 28). God punishes sin with sin, unbelief with unbelief. Whatsoever a man soweth, that also shall he reap (Gal. 6:7).

II. The Church Doctrine concerning Predestination.

(a) *The Early Church.*

1. The tendency of the Greek and Latin Fathers before Augustine was Semipelagian in character. They taught the

doctrine of conditional predestination, that the predestination of the individual to salvation was dependent on foreknowledge, which is not, however, to be regarded as causative.

2. *Gieseler*: "All the fathers of this period agree that God so far predestines men to blessedness or condemnation, as he foresees their free acts, by which they are made worthy of reward or punishment; but the foreseeing these acts is not the cause of them, but the acts are the cause and ground of the foreknowledge." So in general Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria. Cyprian also refused to accept the doctrine of rigid predestination and of irresistible grace, although Augustine, over a century later, discovered his own views in the writings of Cyprian.

3. Augustine taught *unconditional* predestination, that God in consequence of an eternal decree, and without any reference to the future conduct of man, elected some out of corrupt humanity to become vessels of His mercy, and left the rest as vessels of His wrath to a just condemnation. The former he called *predestination*, the latter *reprobation*. He thus taught a predestination to punishment and condemnation, but did not assert a direct predestination to evil or to sin. His doctrine of predestination resulted from the views he held of original sin.

4. Semi-Pelagianism tried to mediate between Augustinianism and Pelagianism. John Cassian, a disciple of Chrysostom, without referring to Augustine by name, combated his doctrine of election and of irresistible grace, regarded the will of man as coöperating with grace in conversion, and taught a conditional predestination based on foreknowledge.

5. Augustinianism finally won the day (Synod of Orange, 529 A. D.), but the doctrine of predestination to evil was rejected. Gregory the Great (*d.* 604) transmitted to subsequent ages the milder aspect of the Augustinian doctrine.

(b) *The Scholasticism of the Middle Ages.*

6. Bede (*d.* 735) and Alcuin (*d.* 804) adopted in the main the views of Augustine, but rejected the doctrine of the predestination to reprobation. The monk Gottschalk (*d.* 868) was the originator of the predestination controversy in the ninth century, and went so far as to teach a twofold predestination, not only to salvation, but also to damnation. He was strongly opposed by Rabanus Maurus (*d.* 856), and especially by Hincmar (*d.* 882), and condemned by the Synods of Mayence (848 A. D.) and of Quiercy (849 A. D.).

7. Anselm (*d.* 1109), Peter Lombard (*d.* 1160), and Thomas Aquinas (*d.* 1274), all endeavored to retain Augustine's doctrine of unconditional election, but were more or less influenced by Semi-Pelagian tendencies. This was especially the case with Duns Scotus (*d.* 1308), who made predestination conditional on the divine foreknowledge of man's free acts. Thomas of Bradwardine, Archbishop of Canterbury (*d.* 1349),

began a new contest in defense of Augustine and his system, and complained that "almost the whole world had fallen into the errors of Pelagianism." The forerunners of the Reformation, Wiclif, Huss, and Savonarola, sought to return again to the more profound fundamental principles of Augustinianism.

(c) *The Age of the Reformation.*

8. The Roman Catholic Church (Tridentine Creed) declares that the doctrine of Predestination is a mystery, that no one can know whether he belongs to the elect or not, but rejects a predestination to evil. The Jansenists, in opposition to the Jesuits, defended strict Augustinianism.

9. Although Zwingle pronounced decidedly in favor of predestination, he differed in many points from strict Augustinianism, and deduced his views from his doctrine of God rather than from his views of original sin, and proceeded from speculative rather than from ethical principles.

10. It was Calvin who introduced the doctrine of predestination into the Reformed Church, with all its consequences and sternness. He, and especially his disciple Beza, went further than Augustine, and made the absolute decree of Predestination on God's part, "whom He would admit to salvation and whom he would condemn to destruction," precede the Fall (*Supralapsarians*), and held that the Fall itself, with the everlasting ruin of the reprobate, was decreed by God at man's creation. The Gomarists especially favored this view. A milder form of this doctrine, which carried the victory at the Synod of Dort (1618-19), and is taught in the Calvinistic Symbolical Books, is that God did not decree the Fall, but permitted it (*Infralapsarians*). According to the Reformed view, grace works irresistibly, nor can man lose it when once in his possession.

11. Arminianism, in Holland, was an uprising against the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, and originally simply meant the assertion of universal grace and conditional election; but gradually embraced liberal views in various doctrines.

12. The antithesis between Calvinism and Arminianism may be briefly stated as follows: a) The five points of Calvinism are 1) particular predestination; 2) limited atonement, designed for the elect alone; 3) the total moral inability of the will; 4) irresistible grace, and 5) the perseverance of saints. b) The five Articles of Arminianism are 1) conditional election dependent on the foreknowledge of faith; 2) universal atonement intended for all; 3) man, *if he chooses*, may, through the appointed means, lay hold of salvation; 4) grace is not irresistible; 5) believers may fall from grace finally. Arminianism in general is the doctrinal system of the Wesleyans in England and of the Methodists.

13. Melancthon, in his earlier writings (1521-1526), favored strong predestinarian views. "All that takes place takes place necessarily according to the divine predestination." In his later writings he went to the other extreme and embraced

Synergism. "Three causes concur in conversion, the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and our own will assenting to and not resisting the Word of God."

14. Luther, in his private writings, especially in his work *De Servo Arbitrio*, written against the Semi-Pelagianism of Erasmus in 1525, uses here and there expressions of a strongly deterministic character, implying an absolute predestination.

15. Three explanations of these statements of Luther have been given by our Lutheran theologians: 1) That in his early writings Luther in fact seems almost to agree with Calvin in his doctrine on predestination, because he had not yet attained his later clearness on this point, lacking the full light of evangelical knowledge; 2) that, though these expressions sound like Calvinism, Luther did not put such a deterministic meaning upon them, treating the subject more philosophically than theologically; 3) that there is nothing erroneous in these expressions, if we only take them in Luther's sense.

16. The true answer seems to lie in the first explanation. In his *De Servo Arbitrio* we still see the strong influence which Augustinianism had over Luther. Our Confessions, so far from sanctioning these views of Luther, avoid all direct reference to the subject, and there is no really official statement and consensus of the Lutheran Church on this subject until the appearance of the Formula of Concord in 1580.

17. *Stellhorn*: With Luther and his pupils, absolute predestination was only an auxiliary, which at first seemed necessary to them to guard the centre, salvation by grace alone; and the Lutheran Church, therefore, dropped this doctrine, or rather never took it up, when it was seen that it was not necessary to shield this central point,—that in fact, by its unavoidable consequences, it annulled the Biblical and Lutheran doctrine of the means of grace. It was quite different with the fathers of the Reformed Church. Absolute predestination was the centre of its entire theology, and its doctrine of the means of grace had to conform to this.

18. In the year 1561 the doctrine of predestination became a topic of discussion between the Reformed and Lutheran theologians, and though the topic was referred to in the controversy with the Philippists, it did not cause any public dissension among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession.

19. The doctrine of predestination as taught by our Church developed slowly in a sound dogmatico-historical way. The common faith of the Lutheran Church is expressed in Chapter XI. of the Formula of Concord. Our Confessors say: "In order by the aid of divine grace to prevent disagreement and separation in the future among our successors, as well as among us, we have desired here also to present an explanation concerning the eternal election of the children of God, so that every one may know what is our unanimous doctrine, faith and confession."

20. The teaching of the *Formula of Concord (Epitome, Chap. XI.)* may be summarized as follows:

- 1) We must accurately distinguish between God's foreknowledge and His eternal election.
 - 2) The foreknowledge of God is nothing else than that God knows all things before they happen (Dan. 2:28).
 - 3) This foreknowledge is occupied alike with the godly and the wicked; but it is not the cause of evil or of sin, nor the cause that men perish, for which they themselves are responsible.
 - 4) Predestination or the eternal election of God is occupied only with the godly, and this is a cause of their salvation, which God also provides as well as disposes what belongs thereto.
 - 5) This is not to be sought in the secret counsel of God, but in the Word of God, where it is also revealed.
 - 6) The Word of God leads us to Christ, in whom all are elected that are to be saved (Eph. 1:4).
 - 7) Christ calls to Himself all sinners, and is anxious that all men should come to Him and permit Him to help them.
 - 8) The true judgment concerning predestination must not be learned 1) from reason, 2) nor from the Law of God, 3) but alone from the Holy Gospel concerning Christ, in which it is clearly testified that "God hath shut up all unto disobedience that he might have mercy upon all" (Rom. 11:32), "not wishing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance" (2 Pet. 3:9).
 - 9) That "many are called, but few chosen" (Matt. 22:14), does not mean that God is unwilling that all should be saved, but the reason is that either they do not at all hear God's Word, but wilfully despise it and harden their hearts, or, when it is heard, they do not heed it. It is not God or His election which is responsible that they perish, but their own wickedness (2 Pet. 2:1-3; Luke 11:49, 52; Heb. 12:25, 26).
 - 10) In Christ alone we should seek the eternal election of the Father, who, in His eternal divine counsel, determined that He would save no one except those who acknowledge His Son, Christ, and truly believe on Him.
 - 11) We have this glorious consolation, that out of pure grace, without any merit of our own, we have been elected in Christ to eternal life, and God saves us according to the purpose of His will.
21. The Formula further explicitly rejects the following errors:
- 1) The error that God does not wish all men to repent and believe the Gospel (as maintained by the strict Calvinists).
 - 2) The error that when God calls us to Himself He is not in earnest that all men should come to Him (as maintained by the Calvinists).

- 3) The error that God does not wish every one to be saved, but that without regard to their sins, alone from the counsel, purpose, and will of God, some are appointed to condemnation, so that they cannot be saved (as taught by the strict Calvinists).
- 4) The error, which the Calvinists charged against the Lutherans, that not only the mercy of God and the most holy merit of Christ, but also *in us is a meritorious cause* of God's election, on account of which God has elected us to everlasting life. (Distinguish between the *meritorious* and the *instrumental* cause.)

(d) *The Presentation of our older Dogmaticians.*

22. Our dogmaticians, in speaking of the gracious will of God to save man in Christ, distinguish between His *universal* will and His *special* will.

23. *Hollaz*: "The *universal* will is that by which God wills the salvation of all fallen and wretched men, and for attaining this has given Christ as a mediator, and has ordained those means by which the salvation acquired through Christ, and strength for believing, are offered to all men with the sincere intention of conferring such salvation and faith." This will is also called *antecedent*, inasmuch as it antedates all question as to the manner in which man may treat the offered grace. It is called *universal* or *general*, because it refers to all men without a single exception.

24. This *antecedent* will depends alone upon God's compassion for the wretched condition of man, and has not been called forth by any merit or worthiness in man (Gal. 3:22; Rom. 11:32). *Hollaz*: "Pity for the sinner does not move God causally, but only affords an occasion. For in man there is no impelling cause whatever."

25. This antecedent will, however, is not absolute and unconditioned, but *ordinate* and *conditioned*.

- 1) *Hollaz*: "The merciful will of God to confer remission of sins and eternal salvation is not absolute, but *relative* and limited by justice. Because it has respect to the satisfaction of Christ, by which divine justice was satisfied."
- 2) This gracious will of God is *ordinate*, because God in His eternal counsel established a series of means, through which He confers saving faith upon all men. *Hollaz*: "These means are the Word of God and the Sacraments. . . . By this ordinate will God wishes not only that all men be saved, but also that all men come to the knowledge of the truth."
- 3) This gracious will is called *conditioned*, because God, "willing that men should be saved, does not will that they should be saved without regard to the fulfilment of any satisfaction or condition, but should be led to salvation under the condition of determined

means. God wills, through ordinary means, to confer saving faith upon all men" (*Hollaz*).

26. The gracious will of God in itself is one and undivided, but it has a twofold relation. We call it the *universal* or *antecedent* will "when regard is had to the means for salvation, in so far as, on the part of God, they have been appointed and are offered to all" (*Gerhard*), but this same will of God, when regard is had to the divinely foreseen conduct of men towards the offered grace, as the condition upon which they are to be saved, is designated as the *special* or *consequent* will of God.

27. This *special* will is called *particular*, because it refers not to all men, but only to those concerning whom God foreknows that they will properly treat the offered grace (Eph 1:1; James 2:5; 1 Tim. 1:16; John 17:20).

28. This *special* will is also called *consequent*, because the divine foreknowledge of the proper conduct on the part of man precedes it. *Hollaz*: "The consequent will is that by which God, from the fallen human race, elects those to eternal life who he foresees will use the ordinary means, and will persevere to the end of life in faith in Christ."

29. Our dogmaticians draw the following distinctions between the *antecedent* (general) and the *consequent* (special) will of God (condensed from *Hollaz* and *Quenstedt*):

- 1) The will of God is said to be *antecedent* and *consequent*, a) not with regard to time, as though the former preceded the latter in time; b) nor with regard to the divine will itself, as though two actually distinct wills in God were affirmed, for the divine will is the essence itself of God, with a connoted object, conceived under the mode of an act of volition; c) but from the order of our reason, according to a diverse consideration of the objects, because, according to our mode of conception, God's willing eternal salvation to men, and His providing the means of grace, are anterior to His will to confer in act eternal salvation upon those who would to the end believe in Christ, or to assign eternal condemnation to the impenitent.
- 2) The *antecedent* will relates to man in so far as he is wretched; the *consequent* will as he is believing or unbelieving.
- 3) The *antecedent* and *consequent* wills are not opposed to each other, but the latter is materially contained in the former, and the antecedent will passes into the consequent when the condition of salvation is fulfilled.
- 4) The antecedent respects the *giving*, and the consequent the *receiving* of salvation on the part of man. The former is universal, the latter is particular. The former precedes, the latter follows a purified condition.

30. This distinction between the antecedent and consequent will is necessary because of the wonderful combination of divine justice and mercy, which are to be reconciled with each other.

31. Three classes of passages can thus be reconciled: 1) those that show that the mercy of God is inclined towards all sinners (1 Tim. 2:6; 2 Pet. 3:9); 2) those which indicate the righteous justice of God and exclude from the inheritance of salvation those who resist the divine order (John 3:18; Mark 16:16); and 3) those in which both the mercy and justice of God are declared (Matt. 23:37,38). On this last passage *Hollaz* remarks: "Christ, by His antecedent will, as far as it pertained to Himself, willed that the children of Israel be gathered together; but, by His consequent will, because they were unwilling to be gathered, He willed that their house be left to them desolate."

32. From the special or *consequent* will of God, which is based upon and contained in the universal or *antecedent* will, there arises the purpose of God, which is called *predestination* or *election*.

33. The word *predestination* has been employed in a twofold sense: 1) In a wider sense, by *Calvinistic* writers, according to whom it denotes the divine purpose, referring equally to the saving of believers and the condemnation of unbelievers; and 2) in a narrower sense, by *Lutheran* theologians, according to whom the purpose of God refers alone to the saving of believers. The latter also maintain that this is the biblical usage (Rom. 8:30; Eph. 1:5).

34. Even if we limit the word *predestination* to the divine purpose for saving believers, our Lutheran theologians have used the word in three different senses:

- 1) In a *wider* sense—as if the decree of predestination referred to the purpose of God to establish a scheme of redemption whereby all might be saved. So *Baier*: "The decree refers to the entire work of leading man to salvation." (So at times in the *Formula of Concord*, and in *Hutter* and others.)
- 2) In a *stricter* sense—in which it signifies the ordination of believers to salvation, combined with the *prothesis* (purpose) and *prognosis* (foreknowledge).
- 3) In the *most strict* sense—by which *pro-orismos* is distinguished from *prothesis* and *prognosis*, and denotes the eternal purpose of God to save those whom he distinctly foresees that they will believe to the end in Christ.

35. We here use the word *predestination* in its *most strict* sense. *Hollaz*: "Predestination is the eternal decree of God to bestow eternal salvation upon all of whom God foresaw that they would finally believe in Christ."

36. *Quenstedt*: "Predestination is an act of the consequent divine will, by which, before the foundations of the earth were laid, not according to our works, but out of pure mercy,

according to His purpose and design, which He purposed in Himself in consideration of the merit of Christ to be apprehended by faith, God ordained to eternal life for the praise of His glorious grace such men as, by the power of the Holy Ghost, through the preaching of the Gospel, would perseveringly and to the end believe in Christ."

37. *Hollaz* presents the syllogism of predestination as follows:

- 1) The *prothesis* as Major premise: Every one who will perseveringly believe in Christ to the end of life will certainly be saved, and therefore shall be elected and written in the book of life.
- 2) The *prognosis* as Minor premise: But Abraham, Peter, Paul, etc., will perseveringly believe in Christ to the end of life.
- 3) The *pro-orismos* as the conclusion: Therefore Abraham, Peter, Paul, etc., will certainly be saved, and therefore shall be elected and be written in the book of life.

38. Our dogmaticians make the following distinctions in discussing the *causes* of election: 1) the *efficient* cause is the Triune God (Rom. 8:28; Eph. 1:4; John 13:18; 15:16, 19; Acts 13:2; 2 Thess. 2:13); 2) the *impulsive internal* cause is the compassion and purely gratuitous grace of God (Rom. 9:15, 16; Eph. 1:5, 6; 2:8, 9; Rom. 11:5, 6); 3) the *impulsive external principal* cause is the merit of Christ, regarded with respect to foreseen final application (Eph. 1:4-7; John 3:16; Rom 8:3; 2 Tim. 1:9); and some, as *Baier*, state 4) the *impulsive external less principal* cause, "faith in Christ, and that final."

39. The relation of faith to predestination was a topic of discussion already among our older dogmaticians.

- 1) *Hollaz*: "The election to eternal life of men corrupted by sin was made by the most merciful God, *in consideration of faith (intuitu fidei)* in Christ remaining steadfast to the end of life."
- 2) *Quenstedt*: (a) Faith, and that, too, as persevering or final faith, enters into the sphere of eternal election, *not as already afforded, but as foreknown*. For we are elected to eternal life from faith divinely foreseen, apprehending to the end the merit of Christ; b) Faith enters into election not by reason of any meritorious worth, but only so far as it is the only means of apprehending the merit of Christ.
- 3) *Jacob Andreae*, one of the main authors of the Formula of Concord, writes: "Election presupposes the merit of Christ and a knowledge of Him by true faith."
- 4) *Aegidius Hunnius*: "When I and others reckon faith among the causes of predestination, we have added the explicit explanation, that this is to be understood of faith only inasmuch as it is based on

Christ Jesus, the rock of our election unto life, and only inasmuch as it relies on the merit of His bitter sufferings and death. This form of expression simply means to say: Christ apprehended by faith is the cause of our election."

- 5) *Leonhard Hutter*: "Faith is taken into consideration in this matter of eternal election, 1) because it belongs to the order and to the decree of predestination or of God electing, and 2) because it is an object of His eternal foreknowledge. . . . Faith is not here regarded as a virtue, a quality, or a kind of work, but only so far as it is related to Christ's merit. . . . We justly repel the expression, 'We are elected for the sake of faith,' which silently presumes merit on our part. But we say with the Scriptures, 'We are elected through faith or in faith in Jesus Christ.'"
- 6) *Frederick Balduin* (in 1607): "God did not elect us for the sake of foreseen faith or of its worthiness and excellence, but he has elected us in Christ unto the adoption in view of faith (*intuitu fidei*), as also it pleased God to justify and save us not for the sake of faith, but through faith as a beggar's hand. Hence, that we are elected in view of faith as foreknown from eternity dare not be referred to faith as an excellent work, but must be gratefully ascribed to Christ as the one foreknown. . . . How does election cause faith while faith is included in election itself? Faith was not only included in the decree of election according to the foreknowledge and with respect to the divine intelligence, but it was also actually awakened in us in accord with the decree. The solution the Apostle himself offers when he declares, 'God has blessed us in Christ, even as He chose us in Christ' (Eph. 1:3, 4). But He has blessed us in Christ as apprehended by faith, hence He has also elected us in Christ as apprehended by faith. It is therefore also evident from this testimony of the Apostle that faith is comprehended in the decree of election. Yet it does not precede election, nor is it a cause of election, unless you do not mean a meritorious, but simply an instrumental cause, which apprehends the mercy of the eternal Father and the merit of Christ offered in the Gospel."
- 7) *John Gerhard*: "Christ's merit is the cause of our election. But since Christ's merit benefits no one without faith, we say that regard to faith must be included in the decree of election. . . . Since Christ's merit is found in man only through faith, we teach that election took place in view of the merit of Christ apprehended by faith."

40. This decree of predestination

- 1) is not *absolute* in this sense as if God absolutely decreed to save some without reference to any prerequisite condition, as the Calvinists teach, but is *ordinate*, determined by a certain order of means, and *relative*, because God had regard to an impulsive external cause,—the merit of Christ to be apprehended by persevering faith (1 Cor. 1:21);
- 2) nor is it *conditional* in this sense as if God from eternity would elect this or that one to salvation, if he would perseveringly believe in Christ; for this decree is not *doubtful*, but *simple, categorical and positive*, because God by virtue of his foreknowledge recognizes who will perseveringly believe on Christ, and predestinates these to salvation, *because* they will perseveringly believe in Christ;
- 3) but is *eternal* (Eph. 1:4; 2 Tim. 1:9; 2 Thess. 2:13; Matt. 25:34);
- 4) is *particular* (Matt. 20:16);
- 5) is *immutable*, because based upon an *ordinate* decree, and because of the infallibility of the divine foreknowledge,—for an elect person cannot become a reprobate (Matt. 24:24; John 10:28; Rom. 8:29, 30; 1 Pet. 1:1, 2, 4; 2 Tim. 2:19). The *elect* may for a time fall from grace, but they will repent and die in faith in Christ. (After *Hollaz* and *Quenstedt*.)

41. *Hollaz*: "A regenerate man, in the course of his life, is certain of his election conditionally (Phil 2:12), but, at the end of life, the same rejoices in the absolute certainty of his predestination."

42. *Quenstedt*: "The *attributes of the elect* are: 1) paucity (Matt. 22:14); 2) possibility of totally losing, for a while, indwelling grace (Ps. 51:12; 1 Cor. 10:12); 3) the certainty of election (Luke 10:20; Rom. 8:38; 2 Tim. 4:8; Phil. 2:12); 4) final perseverance in the faith (Matt. 10:22; Rev. 2:10)."

43. In contrast with *predestination* stands *reprobation*. The word *adokimos*, in the sense of *reprobate*, is found in 1 Cor. 9:27; 2 Cor. 13:5-7; 2 Tim. 3:8. This condemnation itself is also referred to in Jude 4.

44. *Brochmann*: "We must avoid considering God the cause of reprobation in the same manner that He is of election. For since reprobation is eternal perdition, to which there is no direct way except through sin and unbelief, every one must see that reprobation cannot be ascribed to God as effecting it. . . . The true cause of reprobation is in man himself."

45. In treating of this difficult topic our dogmaticians discuss various points:

- 1) The *internal exciting cause* of reprobation is the punitive justice of God (Rom. 2:8);
- 2) The *external exciting cause* is the rejection of the

- merit of Christ, the foreseen final incredulity or want of faith (Mark 16:16; John 3:36);
- 3) The *form* of reprobation is exclusion from the inheritance of eternal salvation (Matt. 25:41) and the infliction of eternal punishment (Mark 9:48; 2 Thess. 1:9; Rom. 2:7-9; Jude 7; Rev. 14:11; 20:10);
 - 4) The *attributes* of reprobation are: *a*) Eternity (Matt. 25:41; Jude 4); *b*) Immutability (Num. 23:19; 1 Sam. 15:29; Mal. 3:6);
 - 5) The attributes of the *reprobate*: *a*) plurality (Matt. 7:13, 14); *b*) possibility of being for awhile in the state of the truly regenerate; *c*) perseverance in final unbelief.

III. Attacks upon and Modifications of the Church Doctrine concerning Predestination.

46. *Socinianism* (and Rationalism in general) denies that there is any predestination at all, and even denies that God has foreknowledge of the voluntary actions of free agents, maintaining that God in creating free agents has voluntarily limited His power and His knowledge, and that as the free actions of man are future contingent events, they do not become objects of God's knowledge until after they have taken place. We answer: God has perfect knowledge of the future free acts of His creatures, *immediately*, by pure intuition, inexplicable to us. This knowledge of contingent events is by no means *contingent* knowledge, but perfect and incomprehensible.

47. Strict *Calvinism* maintains that God's foreknowledge of all events from the absolute beginning virtually involves the pre-determination of every event; that the decrees of God are absolute, and that all events, without exception, are embraced in God's eternal purpose, even the primal apostasies of Satan, and of Adam. Those who hold that God not only foresaw and permitted but actually decreed the fall of man (logically the most consistent type of Calvinism), are called *Supralapsarians*; while those who hold that the decree of God presupposes the creation and fall of man, and that after the fall God was pleased to choose some to holiness and eternal life, while he left others to the just punishment of their sins (the view of the vast majority of Calvinists), are called *Infralapsarians*.

48. Arminianism (Wesleyanism and American Methodism), in antithesis to Calvinism, maintains 1) that God does not predetermine the volitions of responsible agents, as this would destroy the freedom of the will, because such predetermination would *fix* the act; and 2) denies that foreknowledge has any influence upon the future of the act, as foreknowledge *is fixed* by the act. Some Arminians even deny God's foreknowledge, on the ground of the intrinsic impossibility of a future contingency being foreknown. So much stress does Arminianism lay upon the *freedom of the will*,—the power of choosing either right or wrong,—that "if the divine foreknowledge of the volitions of a free agent contradicts the freedom,

then the freedom, and not the foreknowledge, is to be believed" (*Whedon*). Election and reprobation, as Arminianism holds them, are conditioned upon the conduct and *voluntary* character of man as a free agent.

49. Since 1877 the doctrine of Predestination has been the topic of more or less discussion in the Lutheran Church of this country, owing to the position taken by Dr. Walther and the Missouri Synod. The main question at issue centres around the phrase *intuitu fidei*, election *in view of faith*,—Did God in the eternal predestination of the believer to salvation have any regard to *foreseen persevering faith*?

- 1) Our older Lutheran dogmaticians unanimously taught with *Baier* that "God in His infinite mercy determined to give eternal salvation to all those, and only to those, of whom He foresaw that they would believe in Christ till the end, and this for the sake of Christ's merits, which must be apprehended by persevering faith, and is foreseen as such."
- 2) The teaching of the Missouri Synod since 1877 is:
Eternal election solely flows from God's *free grace* in Christ. In the decree of eternal predestination the *faith* of the elect is not *presupposed* (as is assumed by the theory that predestination took place "in foresight of faith"), but *included*,—for when God elected them He at the same time and in the same decree decreed to grant them faith and perseverance in faith. As God *in time* unites His children to Himself by giving them faith, so *in eternity* He united His children to Himself by decreeing to give them faith. "We exactly know the reason why those who are actually saved, are elected, brought to faith and preserved in it. It is, so Scripture clearly reveals, out of God's pure, free mercy in Christ. We also know the reason why those who perish are not converted or not preserved in faith, and thus go to perdition. It is, as Scripture likewise plainly teaches, from their own fault, namely, from their obstinate resistance to the saving grace of God. But we do not know the reason why one person *in preference to another* is converted and saved, *as all men by nature are equally guilty and dead in sin*. By acknowledging a mystery right here we must not be charged with *Cryptocalvinism*. For this and none other is the doctrinal position of the *Lutheran Church*" (*Pieper*).
- 3) The Missouri Synod further holds 1) that the dogmatical phrase that election has taken place "in view of faith" is not taken from Scripture; 2) that it is not found in the Lutheran Confessions; 3) that it does not solve the mystery, if at the same time the biblical doctrine be maintained that faith is a free gift of grace, and in no respect man's own work; 4)

that, if the phrase, "in view of faith" be exchanged for "in view of man's *conduct*," the mystery, indeed, is solved, but by the key of *Synergism* (*Pieper*).

- 4) Every true Lutheran can most unreservedly subscribe the four points just presented, but this does not in any way prove that the expression *intuitu fidei* is unscriptural, un-Lutheran, or Synergistic.
- 5) It is very interesting to compare the teaching of the Missouri Synod with that of the Calvinistic Canons of the Synod of Dort (1619 A. D.).

a) Missouri Synod: "Election is the unalterable and eternal decree of God, by which, from the entire human race (fallen by its own fault from its original state of innocence into sin and destruction), according to the free purpose of His will, out of pure grace and mercy, He ordained unto salvation a certain number of individual persons, neither better nor worthier than others, lying together with them in the same universal destruction."

b) Synod of Dort: *Of Divine Predestination*. Art. vii.: "Election is the unchangeable purpose of God, whereby, before the foundation of the world, He hath, out of mere grace, according to the sovereign good pleasure of His own will, chosen, from the whole human race, which had fallen through their own fault from their primitive state of rectitude, into sin and destruction, a certain number of persons, neither better nor worthier than others, but with them involved in one common misery, to salvation in Christ," etc. Art. ix.: "This election was not founded upon foreseen faith, and the obedience of faith, holiness, or any other good quality,.....but men are chosen to faith and to the obedience of faith, holiness, etc."

- IV. *Literaturz.* Luthardt, *Kompendium*, sec. 32; Luthardt, *Die Lehre vom freien Willen, etc.*, (1863); Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines* (Index); Thomasius, *Dogmengeschichte* (Index); Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, sec. 31; Neander, *History of Christian Dogmas* (Table of Contents); Koestlin, *The Theology of Luther* (Index); Schmid, *Theology of the Lutheran Church*, sec. 30; Baier, *Kompendium* (Walther), Vol. III., pp. 531-613; Martensen, *Dogmatics*, pp. 362-382; Dörner, *System of Christian Doctrine* (Index); Frank, *Wahrheit*, sec. 20; Frank, *Theologie der Concordien-Formel*, Vol. IV., pp. 121-344; Loeber, *Dogmatik*, pp. 434-495; Lindberg, *Dogmatik*, pp. 63-75; Harnack, *Luther's Theologie*, Vol. I., pp. 149-250; Philippi, *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, Vol. IV., pp. 1-121; Vilmar, *Dogmatik*, Vol. II., pp. 5-30; Stelhorn-Schmidt, *The Error of Modern Missouri* (1897); Faber, *The Primitive Doctrine of Election* (1843); Forbes, *Predestination and Free Will Reconciled* (1878); Mozley, *Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination* (1878); Gerhart, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, sec. 19, 20, 21, 341-343; Field, *Handbook of Christian Theology* (Meth.), pp. 176-192; Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 535-549; Vol. II., pp. 639-732; Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 393-462; Strong, *Systematic Theology* (Bapt.), pp. 171-182, 426-436; Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, Vol. II., pp. 446-458; Smith, H. B., *System of Christian Theology*, pp. 502-521.

SEC. 12. *The Doctrine of Creation.*

I. The Biblical Account of Creation.

1. In Gen. 1:1-2:3, and Gen. 2:4-25, we do not have two separate accounts of Creation, but the latter narrative is supplementary to the first record. *Delitzsch*: "The difference between the two accounts is, that Gen. 1:1-2:3 relates the origin of the human race, and Gen. 2:4-25 that of the first man and of the first human pair; in the former man appears as the object and end of the line of creation, in the latter as the centre of the circle of creation."

2. This record of Creation can only have been given to man by direct revelation, very probably to Adam, and if not recorded by him, handed down by him to Methuselah, and by him to Noah and Shem, and by Shem transmitted to Abraham, and through him to the patriarchs—for all these are represented as men very near to God. It is not inconsistent with the inspiration of Moses that in arranging the Book of Genesis he should preserve and incorporate with his own work all traditions, written or oral, which were true records of the past.

3. As to the precise manner in which this revelation of the Creation was imparted to the writer, whether to Adam or to a later patriarch, or to Moses, we cannot tell. The vision theory is perhaps the best. It is highly probable that God revealed the far past to the writer of this narrative in the same way as He made known to John the sublime description of the end of the world.

4. We are dealing here with facts of *revelation*. The Mosaic doctrine of Creation rests on two fundamental thoughts: 1) that the creation of the world proceeded from the Word, and 2) from the Spirit of God,—and this means that the world originated *through a conscious, free, divine act*.

5. We are not dealing with *history*, for these events antedate the dawn of history,—nor with *science*, for of the first four creative days modern scientific research can give us very little information,—nor with *mythology*, for the Biblical narrative, by its simplicity, its chaste, positive historical character, is in incomparable contrast with the fanciful, allegorical, intricate cosmogonies of all heathen religions.

6. A comparison of the Biblical account of Creation with that given by the cuneiform inscriptions is extremely interesting, both on account of their remarkable resemblance and their characteristic differences.

7. In the narrative of Creation the production of beings advances continually toward higher organisms, and we cannot fail to observe a parallel between the first three and the last three creative days. Still the divine creative power is not satisfied till it reaches its ultimate end in the creation of *man*.

8. We have heard much in time past of the conflict between Science and Scripture. To speak exactly, there never has been a conflict between them, but between science falsely so-called and theology falsely so-called. The Book of Nature

and the Word of God have one and the same infallible Author. If God is the author of both revelations, the truths recorded in these books cannot be at variance, and there must be a harmony between them.

9. The facts contained in these two different records are absolutely true, lie open to an investigation, and are legitimate sources of knowledge, and the truths therein recorded are not affected or changed in any way by our unbelief, misbelief, or ignorance.

10. Man, however, is a fallible interpreter. By mistaking one or both of these divine records, he forces them, too often, into unnatural conflict. As the truths and facts belonging to either domain are by deeper research more fully grasped and more truthfully presented, the nearer we reach absolute truth, and the more harmonious will be the relation between the Science of Nature and the Science of Theology.

11. In this whole discussion we must remember that in the Bible we do not have a scientific treatise. The truths which are revealed in the Bible have reference to our spiritual life, and make known to us the relations of the finite world to the infinite, and unveil to us the glory of the invisible things of God. All other knowledge imparted to us in the Bible serves only as a means to this great end, and we have no right to ask of the Bible that kind of knowledge which it does not aim to teach.

12. In the first chapter of Genesis we have a plain, simple account of the works of God, and though it is deep and even beyond our apprehension, nevertheless from this first page of the Bible a child can learn more in an hour than all the philosophers of the world were able to discover without it in four thousand years.

13. *Murphy* (on Gen. 1:1): "This simple sentence denies *atheism*, for it assumes the Being of God. It denies *polytheism*, and, among its various forms, the doctrine of two eternal principles, the one good and the other evil—for it confesses the one eternal Creator. It denies *materialism*, for it asserts the creation of matter. It denies *pantheism*, for it assumes the existence of God before all things, and apart from them. It denies *fatalism*, for it involves the freedom of the Eternal Being."

14. In the first two chapters of Genesis we meet with four different verbs to express the creative work of God: 1) *bara*, to create; 2) *asa*, to make; 3) *yatzar*, to form; and 4) *bana*, to build. *Bara* is used exclusively of God. It designates the divine causality as unconditioned, and its product as being, with respect to its real state, absolutely *new*, and, as to its ultimate cause, miraculous, and God-originated. Though not necessarily involved in the very significance of the word, the idea of creation *out of nothing*, without the use of pre-existing materials, is acknowledged by the best expositors to be here intended.

15. That these creation days were long periods, and not simply solar days of twenty-four or twelve hours, is confirmed by a variety of considerations: 1) The Hebrew word *yom* (day) is used in these first chapters in various senses,—a) standing for *light* as opposed to darkness (Gen. 1:5); b) a day of twelve hours

(1:14); *c*) a day of twenty-four hours (the *days* of 1:14); *d*) an indefinite period, covering the whole creative period (2:4); *e*) the cosmogonic day, the nature of which is here under discussion.

2) "Days of God are intended, and with Him a thousand years are but as a day that is past (Ps. 90:4), and Dawson, and others (Dana, Guyot, etc.,) who are convinced that the days of creation are, according to the meaning of Holy Scripture itself, not days of four-and-twenty hours, but æons, are perfectly right." (*Delitzsch.*)

3) The duration of the seventh day gives us a hint as to the length of the other six. God's Sabbatic rest has continued from the close of creation until this present hour. It is the present age of this globe. When the evening shall come, and the dawn of the eighth day shall rise, the last Day has come.

4) The harmony between the Book of Nature and the Word of God demands it. *Luthardt*: "One thing alone science imperatively demands, the concession of extensive periods, that she may not be confined to six days of twenty-four hours each, which is simply impossible. . . . We cannot and must not entertain the notion that God, having created the world at once, only impressed upon it the appearance of gradual formation, so that our investigations might be deceived and deluded, by our being able to persuade ourselves that it must have been formed gradually. . . . As to how we are to understand the demiurgic days, even orthodox theologians are not unanimous, since days are spoken of before the sun. . . . This much is certain, that the chief matter in question in the work of each day, is not the day, but the work. For the interests of religion are concerned not in the time, but in the fact; that is, in the fact that God created the world by the power of His own will, in free love; that He fashioned it in an ascending gradation of separate formations up to man, to reach in him the end of His creative work, and to ally Himself with him in community of spiritual nature."

16. Aided by the light derived from geology, chemistry, physics, and astronomy, we may distinguish, in the gradual formation of the physical globe *before the introduction of life*, four periods: 1) the nebulous state; 2) the mineral incandescent; 3) the period of the hot oceans; 4) the period of cold oceans.

17. On the fourth day the history of the earth begins to enter upon an entirely new phase. It is the beginning of the era of life. The six days of creation are subdivided into two symmetrical series of three days each. The first series describes the arrangement of the material world—the Era of Matter; the second describes the creation of organized beings, animals and men—the Era of Life.

18. Of the first four days geological science can give us little trace. But the fifth and sixth days offer no difficulties, for they unfold the successive creation of the various tribes of animals which people the water, the air and the land, in the precise order indicated by geology. (*Guyot.*)

19. Five great ages of life may be distinguished: 1) The age of invertebrate animals in the Silurian rocks. 2) The age of fishes, in the Devonian series. 3) The age of first plants, in the

Carboniferous rocks. 4) The age of reptiles, in the Mesozoic rocks. 5) The age of mammals, in the Tertiary rocks, which is closed by the age of man, in the Quaternary or present age.

20. The first four ages of life belong to the fifth day, which covers a vast space of time, and the testimony of geology with reference to the physical formation of the earth is very full. The fifth age of life covers the sixth day, as well as the present or seventh day.

21. The Christian theologian by all means should study some good work on Geology and on Astronomy.

II. THE OLD TESTAMENT TEACHING.

22. The O. T. Revelation places itself above all natural religions by the declaration, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."

23. That God was the Creator of the heaven and earth is everywhere implied, and repeatedly stated in the Psalms (Ps. 8: 1, 3; 19:1; 24:2; 33:6; 95:4, 5; 121:2; 124:8; etc.), and by the prophets, especially by Isaiah (Isa. 37:16; 40:20; 42:5; 44:24; 45:12, 18; 48:13; 51:13; etc.).

24. The view of creation as given in Gen. 1 and 2, and in the Psalms (Ps. 90:2; 104:1-35, which last is really a commentary on the narrative of the creation) stands in decided opposition to all theories of emanation as taught in the oriental cosmogonies,—as if the world was of the same substance with God, and the product of necessity of successive emanations from His Being. This theory (emanation) of accounting for the origin of the finite 1) virtually denies the infinity and transcendence of God; 2) leads logically to Pantheism; and 3) makes God the author of sin. The creation of the world is not made subject to a necessity of nature, but is a conscious, free divine act.

25. Nor does the Bible narrative assume that there was an eternal elementary matter independent of God. *Oehler*: "In Gen. 1:1 the divine creation is fixed as an *absolute* beginning, not as a working on something which already existed, and heaven and earth is wholly subjected to the lapse of time, which God transcends; compare Ps. 90:2; 102:25." Dualism,—that there are two self-existent principles, God and matter, distinct from and co-eternal with each other,—has no foundation in Scripture.

26. As God does not reach the goal of His creation until He has created man in His own image, we may infer that the *self-revelation of the glory of God*, the unveiling of His Being, that "all the earth shall be filled with the glory of the Lord" (Num. 14:21), is the final end of the creation of the world. The whole Old Testament view of nature rests on this fundamental conception. *Martensen*: "As Love is the ground of creation, so the *kingdom* of love is its end and aim. But in the kingdom of love God and His creatures are reciprocally means and end to each other. As God Himself alone can be the final goal of His ways, we must undoubtedly say 'He created the world for Himself,' but as God glorifies His love to Himself through His love to creatures, we may equally say 'He created the world for us.' In agreement therefore with the hints given by Scripture we combine the two

expressions, God has created the world *for His own glory and for our salvation* (Eph. 1:12-14; 2 Cor. 3:18)."

27. That creation is the work of the Triune God is already implied in the O. T., for it is especially affirmed as the work of the Holy Spirit (Ps. 104:30; Job 33:4; Ps. 33:6; Isa. 40:12-14).

III. THE NEW TESTAMENT TEACHING.

28. In the N. T. the doctrine of creation is still more clearly developed. Creation is not only affirmed of the Father (Acts 4:24; 14:15; 17:24; 1 Cor. 8:6; Rom. 1:20, 25; 11:36; Eph. 3:9), but especial stress is laid on the fact that the creation of the world, of which the Triune God is the First, Absolute Cause, was accomplished by Christ as the Mediator of the Divine work (1 Cor. 8:6; Rom. 11:36; Col. 1:16, 17; Heb. 1:2; John 1:3).

29. Paul everywhere emphasizes the fact that God is the Creator of all things (Acts 14:15; 17:24; Rom. 1:20, 25; 4:17), that of Him are all things (Rom. 11:36), and that creation exhibits the divinity of God as well as His everlasting power (Rom. 1:20).

30. In 1 Cor. 8:6, "Jesus Christ, through whom are all things," and in the parallel passage Rom. 11:36, "through Him are all things," the fact is emphasized that the world came into existence through Christ, inasmuch as He is the Mediator or instrument of the world's creation.

31. According to Col. 1:16 the Son of God, *i. e.*, Jesus Christ according to His divine nature, is the *conditional* Cause of creation (*i. e.*, the act of creation depends on Him, "for in Him were all things created"). He is the *instrumental* Cause of creation (*i. e.*, "all things have been created *through* Him"). He is also the *ultimate* Cause of creation, for "all things have been created *unto* Him" to enhance His glory.

32. So also according to John 1:3 the Logos, the essential Word, the Son of God, is stated as being the *Mediator of creation*, "all things were made by (*through*) Him"; the negative antithesis "without Him was not anything made that hath been made" (John 1:3) purposely excludes eternity of matter as well as all other dualism. The *through* (*dia*) Him (John 1:3, 10) must not be overlooked; the Logos is the *instrument* of the world's creation, while the Father is the original Author and origin of creation.

33. In the Apocalypse also special stress is laid on the fact that God created the world and all that exists (Rev. 4:11; 10:6; 14:7). In Rev. 4:11, where "the glory and the honor and the power" are ascribed to "our Lord and our God,"—"for Thou didst create all things, and *because of Thy will they were, and were created*", it is best to emphasize each distinct statement. The expression *they were* calls attention to the fact of their existence, in antithesis to their former non-existence, and *were created* points to the manner of coming into existence and to the Person to whom this existence was due.

34. In Heb. 11:3, "by faith we understand that the worlds (*ages*) have been framed by the word of God, so that what is seen hath not been made out of things which do appear," it is implied that the divine origin of the universe as recorded in Gen. 1 and 2

is apprehended only by faith in the Word of God,—and that faith only, resting on the revealed creative Word, can penetrate behind the veil. Creation itself is a postulate of faith. The universe was framed, as it is preserved, *by the word of God*. God first willed that the world should be (Rev. 4:11), and then gave expression to His inward thought (compare *Delitzsch* on Heb. 11:3).

IV. CHURCH DOCTRINE BEFORE THE REFORMATION.

35. The early church unhesitatingly received the narrative of the creation (Gen. 1 and 2) as a revelation from God. They taught that God, the Father Almighty, is the Creator, though the creation *through* the Son also formed part of the orthodox faith. Irenæus often speaks of the Son and the Spirit as the hands of God, by which He created all things. Clement of Alexandria emphasized the fact that God created the world *through* the Logos.

36. In opposition to the Gnostics the Early Fathers rejected the eternity of matter, and opposed all views of emanation and of dualism. When Hermogenes maintained that God must have created the world 1) either out of Himself, 2) or out of nothing, 3) or out of something,—and then held that He created the world out of matter already in existence, and that matter was eternal, because God was *Lord* from eternity, and must therefore from eternity have an object for the exercise of His lordship—Tertullian replied: God is certainly *God* from eternity, but not *Lord*; the one is the name of His essence, the other of power or of a relation. Only the essence is to be viewed as eternal.

37. Origen, although from his idealistic position denying the eternity of *matter* as an independent power, held that creation took place in *eternity past*, *i. e.*, God and the world are co-eternal, yet God is the cause of the world, as He is the begetter of the Son. Although some moderns favor such a theory (Martensen, etc.), such a view is in conflict with the absolute personality of God—it would imply that “without the world God is not God,” and leads either to dualism or pantheism. *Strong*: “A God existing in necessary relations to the universe, if different in substance from the universe, must be the God of dualism; if of the same substance with the universe, must be the God of pantheism.”

38. The views of Origen were rejected by Athanasius and Augustine, the great champions of orthodoxy. Augustine, however, already raised the question whether the six days of creation were natural days, remarking: “Of what sort they could be it is difficult, or rather impossible, for us to think, much more to say.”

39. In general, creation was regarded as the act of the Father wrought *through* the Son. Gregory of Nazianzen speaks of the creative work as “accomplished by the Word, and completed by the Spirit.” Following Augustine, the Western church regarded creation as an act of the Triune God.

40. According to the pantheistic system of John Scotus Erigena (850 A. D.) all things were not so much created as developed out of the divine essence, but the orthodox scholastics firmly held to the idea of absolute creation out of nothing.

41. Hugo of St. Victor (*d.* 1141) maintained that “God is not

only the Former, but the Creator and Author of matter." Thomas Aquinas (*d.* 1274) held that the doctrine of a creation out of nothing was an article of faith, and not an object of knowledge and argumentation.

42. As to the purpose of God in creation, the great majority of the Scholastics, with Athenagoras, Irenæus, Augustine, Chrysostom, and the later Fathers, held with Thomas Aquinas that God "intended only to communicate His own perfection, which is His goodness; so that the divine goodness is the end of all things."

V. THE TEACHING OF OUR LUTHERAN THEOLOGIAN.

43. Luther (and so all later Lutheran theologians) taught that the world was created out of nothing, and that with its creation *time* began. It is through the power of the Word of God uttered at the creation (Gen. 1:11, 20, 24) that the multiplication of all creatures has taken place, and shall continue as long as the world shall stand.

44. 1. *The time of creation.* Calovius: "The creation of things did not occur from eternity, but *in that beginning in which all time began to flow.*"

45. 2. *The order of creation.* Quenstedt: "The action of creation comprises three steps: 1) the production, on the first day, of the crude material, which was the germinal source, as it were, of the entire universe; 2) the distinction and disposition of simple creatures during the first three days; and 3) the furnishing and completion of the world, which was brought to perfection in the second period of three days."

46. 3. *The world was created from nothing.* Quenstedt: "The things that exist were created on the first day, *not from any pre-existing material, whether eternal or created before, but were made from purely negative nothing.*" Schmid: "There was nothing in existence which God made use of in forming the world, but everything that exists was first called into being by Him" (Rom. 4:17; Heb. 11:3). Calovius: "Creation does not consist in emanation from the essence of God, nor in generation, nor in motion, . . . but in an outward action, by which, by means of infinite power, things are produced from nothing."

47. 4. *The efficient cause of creation.* Calovius: "The efficient cause of creation is God one and alone." Chemnitz: "Creation is an action of God alone which neither ought to be, nor can be, ascribed to any creature" (1 Cor. 8:6). Gerhard: "Creation is an undivided action of the one and true God alone. But that one true God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; therefore, in Scripture the work of creation is ascribed to the Father (1 Cor. 8:6), and to the Son (John 1:3; Col. 1:16), and to the Holy Ghost (Job 26:13; 33:4; Ps. 104:30)." Hollaz: "The three persons of the Godhead are not three associated causes, not three authors of creation, but one cause, one author of creation, one Creator. Although they are three distinct Persons, yet they influence the work of creation with one power. . . . The work of creation is ascribed, in a peculiar manner, to God the Father: 1) because of the order of working,—in that what the Father has of Himself to do and to create, the Son of God and the Holy Ghost have of the

Father; 2) because, in the work of creation, God the Father, by His most efficacious word of command, manifested His own omnipotence (Gen. 1:3); 3) because creation is the first divine work *ad extra*, and therefore, by appropriation, is affirmed of the first person of the Godhead."

48. 5. *The impelling cause of creation.* Calovius: "The *impelling* cause of creation is the immense goodness, from which God, as He wished to communicate the highest good, most freely communicated Himself."

49. 6. *There was no instrumental cause outside of God's essence.* Calovius: "In the primeval creation there was no instrumental cause or means, because God created all things by the Word."

50. 7. *The antecedent cause.* Quenstedt: "There was no antecedent cause, except the purpose of God alone, communicating Himself, not from the necessity of nature, but *from the freedom of the will.*"

51. 8. *The intermediate end of creation.* Quenstedt: "This is the advantage of men,—for God made all things for the sake of man, but man He made for his own sake (Ps. 115:16)."

52. 9. *The ultimate end of creation.* Quenstedt: "This is the glory of God. For in and through creation God manifested 1) the glory of His goodness, by sharing His goodness with creatures, 2) the glory of His power, by creating all things from nothing, with His will and word alone, and 3) the glory of His wisdom, which shines forth from the multitude, variety, order, and harmony of things created (Ps. 19:1)."

53. 10. *Definition of creation.* Gerhard: "Creation is an act of God, who is one and alone, and an undivided work of the three persons of the Godhead, by which the Father, through the co-eternal Son, in the co-eternal Holy Spirit, of His own free will, in six distinct days, formed all things, visible and invisible, not out of some materials co-existing with Himself from eternity, but from nothing, for the glory of His own name and the benefit of man; and all things that God made are very good."

54. 11. *The teaching of the later Lutheran Theologians.* This is in perfect accord with the older Lutheran Theologians.

Martensen: "The *nothing out of which* God creates the world are the eternal possibilities of His will, which are the sources of all the actualities of the world (Heb. 11:3)... The proposition that God creates the world out of nothing, is inseparable from the other proposition that He creates the world through the Son."

Sartorius: "Heaven and earth and all things came into existence through absolute love, were made by the Father through the Son, through the Word, and without Him was not anything made that was made (John 1:3; Rom. 11:36). It was His good pleasure, His counsel, that the world should be, and it was through the power of His will, of His love, which produces all from itself"... "Creation does not necessarily and eternally result, like the Son and Spirit, from the nature of God,—it is no essential effluence thereof,—nor is it from any other being, but from the *will* of God, and it exists through a free, *i.e.*, not an absolutely necessary and eternal, act of that will"... "Creation is not an

immanent productivity of the divine nature, but an act, a fact, a deed of God; it has therefore a *history*".... "The history of creation plainly shows, as accurate investigators of nature have also proved, in various histories of development, that the higher species of creatures did not grow by a natural process from the lower, but that they originated and were appointed, both with and after each other, by special acts or words of creative will."

Luthardt: "If God is a living and personal God, then the world was made by Him, and creation was a free act of His power, wisdom and love".... "The conflict between the physical sciences and the religious view of the world is a product of modern times.... Religion and science have both their rights, but each within its own domain.... The *idea of creation* belongs to religion, and not to natural science.... Of creation science, from its own resources, is able to tell us nothing. Science always assumes the existence of matter, and all her labors begin therefrom.... The creation of the world, therefore, is an article of religious faith, and one of far-reaching religious influence.... Its opposite is the teaching of Pantheism and Materialism."

Delitzsch: "If we consider God in relation to the creation, which according to Rom. 1:20 reflects 'the invisible things of Him,' we only need a glance at Gen. 1:2, 3, in the light of John 1:1-4, to apprehend that it is the Godhead in the totality of its nature which brings creation into temporal actuality; for the Father accomplishes it through the Logos with the perfecting co-operation of the Holy Spirit."

VI. MODERN THEORIES WHICH OPPOSE THE SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF CREATION.

55. 1. *Dualism*. As to the origin of the world, *Dualism* is the doctrine that the universe was created by the concurrence of two principles,—the one active, the other passive, the one mind, the other matter,—both equally necessary, eternal, and independent.

But the supposition of two infinities, or of two first causes, is self-contradictory.

56. 2. *Hylozoism*. This theory teaches that the formative principle of the world is to be sought exclusively in matter itself,—that the universe is a living being, animated by a principle which gave to it motion, form, and life (*Stoics*). God is the universal life, the world-soul, which pervades the Cosmos as our soul the body.

This doctrine confounds life with force and chemical affinity, and either ends in Pantheism or runs into Atheism.

57. 3. *Pantheism*. This denies to God any being distinct from the world, and to the world any being distinct from God. God and nature are the same thing under different aspects. The course of nature is unalterably fixed, and needs no alteration. There is no personal God, and therefore creation is impossible and absurd.

But such a doctrine after all really gives no account of the origin of the universe. Wherever the Pantheistic theory is accepted, Polytheism, in a more or less refined form, prevails.

58. 4. *Materialism*. This theory recognizes the existence of nothing but matter, and for it there is no problem of creation, for matter is eternal. "Matter and force have built up the universe, the former being the stuff out of which the structure has been raised, the latter the architect by whose unconscious skill it has been shaped into a *cosmos*. The world-process is throughout an affair of mechanism." Life in its primordial form originates in lifeless matter. Science leaves *spontaneous generation* an open question, but the materialist does not.

Materialism is not only a very hypothetical, but also an exceedingly improbable metaphysical explanation of the *cosmos*. The main cause of its ascendancy has been the remarkable progress of physical science within this generation. But it has now lost its standing in philosophical circles, and its followers are mostly found among physiologists and scientists.

59. 5. *The Emanation Theory*. This maintains that creation is the product of successive evolutions from the being of God,—that creation has flowed forth as a stream from a fountain, or a ray of light from the sun. It denies that creation is a *free* act of God, the Godhead becoming purely passive, and the world becoming a part of the totality of God's life.

This theory differs but little from Pantheism. We may well answer: "The Creator when He issues a creative fiat, does not send out a beam or efflux from His own substance, but by a miracle of omnipotence wills an absolutely new entity into being."

60. 6. *Eternal Creation*. This theory regards creation as an act of God in eternity past,—that the universe is as old as the Creator. This view was already propounded by Origen, and has been maintained in various forms in modern theology.

But if the world is eternal like God, this leads to Dualism or to Pantheism. Creation implies the origination of a thing which did not exist before. Creation from eternity is a contradiction in terms. There was no time apart from the world. God created the world "in the beginning" of time. When the world came into actual existence by the creative word of God, actual time came into existence.

61. 7. *Evolution, Darwinism, Spontaneous Generation*. There is a true and false theory of evolution. We do not here refer to the evolution or development in which the same substance in kind appears under new forms (the seed, the root, the stalk, the flower, the fruit), yet all homogeneous with the original substance. The evolution here spoken of claims that homogeneous substance transmutes itself into *heterogeneous*. The modern hypotheses of evolution present themselves under two aspects—the *theistic*, which holds that God creates, but that created things may have powers of spontaneous evolution, under laws whereby they may pass into new and higher forms, and the *atheistic* or *agnostic*, which eliminates the idea of a Creator, and reduces everything to the action of atoms and forces supposed to be practically and inherently omnipotent.

The theory of evolution virtually claims to be a theory of the universe. Upon the theory of Hæckel and others, there is no need of a personal God in order to account for the existence of the

universe. Molecular motion and natural selection give us the solution of the problem, how *inorganic* matter becomes *organic* matter. All the kingdoms of nature issue out of each other without any intervening agency. Darwinism (one form of the theory of Evolution) does not concern itself so much with the creation of matter as with the origin of life, for Darwin distinctly recognizes the creation of matter and life, confining the theory of Hæckel to organic matter.

Evolution knows absolutely nothing of the origin of things. It can take place only where there is something to be evolved, with adequate causes for the evolution. Darwin gave a wrong title to his famous *Origin of Species*. The book does not treat of the origin of species, but of the transmutations of species already in existence.

With reference to this *Evolution* or *Transmutation* theory we may remark:

1) This theory is purely hypothetical. *Agassiz*: "Darwinism is an *a priori* conception, and a burlesque of facts. . . . It shuts out almost the whole mass of acquired knowledge, in order to retain and use only that which may serve its purpose."

2) This theory is contradicted by the whole course of scientific observation and experiment. *Dawson* (1890): "The man who, in a popular address or in a text-book, introduces the 'descent of species' as a proved result of science, to be used in framing classifications and in constructing theories, is leaving the firm ground of nature and taking up a position which exposes him to the suspicion of being a dupe or a charlatan."

3) No naturalist has ever discovered an instance of the transmutation of species.

4) All their examples only prove that varieties develop from species,—which no one denies.

5) The demand made by Professor Hæckel of Jena, that the theory of evolution should be taught in schools as an established fact of science, brought out the answer of the famous Dr. Virchow: "When Dr. Hæckel says that it is a question for the educators, whether the theory of evolution should be at once laid down as the basis of instruction, and the protoplasmic soul be assumed as the foundation of all ideas concerning spiritual being,—whether the teacher is to trace back the origin of the human race to the lowest classes of the organic kingdom, nay, still further, to *spontaneous generation*. . . . I am of opinion that, before we designate such hypotheses as the voice of science,—before we say, 'This is modern science,'—we should first have to conduct a long series of elaborate investigations. *We must therefore say to the teachers in schools, 'Do not teach it.'*" At another place he remarks: "Of spontaneous generation. . . . we do not possess any actual proof. . . . and whoever supposes it has occurred is contradicted by the naturalist, and not merely by the theologian."

6) It is sufficient to say that the doctrine of evolution, by assuming an intelligible and adequate principle of change, simply eliminates the idea of creation.

- VII. *Literature.* Luthardt, *Kompendium*, sec. 33; Luthardt *Fundamental Truths*, Lectures IV, and V.; Schmid, *Theol. of Lutheran Church*, sec. 20; Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, sec. 23; Thomasius, *Dogmengeschichte* (Index); Philippi, *Kirch. Gl.*, Vol. II., pp. 225-258; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, pp. 114-127; Sartorius, *Doctrine of Divine Love*, pp. 22-27; Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology* (Index); Delitzsch, *Genesis*, Vol. I., pp. 60-114; Keil, *Pentateuch*, Vol. I, pp. 37-76; Baier, *Kompendium* (Walther) Vol. II., pp. 76-103. Lindberg, *Dogmatik*, sec. 8; Weidner, *Bib. Theol. of O. T.* (Index); Weidner, *Bib. Theol. of N. T.* (Index); Dorner, *Christian Doctrine*, Vol. II., pp. 9-44; Vilmar, *Dogmatik*, Vol. I., pp. 232-249; Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 550-574; Smith (H. B.), *Christian Theology* (Index); Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 463-526; Pearson, *On the Creed* (Index); Twisten, *Dogmatik*, Vol. II., pp. 63-90; Stearns, *Present Day Theology*, pp. 248-263; Gerhart, *Institutes*, Vol. I., pp. 561-640; Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines* (Index); Fisher, *History of Christian Doctrine* (Index); Neander, *History of Christian Dogmas* (Table of Contents); Crippen, *History of Christian Doctrine*, pp. 53-61; Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, Vol. I., pp. 300-308; Strong, *Systematic Theology*, pp. 183-202; Ebrard, *Christian Apologetics*, Vol. II., pp. 1-76; Field, *Handbook of Christian Theology*, pp. 123-139; Laidlaw, *Bible Doctrine of Man*, pp. 272-297; Dawson, *Modern Ideas of Evolution*; Dawson, *Origin of the World*; Guyot, *Creation*; Pratt, *Scripture and Science not at Variance*; Bruce, *Apologetics*, pp. 65-115.

SEC. 13. *The Doctrine of Providence.*

I. THE RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD.

1. The relation of God to the world may be designated as **both transcendent and immanent.**

2. In opposition to Pantheism, which maintains that God and the world are one, Christianity teaches that God has a subsistence above and distinct from the world,—that God is a *transcendent* God. Pantheism (and in a large degree modern speculative Theism) would imprison God in respect of His being and energy within the world, and confine His activity to natural law.

3. In opposition to Deism, which would banish God from the world, making God stand outside of the world which He has made, Christianity teaches that God is present and operative in the world,—that God is an *immanent* God. According to Deism, God made the world and impressed upon it certain laws, and then left it to the government of physical laws and the affairs of men to the guidance of general laws. Deism denies the continuous, active presence of God in the world and His interposition in its affairs.

4. In speaking of the presence of God in the world the scholastics and our older theologians distinguish between 1) God's essential nearness to creatures (*immediatio suppositi*, immediateness of His being), by which God by His essence is especially near to creatures operating, inasmuch as He fills all in all (Jer. 23:23, 24; Gen. 1:2; Ps. 139:7-10), and 2) His efficacious and omnipotent activity (*immediatio virtutis*, the immediateness of His power), by which God by His efficacious influence on the action of the creature, immediately affects the result (Acts 17:27, 28; Col. 1:17; 1 Cor. 12:6).

II. THE CERTAINTY OF PROVIDENCE.

5. The proofs of the doctrine of Providence are both philosophical and scriptural. The ancient philosophers and poets already laid stress upon the philosophical arguments (so Cicero,

Seneca, Pliny). Cicero argues in favor of divine government and providence—1) from the very fact of the existence of the gods; 2) from the laws of nature (in a pantheistic sense); 3) from the order, harmony, beauty and wisdom manifested in the works of creation. The philosophical arguments are, however, weak and imperfect, and the certain and perfect knowledge of the reality of Divine Providence is given to us by revelation alone.

6. The philosophical arguments are either *a priori* or *a posteriori*.

7. Among the *a priori* arguments we may name the following:

1) The idea of a *personal* God as *Creator* demands it. The world is not self-existent. The continuance and preservation of the world, as well as its creation, is due to a Superior Being.

2) The immutability of God requires it. God's plan of creating the universe will be carried out, and this involves the preservation and government of the world.

3) The omnipotence of God demands it. Nothing can exist, or continue existence, independent of God's will.

4) The benevolence of God demands it. God is not only the creator of all things, but in His great goodness He will preserve and care for His creatures.

5) The justice of God demands it. As the source of all moral law, God must administer justice in His created universe, and this is largely accomplished by His Providence.

8. Among the *a posteriori* arguments we may mention:

1) The argument from the evidence of intelligence and design in nature. The forces in the universe have a continuous existence only by virtue of the continuous sustaining agency of the divine will. All events whatever in the material universe, except those which are caused directly by human will and power, are the work of God. We can recognize the activity of God in nature and this proves His preserving agency.

2) In the history of the world we have evidences of law and moral order. Imperfect as this may appear on account of the sinfulness of man, the providence of God in overruling evil for good, may very clearly be traced in the history of nations and in the affairs of man.

3) The experience of individuals proves the Providence of God. "There's a divinity that shapes our ends, Rough-hew them how we will." "Man proposes, God disposes."

9. Of the scriptural proof it may be said:

1) That the teaching of the O. T. concerning the *certainty* and *reality* of Providence is as clear as the teaching of the N. T. Everything is subjected to the divine direction (Ps. 65:2); divine Providence extends also to animals (Job 38:41; Ps. 104:27); no sphere of *chance* exists in the O. T.; even what men call accidental death is under God's direction (Ex. 21:13); in drawing lots "the lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord" (Prov. 16:33).

2) "All Scripture is nothing else than a brilliant mirror from which, in whatever direction you turn, the ever-watchful eye of providential guidance clearly shines forth" (*Hollaz*). We need

only quote from the N. T. such passages as Acts 17:27, 28; Heb. 1:3; Col. 1:17; Rom. 8:28, 31, 32; Phil. 2:13.

10. The teaching of Scripture concerning Providence will appear in our further discussion, but the proof of its *certainty* and *reality* can be drawn from such passages which declare and indicate the government of God

- 1) over the universe in general (Heb. 1:3; Eph. 1:11);
- 2) over nature (Ps. 147:8; Matt. 6:30);
- 3) over irrational animals (Ps. 147:9; Matt. 6:26);
- 4) over nations (Acts 17:26).
- 5) over men in general, evil and good (Acts 17:28; Matt. 5:45);
- 6) especially over the godly (Rom. 8:28; Heb. 1:14; Matt. 10:31);
- 7) over the origin (Ps. 139:13-16), the progress (Luke 1:52; Matt. 6:25, 30; 10:30), and the end (Phil. 2:27, 30) of human life;
- 8) over the lives of eminent men of God (Noah, Abraham, Joseph, Moses, David, Elijah, Daniel, Paul);
- 9) over the Jewish nation;
- 10) in the fulfillment of prophecy;
- 11) in the promises to answer prayer.

11. The doctrine of the certainty of Providence was affirmed with great unanimity by the most distinguished early Christian fathers in opposition to the objections of ancient philosophy,—which objections were nearly the same as those revived and reaffirmed by modern speculative philosophy.

1) Against Stoicism, which taught that gods and men were alike subject to an inexorable fate (*Fatalism*), the decrees of which could be read in the motions and influences of the stars (*Gnosticism*), Clemens of Alexandria taught the truth of divine Providence: "In one glance God views all things together and each by itself . . . Health by medicine and wealth by trade have their origin in divine Providence as well as in human co-operation."

2) Origen devoted his special attention to this subject, and opposed the view of Epicureanism, according to which it was unworthy of God to concern Himself about the affairs of men.

3) In opposition to a *mechanical* view of the universe, Augustine taught "the world would at once cease to exist, if God were to deprive it of His presence."

4) Chrysostom and Theodoret in the East and Salvian in the West, wrote separate treatises on Providence.

5) Jerome, by laying stress upon *general* providence, prepared the way for the speculations of Junilius, an African bishop of the sixth century, who distinguished between the *special* providence which God exercises over angels and men, and the *general* providence which He exercises in the preservation of other creatures.

6) The doctrines of the early fathers, especially of Augustine and Chrysostom, were adopted and developed by the great theologians of the Reformation and may be summed up in the words of Melancthon: "God is present with His creatures; not present as a stoic God, but so that He acts most freely, sustaining the creature; and of His unbounded compassion, controlling, bestowing good things, helping or hindering second causes."

III. THE DEFINITION OF PROVIDENCE.

12. The providence (*providere, pronoia*) of God is that divine act by which God foresees, disposes and cares for, the things which will be beneficial to His creatures.

13. Our dogmaticians distinguish three parts in every external act of Providence:

1) The *prognosis* (foresight or foreknowledge), an internal act of the intellect, by which God sees beforehand what will be beneficial to creatures;

2) The *prothesis* (purpose), an internal act of the will, by which God wills to exercise providential care; and

3) The *dioikesis*, the external action of Providence itself, which consists in the actual preservation of, co-operation with, and the governing of all created things.

14. Of the internal act of *prognosis* or foreknowledge it may be said:

1) It is eternal,—for to God there is nothing future, but all things are present, not indeed actually by way of existence, but objectively;

2) It is intuitive,—for the knowledge of God is not mediated by a succession of time nor of thought, as with man.

3) It does not bring necessity to things foreknown. *Hutter*: "For every object is foreseen or foreknown by God as it is in its own nature, and according to its results, so that this foreknowledge depends upon the event, but the event does not depend upon the foreknowledge."

4) It does not rest upon a previous decree. *Hollaz*: "The foreknowledge and purpose (or decree) of God concerning future things are eternal and simultaneous on the part of God; but, according to our mode of conception, the foreknowledge of God precedes the divine purpose or decree."

15. Providence is the work of the entire Trinity. It is the work of the Father (John 5:17); of the Son (Col. 1:17; Heb. 1:3); of the Holy Ghost (Ps. 104:30).

16. Strictly speaking, the providence of God is a divine action *ad extra*. *Quenstedt*: "Providence is that external action of the entire Trinity, by which God 1) most powerfully preserves the things created by Him, both as an entirety and singly, both in species and in individuals, and 2) concurs in their actions and results, and 3) freely and wisely governs all things to His glory and the welfare and safety of the universe, especially of the godly."

IV. THE OBJECT OF PROVIDENCE.

17. We may distinguish between *general, special* and *most special* Providence.

18. *General* Providence extends to all created things, without even the least exception (Ps. 147:9; Matt. 6:26, 30; 10:29, 30; Luke 12:6).

19. *Special* Providence extends to the human race in general (Acts 17:26, 28; Matt. 5:45; Ps. 36:7). Especially does Providence control the origin, progress and end of human life: 1) its entrance (Job 10:8-11; Ps. 139:13-16); 2) its progress (Job 10:12; 34:21);

3) its sorrows (Ps. 56:8); 4) its needs (Matt. 6:25); 5) its termination (Job 14:5).

20. A *most special* Providence extends to the godly and to believers (Ps. 1:6; 33:18, 19; 37:18, 25; Rom. 8:28; Heb. 1:14; Matt. 10:30, 31).

These distinctions with reference to general and special Providence are made as to what is called *ordinary* Providence, in which God carries on His work through the established and ordinary course of nature. Miracles belong to the *extraordinary* Providence of God.

V. THE FORM OF PROVIDENCE.

21. The Providence of God specially manifests itself in the three forms of Preservation (*conservatio*), Concurrence (*concur-sus*), and Government (*gubernatio*).

1. Preservation.

22. *Hollaz*: "Preservation is the act of Divine Providence by which God sustains all things created by Him, so that they continue in being with the properties implanted in nature and the powers received in creation . . . It is not merely a negative or indirect act, . . . but a *positive* and *direct* act, by which God through a true and real influence, imparts Himself in a general way to the efficient causes of the objects that are to be preserved, so that in their nature, properties and strength, they continue and remain." See Ps. 36:6; Neh. 9:6; Acts 17:28; Col. 1:17; Heb. 1:3.

1) The doctrine of Preservation is directly opposed to all mechanistic and deistic views of the universe. God did not simply create the world and then leave it to a process of self-development, as taught by the English Deists (Herbert of Chisbury, Collins, Bolingbroke and others), but God upholds all things by the word of His power (Heb. 1:3).

2) We ought to draw a sharper distinction between Creation and Preservation than some of our older Dogmaticians did,—for Preservation differs from creation.

a) Though the same divine power is the Cause of both, these two actions are distinguished in our conception.

b) Creation brings about a beginning of being, implies that the object had not existed before, and is the original operation of God's omnipotence,—while Preservation brings about a continuance of being, implies that the object has existed before, and is the continued act of God's faithfulness.

c) Creation presupposes nothing but a creative cause; Preservation presupposes not merely a divine cause, but also a *finite* causality, which owes its existence to the divine.

d) If we speak of Preservation as a *continuous* creation, it can only be in the sense that we wish to indicate that the universe only exists by the means of the same power which called it into being. Preservation is a continuous act, which is clearly distinct from the original creation.

e) God rested from His original creation (Gen. 2:3; Heb. 4:10), but the *rest* of God is not cessation of activity, but a new

exercise of power, which is partly displayed in preservation (John 5:17).

3) Preservation is not a merely negative action,—a refraining from annihilation, as Limborch, the chief Arminian theologian, taught,—nor simply a maintenance of the latent powers and properties originally implanted in matter and mind.

23. As to the *manner* in which God preserves all things, we can give no satisfactory answer. It is clear, however, that God upholds all things in a manner differing according to their various natures and properties. Of some,—plants, animals, and men,—God preserves species and individuals; of others,—angels and stars,—the number originally created. As a rule, God preserves creatures through *means*, through second causes.

24. The doctrine of Preserving Providence is of great importance for the Christian life. We can only *love* and *trust* a God who is in actual relationship to the world. *Luther*: "God is not like an architect who, when he has built a house, or ship, or other work, straightway takes his departure and asks no more about it; but He abides with His work. He loves the creatures, and animates, moves, and sustains them each one after its own fashion.... He who feeds His birds, shall He ever forget His children?"

II. Concurrence.

25. Some of the Dogmaticians (Gerhard, Calovius, Baier) limit the forms of Divine Providence to Preservation and Government, including under the latter both the general *concurrence* with second causes, and the government of the action of created things.

26. Since the time of Quenstedt (1688), it has become customary to speak of *concurrence* as the second of the three forms of Providence.

27. *Definition given by Hollaz*: "Concurrence, or the co-operation of God, is that act of Divine Providence by which God, by a general and immediate influence, proportioned to the need and capacity of every creature, graciously takes part with second causes in their actions and effects."

28. The action of God and the action of men are simultaneous actions. *Quenstedt*: "The same effect is produced not by God alone, nor by the creature alone, nor partly by God and partly by the creature, but *at the same time by God and the creature*, as one and the same total efficiency,—by God as the universal and first cause, and by the creature as the particular and second cause."

As the pen and the hand together produce an act of writing, so God's concurrence and man's action are simultaneous.

29. *Scripture proof*. Isa. 26:12; Phil. 2:13; 1 Cor. 12:6; especially Acts 17:28. On this last passage Quenstedt remarks: "'We have our being' in God as the One preserving; 'in Him we move,' *i.e.*, all our actions and movements we perform by His concurrence, so that without His concurrence we cannot extend even a finger, or produce even the least movement."

30. *The objects of concurrence.* These are all the actions and effects, as such, of second causes.

31. *The manner of God's concurrence.*

1) In a most general way, *by the immediateness of His being.* *Hollaz:* "God concurs with the actions of creatures by the immediateness of His being, because God, by His essence, is especially near to creatures working, inasmuch as He fills all in all (Jer. 23:24)."

2) In a general way, *by the immediateness of His power.* *Hollaz:* "God concurs also by the immediateness of His power, by His efficacious influence on the action of the creature, and by immediately and proximately affecting the result, in that He 'worketh all in all' (1 Cor. 12:6)."

3) In a *special* concurrence, by which God is present to all believers (Phil. 2:13).

4) *With second causes, God concurs according to the need and requirement of each.* a) "God immediately influences according to the requirement of each, the action, and with the action the effect, as such, of second causes" (*Quenstedt*). b) "With second causes God concurs according to their nature. . . . freely with the free, necessarily with the necessary, feebly with the feeble, vigorously with the vigorous" (*Quenstedt*). c) God concurs one way with inanimate nature, and in a very different way with a creature endowed with freedom. "With necessary agents God concurs *uniformly*, e. g., with fire, in order for it to burn; with the sun, in order for it to shine. With free agents God concurs variously, leaving to them their free decision and the free power to choose this or that" (*Hollaz*). d) God concurs one way with good deeds and another way with those that are evil.

32. The explanation of the manner in which God concurs with the *evil* actions of men is one of the most difficult problems of Theology.

33. Our Lutheran Dogmaticians employ two expressions to explain the nature of this concurrence with evil actions: 1) "God concurs in producing the effect, not the defect" (*Quenstedt*); 2) "God concurs as to the materials, not as to the form" (*Hollaz*).

34. As to the *first* formula, we must distinguish between the action or effect itself and the defect. God concurs with the evil acts of His creatures only in so far as they are natural acts, and not as they are evil. *Quenstedt:* "God enters into sinful actions, with respect to their entity and natural form (*species naturæ*), and not with respect to their deformity and moral form (*species moris*)."
Hutter: "God, as the *universal* cause, affords only this,—that you are able to act, but the fact that you act wickedly proceeds from a *particular* cause, even your perverse will."

35. The *second* formula is intended to teach that the power to do any action must be ascribed to the divine concurrence, but the application of the action in the direction of evil is the act of the human will. *Hollaz:* "With the formal *lawlessness* or *disorder* of actions morally evil, God undoubtedly does not concur by any positive influence, because wickedness is a defect and privation not proceeding from God the Most Perfect, in whom no defect can occur, but from a human will failing in its action.

But God concurs with the *remote*, not with the *proximate material* of actions morally evil.... When Eve extended her hand to the forbidden fruit, two acts were present: 1) the extension of the hand; and 2) the extension applied to the forbidden fruit. The *former* act is said to be *remote material*; the *latter*, the *proximate material*. With the *latter*, God does not concur, because His concurrence is general and indeterminate; and, therefore, the determination to this or that object is not from God as from the first and universal cause, but from the second and particular cause."

36. This concurrence is not antecedent or previous, pre-determining free agents to action, but occurs when the action itself is produced.

37. In good actions God gives the natural power, and by a special concurrence through His Word and Spirit influences the soul of believers to use the natural power aright (Phil. 2:13; 4:13; 2 Cor. 12:9; Gal. 5:22); but in evil actions God gives only the natural power, and evil direction is caused by the perverse will of man (Ps. 81:12; Acts 14:16).

III. Government.

37. "*Government* is that act of Divine Providence by which God most excellently orders, regulates, and directs to their limits the affairs and actions of creatures according to His own wisdom, justice, and goodness, for the glory of His name and the welfare of man" (*Calovius*).

38. Government has to do pre-eminently with the actions and sufferings of all created things. God governs in such a manner that the liberty of His creatures is not restricted.

39. There are four ways in which the character of this government may be described: Permission, Hindrance, Direction, and Determination.

40. *Quenstedt*: "*Permission* is that act of governing Providence, by which God does not employ hindrances which a finite agent cannot overcome, or which he does not know how to overcome, to restrain rational creatures, inclining themselves of their own free will to sin, from an evil forbidden by the law, but for just reasons, permits them to rush into sins (Ps. 81:12; Acts 14:16; Rom. 1:24, 28)."

41. This divine permission 1) is not an indulgence on the part of God; 2) nor a mitigation of the law; 3) nor a weakness in God,—a defect of knowledge or of power; 4) nor does it make God an unconcerned witness of sins; but 5) it is a negative act of the wisdom of God, with reference to sin, which sin God does not will, nor approve, nor assist, nor prevent, but permits (*After Hollaz*).

42. *Quenstedt*: "*Hindrance* is that act of governing Providence, by which God limits the action of creatures according to His judgment, so that they do not produce the result, which otherwise they would effect, either by a natural or a free power to act." Gen. 20:6 (*Abimelech*); Gen. 31:24 (*Laban*); Num. 22:12, 13 (*Balaam*); Ps. 19:13.

43. *Quenstedt*: "*Direction* is that act of governing Provi-

dence, by which God so regulates the good actions of creatures, that they tend and are led to the object intended by God, but directs the evil actions to a certain end prescribed by Himself, yet not considered by those who sin, and frequently contrary to their intention." Gen. 50:20 (*Joseph*); Ex. 4:21; 7:13; 8:15; 9:7 (*Pharaoh*); 1 Sam. 9:17; 10:21 (*Saul*); 1 Sam. 16:7, 12 (*David*); Acts 4:27, 28; Rom. 8:28.

44. *Quenstedt*: "Determination is that act of governing Providence, by which God has appointed to the strength, actions, and sufferings of creatures, certain limits within which they are restrained, both with respect to time and with respect to greatness and degree." Job 1:12; 2:6; Ps. 124:2; Ps. 66:7; 1 Cor. 10:13.

IV. A Theodicy is Possible.

45. A *Theodicy* is an attempt to vindicate the justice of God in permitting the existence of natural and moral evil in the world, or an attempt to justify the government of God against the objections raised against it from different standpoints.

46. In the O. T. we already find attempts to solve this problem,—witness the book of Job, and Pss. 37, 73, 77.

47. The problem can only be solved from the standpoint of the most perfect revelation found in the Gospel of salvation in Christ Jesus our Lord. *Martensen*: "A true Theodicy must take Christianity as its basis, and may be raised upon it, but the perfect Theodicy cannot be attained except in the perfected history of the world. There are phenomena in the misfortunes of the species and of individuals, whose economic purpose cannot be understood at our present stage of knowledge, but which must be accepted in faith. To demand a perfect Theodicy during this temporal life, would be to require us to see through the course of this world in all its parts, and to expect that the manifold wisdom of God shall be exhausted in this present life."

48. Some of the greatest thinkers of all ages have sought to solve this problem. Among philosophers we may name Plato and Leibnitz; among the Early Fathers, Lactantius Basil the Great, and Augustine; among the Scholastics, Anselm and Thomas Aquinas.

49. We may name a few principles that lie at the basis of a true Theodicy:

1) God's holy will fulfills itself in the course of the world, in harmony with nature and with human freedom.

2) The Christian idea of God and the Christian idea of sin are not in irreconcilable conflict.

3) God is not the author of sin,—He neither ordains, nor wills, nor approves its existence, but simply permits it.

4) Sin has its origin in the free will of the creature, and brings with it a liability of guilt and punishment.

5) The moral world is not constituted according to the scheme of *necessity*, as taught by Leibnitz and Edwards the Elder.

6) The foreknowledge of God depends on the event, not the event on the foreknowledge.

7) The existence of moral evil or sin can be reconciled with the holiness of God,

8) The existence of natural evil or suffering is consistent with the goodness of God.

50. Questions to be discussed in a Theodicy:
 - 1) The origin of evil.
 - 2) Why did God permit sin to enter into the world?
 - 3) Could God have prevented sin in a *moral* system?
 - 4) Is sin the necessary means of the greatest good?
 - 5) Does the existence of sin limit the omnipotence of God?
 - 6) Does the existence of sin limit the goodness of God?
 - 7) Does freedom of the will explain the origin of sin?
 - 8) The mysteries of Providence.
 - 9) The relation of the doctrine of Providence to miracles.
 - 10) Providence and grace.
 - 11) Providence and prayer.
 - 12) Providence and Christian activity; etc.

VI. THE AIM OF PROVIDENCE.

51. The aim of Providence is the establishment of the kingdom of God, wherein the highest good is realized in a system of divinely blessed individuals. It has for its ultimate end the glory of God, and for its intermediate end the salvation of men (Prov. 16:4; Isa. 45:18; Ps. 115:16; Rom. 8:28).

52. *Martensen*: 1) "The perfect revelation of the wonder-working Providence of God is presented in the Incarnate Logos, in the world-redeeming, soul-saving manifestation of God in Christ".... 2) "Human history finds its *centre*, its true meaning, in the revelation of Jesus Christ. If it moves on apart from Christ, without desire for or belief in Him, it knows neither beginning nor end,—it is objectless, it has no centre".... 3) "The germ of Christian experience regarding Providence is individual conversion and the experience of the grace of God in Christ, whereby the believer is brought to the very centre of the divine counsels."

VII. THEORIES OPPOSING THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE.

53. 1. *Fatalism* is the doctrine which maintains that events occur from inevitable destiny, resulting either from the arbitrary decrees of God or from the fixed laws of nature,—thus denying human self-determination and substituting *fate* for providence. Chaldaic or *astrological* fatalism taught that the free acts of the human will depend on the influence and positions of the stars, and are determined thereby; *Stoic* fatalism held that all things occur from absolute necessity, from *fate*, which not only determined but also governed all things; *Mohammedan* fatalism regards all things as inexorably predetermined from the beginning,—the ordinary Mohammedan refusing to employ a physician or to use medicine, because everything happens as God has before appointed; *Theological* fatalism represents God as above the laws of nature, and ordaining all things according to His will—the expression of that will being the law; *Pantheistic* fatalism knows nothing of the freedom of the will, nor of the personality of God, and obliterates all distinction between good and evil; modern *Philosophical* fatalism is but a blind causality,

the sum of the laws of the universe,—the product of eternal intelligence and the blind properties of matter.

Fatalism is the natural consequence of the denial of Supernatural Theism, and is usually associated with the Pantheism of the present day, for it absolutely denies the personality and freedom of God.

When some of our Dogmaticians speak of *Christian Fate*, they wish especially to deny the doctrine of Fatalism, and to teach that God influences the actions of men, concurring with them, and by His government directing the affairs of men.

54. 2. *Casualism or Chance*. Events are generally referred to *chance, fortune, or luck*, when we do not know the proper cause, nor the law according to which a phenomenon occurs. By using the word *chance* man only expresses his ignorance of the real and immediate cause, and the narrowness of the range of his vision and of his wisdom, for there is no such thing as *chance* in God's dealings with man in His Providence (Prov. 16:33; Matt. 10:29).

55. 3. *Deistic Mechanism* represents the universe as a machine, working by laws of necessity. God at creation implanted in the universe an original force, through which He now operates, and the world is thus left to a process of self-development. There is no free will to interrupt the connection of cause and effect, nor is there any end or purpose in things by which the course of events is directed. This is the natural teaching of Deism, which places God outside of the universe and indifferent to its concerns, and mechanism tends toward materialism. The way for modern mechanism was prepared by Descartes when he asserted that animals are automata or machines.

56. 4. *Materialistic Determinism* regards the operations of the human will as necessarily determined by causes antecedent, so that there is no proper self-determination. Everything is reduced to cause and effect, condition and consequence, motive and action. According to this theory all our volitions are determined by the force of motives within, which motives produce their results as invariably as physical laws effect their ends. There is a close connection between Mechanism and Determinism. The conflict between Determinism and Indeterminism has colored the whole history of philosophy, and though Determinism has great influence in the psychology, metaphysics, and ethics of the present day—we cannot but maintain that as moral agents we might have acted otherwise than we do. Otherwise there can be no ideas of merit or guilt, nor can we ascribe to man responsibility or accountability. Every man is the doer of his own deeds.

57. 5. *Occasionalism* regards a real interaction between the mind and body impossible. It is only by the intervention of God as the First Cause that an intercourse between soul and body can take place, as the soul is regarded as a thinking substance (*res cogitans*) and extension, the essence of the body (*res extensa*). It is God who directly excites the movements in the body corresponding to the modifications of the mind, and *vice versa*. This theory, involved in the philosophy of Descartes, was developed by Malebranche and Geulincx.

VIII. *Literature.* Luthardt, *Kompendium*, sec. 34; Schmid, *Theol. of Lutheran Ch.*, sec. 21; Martensen, *Dogmatics*, sec. 113-118; Baier, *Kompendium* (Walter), Vol. II., pp. 160-180; Hase, *Hutterus Redivivus*, sec. 66-68; Philippi, *Kirch. Gl.*, Vol. II., pp. 258-284; Jacobs, *Elements of Religion*, pp. 80-88; Lindberg, *Dogmatik*, sec. 9; Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, sec. 23; Vilmar, *Dogmatik*, sec. 27; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Vol. II., sec., 35-37; Gerhart, *Institutes*, Vol. I., pp. 713-745; Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 575-616; Smith, H. B., *System of Christian Theology*, pp. 102-114, 146-159; Stearns, *Present Day Theology*, pp. 264-281; Candlish, *Christian Doctrine of God*, pp. 34-56; Mueller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, pp. 219-233; Strong, *Systematic Theology*, pp. 202-220; Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, Vol. I., pp. 326-354; Neander, *History of Dogmas*, pp. 123-129, 565-568; Hagenbach, *History of Dogmas* (Index); Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural*, chap. IV.; Bledsoe, *Theodicy*; Bruce, *Providential Order of the World*, 1897; Bruce, *Moral Order of the World*, 1899; Cook, *Origin of Sin*, 1899; Hartman, *Divine Penology*, 1898; Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, 1897; Naville, *Problem of Evil*; Butler, *Analogy of Religion*; Lotze, *Philosophy of Religion*, sec. 48-74; Kuelpe. *Introduction to Philosophy* (Index).

SEC. 14. *The Doctrine of Miracles.*

I. MIRACLES OF SCRIPTURE.

1. The miracles recorded in Scripture are the revelations of the glory and absolute power of God, and are at the same time striking symbols of the salvation which God offers and promises.

2. But the question of miracles, in our days, presents many difficulties even to some believers and Apologists.

3. If there is a personal God, He can reveal Himself. Miracles are not arbitrary acts, but form a part of revelation.

4. A miracle, as the personal act of an incomprehensible God, can never be fully explained, but only comprehended to a certain degree.

5. Scripture miracles centre in the miracle of the Person of Jesus Christ and His resurrection. These miracles cannot be explained away with a 1) naturalistic (*Paulus*), 2) mythical (*Strauss*), 3) allegorical (Deists), or 4) symbolical interpretation, but the explanation rests upon a grammatico—historical and Christocentric—theological interpretation of the Word of God.

6. In the O. T. miracles occur chiefly when the point at issue was to prove the existence of the living God in opposition to worshippers of false gods, as in the time of Moses, Elijah and Elisha, and Daniel.

7. *Schultz*: "The chief use of the miracle in the O. T. is to convince, to act as a sign (Ex. 3:12; 12:13; etc.) that the living God is in the midst of His people (Josh. 3:10), as a pledge by which God, as the absolutely Supernatural, attests the commission of His messengers, and confirms their words. Hence the miraculous is also specially connected with the holiness of God (Ex. 15:11; Ps. 77:14, 15)."

8. The fact that there are demoniacal miracles (Ex. 7:11; etc.; Deut. 13:2), does not prove that there are no true miracles, for it is "the God of Israel, who only doeth wondrous things" (Ps. 72:18).

9. The names by which miracles are designated both in the O. and N. T. exhibit the different aspects under which they may be viewed:

1) In their *negative* aspect they are "wonders" (*pe-le'*, Ex. 15:11; etc.; *niphlaoth*, Ex. 3:20; 34:10; etc.; *mophethim*, Ex. 4:21; 11:10; etc.; *terata*, Acts 2:19, 43; etc.), acts which excite astonishment as something marvelous or extraordinary.

2) In their *positive* aspect they are "mighty deeds" (*gedoloth*, Ps. 71:19; *gebhuroth*, Deut. 3:24; *dunameis*, Acts 2:22; 2 Cor. 12:12), because they are rightly regarded as acts of an Almighty power. Side by side with these names there appears also the more general emphatic expression *ma-a-sim*, *works* (Deut. 3:24), or more frequently *a-liloth*, *great deeds* (Ps. 77:13 (12)), corresponding to the *erga* of the Gospel of John (5:20, 36; etc.).

3) With reference to their purpose or *teleological* designation they are called "signs" (*othoth*, Ex. 4:9, 30; etc.; *semeia*, Acts 2:22, 43; etc.), as indicating a definite divine aim, and as being visible tokens of divine agency.

II. MIRACLES IN THE CHURCH.

10. It is clear from the Epistles of Paul that miracles were well known in the Apostolic Church (1 Cor. 12:10, 29; Gal. 3:5).

11. It is always a miracle when God makes a new beginning, and so the beginnings of the Christian Church were accompanied by miracles.

12. Within the Apostolic age itself we can trace the gradual disappearance of miracles, for the Church was passing from the period of miraculous power into the ordinary and abiding course of her history.

13. The entire history of miracles centers around Christ and His resurrection.

14. Miracles occur mainly at the period of great developments in the Kingdom of God (Abraham, Moses, Elijah, Daniel, the Apostles, Antichrist).

15. In the intermediate period miracles fall into the background.

16. Although the Church Fathers held firmly to the belief in the existence of miraculous powers in the Church, and some like Irenæus (*d.* 202) maintained that they still were in the possession of the Church; nevertheless a great difference was soon drawn between the wonderful events happening in the Church, and the really miraculous events in the Apostolic Age.

17. The early Church did not deny the existence of miracles in the heathen world, but ascribed them to the influence of demons.

18. Both Origen (*d.* 254) and Augustine (*d.* 430) laid more stress on miracles in the kingdom of grace, than in the kingdom of nature.

19. Most of the so-called ecclesiastical miracles are ill-authenticated and of a trivial or unworthy character.

20. Luther assigned to the miracles of Scripture their place in the development of Christian revelation; but, now that Christ has come, he asserted that miracles were not needed, and therefore maintained that the miracles claimed by the Papacy in support of its deceptions are partly fraudulent and partly the work of

the devil. Like Origen and Augustine he put spiritual miracles far above the physical.

21. The older Protestant Theologians, in answering the boast of the Roman Church that it still possessed miraculous powers, replied, that the time of miracles was past, that those claimed by the Roman Church were false, and that the Protestant Church had greater spiritual miracles in the wonderful progress of the Gospel.

22. Christlieb in his "Modern Doubt and Christian Belief," discusses the question, Are miraculous manifestations still vouchsafed? and answers in substance as follows:

1) Are new miracles required while the *old ones* (His Word and Spirit) *are still in active operation?*

2) The apostolic age required miracles, because it was the epoch in which the Church was first founded; the present period, during which the Church is only maintained, no longer requires them to the same extent.

3) The last epoch of the consummation of the Church, in her final decisive struggle with the powers of darkness (Antichrist), will again require the miraculous, and hence the Scriptures lead us to expect miracles once more for this period.

4) In the history of modern missions we find many wonderful occurrences which unmistakably remind us of the Apostolic age.

5) The people of Israel are a perennial living historical miracle.

6) Especially in the healing of the sick and in miraculous answers to prayer, our times offer resemblances at least to the Apostolic age, but these signs and wonders do not possess the same force and clearness as the biblical miracles.

7) *Unbelief* is the final and most important reason for the retrogression of miracles.

8) He who believes in God must also believe in the miraculous.

III. DEFINITION OF MIRACLES.

23. *Quenstedt* regards all miracles as effects of the extraordinary *Providence* of God. "Providence is *extraordinary* when God operates either without means, or beyond or above means, or contrary to means and their nature, or, what is the same, above and beyond the order instituted by Himself (Ex. 34:28; 1 Kings 19:8; Isa. 38:8; 2 Kings 6:6; etc.)."

24. A miracle may be defined as an extraordinary manifestation and occurrence, in which God makes known His power for the purposes of His Kingdom in a unique manner.

IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF MIRACLES.

25. During the last two hundred years various objections have been raised against the possibility of miracles both from a Pantheistic and Deistic standpoint.

26. The *first* objection is Pantheistic: God's will and the laws of nature are one; a miracle would imply contradiction. So already Spinoza (1632-77), the father of modern European Panthe-

ism, who sought to get rid of miracles in this way: "The laws of nature are the only realization of the divine will; if anything in nature could happen to contradict them, God would contradict Himself." This is pure *Pantheism* and implies that God and nature are the same thing under different aspects, that God has no personal existence apart from nature, that He is entirely bound by the laws of nature. From the *theistic* conception of God, that God is a personal, free Being, omnipotent and continually active in the world, the *objective possibility of the miraculous* necessarily follows. "He who believes in a living God must logically believe in miracles" (*Christlieb*). In opposition to Spinoza we are compelled to say: "If God performed no miracles, and left the world to itself, He would contradict Himself."

27. The *second* objection is also Pantheistic: A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature, a disturbance, "a rent in nature's harmony" (*Strauss*). This implies an eternity of matter, that God did not create the world, because from the laws of nature we can never deduce the creation of the world. This would also imply *spontaneous generation*, which modern science has demonstrated as absolutely impossible. The laws of nature are in no way suspended by a miracle, because the products of the miracle, with all their consequences, immediately take their place in the ordinary course of nature (*Christlieb*). Miracles only withdraw individual occurrences from the control of natural laws, and place them under a higher will and power.

28. The *third* objection is Deistic: A miracle implies that God's work is imperfect and incomplete. So *Renan* (among others): "Miracles are special interpositions like those of a watchmaker, who, though he has made a very fine watch, yet is compelled to regulate it from time to time, in order to compensate for the insufficiency of the mechanism." But this rests upon a false or deistic conception of the world, 1) as if God was actually separated from the world, 2) as if no miraculous interference on the part of God was possible, 3) as if the world continued its course mechanically, 4) as though the world were normal and perfect and therefore had no further need of God's interference. This objection also entirely overlooks the *moral aim* of miracles, which is to heal and restore God's order of the world which has been destroyed through sin and death.

29. A *fourth* objection has its root in Rationalism: Miracles are a contradiction to the modern scientific mind, which requires that everything occur naturally. We only believe in miracles as far as we are ignorant of the laws and forces of nature. As we advance in knowledge the obscurity of the miracle will pass away. —But we all know very well that there can be no unknown law of nature whereby a dead man can become alive again.

30. A *fifth* objection is: We cannot attain to a certainty of the genuineness of miracles. This is Hume's famous argument: 1) "For miracles we have the questionable testimony of a few persons"; 2) "Against them we have universal experience; therefore this stronger testimony nullifies the weaker and more questionable." In other words, Hume argues, because according to

universal experience no miracles now take place, therefore none can ever have occurred.

But the *first* statement is false. The entire Scriptures are full of miracles, and the historical testimony for them is unquestionable. The Christian Church is utterly incomprehensible without miracles. Witness the resurrection of Christ and the conversion of Paul.

The *second* statement and the conclusion are equally false. The inhabitants of the tropics might just as positively affirm that there is no snow nor ice, because in their country, according to "universal experience," it never snows, and water never freezes.

31. The objections raised against miracles have been classified by Trench as follows: 1) Jewish, 2) heathen (Celsus, etc.), 3) pantheistic (Spinoza), 4) sceptical (Hume), 5) that which regards miracles as such only subjectively (Schleiermacher), 6) rationalistic (Paulus), 7) historico-critical (Strauss).

32. The Possibility of miracles lies in the very fact that there is a living God, in the fact that God can reveal Himself.

V. THE NECESSITY OF MIRACLES.

33. The necessity of miracles lies in the necessity of God's revelation in Christ. For he who believes in Jesus Christ believes also in miracles. This necessity lies:

1) in the moral condition of the world after the entrance of sin;

2) in the internal aim of miracles, which is to nullify the disturbance which entered into the world through sin, and to heal the disorder;

3) in the ultimate aim of miracles, which is the restoration, salvation and consummation of the world;

4) in confirming the divine mission of those who perform them, and adding to the weight of their testimony;

5) in the contents of revelation itself, in Christianity itself as the true religion.

Christianity is essentially miraculous; its beginning is a miracle; its Author is a miracle, the miracle of all miracles; its progress depends upon miracles; and miracles will be its consummation (*Christlieb*).

VI. THE REALITY AND GENUINENESS OF MIRACLES.

34. The reality and truth of miracles rests upon the central truth of Christianity, that of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ (1 Cor. 15:14). There is no fact of history more fully established than this.

35. With the truth of miracles the entire citadel of Christianity stands or falls.

36. The Person of Christ is the center of all miracles, and the second great miracle after the creation. The entire history of miracles is grouped around this central miracle. Christ's resurrection and our regeneration give validity to all Biblical miracles.

37. The true distinguishing mark of a genuine miracle lies 1) in its relation to Christ and the plan of redemption, and 2) in

the moral character of the worker of miracles and the godly aim of his act.

38. In investigating the *reality* of miracles, we must distinguish between the evangelical miracles of the first century of Christianity and that of any single narrative of a miracle, regarded by itself and apart.

39. We have a series of unsuspected and clear testimonies to prove that the Gospel miracles gradually disappeared.

1) Miracles are the peculiar attestation given directly by God to persons commissioned by Him to communicate *new* truths to man with reference to the plan of redemption;

2) The power of working miracles was not given to the apostles in such a manner that they could use that power at their own discretion; they acted as the Spirit prompted and gave the power;

3) The miracles which divine power wrought by them were the necessary proof of their authority to preach and teach;

4) These miracles gave the stamp of divine authority to their epistles and their teaching as directly as if Christ Himself spoke;

5) To the apostles *alone* was given the power of communicating miraculous gifts of the Spirit, and these gifts of the Spirit were not transmitted to others by those who had so received that miraculous gift;

6) These miraculous gifts ceased when the last of the Apostles died;

7) Since the death of the Apostle John, that is, since the close of the first century, there is not a single instance of a miracle as well authenticated as those recorded in the Gospels and Epistles.

40. There are certain marks or *criteria*, by which a true miracle can be truly known to be a miracle. These are very clearly stated in Leslie's *Short and Easy Way with Deists* (London, 1723), a little work which never has been, and, we may safely say, never can be answered. It will be utterly impossible to find these *criteria* combining in support of an imposture or fiction.

1) An event, purporting to be miraculous, must have in view some result or object to be accomplished, worthy of God.

2) It must be instantaneously and publicly performed, in the presence of credible witnesses.

3) The miracle must be of such a kind that the senses of mankind (sight, hearing, touch) can rightly and fully judge of it, both that it is real, and that it is supernatural.

4) A miracle must be independent of second causes.

In miracles of a national character, two additional *criteria* present themselves:

5) Not only public monuments must be set up, but some outward actions must also be constantly performed, in memory of the facts thus publicly wrought.

6) These observances must be instituted at the very time when those events took place, and be afterwards continued without interruption.

41. *Godet*: In spite of the very much which is said to the contrary, biblical miracles are, nevertheless, according to all laws

of historical criticism, true realities. They form the brilliant connection between the first creation which we contemplate, and the second and much more magnificent creation which we expect. They proclaim the eternal omnipotence of the creative Spirit over matter created, and belong to a special and superior history which runs through ordinary history—to the history of salvation, which having begun spiritually here on earth, shall find its consummation in the renovation of the universe (Matt. 19:28).

42. Summary: Miracles are *possible*, because there is a living God; miracles are *probable*, because we need a positive revelation; miracles are *necessary*, because they constitute an essential element of revelation itself; miracles are *genuine*, because Jesus Christ is the miracle of miracles, and the testimony of Christ and His Apostles can be believed.

VII. THE DIVISIONS OF MIRACLES.

43. Miracles may be arranged under three classes:

- 1) Miracles of power in the kingdom of nature;
- 2) Miracles of power in the kingdom of grace;
- 3) Spiritual miracles: a) Inspiration; b) Prophecy.

44. *Westcott*, in his *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels*, offers the following classification of the Gospel miracles:

I. Miracles on Nature. 1) of Creative Power; 2) of Providence.

II. Miracles on Man. 1) of Personal Faith; 2) of Intercession; 3) of Love.

III. Miracles on the Spirit-World. 1) of Intercession; 2) of Antagonism.

45. *Steinmeyer*, in his famous work, discusses the Miracles of Jesus under four groups:

- 1) As signs of the kingdom of heaven;
- 2) As symbols;
- 3) As witnesses of the power of the kingdom of heaven;
- 4) As prophecies.

VIII. *Literature.* Luthardt, *Kompendium*, sec. 35; Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths*, Lecture VII.; Christlieb, *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, pp. 285-339; Steinmeyer, *The Miracles of Our Lord in Relation to Modern Criticism* (1875); Fisher, *Manual of Christian Evidences* (Index); Fisher, *Supernatural Origin of Christianity* (Index); Mansel, *Essay on Miracles*, in *Aids to Faith*; Auberlen, *Divine Revelation* (Index); Mozley, *Eight Lectures on Miracles* (1865); Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics* (Index); Trench, *Notes on the Miracles of Our Lord*; Lias, *Are Miracles Credible?* (1890); Thomson, *Christian Miracles and Science* (Handbooks for Bible Classes); Bernard, Article on *Miracles* in *Hasting's Dict. of the Bible*, Vol. 3; Smith (H. B.), *Apologetics*, pp. 90-116; Strong, *Systematic Theology*, pp. 61-67; Bruce, *Miraculous Element in the Gospels*; Smith (Hackett), *Dict. of Bible*, Art. on *Miracles*; Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, Vol. 1, pp. 533-546; Hase, *Hutterus Redivivus*, sec. 69; Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. 1, pp. 617-636; Dörner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Vol. 2, pp. 146-183; Stearns, *Present Day Theology*, pp. 58-74; Stewart, *Handbook of Christian Evidences*, pp. 29-38; Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural*; Butler, *Analogy of Religion* (Index); Hetherington, *The Apologetics of the Christian Faith*, pp. 238-324.

SEC. 15. *The Doctrine of Angels.*

I. THE SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE.

a) *The Doctrine of the Old Testament.*

1. 1. *The Names of the Angels.* They are called *mal'achim*, i. e. *messengers* of God; *bene ha-Elohim*, "sons of God" (Job 1:6; 2:1); *bene Elim*, "sons of the mighty" (Ps. 29:1; 89:7),—the word *Elim* being probably a double plural of *El*, "God" (so Oehler, Del., Ges., Ewald, Riehm); *kedoshim*, "holy ones" (Job 5:1; 15:15; Zech. 14:5; etc. All these names designate the close fellowship of the angels with the Holy God. (On the Angel of Jehovah see pp. 42, 43.)

2. In Gen. 6:1-4 there is no reference to the *fall* of the angels (as Hofmann, Kurtz, and Delitzsch have taught), for "sons of God" refers to the *pious* race of Seth (used in same sense in Deut. 14:1; 32:5; Hos. 2:1; Ps. 73:15).

3. 2. *Their Creation.* Like the existence of God, the existence of the angels is presupposed in Scripture. In the O. T. their *creation* probably is asserted in Ps. 148:2-5 ("and they were created"),—is however implied in Gen. 2:1; Neh. 9:6. In Job 38:7 they are referred to as existing prior to the creation of the earth.

4. 3. *Jehovah Sabaoth.* This expression *Sabaoth*, "hosts" includes the celestial hosts (angels and stars) as well as the terrestrial (powers of nature and hosts of Israel). In Neh. 9:6 the "host of heaven" includes the heavenly bodies and the *celestial spirits*, but in Josh. 5:14, 15, *the host of the Lord* refers to the host of the heavenly spirits.

5. 4. *Their Number.* They are of a great multitude, a "host" (Gen. 32:2), *Mahanaim*, that is, *two hosts*, "thousands upon thousands" (Deut. 33:2; Ps. 68:17), innumerable (Job 25:3).

6. 5. *Their moral condition.* They were created holy (Gen. 1:31). Relatively to God, the good angels, though the purest beings, are imperfect (Job 4:18; 15:15). (We here treat only of *good angels*.)

7. 6. *Their Office or Employment.* The O. T. speaks of the angels in a threefold aspect: 1) They form the *higher church*, which adores God in the heavenly sanctuary (Ps. 148:2; 29:1; 89:5-7), rejoice in God's works (Job 38:7), and are witnesses of His counsels (Ps. 89:7; Dan. 7:9, 10; 1 Kings 22:19, 21; Job 1:6; 2:1; Zech. 1:8-11); 2) As *messengers of God*, they are the instruments of executing His will—*a*) by directing the powers and elements of nature (Ps. 103:20, 21; 104:4); *b*) by protecting the individual believer (Ps. 34:7; 91:11; Dan. 6:22); *c*) by guiding the affairs of nations (Dan. 10:14, 21; 12:1); and *d*) executing the judgments of God (2 Sam. 24:16; 2 Kings 19:35; Ps. 35:5, 6); 3) they are God's attendant witnesses, and partly His instruments when He appears in His royal and judicial glory (Ps. 68:17; Isa. 31:4), and form His retinue at the final revelation of His Judgment (Joel 3:11; Zech. 14:5).

8. 7. *Their Rank.* The later prophetic books speak of

angels of *higher order* among the heavenly host, and in Daniel for the first time some of them receive names.

9. *a)* The Cherubim. All the references to the Cherubim in the O. T. may be arranged under four headings: 1) in Eden (Gen. 3:24); 2) in Hebrew poetry (Ps. 18:10; 80:1; 99:1); 3) in the prophecy of Ezekiel (Chs. 10, 28, 41); 4) in Hebrew art (on the mercy-seat, Ex. 25:18-21; on the veil before the Holy of Holies, Ex. 26:31; 36:35; in the Holy of Holies of Solomon's Temple, 1 Kings 6:23-28; on the carved wood-work of the Temple, 1 Kings 6:29, 32, 35; on the molten sea, 1 Kings 7:29).

10. In some of these passages they seem to be regarded as actual beings of higher rank than man, and in others as symbols of angelic creatures.

11. Two views have been held concerning this difficult subject. 1) That the cherubim nowhere appear developed into independent personalities like the angels, but are symbols used to designate *a)* a place as the abode of God (in Paradise, in the tabernacle, in the temple), and set forth the divine glory as it is manifested in the world (*Oehler*), or *b)* the divine attributes—the fullness of the deity (*Bachr*), or *c)* redeemed and glorified humanity (*Fairbairn, Candlish, Strong*), or *d)* natural phenomena,—the storm-clouds that do Jehovah's bidding, Ps. 18:10 (*Cheyne, Ryle*). 2) That they are not incorporate natural phenomena, nor purely subjective creations of the imagination, but actual beings. "They are superhuman beings, who unite in themselves the special excellencies of the highest stages of created life, the bearers of the throne-chariot of God in the manifestation of Himself in His majesty as Judge" (*Delitzsch*, on Gen. 3:24; Ps. 18:10, and *Keil*).

12. The cherubim seem to be a high order of spiritual beings, and in the tabernacle, the temple, and the prophecies of Ezekiel, were intended to represent some angelic beings in immediate contact with Jehovah.

13. In later Jewish theology the cherubim took their place among the highest angels. Rabbinic theology regarded them as *youthful* angels, whence the modern use of the word *cherub*.

14. *b)* The Seraphim. Only mentioned in Isa. 6:2, 6. Various views are held. 1) Some would identify the *seraphim* of Isaiah with the *cherubim*, and both with the *living creatures* of Rev. 4:6; 2) others regard them as merely poetic expressions—"the popular notion of the Seraphim as angels is of course to be rejected," "as the cherubim are almost certainly the clouds of storm, so the mythic Seraphim are the serpent-like flashes of lightning" (*Cheyne* on Isa. 6:2); 3) *Delitzsch*: "Pure pictures and images of fancy the Seraphim are not, but actual heavenly beings, if not the most exalted of all spirits, at least spirits with a special distinction over others; for the Scriptures really teach a graduated celestial hierarchy. . . . The seraphim and cherubim are heavenly beings of different kinds. In Isaiah the seraphim are the bearers and mediators of the divine *fire of love*, as in Ezekiel the cherubim are bearers and mediators of the divine *fire of wrath*." *Orelli*: "To the Israelites they are supernatural beings in the retinue of God, setting forth His holiness, as the cherubim do His power and glory."

15. The view of Delitzsch seems to be the correct one.

16. *c)* Michael, called *the* archangel in Jude 9. In the O. T. Michael is regarded as the guardian angel of the Jewish people in their conflict with heathenism (Dan. 10:13, 21; 12:1), and in the N. T. as the leader of the good angels in their conflict with the power of Satan (Jude 9; Rev. 12:7). In later Jewish tradition he is one of the seven archangels who execute the commands of God at the final judgment, and stands at the head of the four great archangels who seem to form a class apart (Michael, Uriel, Raphael and Gabriel).

17. *d)* Gabriel. This angel appears both in the O. T. (Dan. 8:15, 16; 9:21) and in the N. T. (Luke 1:11, 12, 19, 26). He everywhere brings divine sympathy and comfort to those in need. In this he is contrasted with Michael, who fights for God and His people. Gabriel figures prominently in post-biblical Jewish literature.

b) The Doctrine of the New Testament.

18. In the N. T. the doctrine of the angels is more fully developed. According to the teaching of Jesus good angels are personal, immaterial, sinless, immortal beings (Matt. 22:30), in the closest relation to believers (Matt. 18:10; Luke 15:10; 16:22), and to the whole future kingdom of God (Matt. 13:39; 25:31). Paul also makes some remarkable statements concerning them (1 Cor. 11:10; Gal. 3:19; Eph. 3:10), and they appear repeatedly in the Apocalypse.

19. The N. T. teaching may be summarized as follows:

1) The angels are spirits (Heb. 1:14), created by the Son of God (Col. 1:16), holy (Matt. 25:3) and elect (1 Tim. 5:21);

2) in number they are an innumerable host (Luke 2:13; Matt. 26:53; Heb. 12:22; Rev. 5:11), the armies of heaven (Rev. 12:7; 19:14);

3) their office in heaven seems to consist in never-ceasing adoration of God (Rev. 5:11, 12; 7:11, 12);

4) they take the deepest interest in the work of redemption (1 Cor. 11:10; Eph. 3:10; 1 Tim. 5:21; 1 Pet. 1:12), minister to the saints (Heb. 1:14), bear the departing soul to heaven (Luke 16:22), are at times the medium by which God reveals Himself (Matt. 2:13, 19; Luke 1:19, 28; Acts 5:19, 20; 8:26; etc.; Rev. 1:1; 22:16), and were the instruments through whom the law was given (Acts 7:53; Heb. 2:2).

5) they have relations to each individual believer (Luke 15:10), but we cannot positively infer that each believer has a guardian angel (Matt. 18:10);

6) they shall attend Christ at His *parousia* (Matt. 16:27; 25:31; Mark 8:38; 2 Thess. 1:7), and execute His counsels (Matt. 13:41, 49; 24:31).

7) they are operative in the realm of nature (Heb. 1:7), and are the ministers of the wrath of God (Acts 12:23; Rev. 8:2, 5; 14:17-19; etc.);

8) they have superhuman but finite knowledge (Mark 13:32), are of great power (2 Thess. 1:7; 2 Pet. 2:11), and good angels are supremely blessed (Luke 20:36);

9) there is no distinction of sex among them (Matt. 22:30,—all angels in Scripture being regarded as male angels, not to mark any distinction of sex, but because the masculine is the more honorable gender;

10) they are never described with marks of age, but sometimes with those of youth (Mark 16:15);

11) they can never die (Luke 20:36), but they are not eternal, for they had a beginning (Col. 1:16);

12) they are distinct from man (1 Cor. 6:3; Heb. 1:14), but are not glorified human spirits (Heb. 2:16),—the fact that the angels always appeared in the human form does not prove that they really have this form;

13) they are of various ranks, and mention is made of *the* archangel, i. e. but *one* (Jude 9; 1 Thess. 4:16), and in Eph. 1:21; 3:10; Col. 1:16; there seems to be a reference to five orders among the good angels, all included among the *elect* angels of 1 Tim. 5:21;

14) they are not to be worshiped (Col. 2:18; Rev. 19:10; 22:8, 9).

II. THE CHURCH DOCTRINE.

20. *a) The Early Fathers.* The creation of the angels is expressed in the Nicene Creed: Maker....of all things visible and invisible.

21. Pure spirituality was at the beginning of the development of the Church doctrine held to with some fluctuation. Irenæus says, "the angels are without flesh"; Basil the Great "their essence is aerial spirit or immaterial fire"; the second Nicene Council (787 A. D.) says: "We reverence the images of *incorporeal* angels." Justin Martyr regards the angels as personal beings who possess a permanent existence; Clemens of Alex. and Origen assign to angels the office of watching over provinces and towns, and with this is connected the idea of individual guardian angels.

22. It is highly probable that *Justin Martyr* (*Apol.* I. 6, 13, 16, 61) does not wish to number the angels among the objects of *Christian worship*; *Irenæus* and *Athenagoras* very decidedly reject such an idea; so does the Synod of Laodicea (364 A. D.); it was also opposed by *Theodore* and *Augustine*; Ambrose and others favored it, and the second Nicene Council (787 A. D.), concedes to angels an inferior worship, but denies them adoration (*latreia*).

23. *Basil the Great* and *Gregory of Nazianzen*, held that there were different orders of angels; Augustine confesses his ignorance; but *Dionysius the Areopagite* seems to have understood the subject much better, for he divides the whole number of angels into three hierarchies, and subdivided each class into three orders: I. Thrones, Cherubim, Seraphim; II. Authorities, Dominions, Powers; III. Principalities, Archangels, Angels.

24. *b) The Scholastics.* The Fourth Lateran Council (1215 A. D.) pronounced as the doctrine of the Church, that the angels are spiritual beings, and that they were created holy. The *Scholastics* were carried away by all kinds of poetical and imagin-

ary speculations, sometimes running out into wilfull conceits.

1) They were created *first* of all creatures; 2) are isolated creations of God, not forming one whole, like the human race; 3) they are distinguished from the souls of men, *a)* physically, for they need no body, *b)* logically, for they do not obtain knowledge by inferences, *c)* metaphysically, for they see by intuitive reason, *d)* theologically, for now they cannot become either better or worse; 4) their knowledge is purely *a priori*; 5) they have a language, not born of sense, but intellectual; 6) are not omnipresent, but move with immeasurable celerity, etc.

25. *c) Luther and the Symbolical Books.* Luther regards the angels as the "most exalted creatures", created "after the beginning" (Gen. 1:1; John 1:1), "spirits"; the good angels "can no longer sin", have "the most exalted knowledge to be found among created beings", they "are actively engaged all about us", and "work in opposition to the devil"; he assigns to every government, city, and country, a special angel as guardian, and to each Christian "many guardian angels, just as every one has also his particular demons creeping after him"; in general, he holds there is among the angels a gradation in dignity, power, and wisdom; in the *Cherubim* and *Seraphim* he does not recognize angels at all. Luther makes no attempt to reach dogmatic precision, and does not even take the trouble to adduce passages of Scripture in support of particular statements, but regards Heb. 1:14, and Matt. 18:10, leading passages to draw his inferences.

26. Our Protestant Confessions are clear in reference to the reverence to be paid to angels. In opposition to the Roman Catholics who teach the invocation of angels our Symbolical Books teach: "We grant that the angels pray for us, for there is a testimony in Zech. 1:12" (*Apol.* 235, 8), "yet it does not follow thence that we should invoke and adore the angels and saints, and for them fast, hold festivals", etc. "For this is idolatry, and such honor belongs alone to God" (Smal. Art. 317, 26).

27. *d) The Doctrine of the Dogmaticians.* This may be presented under three heads, 1) the nature of angels, 2) their state, and 3) their office.

28. 1. *The nature of angels.* *Quenstedt*: The angels are spiritual substances (Ps. 104:4; Heb. 1:14), without any bodily form (whether gross or refined), finite, complete, and thus real persons.... They were created by God, (Col. 1:16; Ps. 103:20) in time, along with this visible world....but on what day, or at what time we are willingly ignorant.

29. Angels are *complete spirits*, because they do not need a body to constitute a person (the soul of man is an incomplete spirit). *Baier*: As the angels have a spiritual essence in common with God and the human soul, so they differ from God in that their essence is not *infinite*, but *finite*, and from the soul of man in that their substance is *complete*.

30. The *personality* of angels is proved: 1) from their names, 2) from their actions, 3) from the fall of some and the perseverance of others, 4) from their attributes as intelligent being (knowledge, desire, power) (*Quen.*).

31. The object of their Creation: 1) With respect to God, His praise and the execution of the divine will; 2) with respect to themselves, the eternal enjoyment of God; 3) with respect to man, service (*Calovius*).

32. The *attributes* of angels are partly *negative* (invisibility, invisibility, immutability, immortality, incorruptibility, illocality) and partly *positive* (knowledge, freedom of the will, power, endless duration, a definite whereabouts, agility).

33. Explanation of *negative* attributes. Angels are *indivisible* and *invisible* as to their essence, *immutabile*, because not subject to physical changes, *immortal* and *incorruptible* by nature, because altogether destitute of matter, *illocal*, because they occupy no space.

34. Explanation of *positive* attributes. 1) The *knowledge* of angels is great, but not infinite, since they are ignorant of the day of judgment (Mark 13:32), 2) they have *freedom of the will* (a) *freedom from compulsion*, for they perform good works, freely of their own accord, (b) *freedom of exercise* also called *freedom of contradiction*, that although they necessarily choose the good, they have the ability freely to choose between different kinds of good, but c) they do not have *the freedom of contrariety*, the ability to choose the good or the evil, for they are able to will and do only the good), 3) their *power* is great, but finite, not infinite (they cannot create anything, nor change the essential nature of things, nor perform true miracles, nor cure all diseases, nor raise the dead), 4) they are *of endless duration*, having a beginning but no end, for their existence is not measured by time, 5) they are always *in a particular place*, not omnipresent, (they are present *definitively*, that is, in an incomprehensible manner, not somewhere *circumscriptively* as occupying a space, nor *repletively*, which can only be said of God, since He fills all in all), 6) of wonderful *agility*, moving with amazing rapidity. (Condensed from *Quenstedt* and *Hollaz*.)

35. 2. *The State of Angels*. The original state of the angels was a *state of grace*. *Quenstedt*: All angels were in the beginning created by God equally righteous, good and holy, to glorify God and render Him a holy service." This is proved from 1) Gen. 1:31; 2) John 8:44; 3) Jude 6; 4) 2 Pet. 2:4. This original state was a *state of grace*, they were created equally wise and holy, and were placed upon the way to eternal happiness. *Perfect righteousness* was concreated with the angels, with the ability perfectly to perform the will of God, yet with *freedom of the will* (with the possibility of disobeying God). (After *Quenstedt* and *Hollaz*.)

36. Some of the angels continued in their concreated goodness, truth, and holiness and were confirmed in it by God, and entered upon *the state of glory*, in which they perpetually enjoy the boundless goodness of God; others by sinning through the abuse of their own free will (internal liberty), fell away from God, and entered into *the state of misery* (2 Pet. 2:4). Hence arose the distinction between the good and the evil angels. (After *Quenstedt* and *Hollaz*.)

37. Three things are to be predicated of the good angels: 1) persistence and continuance in concreated truth and holiness; 2) divine confirmation in the good, so that they are now altogether unable to sin, inferred principally from Luke 20:36, (in their original state of *grace*, the angels *were able not to sin, posse non peccare*, now in the state of *glory*, the angels *are not able to sin, non posse peccare*); 3) the eternal enjoyment of God, which is properly *the state of glory* (Matt. 18:10; 2 Cor. 11:14; 1 Tim. 5:21). (*Calovius.*)

38. In the *state of glory* the good angels have greater excellencies and perfections than in their original condition (*state of grace*). 1) In knowledge, since they are enjoying the beatific vision of God,—yet this knowledge is finite, not infinite (Mark 13:32; 1 Pet. 1:12); 2) *in holiness*, since they are always illuminated by the most glorious light of the knowledge and holiness of God (Matt. 18:10; 2 Cor. 11:14); 3) *in freedom of the will*, for they attained a greater freedom; 4) *in power*, for in the state of glory they are enabled to overcome the power of evil angels,—yet this power is finite and subordinate and subject to the divine power and will. (*Quenstedt.*)

39. 3. *The office or occupation of angels. Quenstedt:* "The duties and works of the good angels are to worship and praise God (Ps. 103:20; 148:2; Isa. 6:3), to execute his commands (Dan. 7:10) (punishing the wicked, Gen. 19:13; 2 Kings 19:35; guarding and protecting the godly, Ps. 34:7; 91:11, 12; Heb. 1:14)." *Baier:* 1) In the *ecclesiastical estate* they promote the ministry of the Word (Gal. 3:19), resist the introduction of idolatry into the Church (Jude 9), and are present in sacred assemblies (1 Cor. 11:10; 1 Tim. 5:21); 2) in the *political state* the angels protect the government and the magistracy (Dan. 10:13; 6:22; 2 Kings 19:35; Isa. 37:36); 3) in the *domestic estate* they serve the family and promote its happiness (Gen. 24:7; Job 1:10; Ps. 34:7; Matt. 18:10); 4) they will accompany Christ to Judgment (Matt. 25:31; 1 Thess. 4:16), gather together the elect (Matt. 24:31; Mark 13:27), and execute God's will at the final judgment (Matt. 25:33; 13:41, 42, 50). (*Condensed.*)

40. As to *guardian* angels *Baier* says: It may be asserted with probability, that one angel is appointed for the protection of each godly person, and that in extraordinary cases, many angels are sent to the help of single individuals.

41. *Their number. Quenstedt* says: There was a certain number created, which, as it was not increased in the course of time, nor will be increased, so also it will never be diminished. But how great that number is the Scriptures do not teach (Dan. 7:10; Matt. 25:31; Heb. 12:22).

42. The *worship* of angels. *Hollaz:* Angels are not to be religiously adored or invoked.

43. *Rank or Order. Hollaz:* There is no doubt as to the existence of a certain order among the good angels, but what or what manner of angelic order that is, we think no one can know in this life. Proof, *a*) There is order in the Church triumphant (1 Cor. 14:40); *b*) different names (Eph. 1:21; Col. 1:16;

1 Thess. 4:16; Jude 9); *c*) from analogy (there is an order among wicked angels, Luke 11:15; Matt. 25:41);

44. The *manifold importance of the doctrine of the angels.*

Dorner: 1) This doctrine forms a *safeguard* against an *over-valuation* of the earth, our race and its history, for it in reality can only be a gain to suppose that outside our earth there is a spirit-world which exists for us as we exist for it (Luke 15:10). The Son of God is the centre of the angel-world as well as of perfected humanity, and its religion is one and the same with that of Christendom (Phil. 2:8-11; Col. 1:20).

2) It proves that what happens on this earth has significance for the entire universe of spirits.

3) It shows how it is possible to conceive this earthly world as non-existent ages ago, and yet God's work of creation as not beginning with it.

4) It enhances the dignity of Christ, who is the Head of the angels, as well as the glory and majesty of the Church, which embraces them (Eph. 1:10; Phil. 2:10; Col. 1:16-20).

5) It forms a pledge to the Christian consciousness, that the triumphant Church is no empty ideal, but a present reality, that we belong to two worlds, and are born into a heavenly kingdom, not first formed by men, but in existence already. (Condensed.)

6) It renders more clear our conception of the all-surpassing majesty of God and the glory of His yet future last appearing (*Van Oosterzee*).

7) It enlarges our conceptions of the dignity of our own being, and of the boundless possibilities of our future existence (*Strong*).

8) It strengthens our faith in God's providential care.

III. MODERN CRITICISM.

45. Two tendencies have arisen in the past, one to embellish the Biblical teaching with all kinds of fantastic views; and the other to oppose the Christian doctrine from the standpoint of a whole or half *rationalistic denial*.

46. With the rise of Rationalism there has been a tendency to ignore, or to disbelieve in, the existence and ministration of angels, regarding the language of Scripture as either mythical, or poetic, or symbolic of the forces of nature.

47. The systematic combating of Angelology has its origin in a Deistic, naturalistic, or Pantheistic tendency, and easily leads to absolute Materialism.

48. The older Supranaturalism tried to defend the Biblical doctrine, but very weakly, for they did not know how to dispose of these mysterious beings.

49. Hase and Schleiermacher treat the topic as an appendix to Theology, and put it more or less in the sphere of poetry and art, or even of superstition. The latter while allowing it a place in Christian language does not at all concede that it has any importance in doctrine or in life.

50. Some critics denying the personal existence of angels seek to trace the *origin* of the idea 1) to the degraded gods of ancient polytheism (Kosters), or 2) to personifications of natural forces (De Wette). With reference to the *first* view A. B.

Davidson remarks: "There is little or nothing in the O. T. to support this theory," and with reference to the *second*, he says: "Such speculations lie outside the O. T. which assumes the existence of Jehovah's heavenly retinue." Oehler says of both these views: "If this were true, angelology would have been more fully developed in the older books of Scripture, not first in the latest ones."

51. Strauss, and many moderns, utterly reject the notion of the existence of angels, as being unreasonable, because it is opposed to the *modern scientific* view of the world. But this view stands or falls with the pantheistic view of the world.

52. But the belief in the existence of a world of spirits is by no means *unreasonable*.

1) Before the idea of angels can be described as impossible, it must be shown to be in *contradiction* with the *idea of God*, or of the *creature*.

2) From the theistic conception of the world the existence of higher spirits, who are servants of God and His Kingdom, is *not* impossible.

3) Without taking revelation into consideration the existence of angels is not only highly probable, but has to be assumed. Nature knows of no transition. The amazing extent of the universe leads us involuntarily to this supposition. The gradual ascent which we discover in the order and rank of being, renders it highly probable that there exist, not only beneath, but also above man, different links in the chain of being. As there is a world invisible, because so little, so there is a world invisible, because so great, too great for the limitations of matter and sense.

53. He who utters the words *absurd* and *impossible* goes beyond the bounds of his reason, and the *impossibility* of the existence of angels, though often asserted, is absolutely unproved.

54. What reason affirms as probable is made certain as positive truth from the clear statements of the Word of God, and is demanded by the religious view of the world.

55. *Dorner*: The doctrine of angels as pure, celestial spirits is attested by the Holy Scripture and accepted by the Church. Though the doctrine lacks complete dogmatic verification, it involves no contradiction in itself or to other doctrines. It is no supposition of the N. T. that angels are merely departed men, as Swedenborgians teach.

56. Martensen, influenced by Hegelianism, regards angels as idealized powers: "The world of angels suggest to us the world of ideas,—not as presented to our abstract thought, but rather ideas as they are presented to our intuition as living powers and as active spirits. . . . What philosophy calls ideas, and mythology calls gods, receive in revelation the name of angels. . . . The essential and distinguishing marks in the conception of an angel are not personality, but spirit and power. . . . They possess only a *represented* personality; in short, are only personifications."

IV. *Literature.* Luthardt, *Komp.* sec. 36; Schmid, *Theol. of Lutheran Church*, sec. 22; Oehler, *O. T. Theol.* (Index); Schultz, *O. T. Theol.*, Vol. II., pp. 214-241; Piepenbring, *Theol. of O. T.* (Index); W. Robertson Smith, Art. on *Angel* in *Ency. Brit.*; Cheyne, on *Seraphim*, *Comm. on Isaiah* (Index); Articles on *Angels*, *Cherubim*, *Seraphim*, etc., in Smith's *Dict. of Bible*, by Barry and others. Hastings' *Dict. of Bible*, articles on *Angel*, by A. B. Davidson, on *Cherubim*, by Ryle; Alexander—Kitto, *Cyclo. of Bibl. Lit.*, articles on *Angels*, on *Cherubim* by Farrar, etc.; Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines* (Index); Baier, *Compendium* (Walther), Vol. II., pp. 103-121; Dörner, *Christian Doctrine*, Vol. II., pp. 96-103; Gerhart, *Institutes*, Vol. I., pp. 641-671; Hall, *Doctrine of Man and of the God-Man*, pp. 33-43; Hase, *Huterus Redivivus*, sec. 73-75, 77; Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 637-642; Koestlin, *Theology of Luther* (Index); Lindberg, *Dogmatik*, pp. 95-102; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, pp. 127-135; Philippi, *Kirch. Gl.*, Vol. II., pp. 287-337; Strong, *Systematic Theology*, pp. 221-233; Twisten, *Dogmatik*, Vol. II., pp. 305-336; Vilmar, *Dogmatik*, Vol. I., pp. 305-311; Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, Vol. I., pp. 308-317; Whately, *Scripture Revelations Concerning Good and Evil Angels*, Phil'a, 1856; Dunn, *The Angels of God*, New York, 1881; Timpson, *The Angels of God*, London, 1847; Rawson, *Nature and Ministry of the Holy Angels*, New York, 1858; Jameson, *Sacred and Legendary Art*, Vol. I., pp. 47-131.

SEC. 16. *The Doctrine Concerning Satan.*

1. On the basis of Scripture, of the testimony of Christ, and of the facts which witness the power of evil—the Church teaches the existence of Satan or the Devil.

2. According to Scripture Satan is a spirit, created by God in holiness, who by his own will set himself in conflict with God and His saving work, and who has drawn other spirits after him, and thus became the author of Sin and Death in the world of man, and has himself forever fallen under these powers. (*Luthardt.*)

I. THE SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE.

a) *The Doctrine of the Old Testament.*

3. The history of the temptation and of the Fall presupposes an ungodly principle which had already entered into the world.

4. Although the doctrine of Satan does not appear in the O. T. until much later, the N. T. teaches us (Rev. 12:9) that by this evil principle we must understand the evil which had penetrated the world of spirits before the fall of man, and which is subsequently spoken of as Satan.

5. That the serpent and Satan are in some way identical we learn from John 8:44; 2 Cor. 11:3, 14; Rom. 16:20; Rev. 12:9; 20:2. This narrative (in Gen. 3) is not a myth, or a parable, or an allegory, but literal truth.

6. The very sagacity of the serpent made it an object of diabolical selection and an organ through which Satan influenced Eve.

7. The serpent was degraded (Gen. 3:14), and we have a right to infer that its form and movements and mode of life, were judicially changed (*Delitzsch, Keil*).

8. The idea of diabolical power appears in *Azazel* (Lev. 16:8-26).

9. It is best to regard the word *Azazel* as a personal name, and though *scape-goat* (A. V.) is not a translation of the word, it describes very well the *office* of the goat sent into the wilderness "for Azazel."

10. Various interpretations have been given of the word *Azazel*: 1) the *avorter* of evil (*Rabbinical* translation, *Ges., Ewald, Hengstenberg, Olshausen, Stade*); 2) that it is the designation of the goat, *scape-goat, freed-goat* (*Jerome, Luther, Coverdale, A. V.*); 3) as an *abstract noun*, in the sense of *dismissal*, "for complete dismissal" (so *Tholuck, Baehr, R. V. marg.*); 4) as the *personal name of the evil spirit* whose abode is in the wilderness, who is thus designated as the demon to whom the goat is sent, and who is thus *dismissed*, or sent to a distance (*Oehler, Driver, Keil*).

11. The last seems to be the correct view, and we agree so far with *Driver*, when he says: χ here can be little doubt that the ritual of Lev. 16 was intended as a symbolical declaration that the land and people are now purged from guilt, their sins being handed over to the evil spirit to whom they are held to belong, and whose home is in the desolate wilderness.

12. Though *Azazel* is not equivalent to Satan, still the idea of *Azazel* is at all events *akin* to the idea of Satan (*Oehler*). *Keil*, however, rightly holds that *Azazel* is but another name of the devil himself, who was afterwards called Satan, as he maintains that no subordinate evil spirit could have been placed in antithesis to Jehovah as *Azazel* here, but only the ruler or head of the kingdom of the fallen angels.

13. "The goat for *Azazel*" (Lev. 16:29) bore symbolically the sins of the people. It was not offered as a sacrifice, but was presented alive before God (Lev. 16:20-22), and was sent into the wilderness to symbolize the condition of the sinner driven from the face of the Lord.

14. No matter what meaning we give to the word, the thought is still clear—there is another kingdom into which sinning men are banished from the presence of the Lord, and the glory of His power.

15. In Lev. 16:10 the goat is represented as making atonement, and the doctrine of substitution comes in. There here seems to be a typical reference to so much of our Lord's atoning work as marks His subjection as our representative to the thrall of the devil in the desolation of the wilderness.

16. In the prologue of the Book of Job, in Chronicles (1 Chron. 21:1), and Zechariah (3:1, 2), we first meet with an angel called *Satan*, of crafty and hostile disposition toward Israel and all who fear God, seeking to deprive them of the favor of God.

17. The word *Satan* means an *enemy, an adversary*, hostile to God and to man.

18. Though most commentators regard this whole scene in Job as a poetic and parabolic representation, yet there are clearly certain facts concerning the invisible world which are intended to be taught:

- 1) Satan appears as admitted into the presence of God (like a Judas among the Twelve) among the sons of God (good angels);
- 2) it is implied that the Kingdom of God in its widest sense holds Satan as a subject;
- 3) the mind of Satan is read by God;

4) within certain limits God allows Satan to perceive His will;

5) Satan's joy consists in undermining human virtue, in spying out the sins and weaknesses of men, in tempting them to sin, and then accusing them before God;

6) God permits Satan thus to try men, though a limit is put to the powers of Satan (1 Cor. 10:13).

19. There is no real discrepancy between 2 Sam. 24:1 and 1 Chron. 21:1. What is in the first record directly referred to Divine agency, is in the latter attributed to Satan. The inference is not that there is here a personification of "the anger of Jehovah", but that Satan was allowed to make himself the organ of God's wrath. The guilt of David was an opening for the influence of Satan.

20. In the same way the three well-known passages in the O. T. must be understood—"the evil spirit from the Lord" which troubled Saul (1 Sam. 16:14, 23); the "spirit of perverseness" (Isa. 19:14) which caused Egypt to go astray; and especially 1 Kings 22:19-23, "the lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets."

21. We learn from all these passages that a divinely permitted agency, differing from the Divine life-giving principle active in the world, rules in the domain of sin.

22. Of special significance is the position of Satan with respect to the covenant people, as presented in Zech. 3:1-4. Joshua, the high priest, is here the representative of the people, and is a type of Christ. The work of Satan is to question the forgiveness, the justification of the Church, in which sense he is called "the accuser of our brethren" (Rev. 12:10).

23. Satan is everywhere represented as in moral opposition to God, yet dependent and subject. In a limited sense he is a servant of God, compelled to bear a reluctant part in the divine plans.

24. Of other *evil angels* nothing is distinctly taught in the O. T. The *se-irim* of Lev. 17:7; 2 Chron. 11:15; Isa. 13:21; 34:14, were evidently *evil spirits* or demons, supposed to inhabit the desert, to which the heathen sacrificed, and which the Israelites idolatrously worshiped under the form of a goat-shaped deity (*he-goat* or *Satyr*)—a superstition probably of Egyptian origin (Ezek. 20:7; 23:3), where a goat or Pan depicted with a goat's head and feet, was worshipped.

25. The *Shedim* of Deut. 32:17 and Ps. 106:37 seem also to have been *evil spirits* or demons, to whom human sacrifices were offered. Compare also 1 Cor. 10:20.

26. The *Lilith* of Isa. 34:14 seems to be a demon of the night (the *night-monster*, R. V.), that wanders about in the deserts. Compare also "the unclean spirit" of Matt. 12:43.

27. It is the tendency of modern criticism to trace the biblical doctrine of Demonology directly to Babylonian traditions introduced during the Exile, especially to Parseeism.

28. But *Oehler* protests against this: 1) Because of the organic connection between the doctrine of Satan and other O. T. doctrines; 2) because the Book of Job unquestionably belongs to

pre-Babylonian times, when Persian influence is inconceivable; 3) because the Satan of the O. T. does not have *the essential attributes* to justify a comparison with *Ahriman*. And Ewald remarks: Down to Zech. 3:3, the whole conception of Satan in its origin and significance is so purely Hebraistic, that nothing can be more groundless and preposterous than to derive it from abroad. To suppose, as has been done of late, that a Persian origin of Satan is firmly established, is entirely unhistorical and without foundation".

29. No doctrine is so antagonistic to Parseism (Ahriman and Ormuzd) as the Biblical doctrine, for in the Bible, Satan is a creature and a servant under God.

30. In the Apocryphal Books of the O. T. mention is made of Satan in but a few passages (Ecclus. 21:27; Wis. 2:24; Tob. 3:8; 8:3), but in the later Jewish theology we have a much fuller development of demonology.

b) *The Doctrine of the New Testament.*

31. The doctrine of Satan and his evil angels is more clearly developed in the N. T. than in the O. T., and is of the greatest importance.

32. Christ Himself speaks in such a way of Satan and his angels as to preclude the idea that his language is but accommodation to popular prejudice.

33. The temptation in the wilderness and the teaching of our Lord can be harmonized with no view but that of the *personality* of Satan (Matt. 12:25-28; 13:39; 25:41; 1 John 3:8), and Christ connects His own suffering with Satan as "the prince of the world" (John 14:30).

34. The *personal* existence of a Spirit of Evil is most distinctly taught in the N. T. through all the Gospels, Epistles, and Apocalypse.

a) Personal names are given to him. He is called 1) the *Tempter* (Matt. 4:3; 1 Thess. 3:5) because he seeks to seduce man to evil and sin, and lead him astray from God; 2) the *Devil*, that is, *Slanderer* or *Accuser*, because he slanders God to man (Gen. 3:4, 5) and man to God (Job 1:9-11; 2:4, 5; Rev. 12:10); 3) *Satan*, that is, *Adversary*, because he is the great opposer of God and man; 4) the *Serpent* (Rev. 12:9), with reference to Gen. 3:1, which "beguiled Eve in his craftiness" (2 Cor. 11:3), the *old serpent* (Rev. 12:9), because *he was a murderer from the beginning* (John 8:44).

b) Personal actions are assigned to him.

1) His *fall* is mentioned (Luke 10:18; John 8:44), but of the time, cause and manner of his fall, Scripture tells us scarcely anything (2 Pet. 2:4; Jude 6; 1 Tim. 3:6);

2) he sinneth from the beginning, is the author of sin (1 John 3:8), a liar and a murderer from the beginning (John 8:44);

3) he is the cause of every sort of evil (Acts 10:38), and hath the power of death (Heb. 2:14);

4) he is at the head of the kingdom of evil (Matt. 12:24-26), and has "angels" subject to him (Matt. 25:41);

5) and as "the god of this world" (2 Cor. 4:4). "the prince of

this world" (John 12:31; 14:30), has a world-controlling power (Eph. 2:2; 6:12; 1 John 5:19).

35. The history of the ever deeper downfall of Satan has four periods:

1) From his original fall to the first Coming of Christ, during which time he still had access to heaven as the accuser (*Devil*) and adversary (*Satan*) of man;

2) from Christ's Ascension to His Second Advent, during which time he is still *the prince of the world*, and rages especially during the *short time* immediately preceding Christ's Coming to destroy Antichrist;

3) his being bound during the period of the Millennium (Rev. 20:1-3); and

4) his final judgment (Rev. 20:10).

36. His activity may be described as consisting in: 1) temptation, sifting, and seduction; 2) accusing the seduced and fallen; 3) bringing destruction and misery, spiritual and bodily (*Dorner*). His activity appears partly in the form of *cunning*, and partly in that of *power*.

37. The *evil angels* are the *demons* (not *devils* as A. V. and R. V. text, but *daimonia*, demons), over whom Satan is ruler and prince (Matt. 9:34; 12:24; Mark 3:22; Luke 11:15); the *evil spirits* (Acts 19:12, 13); the *unclean spirits*, at enmity with God, and having power to afflict man, not only with disease, but with spiritual pollution also (Matt. 12:43-45; Luke 11:24-26). They are everywhere regarded as endowed with great talents, power, and knowledge (Matt. 8:29; Mark 1:24).

38. These demons recognize in Jesus the Messiah (Mark 1:34; 3:11), know that He has come to destroy them (Mark 1:24), know that they cannot escape the torment into which they must come at the appointed time (Matt. 8:29), for eternal fire is prepared for the devil and his angels (Matt. 25:41).

39. The evil angels are now kept in everlasting bonds under darkness unto the judgment of the great day (Jude 6), in "pits of darkness", "in Tartarus" (2 Pet. 2:4), that part of Hades which is the *fore-hell*, the abyss spoken of in Rev. 9:1, 2, 11; 11:7, etc., which finally will become the *Gehenna*, the place of final punishment.

40. They are thus now only in a *preliminary custody* for these evil angels may still exert their influence on earth (Luke 8:31; Eph. 2:2; Rev. 9:1-11), but they are awaiting the time of the final judgment which is in store for them (Matt. 8:29; 25:41; James 2:19; Rev. 20:10).

II. THE CHURCH DOCTRINE.

41. The *personality* of Satan was maintained from the very beginning. In antithesis to Manichean Dualism, that Satan as a distinct and essential evil principle existed from the beginning, all the orthodox Fathers taught that Satan as an angel was created by God in a state of holiness, but voluntarily rebelled against His maker.

42. All physical evils (drought, failure of crops, famine, pestilence), as well as the persecutions of Christians, were thought

to be the work of Satan and his evil angels. *Origen* calls the evil spirits "the executioners of God."

43. The whole system of paganism, its mythology and worship, were ascribed to demoniacal influence. The demons were present at all heathen sacrifices, sipped in the smoke of the offerings, spoke out in the oracles, and rejoiced in the excess and licentiousness which accompanied the heathen festivals. (*Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Origen, etc.*)

44. Particular vices were considered to be the effect of individual evil spirits (the greedy belly-demon, the ventriloquistic demon, the sensualistic demon, etc.).

45. The Fathers do not agree as to the time of the Fall of Satan, nor as to the particular sin which caused the apostasy of Satan and his evil angels, some ascribing it to envy and pride, others to lasciviousness and intemperance.

46. Of Satan and his angels, *Origen* writes: "The Church teaches that they exist but does not clearly state what they are or how, but the opinion prevails among most that the devil was originally an angel, and having become apostate, he persuaded many to withdraw with him." *Origen*, however, contrary to the general opinion, believed that Satan is yet capable of being converted.

47. During the middle ages most theologians held that *pride* was the principal cause of the fall of the devil, and *Anselm* declared it impossible that the evil angels should finally be redeemed (as *Origen* supposed), and he also maintained that God created man as a kind of compensation to supply the deficiency in the number of the elect spirits. So already *Augustine*.

48. *Luther* had very vivid conceptions of the devil and the evil angels. That the devil was once an angel of light is certain from the declarations of Scripture, but on which of the days of creation Satan fell is uncertain (probably on the second or third). *Pride* was the cause of the fall. The evil spirits now constitute a realm by themselves, Lucifer, "the devil," ruling over them. From the *devil* and his evil angels all our *misfortunes* come; the loss of an eye, sickness, death at the hands of a murderer, etc., are strokes of the devil. He raises storms, incites enemies against us, etc. It is his special work to inspire evil thoughts, etc. Every one has his own demon as well as his own guardian angel. Man is a steed, upon which sits either Satan or God. Since the fall of the evil angels, their sentence has remained unalterably fixed, and they have already been bound with chains as a preparatory movement, but there still remains the final execution of the divine judgment, when they shall be cast into hell.

49. Calvin and Zwingle did not trouble themselves so much with the question of Satanic agency, as *Luther*.

50. This topic of the evil angels is very fully discussed by *Hollaz* and *Quenstedt*.

51. *Hollaz*: The evil angels are those who did not persevere in concentered wisdom and righteousness, but of their own free will turned away from God and the rule of right, and became the perpetual enemies of God and men.

52. Pride was probably the sin through which they fell away from God. *Quenstedt*: Probably an affected resemblance to the Deity or an affectation of superior pre-eminence (Gen. 3:5; Matt. 4:9; 1 Tim. 3:6).

53. Their number was great. *Quenstedt*: Those who fell were individual angels, whose number is not mentioned in the Scriptures; that they were many, however, we infer from the multitude of demons (Mark 5:9; Luke 8:30).

54. Satan was their leader. *Hollaz*: It is probable that the wicked angels fell under the guidance of a certain leader or chief, whom the Scriptures call Satan and the devil (John 8:44; Luke 11:15), who by his example or persuasion drew many angels into the fellowship of his crime (Rev. 12:4).

55. "The punishments which are inflicted upon the wicked angels will be eternal (Matt. 25:41-46; Mark 9:43)". (*Baier*).

56. This punishment is both *privative* (negative) and *positive*. The *privative* is the most lamentable loss of grace and glory; the *positive*, that punishment which the demons are keenly enduring ever since the fall, and the still greater one which they will undergo on the day of final judgment (2 Pet. 2:4; Jude 6). (*Hollaz*).

57. The evil angels in their *state of misery* still have a knowledge of God, "but they dreadfully shudder at this divine knowledge" (*Hollaz*). "Their *intellect* is deprived not only of the light of grace, but also of the light of glory" (*Baier*); their *will* is inclined to evil, and their freedom is exercised with reference to particular evils; their *power* is, indeed, more than human, but is restrained by divine power, so that without the permission of God they can accomplish nothing (*Hollaz*). Their power is limited: 1) They are dependent on God, and can act only under His control and by His permission; 2) their operation must be according to the laws of nature; 3) they cannot interfere with the freedom and responsibility of man (*Hodge*). This last point Strong rightly emphasizes: "The power of evil spirits over man is not independent of the human will. This power cannot be exercised without at least the original consent of the human will, and may be resisted and shaken off through prayer and faith in God (Eph. 6:11; James 4:7; 1 Pet. 5:9)."

58. "Their *knowledge* of supernatural things is joined,— 1) with great hatred and murmuring against God; 2) with jealousy, envy and rage against good angels and godly and happy men; 3) with ignorance, doubt, error and forgetfulness (Matt. 4:6; John 13:2; 1 Cor. 2:8)." (*Quenstedt*.)

59. The *work* of the evil angels aims to injure the divine glory (Rev. 12:7), and the temporal as well as the eternal ruin of individual men. *Hollaz*: "The evil demons are assiduously plotting to disturb, overturn, and totally destroy the *ecclesiastical estate* (by scattering heresies, Matt. 13:27, 28; by hindering the efforts of godly ministers, 1 Thess. 2:18; by averting the minds of hearers from the meditation and practice of the divine Word, Luke 8:12; by exciting persecutions against the Kingdom of Christ, Rev. 12:7), the *political estate* (1 Kings 22:21; 1 Chron. 21:1), and the *domestic state* (by alienating the minds of married persons,

in sowing contentions, John 8:44, and by lying in wait for the children and possessions of parents, Job 1:11-19").

60. That the evil spirits or demons are not the spirits of wicked men who have departed this life, as some have maintained, is clear: 1) because they are distinguished from the good angels; 2) from its being said that they kept not their first state, Jude 6; 3) from the language of 2 Pet. 2:4; 4) from the application to them of the titles "principalities" and "powers" (After *Hodge*).

61. In spite of their malice, Satan and the evil angels cannot entirely avoid carrying out God's will, for God uses them to punish the wicked and chasten the godly for their own good. *Harless*: For all that is opposed to God belongs to the rule and sovereignty of God. Not everywhere can we regard the agency of Satan as standing apart from divine government, but there are conditions where Satan, against his own will, must become the executor of God's visitations and judgments, which Satan indeed intends to serve for corruption, while in God's purposes they are to serve for probation, for "sifting the wheat" (Luke 22:31; 1 Cor. 5:5; 1 Tim. 1:20).

62. Among the evils inflicted upon individual persons by evil spirits the Dogmatists especially speak of *spiritual* and *corporeal* possession.

63. By *spiritual* possession is meant "that the devil possesses and fills the minds and hearts of the wicked, enters into these, and works in them (Acts 5:3; Luke 22:3; John 13:2; 2 Thess. 2:9; Eph. 2:2)" (*Quenstedt*).

64. By *corporeal* possession is meant that "the devil immediately and locally exists and operates in a body, and controls it for the time being (Matt. 4:24; 8:16, 28; Mark 7:25; 9:17; Matt. 12:22; 15:22; Luke 4:33; Acts 8:7; 19:13)" (*Quenstedt*).

65. *Quenstedt* holds that *corporeal* possession can befall also a godly person. "The subject of it is not only a wicked man, but also sometimes a godly one (Mark 9:21). God gives over the wicked to be possessed by the devil, that they may be punished and corrected, but the godly, that the wickedness of their sins may be exhibited and their faith exercised."

66. There are many earnest students of God's Word who believe that God does *still* permit "evil spirits" to act directly on the souls and bodies of men. Witness especially the modern examples of demoniacal possession as seen in certain mission fields.

III. MODERN CRITICISM.

67. Modern Criticism was at first directed against the Fanaticism connected with the processes against wiches, and against the superstitions which had arisen with reference to the doctrine of evil spirits, but at last it attacked the doctrine of the existence of Satan and his evil angels. The denial of the existence of the devil is regarded as a necessary requirement of an enlightened mode of thought.

68. Rationalism attacked the doctrine on the ground that in the researches of natural science there are no traces of the supernatural—that it is utterly inconceivable that there should be a

fall in spirits, created good and holy. *Nitzsch* truly says: Philosophy is as unable to explain the reality of Satan as the reality of man's fall.

69. Strauss and the mythical school held that the whole account of Satan and the demoniacs is merely a lively symbol of the prevalence of evil in the world. But this view stands or falls with the mythical theory as a whole. It disparages the truth of the gospel narrative, the inspiration of the Bible, and the integrity of our Lord and the Apostles.

70. Another objection raised is, that our Lord and the Evangelists, in referring to demoniacal possession, spoke only in *accommodation* to the popular belief of the Jews, without any assertion as to its truth or its falsity, that the demoniacs were merely persons suffering under unusual diseases of body and mind. But there is no indication of such an "accommodation" teaching in the whole of the N. T., and such a theory, if carried out in principle, must destroy the truth and honesty of Holy Scripture itself. (Hugh Farmer, in his *Essay on the Demoniacs of the N. T.*, London, 1775, seems to have been among the first in modern times who adopted this rationalistic or accommodation principle of interpretation, and this view is very generally accepted by Unitarians, Universalists, and theologians of a rationalistic tendency. Semler introduced this work of Farmer into Germany, and the German rationalistic school substantially adopted this theory.)

71. Modern Theology, however, has been most influenced by Schleiermacher, who says: "The idea of the devil, as conceived by the popular mind, is so untenable, that the conviction of its truth can be demanded from no one, nor has our church ever made doctrinal use of it".... "Neither Christ nor the Apostles interweave this idea in the plan of salvation".... "What is affirmed in regard to the devil is so conditioned, that faith in it need not be considered as a condition of faith in God or in Christ, and we are not to suppose that the devil has any influence within the kingdom of God."

But the greatest theologians after Schleiermacher have not agreed with him. *Nitzsch*, *Twisten*, *Rothe*, *Julius Mueller*, *Tholuck*, *Lange*, *Dorner*, and *Martensen*, have held with the more conservative Dogmaticians like *Thomasius*, *Hofmann*, *Kahnis*, *Philippi*, and *Luthardt*, that sin is found not merely in man, but that a kingdom of evil spirits, with a head over them, must also be accepted and taught.

Strauss, who neither believes that Christ is the God-man, nor that the devil exists, very properly says: "The demons are to be regarded as necessary elements in the entire mode in which Jesus and His Apostles viewed the world.... If Christ came to destroy the works of the devil, He needed not to have come, if there is no devil; if there is no devil, but only a personification of an evil principle, very good, it is sufficient if we regard Christ also as an impersonal idea." *Nullus diabolus, nullus Redemptor.*

73. The exegesis which does away with the personality of the devil does away also with the personality of Christ and of God. "If there be *spirit* at all, there are no doubt spirits. If there be

spirits at all, there are no doubt both good spirits and evil. If there be evil spirits at all, they will no doubt be somewhere, and have some influence on things and persons around them" *Morison* on Matt. 8:28.

74. In opposition to those who deny it, *Dorner* maintains that the Biblical teaching concerning Satan is perfectly harmonious, that there is no contradiction between the four leading characters under which Satan appears both in the O. and N. T. 1) as the *tempter* of freedom, who desires to bring to decision; 2) as the *accuser*, who by virtue of the law charges man with crime; 3) as the *instrument* of the Divine *punitive justice* brings evil and death upon man; 4) as the *enemy* of God and man.

IV. PRACTICAL USE OF THE DOCTRINE.

75. In opposition to those who make light of the Scripture doctrine, *Dorner* maintains that it has a great significance for the Christian consciousness. 1) It establishes the intensive idea of the terrible importance of evil and its far-reaching results; 2) it gives us an instructive glance into the far-reaching connections of evil, and upon the anti-divine unity of evil (Satan and his kingdom of demons), and thus we can understand in how great a world-historical struggle humanity is involved; 3) on account of these two facts, it is adapted to commend vigilance on our part, and presents the redemption through Christ in a new light.

76. One of the most subtle influences which Satan uses to deceive men is to delude them into the idea of his non-existence, —causing them either to deny his existence and influence, or else to ignore him as a mere phantom of the imagination.

77. The more men deny his existence, the more they affirm that sin is only a consequence of natural weakness, a mere limitation of finite existence, the result of ignorance and want of culture, —all of which must yield to enlightenment, better instruction in schools, and higher intellectuality.

78. Harless is correct, when he says: The existence of Satan, his mode of action, and his power, reveal themselves to those *alone who are truly in Christ*, and have learnt in Him to resist and overcome the tempter. For the perfect light alone reveals the whole depth of the darkness, "the deep things of Satan" (Rev. 2:24).

79. *Strong* condenses *Philippi's* discussion of the relation of the doctrine of Satan to the doctrine of sin: 1) Since Satan is a fallen *angel*, who was once pure, evil is not self-existent or necessary. 2) Since Satan is a purely *spiritual* creature, sin cannot have its origin in the mere possession of a physical nature. 3) Since Satan is not a *weak* and *poorly endowed* creature, sin is not a necessary result of weakness and limitation. 4) Since Satan is *confirmed in evil*, sin is not necessarily a transient or remediable act of will. 5) Since in Satan sin *does not come to an end*, sin is not a step of creaturely development, or a stage of progress to something higher and better.

80. *Van Oosterzee*: The doctrine of Satan is of special and incontestable importance in connection with the doctrine of sin. 1) The *origin* of sin in man is better understood; 2) the

nature of sin is explained better in this way; 3) the *power* of sin is more apparent when the eye penetrates so much further than this visible creation; 4) the *conflict* against sin is, by the recognition of the existence of Satan, at once excited and directed; 5) this doctrine, like so many others, is more fitted for the strong meat of the full grown, than for babes in Christ.

- V. *Literature.* Luthardt, *Komp.*, sec. 37; Schmid, *Theol. of Lutheran Church*, sec. 22; Oehler, *O. T. Theol.* sec. 61, 73, 140, 200; Schultz, *O. T. Theol.* (Index on *Azazel, Demons, Satan*); Piepenbring, *Theol. of O. T.*, sec. 29; *Ency. Brit.* (Tylor on *Demonology*; Art. on *Devil*); Smith, *Dict. of Bible* (see articles on *Azazel, Demon, Demoniacs, Devil, Magic, Satan*); Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible* (Articles on *Angel* by Davidson, *Demon* and *Devil, Exorcism, Satan*, all by Whitehouse, *Azazel by Driver*); Schaff-Herzog, *Encyclopedia* (Articles on *Angels, Demon, Demoniacs, Devil*); Alexander-Kitto, *Cyclo. of Bibl. Lit.* (Articles on *Demon, Demoniacs, Exorcist, Satan*); Delitzsch, *Bibl. Psychology*, pp. 345-360; Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of N. T.* (Index); Neander, *Planting and Training of Christian Ch.* (Index); Schmid, *Bibl. Theol. of N. T.* (Index); Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, sec. 51, 52, 133, 172, 265, 297; Crippen, *Hist. of Christian Doctrine*, pp. 72-76; Trench, *Miracles*, pp. 160-175; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, vol. 3, pp. 85-113; Gerhart, *Institutes*, vol. 1, pp. 688-712; Hase, *Huterus Redivivus*, sec. 73, 74, 76, 77; Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1, pp. 643-648; Koestlin, *Theology of Luther* (Index); Lindberg, *Dogmatik*, pp. 102-107; Martensen, *Dogmatics*, sec. 99-107; Nitzsch, *System of Christian Doctrine*, sec. 116; Philippi, *Kirch. Gl.*, vol. 3, pp. 251-354; Smith (H. B.), *System of Christian Theology*, pp. 99-101; Strong, *Systematic Theology*, pp. 227-233; Twisten, *Dogmatik*, pp. 331-383; Vilmar, *Dogmatik*, vol. 1, pp. 312-324; Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, vol. 2, pp. 413-422; Whately, *Good and Evil Angels*, Phil'a, 1856; Blavet, *The Kingdom of Satan*, New York, 1868; Brown, *Personality and History of Satan*, London, 1887; Conway, *Demonology and Devil-lore*, 2 vols., New York, 1879; Jewett, *Diabology*, New York, 1889; Matson, *The Adversary*, New York, 1891; Reville, *The Devil*, London, 1877; Young, *Demonology*, London, 1856; Ormiston, *The Satan of Scripture*; Sartorius, *Doctrine of Divine Love*, pp. 74-88; Harless, *Christian Ethics*, pp. 268-273.