

THE IMMORTALITY CONTROVERSY IN  
SCOTLAND:

A

R E V I E W

OF THE

“‘ANTIDOTE’ ; BEING A REPLY TO THE REV. W. G. MONCRIEFF’S  
PAMPHLET, ENTITLED ‘SOUL ; OR THE HEBREW WORD  
NEPESH, AND THE GREEK WORD PSUCHE,’ BY  
K. JOSEPH BOYLE, MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL,  
LEITH.”

~~~~~  
*(Re-printed by Request from the “ Christian Examiner and  
Bible Advocate.”)*  
~~~~~

LONDON: WARD & CO. EDINBURGH: JAMES KERR, 32 NICOLSON  
STREET. GLASGOW: MESSRS RATTRAY, 86 TRONGATE.  
BRISTOL: EVANS & ABBOT, AND H. H. KING.

1853.

[PRICE THREEPENCE.]

" BUT NEITHER DO THESE WORDS (THE ORIGINAL TERMS DENOTING SOUL AND SPIRIT), NOR ANY OTHER, AS FAR AS I CAN FIND, EVER STAND FOR A PURELY IMMATERIAL PRINCIPLE IN MAN, OR A SUBSTANCE, WHATEVER SOME IMAGINE THEY MEAN BY THAT WORD, WHOLLY SEPARABLE FROM, AND INDEPENDENT OF, THE BODY."—*Bishop Law.*



THE

## IMMORTALITY CONTROVERSY IN SCOTLAND.

---

*The Antidote; being a Reply to the Rev. W. G. Moncrieff's Pamphlet, entitled "Soul; or the Hebrew Word Nephesh, and the Greek Word Psyche," by Joseph Boyle, Minister of the Gospel, Leith.*

"There are so many persons assuming to be pillars in the churches, who make a religion of orthodoxy, and find it so much easier to be exceedingly mad for this, than to be humble, gentle, and patient for Christ's sake."—*Bushnell.*

THE work which stands at the head of our present remarks, has been called into existence, as its title proclaims, to administer the suitable specific which is to counteract the alleged mischievous tendency of a pamphlet which, to us and some others, appeared a very interesting, Scriptural, and valuable performance, and which we ventured in a former number to very strongly recommend. It is our intention to subject this work to a searching analysis, not, indeed, because we think it of so much intrinsic value, or its author deserving so much painstaking attention; but because it has been adopted and endorsed, we blush to know, by that section of the christian community to which its author belongs. Before addressing ourselves to our undertaking, we think it due to ourselves, and to Mr Boyle to say, that but for the *show* of argument which his book contains, and the reason already mentioned, we should not have noticed it at all.

We regret that a spirit of theological partizanship should so far have blunted the finer sensibilities of some ministerial brethren as to suffer them to lend their sanction and influence in the circulation of this book. If they had a high opinion of its argumentative worth, and thought an

“ Antidote ” to Mr Moncrieff’s work was needed, which it might be suitably made to supply, we think they would have done wisely, and certainly have better consulted their own reputation, to have submitted it to an expurgatorial process, and published an abstract which would have had the advantage of materially diminishing the volume of the book, as well as denuding it of its vituperation and vulgarity.

Our author, it may be well to state, is a neophyte minister of the christian community known in Scotland under the *sobriquet* of “ Morisonians,” the party to whom Mr Moncrieff formerly belonged, and who withdrew from all fellowship with him for the adoption and publication of his present opinions. This party, so we are informed, are making strenuous efforts through their newspaper (“ The Christian News ”), their magazines, by hand-bills, and puffing letters from several of their leading ministers, to extend the sale of the “ Antidote.” Under these circumstances we condescend to do, what we hope our friend Mr Moncrieff from self-respect will *not* do, as his opponent has forfeited all claim to be honourably received in the arena of christian controversy. The pedantry of Mr Boyle’s Preface, where he begs the “ learned ” reader’s pardon for stooping to such a literary impropriety as to write Hebrew and Greek words in English characters, will only be smiled at by “ the more learned reader,” who will pity the conceit and ignorance of the man who could write in reference to such an act of condescension, and in intolerable italics too, “ *We stoop to conquer.*” But Mr Boyle’s conceited pedantry is not his worst fault: he is rude and abusive to his opponent to an extent which we have rarely seen equalled. The preliminary politeness and seeming propriety of his Preface contrasts strangely with the execution of the work itself, and is a most suitable condemnation of the spirit of the whole performance. Out of his own mouth he may well be judged. Who could think that a writer who should preface his work with a disclaimer of “ any feeling of resentment ” towards his opponent “ personally,” — who could say, — “ It becomes us not to question his motives or asperse his character,” should, in the very outset, begin throwing scurrilous stones at his antagonist, and denouncing him as worse than the most low-bred

Socialist, and his production as a fit shelf-companion of "the profligate wit of Voltaire, and the coarse buffoonery of Paine." We hope that the "Antidote" is Mr Boyle's first attempt at authorship, and that he will not favour the reading public with another work until he has more successfully studied the obligations of christian courtesy and literary etiquette. It is a kind wish that he may live to be ashamed of it, and make the *amende honorable* to his insulted brother and the public generally. We would fain hope that it is indicative of a nascent sense of shame, and not only of inexperience or literary impoliteness, that Mr Boyle gave no instructions (as we are informed) to his publisher to transmit Mr Moncrieff a copy of his work. We are not surprised at this omission, for we can assure him and our readers that we have been so thoroughly disgusted with the coarse personalities and vulgar banter of his production, that we have again and again been tempted to throw it aside, and have made no little painful effort to oblige ourselves to the task of reviewing it. Alas! that religious men, and ministers of the gospel of charity, should so often disgrace themselves, and pain their better readers in their contests for christian truth. Surely error may be exposed without the sacrifice of Christian charity and good breeding. To meet even coarseness with courtesy is far more dignified than retaliating its like; but to meet courtesy coupled with the most thorough ingenuousness with unfeeling coarseness, as is the manner of Mr Boyle in the present instance, can only excite loathing and pity in those who differ from him, and regret in his right-minded and best friends.

We cannot commence our unpalatable task without entering a most emphatic protest against our author's introductory misrepresentations of Mr Moncrieff's pamphlet. Mr Boyle thus introduces his "Antidote."

"Had we been ignorant of the fact, that the pamphlet before us is the production of a professedly Christian minister, we should have supposed (making an exception in favour of a few redeeming periods,) that it was a bad copy of some Socialist writing—the work of a Southwell or a Holyoake." p. 5.

As a rule, it is not well to call in question the sincerity of a writer; but this supposition is so rashly gratuitous, that we feel bound to challenge its *honesty*. None but a

very unscrupulous and inveterately prejudiced opponent could have so described Mr M.'s pamphlet, which breathes throughout a christian, manly, and generous spirit. "A bad copy of some Socialist writing—the work of a Southwell!" Oh fie! fie! Mr Boyle. You may well say "*We stoop to conquer*," for in so writing you "*stoop*" to the most contemptible and slanderous weapons with which to rise up and smite a brother who is no "Socialist" as technically understood, and far otherwise in his spirit and bearing than the atheist "Southwell," who, if report speaks truly, is what you imply him to be. We omit the mention of Mr Holyoake, whom you couple with "Southwell," not because we have any sympathetic leaning towards his religious sentiments, but because we would not, willingly, slander a professed atheist; and it is equally notorious that Mr Holyoake, with all his lamented defects, does not lack the grace and good breeding of a gentleman. To brand a man with unpopular and offensive epithets, with a view to damage his character and influence, especially such a man as Mr Moncrieff, is unworthy the candid controvertist, and especially the Christian Minister. But to proceed. Mr B. says with astonishment,—

"That the Bible emits a declaration that strips man of the chief mark distinguishing him from the brute, is an announcement for which, we confess, we were not prepared." p. 5.

According to Mr Boyle, then, "the chief mark" of distinction between man and the brute lies in the alleged fact that the former has an *immortal* or deathless existence, while the latter has only a limited duration of being. Will "The Christian News," and those ministerial brethren who are so laboriously pushing the circulation of "The Antidote," subscribe this deliverance of their oracle? Is it "the chief mark" of man's superiority to the brute creatures that he has a *longer lease of life* than they? So says Mr Boyle! We had always thought that the possession of an intelligent and moral nature, in which we bear "the image" and "likeness" of our Creator, constitutes our constitutional pre-eminence over the rest of the animal creation. But according to Mr Boyle, a man is better than other animals, because they die, and he does not die—they are mortal, and he immortal—they have a measurable, and he an immeasurable life. Length of life

says our author, is the criterion of superior existence; hence the tortoise is a nobler animal than the tiger, and, for the same reason, a man is better than a monkey! This is a bad beginning; but let us proceed. The very next sentence brings us to a stand. Our author is evidently a sciolist in the controversy in which he has, unfortunately for himself and his party, been voted the corypheus. He knows nothing of the history of the doctrine of which he has become the champion.

"This discovery," he writes, viz., that the immortality of the soul is not taught in the Bible, "which the labours of his predecessors had failed to unfold, Mr Moncrieff, it appears, has happily brought to light, and, with a most laudable zeal and self denial, published for the benefit of mankind. . . . The position assumed by Mr M. in this unambiguous statement is, that the Bible ignores the immateriality and immortality of the human soul." p. 5, 6.

So Mr Boyle has undertaken to find the philosophical figment of the "*immateriality*" of the human soul in the Bible, as well as its "*immortality*!" This is bold indeed, for certainly none "of *his* predecessors," that is, whom he would prefer to acknowledge as such, have ever undertaken so much. Why some of the more candid of them have acknowledged that even the "*immortality* of the soul is rather supposed, or taken for granted, than expressly revealed in the Bible." So said Archbishop Tillotson. And Bishop Lowth declared that "Revelation" does not afford "the smallest assistance on the subject." So confident are we that the Archbishop and the Bishop are right, that if Mr Boyle will produce *one* text of Scripture that proves "the immateriality and immortality of the soul," we will undertake at our own expense to take a long journey to the Northern Metropolis, and in the most public and humiliating manner possible recant our denial of what we ourselves believe with Mr Moncrieff, to be most anti-scriptural and injurious errors. If it was competent to Mr Boyle to prove that the Bible does *not* ignore the immateriality and immortality of the human soul, why did he not show the proof in his "*Antidote?*" *He has not adduced a single proof text.* Many of our readers, moreover, will be astonished at the historical ignorance of our author in asserting that Mr Moncrieff was the first who "brought to light" the fact that the Bible does not

teach these doctrines, and that "the labours of his (Mr M.'s) predecessors had failed to unfold" this fact. They will tell Mr Boyle that the Reformers of the sixteenth century, to say nothing of their predecessors, denied the immateriality and immortality of the soul! Luther denied this doctrine, and classed it among "those monstrous opinions to be found in the Roman dunghill of decretals." William Tyndale, the martyr and translator, denied this doctrine; he called it "*heathen doctrine*," and "the *fleshy doctrine* of philosophers." John Milton, in his "Christian Doctrine," took pains to prove that the Bible does *not* teach the notion of the soul's separate state and immortality. And, to come down to our own times, we may mention that the eminent Dr Whately, Archbishop of Dublin, has said of "the immortality of the soul as a disembodied spirit," that "in the Word of God, *no such doctrine is revealed*." And yet, says Mr Boyle, "this discovery the labours of his (Mr M.'s) predecessors" have "failed to unfold"!! These somewhat considerable items of ignorance and error are comprised in less than the first twenty lines of this puffed and popular "Antidote."

We will not weary our readers, nor impose on ourselves the unprofitable labour of exposing in too minute detail the multifarious blunders of Mr Boyle's book. Its salient points are so many, and various in their nature, that were we to notice them all, we might be thought to take a malicious pleasure in our work. But when a writer, in whom vanity is most glaringly conspicuous, takes upon himself to very freely censure and jeer at an opponent for his scholarship, and ejaculates, with treble notes of admiration, "Admirable Grammarian!! Excellent Critic!!" after his own ridiculous "blunderings," and to which, therefore, his exclamations more properly apply; it is meet that we should tell such an one, that his own pamphlet discovers the most consummate conceit, and, like all pedantic performances, betrays its author's shallow superficiality. Mr Boyle wishes to be thought a scholar; but he has tampered too much with learned technicalities for the safety of his reputation. The grammatical figures, for example, he is very unfortunate in; thus, he calls one figure of speech, "catachrestical," and another, a "metonymy," both of which, if figures of speech at all, are



examples of the figure synecdoche! What a temptation to quote his own words, and with their full complement of admiration notes! We have no wish, however, to pursue this course of treatment with Mr Boyle; but it is our duty, in undertaking to review his book, to show such a man his vanity and impertinence, and he has very unwisely laid himself open to a more unmerciful handling than we feel disposed to bestow on him. We shall, therefore, quit this least agreeable part of our duty, and direct our attention chiefly to those points in which our author seems most confident and self-complacent, in which he adventures argument, and for a brief bright moment reins in his anger and abuse. The "few philosophical considerations" which we are promised in "an Appendix" may be very summarily disposed of. Mr Boyle may be perfectly satisfied with what he calls the "profound and conclusive reasonings from Cudworth's 'Intellectual System,' and an extract from Dr Samuel Clarke's 'Letter to Dodwell';" but neither Cudworth, nor Clarke, nor Samuel Drew together, can satisfy more highly gifted men than Mr Boyle. Archbishop Whately has shown the extremely unsatisfactory character of the arguments from reason in support of the immateriality and immortality of the soul. The preservation of *personal identity* through all the successive changes of our material structure is *no proof*, as Mr B. thinks it is, that the seat of our personal consciousness is in an immaterial being separate from our material organization. *Personal identity*, like *life*, is a profound mystery; and it is bad philosophy, and worse religion, to conclude that, because we cannot understand how our identity is preserved in harmony with our notions of our material being, therefore, it is perfectly *independent* on that being. The self-satisfaction of Pythagoras and Plato, as taken for granted by Mr Boyle, was not participated in, as he tells us so confidently it was, by Cicero. Did Mr Boyle never meet with the following declaration of Cicero? "I have perused Plato with the greatest diligence and exactness over and over again; but know not how it is, whilst I read him I am convinced, when I lay the book aside, and begin to consider by myself of the soul's immortality, *all the conviction instantly ceases.*"—Tusc. 2 lib. 1. Again, he says, "Which of all the philo-

sophical opinions is true, let some God see to it; which even is most likely to be true, is a question hard to be determined." *Ibid.*

A page or two of introductory matter, mostly copied from Gesenius' Hebrew Lexicon, and with an assumed air of independence on that aid, needs a passing remark or two.

"In Old Testament phraseology," says Mr B., (*not* Gesenius) '*ruach* undoubtedly possessed a superiority over *nephesh*, being appropriated to intelligences of a higher order than man, and of whose immateriality there can exist no rational doubt."

Now, if Mr Boyle, instead of venturing a criticism of his own on the nature and relation of these Hebrew terms, had allowed Gesenius only to speak, he would not have fallen into the twofold mistake expressed in this passage. Because, in a highly poetical composition, like the book of Job, the term *ruach* is applied to men, and *nephesh* to the brute creatures, are we to conclude that *ruach* "undoubtedly possessed a superiority over *nephesh*?" So rash a conclusion is at once rebuked by the fact that the word *ruach* is ascribed to the brutes and the meanest reptiles, in common with man: thus,—“Behold, I, even I, do bring a flood of waters upon the earth, to destroy *all flesh* wherein is the *breath of life*, (*ruach chayyim*.) “Who knoweth *whether* the spirit (*ruach*) of man goeth upward, and *whether* the spirit (*ruach*) of the beast goeth downward to the earth.” Eccles. iii. 21.\* And, again in the 19th verse, we read of man and the beast, “yea they have *all one breath*,” (*ruach*). Hence, Solomon, instead of claiming any “superiority” for man because possessed of *ruach*, declares that *ruach* is a common possession of all the animal creation, and concludes, in opposition to our author, “so that a man hath *no pre-eminence* above a beast.” But Mr B. finds this *undoubted* “superiority” in *ruach*, because it is applied to a *phantom* which Eliphaz saw “in thoughts from the visions of the night when deep sleep falleth upon man!” This is the very Nemesis

---

\* Luther's Version. Also the Septuagint and Vulgate Versions. This rendering has the advantage of reconciling the passage with its context, whereas our English version involves the whole in self-contradiction and confusion.

of ratiocination! That the term *ruach* is applied to God, as in the phrase "the Spirit of God," does not add, as Mr B. imagines, to the verbal "superiority" of this word for the reasons above assigned. All that Mr B. should have legitimately inferred from the different usage of *nephesh* and *ruach* is, that the two words are not absolutely identical in their meaning; and that although they are sometimes used to express the same ideas, there are cases in which they are not interchangeable. *Ruach* means *wind*, *breath*, *tempest*, or wind in motion,—does this rudimental sense of *ruach*, we ask, give it a "superiority" over *nephesh*? Mr Boyle labours hard to turn the word *ruach* to some account. He finds it used to express a *phantom*, and he actually tells us that a *phantom* is an intelligence "of a higher order than man!" But this is not all. A phantom, virtually reasons Mr B., is *immaterial*, and therefore *ruach*, which expresses this idea of a phantom, is a term whose essential meaning must be a *distinct personal entity*, *an actual immaterial being*!! Of this we are assured, "there can exist no rational doubt"!! His favourite notion of "immateriality" he is determined to have out of this word. "The evil spirit" (*ruach*) which entered into Saul, he is quite certain, was not a moral influence, but an actual *entity*,—a distinct intelligent being, and therefore *must* have been immaterial! The Spirit of God is expressed by the word *ruach*, but such a usage of this term can never prove that it involves the essential ideas of *personality* and *immateriality*. All we can say is, that the most suitable term which human language supplies to express the idea of God's Spirit is, in the Hebrew tongue, *ruach*, which could not have been philosophically used, because no language can furnish the philosophical expression of an idea which is necessarily beyond the conception of beings only conversant with materialities, and who need a language for their mutual intercourse. The radical sense of *ruach* is *wind*, or *breath*; hence it was an appropriate term to express the idea of the Divine Spirit, whose motions and operations are as the "*wind* which bloweth where it listeth," whose sound we hear, "but know not whence it cometh, and whither it goeth." It is a term of convenience, analogical, not of philosophical accuracy, and hence the folly of attempting to prove from

it the idea of a philosophical "immateriality." What we have remarked on the Hebrew *ruach* applies also to Mr Boyle's observations on *pneuma*, the Greek New Testament equivalent of *ruach*.

The quotation from Isaiah xxxi. 3, where the horses of the Egyptians are said to be "flesh," and not "*spirit*" (*ruach*) is of no avail, unless Mr Boyle will affirm that what is *spiritual* is essentially immaterial. The angels are spirits. Is Mr Boyle certain that they have *no material organization*? Because our Lord said, "A spirit hath *not flesh and bones* as ye see me have:" did he imply that a spirit had *no material structure at all*? It would seem that the order of beings called *spirits* (*ruach*), who are distinct from human beings, who are called *souls* (*nephesh*), are *material organizations*, for they are perceptible to sight. The disciples, when they "*saw*" Jesus walking on the sea, "were troubled, saying, it is a *spirit*." On the appearance of Christ in their midst after his resurrection, "they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they had *seen a spirit*." According to the philosophy of the disciples, a *spirit* was sufficiently *material* to have extension and form, and to be patent to their vision. The apostle tells us, in his epistle to the Corinthians, chap. xv., of different kinds of material substances, "celestial" and "terrestrial," "natural," and "spiritual," but he has not a word about *immaterial*. The *spiritual* and *celestial* are all, in Paul's idea, *material*, however diverse; hence, he calls them "*bodies*,"—"there is a *natural body*, and there is a *spiritual body*." Now, if Mr Boyle can prove that a "*body*" is an immaterial, unsubstantial entity, he will do some service to his party, and may more justifiably assure us, than he is permitted to do at present, that of the positive truth of his view of the subject, "there can exist no rational doubt." At present, however, this task remains to be fulfilled, and we are therefore obliged to be so irrational as to "doubt" his assurances. So far as we have accompanied our author, we have discovered no evidence of the essential *personality* and *immateriality* of *ruach*, and consequently "we are (*not*) persuaded," as Mr Boyle so confidently is, "that *nephesh*, in Hebrew, properly denoted the vital, and *ruach* the *rational spirit*," meaning thereby an essentially independent, immaterial, and immortal being.

In concluding our notice of the introductory portion of Mr Boyle's "Antidote," it gives us pleasure to be able to assure him that Mr Moncrieff did not desire, as he is charitable enough to surmise, "to practice a deception on the mere English reader," by omitting any reference to the Hebrew word *ruach*, and its New Testament equivalent *pneuma*.\* The consideration of these terms forms a distinct and somewhat larger work already in MS., which is now awaiting the requisite number of subscribers, and will be shortly sent to press. We recommend Mr Boyle to become a subscriber to this new work, as it is plain he needs its assistance for the correction of the many mistakes into which he has unfortunately fallen.

Mr Moncrieff's pamphlet on "Soul," &c., is distributed into two main divisions, subdivided into sections, under which he considers respectively the Hebrew and Greek representatives of this word, viz: *Nephesh* and *Psuche*. This arrangement is followed by his Reviewer, and we now invite the reader to accompany us through his criticisms and comments.

#### NEPHESH. (Hebrew Term.)

SECTION 1.—Mr. Moncrieff, under this section, states—that "*Nephesh* is a noun, derived from the verb *Naphash*, which means to breathe, *expire*." This is denounced by his Reviewer as "haste and inconsiderateness," followed by a very unprovoked ebullition of malicious sarcasm, and a correction of the word "*expire*" by "*respire*," which piece of hyper-criticism the Reviewer might have spared himself, as "*expire*" means to *breathe out* or *exhale*, the same as *respire*. Did Mr. Boyle forget that "*expire*" is not only used in the sense of *to die*? But now comes the criticism. "*Naphash*," writes our Reviewer, "does not mean *to breathe*, but *to be refreshed*, being only used in Niphal, a passive conjugation."—p. 9. Now, Gesenius, quoted by Mr Moncrieff, says, *Naphash* in Kal conjugation, means *to breathe*; Mr. Boyle, on his own authority,

---

\* It is painful to make the record, but we have evidence that Mr Boyle was informed, while his "Antidote" was only the length of *proof* at the printing office, of Mr M.'s intention to publish immediately a separate work on "SPIRIT," which has appeared since the above sentences were penned. (*See Advertisements at the end of the Review.*)

says "*Naphash* does not mean to breathe." We prefer the authority of Gesenius, which supports Mr Moncrieff, and flatly contradicts Mr Boyle. Because the *passive* or Niphal conjugation of this verb is used in the Old Testament, and not the *active* or Kal, Mr Boyle denies that there is any active form! In the active voice, *Naphash* is to breathe, and in the passive, it is to take breath, to be refreshed. This Mr Boyle saw when he consulted Gesenius, but he would not select to take breath, although the lexicographer gives this meaning first under the conjugation Niphal, but passes over it to the next meaning, to be refreshed, which had the advantage of not having the word *breath* or *breathe*, which he wanted to avoid. We should belie our conscience, and reject the evidence of the plainest facts, were we to smooth over this piece of dishonesty. It would be cant charity were we to withhold our conviction, that Mr Boyle, in this instance, has been guilty of a puerile controversial cheat. Mr Moncrieff quoted the Kal, or active form of the verb, as every scholar would have done, to show that *breath* was the radical idea of the verb *Naphash*; he might have quoted the Niphal, or passive form, for the same purpose, as it means to take breath, or to be refreshed by taking breath.

SECTION 2.—"*Nephesh*," writes Mr Moncrieff, "is in the English version translated *breath*," "a thing," observes his Reviewer, "which will not be questioned." But although he is unable to question the soundness of his opponent's criticism, he will essay to turn the laugh upon him. *Risu inepto res ineptior nulla* is a hint which we hope our Reviewer will profit by. Such laughter betrays both his own folly and the weakness of his cause,—it is at once silly and suicidal.

"We think it rather an unhappy circumstance," he writes, "that Mr M. should have concluded his observations on *NEPHESH* by informing his readers that it means a smelling bottle—a remark which is fitted to subvert every notion of *HUMANITY*, not to speak of immateriality and immortality."—pp. 9, 10.

It is indeed "an unhappy circumstance," but *not* for Mr Moncrieff, that the word *Nephesh* means "a smelling bottle," or "perfume box," poetically "a house of breath." Mr Boyle thinks that the easiest way to get over this difficulty is to laugh at it; his readers, however, will dis-

cover neither dignity nor logic in such laughter. He cannot dispute such a rendering, because Gesenius and Professor Alexander, and all Hebrew scholars affirm it. But it "subverts every notion of humanity," he exclaims. Not "every notion," but *his* and the *popular* notion only. If *Nephesh* mean "a smelling bottle," a box of perfume, or odorous breath, and moreover, if it signify the meanest reptile that crawls the earth, as an animal existing by breathing, it is a sorry term on which to found the favourite notions of the "immateriality and immortality" of the soul. Mr Boyle sees this clearly enough; but with the most marvellous obtuseness, he discovers not its bearing against his own theory, and therefore turns it into banter against his opponent. Thus he proceeds:—

"Not more felicitous is he (Mr M.) in the close of his remarks on *PSUCHE*, the corresponding Greek term, when he tells us that in one passage it obviously imports a *FISH*—a *MONSTRUM* in the way of translation, which we submit to the author of the 'Vestiges of Creation.'" p. 10.

The risibility of our author makes him reckless. Let the reader glance at the passage in question, Rev. xvi. 3, and he will see who is "more felicitous," the Reviewed or his Reviewer. The words in the English version, are "and every living soul (*psuche*) died in the sea." Mr Boyle virtually asserts that the living souls in the sea are not *fishes*,—will he please to inform us to what other genus they belong? "A *monstrum* in the way of translation!" only worthy to be referred to "the author of the 'Vestiges of Creation!'" This is bold indeed! We refer Mr Boyle to Isaiah xix. 10, where he will find it written, "all that make sluices and ponds for *fish*" (*Naphesh*). Is this, we would ask him, "a *monstrum* in the way of translation?" So much for our author's review, we should more justly describe it as a rodomontade, on the second section of Mr Moncrieff's work.

SECTION 3.—Under this head, Mr Moncrieff adduces several examples to show that the word *Nephesh* is translated "creature," or animal, and that it is applied to all orders of the animal creation as well as to man. "We may, therefore, make all the original phrases in our English version 'living creature,' or all 'living soul,' so that to be a 'living soul,' is nothing peculiar to man, each of

the inferior tribes being a 'living soul,' as well as himself. They are all *souls*, inasmuch as they live by breathing. He *became* living soul—living creature, an animal alive, and to live by breathing.' "Soul:" &c., page 6. Mr Boyle can discover in this straight-forward and scriptural reasoning, nothing but "one-sided criticism, fitted only to excite compassion for the author." But Mr Boyle's "compassion" is not quite so considerate as we should like it to be; the yearning of his bowels is the unpromising preface of a page of misrepresentation, which, as it is too obvious to need any comment, we are thankful to be permitted to pass by. But will our readers believe that after all this fencing on Mr Boyle's part, in defence of his extravagant notions of *Nephesh*, he gives up the controversy?

"We CHEERFULLY CONCEDE to Mr M. that the terms (*nephesh hhaya*) applied to man, in Gen. ii. 7, are used in relation to the inferior animals in the other passages to which he refers, and cannot, therefore, be regarded by THEMSELVES as conclusive evidence of his immateriality and immortality." p. 13.

On a previous page, he had said that Mr M.'s "observations on *Nephesh*," were fitted to subvert every notion of humanity, not to speak of *immateriality and immortality*." Now he will "cheerfully concede" that this term, as applied to man, is not "conclusive evidence of his immateriality and immortality!" and that the question is certainly not to be determined by the mere adduction of a term," viz. *Nephesh*! Had he been candid enough to make this concession earlier, he would have spared both himself and us much trouble. But although he makes this concession so "cheerfully," he yet goes on to do battle for it, and labours hard to distil from it his doctrinal elixir. The confession, however, has been unwillingly extorted, and all his subsequent labour but exposes his want of candour, and exhibits him as unreasonably querulous and cavilling. The impartial testimony of the late learned Dr Pye Smith is so emphatic and satisfactory, that we transcribe his words as a tacit rebuke to the disingenuousness and vacillation of Mr Boyle, as well as for the consideration of our readers. In the article '*Adam*,' in Kitto's Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature, Dr Smith observes, "some of our readers may be surprised at our having translated *nephesh*



*hhaya* by *living animal*. There are good interpreters and preachers, who, confiding in the common translation, *living soul*, have maintained that there is intimated the distinctive pre-eminence of man above the inferior animals, as possessed of an immaterial and immortal spirit. . . . *We should be acting unfaithfully, if we were to affirm its being contained or implied in this passage.*"

The phrase "living soul" (*nephesh hhaya*) having failed our author, he breaks new ground in support of his theory, with how much better success, our readers shall have the opportunity of judging.

"Not to mention the importance manifestly attached to the creation of man—an importance remarked by commentators of every class, and of every age, the wisdom of the entire Trinity being in requisition to accomplish this *chef d'œuvre* of the Creator's terrestrial works—the fact that he was created **IN THE IMAGE OF GOD**, places him, in our view, at an immeasurable distance above the very highest of the subordinate living creatures. 'And God said, Let us make man **IN OUR IMAGE, AFTER OUR LIKENESS,**' &c. It is of no consequence to point to man's erect and dignified bearing, as affording an explanation of the nature of this 'image' in which he was 'made,' for no form, prone or upright, can, in any intelligible sense, be the 'likeness' of that which is immaterial. . . . Perhaps Mr M. will tell us that, according to Paul (Col. iii. 10), this 'image' consists in 'knowledge,' be it so; we answer, it is clear that a God-like property can only inhere in a God-like substance. And if the divine intellectual nature be immaterial, the derived and reflected and human intellectual nature must be also immaterial. It was manifestly on this principle that Paul reasoned with the idolatrous Athenians, "Forasmuch, then, as we are the **OFFSPRING** of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device."—Acts xvii. 29. His argument is an argument from the less to the greater, and plainly assumes that in some part of their nature they were immaterial, and known to themselves to be immaterial."—pp. 13, 14.

The logic of this rather lengthy extract, is briefly as follows:—Man was created in the image or likeness of God; this image, or likeness, was not in mere intellectual *qualities* or *properties*, but in an actual intellectual *substance*, because "it is clear" to Mr Boyle, "that a God-like property *can only inhere in a God-like substance.*" An intellectual substance, about which Mr B. professes to have such 'clear' ideas, is, according to him, *an immaterial substance*, and as man partakes of this substantial immateriality, which was to be demonstrated, man is, in his essential nature, immaterial, and, therefore, immortal.

This immateriality, moreover, is declared by Mr B. to be evident to the personal consciousness of all men. The conclusiveness of this super-Socratic reasoning receives its top stone of confirmation in the phrase 'OFFSPRING OF God,' which, borrowed by Paul from the Greek poet Aratus, is alleged by Mr B. in proof that man has the *identical substance* of God in his essential composition! He mistakes a figure of speech for a literal fact, and, with singular simplicity, concludes that mankind are the '*offspring* of God,' in the same literal sense that children are the offspring of their parents, and that, as the one involves a participation of constitutional substance, the other does also! According to our astute author, man is created in the natural, or, so to speak, constitutional image of God! his physical nature is a substance identical with the Divine nature, from which it is physiologically derived! We are surprised that Mr B. needs to be informed that the phrase 'offspring of God' merely expresses, in a figure, that man is the work of God's hands, and not that between him and his Creator, there is an actual physiological relationship and identity of substance. He is, however, so thoroughly satisfied of the soundness of his new position, and imagines that he has so much redundant power in his logic, that he thinks it may fairly communicate some of its argumentative worth to the less powerful phrase 'living soul' as applied to man, which he is so loath to give up.

"When man is called a 'living-soul,' the full import of the expression is not apprehended, except the lofty and ennobling conception be grasped, that he was made in the 'likeness' of the Eternal,

'Nearest the great King of kings,  
AND LITTLE LESS THAN GOD.'" p. 15.

The presumption of immortal-soulism reaches its climax here. Ever soaring in its proud flight, it scarcely stops short of God himself! A "*little less than God!!!*" Our author has claimed for the human race a oneness of *substance* with God, and now he is emboldened to claim for them "little less" than a oneness of dignity. A distich of Charles Wesley, in default of the written Word, supplies this diadem for the mortal brow, and, encircled with this halo of almost heavenly majesty, our aspiring

race have reached the acme of their ambition—*Nearest the great King of kings, and little less than God!!!* Alas! how often has the extravagant licence of the poet become evangelical law to the pulpit. The rhapsodies of religious poesy have become the rule and reason of truth; and rhythm, though it raves, as conclusive as revelation. We lament, and justly, as Protestants, that impious infatuation which has led certain enthusiasts of the Romish communion to displace the name of Jehovah by that of the deified Virgin in the sacred books; but are Charles Wesley and his endorsers a whit the better, when they substitute in this miserable couplet for the subordinate name of “angels,” the sacred name of the Supreme God? This couplet professes to be a version of Psalm viii. 5, “Thou hast made him to be *a little lower than the angels,*” which is thus quoted in Hebrews ii. 6, 9, and so rendered in the Septuagint. Yet, although on these conclusive authorities, and the necessities of the context, our translators retained the word “angels,” as the proper rendering of the somewhat vague term “*elohim,*”—Mr Wesley, maugre all reason and authority, substitutes the word “God.” The Hebrew term *Elohim* is used with considerable latitude in the sacred Scriptures. Thus, in Psalm lxxxii. it is applied to the Jewish magistrates, and in Psalm xcvi. 7, to angels. “Worship him all ye gods,” (*elohim*) is rendered in the Septuagint, “Worship him all ye *angels*” (*aggeloi*), and the Septuagint version is quoted in the Epistle to the Hebrews, chap. i. 6, thus:—“Let all the *angels* of God worship him.” If our readers will refer to Psalm viii. they will see that the royal Psalmist must have attached a very different notion to his words from what Mr Wesley and his admirers would give them. So far from expressing any “lofty and ennobling conception” of a dignity only short of Divinity itself; these words of David follow the lowly and humiliating confession of man’s utter insignificance, not in the view of the grandeur of God, but of the infinitely lesser grandeur even of his *material* works. “When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers; the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained; *What is Man,* that thou art mindful of him? and the son of man, that thou visitest him? *For thou hast made him a little lower than the angels.*”

Mr Boyle confesses himself unable to understand in what sense man was originally created in the "image" and "likeness" of God, unless he has a *constitutional substance*, a *spiritual material* resembling the essential being of God. "A God-like property can only inhere in a *God-like substance*," are his marvellous words. Now, as the champion of *immateriality*, we think he looks somewhat inconsistent with himself, in his anxiety to carry his point by the aid of so gross an argument as this. He is careful, however, to assure us, that this concrete something, this "God-like substance," which is the substantial basis of every intellectual "property," is "*immaterial*," i. e. *not* material. This substratum of attributes and functions is an unsubstantial substance, an immaterial material, a something which is nothing! Such reasoning is much too profound for the plummet of our understanding; we candidly confess we cannot fathom its mysterious depths. Materialists as we may be reputed, we have never dreamt, like our author, of giving substantial form to intellectual and moral qualities; we have been always content to call these properties or attributes of the being man, as we call roundness, and hardness, and gravity, properties or attributes of a spherical solid of any kind. True, they inhere in a substance, and for this very reason, they are the qualities not of an "*immaterial*," but a *material* being. But Mr Boyle will estimate the manner of the Divine existence by an earthly analogy, and deduce from it an unearthly consequence. By a chemistry known only to himself and his school, he sublimates material into immaterial entities, or something which is really nothing. He imagines the Great Eternal to be a "substance," the source of all created intelligent substance, which is "derived" and "reflected" from this central source. This "God-like substance" he pronounces "*immaterial*," and having put together his premises, he pounces upon his conclusion, that what is "derived" and "reflected" thence must be "*immaterial*" also. What is this incoherent rigmarole but a repetition of the old Hindoo mythology, whose philosophy has imported into the current christianity of our day such phrases as "the soul is a scintillation of Deity,"—"a spark of God,"—"a reflection of the Divine essence," all of which heathen nonsense Mr Boyle and immortal-

soulists profess to believe. The immortal soul theory is derived from heathenism, upheld by heathenism, and tends to the pantheism of heathenism. It makes men bold even to blasphemy. And, yet, to deny this proud and earth-born theology, is denounced as "infidelity,"—"wretched infidelity"! Mr Boyle evidently thinks that unless we accept his theory of the origin and constitution of man, it is impossible to attach any sense to the words of the Sacred Record, that man was created in the "image" and "likeness" of God. We should, no doubt, fail to give Mr B. satisfaction, were we to express our own ideas of what is comprehended in these terms; we therefore submit for his consideration the opinions of the two Clements, of Rome and Alexandria, whose opinions will probably merit his attention,—the former having been a contemporary with the Apostles, and the latter a member of that ancient seat of learning, to whose influence christianity is indebted for that very theory on behalf of which he so earnestly contends. Clement of Rome, one of the Apostolical Fathers, thus remarks on the text,—“Let us make man in our image,” &c. “Above all, He, with his holy and pure hands formed man, the most excellent, and, as to *his understanding*, truly the greatest of all earthly creatures,—*the character of his own image.*” 1 Epis. Corinth. ch. xxxiii. Clement of Alexandria, whose writings bear the date of the latter part of the second century, observes, “To be made in the image and the likeness of God, therefore, does not imply any bodily likeness; for it is not lawful to compare the mortal to the Immortal, but the resemblance lies in the mind and reason, on which the Lord has stamped his impress both in the desire to do good, and the power to rule.”—*Stromata*, Lib. 2. cap. 19. Although the last Clement was a Platonist, and of the school of Alexandria, he did not attempt, like Mr Boyle, to force the sacred text into a witness, in behalf of the immateriality and immortality of the soul. We submit these testimonies to Mr B.'s consideration, as at least worthy his attention, if not authoritative on the point at issue.

Mr Boyle will now remind us of the wide-spread belief of the soul's separate state and immortality; he says,—

“We should like to know whence, if not from the Scripture account of man's creation, there sprang that almost universal belief in the

separable existence and immortality of the soul, which has been found to prevail among the nations, whether civilized or the contrary.”—p. 15.

“Let Mr M. account for this universal persuasion of a truth which he would have us believe the Bible sets aside,—a persuasion which, we confess, is inexplicable to us, except on the assumption that men sprung from a common source, carried with them in all their migrations the traces of a primeval faith, high in which, as a main column in the Divine and glorious superstructure, there stood unimpaired by the flight of time, the large and soul-filling revelation of the soul’s immortality.”—p. 16.

Now this is a fair question, but not fairly stated. The doctrine of the soul’s immortality is undoubtedly an ancient and wide-spread doctrine; but it is not *so ancient* as the scriptural doctrine that man has no inherent or constitutional immortality whatever, but is dependent on Divine grace for it, as a gift through Christ. Mr Boyle may fairly ask us, if he is uninformed, whence this doctrine originated; but he writes without book when he tells us that “high” in the “primeval faith” . . . “there stood unimpaired by the flight of time, the large and soul-filling revelation of the soul’s immortality.” This “soul-filling doctrine neither stood so “high” up in the “primeval faith,” nor was it “unimpaired by the flight of time,” as on a preceding page he himself acknowledges, with strange self-contradiction. Its antiquity may be coetaneous with Zoroaster, and Plato, and Socrates, and even Homer, a great antiquity confessedly, but not so “high” up in the primeval times as the age of Job, and Moses, and Abraham, and the pre-diluvian age. In the writings of this earliest antiquity, no mention is made of this “large and soul-filling” doctrine. Job plainly asserts the contrary doctrine (chap. xiv. and elsewhere), and Moses was obviously an utter stranger to it,—he never mentions the soul’s immortality, but calls beasts and reptiles *souls*, as well as man; and this is the more remarkable, because he “was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians,” whose advocacy of this doctrine seems to Mr B. so corroborative of its truth. “We know that the Egyptians,” writes Mr Boyle, “taught the immortality of the soul, not as a truth discovered by human reason, but as a doctrine *derived by tradition* from the earliest ages.” Mr B. would greatly oblige us, by informing us, *how* he knows this. He knows what no one else does, if he knows so much. The prevalence of this doctrine among the nations

of the earth is surely no proof of its truth ; for polytheism was even more prevalent than the doctrine of the soul's immortality ; and the argument of Mr B. makes polytheism a truth worthy of all acceptation. The ancient doctrine of the soul, and its immortality, was associated with its pre-existence, and transmigration ; on what authority does Mr B. dissever these constituent portions from this ancient " soul-filling " doctrine ? If antiquity and extensive prevalence are the reasons of his faith in the soul's immortality, let him take that doctrine *as anciently held and professed*. He lays stress on the fact, that the Jewish Pharisees, a sort of Hebrew Parsees, believed this doctrine ; let him also remember, that they held it in connection with the same absurd notions as the Gentile conquerors of their nation, from whom, when in captivity, they had originally obtained it. Mr Boyle will have us go to the Babylonians,—Medes,—Persians,—Egyptians, and Hindoos, to learn the doctrine of immortality, which was " brought to light through the gospel ! " He will have us turn away from the Prophets and Apostles, and even the Great Master himself, to listen to the jargon of Gymnosophists and Parsees ; of heathen poets and philosophers. According to him, Plato and Pythagoras are teachers of equal authority with Peter and Paul, and the theology of Greece and Rome as reliable as that of Judea ! It matters not that the Bible is silent on his favourite dogma ; the Vedas of the Brahmins, and the Zendavesta of the Parsees are loud in its praise. He hurries away from the temple of Scripture truth, to the halls of ancient heathendom, and there he finds it duly honoured in the " wisdom of this world." But Mr Boyle should remember that " the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. The universality of its faiths is but the evidence of its universal folly. If an almost universal belief proves the truth of the doctrine believed, then, as we have said, is polytheism a truth and the Scripture doctrine of One Jehovah is an error. This method of our author stakes truth on majorities, and puts it to the vote. Mr Boyle is the Vincentius Lirinensis of immortal-soulism. He will prove his doctrine by the touchstone of "*semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*," (always, everywhere, and by all), but, like his celebrated prototype, he assumes too much. It is sufficiently condemna-

tory of the popular doctrine of the soul's immortality, that it sprung up and was maintained in heathen nations,—that it forms no part of the Scripture revelation, and was not known among the Jews till after the return from the Babylonish captivity, when the sect of the Pharisees sprung up, whose heathen philosophy was as much condemned by Christ as that other philosophical extreme which had probably been provoked by Pharisaism into existence. “Beware of the doctrine of the *Pharisees* and of the *Saducees*.” In Christ's regard they were both wrong, and it is but a pitiful dernier resort of such writers as Mr Boyle, that they should imagine the errors of one extreme party,—the *Saducees*,—to justify the doctrine of the other. The theology of the *Pharisees* concerning the soul was of Babylonish, and not of purely Jewish origin.

And while this doctrine is not to be found in the more ancient and authoritative writings of the Jewish Scriptures, so neither are they recognized in the later or New Testament writings, and the works of the Apostolical and the earliest of the post-Apostolic Fathers. Clement of Rome, Polycarp, Ignatius, Barnabas, and Hermas among the former make no mention of it; and Justin Martyr, Tatian, Irenæus, Athenagoras, Theophilus of Antioch, Tertullian, Arnobius, Lactantius, Cyprian, and others, who knew the Platonic doctrine of the soul's immortality, contended against it. Even the “orthodox” Athanasius was not a bona fide believer in this popular doctrine; and it has been shown that Luther and other Reformers of the sixteenth century expressly denied it. The Grecian philosophy, itself of Egyptian and Hindoo origin, gave this “large and soul-filling” doctrine its ancient prominence and popularity; and the Platonism of Origen, in the second and third century, was the cause of its introduction into the earlier christianity. Mr Boyle conjectures that its diffusion among heathen nations was the consequence of an unimpaired “tradition” of “the Scripture account of man's creation,—a singular conjecture truly, as it amounts to the absurd supposition that the people farthest removed from the lands of the Bible, and without written documents, have preserved a doctrine which those, who, from the first occupied those lands, and possessed the sacred documents, have ever been, before



their admixture with other nations, utter strangers to! We would remind him that this very prevalence of the doctrine in question among the heathen nations of antiquity, is one of the best evidences of its falsity. Truth rarely enjoys the common consent of mankind; it is the companion not of the many, but the few,—not of the wise and noble of the earth, but the despised and rejected of men. We readily allow, that the polite and barbarous nations of a somewhat remote antiquity cherished Mr Boyle's faith in the immortality of the soul; with them it originated, prompted no doubt by that instinctive love of life which sought for evidences of an eternal futurity, and could discover none in the partial revelations of natural religion. Conjecture did its best to supply the place of oracular certainty,—and in their twilight wisdom they framed their theory of an essentially indestructible part of the human nature, which they assumed would survive the dissolution of the body. They could not suffer the idea that the whole conscious man expired in death, because they had no idea, or at least no faith, in a *resurrection* from such a complete decease. Unless some element wherein resides the essential personality of the human being were kept alive even in death, and intact by that catastrophe, they could see no assurance of a future and eternal life. *One and all had no faith in a resurrection from the dead*, and when the Gospel doctrine of *future life by resurrection from the dead* was proclaimed, it was a “stumbling-block” to the Pagan-philosophy of the Pharisee, and “foolishness” to the wisdom of the Platonist;—they “mocked” the doctrine of resurrection at Athens, and declared the preacher of it “mad,” in the judgment-hall, at Cesarea. Here was a common consent, Mr Boyle, “which has been found to prevail among the nations, whether civilized, or the contrary,”—here was a “universal persuasion too,”—must we not conclude according to your own reasoning, that this universal *denial of the resurrection* was a trace of the “primeval faith . . . unimpaired by the flight of time?” The argument that proves too much proves nothing at all, so that our author must be driven back to the Book again whence he made this hopeful, but profitless excursion into the Pagan nations of antiquity, in defence of his death-doomed dogma of the immortality of the soul.

Mr Boyle commences Section 4 with some testy observations on the stubborn fact, that *Nephesh* is rendered "life" in several passages quoted by his opponent, Mr Moncrieff. He can find no fault with this fact, although his own notion of this word ought to oblige him to prove Mr M. wrong. This obligation, however, he evades, and directs his attack on some subordinate and unimportant point. He disputes Mr M.'s assertion, that "life results from breathing, and is its product." According to our Reviewer, the breath is not the cause, but "the mere manifestation of life," which he oracularly assures his reader is "the fact of the case." The abstrusest mysteries are as patent to Mr Boyle's ken, as are the secret thoughts and intents of his opponent's heart. He thoroughly understands—at least, he thinks he does—the great problem of life. He is quite sure that the breath is not the producing cause, but the "manifestation" of life. We will not stop to discuss this physiological question, which is not essential to the main question before us, and pass it by with merely observing, that, however "the lexicographers regard the breath," on this occasion of supreme authority with our author, the sacred historian seems rather to agree with Mr Moncrieff, when he says, that God breathed into the nostrils of Adam the breath of life, and he became a *living* soul. The life-producing agent is called the "breath of life,"\* and the "product" of the breathing this breath of life into the lifeless Adam, was "a *living* soul:"—he "*became* a living soul." Our author puts to us some singularly simple queries, to which, in his singular simplicity, he anticipates that we *must* return negative replies.

"Is it," he asks, "because they (men) *cease to breathe*, that they cease to live? . . . Is the aggregate of dissolution to be ascribed to *want of breath*? . . . We should like to ask him (Mr M.), when a man dies of the rupture of a blood vessel, or the fracture of a limb, does his death result from *the suspension of breathing*?" p. 19.

We should rather think that the "want of breath" is the cause of death in *every* case. We have never heard of such a case, as a man dying from the "rupture of a blood vessel, or the fracture of a limb," an dyet *retainin* *ghis* *breath*. So long as the action of the lungs continues, even

---

\* The reader may profitably study Ezekiel xxxvii. 4-10, where life is plainly asserted to be the product of breath.

though every limb in the body were fractured, and every blood vessel ruptured, there would still be life. Fractures, ruptures, and all other casualties, are the causes of death, in so far as they derange the human organism, and disturb its several functions. But so long as "breath" remains, there is life. Our remarks, as well as those of Mr Moncrieff, may be designated "physiological twaddle;" but, at the risk of incurring so severe a censure, we must venture to say, that, in our opinion, *it is* "because men *cease to breathe*, that they cease to live." Mr Boyle sarcastically observes,

"Had Mr M. consulted his medical brother [Dr Thomas we presume] to whom we have referred, he would probably have been told, that so far is life from 'resulting from the inhalation of vital air, by the lungs,' that the first form of animal existence—the existence of the embryo—is entirely independent of the action of the lungs." p. 18.

Mr Moncrieff's "medical brother" would have told him, had he needed the information, that the "embryo" can no more live without "vital air," than can the perfect animal in the exhausted receiver of an air-pump. It is very evident, that our sarcastic critic, himself, needs some physiological information; for he seems to suppose that, because the fœtus has not lungs, therefore it neither needs nor receives "vital air." We can assure him that he is mistaken, as any "medical brother" of his own will confirm. The banter and abuse, in context with the above extract, looks especially unseasonable, associated, as it is, with the betrayal of such consummate ignorance. We waded through this mire in dutiful search after argument, but have found none. Could we be cajoled into conviction by sneers and sarcasm, Mr Boyle would make a convert of us; for, through no fewer than four successive pages, he retaliates reason with rudeness, and arguments with ignorant abuse. Like most irascible persons, his intemperance betrays him into inconsistency. In the tumult of his towering wrath he declares of Mr M.'s reasoning, that it "is nothing more than a clumsy deception which he attempts to practise on his less informed or more credulous readers." This unqualified accusation of a designed duplicity on Mr M.'s part, naturally recalled to our memory an earlier profession of our author's, which we transcribe, and ask our readers to compare:—"We are unwilling to believe that he (Mr M.) desired to practise a deception.

We know nothing of him but by report, and it becomes us not to question his motives or asperse his character." Wrathful people are seldom witty. It is one of the penalties of passion that it betrays its unhappy subject into self-contradiction. We should make allowance for this inconsistency by imputing it to the intemperance of a hasty temper, had it been uttered instead of written; but no such excuse can be made for a man who can calmly put down his passion upon paper, and leisurely turn his temper into type. The process is too deliberate to allow of such charity. The righteous, if severe, inference from the comparison of these contradictory passages is, that when Mr Boyle at the outset of his reply, gave his opponent credit for sincerity, he himself was not sincere.

We now enter upon Section 5, under which Mr Moncrieff has considered such examples of the usage of the term *Nephesh* (soul), as imply the *idea of personality or the individual self*. Thus—"My soul shall live because of thee," is rendered by Mr Moncrieff "*I shall live, &c.*" "*His soul clave unto Dinah.*" "*He clave, &c.*" "*Which say of my soul.*" "*Which say of me;*" and in numerous other examples. To this mode of rendering such passages, Mr Boyle objects, but the grounds of his objection are clearly as unintelligible to himself as they are to his readers. His own notion of the word *soul* (*Nephesh*) is an immaterial, immortal being, separate entirely from the material structure or body, and which comprises in itself the actual human personality. Will he then interpret these texts, on his own principles, to his own and his reader's satisfaction? According to him, Abraham is made to say to Sarah, "*My disembodied and undying soul shall live because of thee.*" "*His disembodied soul clave unto Dinah.*" "*His soul abhorreth dainty meat.*" Mr Boyle would render, "*His disembodied, immaterial soul abhorreth dainty meat.*" "*His soul draweth near unto the grave,*" he would render, "*His disembodied, immaterial, and immortal soul draweth near unto the grave.*" "*His soul came into iron,*" should, according to Mr Boyle, be read, "*His disembodied, immaterial soul came into iron.*" Imagine, reader, an *immaterial soul* abhorring "*dainty meat,*" and shackled with fetters of "*iron*"!! We might multiply such examples, but the above will suffice and show the utter folly of Mr Boyle's interpretation of the word *soul* (*nephesh*), and the necessity of ac-

cepting the common sense and consistent explanation given by Mr Moncrieff. Our author's remarks on this section appear to us puerile in the extreme, and too frivolous to need any comment. The sum and substance of eight pages may be gathered from the following extracts, which are as reckless and reprehensibly dishonest, as they are ridiculous:

"These elements (*viz. breath and dust*), according to Mr M., comprehend the ENTIRE MAN."

"We saw the anguish of *his soul*,' is, we saw the anguish of his *dust*, and his *breath*—these being the only constituents in the nature of man.

"If from such gross elements as 'dust' and 'breath,' he (Mr M.) can elicit the varying emotions of the soul, the thrill of joy and the gloom of grief, . . . we will regard him as another Orpheus, greater than he who made the savage beasts forget their wildness, and brought the mountains to listen to his strain." *passim*.

Our author makes merry with his opponent, and endeavours to make him appear ridiculous, because he asserts that the radical elements of the human organism, is the "dust" of the earth, and the vitalizing agency "breath." We may turn upon Mr Boyle, with the celebrated query, "Art thou a master in Israel, and knowest not these things?" Is it not written, "The Lord God formed man *of the dust of the ground*, and *breathed* into his nostrils the *breath* of life, and man became a living soul?" Did not the Creator, in passing the sentence of death upon our first parent, say to him, "*Dust* THOU art, and *unto dust* shalt THOU return?" Was David mistaken, when he said of God, that "he knoweth our frame: he remembereth that *we are dust*?" Paul would have said to this teacher, "Ye have need that one teach you again which be the *first principles* of the oracles of God," Our author cannot understand how mere "dust," and mere "breath" can develop moral and intellectual phenomena. Nor can we; so absurd an idea never entered our mind, until Mr Boyle suggested it. Mr Moncrieff was not so fortunate as to give us such an impression: the honour of its originality is exclusively due to his Reviewer. The impression we got from the perusal of Mr Moncrieff's treatise, was, that ORGANIZED "dust," animated by *vital* "breath," by the wisdom and power of the Omnipotent Creator, is capable of becoming an intellectual, moral, and sensational being—in fine, a Man. A shallow, conceited philosophy will assert, that matter cannot think and be-

come capable of moral emotions. But, on what authority is this assertion made? On no other, manifestly, than an incapability to understand so profound a mystery. The same principle of reasoning would, if consistently carried out, convert men into universal sceptics; for, as they know only the philosophy of phenomena, and not the philosophy of absolute essences, their ignorance of the forces of nature and their mode of action, should lead to the denial of all the facts by which they are surrounded. I cannot understand *how* a tree germinates, gathers bulk, and brings forth fruit, *therefore* a tree does not germinate, &c., is as logical as the argument, "I cannot understand how organized matter thinks, and loves, and hates;" *therefore*, organized matter does not think, &c. If our ignorance is to justify our denial, then we may deny everything; for, absolutely and essentially, we are ignorant of everything. According to Mr Boyle, an *immaterial and immortal* property, which, after the style of the oriental philosophy, he calls a *soul*, is only capable of self-consciousness and the evolution of thought and feeling. Has Mr Boyle overlooked the fact, that all these phenomena, in a certain degree, are developed in the inferior animals as well as in man? If matter, in the subtle form of brain, in the vitalized organism cannot evolve thought and emotion, what is it that evolves these phenomena in the elephant, and the monkey, and the dog? Have *these* immaterial and immortal souls? Matter can evolve light, and heat, grateful perfumes, and harmonious sounds; why not thought, and volition, and feeling also? Who will set a limit to the productive skill of the Omnipotent, and affirm that the Almighty One cannot so combine material agencies, and subject them to conditions which shall result in a personal consciousness, and all the capabilities of a moral and intellectual being? A wise and holy man of old, contemplating the mysteries of his own existence, exclaimed, "I am fearfully and wonderfully made!" But Mr Boyle is not content to wonder and adore; he will undertake to tell mankind *how* they are made, and, like all persons who presume to be wise above what is written, he falls into the snare of his own folly, in the greatness of which he has gone astray.

Our author concludes his observations on this section, by a quotation of some twenty texts, where the word "spirit"

(ruach) occurs, for the very unnecessary purpose of showing that it cannot mean, in such examples, mere vitalized *breath*, or be accepted as a synonyme for *life*. Mr Moncrieff neither asserts nor implies such obvious absurdities, they are exclusively due to the genius and originality of his Reviewer. The Hebrews, as well as the English, and all other people, spoke of a "troubled spirit," and "anguish of spirit," and a "wounded spirit," and a "broken spirit;" but they, no more than ourselves, meant, by such expressions, that a *spirit detached from the body* was "wounded," and "troubled," and "broken." These and kindred phrases, express certain emotions of which the human organism is conscious: to interpret them as philosophical deliverances on the structure of the organism itself, is to represent man as singularly studious amidst his sufferings. Mr Boyle, no doubt, has sometimes used such expressions, as an "exuberance of *spirits*," a "depression of *spirits*;" did he use this plural form "spirits" in a theologico-philosophical sense? If he, himself, has been the subject of one or other, or both states, as probably he has, then *how many* "spirits" did he possess at such a time, and were they all *distinct entities, immaterial and immortal*? Perhaps, in his time, he has suffered from "lowness of *spirits*;" has he, under such circumstances, ever been so gross in his conceptions of this troublesome malady, as to accept *medical* advice? Doctors of *medicine*, whatever doctors of *theology* may think, treat "lowness of *spirits*" in a very *material* sort of way. They never imagine these "*spirits*" to be immaterial, distinct entities, within the material organism of their patient, but a morbid condition of the material organism itself; hence, they elevate the depressed "*spirits*" of their patients, by doses of matter of fact medicine. No doubt, these doctors are very gross; but their material means have been found very material remedies for these *immaterial* distempers.

Our readers will allow, that we may fairly test the worth of our author's reasoning, by comparing his own formally expressed conclusions with the testimony of Scripture. If his logic is unimpeachable, which he would not like to be questioned, then his conclusion is as follows, which we state in his own words.

"From these passages, we submit, he (man) is shown to be already a *spirit* (ruach) tenanted a body of flesh." p. 30.

According to Mr Boyle, *man is a spirit*, and the "body of flesh" is no essential part of him, merely his house, or earthly residence, which he can go into, or go out from, without experiencing any personal detraction or loss. The several passages, quoted by Mr B., he says, prove that man, by constitutional nature, is "a *spirit*," that is, an immaterial and immortal being, and therefore, incorruptible and imperishable, not of earthly, but of heavenly birth. Now, with this conclusion, we contrast *another conclusion*, that of the Apostle Paul:—

"And so it is written, The *first man*, Adam, was made a living *soul*; the last Adam was made a quickening (life-giving) *spirit*. Howbeit that was *not first* which is *spiritual* (a *spirit*), but that which is *natural* (a *soul*, *psuchicon*, the adjective of *psuche*, a *soul*), and afterwards (that is, he, afterwards, viz. Christ) that is *spiritual* (a *spirit*). *The first man is of the earth, earthy*. . . . As is the earthy, *such are they also* that are earthy. . . . For *this corruptible* (nature of man, as a *soul*) must *put on* incorruption (the heavenly or *spiritual* nature), and *this mortal* (nature of man, as a *soul*), must *put on* immortality (the quality of *spiritual* or heavenly existence).

According to Paul, the first man was NOT a spirit, but a *soul*; and *because* he was a *soul*, or "living soul," he was necessarily corruptible and mortal; needing to "*put on*" incorruption and immortality, in order to become like Christ, the "heavenly" one, or "quickenning *spirit*." Mr Boyle has not only measured swords with Mr Moncrieff, but also, unwittingly, with the Apostle Paul; but, tempered by a false theology, it has snapt asunder in the rencounter, and exposed him to a defeat, as disgraceful as it is decided.

Section 6 contains examples of *Nephesh* (*soul*), applied to *dead men*, or to designate a *corpse*. "Man," observes Mr Moncrieff, "*became* a living soul," by being made to breathe; and when he expires, at the final hour, he becomes a soul without life, or a dead soul,—or, dead being. The following are instances of this usage:—Num. vi. 6.—ix. 6; Lev. xix. 28.—xxii. 4; Hag. ii 13." Mr Boyle admits "the Hebrew usage in this case:"—he cannot contradict the statement, that a *soul* (*Nephesh*) sometimes means a dead person, or corpse. All, therefore, he can



say in reply, under this section, is, that because the word "*soul*" is so used, it does not prove "that the Scripture writers believed that the soul died with the body." But it proves that a *soul* dies; a somewhat stubborn fact for our author's theology; and, moreover, that a *man* is, in his perfect organism, called a *soul*, and not a soul independent of a body.

The 7th section of Mr Moncrieff's work, takes into consideration that class of passages where the word "*soul*" (*Nephesh*) describes certain powers, desires, appetites, and mental states of a man, or of a living human soul. Gen. xxiii. 8; Exodus xv. 9; Deut. vi. 5—xxiii. 24—xxviii. 65; &c. &c.

And what has his Reviewer to object to this item of the classification of *Nephesh*? All he can say is, "It is amusing to find Mr M. talking of the 'mental states of a man,' after labouring to show that man is nothing but 'dust' and 'breath.'" Here, as in so many other instances, Mr B. betrays either a want of candour, or a want of capacity to understand the subject he undertakes to criticise and refute. As we have already said, Mr M. nowhere asserts or implies that "man is *nothing* but 'dust' and 'breath'." As an organism "fearfully and wonderfully made" of the "dust" of the earth, he has both a mental and moral consciousness; which are the result of that material organism, and necessarily dependent on it. To say, then, as Mr Boyle does, that "Mr M. doubtless felt it impossible, on his principles, to account for the thoughts and emotions attributed in Scripture to *Nephesh*," is just reckless impertinence, an assertion which none but a superficial and stolid critic could venture to make.

Page 31 of our Reviewer's pamphlet, is a marvellous composition, for one who would be thought a religious and educated man. Mr Boyle laughs at the idea, that an "elephant" has mental states; but his laughter, as usual, does but provoke his reader's blush. He has a strange notion, too, of inspiration, as may be gathered from his designating the language of Scripture "*inspired vocables*." Evidently our author has studied neither nature nor revelation very profoundly; and whether he has studied good manners and Christian charity with any better success, our readers will, by this time, be able to judge without

our quotation here of another paragraph, by way of sample, of offensive and intemperate abuse, which he lavishes, with evident relish, on the person and performance of his opponent.

We have thus far followed Mr Boyle in his criticisms on Mr Moncrieff's classification of the Hebrew word *Nephesh*. *Psuche* the corresponding Greek term for *soul*, next comes under review, but as Mr Boyle iterates the same objections to Mr M.'s classification of this New Testament word, we need not repeat what we have already said in reply. We have only therefore to draw our already too extended notice of Mr Boyle's book to a conclusion, by pointing out the fallacy of his interpretations of certain passages of Scripture which he cites in support of the dogma of a separate, immaterial, and immortal soul.

Matthew xvi. 25, 26. "Were we," writes Mr Boyle, "to render *psuche*, *life*, in this text (26th v.), as Mr M. desires, we would strip it not only of its antithetic power, but of any intelligible significancy. 'What is a man profited if he gain the whole world and lose his own *life*?'—how would that read?" Very intelligibly, we reply, and in obvious harmony with the context, which the commonly received interpretation does not. "We had always supposed," continues Mr B., "that a man must lose his life, whether he will or not. \* \* Does he, (Mr M.) not believe that *it is appointed* unto men once to die?" It is clear that our Reviewer does not understand this passage, for if he objects to Mr Moncrieff's rendering of *psuche* by *life*, in the 26th verse he ought to object to our translators' rendering the same word by *life* in the verse immediately preceding. There we read, "For whosoever will save his *life* (*psuche*) shall lose it." Mr B. should, to be consistent, say to the translation of *this* verse also, "We had always supposed that a man must *lose his life* whether he will or not." Let him then, as he is bound to, substitute the word *soul* here for *life* as in the 26th verse, and with his notions of the *soul* as an immaterial, immortal, and separate being, how strangely would it sound, "For whosoever will *save his soul* shall *lose it*!" The word *psuche* obviously signifies *life* in both verses, and when our Lord speaks in these verses of *losing life* and *finding it*, he necessarily cannot refer to that *present* life which is

already *found* or possessed, and which must be *lost* or given up at death, but to that *life* which is of *eternal duration*, and which he will bestow as the *Life* of men. The sense of this passage is clearly brought out by the Evangelist Luke, in his version of our Lord's words, "For whosoever will save his life, shall lose it: but whosoever will lose his life for my sake, the same shall save it. For what is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and *lose himself*, or be cast away?" Here, the word "soul" on which Mr B. lays all his emphasis, does not occur, but the sense of that word is given by the reflexive pronoun "himself." The *soul* of man, as Mr Moncrieff has well argued, frequently means the *man himself*, to "lose" which is for the *man himself* to be lost or entirely obliterated from personal existence.

Matthew x. 28. "On this text," writes Mr B., "Bishop Porteus remarks with great justice, 'This text contains a decisive proof of two very important doctrines, the existence of a soul distinct from the body, and the continuation of that soul after death.'" If Mr Boyle desires the authority of great names, we can balance some against his authority, Bishop Porteus. Luther and Tyndale, Milton and Whately, are unable to find such ideas in this text as Bishop Porteus and Mr Boyle have discovered. Their notion of this text is concurrent with Mr Moncrieff's, when he says, that the word *soul* here means the *life*. We have become so accustomed to Mr Boyle's learned mirth, that we shall venture to expose ourselves to it, by furnishing the following paraphrase of the text in question: "Fear not them who can destroy the present organization, or *body*, (which when dissolved in death will never again be resumed,) but are not able thus completely to destroy the *life*, which will be rekindled at the time of resurrection in a new spiritual organization; but rather fear him who is able to destroy not only the present constitutional nature of man, but also the conscious life of man for ever in the consuming fires of hell." This "body," or present constitution, can be destroyed by man, for it will not be restored again, because as "flesh and blood" it is corruptible, and "cannot inherit the kingdom of God." The Apostle assures us of this when he says, "Thou sowest not *that body that shall be*." But while man can destroy the present organization

or "body," he cannot destroy the *life* in the same effectual sense, for the life of Christ's saints "is *hid* with Christ in God, and when Christ who is *our life* shall appear, then shall ye also appear with him in glory." Mr Boyle, like most reasoners on his side of the controversy, pays exclusive attention to the first part of the verse. They should not overlook what follows the declaration, that *man* is "not able to kill the soul,"—namely, the declaration that *God* "is able to *destroy both soul and body in hell*," and which implies that such a complete destruction shall be experienced by some in the future righteous retribution. This text, therefore, so commonly urged in support of the separate state and immortality of the soul, is manifestly an emphatic testimony against these popular notions.

Here are introduced several texts where the word *psuche* occurs, and which Mr Boyle thinks triumphantly sustain his side of the controversy, because some of them will not bear the word *life* as the proper interpretation of *psuche*. But, we must again remind Mr B., as we did under the word *Nephesh*, that Mr Moncrieff's pamphlet takes cognizance of *other meanings* of the word *psuche* besides *life*, and his classification of this word under separate sections, is to exhibit the fact, that, like its Hebrew representative, *psuche* has more than one signification. We opine that Mr B. would not like us to test some of even his cited texts by his own narrow definition of "soul," as invariably meaning the "*thinking part of man*," the *immaterial* and *immortal* portion. He insists that the word "soul," both in the Old and New Testament, signifies an essentially spiritual and deathless part of the human nature; but he cannot make up his mind what is its precise import, and betrays his indecision from the beginning to the end of his book. Once he tells us that *psuche* and *pneuma* "are of *kindred import*;" then, again, that "*psuche* properly denoted the *vital*, and *pneuma* the *rational soul*." Again, he writes, "*psuche*, like *nephesh*, signifies the *rational soul*," and yet again we are assured that "Mr Moncrieff has directed his zeal against the wrong word: *pneuma*, NOT *psuche*, designating in the New Testament the *rational nature* of man!" We have no wish to retaliate personalities, but in the view of such obvious indecision and inconsistency, we may justifiably adopt Mr Boyle's own

language as being specially applicable to himself—" His system requires an infinite number of shifts to give it feasibility, and himself is a Proteus, supple enough to meet the exigencies, being all things by turns, and nothing long."

We have now done with Mr Boyle and his brochure, which has already drawn largely upon our space, and received an amount of attention which, no doubt many of our readers will think, has been beyond its merits. To follow him through the rest of his quotations, we think unnecessary; for he does but quote texts where the words *soul* and *spirit* occur, and, with the utmost contempt for contexts and the qualifications of parallel passages, proceed to interpret them on the false principles advocated in the former part of his work. Texts upon which expositors have scarcely ventured to pass an opinion, on account of their acknowledged obscurity, Mr Boyle stamps for his service with the coolest confidence. His object seems to be to search out texts where the words *soul* and *spirit* occur, decorate them in the livery of his own theological learning, and then beat them up into his brigade to do battle against his opponent. Most of these texts are so well explained by Milton in his *Christian Doctrine*, Book 1st, Chapter 7, and which we have quoted in Nos. 5 & 6 of the *Christian Examiner*, that we shall content ourselves with referring our readers to what is there said by our great bard in explanation of their true meaning. Our readers will find also a proper classification of many of these texts with their exposition in Mr Moncrieff's new work entitled " Spirit: or the Hebrew terms *Ruach* and *Neshamah*, and the Greek term *Pneuma*." As for the rest of Mr Boyle's argumentation, our readers will excuse us combating it, when we inform them, that he brings such arguments as the Athanasian Trinity to prove a trinity of distinct subsistences in man, of which *one* is immortal, and the others temporary and accidental! and cites extravagant rhapsodies in blank verse where *Life* is denounced to be the greatest of curses, and *Death* the greatest blessing! We cannot, however, take leave of Mr Boyle without correcting a serious misapprehension into which he has fallen, when he says, that " the scheme which Mr M. has set himself to establish, makes the work of Jesus but a mere stepping-stone by

which man reaches an unending existence, instead of being a mighty moral power by which he is transformed into the same image. The result of the propitiatory sacrifice is physical,—the purchase of life,—instead of the turning of the stagnant stream of existence into a fertilizing river of God. Jesus is seen not as the wisdom and sanctification of the soul, but as the source of its mere perpetuity." Because Mr Moncrieff has written a work advocating the Scripture doctrine, that immortality or deathless existence, is a Gospel blessing, is it reasonable to conclude that he regards it as the *whole* Gospel, and that redemption by Christ includes nothing beyond the bestowment of an endless duration of being? As reasonable would be the conclusion that Sir David Brewster believed that *Optics*, and Professor Buckland that *Geology*, comprised the whole circle of science, because they wrote distinct treatises on those sciences. The doctrine of Life in Christ, is not *all* Mr Moncrieff's gospel, but it is a distinguished part of the Gospel he preaches. He, as well as Mr Boyle, preaches Christ our "wisdom, righteousness; and sanctification," as well as our "redemption." It is Mr Boyle who preaches the partial Gospel,—who denies to Christ *all* the honours of his great mediation, for *he* has said, and we look with painful astonishment at his words,—

"*This boon of existence* is so far from being an unmitigated blessing—a something calculated to excite our holy ambition, that a Job could say, 'I LOATHE IT, I WOULD NOT LIVE ALWAYS.'" !!! p. 57.

We pause not to show our readers how Mr Boyle wrests the words of the holy Patriarch; they will know that Job never used this language in reference to *the future and endless life*, but that life of suffering and sorrow of which he was then the subject. He who could ask in anxious inquisitiveness, "If a man die, shall he live again?" and lament that while "there is hope of a tree if it be cut down, that it will sprout again," yet that "man dieth and wasteth away," just "as the waters fail from the sea, and the flood decayeth and drieth up," was surely one of the last men to "loathe" this much contemned "boon of existence." We entreat Mr Boyle to review this awful language which he has adopted in reference to the gift of *eternal life* by Jesus Christ. We stand amazed, that a minister of the Gospel of Christ can declare with all the emphasis which

Roman capitals indicate, that he *loathes* "the LIVING BREAD which came down from heaven," and concerning which, it is declared, "if any man eat of this bread he shall LIVE FOR EVER"! We would remind Mr Boyle of those solemn words of Christ, "Ye will not come unto me that *ye might have life.*" We would entreat him not to be offended, as were certain disciples of old, at this glorious doctrine of *Life* in Christ; but, like Peter, rejoice in this new revelation from heaven, and say with him, "Lord, to whom shall we go, thou hast the words of *Eternal Life.*" We would urge him to examine more fully a controversy in which such men as Martin Luther and John Milton have decided against him, and whose extensive learning, human and divine, presented no obstacles to their acknowledgment and advocacy of opinions which he has not hesitated with so much censoriousness and severity to condemn. Finally, we would bid him farewell, reminding him that *Hominis errare, insipientis vero in errore perseverare.*