A Critique On Universalism.
By C. F. Hudson,
http://www.creationismonline.com/TSK/Immortality.html
“To those who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, Eternal Life."
NEW YORK:
1862
THE "Affirmative Argument" here offered to the public, upon the question stated in page 21, first appeared in a discussion held with the Rev. Sylvanus Cobb, editor of the Christian Freeman, in the columns of that paper. The use of it as part of a volume was granted to Mr. C. at the outset, and the whole discussion was published by him in that form, in January last. Declining an offer made' in the mean while for publishing, each party at the expense of his own matter, Mr. C. courteously grants the use of his plates for the present volume. This will account for its appearance as part of a work, though in itself complete.
The "Rejoinder" which was made occupies about twenty pages of the larger work, but is too closely connected with the "Negative Argument" to appear in place without it.
The writer intimated a wish to present, at some future time, a more full and thorough criticism of the Universalist faith. (P. 24.) This is still his desire, if he may ever think himself competent, and find leisure for the task. But he cannot now flatter himself with that hope, and therefore the more readily offers the present essay. And, though no other person would execute precisely his design, yet he finds so many things uttered elsewhere, quite to his mind and far surpassing his ability, that he need little regret if his wish is finally disappointed.
The turning-point of the whole controversy, he believes, will be found in the question of free-agency. In his work on "Debt and Grace" he has signified his approval of that view which regards sin as mystery (c. 2, §§ 2, 3); and he also finds something of man's dignity in his power to choose immortal life, and to make it in that special sense his own (c. 13, §§ 4, 5). And though his view of the end of evil is commonly deemed heterodox, it should do no harm if he commends, on the question of free-will, large portions of Dr. Bushnell's "Nature and the Supernatural," and of Dr. Squier's "Sin not of God," his "Reason and the Bible," c. 14, and his article on "The Power of Contrary Choice," published in the New Englander, May, 1860. It is also to be wished that some of the more abstruse discussions of this matter in Dr. Millers " Christian Doctrine of Sin" could be popularized; but this, perhaps, can only be when the people at large shall be brought, by a fresh and practical interest in theology, into the same range of thought.
Meanwhile, the common consciousness of accountability, betrayed in the love of praise no less than in the sense of guilt, must ever suffice for the practical argument. Yet, as the dearth of virtue and the prevailing unfitness for an after-life may have caused a general despair of immortality just before Christ appeared, so mere argument for free-will can effect little except with the daily example of high moral sense. The upright life, abhorring the evil and cleaving to the good, can alone thoroughly persuade men that they may either lose or gain eternal life.
CAMBRIDGE, Mass., November, 1880.
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
What are the prominent occasions of the universalist faith?
1. Reaction from the Doctrine of Eternal Misery
2. Certain Views of Divine Sovereignty
3. A certain View of the "Highest Good"
4. Various Reforms
5. Anti-slavery Effort
6. Modern Spiritualism
7. A light Estimate of the Import of Salvation
CHAPTER 2
Are there radically bad men?
I. The essential Freedom of the Human Will
2. The Nature of genuine Moral Virtue
8. Extensive Wickedness among Mankind
9. Various Examples
CHAPTER 3
Do the scriptures teach the immortality op man as a race, or of the good —or those who shall become good — as a class?
1. Is the proper Immortality of Man assumed in the Bible?
2. Is the immortality of the Soul implied in the Scriptures?
3. The General Tenor of Scriptural Language
4. The Exegetical or Analytic Argument. Gen. 2. 17; Ezek. 18. 31, 32; Luke 10. 25, 28; John 14. 19; Rev. 2. 10, 11; Matt. 10. 28; and 2 Pet. 2. 12, examined
5. Do the Phrases zoe ainios (rendered in our Version "eternal" or "everlasting life," by Universalists, "age-lasting " or "aionian life "), and its equivalent sae eis ton aiona, imply Immortal Life?
6. If " aionian" life does not imply Immortal Life, then do any who fail of it finally attain Immortal Life? Luke 20. 34-38; 1 Cor. 15. 22; Rom. 5. 18; Acts 24. 15; and 1 Tim. 4. 10, examined
7. The Two Theodores. Change for Authorities
CHAPTER 4
The historical argument
§ 3. There was deplorable need of Light on the Subject of Immortality when Christ came
§ 4. As the early Christians were not "Orthodox," so neither were they Universalists
§ 5. Whence did Universalist Views take their Rise?
CHAPTER 5
Does the doctrine of the immortality op a class accord with a just philosophy and with the sentiments of humanity?
1. The Ontological Proof of a Future Life
2. The Theology of Salvation
3. The Nature and Design of Punishment
4. Is the Immortality of a Class unkind to Man?
5. Is the Selection of a Class to Immortality worthy of God
CHAPTER 6
The doctrine of endless misery an occasion of skepticism.
CHAPTER 7
The silence of the scriptures respecting the immortality of the soul, or of the race, or of the lost.
CHAPTER 8
Eternal death in the literal sense is eternal punishment.
CHAPTER 9
The parable of the rich man and Lazarus.
Does it imply eternal future suffering?
CHAPTER 10
The "discourse concerning hades."
Not written by Josephus.
CHAPTER 11
The rights of wrong; or, is evil eternal?
CHAPTER 12
Postscript.
CHAPTER 13
Immortality through Christ alone.
The doctrine safe and salutary.
CHAPTER 14
Reviewers Reviewed.
QUESTION.
Do reason and the Scriptures teach the utter extinction of an unregenerate portion of human beings, instead of the final salvation of all?
AFFIRMATIVE ARGUMENT.
BY C. F. HUDSON INTRODUCTION.
FOR several generations past the great controversy in the Christian Church has turned on the question of a supposed eternal misery of the wicked, and a supposed eternal evil in the universe of God. Two parties have been arrayed against each other, separated by a twice infinite difference of opinion, inasmuch as endless bliss and endless woe are each infinitely removed, and in opposite directions, from man's original nothingness. Each party has also maintained, consistently with its confidence in the safety of truth, or at least in the hurtfulness of error, that its opinion is most conducive to the present and future welfare of man. And when we look to the lives of those who have held the opposing opinions with any devoutness, it cannot be denied that they have exhibited real, though sometimes different, graces and virtues.
Paradoxical though it may seem, their twice infinite difference has turned on one point of agreement. They have held alike and in common the actual immortality of all human souls. The paradox vanishes at a single thought, and appears as an essential and explanatory fact. For only as immortal beings can sinful men be eternally blessed or endlessly wretched.
But this common opinion of a general immortality is lately, more than for several centuries past, challenged and denied. It is claimed, by respectable and growing. numbers, that man's immortality is not absolute, but dependent on personal goodness and, virtue of character. The language of Paul, " to those who by patient continuance in well-doing 'seek for glory, honor, and immortality, eternal life," is taken by these persons in a literal sense, which precludes the endless life of those who obey not the gospel of Christ. This third opinion, commonly known as that of the final annihilation of the wicked, is now giving a triangular character to the Eschatology of the day. In its recent history it is not old enough .to have produced much character of any kind, and will be judged somewhat by the existing character of those who embrace it. I think it suffers no disparagement by their general morals. And two hundred years ago, when it had lived long enough to allow some estimate of its proper fruits, we are told it was " matter of public notoriety that in respect to morals no sect had approached more nearly to the simplicity and strictness of the early Christians" than those who held this view.
It has fallen to my lot to offer this view instead of that of eternal suffering, in my book on "The Doctrine of a Future Life." There has been a little criticism on the part of my orthodox friends, as if I had more ably combated their view than defended my own. And I have met a few who told me they would sooner accept the Universalist faith than mine. The former fact I think is due to the aggressive character of my book; the latter, to the modern novelty of my opinion. But in view of both facts I am happy in my present opportunity to treat the question anew; to show — if my pen and the truth will allow it—that the Universalist view is untenable, and to say some things that more directly concern the view I hold.
But before I proceed to the argument I should meet certain prejudices of various kinds that may beset me.
1. I shall not by the phrase "Universalist faith" imply the opinion that all men, without respect to present character, enter immediately after death into a state of unsullied happiness. This notion has been ably opposed by those called Restorationists, and it is fast declining. Yet I find the term Restorationist inconvenient, because it implies the opinion that there is a fall in the history of the human race from which man is restored; and this opinion is disowned Fly many who Believe that condition is ewer the inseparable consequence of acquired character, that salvation is never forfeited or lost, and that Restoration is strictly impossible. By the term Universalist, then, I mean simply one who holds that all men will be at last both holy and happy.
2. I shall disclaim all opinion of a special or violent interposition on the part of God, in the final perishing of the wicked. My view is that the unrepenting sinner destroys himself; and though this self-destruction may not be complete in the death of the body, but in a second instalment of death, I shall still regard it not as miracle, but the natural process of the life divorced from an unloved God, languishing back to naught.
This view also cuts off a frequent objection that final punishment is "vindictive," and that God is wrathful in a bad sense of the word. It also allows the opinion that physical death is not a crisis in the history of one's being, and that one who has not deliberately rejected God and virtue before the dying breath, may embrace God and virtue thereafter. Thus I hold, and have long held, the solvability of the heathen. The doctrine of an intermediate state without change, and of an appointed limit of probation on either side of the interval between death and resurrection, may still be true.
3. I speak of "persistently wicked" men. I do not assume that there are such, that being part of the argument. Nor do I design to limit the power of God in this regard, but only to show that the soul may be so contaminated with sin that reformation would involve reconstruction, at the hazard of personal identity; or, that after a great sin the power of faith in God's forgiveness, or the possibility of happiness along with a faithful memory, may be gone.
Having premised these things, I am prepared to state my general argument, as follows:—
1 What are the prominent occasions of the Universalist faith?
2 Are there radically bad men? Or, is there a "good in all," which may justly be called a redeeming virtue in the worst, and a nucleus of their reformation and salvation?
3. Do the Scriptures teach the immortality of man as a race, or of the good — or those who shall become good — as a class?
4. Is the immortality of the good as a class supported by the history, especially of early Christian doctrine?
5. Does this doctrine accord with a just philosophy, and with the sentiments of humanity?
By way of apology I will offer but a single word. The compliments that have been bestowed upon my book may raise undue expectations of my present argument. Suffice it to say, the book was the fruit of long meditation, and of several years' study; my present effort must be begun and ended in not many days. And I am not as familiar with Universalist as with orthodox opinions and history. The main advantage, if any, which I shall have over the opponent of my opponent in their late discussion, will be that of my position. I have not to maintain any tenet of eternal woe. For this advantage partly do I write, and on it partly shall I rely. In one view it is a disadvantage. My change from the orthodox view was a great emancipation, and he who has changed once may change again. Who knows that one will abide in the half-way house, and will not some day rejoice in another great emancipation? We shall see. Meanwhile, I shall deem the present essay as an introduction to the great subject, on which I may possibly, years hence, gratify the wish of friends at both ends of the street by writing more fully.
WHAT ARE THE PROMINENT OCCASIONS OF THE UNIVERSALIST FAITH?
HERE is a delicate point of argument; for the causes of human opinion bear some analogy to the motives of human conduct, of which we ought not hastily to judge. I think, however, the argument is a legitimate one; forevery cause enters into and qualifies its effect. Nothing is thoroughly known until it is traced to its source. Moreover, in every important and extensively prevalent opinion, however erroneous, there is some element of truth whence its power is derived. And we shall labor at great disadvantage if we do not thankfully recognize all that is good, even relatively, in whatever we oppose. I think the remark of Coleridge a just one, that " unless you understand a man's ignorance, you may be sure you are ignorant of his understanding." I shall waste my words if I do not know the paths by which my gentlemanly opponent and those on his side have come to their opinions. Only thus should any one pretend to offer himself as a guide into the right way.
1. One most obvious cause of Universalism is the reaction from the doctrine of eternal misery. It is easy to utter those two fearful words without thinking what they mean. It is almost as easy to forbear thinking upon them out of a suspicion that they mean more than can be true. But to ponder them, and then believe them, is hard indeed, and requires a high opinion or a deep sense of human guilt and ill desert. I have met with ministers who confessed they did not dare to think of the eternity of misery, for fear they should doubt the fact. And it has been said very plausibly, if not very truly in the choice between the two more prevalent beliefs: " We are all Universalists when we lose our friends." And I can easily understand those who say they did not really believe in endless woe, even when they thought they did.
In this view I would say that the Universalist faith is relatively true. But it will be a part of my historical argument to show that this reaction did not begin — as there was no occasion for it—until the latter half of the second century, when Platonic views of the immortality of the soul had begun to be received into the faith of Christians.
2. Certain views of the sovereignty and supremacy of God have in various ways promoted the Universalist faith. Men would fain comprehend all things in the world, including those which seem evil and wrong, under one system and plan of God. This desire seeks to get rid of the perplexity and mystery of sin. It is of two kinds, — intellectual and moral; the first often attended with a deadness of the moral sense, and the second growing out of a tenderness and acuteness of the moral sense. A word respecting each of these.
(1.) I frequently meet persons who say there can be nothing in the universe opposed to the will of God, for the very idea of God makes Him the absolute sovereign, disposing and ordaining all events. In accordance with this view they excuse any apparent wrong in themselves as the necessary imperfection of finite and infant being. And as they grow consistently cold and philosophic, they extend the same charity to their neighbors. " Whatever is, is right," is their motto. And though earth is so full of apparently needless suffering, and of such exquisite counterfeits — if not realities — of guilt, these people persuade themselves that the Infinite Being cannot have allowed anything which He would disapprove or dislike, and that all men, with greater or less completeness of moral mechanism, are gliding on toward the same final happiness.
This philosophy is doubtless a reaction, in part, from the higher forms of Calvinism. When the scripture texts that asserted the unity and sovereignty of God against the Persian Dualism and the Greek and Roman Polytheism, were taken as charging God with all that men ever did, and when God was said to condemn some for the sake of glorifying others, so that he must appear to do evil that good might come, it is no wonder that all evil was denied, though at the hazard of denying with it all moral good, and of locking up the universe in necessity and fate.
This doctrine of necessity I name as a cause of Universalism, not because all Universalists hold it, but because I meet it more frequently now in their books and on their lips than elsewhere. I rarely meet one who makes a thorough and outspoken denial of man's free agency, who is not a Universalist. And I so often meet Universalists who scout the notion of free will and moral responsibility, that the two beliefs have become somewhat associated in my mind. Many of the persons I speak of are not members of Universalist churches; but some of them are such, and they find support in respectable books of Universalist literature.
(2.) But a sensitively acute moral sense, no less than a cold philosophy, may stagger at the mystery of sin and deny its existence. For sin, as I take it, when reduced to its proper elements, is no mere misfortune or indiscretion; but it is doing wrong in the face of conviction both of duty and of interest, and with the certain prospect of bitter regret, availing or unavailing. Thus sin, as sin, is purely monstrous, — excuseless and reasonless, a disjointing of the will from its just moral relations, threatening havoc around if not min within. But this anomaly is so horrible and horrifying that, like calamitous tidings, men dread to believe it true. They sometimes turn away from it, shocked and confounded, wishing not to look at it, or to think of it, again; but hoping that the apparent mystery of human guilt may be resolved into some better mystery of divine goodness and omnipotent love.
Whether the mystery can be thus solved is a question to be considered in the next chapter. I need only to remark here that Olshausen, alluding to the Universalist view, has well said: " Although this may often be owing to a sickly and torpid state of the moral feelings, yet it is without doubt deeply rooted in noble minds; it is the longing of the soul after complete harmony in the universe." But I think such a harmony does not preclude the notion of temporary and even self-ruinous perversion of finite free agency. God may still be divinely sovereign and good. " The highest power only becomes the more perfect, from the fact that instead of acting with all-subduing violence, it operates in a determinate mode, as a spirit of holiness and love. This higher power may safely leave man free, for the very reason that it is omnipotent; for it is the character of strength not to fear freedom; and it is precisely because Omnipotence governs the world, that no infringement of universal order is to be apprehended from the personal self-subsistence [or perverse action] of finite spirits." [Matt. 12. 31, 32.]
3. I query whether Universalists do not usually hold an opinion of the "highest good" from which I should dissent, but which has contributed to their faith. The natural and just revulsion from the thought of eternal misery has given prominence to the question of happiness or misery; and it were no wonder if this question should displace that which is most important, — What is the highest kind of happiness or welfare? Is it not 'virtue? Is it not better to be worthy than to be fortunate? My noble opponent, and multitudes of Universalists with him, will at once say, " Yes, virtue by all means, and let the happiness take care of itself. First pure, then peaceable. Seek first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness." And the moral philosophy prevalent among Universalists, — that blessing cannot be sundered from goodness, that suffering is inseparable from guilt, and that. the only forgiveness is the putting away of sin, — this philosophy has opposed the happiness-worship of which I speak. Still I doubt if many have not become Universalists out of a primary love of enjoyment—here or hereafter — to which moral worth is secondary. The same may be true of other religionists — this is religionism as distinct from genuine godliness, and it is an exceedingly subtle mischief in human nature. But is it not fostered more by the hope of a final happiness, in spite of any guilty abatement or postponement of that happiness, than by the doctrine that makes godliness the condition of the gain or total loss of the happiness?
I have watched the progress of phrenology, and have read some phrenological books. I am sure that multitudes of them make virtue the means and happiness the end, as if virtue were not intrinsically good. Many of them manifestly use words of moral and religious import in a merely physical sense, as Epicurus doubtless did when he wrote a book about holiness. In fact, much of the phrenological philosophy is strictly Epicurean, making pleasure the highest good, and prudence the highest virtue. Of the phrenologists the great majority I think are Universalists; — many because they have found in their science special and striking proofs of the goodness of God in the economy of Pain — of which hereafter. But many of them are Universalists on the happiness principle. These are no disparagement to those who are nobler minded; but the fact is proper to be named among the causes of the faith.
4. Important among these causes are various modern reforms, such as those of criminal codes, of prison discipline, and of the treatment of the insane, and efforts in behalf of the intemperate, of abandoned females, and of vagrant children. All these reforms have grown. out of a kindlier feeling of humanity, and they have all encouraged a higher faith in the salvability of those who seemed beyond hope. Many who had been given up as lost have been recovered back to the paths of virtue. These reforms are an honor to our age, and no lover of his kind should discourage the last effort to save the fallen. They are our brothers and our sisters all. But the question still remains whether the cases of reformation form so large an induction as to warrant the inference of a general salvation in the holiness and blessedness of God's kingdom. This question I reserve for the next chapter, where I shall examine the doctrine of the " good in all," which is one form of the Universalist faith.
5. Philanthropic effort in behalf of the slave is another occasion of this faith. " God hath made of one blood all nations of men." There is a human brotherhood, and a divine Fatherhood; and he is false to humanity and piety who does not recognize and live out this truth. But whether the fact warrants the faith in question is to be considered.
1. Modern Spiritualism has doubtless promoted the belief of the final salvation of all. I would not by any means confound, the two doctrines; for the majority of Universalists may think no more of the supposed revelations of Spiritualism than I do. And I shall have no occasion to discuss their merits. I simply name the fact that nearly all Spiritualists are Universalists, and may refer to the opinions of some Spiritualists when I come to the scripture doctrine of immortality.
2. I think that Universalists have thought less than others of the infinitude of blessing implied in eternal life, and have thus been more ready to regard eternal life as the destiny of all. I think this is the fact because I have frequently heard Universalists speak of it as unjust if the sufferings of this life are not to be compensated with endless joy; or, as if the eternal life of some instead of all would be an unequal partiality in God. The reasons for the fact are various.
(1.) Universalists have not been compelled to ponder and weigh an infinite boon in order to justify a supposed exposure to an infinite woe. This is an orthodox habit of mind, which is exceedingly interesting, and which is one of the more common methods of vindicating the divine justice. God is so good as to offer immortal glory to man, once and again. If man declines — refuses — rejects— scorns the offer, does he not deserve the pains of hell? How shall we escape endless pangs, if we neglect so great salvation? such is the argument; and it is so plausible that I have heard of one Universalist preacher who in a pardonable vexation with the people for not welcoming his faith said that if there was not a hell there ought to be one. The orthodox reasoning on this subject is indeed a monstrous perversion, which, pressed to its consequences, involves the notion that, from the beginning and forever, infinite evil has as good a right of possession and may claim as fair a chance in the universe as infinite good.
But, notwithstanding this fearful corollary, the orthodox man, compelled to offset an infinite good against an infinite evil, has got some benefit of the process. With this doctrine of election, or selection, he has thought intensively, has intently considered the "powers of the world to come," has reckoned the " un-searchable riches" until he has felt that they were past computation, and has contemplated the " far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory" until not only the heaviest temporal calamities have seemed a " light affliction," but even the hazards of deathless pain, however imminent, have seemed of little ac-coat.
The method of the Universalist, on the other hand, has been the extensive. He has enlarged the range of the eternal life, making it comprehend the entire host of the human race, and the whole range of God's intelligent creatures. The orthodox estimates have been those of magnitude; the Universalist, those of multitude. And I believe that many Universalists have sought to enlarge the bounds of the eternal weal (they cannot make them wider than I shall) because they have less fathomed its depths.
I think the early Christians had an advantage here. With no eternal evil to fear for any, but deeming themselves called by God's free gift, freely received, to be " heirs of glory," joint heirs with Christ of all that eternity can yield, they gained some sense of what is " Length, and Breadth, and Depth, and Height," in the computations of the celestial kingdom. Hence we cease to wonder that when fiery trials came, and not the strong men only, but delicate women and children of tender age were killed all day long, counted out like sheep for the butcher, — they thought they more than conquered, in the name of the Prince of Life who had loved them unto death. The early Christian martyrdoms served as a precedent for the courage of the later martyrs, burdened with the tenet of eternal woe. Let that burden be removed, and the " great salvation" be great not as from an infinite evil, but as for an eternal and ever augmenting good, and when poor, weak men, born of yesterday, shall begin to reckon the magnitude of the salvation, modesty may inspire some doubt whether all are thus saved. To be indeed "children of the Most High," "sons of God," "kings and priests" unto the Lord of all, may be so high an honor that an " election," or selection, shall not be a very unworthy doctrine.
(2.) The slight estimate of which I speak is in part due to a reaction from a false heavenly mindedness. There are many professing Christians who seem to do Christian duties because they lead on to eternal glory. This is what Coleridge has well styled " the-other-worldliness," — trying to be godly, not because it is right, but because it will pay well. This is a gross perversion, the over-working and abuse of considerations that should be properly used, for cherishing of gratitude and for comfort in tribulation. It is the counterfeit doing harm to the genuine. And this spurious piety is specially mischievous when it assumes that the degree of future glory is never affected by one's attainments in virtue, but that the best and the worst of the saved will be at once and equally blessed when they pass the pearly gates — a doctrine which the parable of the laborers in the vineyard was never designed to teach. This selfish and miraculous theory of future glory is justly repudiated by many Universalists, who find the law and the measure of happiness in virtue itself: Science and philosophy are discovering to men close and natural connections between well-doing and well-being. A very important gospel this — or, rather, a very important law of all gospel. But it may go too far with its doctrine of natural processes, sinking the supernatural in these, and losing itself in the finite, which is its proper sphere. And it will be well if in the rigor of moral law men do not forget the miracle of infinite love that has offered immortal life to those who had incurred some sort of death.
(1.) The light estimate of eternity is also due, in part, to the secular prosperity of this age, and to the unwonted preaching of the gospel in its secular bearings. The gospel easily catches the spirit of the times; and in this age of social wealth, with its new social interests and pressing problems, the attention of Christians is a little turned away from heaven to earth. In the gospel for the times many things are said that are immensely true and important. There is a gospel for the drunkard, for the harlot, for the pauper, and for the slave; and woe be to us if we preach not all these gospels. Yet they are all worthless and false, and they will surely degenerate into mere temporalities, if they are not leavened and permeated with the old gospel of salvation from sin and death, for a life that runs parallel with the eternal being of God. We have need to remember what Archbishop Leighton once said, when reproached for not preaching up the times. He hoped that while so many were preaching up the times, he might be excused if one humble servant of Jesus Christ should preach up Heaven and Eternity.
ARE THEIR RADICALLY BAD MEN?
BY radically bad men I do not mean persons who are born of badness and unto badness, as if character were a thing of parentage or race. But, are there human beings in whom evil feelings, purposes, and habits so predominate that they mark and determine the character? And I use the popular phrase "bad men," rather than the scriptural phrase " the wicked," because I think the former best represents the latter in its original and proper sense. But scriptural expressions are apt to be used in a technical and conventional sense; " the righteous" and "the wicked" may come to signify men who are such according to an arbitrary and false standard. This is a great evil, and it needs to be corrected by substituting for the technical phrases such homely but hearty Saxon words as scarcely need defining.
And by the question, Are there radically bad men?— I do not mean to intimate that there are no traces of good nature even in the worst men. The real question will be, Is the "good in all," upon which the Universalist so much relies, a genuine goodness, a real virtue, a moral principle? Is it an element so substantial, and a germ so vital, that it must, by a natural law of character, grow and develop into a prevailing goodness and a final salvation? If this question is answered in the negative, then the question remains, Will God, by methods higher than the native elements of character, secure in all men a filial holiness and blessedness? This question will be considered in the closing chapter.
Here, at the outset, I should discard a host of rash and conventional judgments that are wont to be pronounced upon human character. Men are too often judged good or bad according to outward appearance. This is the way of men as compared with the judgment of Him who looked upon the heart. Precisely this is meant by the "respect of persons" which the Scriptures so much rebuke. Human nature, fallen desperately in love with happiness, is apt to think that those who are " well off" must be good people, and that those who are badly off must be bad folks. This was the great mistake of Job's friends, and it has been made thousands of times since his day. God is no such "respecter of persons," or of outward advantages; but in every nation he that feared God and work-eth righteousness, in whatever condition, is accepted of him.
This principle cuts off all hasty condemnation of the heathen in the mass, as if they must inevitably perish. If they cherish true goodness and virtue, neither their ignorance nor their un-scriptural methods of worship will exclude them from God's kingdom. But as ignorance is a very great evil, and the gospel is worth preaching to everybody, the question remains, Whether a heathen, with his false views of God, may not lose confidence in the supremacy of goodness, take the side of an evil divinity because the evil divinity is supposed to be the more powerful, and thus debauch the conscience and allow vice to become a settled policy and ruling principle of the character? How else shall we understand Paul's account, in which, after giving a long catalogue of heathen sins, he says: "Who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them? "
In judging of character I also throw out of account all considerations of natural temper or disposition, amiable or otherwise. The brutes, in their measure, may have these as well as men. We are responsible, not for the nature we. are born with, but for the use we make of native temper and capacity, in repressing the evil and cherishing the good. I also throw out of the account the manifold differences of education and custom, whereby the same act which expresses ill-feeling and hate in one man may express goodness and love in another man. All this, I presume, is so well understood between himself and my opponent, that it needs only to be named, and not argued.
The whole subject of human character is a vast one, and it is all involved in the question if there be radically bad men. I can only pretend to nuke a few points of the general argument; suggestions only, where demonstration—in a matter so prejudiced by manifold dispute — would require a volume.
1. The first point to be insisted on is the essential and responsible freedom of the human will. I believe — it is almost a proverb—that the common consciousness of man asserts his freedom. Without this there could be no merit, either good or ill. Without this, whatever right or wrong there might be in the nature of things, neither could exist in actions or in men. There could be neither praise nor blame, there could be no character worthy of the name. Without freedom, the native dispositions and original feelings of men might be more complex than those of the brute, and more interesting for study; they might be more agreeable or disagreeable, more fortunate or unfortunate; still they would be the inevitable result of forces within the man and of circumstances without him, for which he would be as blameless and as thankless as the revolutions of the windmill.
But this practical consciousness of freedom—which excuses or condemns ourselves if it be real, and makes God an impostor if it be unreal — has been often denied for the sake of a theory. I believe it has often been denied by men troubled with a sense Of guilt, of which they wished to be rid. Still more unfortunately has it been denied by divines, to save their views of a divine sovereignty and efficiency, or to save a false theory respecting God's foreknowledge. Supposing that God could foreknow only as a natural philosopher does, or as an astronomer predicts an eclipse, — by calculations of cause and effect — they have ignored all actions that could not be determined by such calculation. The same class of divines have also been prejudiced by a false theory of freedom; one which divorced the will utterly from moral considerations, and reduced it to a sheer caprice. At an earlier date —in the Reformation—the notion of free will was supposed to make man independent of the gratuitous help of God. This explains that remarkable book of Luther, On the Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio). The other causes culminated in the no less remarkable and more famous work of Edwards on the Freedom of the Will.
Those who have opposed the Calvinistic scheme have often said that Universalism is its legitimate fruit. I think, for the theoretic denial of free will I have just named, that this is true. The Calvinists, by a happy inconsistency, have maintained a deep sense of the evil and wickedness of sin. But when they had, by a method More honored in the breach than in the observance, made the Author of man's nature and surroundings responsible for all men's doings, it was natural that men should infer that God's fairness required the salvation of one as well as another. The principle, or rather the lack of principle, by which God elected one man, appeared equally good for the election of all men. Hence we need not wonder that the Universalism of eighty years ago was offered as a "Calvinism Improved"— a title given by Dr. Joseph Huntington to his Universalist book. Here another cause of Universalism is worthy of note. The Old-School doctrine of the nature of the Atonement made it a legal satisfaction for the sins of the saved. The New-School doctrine of the extent of the Atonement makes it sufficient for all men. Combine the two, and all are saved at a stroke of logic. Some of the Universalists have employed this logic, and the result of their reasoning abides, though the old and false view of the Atonement is discarded. But the Calvinistic views of the human will, I think, prevail now more among Universalists than among the Orthodox. I may have misjudged the literature of Universalism on this point, and if so I shall thankfully stand corrected. But such is my strong impression.
Now I admit that the freedom of the human will, as uncontrolled by any necessitating power of motives, makes the actions of men no more traceable by any philosophy of cause and effect. We shall then have what Dr. Bushnell calls the " supernatural " in the will itself. And when the will does not follow the motives or reasons which it ought to follow, there is a wild lawlessness that perplexes us, and threatens disorder and ruin, limited only by the power of the perverse free agency. But this lawlessness is precisely what I understand to be the essence of sin. Sin is the transgression of law; and sin is guilty, and not unfortunate merely, just because it is not compelled by motive, or passion, or any cause out of the free will itself. And this, too, is the mystery of sin. It is that for which there is no valid reason; an act which the person knows to be equally wrong and imprudent, and so an act of un-reason; an act admitting no excuse save those worthless pleas by which the selfish or malicious guilt was first palliated or instigated. Such are the excuses which the stammering tongue fails to utter when one is confronted with the conscience, suppressed for a while, but again accusing. And by this final verdict of the conscience the guilty man is rendered — like him in the parable of the wedding garment — speechless.
This mystery of sin, which seems to be involved in the very idea of moral character, has been recognized by various eminent writers, ever since the time of Plato. I will quote but one, and that one probably a Universalist. I mean Neander, whose labors in Church History have such signal merit because he was not a mere compiler of facts, but a philosopher, profoundly versed in the causes of human action. He says: "According to my conviction, the origin of evil can only be understood as a fact —a fact possible by virtue of the freedom belonging to a human being, but not to be otherwise deduced or explained. It lies in the idea of evil that it is an utterly inexplicable thing, and whoever would explain it nullifies the very idea of it. It is not the limits of our knowledge which make the origin of sin something inexplicable to us, but it follows from the essential nature of sin as an act of free will that it must remain to all eternity an inexplicable fact. It can only be understood empirically by means of the moral self-consciousness." (Planting and Training of the Church, book 6, chap. 1, note.)
I have thought it important thus to insist on the freedom of the will and the reasonless nature of guilt, as showing that man may be really guilty and bad. This alone, of course, does not prove any man radically bad, since one may, perhaps, repent of little sins, and reform himself into entire goodness. Yet the reasonless nature of guilt shows that it may not so be. He who acts foolishly, lawlessly, madly in a small matter, may do the same in things of weightier moment. He that is unjust in that -which is least may also be unjust in much. Nay, as physical disorder tends to further and utter derangement, so the human will forsaking the law of reason may gain fresh impulse away from the true good, and end in final and utter abandonment, in the darkness of un-reason which it has freely entered.
I will here remark that while I am glad to hear my Universalist friends speak of charity and forgiveness, and doubt not they cherish a real feeling of good will toward all, yet a very common theory pressed to its consistent results would destroy the very idea of charity and forgiveness. If no man acts against known duty or interest, if all are doing precisely according to their best light and knowledge, then what place for charity or pardon? One who is conscious of having done the best he knew or could, does not ask forgiveness, nor thank one for the offer of it. And if it is further said that men do wrong only under the influence of passion or of strong temptation, the question recurs, Do they act with good conscience? and, Can they not resist and conquer their foes, the evil passions? If they cannot, they need no pardon, for they are simply victims. If they can do better, their guilt remains; and while we should forgive until the seventy times seven, it should be with some fear that the actual and, in its measure, reasonless and excuseless guilt may continue and subvert the soul. But let us never speak of forgiveness under a theory that leaves nothing to be forgiven.
2. The nature of genuine moral virtue is such that we should not hastily conclude that all men possess it, even in slight measure. Virtue is something more than prudence, or a regard for one's interest. It is true that duty and interest ever coincide; neither can properly interfere with the other. Honesty is ever the best policy. Yet it has been well said that he who is honest from policy is not an honest man. To do a certain act because it is prudent and profitable, and to do the same act because it is right, generous and noble, are two very different things. Though all that is really virtuous is also really prudent, still here are two kinds of motive totally different. The two planes are indeed exactly parallel, and the figures are equal and similar; yet he who moves in one plane may have no sympathy whatever with him that moves in the other. The two persons are of different aims, and may therefore reach different moral results, and destinies.
The nature of virtue as something more than prudence may be observed in various relations, and illustrated in various ways. The man of prudent expediency is apt to be self-seeking and selfish. The man of principle regards what is right — for others no less than for himself. One makes self the centre about which his life revolves; and the other looks to what is just and good for all. One is devoted supremely to his own interests; the other is benevolent, devoted to the welfare of those around. One is seeking to gratify himself; the other is self-sacrificing, self-denying. The friendships of the one class are friendships of convenience,—they love those that love them, as publicans- and sinners may do; the other class make all men their neighbors, and give not expecting to receive again. The former are almost sure to fall before temptation, because selfishness is ever short-sighted and blind and weak; the latter endure trial because they are settled in principles of duty, as upon a rock.
Here we may urge that the scripture doctrine of conversion contains an important principle, and that the change from selfishness to benevolence is most radical, and beyond the power of any prudential consideration. " He that saves his life shall lose it." "If any man come to me, and hate not his father and mother and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea, and his life also, he cannot be my disciple." Self-denial, or the foregoing of pleasure and even of the favor of friends and kindred, out of regard for him who was "full of grace and truth," is made the condition of acceptance with God. Such is the high style of virtue which he requires. But self-denial is, in the very idea of it, beyond the power of self-love. No self-seeking can help in this matter of self-forgetting. If this is not the sole work of a higher power, lifting man up and out of his selfishness with his free consent, it is at least the work of a higher nature than any mere regard, however far-seeing, to one's own interest. And this seems to me to cut off one very common argument of the Universalist, 1.e., that the vicious and abandoned will and must become virtuous when they find that this is for their interest. I answer, the habit of self-interestedness is just what makes the case of many so helpless and hopeless. They are slaves to self, "lovers of pleasures more than lovers of God." This is their bondage, and they cannot be emancipated by any proclamation how they may serve themselves better. Prudential maxims may lengthen their chain, but they cannot break it; a wiser policy may let out their tether, and give them a wider range of self-service, but it cannot make them truly free. It cannot make them unselfish, or give them a generous and hearty interest in the well-being of others, or a self-sacrificing joy in that which is noble and true. Such a freedom comes from the Deliverer, the Jesus who came to save his people from their sins.
But to break away from this self-love requires some struggle and effort, and it may be refused as an intolerable hardship. Here is a most alluring bondage from which we are not sure that all will escape. True it is that when one is devoted from self to the general good, he has an interest in that wherein he takes an interest, so that "all things are his," and he has gained the true riches, the unsearchable and inexhaustible wealth of God's domain. But no self-love can grasp that priceless pearl. And because the neglected duty of regard for others brings an accusing conscience, the duty itself may be hated. I cannot otherwise explain the dislike which Alcibiades had for Socrates, when he "wished that he were no longer to be seen among men," apparently because, while Socrates was doubtless his true friend and well-wisher, he wished to dissuade him from a low but fond demagoguism, and make him a nobler and truer man. I cannot otherwise explain the conduct of the man who ostracized the Athenian whom no man could accuse, because he could not bear to hear him perpetually called " Aristides the Just." I cannot otherwise explain the open scoffing at the idea of moral principle, of which we heard a little in political life, a few years since, when many whose sincerity was not questioned were reproached as " conscience men." I cannot otherwise explain the feeling of the Scribes and Pharisees, of whom Christ said, " Ye have both seen and hated both me and my Father;" a signal instance of cherished malignity, which seems to preclude the notion that all sin grows out of ignorance or misconception, or that all will do better when they know better.
For some further suggestions under this and the following heads, I will refer to Dr. Bushnell's argument on "The Fact of Sin," in his work on "Nature and the Supernatural." The most thorough discussion of the whole subject is found, I think, in Muller's " Christian Doctrine of Sin."
3. The extended history of wickedness among men, often in most flagrant forms, gives some reason to fear that there may be radically bad individuals, finally unsaved. I wish here not to be misunderstood. I am not of the croaking school of philosophers, who say deliberately and habitually what David said in haste, that "all men are liars." It is indeed a significant fact that multitudes have doubted whether there be any disinterested benevolence or virtue in the world. The famous maxims of Rochefoucault are based on this denial. And we know how many have re-asserted that of the British statesman: "Every man has his price." Almost in the same tone has Jeremiah said, " The heart of man is deceitful above all things, and desperately weak" (Heb. enosk), 1.e., our hopes of human nature are often woefully disappointed. But, while I doubt the conversion of the world into a church, I am not given to jeremiads. I do not believe that the history of the world has been mainly a catalogue of hatreds, vices, and crimes. I doubt not the vast majority of all men's outward acts have been good rather than bad. It must have been so. Society could not subsist for a single week if it were otherwise. Fallen as mankind are, they are not so lost to self-love that they should destroy themselves in a trice. And—better than this self-love or prudence — there are many natural sentiments of the human heart that produce much agreeable and amiable deportment and feeling. But it still remains true that man shows too bad a history for an unfallen race—a race of which every individual has retained the remnant of saving virtue, as a "good in all." For argument's sake we May regard as hyperbole the strong language in Genesis: " God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of his thoughts was only evil, continually." And we may say the same of Paul's account in the first chapter of Romans: " And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient; being filled with all unrighteousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, with-out understanding, covenant-breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful; who knowing the judgment of God, that they who commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them." But if this be hyperbole, it is not confined to inspired men, writing in the interest of a humbling doctrine of man's nature. A heathen writer of the first century says of Rome: "All is full of criminality and vice; indeed much more of these is committed than could be remedied by force. A monstrous contest of abandoned wickedness is carried on. The lust of sin increases daily, and shame is daily more and more extinguished. Discarding respect for all that is good and sacred, lust rushes on wherever it will. Vice no longer hides itself. It stalks forth before all eyes. So public has abandoned wickedness become and so openly does it flame up in the minds of all, that innocence is not only a rare thing, but has wholly ceased to exist." Add to this dark picture of an age of corruption and vice the wars of aggression in all ages, and of conquest without even the paltry pretense of " extending the area of freedom "—too often for a French or Napoleonic love of " glory;" add the intrigues, lusts, rapines, and murders of all times, including the finest portions and palmiest days of Christendom; the revival of the slave-trade in the noon of the nineteenth century, uncondemned by the courts of "the land of the free and the home of the brave," and with the augmented horrors of a "middle passage" under the vigilance of a frowning world; add the developments of border-ruffianism, in Congress and out of it, scorning reason and truth to carry a purpose of oppressive and lustful conquest; add the recklessness of a perverse nature that so often utters the maxims: "rule or ruin," and " after us the deluge;" and from such historic data what shall we infer? Shall we say that all this badness is only a lowering of the general tone of morals, which yet spares the inmost integrity of each individual of the race? Shall we say that the evil infests society, and pervades the mass, injuring-fatally no single member? The wide differences of character that have been ever observed, oppose this view. The distinctions of good men and bad men have not been regarded as mere differences in degree, but distinctions radical; and though they may have been sometimes made by false tests and standards, yet wherever there has been enough of moral truth for a true and just standard, the same distinctions have been made none the less. Here is a very strong presumption that, as many seem far more bad than good, so as to be commonly reckoned on the whole bad, the badness which is so large in the aggregate may in some individuals be more concentrated, so as radically to affect and determine the character.
Various examples, I think, confirm our fears that some men are hopelessly bad. And I shall not seek my examples among the lower classes of men, so often given over as past saving, or as not worth saving, by the elite of society. Here is one, of the great corruptions that Christ came to rebuke, — the " respect of persons" or of outward appearances and advantages, which often make men really worse instead of better. Akin to this is the common condemnation of men because ignorant, skeptical, or unorthodox. So the Pharisees said: " This people_ that know not the law are accursed." And in modern times the term " miscreant " has grown out of the same feeling that no man could be worse than a misbeliever; for that is the meaning of the reproachful word. The mission of Christ, who made himself the "friend of publicans and sinners," was in part to condemn this false and pernicious method of judgment.
Here it may be urged that Christ extended his charity to all classes. " Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do," was his dying prayer. But it may be fairly questioned whether the prime instigators and contrivers of his death were included in this petition of mercy. The account occurs in Luke 23: 33, 34: " And when they were come to the place. which is called Calvary, there they crucified him, and the malefactors; one on the right hand and the other on the left. Then said Jesus, Father forgive them, for they know not what they do." This condonation may apply only to the Romans, who were the instruments employed by those who plotted his death, and to others who might fairly plead some excuse of ignorance. Luke tells us in the next verse, with two intervening statements, that " the rulers derided him;" and though Christ felt no resentment or revenge, we cannot, in a strict interpretation of the passage, make the act of pardon cover the argument of my opponent. Especially is this view discouraged by what Christ had before said to the class in question, "Ye have both seen and hated both me and my Father;" and on another occasion, " If ye were blind, ye should have no sin; but now ye say, We see; therefore your sin remained." With which agrees that of John, " There is a sin unto death; I say not that ye shall pray for it."
For examples of apparently bad men, then, I will name: — (2.) Balaam. This man, who had very important gifts of prophecy, seems after all to have had none of that charity or holy love without which one is nothing. He is preeminently an instance—and as such Bishop Butler has wisely selected him — of the power of man to act wickedly, against the fullest conviction both bf duty and, of interest. He was well persuaded that Jehovah was the true God, and that one's highest welfare, if not the only salvation, was in his favor. " Surely there is no enchantment against Jacob, neither is there any divination against Israel." (Num. 23: 23.) " There shall come a Star out of Jacob, and a Scepter shall rise out of Israel, and shall smite the corners of Moab, and destroy all the children of Sheth." (24: 17.) " Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his." (23: 10.) Such were his utterances in the rapture of the prophetic spirit. Yet this same man, for filthy lucre's sake, contrived a plan by which he should seduce the Israelites into idolatry with its usual vices, so he might feel warranted in pronouncing upon them the curse which Balak craved. If it be said that he did this in the confidence that nothing could harm the Israelites,— as some have excused the treason of Judas against Jesus, — then we must consider that after the seduction was accomplished and the curse pronounced, and twenty-four thousand of the Israelites had perished, he joined the army of Balak to meet their attack. If he expected Balak would conquer, he accepted the bribe and repeated the guilt which procured it. If he expected the Israelites to conquer, he gave up all hope of dying the death of righteous people, or of interest in their inheritance. In either case, we do not wonder that the Jews regarded him as a thoroughly bad mad, and that the early Christians called the sin of simony after his odious name.
(2.) Nero. This emperor of Rome, in the earlier part of his government, was restrained by the counsels of Seneca, and seemed likely to disappoint the gloomy expectations of the people. But he soon entered upon a career of infamous lust and crime. His mother, wife, and many other relatives, were put to death by him. Seneca was sacrificed to his jealousy. Tacitus remarks that, after the murder of many illustrious personages, he manifested a desire of extirpating virtue itself.
Suetonius asserts positively that the burning of Rome that occurred in his reign was by his command. Tacitus thinks it uncertain whether this was by his order, or by accident; he says, however, that all Nero's efforts failed to quiet the general suspicion that he fired the city, and for this reason he charged the crime upon the Christians. There is no doubt that during the conflagration he sung the Fall of Troy to the music of the lyre, looking upon the scene from a tower.
Niebuhr regards this as simply showing that Nero was mad, though he says that after the murder of Agrippina he " abandoned himself more and more to bloodshed, and delighted in it." Admitting that he was insane, the question still remains whether moral causes did not mainly produce his insanity; for all his derangement was apparently moral rather than mental. And if so, what proof have we that such a morbid condition, such disease of the soul, might not end in its proper death?
I have met another solution of the rational difficulties in the way of Nero's salvation. A Universalist to whom I mentioned his playing while Rome was burning, thought that was rather a hopeful feature of the case. For Shakespeare has said The man that hath no music in himself, Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds, Is fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils."
But Nero was evidently no such man, for he could sing. " So much the worse," said I, " for the common opinion is that he played the lyre just because Rome was burning." My friend was not so sure of that, and thought that as we all need charity we should have a little for Nero. This seemed to me like stretching the veil of charity to meet a case and cover a theory — until it was rent. The question remains: Was Nero so unmoved by the calamities of half the people, that he could enjoy the poetry of their blazing homes? If so, was he radically good or bad?
(3.) Caesar Borgia. Ranke says of this ambitious son of Pope Alexander 6., " He bad caused his brother, who stood in his way, to be murdered and thrown into the Tiber. His brother was attacked and stabbed on the steps of the palace by his orders. The wounded man was nursed by his wife and sisters; the sister cooked his food, in order to secure him from poison, and. the Pope set a guard before his house to protect his son-in-law from his son—precautions which Caesar derided. He said, ' What is not done by noon, may be done by evening.' When the prince was recovering from his wounds, Caesar burst into his chamber, drove out the wife and sister, called an executioner, and ordered the unfortunate prince to be strangled. . . . He killed Peroto, Alexander's favorite, while clinging to his patron and sheltered by the pontifical mantle. The Pope's face was sprinkled with blood. . . . Rome trembled at his name. Cesar wanted money and had enemies; every night murdered bodies were found in the streets. Men lived in seclusion and silence; there was none who did not fear that his turn would come. Those whom force could not reach were taken off by poison."
There were, if possible, " greater abominations than these." The record of them is cited by Gordon in his lives of the father and the son, in modest Latin which may satiate the curious.
(4.) Colonel Francis Chartres. " Of immense wealth and of aristocratic connection, every effort was turned to the gratification of animal passion. Even in his old age, his body burned to a cinder, the fire of passion continued unabated. Utterly impotent in body, he pursued the shadow of the same lusts with the same energy with which he had pursued their substance." He was executed in the year 1730, at the age of seventy, for an attempt at rape. The following epitaph was written by Dr. Arbuthnot:— Here continued to rot the body of Francis Chartres, who, with an inflexible constancy and inimitable uniformity of life, persisted, in spite of age and infirmities, in the practice of every human vice, excepting prodigality and hypocrisy. His insatiable avarice exempted him from the first, his matchless impudence from the second. . . . He was the only person of his time who could cheat without the mask of honesty, and retain his primeval meanness when possessed of ten thousand a year; and, having deserved the gibbet for what he did, was at last condemned to die for what he could not do.
Along with Chartres I may allude to Count Cenci, so abandoned to lust as to attempt the ravishment of his own daughter. The account of him may be found in a tale recently translated, " Beatrice Cenci." It is doubted by some whether so over true a story should be read.
(5.) Bertrand Barere. This man is known to many of your readers from the account of him by Macaulay. Those who have read that account, I think, will not say that the French Revolution, with its Reign of Terror, made him what he was; but that he more than any other man made them what they were. Let those who have read say whether Macaulay is rash in his opinion "that Barere approached nearer than any person mentioned in history or fiction, whether man or devil, to the idea of consummate and universal depravity. In him the qualities which are proper objects of hatred, and the qualities which are the proper objects of contempt, preserve an exquisite and absolute harmony. In almost every particular sort of wickedness he has had rivals. His sensuality was immoderate; but this was a failing common to him with many great and amiable men. There have been many men as cowardly as he, some as cruel, a few as mean, a few as impuDeut. There may also have been as great liars, though we never met with them or read of them. But when we put every thing together, sensuality, poltroonery, baseness, effrontery, mendacity, barbarity, the result is something which in a novel eve should condemn as caricature, and to which, we venture to say, no parallel can be found in history."
(6.) The perpetrator of the " Three Memorable Murders," of whom De Quincey says:— To an epicure in murder, such as Williams, it would be taking away the very sting of the enjoyment, if the poor child should be suffered to drink off the bitter cup of death without fully apprehending the misery of the situation. . . . The logic of the case, in short, all rested on the ultra fiendishness of Williams. . . . Our present murderer is fastidiously finical in his exactions —a sort of martinet in the scenically grouping and draping of the circumstances in his murders. . . . Let the reader who is disposed to regard as exaggerated or romantic the pure fiendishness imputed to Williams, recollect that except for the luxurious purpose of basking and reveling in the anguish of dying despair, he had no motive at all, small or great, for attempting the murder of the young girl. She had seen nothing, heard nothing — was fast asleep, and her door was closed; so that, as a witness against him, he knew that she was as useless as any of the three corpses. And yet he was making preparations for her murder, when the alarm in the street interrupted him. (Note Book, pp. 53, 54.)
The "three corpses" do not mark the three murders, but the third murder.
The reader should also peruse De Quincey's essay on " Murder as one of the Fine Arts," in his volume of " Miscellaneous Essays." I quote De Quincey the more willingly, because, Caking the common view of man's immortal nature, he seems to be a Restorationist.
I mention these examples, not because I would assume the divine prerogative of judgment upon the cases; I do no such thing. I do not assert that all or any of these apparently quite bad men are lost. I simply cite the facts of history respecting them, to show what may be true of their radical characters, and to show that in a human, and even a humane, judgment of character, we are not warranted in asserting their final regeneration and salvation as heirs of an " eternal weight of glory."
I need not multiply examples, for the argument does not turn on numbers. If it did, I think almost any one might name instances of apparently utter abandonment, or of persons in whom the religious faculty, once excited, had afterwards apparently died out. I have known such persons; and in each case the apparent death of the spiritual capacity could be directly traced to a deliberate resolve to please one's self out of the way of manifest duty, and that resolution was considered final, and was made in view of all supposable consequences, here or hereafter. Some points here raised will be considered more fully in my closing chapter; but this class of cases gives some support to a strict interpretation of the Parable of the Sower. Such are the seed falling on stony ground, or among thorns; it is as if the soul had but one germ of religious vitality; and when this is quickened and fails to take root, or to become a radical and ruling principle, the proper life of the soul is expired forever.
The Scriptures speak of a sin against the Holy Ghost. Whether that is strictly unpardonable will be considered in the next chapter. But I may here give my view of the nature of it, to meet an argument that will doubtless be offered by my opponent, from the many cases of conversion of very hardened and abandoned men. I think that in all such cases there had been no flagrant sin against conscientious conviction. Either the law or the love of God had never been fully understood. The sense of duty or of mercy in all such cases comes with an original and fresh power, upon a heart before blinded, or upon feelings blunted by bad or even vicious habit, reaching for the first time the inmost core and center of the nature, and inspiring there a spiritual and immortal life. So it was with Paul—fierce persecutor as he was, he had never disowned the principle of duty, though sadly, and not without fault, mistaken in the details of it. So it was with John Newton — carrying on an active traffic in the persons of his fellow-men, "ignorantly, through unbelief." My Universalist friends are very familiar with such cases, and I am glad of it. I wish my orthodox friends knew them as well. They relieve our Wes of the degraded and the outcast, and rightly interpreted, they give fresh zeal to our efforts for fallen humanity. But ten thousand such cases do not relieve one instance of contempt of duty, and of mercy, and of man, and of God, deliberately cherished under the full blaze of the gospel's blessed light; and I do believe there are such instances.
Do the scriptures teach the immortality of man as a race, or of the good — or those who shall become good—as a class?
§ 1. Is the proper immortality of man ASSUMED in the Bible?
HERE, at the outset, we meet the question whether man is naturally immortal. We may call this the question of the immortality of the soul; or, if that phrase seems too technical and metaphysical, it is the more general question whether all human beings are destined actually and absolutely to an immortal life, without forfeiture or failure.
The older Universalists, as Winchester and Huntington, holding the old opinion that sin against an infinite God deserves endless woe, regarded eternal life not as of man's nature or desert, but as once forfeited, and now bestowed as an act of grace. They held that all had been liable to " eternal death." And if we take this phrase in its literal sense, as signifying the loss of immortality, we should then have at once a doctrine of conditional immortality, and we should say nothing more about any absolute immortality of the soul or of man.
But modern Universalists, if I am not mistaken, do not allow any notion of forfeiture or of speculative contingency in respect to immortality. They say it would be either unjust to man, or unworthy of God, that He should allow such a being as man, · by any possible means or supposition, to fail of the immortality for which he was created. And in this view the word death, as used in the Scriptures, can have no reference whatever to the being of the soul, or to the loss of immortality, but it can refer only to the dissolution of the body, or to such a low moral or spiritual state as is, for the time, no better than death itself.
Universalists at this day, I say, will hardly allow the idea of annihilation as a thought to be in anywise entertained. I may be mistaken; but I think the following criticism of my heterodox book, from my very good friend, the editor of the Christian Inquirer (Dec. 19, 1857), is only a strong statement of the real views of Universalists generally. The Inquirer says:— He admits the possibility of the annihilation of the soul of man, which argues a want of appreciation of its exceeding worth, its dignity, and divinity. We cannot but feel that any man who esteems the image of God at so light a figure that it could by any possibility of its earthly action, choice, experience, or condition, come within the verge of the shadow of annihilation, is not fitted to write upon the immortality of man. He speaks of what be does not know, and testifies of what he has not seen. The creation points to man as the crown and completion of its long ages of change and refining development, the king and climax of its several departments of vegetable and animal growth. History and revelation confirm all that nature hints of the honor and greatness of the spiritual nature. To believe in the remotest contingency or possibility of 'the utter extinguishment of these souls, is to throw a disastrous eclipse over all those teachings and hopes they inspire, and destroy all moral perspective. If we admit that one soul will be annihilated, we admit that all souls may be; we lose the absolute certainty of immortality; we begin to sink ever so little in a fathomless gulf of soulless and atheistic nonentity.
Abating the strong statement of the case, the above, I think, expresses the common view and sentiment of your readers. But if so, it cuts off all proof of the natural immortality of man, from two of the passages most relied on by Universalists. I refer to Rom. 5. 12-21, and 1 Cor. 15. 12-58. For it is manifest that if these passages teach the final salvation and actual immortality of all men, they equally teach that man has been subject to utter death, and liable to annihilation T the very thing which is held unjust to man or unworthy of God. Life and death are in these passages put in contrast. The death came by Adam; the life comes by Christ. If the life includes immortality, the death implies annihilation; and it follows that man is no more absolutely immortal, or by a strict nature, but by grace; by a regaining of what was lost; by a recovery of what was forfeit; by a redemption — a rescue from the jaws of the very monster which it is supposed has no place nor right in all the universe of God.
The only escape from this view that annihilation has been invited and confronted by man, is in supposing that Rom. 5. 12-21, and 1 Cor. 15. 12-58, refer not to life and death of man's being, but either, literally, of man's body, or, metaphorically, of his moral nature. The immortality of the soul is then no longer expressed or directly taught in those passages, but assumed and implied. So much for the present; what the passages do refer to, we will inquire hereafter.
Another important passage relied on to prove the final salvation of all is that in Luke 20. 35-38. And this is also relied on by some as explicitly declaring the immortality of all. The phrase, " Neither can they die anymore," is applied to all mankind. But we need only remark that the expression, "they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world," etc., is at least partitive in form; the whole passage taken alone would not suggest the immortality of all, but of a class only; the proof that it applies to all must be derived from other passages. Hence it is simply accurate to say that the immortality of all men is not here named, or explicitly taught.
Now orthodox writers, in saying that " the immortality of the soul is rather assumed, or taken for granted, than explicitly revealed in the Bible," have been obviously consistent because they have not applied these three passage's to all mankind. A single orthodox writer, maintaining the immortality of the lost, has endeavored to show that the last-named passage applies to all; but his attempt to relieve the silence of the Scriptures on the immortality in question only adds a manifest burden to the orthodox argument; for he would have those elsewhere called the "children of the wicked one" here called the "children of God." (J. H. Hinton, Athanasia, pp. 423-443.) What the passage means is to be seen hereafter.
But it will be found as really consistent for the Universalist to say that the immortality of the soul is not explicitly taught, but silently assumed in the Bible. For if he claims that it is taught in Rom. 5. 12-21, and 1 Cor. 15. 12-58, his argument, as we have seen, proves more than he admits; it proves too much. Hence I think the Universalist labors under the same general difficulty, with the Orthodox, respecting the profound silence of the Scriptures on a very weighty matter,—their utter failure to name the immortality of the soul as such, or the immortality of man as man. And I may therefore here repeat, with some variations, the argument I have .published on this subject.
To propose the argument more distinctly I should say that I reserve two or three passages supposed to imply the immortality in question, for separate consideration. The point now urged is that man's immortality is nowhere either directly asserted or made the burden of a proposition, nor ' stated, mentioned, spoken of, or alluded to, in proper terms. As Olshausen says, " the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and the name are alike unknown to the entire Bible." Such expressions as to live or to exist forever, to be immortal, the immortal soul, etc., never occur in the Scriptures with plain reference to the nature of man or the destiny of the human family. If such be the doctrine of Scripture, it is not told, but quietly taken for granted and assumed.
For argument's sake I will admit this; and we will compare this supposed implicit doctrine of the Bible with another doctrine doubtless assumed in that volume, and with which the doctrine in question is often associated as one of the main pillars of all religious truth. I mean, of course, the doctrine of God's existence; which I say is assumed or taken for granted because it is never made the burden of a proposition. The doctrine of one God is sometimes asserted against that of many gods. And in one instance (Heb. 11. 6), where the nature of faith is the point in question, the existence of God appears in a subordinate statement, by which the doctrine is explicitly assumed; but even this is a single case.
Now I assert that we might expect these two truths to receive similar treatment in the Bible. For the questions of God's existence and of man's immortality are of precisely the same importance to man himself: Not of the same absolute importance, to the universe at large; for in that relation the eternal duration of a billion human souls might be only as a drop in the ocean, to the existence of an infinite and eternal God. And therefore, if the universe had been divided into two halves, ruled by two Gods, and if the Bible were a volume of diplomatic documents and messages exchanged between the two deities, then we might suppose a bare allusion in it to the existence of the people of this earth, and nothing said whether they would at all live forever. All nations are as the dust of the balance, compared with the Deity. " He sits upon the circle of the earth, and the inhabitants thereof are as grasshoppers before him." But the Bible is no such book of state papers, or of royal correspondence. It is not a majestic thundering, from deity to deity, uttered from Sinai to Olympus, or from nebula to nebula, in which the children of Adam might be overlooked and forgotten; but it is a special revelation from the Supreme God to the sons of Adam. And it is a revelation for their special instruction and benefit and behoof; and so exclusively for them is it designed, that all the rest of the universe is put by it in the background, and it seems to make the earth the center of the world, insomuch that its apparent meaning once imprisoned the reformer in astronomy, Galileo; and the star gazers can now tell us more about the universe than the Bible itself does. And this confined and exclusive character of the revelation, with which geologists and astronomers have sometimes quarreled, is just and proper because the dearest personal interests of man's immortality are as important to him as all worlds beside, and as the being of God himself. Whether God exists at all and whether man lives forever, are questions of equal moment to man. Hence I say that in the revelation of God's character and of man's destiny, these two doctrines, if equally true, should be treated alike; we should expect to find them on the same footing.
If, then, One of these cardinal truths is stated in the Bible explicitly and directly, we should expect the same of the other. If one is expressed not directly, but explicitly assumed, with frequent mention and allusion, we should expect the same of the other. If one is assumed implicitly and silently, — taken as a doctrine too clear for doubt and scarcely needing to be named, we should expect the same of the other.
But in fact these doctrines receive in the Bible the widest difference of treatment. That of the divine existence, as I have already remarked, is not directly asserted; but it is assumed as too clear for assertion. It is taken as a first truth of the religious consciousness, to prove which would be preposterous. The Bible never goes into debate with the atheist.
· If one says in his heart, " there is no God," there is no help for him in logic. But while this truth is taken for granted in the Bible, so far from being tacitly assumed, it is named and alluded to in various forms of speech, continually. It stands out, in bold relief, on almost every page. In two short books only is it not named, — Esther and the Song of Solomon, —and their inspiration has been questioned on that ground. In every other book this doctrine is the apple of gold in the picture of silver. It is the central truth, that makes the Bible a Discourse of God — the Word of God. It is the Shekinah that renders it sacred and "holy." And with manifold names, and expressions of the wisdom, power, and goodness of God, do the Scriptures invite men to the faith, love, and service of Him. If we strike out from the record those passages that tell of His being and His works, we reduce the dimensions of the volume almost by half, we make it a book without sense or meaning, we exchange its radiant light for midnight darkness.
But if we expunge from the same book all those passages in which man's immortality is expressly mentioned or unquestionably assumed, we leave the volume unchanged. It might have been written precisely as it is, and the revelation would have been just as complete as it is, if the sacred writers had agreed to ignore that doctrine now so much on the lips of men, or at least, to speak about it so obscurely that their words should settle nothing in the case.
Whence this contrast in the scriptural treatment of these ideas? Will it be said that man's immortality is sufficiently clear to man's unaided reason? But that important truth ought to be exceedingly clear to human reason, which need not be named in a revelation. And if the more obvious truth is named less frequently because more obvious, then man's immortality should be as much clearer than God's existence as a thousand is greater than zero; for this is about the numerical ratio in which the truths are named.
No one will claim that the soul's immortality is so clear past all shadow or dream of doubt. But if we suppose, for argument's sake, that it is too clear to need explicit mention in the Bible, we only encounter a new difficulty. The revelation which God should make to man is of necessity given in man's language; not only in a human dialect, but also in the current phrases of human speech, including many proverbial expressions. But if the immortality of men were so clear a doctrine of the human reason, it must be a most cherished sentiment, and must give rise to many familiar expressions—household words of natural theology. In fact, the doctrine has created various forms of expression that reveal the sentiment, wherever it has been believed. These now appear in the daily speech of Christendom, and we shall find them also in the old forms of gentile philosophy. Why, then, are such expressions wholly avoided and unknown in the Bible? Why should the spirit of prophecy, that catches so readily the language of men, have failed to conform to their style of thought in this most important item of their own immortal nature? If man is born an heir of the future eternity, why is he not invited and encouraged to its suitable virtues by some mention of the fact? The gift of immortality is surely preeminently worthy of God's sacred mention to those who think and say so much of their supposed possession of the boon. Why has he not deigned to say a plain word about a nature in man which would be the chief element of the divine image in him?
Such are our difficulties, on the supposition that man's proper immortality is too clear to need mention in a revelation. Turning from the supposition to the facts, we only meet a new difficulty in the anxious doubts of long generations on this very question. Because man was made for immortality, we find in his fallen nature, through all history, some sentiment of the birthright he had lost. He finds himself subject to death; but he also finds, or thinks he finds, some remnant within him of that which is too good to die. Is death an eternal sleep? or, "If a man die, shall he live again?" This was the Question of Ages. But when it came to be answered, and "Life and Immortality were brought to light," there was not a word said respecting the immortal nature of which there had been so much talk. He who "had the words of eternal life" never said that all men were to live forever. He never spoke of the life that he gave as an attribute or quality of some other essential life which men already possessed.
As I have remarked already, the Universalist will not probably claim that Christ gave immortality to all men; for this would imply that it had been lost. He will say rather that Christ revealed and gave assurance of what was already true. Thus a writer on 2 Tim. 1. 10, in the Universalist Quarterly (vol. 2. p. 55), says: "Immortality of some beings was brought to light; but not surely the immortality of angels or of beings in another sphere of action. It was the immortality of mankind. But this could not have been disclosed, unless it had been possessed as an inherent attribute of the soul, prior to its disclosure—before the appearing of Christ." But Christ never said that men are immortal. His own words are never such as to describe such an existing fact. And the expression "brought to light" does not require such an interpretation. It may as naturally signify that he pointed out the way of life; 'or that he showed that there is immortality for man, and how it may be gained. And this accords perfectly with the general tenor of his language. "I am the way, and the truth, and the life." "He that eats of this bread shall live forever." " God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life.". "Because I live, ye shall live also." Whether these and similar expressions cover the doctrine of immortality, I shall examine hereafter. But if they do, we see at once that they confirm my interpretation of the phrase in question.
And equally significant, it seems to me, is the silence of Paul respecting the immortality of the soul. It may be said that the Jews were too little philosophic, or too full of national conceit and prejudice, to think of such an immortality, good for all nations and all men. 'But Paul surely suffered no such lack of culture, nor such narrowness. He was the apostle of the Gentiles; and he who could quote the gentile poets, and was even more a logician than a poet, could not have been so grossly ignorant of the Grecian philosophy as to know nothing of its doctrine of immortality. Why did he, then, never speak of the immortality of the soul? Or, if he thought that too abstract and metaphysical a form of thought, why did he not speak of an immortal nature in man? or of man as somehow immortal? Nay, if he thought the Greeks in the truth respecting a universal immortality, but in error respecting the nature or method of it, why did he not take special pains to recognize their half of the truth, and complete the doctrine by showing the connection between its two parts? When some mocked at the mention of the resurrection of the dead, why did he not show that immortality did not at all depend on the resurrection? And when, in that most ample discussion in the 15th chapter of 1st Corinthians, he made a supposition of no resurrection, why did he say, " Then they which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished"?
The sum is this: The Scriptures, given to reveal God's character and man's duty and destiny, speak of the divine existence many hundred times and in considerable variety of ways; but they speak of man's proper immortality, equally important to himself, never. And though the question had been long agitated among men, and the doctrine was incarnated in men's language, Christ, coming to illustrate the subject, said nothing of the doctrine. And Paul, whose education and mission pointed him out as the man to name and teach so great a truth, has failed to do it. The question arises whether the supposed taking for granted of man's immortality is not an assumption out of the Bible, and foreign to it.
This argument from the persistent silence of the Scriptures respecting man's immortality I regard as the main argument of my book; and it is so regarded by others. It is passed over in silence by three of my reviewers: D. N. Lord, Theological and Literary Journal, April, 1858; Dr. J. Strong, Methodist Quarterly Review, July, 1858; and Dr. A. Hovey, State of the Impenitent Dead. Another reviewer, Prof. E. P. Barrows, Bibliotheca Sacra, July, 1858, entirely misapprehends the argument; he proceeds as if I had in mind only the "immortality of the soul" in the technical or metaphysical sense, though I devote a paragraph (p. 162) to prevent such a misconception. I know the professor too well to suspect him of an intentional ignoratio elenchi; but the ignorantia elencbi is manifest.
I think that my argument from the silence of the Scriptures respecting man's immortality receives additional force from some facts among the Spiritualists. They offer the spiritual manifestations as proving more than almost anything else the immortality of the soul. Those Spiritualists who reject the Bible will naturally regard its teachings as defective on this subject. But how is it with those who accept the Bible? I cannot speak from very general acquaintance or reading; but I have read enough to know that the following incident means something. The first lecturer on Spiritualism whom I have heard, informed us he had been a Methodist preacher. He found himself in trouble because he could not prove the 'im-mortality of the soul from the Bible. He told his perplexity to a friend; yet he found no relief, but aggravation of his difficulty, for his friend was in the same predicament. The friend, however, thought that what the Church had always held must be true, and he must preach it indulging no private speculations on the subject. Our lecturer replied that God gave him the faculty of reason, and he did not dare to forego the use of it; he must think for himself. And he thought he could now prove the desired immortality, thus: Matter is eternal. Whatever produces material effects is matter. The spirits do this; hence they are material and eternal; and the Bible, recognizing their existence, teaches thus the immortality of the soul.
The argument of our lecturer plainly proved a great deal too much,—a past eternal existence, as well as a future im-mortality, and that of all species of life. It was pretty straight pantheism. Yet I doubt whether the lack of faith among orthodox Christians in a Providence that could give immortal life to the worthy alone, or their reliance on immortality from some " nature of things," has not helped forward this modern style of pantheism.
§. 2. Is the immortality of the soul IMPLIED in the Scriptures?
A truth which does not lie on the surface of an expression, or in the form of its words, may yet be very clearly contained or implied in it. Is the immortality of man thus taught in the Bible? A very few passages only need here to be considered.
Gen. 1. 26, 27: " And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. . . . So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him."
I think this can prove no more than the creation of man for immortality, of which, nevertheless, he might fail. I think the expression in the Book of Wisdom, 2. 23, denotes just this: "God made man for immortality (ep' aphtharsia), and to the image of his own nature made he him. But by the envy of the Devil death came into the world." Some editions of the Apocrypha have the word eternity instead of nature; but this is a false reading of aidiotetos instead of idiotetos, which has been remarked by various scholars. And I think the context shows that the prospective immortality was, in the opinion of the Jews, cut off by the entrance of death. This appears more fully from the entire context, which I think signifies the im-mortality of the righteous alone:— " And they [the wicked] knew not the secrets of God, nor hoped for the reward of: righteousness, nor esteemed the honor of holy souls. For God made man for incorruption, and to the image of his own nature made he him. But by the envy of the Devil death came into the world; and they follow him that are of his side. But the souls of the just are in the hand of God, and torment may not touch them. In the sight of the unwise they seemed to die, and their exit was reckoned a calamity, and their departure from us utter destruction; but they are in peace. For though in the sight of men they are punished, their hope is full of immortality."
This passage may be taken as showing how the Jews understood that in Genesis, and my view is supported by an expression in chapter 15. 3: " The just live forever (eis ton aitina), and their reward is in the Lord."
And two expressions in the New Testament seem to denote that the divine image in man is a moral likeness. Eph. 4. 24: " Put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness." Col. 3. 10: "And have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him." From this we should not infer that actual holiness was concreated in man; for character cannot be created by another. Rather, I should take it, man was made with a capacity and design for, godliness, or godlikeness, and thus for immortality. Now that which is moral is primary and ruling; that which is physical is subordinate. If the godlikeness fails, the immortality may follow.
Gen. 2. 7: " And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul."
Few of your readers, I presume, need to be told that the Hebrew phrase for " living soul " is in chapter 1. 30, applied to the brutes. And in chapter 7. 22, we have a still stronger expression: "All in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of lives (nishmatla ruach chajini) died." In 1 Cor. 15. 45, the phrase is put in a contrast which directly intimates that Adam was not made absolutely immortal: " The first Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit."
Eccl. 3. 21: " Who knoweth the spirit of man that-goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth? "
This text would be unworthy of attention in this argument if it were not so often adduced by many orthodox people. I am happily ignorant of the Universalist treatment of it. Suffice it to say, the previous verse,—"All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again," —and still more . the 19th verse, sustain the view which takes it as a challenge; q. d.:" Who knows whether the spirit of man goes upward?" etc. It is a piece of Solomon's skepticism, which proves Epicureanism and French atheism if it proves anything. That it should get into a " Scripture Manual" as a proof-text that man will live as long as God does, shows either a sad state of traditional reasoning, or a great meagerness of orthodox argument.
Eccl. 12. 7: " Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was; and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it."
Here the Preacher speaks more as a moralist, and, as the last two verses show, with some sentiment of piety. Yet his whole book yields scarcely a glimpse of immortality. The " judgment" named in verse 14, if after death, proves no eternal life. And the expression " shall return to God who gave it" naturally denotes that the spirit reverts back to the disposal of the power that cleated it; and it may intimate a return to original nothingness. This view is strongly supported by an expression of Justin Martyr, treating this very question of immortality. He says: " As the personal man does not always exist, and body and soul are not ever conjoined; but, whenever this harmony must be dissolved, the soul leaves the body, and the man is no more; so likewise, whenever it is necessary that the soul should no longer be, the vital spirit leaves it, and the soul is no more, but itself returns again thither whence it was taken." (Dial. c. Trypho, c. 6.)
§ 3. The General Tenor of Scriptural Language.
There are two methods of human thought and investigation synthesis and analysis; the compiling of facts, and the examination of them singly. Neither of these methods is safe or complete without the other. When, therefore, I offer the general tenor of scriptural language on this subject, I do not ask the reader to deem it worth a straw without some consideration of what the language means. For it is at least conceivable that after a hundred passages have been recited, sounding as if they supported one side of a question, they should be one by one transferred to the other side, or removed and thrown out as not referring to the subject,— belonging to neither side.
Before giving my list, therefore, or my enumeration, I remark that it includes most of the passages that seem to refer to the future if not the final destiny of man. It also does not include the greater number of passages in the Old Testament that probably denote temporal destructions or deliverances of the Jews. I think not more than a tithe of the number I give could be claimed as of special Jewish application; and I willingly pay such a tithe in account with the seed of Abraham, with the single remark that if such Old Testament passages signify nothing beyond the grave, then the Jews knew nothing beyond the grave. But then it becomes a fair question whether the passages do not contain a principle, and if the temporal deliverances and destructions were not types of similar results in man's relations to the immortal life. And if it is claimed that many of the passages I count refer to the life or death of the body but not of the soul, I reply that very few passages will be left to be referred to any immortal life. And the question whether they are to be taken literally or metaphorically, will be duly considered. Also the question whether those which speak of everlasting or eternal life, or life eis ton aiona, denote the life of the Christian dispensation, aionian life in some limited sense, or immortal life in the absolute sense.
A very few passages, obviously not referring to man's final destiny (e.g. Isa. 38. 16), are' thrown in as suggesting the literal sense of others which may thus refer. Also two or three asserting God's immortality, because they contain phrases apparently denoting the destiny of good men.
I must ask the indulgence of the reader, or rather his assistance, referring as I do to most passages without quoting them. My best apology is that such passages ought to prove nothing either way if they are not read; and when they are read in their places one has the benefit of the context.
TO LIVE; LIVING.
This do, and thou shalt live (Luke 10. 28; compare Lev. 18. 5; Neh. 9. 29; Prov. 4. 4; 7. 2; Rom. 10. 5; Gal. 3. 12). "Man doth not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeded out of the mouth of the Lord doth man live" (Deut. 8. 3; compare Matt. 4. 4). "Incline your ear and come unto me; hear, and your soul shall live " (Isa. 55. 8; compare 1 Sam. 1. 26; 17. 55; 25. 26; 2 Sam. 11. 11; Ps. 69. 32; 119. 175; Jer. 38. 20).
He is just; he shall surely live (Ezek. 18. 9; compare chapter 3. 21; 18. 17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 32; 20. 11, 13, 21, 25; 33. 10, 11, 18, 15, 16, 19; 37. 3-14). " The just shall live by faith" (Rom. 1. 17; compare Hab. 2. 4; Gal. 3. 11; Heb. 10. 38). See also Ps. 72. 15; 118. 17; 119. 144; Prov. 9. 6; 15. 27; Isa. 26. 14, 19; 38. 16; Luke, 20. 88; John 5. 25; 6. 57 (" He that eats me, even he shall live by me "); 11. 25; 14. 19 (" Because I live, ye shall live also"); Rom. 6. 8; 8. 13; 2 Cor. 13. 4; Gal. 2. 19, 20; 1 Thess. 5. 10; 2 Tim. 2. 11; 1 John 4. 9.
Shall be called holy, every one that is written among the living in Jerusalem (Isa. 4. 3). See also Pa. xxvii. 13; lii. 5; lvi. 13; 69. 28; 116. 9; cxlii. 5; Matt. 22. 32; Mark 12. 27; Luke 20. 38.
TO LIVE FOR EVER, (Gk. eis ton dons; Heb. olam.)
He that eats of this bread shall live forever (John 6. 51, 58). See also Gen. 3. 22; Deut. 32. 40 (" I [Jehovah] lift up my hand to heaven, and say, I live forever"); Ps. 22. 26; 49. 9.
LIFE.
Tree of life (Gen. 2. 9; 3. 22, 24; Prov. 3. 18; Rev. 2. 7; 22. 14). " The soul of my lord shall be bound in the bundle of life with the Lord thy God" (1 Sam. 25. 29). " Thou wilt show me the path of life " (Ps. 16. 11 compare Acts 2. 28). " I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore choose life" (Deut. 30. 19; compare 5. 15; Jer. 21. 8. This and the following passages, I offer as typical, and as containing a principle: Deut. 32. 47; Ps. 30. 5; 34. 12; 36. 9; xci. 16; Prow. 3. 2, 22; 4. 22, 23; 5. 6; 6. 23; 8. 35; 10. 11, 16, 17; 11. 19, 30; 12. 28; 13. 12, 14; 14. 27 (" The fear of the Lord is a fountain of life "); 15. 4, 24 (" The way of life is above to the wise, that he may depart from Sheol beneath "); 19. 23; 21. 21; Eccl. 7. 12). " Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, that leadeth unto life; and few there be that find it " (Matt. 7. 14). " It is better for thee to enter into life," etc. (Matt. 18. 8, 9; compare Mark 9. 43-45). " If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments " (Matt. 19. 17). " Shall not see life " (John 3. 36). " Resurrection of life " (John 5. 29). " Ye will not come unto me, that ye might have life" (John 5. 40; compare 10. 10; 20. 31). " I am the bread of life " (John 6. 35; compare vs. 33, 48, 51, 53, 63; also chapter 1. 4; 8. 12; 11. 25; 14. 6; Acts 3. 15; Col. 3. 4; 1 John 1. 1, 2).
Book of life (Phil. 4. 3; Rev. 3. 5; 13. 8; 17. 8; 20. 12, 15; 21. 27; 22. 19). " Water of life " (Rev. 21. 6; 22. 1, 17; compare chapter 7. 17; John 4. 10; 7. 38). " Crown of life " (Jas. 1. 12; Rev. 2. 10).
See also Rom. 5. 17, 18; 7. 10; 8. 6, 10; 2 Cor. 2. 16 (" Savor of death unto death, and of life unto life "); 3. 6; 5. 4 ("Mortality swallowed up of life"); Gal. 3. 21; Eph. 4. 18; Phil. 2. 16; Col. 3. 3; 1 Tim. 4. 8 ("Godliness, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come; " compare 2 Pet. 1. 3); 2 Tim. 1. 10; Heb. 7. 16; 1 Pet. 3. 7, 10; 1 John 5. 12, 16.
ETERNAL OR EVERLASTING LIFE (zoe aionios.)
The phrase is found once in the Old Testament (Dan. 12. 2), and forty-four times in the New Testament, the places easily found by the concordance. In most instances the expression is partitive, or designates a class of men. Whether the phrase implies immortal life will be considered hereafter.
OTHER EXPRESSIONS APPARENTLY DENOTING IMMORTAL LIFE.
He asked of thee life, and thou gayest it him, even length of days forever and ever (Ps. 21. 4). "Life forevermore" (Ps. 133. 3). Immortality or incorruption; — Athanasia (1 Cor. 15. 53, 54; compare 1 Tim. 6. 16). Aphtharsia, (Rom. 2. 7; 1 Cor. 15. 42, 50, 53, 54; 2 Tim. 1. 10. The word also denotes incorruptness, as in Eph. 6. 24; Tit. 2. 7.* King James' translation of the word is not bad.) Incorruptible (Rom. 1. 23; 1 Cor. 9. 25: 15. 52; 1 Tim. 1. 17; 1 Pet. 1. 4, 23; 3. 4.)
TO DIE.
Shalt surely die (Gen. 2. 17; 3. 4; Ezek. 3. 18; 33. 8, 14). " He that hated reproof shall die_" (Prov. 15. 10; compare 5. 23; 10. 21; 19. 16). " The soul that sinned, it shall die" (i.e. the very person that sins, Ezek. 18. 4; compare vs. 18-32). "That a man may eat thereof and not die " (John 6. 50; compare 11. 26). See also Luke 20. 36 · John 8. 21, 24; Rom. 8. 13.
DEATH.
He that sinned against me wronged his own soul; all they that hate me love death. (Prov. 8. 36. This I offer as containing a principle respecting the future life. Compare 10. 2; 11. 19; 12. 28; 13. 14; 14. 12; 16. 25; 18. 21; Ezek. 18. 32; 33. 11.) " If a man keep my saying he shall never see death " (John 8. 51; compare verse 52). " The wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord " (Rom. 6. 23; compare vs. 16, 21; chapter 5. 12, 14, 21; 1 Cor. 15. 21, 26, 54,455, 56; also the following passages, from which some may argue the metaphorical sense: 7. 5, 10, 13, 24; 8. 2, 6). See also 2 Cor. 2. 16 (" death unto death "); 3. 7; 2 Tim. 1. 10 (" hath abolished death "); Heb. 2. 14, 15; Jas. 1. 14; 1 John 3. 14; 5. 16, 17; Rev. 21. 4.
SECOND DEATH.
This phrase is put in contrast with " crown of life," " resurrection," "book of life," " water of life," Rev. 2. 11; 20. 6, 14; 21. 8. It will be further examined.
TO PERISH; TO BE DESTROYED.
These expressions are the same in the original. I select mostly from the New Testament. " It is not the will of your Father which is in heaven that one of these little ones should perish " (Matt. 18. 14; compare John 3. 15; 10. 28; 1 Cor. 8. 11). " A sweet savor . . . in them that perish . . . of death unto death " (2 Cor. 2. 15, 16; compare 1 Cor. 1. 18; 2 Thess. 2. 10). See also Luke 13. 3; Acts 8. 20; 13. 41; Rom. 2. 12; 1 Cor. 15. 18; 2 Pet. 3. 9. " Shall utterly perish in their own corruption " (2 Pet. 2. 12).
Able to destroy both soul and body in hell (Matt. 10. 28; compare Jas. 4. 12). " Will destroy those husbandmen," etc., (Matt. 21. 41; Mark 12. 9; Luke 20. 16.) See also Rom. 14. 20; (2 Pet. 2. 12; 1 John 3. 8; Jude 1.5. " Every soul which will not hear that prophet shall be utterly destroyed (exolothreuthesetai) from among the people " (Acts 3. 23; compare Deut. 4. 26).
PERDITION; DESTRUCTION.
I discard the conventional sense of the word " perdition " which makes it the same with " damnation," remarking that it strictly means perishing or being destroyed. The question whether these words refer to the body alone, or to the being, is not here decided.
To them an evidence of perdition, but to you of salvation, and that of God (Phil. 1. 28; compare Heb. 10. 39; 2 Pet. 3. 7). "Son of perdition" (John 17. 12; 2 Thess. 2. 3). " Foolish and hurtful lusts which drown men in destruction and perdition " (1 Tim. 6. 9). "The beast . . . that goes into perdition" (Rev. 17. 8, 11).
Broad is the way, etc., (Matt. 7. 13.) " Vessels of wrath, fitted to destruction" (Rom. 9. 22). "Whose end is destruction" (Phil 3. 19; see context). See also 2 Cor. 5. 5; 10. 8; 13. 10; 2 Pet. 2. 1; 3. 16. " Everlasting destruction," (2 Thee. 1. 9; compare 1 Thess. 5. 3; Ps. lii. 5; xcii. 7; Ise. 10. 25; 13. 6. Whether this destruction admits a subsequent salvation is to be considered.)
As part of the general tenor of scriptural language I should name the class of
PASSAGES SUPPOSED TO IMPLY A GENERAL SALVATION.
Luke 20. 38; Rom. 5. 12-21; and 1 Cor. 15. 12-58, are named above. The others most important are the promises that in Christ should all the nations of the earth be blessed" (Gen. 12. 3; 22. 18; 26. 4; Acts 3. 25; Gal. 3. 8; compare Ps. 67. 2; 72. 11, 17; lxxxvi. 9; Isa. 2. 2; Mal. 3. 12; Rev. 15. 4). The mission of Christ to seek and save the lost (Matt. 10. 6; 15. 24; 18. 11; Luke 19. 10). The declaration, "And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me " (John 13. 32). The designation of Christ as the " Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world" (John 1. 29; compare 1 John 2. 2); as the "bread of God that giveth life unto the world" (John 6. 33; compare verse 51); and as the " Savior of the world " (John 4. 42; 1 John 4. 14; compare 1 Tim. 4. 10; 2. 4). See also Rom. 11. 14. The paternal relation and character of God (Isa. 63. 16; 69. 8; Mal. 2. 10; Matt. 6. 9; Luke 11. 2; Acts 17. 26, 28; Heb. 12. 9; but see context, and compare Ps. ciii. 13; Ezek. 18. 4; Matt. 5. 45; John 8. 41-44; Rom. 8. 15). The character of God as loving and merciful (in manifold passages). The restitution of all things (Acts 3. 21). The promises of Christ's universal dominion (Phil 2. 9-11; Isa. 45. 23; 1 Cor. 15. 24-28; Rev. 5. 13). The destruction of death, Satan, and his works (1 Cor. 15. 26, 53; Gen. 3. 15; Heb. 2. 14; 1 John 3. 8; Rev. 20. 14; 21. 4).
This list I do not offer as complete, so the reader will not be prejudiced by its brevity. Several passages concerning God's long-suffering with and repeated forgiveness of the Jews, in the Old Testament, might be added as containing a principle.
Yet if passages declaring the mercy of God are brought into the list, those touching the divine anger, whatever that means, might be added; and, as apparently asserting a limit to the divine forbearance, such a passage as Heb. 3. 7—4. 11.
I have tried what I shall be proud if I have accomplished, to give this " general tenor " impartially. I here add that I do not assume that any of the passages apply to man's final destiny. I simply insist that in the absence of all statement of man's immortality this general tenor has great force; and the same silence respecting an immortal nature in man may admit the application of the common remark, that the literal or ordinary sense of words is prima facie the true sense, overruled only by special considerations. Whether the literal sense shall be applied to physical life and death, or to the question of immortality, is to be considered.
I am very far from asking or expecting that my opponent should examine all these four hundred passages, or even a small fraction of them. If he shows that those which I shall examine do not prove my proposition, I am answered, and that triumphantly, unless I happen to select the weakest passages for proof. For if my chosen texts do not contain my doctrine, there is left an a priori presumption against those I do not select. And if I have failed to present fairly the general tenor of the Scriptures, my opponent may do better.
§ 4. The Exegetical or Analytic Argument.
So much for the general tenor or tone of scriptural language respecting man's destiny. This is the synthetical argument, valuable in its place, but, as I said, indecisive without that other element of reasoning, — the inquiry what individual expressions mean.
I will now therefore examine a few of these passages more particularly; partly to meet certain arguments for their metaphorical sense, and partly to show more directly that they contain the literal sense, and apply to a final destiny.
Gen. 2. 17: " Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eats thereof, thou shalt surely die."
This is claimed, 1st, as applying to temporal or physical death only, not that of the soul; 2dly, as denoting moral or spiritual death only, and not that of the being.
To the first objection it is sufficient to reply for the present that no plain instruction appears to have been given our first parents of a distinction between body and soul as "body mortal" and "soul immortal." Hence, when they saw the brutes around them dying into nothingness, and heard the sentence, " Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return" (Gen. 3. 19), it seems to me they must have had small hope of immortality left, unless by a rescue and redemption. And whether the promised deliverance would accrue to their benefit, or to that of their seed only, they were not told particularly, so far as we are aware. And the expression in Gen. 3. 22, "Lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever," seems a little discouraging in the hour of expulsion from so sweet a paradise. I query whether a Universalist, commissioned to execute the business, using his own words, would have said just so much and then have dropped the subject, to finish his work by guarding the tree of life with forbidding security (ver. 24).
But it is urged, both by the Orthodox and by Universalists, that literal death could not have been intended in the sentence in Gen. 2. 17, because our first parents did not actually die on the day of their sin. It is inferred that the death intended was a moral or spiritual death, commonly called death "in trespasses and sins;" and to support this view the expressions in Eph. 2. 1, 5; Col. 2. 13; Matt. 8. 22 (" Let the dead bury their dead "); 1 Tim. 5. 6 (" is dead while he lives"); Rev. 3. 1 (" Thou hast a name that thou lives, and art dead "), and some others, are frequently cited. And the apparently metaphorical sense of the word in such passages gives a very respectable appearance of argument to show that the threatened Penalty of sin is a death which does not kill.
But I think the argument is only apparent. True, as Adam did not die out on the day he sinned, there must be some figure or trope in the sentence.; but it may still be a trope that leaves the literal sense intact. " There is just such a figure, in frequent use in the Bible and in the common speech of men. Thus, if a person has taken active or subtle poison, by which sooner or later he must die, or has provoked a mortal enemy, or has committed a capital crime, for which he must be detected and sentenced, or is falling from a precipice and must be fatally hurt if not dashed in pieces, — we say "he is a dead man!" And the time of his dying, whether instant or after long years, makes no difference in the proper import and truth of the ex-pression. The literal sense, of course, remains. This figure—of the anticipation of the future as if present—is well known among the rhetoricians, who have bestowed upon it the classic name of prolepsis. I said it occurs in the Bible. The Egyptians applied it to themselves, when the angel of death had smitten their first-born: " We be all dead men." And so the Israelites, when the troop of Korai; was suddenly destroyed: " Behold, we die; we perish; we all perish." And God himself is represented as speaking in the same way to Abimelech " Behold. thou art but a dead man, for the woman which thou hast taken."
And language very similar to that in Gen. 2. 17, occurs in two parallel passages. In Exod. 10. 28, Pharaoh says to Moses: " Get thee from me; take heed to thyself, see my face no more; for in that day thou sees my face, thou shalt die." Would anyone have questioned the veracity of the king, if his threatening had been incurred, and executed after several days, or even weeks or months? Again in 1 Kings 2. 36, 37, Solomon says to Shimei: "It shall be that on the day that thou guest out, and passes over the brook Kidron, thou shalt know for certain that thou shalt surely die." Shimei did go, in pursuit of two fugitive servants, (under the law of Congress, we suppose, as Solomon had no statute so convenient, and thus by a long prolepsis or three thousand years anticipating the future as already present,) all the way from Jerusalem to Gath, and then from Gath to Achish— several days' journey. Did that make the threatening word of Solomon out of date? His last words tell his evident meaning: " Thy blood shall be upon thine own head."
I take the meaning of Gen. 2. 17, to be, then, that life was forfeit by transgression. And this might be the life of the soul no less than of the body; nay, it must appear so if there were no clear intimation that the soul was spared. And the earliest versions and paraphrases, besides able commentators. support the view I have given. The Greek translation of Symmachus (A. D. 200) renders the phrase: " Thou shalt be mortal." The Syriac gives the same sense, which is accepted by Jerome, and by Grotius. The Arabic renders it: " Thou shalt deserve to die." The Targum or paraphrase of Jonathan: " Thou shalt be subject to death," or guilty of death (reus mortis); in like manner Isidore of Pelusium, and an eminent Rabbi, Nachmanides. Some of the Hebrews understood it to mean immediate death, averted by repentance. (See Fagius, in Poole's Synopsis.) Other writers say: " The phrase, Thou shalt die, does not signify the fact of dying, but its necessity and desert." (Cornelius b. Lapide, et. al., in Poole's Synopsis.) Vatablus interprets: " Thou shalt be subject to death, both of body and soul." And Fagius adds that the Hebrews deny not this twofold death. Others: " Say rather that Adam then began to die; that is, by a lingering death of inward wasting and decay." The above are all, save one, varieties of the same proleptic sense, and all are varieties of the literal sense. They differ in form only, while they agree in substance. The sense I have given is also approved by Anselm among the medieval Fathers, and by Dr. Knapp and Dr. J. Muller, among modem German divines.
Of the Jewish opinions I may give some glimpses elsewhere. But the following, from a Rabbi of the sixteenth century, Abarbanel, who knew how to talk of the immortality of the soul, is significant. He says "The wicked in their lifetime are called dead, and their soul is to be destroyed with the ignominy of the body, and will not have immortality or eternity." (Summary of the Faith, c. 24.)
And in one or other of the following passages of the New Testament supposed to sustain the metaphorical sense of death, —Matt. 8. 22; Rom. 6. 11; 8. 11; Eph. 2. 1, 5; Col. 2. 13; 1 Tim. 5. 6; Rev. 3. 1,—I find the sense I have given supported by Theodoret, Chrysostom, Augustine, Erasmus, Calvin, Beza, Turretin, Calovius,,Pareus, Calixtus, Gomar, Grotius, Vitringa, Bendel, Michaelis, Bretschneider, Wahl, Ruckert, Flatt, Fritzsche, Kauffer, Tholuck, Meyer, Hammond, Whitby, Clarke, Macknight. In this view, to be "" dead in trespasses and sins " will mean, to be subject to death by reason of trespasses and sins. And this agrees naturally with the expressions in Ezek. 18. 18: " He shall die in his iniquity." And verse 24: " In his trespass that he hath trespassed, and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die." And John 8. 21, 24: " I said therefore unto you, that ye shall die in your sins: for if ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins." And 1 Cor. 15. 17: " If Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins." The last expression is used of the Corinthian Christians, who were supposed to be converted, regenerate, and no longer in the guilt or bondage of sin. Here the only possible sense is, subjection to the effects or penalty of sin, which is death. Here appears very finely the sense of the Latin word reus, and of the old English word guilty; i.e. liable, but not of course ill deserving.
Some of the above writers are Restorationists. The most. indeed, are orthodox. But my Universalist friends will hardly quarrel with that fact, since the interpretation, so far as it affects the present question, is as unfriendly to the orthodox view as to the Universalist. It goes to refute the notion of a metaphorical death that spares the immortal life of the soul. And hence the effort of a late writer against the view I hold to show that these passages do signify spiritual death.
Prof. Hovey (State of the Impenitent Dead, § 5) takes no notice of the authorities given in my book for the proleptic sense of Gen. 2. 17. His reader might think that I stand alone in my exegesis. He argues against it on the ground that such a lively figure of speech would not suit the formal announcement of a law and its penalty. It might be so in modern legislation, made into a special branch of government and a special business of a deliberative assembly. But God's personal and earnest words to Adam required no formality. This argument and the other reasons given by Prof. H. are freely submitted to those who read both sides.
But I am willing, for argument's sake, to give up any support to my view that comes from my interpretation of all these passages. Allow, for a moment, that "death in trespasses and sins " denotes morally or spiritually dead. What is gained, either to the orthodox view or to the Universalist? If this death is like disease, it remains to be shown that it is not mortal,— that sin is not to the soul what fatal disease is to the body. The metaphorical sense may thus include, rather than exclude, the literal sense. So we say of the abandoned inebriate that he has " destroyed " himself. Instead of foolishly arguing that since he is not dead yet, but staggers boisterously about, he will live forever, and never drop into a drunkard's grave, we say he will certainly die just because he has destroyed himself. So a moral and spiritual death may foreshadow and atmosphere a real and final death of the soul. We shall meet this question again. But here it may be remarked that the expression "dead in trespasses and sins" supports the notion, if not of radical badness in human nature, at least of radical defect; and thus it supports some of the previous argument against the Universalist view. The word dead is a strong word even in a metaphor. The literal sense of Gen. 2. 17, is, I think, pretty fairly sustained. And though the view runs counter to the prevalent notions about the immortality of the soul, the passage applies to the soul as naturally as to the body. And this literal and extended application is proven, I think, by a few passages that speak of tile as a thing to be chosen and gained, and of death as to be shunned. I will name two or three passages. One is in Ezek. 18. 31, 32: " Make you a new heart and a new spirit; for why will ye die, O house of Israel? For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dies, saith the Lord God; wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye."
I think the whole chapter and the class of sins which it mentions, do not favor the reference of this passage to the national life of the Jews as a people. It is remarkable as asserting and insisting on the personal accountability of each man for himself. " The soul that sinned, it shall die," and not one for another's fault. Does the passage, then, refer to the prolonging of life in this world? It does, indeed, unless we suppose the Jews had such hopes of a future life in their own land, by a resurrection, that they might well understand these words as applying thus. I will not positively affirm that they looked so far into the future, in Ezekiel's time; though they did afterwards. If they did then, the passage decidedly favors the future life of the righteous alone. If they understood it only of long life on earth, it has only a typical value in my argument, though that is something.
Luke 10. 25, 28: "Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life? This do and thou shalt live."
I do not now affirm that eternal or aionian life implies immortal life. But the phrase " thou shalt live " naturally suggests the literal sense. If the aionian life, or life of the gospel era, was implied, still Christ must mean more than simply that the lawyer would live on and into the gospel age, by keeping the commandments. If the aionian life was a spiritual and higher life, still Christ's reply no less favors the idea that such -would be the only continuing and immortal life.
John 14. 19: "Because I live, ye shall live also."
This expression cannot easily be referred to a moral or spiritual life, as distinct from life in the literal sense. All the circumstances, as they appear in the previous context, seem to refer the expression to the future destination of the disciples.
I will not leave you comfortless; I will come to you. Yet a little while, and the world sees me no more; but ye see me; because I live, ye shall live also." The same literal interpretation is proven by the words of Christ in John 6. 39, 40, 49, 54: " And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he bath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day. And this is the will of him that sent me, that everyone which sees the Son and believeth on him may have everlasting life; and I will raise him up at the last day.... Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness and are dead. Whoso eats my flesh, and drinks my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day: Rev. 2. 10, 11: " Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life. He that hath an ear, let him hear what the spirit saith unto the churches. He that overcomes shall not be hurt of the second death."
The phrase "second death," which is here contrasted with "a crown of life," occurs in three other places in this book, where it is put in contrast with " resurrection," " book of life," and " water of life." It was also common among the Jews, and the following examples go to show that it meant extinction of being: " Every idolator, who says that there is another God besides me, I will slay with the second death, from which no man can come to life again." (Pirke R. Elieser, c. 34.) " Let Reuben live, and not die the second death, by which the ungodly die in the world to come." (Targum of Jerusalem, on Deut. 33.
6.) " This bath been decreed by the Lord, that this sin shall not be forgiven them, until they die the second death." (Tar-gum on Isa. 22. 14.) I take this to be a periphrastic way of saying that the sin should never be forgiven. So Matt. 12. 31: " It shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in the world to come." David Kimchi, one of the ablest Jewish doctors, says the Targumist means, in the above expression, " the death of the soul in the world to come." Again: " They shall die the second death, and shall not live in the world to come, saith the Lord." (Targum on Jer. 51. 39.) " They shall die the second death, so as not to enter into the world to come." Jer. 51. 57.)
On the phrase " the world to come," I shall speak again. I am aware that Dr. Hammond, who is quoted at length by Mr. Paige in his " Selections," makes some application of the passage in Rev. 20. 6, to the gospel dispensation. He speaks of " the second death, into which they are said to go, that are never to appear in the church again." But this indicates no immortality of the wicked. And the above citations, I think, fully warrant the words of Dr. H.: " Whatsoever be signified by the world to come (the age of the Messiah, in whatsoever Jewish notion of it), it seems to denote such a death from which there-is no release. And according to this notion of it, as it reflects fitly on the first death (which is a destruction, but such as is reparable by a rising or resurrection, but this past hopes, and exclusive of that), so will all the several places in · which it is used be clearly interpreted. ... And though, in these different matters, some difference there must needs be in the significations, yet in all of them the notion of utter destruction, final, irreparable excision, may very properly be retained and applied to each of them."
Matt. 10. 28: " Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." Compare Luke 12. 5.
I need not here debate the question whether the being here referred to as " able to destroy both soul and body" is God or Satan. It is supposed to be Satan by Maurice in his " Theological Essays," and also by Stier in his " Words of Jesus," in a happy statement of the argument. This view likewise accords with a remarkable passage of Arnobius, in his work "Against the Gentiles," (A.D. 303.) " This is the real death of man which leaves him nothing. What we see is but the separation of soul and body, not his utter destruction. This, I say, is the true death of man, when souls that know not God are consumed by long-continued torment, by a fierce fire into which certain cruel enemies shall cast them, who were unknown before Christ, and detected by himself alone." (1. 2. c. 14.) Arnobius evidently refers to the evil angels, whom, in a collective sense, Dr, Bushnell calls Satan. What Arnobius says of " long-continued torment," or of infliction generally, belongs to his age. It concerns the form of thought only, not its substance.
That annihilation is the danger here described is conceded by Dr. Ballou, who says: " We see no allusion, here, to the idea of endless misery, but rather to that of annihilation. It was a killing of the soul as well as the body, a destroying of both soul and body; and the literal import at least of both expressions is, that it was a destruction of the one in the same sense as of the other." (Universalist Expositor, vol. 4. p. 168: See Paige, Selections, in loco.) And Mr. Balfour: "Men who are able to kill the body could not kill the whole man or person, for this would be to blot the man forever out of existence. God. only was able to do this." " If Gehenna refers to punishment in a future state, the passage in question rather teaches the doctrine of annihilation than endless misery." (First Inquiry, pp. 152, 156. See also Appendix, pp. 354, 355.) These writers think there could be no actual danger of annihilation,—or that, if God can thus destroy, it does not follow that he will, — because those whom Christ addressed were in the divine favor and under the divine protection. Very true; but that does not destroy all practical meaning of the passage. It may still describe a danger from which the disciples were delivered by their faithful allegiance, and would be finally saved by." continuing unto the end;" and a danger to which those are still exposed who do not trust in God because they do not love him.
Again, when one urges that the disciples were in no actual danger of annihilation, I reply, it is equally true that they were in no actual danger of any other calamity which Gehenna may be supposed to mean. But Universalists now contend that " Gehenna punishment," in some sense, is orates been actually suffered by ungodly men. And this is to admit that if destruction of " both soul and body " means annihilation, that is an actual danger, to be averted only by repentance; Christ never warns against an unreal danger.
Now that the destruction of the body here contemplated is literal, is admitted by all. It remains to be shown that the contemplated destruction of the soul is not also literal; or that the phrase " destroy both soul and body in Gehenna " admits the idea that the soul is indestructible, or never will in fact be destroyed. But the literal sense seems so obvious and inevitable that some Universalists take the word " soul " (psyche), not in its modern sense, but in the sense of " life," comparing the passage with Isa. 10. 18, and Mal. 4. 1. They take the phrase " soul and body " to be proverbial, and the whole phrase ' in hand to denote an utter destruction, temporally. But in a Bible that says nothing about an immortal soul, this interpretation is quite formidable. Admitting the phrase to be proverbial, it remains to be shown that the destruction named spares a principle of immortality, of which the Scriptures say nothing. But the passage in Matt. 10. 28, is of still further importance, because it contains a much disputed word, Gehenna (hell). Universalist writers have shown with great learning and ability that Gehenna cannot mean a place of eternal misery. It is taken from the valley of the son of Hinnom, or Tophet, and there was no eternal misery there. And because the punishment referred to in the twelve places in the New Testament where the word occurs, could not be executed in that valley, Universalists have also inferred that it might be something different from any punishment accomplished in that valley. Here two questions arise: What was the punishment of the literal Tophet? and, What corresponds to it, in the penalty of Gehenna? In Mark 9. 43-48, the word Gehenna thrice occurs, and as often the phrase, " Where their worm dies not, and the fire is not quenched." This brings us at once to Isa. 46. 24, the only other place where the phrase is found. " They shall go forth, and shall kink upon the carcasses of the men that have transgressed against me; for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorring unto all flesh." Here I do not see that it matters whether the place described is the valley before Jerusalem, or the scene of the ruin of Sennacherib's army, or of the destruction of Jerusalem. Allowing all this latitude, the words still denote a proper destruction, the fire devouring what the worm does not consume. The orthodox view of eternal non-destruction as much favors the immortality of " carcasses " as of the lost soul The accompaniments of this scene of death are, the horror and infamy of dying unburied, the body being thrown into an accursed place once devoted to a hideous idol worship. Death, then, with all its degradations and corruptions for an abhorring unto all flesh," was the literal significance of Tophet. Such was the type — what was the antitype?
Universalists maintain that the special punishment of Gehenna was accomplished in the destruction of Jerusalem, in fulfilment of the prophecies in Jer. 7. 31-34; 19. 6-13, (See Balfour, First Inquiry, pp. 123-128.) It seems to me difficult to refer to all the passages that contain the expression, particularly James 3. 6, to that particular event. Yet I am willing for argument's sake to suppose that they contain no allusion to a punishment after death. It will still remain for the Universalist to show that the Jews who suffered that punishment have any resurrection either to " everlasting life," or to immortality. This point will be examined soon.
But suppose we take Schleusner's statement, that among the Jews " any severe punishment, especially a shameful kind of death, was denominated Gehenna." And also that the phrase " soul and body" was a proverbial expression, as above named. Setting out from this view, we naturally inquire how the Jews themselves came to use the term Gehenna: Its general import is likely to appear in their traditions, though in these traditions may be many things foolish and puerile. In this view I quote a few passages from the Targums and the Talmud, premising that the doctrine of annihilation was adverse to the philosophic doctrine of the " immortal soul " which had begun to affect the Jewish mind. And again, I think I shall show that the early Christians, no less than the Targumists and Talmudists, held the annihilation of the incorrigibly wicked.
In the Jerusalem Targum on Gen. 3. 24, it is said: "made Gehenna for the wicked, like a two-edged sword, cutting either way; and in the midst of it sparks and coals, burning up the wicked." In the Targum on Ps. 38. 20: " And they shall be consumed in the smoke of Gehenna." On Eccl. 8. 10: "They have gone to be consumed in Gehenna." And on Isa. 31. 9, Gehenna is spoken of as " a fire which goes forth from the bodies of the wicked and sets them on fire; for it is said, " Ye shall conceive chaff; and. bring forth stubble; your breath, as fire, shall devour you." This may illustrate the phrase in James, 3. 6: " set on fire of hell." The writer of the apocryphal book, Ecclesiasticus, evidently alluding to " Gehenna punishment," says: " Humble thy spirit very much; for the vengeance on the flesh of the ungodly is fire and worms " (7. 19). And again: " He that joined himself to harlots will be reckless. Rottenness and worms shall inherit. him; and he shall be lifted up for a greater example; and his soul shall be taken away out of the number." (19. 3.) The Jewish Talmud also says: " Those who sin and rebel greatly in Israel, as well as gentile sinners, shall descend into Gehenna, and there be judged during twelve months; at the end of which the body is consumed, the soul is burned up, and the spirit is scattered beneath the feet of the just, as it is said in Mal. 4. 3."
What, then, was "Gehenna punishment," even if we take the disputed word as an adjective, signifying simply the severest judgment, as Universalist writers explain the words in Matt. 5. 22?
That "extermination is the greatest of all punishments" is a common remark of Maimonides, the " Eagle of the Jewish Doctors," and of other Rabbis. One of these, speaking of the death of the soul, says this is "perfected punishment, and excision absolute, and perdition and corruption, which is never reversed, and is the greatest among all punishments." And we dismiss the passage in band with the words of Dr. Bentley, partly as confirming our interpretation, partly as showing that the punishment may not be severe beyond all reason or thought of man: " Oh, dismal reward of Infidelity! at which Nature does shrink and shiver with horror. What some of the learnedness doctors among the Jews have esteemed the most dreadful of all punishments, and have assigned for the portion of the blackest criminals of the damned, — so interpreting Tophet, Abaddon, the Valley of Slaughter, and the like, for final extinction and deprivation of being,— this atheism exhibits to us as an equivalent to heaven." (Boyle Lecture, Sermon 1.)
2 Pet. 2. 12: " But these, as natural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed, speak evil of the things that they understand not; and shall utterly perish in their own corruption."
Granting, for argument's sake, that this refers to a temporal destruction, it will remain for the Universalist to show that the phrase "shall utterly perish" allows a subsequent resurrection to immortality. It may also be compared with Acts 3. 23, where Peter quotes from Deut. 18. 19, and says: " Every soul which will not hear that Prophet shall be utterly destroyed (exolothreuthesetai) from among the people." This was the punishment of extirpation, and it is explained in the Mishna, the text or older tradition of the Talmud, as cutting off from the life of the olam habba, —a Hebrew phrase denoting the world or age which the Jews expected to inherit in the resurrection of the dead, and which they expected would continue forever. What the phrase means we are to decide. I will only say for the present that it seems connected not only with the phrases, " world to come " (aion ho erchomenos, Mark 10. 30; Luke 18. 30, mellon aion, Heb. 6. 5), and "that world" (aion ekeinos, Luke 20. 35), but also with the zee eis ton aion, and the zee aionios which are the subject of our next inquiry; and that it was a common expression in the Mishna that such an one is "worthy of the olam hahba" (see Schoett-gen, Horae Heb., in Luc. 20. 35).
§ 5. Do the phrases zoo aionios, (rendered in our version " eternal" or " everlasting life," by Universalists, " age-lasting" or " aionian life,") and its equivalent zee eis ton aiana, imply immortal life?
It is freely admitted that aion and aionios are often used in a limited sense. The former word does not necessarily mean eternity; nor the latter a duration strictly eternal. The same is true of their English equivalents. The word ever is apparently derived from the Latin cevum, which is the same as aion. When one says, "I have ever loved flowers," the phrase limits the term to a very few years. Yet, when it is asked whether the earth will endure forever, we understand an absolute eternity. In the same way the phrase eis ton aiona, like its Hebrew equivalent, Po/am, may signify a duration without any, limit, assigned or conceived. And the word aionios is doubtless thus used. (Rom. 16. 26; 2 Cor. 4. 17, 18; 5. 1; 1 Tim. 6. 16; 2 Tim. 2. 10; Heb. 5. 9; 9. 14, 15; 1 Pet. 5. 10.)
As already remarked, the phrase zog aionios is used forty-five times in the Bible, and in most instances partitively, or with reference to a class. It is therefore important to the Universalist argument to show, if possible, that the phrase does not signify " eternal life," in the strict sense of that expression. Either the adjective aionios does not refer to duration at all, but signifies the nature or kind of life spoken of, or it refers simply to the future age or dispensation, as distinct from the expiring Jewish economy. The latter view, I think, is that preferred by Universalists. The phrase eis ton aiona would, of course, be taken in a similar sense.
To the first view, — that edi aionios denotes a gospel or spiritual life, derived from Christ, as the Lord of the gospel age, or (according to Maurice) a divine life, that relates us to the Eternal One, — I simply reply: Granting this as the primary sense of the word, then is not the endless continuance of the life implied as a secondary sense; and if so, do not the " perishing," " death," and " not seeing life," put in contrast with it, denote a falling short of immortal life?
To the second view I find several objections:
1. The matters of contrast, and the connected and paralleled expressions, do not favor a reference merely to the gospel dispensation. Contrasted are the expressions, to "perish" (John 3. 15, 16 (compare 6. 27); 10. 28); "persecutions in this time" (Mark 10. 30; Luke 18. 30); "death" (John 5. 24; Rom. 5. 21; 6. 23); "abiding in death" (1 John 3. 14, 15); "corruption" (Gal. 6. 8). The following expressions are connected: " Ye judge yourselves unworthy of" (Acts 13. 46); " As many as were ordained to" (ver. 48); " To those who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, honor and immortality" (Rom. 2. 7); to "lay hold on" (1 Tim. 6. 12, 19). The phrase "to live forever" (eis ton aiona) occurs in John 6. 51, 58, which should be compared with chajah l'olam (Gen. 3. 22; Deut. 32. 40; Ps. 21. 26; 49. 9). The following expressions are also important: "They [Christ's flock] shall never perish" (shall not perish eis ton aiona, John 10. 28); "shall never die" (shall not die eis ton aiona, John 1. 26); "shall never see death" or " taste of death" (eis ton aiona, John 8. 51, 52); "shall never thirst" (eis ton aiona, John 4. 14); " He that doeth the will of God abideth forever " (els ton dorm, 1 John 2. 17). I also venture to name as parallel the phrase "neither can they die any more" (Luke 20. 36), because it stands in connection with the phrase " to obtain that world" (tou aionos ekeinou, verse 35).
2. If the phrases in question are referred to the Christian dispensation, many of the passages where they occur will be hard to translate. The following are examples: " Shall not thirst during the Christian dispensation." " Shall not perish during the Christian era." " Shall not perish for the age to come, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand." " Shall live during (or into, eis) the future age." " Abideth during the Messianic kingdom." " God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him might not perish, but have life for the age." " Whosoever lives and believeth on me shall not die during the aion. Believes thou this?"
I do not wonder that in the argument which confines these phrases to a dispensation, the terms " aionian life" and " teonic life" are found so convenient and occur so often. But this is not to translate the words of life; and we should not be content with a mere transfer, when a translation involves or betrays no difficulty.
3. It would follow that immortal life is one of the rarest things named in the Bible. It follows that he who " brought life and immortality to light," and who "had the words of eternal life," spoke of immortal life in only a single recorded instance. (Luke 20. 36.) In this view, about fifty passages are given up at once as containing no assurance whatever against the final annihilation of all mankind. And the whole doctrine of immortality, either for all men or for any select class of men, rests upon half a dozen passages or less. For not only the fifty passages that speak of " aionian " life will fail in this great argument, but all which speak merely of "life" or of " salvation;" for life and salvation might be only for a temporary existence. But if these words are supposed to imply immortality, then those who have not life or salvation, may have no immortality.
And here, before proceeding to the few passages on which depends the last hope of immortality, I must repeat the caution against the assumption of man's immortal nature. Mr. Balfour, in his " First Inquiry," has very properly remarked on this subject: "Is not the doctrine of the soul's immortality revealed in the New Testament? No; for if it was taught there, it would be no revelation from God to the world, for it was a popular doctrine among the heathen nations many centuries before the Christian era. With more propriety it might be said that the heathen revealed this doctrine to God than that God revealed it to them. 'Had the New Testament writers believed the soul to be immortal, why did they never speak of it as such?" (Pp. 332, 333.)
The sum is this. The Scriptures reveal no "immortality of the soul." And they announce the " aionian " life, not of all mankind, but of those who through faith become righteous or good. If, now, " aionian " life does imply immortal life, the numerous passages in question teach most decidedly the immortality of a class.
If "aionian" life does not imply immortal life, then do any who fail of it finally attain immortal life,"
This question is important in the Universalist argument, and complicated generally. Important, because some Univer- salist writers admit that a sin has been committed of which it is said there is never forgiveness, neither in this age (aion), nor in the age (aion) to come. (Mark 3. 29.) Mr. Balfour, treating on this passage, makes temporal death the irremissible penalty in either age. He says: " It is generally admitted that temporal death was the punishment of crimes under the old dispensation; and that temporal death was inflicted for crimes under the new, no one will dispute; for Ananias and his wife, persons in the church at Corinth, are noted examples; and John speaks of a sin unto death, for which even Christians were not to pray, 1 John 5. 16, 17." (Second Inquiry, pp. 279, 280.) Thus Mr. Balfour. It remains to be shown that Ananias and Sapphira, failing signally of " aionian" life, shall yet attain pardon of soul, and immortal life. Is there a third dispensation of forgiveness for sins unpardonable in the second? The language of the Epistle to the Hebrews I think hardly allows that. " For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Spirit, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the age (aion) to come, if they shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance; seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame " (6. 4-6). " For if we sin willfully after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remained no more sacrifice for sins; but a certain fearful looking for of judgment, and of fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries" (10. 26, 27). Granting this " judgment and fiery indignation" to signify the destruction of Jerusalem, where is the "sacrifice for sins " thereafter?
Mr. Paige endeavors to show that Mark 3. 29, does not preclude final forgiveness, with a noticeable remark: "If, by never forgiveness, it be denoted, strictly speaking, that the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit shall never be given, then there is a direct contradiction between this verse and verse 28; for there it is Positively asserted, without any limitation or exception, that 'all sins shall be forgiven unto the sons of men, and blasphemies wherewith soever they shall blaspheme." (Comm. in loc.) This would be called by Coleridge an asthmatic exegesis. Need any one be told that the 29th verse is the limitation and exception to the statement made in verse 28? This statement is in fact worse than nonsense without such a limitation. Aside from the qualifying exception, it is a proclamation of unbounded license to sin and blasphemy. If anyone doubts this, let him read the 28th verse without the 29th. And then, as he shudders at the repeal of all moral law which stares him in the face, let him ask what the 29th verse does mean. I do not see how one can then avoid the notion of an unpardonable sin.
And if we take the whole expression as a strong, proverbial mode of speech, — as if it were said, " That is the blackest. guilt of all; God will forgive anything else but it," — I do not see how we can escape the same conclusion, that there may be a sin unforgiven in the age to come, whether that age or aion be temporary or eternal.
And some of the expressions before cited show that the Jews regarded a certain guilt as finally unpardonable. "This hath been decreed by the Lord, that this sin shall not be forgiven them until they die the second death." "They shall die the second death, and shall not live in the world to come, saith the. Lord."
But the question I have raised is also complicated. For it involves the whole doctrine of the Resurrection. Is this moral and spiritual, consisting in the conversion of the soul? or, is it physical, initiating the immortal life? Does it occur at the death of the body? or is it an event yet future to the human race? If future, is it simultaneous, and homogeneous for all? or, is there a twofold resurrection, one to immortality, and another abortive, ending in a sleep that knows no waking?
I shall have neither time nor occasion to resolve all these complications. All these shades of opinion are found in almost every denomination of Christians, and only one of them is peculiar and essential to the Universalist view. I need only show that there is not a final resurrection of all to immortal life. The supposed proof of this rests upon two or three passages, which must be the final resort of the Universalist faith. I have already alluded to them, and we will now examine them.
Lake sm. 34-38: " The children of this world (age, aionos) marry and are given in marriage. But they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world (age, aid nos), and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage; neither can they die anymore; for they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection. Now that the dead are raised, even Moses showed, at the bush, when be calleth the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living; for all live unto him."
Some have supposed that the expression, " a God of the living," proves that the dead are now alive. But this would manifestly vacate the proof of a resurrection — the very thing that Christ was to show. What need of a resurrection for those who live? Thus Tyndale, answering the Platonic Thomas Moore, says: " Ye destroy the arguments wherewith Christ and Paul prove the resurrection. . . . If the souls be in heaven, tell me why they be not in as good case as the angels be? And then what cause is there of the resurrection?" The sense is this: God is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, not because they were then alive, for the Jews never thought of them as such, but because they were to live, in the resurrection. Here is the figure of prolepsis, before noticed. God " calleth the things-that are not [yet], as if they [already] were." The heirs of life belong to the living God; they "live unto him" because his eye is upon them, and no power can pluck them from his hands, but they shall be raised up at the last day. They have a life hid with Christ in God. But not so the children of death. This explains an expression already cited from the apocryphal Book of Wisdom, 2. 23: " By the envy of the devil death came into the world, and they follow him that are of his side."
But it is said, "For all live unto him." This expression is important in the Universalist argument. But it proves nothing; for the context naturally refers the " all " to the subjects of discourse, either the patriarchs just mentioned, or those "accounted worthy to obtain that world," in verse 35. Then it will be perfectly proper to read, " For they all live unto him." The Greek always allows this whenever the context can suggest it; for the pronoun is implied or rather contained in the verb, and is never separately expressed when the context does suggest it. And in the Syriac, as given us by Dr. Murdock, we actually have the translation I offer: "For they all live unto him."
The same phrase is used in Rom. 6. 10, 11, and Gal. 2. 19, apparently with reference to the future and immortal life. There is nothing in either context to suggest its application to the entire human race.
This phrase has also a historical interest. It occurs twenty-four times in the " Book of the Shepherd," written by Hermas, about A.D. 140. Clement of Alexandria cites a passage from it as " divinely expressed." Origen thought the book " divinely inspired." Chevalier Bunsen calls it "one of those books which, like the Divina Commedia and the Pilgrim's Progress, captivate the mind by the united power of thought and fiction, both drawn from the genuine depths of the human soul." All these admirers of the book rank as Universalists. It was read by the churches of Greece as late as the time of Jerome, and was the great exponent of the religious mind of the second century. But this favorite phrase, "shall live unto God," is in every instance referred to a class and never to all mankind. As used by Hermas it seems to refer to the future and immortal life.
But it is asked, Is not the resurrection here spoken of universal? This cannot be inferred from the expression "the dead" (ver. 37); for the article does not, of course, make the expression universal, and in several of the like expressions in 1 Cor. 15. the article is omitted. Again, the expression in verse 36 is peculiar. The " resurrection from (ek) the dead" is different from " the resurrection of the dead," and there are strong reasons for referring the phrase to the so-called resurrection of the just," as if this were a resurrection from among the dead, either by priority in time, or by their prerogative as being worthy of life. In Luke 14. 14, we read, " Thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just." In Acts 4. 2, we read of "the resurrection of Jesus from (ek) the dead," —the last phrase being the same with that under consideration. So likewise in Acts 26. 23, and Rom. 1. 4. In Phil. 3. 10, 11, Paul says: " That I may know him [Christ], and the power of his resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, being made conformable unto his death; if by any means I might attain unto the resurrection of the dead." In this remarkable passage the term rendered resurrection in verse 2, is itself peculiar. It is not anastasis, but exanastasis, — an out-rising, or a rising up from among the dead. Universalists think Paul cannot here refer to a literal resurrection, because he was sure of that, and because it would be absurd to say of it, " Not as though I had already attained, either were already perfect" (ver. 12). But there was reason why Paul should say this. There were those who said that the resurrection was past already, subverting the faith of some (1 Tim 2. 18). These were the spiritualists of that day, denying that Christ had come in the flesh, and affirming that the resurrection was rather an escape from the body or the " form," than a being clothed upon after the pattern of Christ's glorious body. Paul had, moreover, good examples to follow — some in that " great cloud of witnesses "—in striving after a resurrection. Women had received their dead raised to life again; and others accepted not deliverance from torture, " that they might obtain a better resurrection " (Heb. 11. 35). This could not have been conversion. Again, the phrase " were already perfect " evidently does not refer to moral perfection, or holiness, but recalls the expression in Heb. 12. 23: " the spirits of just men made perfect;" and this apparently signifies the being made complete, in the resurrection state. It is in almost so many words, " the resurrection of the just." Again, to say that Paul was sure of a resurrection is not to touch the point in question.
To be sure of an anastasis, was not to be sure of the exanastasis. In this might specially appear "the power of Christ's resurrection," — in a " resurrection of life," clothing the heirs of life with spiritual bodies, of which his own risen form was the type and the assurance to all that "live and believe" on him, or have living faith in him, that they may "never die." Compare what is said in Rev. 20. 5, 6: " This is the first resurrection. Blessed and holy is he that hath part in the first resurrection; on such the second death hath no power." This might be emphatically the resurrection, compared with which that of "the unjust" should be sometimes nameless or forgotten. 'Why, then, should Universalists dwell so much on " the resurrection of the dead, both of the just and the unjust" (Acts 24. 15) as literal, while they take as simply moral or spiritual the words in John 5. 28, 29? "All that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of condemnation."
And once more. We have already remarked that the expression "they which shall be accounted worthy," is, in form, the description of a class of persons, and does not refer itself to all mankind. The equivalent expression in verse 36, " the children of God," also frequently occurs apparently denoting a class; e.g.: Matt. 5. 9; John 11. 52; Rom. 8. 16, 21; 9. 8 (" They which are the children of the flesh, these are not the children of God "), 26; Gal. 3. 26; John 3. 10 ("In this the children of God are manifest, and the children of the devil "); 5. 2. It is sometimes urged that the phrase "accounted worthy" does not denote moral fitness, but simply being thus "honored." This I admit for argument's sake.
The words in verse 21, certainly look to the literal sense. "As the Father raises up the dead, and quickened them, even so the son quickens whom he will." Also verse 20: " Greater works than these, that ye may marvel." Christ had just healed the impotent man. The resurrection of the son of the widow of Nain, and of Lazarus, occurred not long after. This may explain the expression in verse 25 "The hoar is coming, and now is," which is not repeated in verse 28
Still we read of those who "judged themselves unworthy of eternal life " (Acts 13. 46), and who were apparently taken at their word.
And this suggests my closing remark on this passage. What was this eternal or "aionian " life, which Luke records as having been rejected (Acts 13. 46), if not the very life of which Christ is here speaking (Luke 20. 34-38)? The " that world " of which certain are " accounted worthy," is the aion, precisely the age, dispensation, or whatever it be that is contained in the expressions "forever" (eis ton aion) and "world to come" (ho mellon aion), and which gives us the adjective aionios, so often rendered " eternal." It is the word used in Mark 3. 29, where it is said that for a certain sin there is " never forgiveness." But Universalists confess that in such an aion the sin is unforgiven. Now these were not two distinct aion. The phrase " world (or aion) to come," often used in the New Testament, seems to have been also proverbial with the Jews, so Christ might speak of it as " that aion." If, then, the phrase " hath never forgiveness " applied to this aion, admits an after forgiveness, why does not the phrase " neither can they die anymore," admit a subsequent dying? The adverbs (oudepote, Mark 3. 29, and ouk eti, Luke 20. 36) are equally strong. If the latter signifies immortal life for all, the former gives us contradiction. Who will tell us the way out of this dilemma? It may be said there must be some distinction between the two aions. But the utmost I can conceive is, a difference in form, leaving the aion single; the aion of the church militant, and the aion of the church triumphant; the kingdom on earth, and the kingdom in the heavens; but each including the same persons, and leaving to those who hear the gospel the duty to " lay hold on eternal life" as if no other life were immortal.
The next passage to be considered is, — 1 Cor. ay. 22: "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."
Two questions arise here. 1st, Does the term " all " in each member of the verse include the entire human race? 2d, If so, does it preclude the distinction of a twofold resurrection, of the just and of the unjust, one class to life and the other to condemnation?
1. There would be no exegetical violence whatever in applying the word "all," in each member of the verse, to the subjects of discourse in the previous context. These were, those who had "fallen asleep in Christ." It was doubt respecting their destiny, that troubled the Corinthian Christians. The expression, "if in this life only we have hope, we are of all men most miserable," goes to make the case of believers, —who then found little good in life, and who were killed all the day long,— the burden of the argument. Again, where our translation speaks of " the dead," the article is commonly omitted in the original. This is a matter of some account if the being " made alive " is taken as the " resurrection of life." The article is found only in verses 29 (baptized for the dead), 35, 42, 52. Here the righteous dead, whether a part, or all mankind, are doubtless intended. But in every other instance (ver. 12 (twice), 13, 15, 20, 21, 32) the article is omitted. We may then translate, e.g. in verse 16, " If dead persons rise not, then is Christ not raised." We are not warranted in saying that in these verses " the dead" means of course all the dead. For all these reasons I find no difficulty whatever in rendering verse 22 with reference to Christians, designated in verse 18, 19, 20: "For as they all die in Adam, even so in Christ shall they all be made alive." The Greek admits this no less than in Luke 20. 38, where, as we have seen, the Syriac requires it. The very common word " all," very naturally used as I have taken it, does not require a sudden extension of the subject to embrace all mankind.
Yet granting that the word " all" in the first member of the verse applies to all the children of Adam, it may in the second member apply to all the " children of God" in Christ, and to none others. Such a comparison of two families and of their respective heads would not be unnatural. I choose, however, not to argue this point, partly because this would require some space, and partly because it is done by those in the orthodox view, and is less necessary for me.
2. But admitting that the word "all" applies in the second clause to the whole human race, we find in the next verse a distinction which may imply a resurrection of some " to condemnation." "But every man in his own order; Christ the first fruits, afterwards they that are Christ's, at his coming." Here it seems to be implied that there are some who are not Christ's. After Christ, the first instalment of the resurrection is of a special " order " or company; evidently the same with that spoken of in 1 Thess. 4. 14, 16, where Paul writes with much the same purpose (ver. 13): " For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him. . . . The dead in Christ shall rise first." And this reminds us of the "first resurrection," on whose subjects " the second death hath no power" (Rev. 20. 5, 6). And as we read on in 1 Cor. 15. 24, 25, about " the end," and the " putting down all rule and all authority and power," and " putting all enemies under his feet," we find no warrant in inferring the conversion of these adverse forces. The same event seems to be predicted in Ps. 2. 8: "Ask of me, and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession." But the next verse indicates a severer conquest than conversion: "Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron; thou shalt dash them in pieces like a potter's vessel." And verse 12: " Kiss the Son, lest he be angry, and ye perish from the way."
We have cited 1 Thess. 4. 14-16, which doubtless describes the same fact with 1 Cor. 15. 23. The passage in 2 Thess. 1. 5-11, apparently refers to the same period. Here Christians are spoken of as " counted worthy of the kingdom of God" (ver. 5), and Paul prays that " God may count you worthy of this calling" (ver. 11), using the same word that occurs in Luke 20. 35. But here wicked men are explicitly said to suffer a very grievous destruction. They "shall be punished with everlasting destruction, from the presence of the Lord, and from the brightness of his power." This everlasting or "aio-nian condemnation, is apparently in or from the same aion that is named in Luke 20. 35, and which is the period of Christ's kingdom. Grant, for argument's sake, that this coming of Christ was at the destruction of Jerusalem. Still where is the proof that they who suffered the "destruction," and who are so plainly excepted from the "order" or company named in 1 Cor. 15. 23, are yet the heirs of immortality?
Passing on to verse 26: "The last enemy, death, shall be destroyed," this is good against the orthodox view of immortal death. But it proves nothing against the view I hold, either in reason or interpretation. There is no more death, when all who live are immortal. So it is said in Rev. 21. 4: "And there shall be no more death." But it had been previously said (20. 13, 14): " Death and Hades delivered up the dead which were in them; and they were judged every man according to their works. And Death and Hades were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death." That this "second death " may have had power upon some, seems implied in verse 6. The resurrection which precedes it may be an after instalment, of another " order " or company of the dead, not particularly named in 1 Cor. 15. And that some may suffer the " second death " seems also implied in chapter 2. 11: " He that overcomes shall not be hurt of the second death."
And the failure to name the secondary " order" of those raised up, agrees well with what I regard as the scope of the chapter. This was to comfort the doubts of the Corinthian Christians respecting their deceased brethren, and to meet certain difficulties respecting the possibility or the nature of a resurrection. In this view the closing argument of the chapter is plain enough, without supposing any allusion to the ungodly. As the immortal life was to be in a spiritual body, Paul might speak to those who professed to be spiritual, and with reference to such only. " He that soweth to the spirit shall of the spirit reap life everlasting." "To be spiritually minded is life and peace." But the early Christians seem to have regarded the ungodly as having a soul without the spiritual nature, a view which agrees with the proper sense of Jude verse 19: " Soul (or psychical, psuchikoi), not having spirit." And Paul draws his glorious-argument to its close, not with any raptures has in behalf of all mankind, but using such narrow pronouns as might make the glories of this resurrection the special privilege of those that " by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honor and immortality " (or incorruption, the aphtharsia, of vs. 42, 50, 53, 54). He says: "We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed" (ver. 51). " Thanks be to God which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore, my beloved brethren, be ye steadfast, un-movable, always abounding in the work of the Lord; forasmuch as ye know that your labor is not in vain in the Lord " (vs. 57, 58). And he next speaks about a " collection for the saints." (16. 1.) Rom. 5. 18: " Therefore, as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life."
I should here say that while I regard the resurrection as yet future, I do not regard it as bringing back the identical dying body. "That which thou sows, thou sows not that body that shall be." The immortal life is in a "spiritual body; " not pure spirit, but an embodiment suited to the higher nature of spirit (pneuma) as compared with soul (psuche). Of the interval between death and the resurrection the Scriptures say little. The early Christians spoke of it as a " detention."
It is in this one verse of the whole passage (vs. 12-21) that the word " all" is used in the second member of the comparison. And it is used with the word "men." This apparently denotes all mankind, and their salvation. It seems to me the strongest passage that is or can be adduced in support of that view. And if this interpretation at all agreed with the general tone of scriptural language, if it were not an apparent exception from the usual style of the Bible, I should joyfully and without hesitation accept it as proving the final holiness and blessedness of all.
But the very frequent distinction made between the "saved" and the " lost " compels me to hesitate and examine the passage more narrowly. And I cannot rest so fond a hope upon it for the following reasons:- 1. The passage is indisputably valid against all theories of a limited atonement. And even more; it seems to assert that in Christ's name the sentence of death for sin is annulled in behalf of all. "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them " (2 Cor. 5. 19). In this view the relation of persons unconverted to God is this: they have not to ask for the pardon of past sins, so much as to accept the pardon already made out. But this is all I can prove from the passage in hand. Comparing it with passages parallel, I at once find a plain distinction between pardon granted, and pardon accepted and received. In chapter 1. 16, I read of the gospel as " the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth," Jew or Greek. In chapter 3. 22, I read of God's righteousness, or plan of justification, which is " by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all, and upon all them that believe," Jew or Gentile. Here the distinction seems to be fairly made by two prepositions, " unto " (eis), and " upon " (epi). In the passage in hand the first of these only is used. The phrase might, therefore be rendered, "by the righteousness of one the free gift came unto (eis) all men, unto justification of life." In this view all men are virtually justified or pardoned, though by unbelief they may not be actually saved.
But it will be said the same preposition is used in the first clause, "upon (or unto, eis) all men to condemnation;" and if all actually die, why are not all actually saved? I answer, the sentence of physical death, even, is only virtual, not actual against all. Enoch and Elijah did not die. And Paul believed and taught that a whole generation of Christians would never die, but be "changed," at Christ's coming. All these are born mortal as others; the sentence was "upon" or against (eis) them, but it fails to reach them. So there may be those within the range and reach of the great salvation, who yet fail of it.
2. In verse 17, it is said, " they which receive abundance of grace, etc., shall reign in life." But the word rendered " receive " (lambanontes) is slightly ambiguous. It may also mean accept or embrace. It is often used in the active sense, as well as in the passive sense. Its original sense is to take, and it is used in the common phrase "respect of persons" of acceptance of persons. It is also the root of the word used 1 Tim. 6. 12, 10, " lay hold on (epilabou) eternal life."
3. In vs. 14, 15, 16, 19, the distinction is made, not between " all" as dead and alive again, but between " many " and "many." The main argument may then rest on the comparison of the children of Adam with the children of God in Christ, which agrees so well with the general tenor of Scripture, and with which the 18th verse, as above explained, does not at all conflict.
4. The whole passage shows that what is gained in Christ has once been lost. This is something more than bodily immortality. It is salvation, in the broadest sense of the word. And the " free gift " or gratuity is said to superabound, or to cover more space than the condemnation could, not because it gives more than was lost, but because one divine act of justification avails against " many offences." Thus salvation is exceedingly gratuitous.
But it inevitably follows that the salvation has been once forfeit. In other words, eternal death was not an unjust sentence to be pronounced upon sin; and Adam might have perished, and the whole race in and with him, without wrong to man. The passage confirms what I have before remarked,—that annihilation has been invited and confronted. That God interposes to save is doubtless in keeping with His nature as Love. We may even say that in saving man God is simply just to Himself. But to man he is more than just. It is strictly true: "By grace are ye saved, through faith; and that not of yourselves, it is the gratuity of God." " The wages of sin is death; but the amnesty of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord."
I dismiss this passage by remarking that Tholuck, a learned Restorationist, of whom hereafter, in his Commentary on the Epistle, finds no proof here of the final salvation of all.
There are several other passages on which Universalists more or less rely, all of which I have not time to examine. Of the whole class given at the close of my " general tenor of Scriptural language," I will say that while they show a final universality of holiness and blessedness, or an end of evil, and are thus valid against the orthodox view, very few can even be offered as applying to all individual beings now living. And one or two might be applied to all brute creatures, as well as to all human beings (Rev. 5. 13). I may hereafter consider such as my affable opponent shall offer. But I will here say a word respecting two or three.
Acts 24. 15: "And have hope toward God, which they themselves also allow, that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and unjust.".
The word " hope" here used is frequently insisted on as showing that the resurrection of " the unjust" is a blessing, a resurrection of salvation. But I think this does not follow for three reasons:- 3. It was natural that Paul, quoting that Jewish faith which he accepted, should name the whole of it; and that he should name it as his hope, if it were on the whole desirable. Now Christ very strongly asserted some sort of twofold resurrection, — of well doers to life, and of evil doers to condemnation. Does the latter sound like a thing desirable? No more so than a thousand calamitous events that have actually occurred. I should never have hoped for the Lisbon earthquake. Yet it did happen, and the existence of all Portugal was desirable nevertheless. So the complex resurrection Christ named was desirable; and no less to be hoped for was that which Paul named, though it were the same; especially if it ends in an immortality of goodness, and a universality of righteousness.
4. The Scriptures elsewhere speak of things partly good and partly evil as matter of thanks. There is an apparent instance in Rom. 6. 17: " God be thanked, that ye were the servants of sin; but ye have obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine which was delivered you." A plainer example occurs in the 136th Psalm: " Oh, give thanks ... to him that smote Egypt in their first-born; ... and slew famous kings; for his mercy endures forever." Such thanksgiving seems at least as misanthropic as Paul's " hope" in question. Yet the whole Psalm means doubtless well enough. The resurrection of the unjust, though it be unto condemnation, and to the "second death," yet may not be for that purpose, as if God were vindictive, or as if the claim of his law for so much penal suffering were inexorable. The Orthodox, regarding annihilation as better than the lost deserve, sometimes represent it as a "coup de grace" to end their woes. Not thus do I "hope" for. it. But if their resurrection be itself the overflowing of the fountain of life, if they who "will not come to Christ that they may have life" do yet in spite of themselves get more than they wish, so that they die by instalments and even die hard, I can rejoice in all the preternatural life they have. In all God's realm no vitality is wholly lost that is lived, though it come to an end. So I can very comfortably " hope" as I think Paul did.
1 Tim. 4. 10: "The living God, who is the Savior of all men, specially of those that believe."
It is noticeable that the only instance in which God is said in so many words to be "the Savior of all" is with such an immediate qualification. I simply remark: 1. In the Universalist view, of the final faith and salvation of all, the more natural phraseology would have been, "especially when they believe." 2. This is one of the few instances in which God is called a Savior, rather than Christ. The word (Sorer) has in the classic Greek the more general sense also of Preserver, which it may have here, in obvious harmony with the specification named. 3. Waiving this, the distinction between salvation in the reach of all, and salvation "laid hold on " by all, will allow the especial deliverance here indicated.
§ 7. The Two Theodores. Change for Authorities.
'In the late discussion between my opponent and the Rev. Dr. Adams, the concession of the Rev. Theodore Parker that the Scriptures teach the doctrine of eternal punishment was adduced, against which was offset the Rev. Theodore Clapp's recantation of that view after an independent examination. In a grave question of this kind no one should, or honestly can, rest his belief on any other man's opinion. Neither Dr. A. nor Rev. Mr. C. wished the names they respectively gave to turn the scales of judgment in any man's mind. That would not be a Protestant wish. Yet both those names were properly offered, because men must respect the honest opinions of learned and thinking men. They have their weight, their importance, and their office, to command attention, and invite people to ponder a subject for themselves.
Partly for this purpose I shall offer a few names from my corner of the triangle, in my next chapter. But I may here offer one or two names in the question between my respected friends, which may command the attention of them both. And it is specially proper for me thus to offer names to gentlemen both right and both wrong in my opinion.
The first name is that of Augustus Tholuck. A few of your readers may need to be informed that he is the man who has done more than any other in Germany to secure a hearty love of the Scriptures, opposing at once the rationalism and the dead orthodoxy which are their equal foes. He is master of more languages than almost any other living man, especially of those which contribute to a right understanding of the inspired Word. Nor is he a mere bookworm, with more of uncommon than of common sense. He spends a large part of his time in walks and entertaining conversations with students in the University, and in visits and varied correspondence. He is one of the most eloquent pulpit orators of Germany. He is an admirable teacher and lecturer, fresh and suggestive, with none of the pedantry or false profundity of German scholarship.
He has written commentaries on the Gospel of John, the Epistles to the Romans and to the Hebrews, the Sermon on the Mount, and the Psalms. Most of these have been republished in English translations. Dr. Schaff tells us: " As a theological writer, Tholuck has devoted his best hours to biblical exegesis. Here he has achieved his most enduring merits."
Now Tholuck is both orthodox and Universalist. lie was one of those who in the World's Evangelical Alliance opposed the article on future punishment. His attitude on this subject is indicated by the following conversation between him and Dr. Sears of this country, held in London some years since. I take the account from Prof. Crosby's " Appeal to the American tract Society," pp. 49, 50.
T. Tholuck. I suppose my American brethren would consider me orthodox in general, except in my Universalism.
S. Where did you find this doctrine — in the Bible, or in your philosophy?
T. In both.
S. What are the passages of Scripture on which you principally rely?
A. My main passage is 1 Cor. 15. 28.. . . Also Rom. 11. 36. . .. Another passage is Phil. 2. 10. [His argument may be considered in the sequel.]
T. Do you find no passages of Scripture which positively assert the everlasting punishment of the wicked?
S. Yes: Matt. 25. 46, and others like it.
S. Can those passages which you think favor Universalism be understood in any other sense without violating the fundamental laws of interpretation?
T. Yes, they can, but the construction would not be so easy and natural.
S. Can the other passages, which speak of endless punishment, possibly bear any other construction?
T. I do not see how they can.
S. Well, what are you going to do with them?
T. That is my only difficulty." ...
The remainder of the conversation I cannot quote. But it sustains the following statement by Tholuck, made in 1837, of what he had said in 1834: " Dogmatically, i.e. as a theologian, I feel myself drawn toward this opinion [the Universalist]; but exegetically, 1.e. as an interpreter, I do not know how to justify it." (Selections from German Literature, by Edwards and Park, p. 215.)
I will close with a passage from one of the best biblical scholars in this country, Dr. G. R. Noyes, Professor in Cambridge Divinity School. He is a Restorationist. In his review of Maurice's " Theological Essays," (Christian Examiner, March, 1855, pp. 294, 295,) he says: "Even in the writings of Paul, who is very strong in denouncing punishment against the wicked, there are passages in which he speaks of the purposes of God, and of the riches of his grace, in such a manner as to make it difficult to believe that he contemplated the strictly eternal punishment of all who die in sin. We refer to the manner in which he speaks of the salvation of all Israel in Romans 11., and the putting down of all enemies to the kingdom of Christ in 1 Corinthians 15. 25-28. We cannot, indeed, find an express declaration in the Scriptures of the final salvation of all men. Enemies may be put under one's feet by confinement in a place of punishment, as well as by being converted into friends. But the spirit of these passages, which makes so much to depend on the means which the wisdom and mercy of God have, as it were, in reserve, is not very favorable to the doctrine of the endless misery of all who are leaving the world with a sinful character, or who have lift it since the creation of man. The thought of Paul logically carried out leads to a very different conclusion, and awakens the most cheering hopes." He adds in a note: " The impartial and sharp-sighted De Wette finds still more actually expressed in 1 Cor. 15. 28, than we can."
This passage is very good argument against the orthodox view. But the words I have italicized would reduce the Universalist view very nearly to an arcanum. These words are the more noteworthy as the writer was in so close neighborhood to verse 22, which Universalists regard as so fully stating their view. But in the view that all who live forever will be holy we find a restitution of all things, and a universal dominion of Christ; and "the thought of Paul logically carried out" may prove no more than this.
The Historical Argument.
IN the words and by the work of Christ "Life and Immortality were brought to light." But that light, either for its original obscurity, or by its passage through the clouds and shadows of eighteen centuries, has come to have three widely different interpretations, of which one only can be true. How shall we select this and correct the errors of the remaining two?
Besides the examination of the Scriptures themselves, another method is perfectly legitimate. We may also inquire, What light was needed when Christ came? What light seemed to be immediately contributed by his coming? or, How did the early Christians understand his words.? And again: What effect had philosophy when afterwards added to the gospel? In reply to these questions I propose to show — 5. That Christ came at a time of general despondency and despair respecting all future life.
6. That the early Christians understood his words as assuring immortal life to be received by faith in him.
7. That the subsequently added doctrine of the soul's proper immortality was the common occasion, first of the orthodox and then of the restorationist view.
§ 1. There was deplorable need of light on the subject of immortality when Christ came.
Because man was made for immortality, there had ever been, both among Jews and Gentiles, many thoughts about it. There could have been no welcome of the coming light if there had been no thoughts — even anxious thoughts — on the subject. But notwithstanding the natural thinking respecting a future life, and even the strong desire for it, the opinions of men just before Christ came indicate a growing, often an utter, despair. Among the Hebrews, it has been questioned whether the Scriptures taught, or were designed to teach, any thing clear on the subject. Certain it is, that the Sadducees, denying all resurrection and spiritual existence, formed a most respectable party among the Jews, being sometimes represented in the Sanhedrim and in the priesthood. They to whom were entrusted the oracles of God, in which some "thought they had eternal life "(John 5. 29), were in need of light.
Much more the Gentiles. If among the Jews, by various culture and intercourse with other peoples and influence from their opinions, there had been progress in the doctrine of an afterlife, on the other hand there was among the Greeks and the Romans a great and manifest decline of faith. The immortality of the soul was as old as Homer. It was older. Herodotus said that the Egyptians were " the first of mankind who defended the immortality of the soul." But the Hindus, probably, had it quite as old, and the Persians not much younger. Yet, in the very form in which it was held by the Hindus, and afterwards by the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, we discover the need of a revelation, and some cause of the doubts that followed. The Bhagavad Gita, which contained the essence of the Brahminical philosophy, asserted that the soul is not only immortal, but eternal. This was the doctrine of Pharcyde’s, the Assyrian, the bearing of which converted Pythagoras from a wrestler into a philosopher.
I need not follow the Greek philosophy on this subject through its forms and changes. The decline of faith which I assert is apparent in Socrates' time. He calls the soul's immortality an " old doctrine, long ago shadowed forth by the founders of the mysteries," and appeals to antiquity in support of his own view of the spiritual, undying nature of the soul, against the skepticism of his age. " Can the soul," he asks, " which goes to the presence of a good and wise God (whither, if God will, my soul will shortly go)—can this soul of ours, when separated from the body, be immediately dispersed and destroyed, as most men assert?" Aristotle, it is now generally conceded, neither taught nor held an afterlife, but the opposite. The famous argument of Cicero, who so greatly admired Plato, does not even pretend to prove the doctrine in question, as its very name imports ("De Contemnenda Morte," on the Contempt of Death). He labors to show that death is not an evil, because, if it is an eternal sleep, we shall not suffer during its continuance. This explains the passage in which his pupil wishes that, if the birds of prey should come for his body, he might have a stick to drive them away. And all are familiar with the expression about the Phaedo of Plato: " I have read it, over and over again; but, I know not why it is, while I read I give my assent; but when I have laid the book down and begin to think on the subject thyself, all that persuasion glides away." And this is said by one who " would rather err with Plato than think the truth with those contemptible philosophers" who denied a future life. And the familiar letters of Cicero, in which he would most naturally express his real sentiments, show no hope beyond the grave. To one friend he says: " Even we who are happy should despise death, since we shall have no sense nor feeling beyond it." And Seneca, whose "Morals" are thought by modern pantheists about as good as those of the Bible, writes to one bereaved: " Death is the release and end of all pain, beyond which our evils do not pass. It restores us to the same tranquility in which we were before our birth." And in one of his poems he says:
Chaos and hungry Time devour us all.
Inevitable Death the body kills,
Nor spares the soul.
Mr. Landis (Immortality of the Soul, p. 98, note) claims Aristotle as holding immortality; taking no notice, however, of my quotation from Ritter and my citation of Pomponatius and Mosheim to the contrary. (Debt and Grace, p. 275, note.) Even Cudworth says: " It must needs be left doubtful whether he acknowledged anything incorporeal and immortal at all in us." (Intell. System, 1. 97, Harrison's ed.) See, also, Wm Archer Butler, History of Ancient Philosophy, 2. 426-429.
Epictetus is another moralist of that age for whom some would dispense with the gospel light. "Whither do you go?" he asks. "Nowhere to your hurt; you return from whence you came, — to a friendly consociation with your kindred elements. What there was of the nature of fire in your composition returns to the element of fire; what there was of earth, to earth; what of air, to air; and of water, to water." And the elder Pliny: " The vanity of man, and his insatiable longing after existence, have led him to dream of a life after death. A being full of contradictions, he is the most wretched of creatures, since the other creatures have no wants transcending the bounds of their nature. Man is full of desires and wants that reach to infinity, and can never be satisfied. His nature is a lie — uniting the greatest poverty with the greatest pride. Among these so great evils, the best thing God has bestowed on man is the power of taking his own, life."
Such were the doubts and despair of men, waiting in the gloom of the shadow of death for the true life and light. And when the Life-giver came, how natural, if all mankind were the appointed subjects of immortal life, that this should appear in the ordinary speech of him who " had the words of eternal life." How strange that he and the apostles who heralded all through the Roman Empire what they called a gospel, should only speak of a certain " aionian " life, and even of that ambiguous duration as if it were the prerogative of a special class, to be had by striving for it; leaving the great and long-debated question of immortality in as great obscurity as it was before. Truly, if man is at all immortal, his immortality was not then at all brought to light. It was not revealed in that phrase, "the resurrection, both of the just and of the unjust;" for this was a tenet of the Pharisees, to which Paul made appeal on a certain occasion of self-defense. If this was the revelation, it came not so much from Christ as by those of whom he said, Beware! For the doubts which Christ found prevailing, there were, as I have intimated, various causes. The philosophers had tried to prove too much; not only that all souls are im-mortal, but that the soul is eternal. And the new revelations on the subject would have to encounter men's philosophy. How natural, if man has immortality in any form, that he who contributed the great light on the subject should have somehow recognized the essential fact; so that one thing at least should be settled.
Does the objector anticipate the varying opinions of the second century, and say that nothing was settled by Christ's revelation? I answer, one thing was settled, so as to be never since disputed as a Christian truth. And that is, Whoever shall have Life —whatever the word means — has it through Christ; and by Faith — whatever that word means — does he accept and receive the life.
If this is a Universalist formula, I yield the argument. Whether anything else was settled on the side of universal immortality, we are next to examine.
§ 2. As the early Christians were not "orthodox," so they were not Universalists.
An orthodox writer, in a late work, says "it is to be lamented that they [the apostolical Fathers] either wrote very little, or else their writings have, for the most part, perished." (Hovey, State of the Impenitent Dead, p. 131). I think I have elsewhere shown that there is reason for such regret as respects the orthodox argument; or that the early Christian writings do not support that view, but rather the view I offer. I will now cite a few expressions to show that they were not Universalists.
The so-called apostolical Fathers were Barnabas, Clement of Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp, and Hermas. The epistle ascribed to Barnabas is probably not genuine, though of a very early date. The writings now extant under the other names are partly genuine and partly spurious. I will quote from the former, making allusion to the latter only as indicating the sentiment of the age in which they were written.
Bunsen assigns the so-called epistle of Barnabas to the reign of Domitian, in the first century. The phrase " eternal death," not occurring in the Scriptures, is here found, in the following passage: " The way of darkness is crooked and full of cursing (or, wholly accursed). For it is the way of eternal death, with punishment; in which they that walk meet those things that destroy their own souls" (c. 20).
The whole expression, "eternal death, with punishment," which some might take as supporting the orthodox view, seems to be otherwise explained by the following expressions in the Homilies ascribed to Clement: " They wholly perish after 6, punishment" (Hom. 3. c. 59). " By the greatest punishment they shall be utterly extinguished," (Hom. 7. c. 7. See also Hom. 16. c. 10.)
In the same chapter of the epistle it is said: " He that chooses the other part shall be destroyed, together with his works. For this cause there shall be both a resurrection and a retribution." Again: " They that pat their trust in him shall live forever" (eis ton aiona, c. 8). " Who is there that would live forever? (eis ton aiona;)let him hear the voice of thy Son " (c. 9).
The phrase eis ton aiona is rendered in the Latin in cater-num and in perpetuum, by Cotelerius. It was undoubtedly used by the early Christians to denote an eternal duration, and we shall therefore accept the common rendering, " forever."
One epistle of Clement to the Corinthians was publicly used in many of the churches. Mosheim and Neander think it interpolated in some passages; yet Bunsen regards it as of great importance, " historically, constitutionally, and doctrinally."
The author, speaking of the " condemnation to come," asks, " What world shall receive any of those who run away from Him?" (c. 28.) Again: " Wherefore we being the portion of the Holy One, let us do all those things that pertain unto holiness" (c. 30). "How blessed and wonderful, beloved, are the gifts of God! life in immortality! brightness in righteous-. ness! truth in full assurance! faith in confidence! temperance in holiness!" (c. 35.) " By him would God have us taste the knowledge of immortality" (c. 36).
Of the eight epistles ascribed to Ignatius, three are deemed genuine. The following expressions fairly indicate his views:
Be vigilant, as God's athlete. The need is incorruptibility, and life eternal (Polycarp, c. 2). " Those that corrupt families by adultery shall not inherit the kingdom of God " (Ephesians, c. 16). " For this cause the Lord suffered the ointment to be poured upon his head, that he might breathe immortality into his church " (lb. c. 17). " I seek the bread of God which is the body of Christ; and his blood, which is love incorruptible and perpetual life" (Romans c. 7).
The views of Polycarp appear in the following passages of his epistle to the Philippians: " To whom [Christ] all things are made subject, both that are in heaven, and that are in earth; whom every living creature shall worship; who shall come to be the judge of the quick and dead; whose blood God shall require of them that believe not in him. But he that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also raise up us in like manner, if we do his will and walk according to his commandments, and love those things which he loved" (c. 2). " Whom if we please in this present world (aion), we shall also be made partakers of that which is to come; according as he has promised us, that he will raise us from the dead; and that if we shall walk worthy of him, we shall also reign together with him, if we believe. . . . And neither fornicators, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind, shall inherit the kingdom of God; nor they who do such things as are unbecoming" (c. 5). The Lord "grant you a lot and portion among his saints; and us with you, and to all that are under the heavens who shall believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, and in his Father who raised him from the dead" (c. 12). This epistle was read in some of the churches as late as Jerome's time.
The " Shepherd " of Hermas has been already cited for the phrase " to live unto God." I will here add the following ex-pressions: " They who are of this kind shall prevail against all impiety, and continue unto life eternal. Happy are they that do righteousness; they shall not perish forever" (Vision 2. 3). " Fear God and thou shalt live; and whosoever shall fear him, and keep his commands, their life is with the Lord; [they shall live forever. Dressel;] but they who keep them not, there is no life in them," (Command 7.) "They that are subject unto evil desires shall die forever" (Command 12. 2). " The trees which are green and righteous shall possess the world to come. . . . The wicked, like the trees which thou rawest dry, shall as such be found dry and without fruit in that other world. And like dry wood they shall be burned." (Similitude 4.) "They who have known the Lord, and have seen his wonderful works, if they shall live wickedly, shall be doubly punished, and shall die forever" (Similitude 9. 18).
I might cite another document belonging to this age, a part of the so-called "Apostolical Constitutions," which Bunsen calls the " Church and House Book," as further showing that there were as yet no traces or indications of Universalist faith. But I do not know that I need have cited a single word. I do not know that any Universalist expressions or writers are claimed before Clement of Alexandria, about A.D. 200, with one exception to be noticed presently. I find some traces of such views also in Athenagoras, who preceded Clement by a few years, and will grant him to the Universalists, though they have not claimed him.
Here, then, we come to a very critical question: — § 3. Whence did Universalist views take their rise?
And I propose to show that not the Scriptures alone, but Platonic additions to scriptural doctrine, were the occasion, first of Orthodoxy, and then of Universalism.
The orthodox view requires three conditions: a doctrine of indefeasible immortality; a doctrine of salvation conditioned within certain limits of time; and such fiery heat as shall fuse these together into the faith of men. They can never be first combined in calm deliberation, however coldly they may be received as a tradition.
The conditions I have named were brought together in Rome, about the year 138. The bloody hand of the imperial power was invoked to revenge the lust of a heathen husband upon a Christian wife. Her teacher in the faith of Christ is accused, and martyred. Two other persons, remonstrating against such flagrant wrong, are devoted to death.
The fierce fire of such persecution offered to combine the requisite doctrinal elements, and the materials were not wanting. Justin, surnamed " the Philosopher" and afterwards " Martyr," was a recent convert from Platonism to Christianity. Of a warm and generous nature, he was moved to address to the emperor his first "Apology" or defense of the proscribed faith. That Apology I believe to be the oldest " orthodox" book. Now Justin brought, along with the name of Philosopher, much Platonic faith. He claimed for many doctrines of Philosophy and Christianity a common origin in an original revelation. The philosophers, he thought, had borrowed some things from the Hebrew prophets. And though he does not speak in distinct terms of the soul as immortal, there is very little in this book to indicate any opinion that the soul can die, but much to suggest the contrary.
On the other side, there is nothing in his book or in our history thus far, to indicate any opinion among the Christians of the final salvation of all. He regarded man as on probation during life, awaiting a judgment after the resurrection. " Plato," he says, " held that the wicked will stand before Minos and Rhadamanthus, to be punished by them. We hold the same event, but before Christ as judge; that they may be punished in their reembodied souls, not a thousand years, as Plato said, but eternally. If anyone thinks this incredible or impossible, the error is of little account so long as we are not convicted of any evil conduct" (c. 8).
This is very mildly said, and with a protest of the paramount importance of practice over belief. The severe faith, however, was a burden to Justin's own mind. Yet the opinion being once expressed, in an hour of darkness and in a book of philosophy to make it respectable, was able to hold its way in the church.
Justin, I said, does not put the soul's immortality into a formula. He uses one expression in this very book which might indicate an acquaintance with another view. " We have learned," he says, " that they only are made immortal who live piously and virtuously before God" (c. 21). Other passages will hardly allow this to be strictly taken. But as I have shown this to be the prevailing faith until his time, I may here add a very important fact confirmatory of my history.
One of the earliest questions in Christian philosophy, was that respecting the nature of the soul. Is it naturally mortal, or immortal? All the gentile philosophers who had at all asserted a future life,—excepting a few of the Stoic school,—and all the native pride of man, had said, " immortal." But the Christians said otherwise. And their almost uniform view on this question of nature is the more remarkable, because it is given by those who differed most widely in the question of fact, whether the soul would die. The following quotations will show their opinion:
Tatian, a disciple of Justin Martyr, says: " The soul is not in its own nature immortal, O Greeks! But mortal. Yet it is able not to die. For it does die, and is dissolved with the body, if ignorant of the truth; but it rises again with the body at the end of the world, receiving death in immortality for its punishment. Whereas the soul that receives the knowledge of God, though dissolved for a time, does not die." (Oratio ad Grmcos, c. 13.)
Prof. Hovey (p. 140) speaks of Tatian as teaching "the final extinction of the wicked." That the above expression gives his real view—of temporary extinction followed by eternal suffering —is believed by Morell, Dumas, Oporinus, Teller, Dodwell, Daniel, and Redepenning, cited by Otto in his edition. The notion of a temporary extinction was the heresy of the sect of Arabians.
Theophilus of Antioch, who also belonged to the school of Justin, says: " Someone will ask, Was Adam by nature mortal? By no means. Immortal? Not thus, either. What then — nothing at all? I answer, neither mortal nor immortal; for if the Creator had made him from the first immortal, he would have made him a god. If mortal, then God would appear as the author of death. He made him, then, capable that he was once a strong defender of the doctrine in question. He thought the fact and justice of eternal suffering all clear and plain. But as he came to know his own thoughts better, the whole dropped away as a sheer logical figment which had never been a part of his real mind or heart. And we met a short time since a fine instance showing how short a time may pass for as good as endless duration. A friend remarked that if the glorified state of the saints did not begin until the final resurrection it seemed hardly worth living for. The interval was his eternity. The infinite beyond eluded his thought.
And this may explain the fact which so much amazes and distresses many devout men,—the indifference of men generally respecting the danger they are supposed to believe. "I confess," says Albert Barnes, "when I look . . . upon the world of woe, filled with hosts to suffer forever; when I see my friends, my parents, my family, my people, my fellow citizens; when I look upon a whole race, all involved in this sin and danger, and when I see the great mass of them wholly unconcerned, and when I feel that God only can save them, and yet He does not do it,—I am struck dumb. It is all dark, dark, dark to my soul, and I cannot disguise it" Here it must impress our minds that the great mass of men are "wholly unconcerned" about this supposed danger, when they seem to believe it, because they do not and cannot comprehend infinitude. They only grasp the finite. And the thought of eternal suffering may sometimes only weary the mind, when it does not stagger the faith.
"Imagine a creature," says Bishop Newton, "nay, imagine numberless creatures produced out of nothing, . . . delivered over to torments of endless ages without the least hope or possibility of relaxation or redemption. Imagine It you may, but you can never seriously believe it, nor reconcile it to God and goodness." (Dissertations, No. 60.) And in fact, when the worst men come to die, most orthodox men, in the funeral discourse, are wont to "leave them in the hands of a Just and merciful God." And if we affirm a general immortality, there is much force in the remark that has been made, "We are Universalists when we lose our friends."
But it may be said that all this reasoning about the proper effect of a doctrine of penalty is very fine—where are the facts that support it? And some may think the argument is too negative, showing, perhaps, that the doctrine we oppose is sometimes hurtful, but not directly vindicating the view we hold. Let us proceed, then, to the argument from the history.
3. For a full century after the death of Christ we find no proof that the early Christians held any immortality out of Christ, or any doctrine of eternal misery; but we find every indication of the contrary. The epistles of Clement of Rome, Ignatius, and Polycarp, that ascribed to Barnabas, and the Shepherd of Hermas, are documents amply large and sufficient to show the opinion of that age on so important a subject as the nature and destiny of man. While these writers quote the Scriptures freely, they also employ their own language sufficiently to show how they understood the inspired words. But they never speak of the soul, nor of the race, nor of the lost, as living or existing forever, nor of the lost as suffering forever. Ignatius speaks thus: "Be vigilant, as God's athlete. The need is incorruptibility, and life eternal." "The bread of God I seek, which is the body of Christ; . . . and his blood, which is love incorruptible and perpetual life." And such is the general tenor of all these writings.
The works of the so-called Apostolical Fathers are found translated in a book sometimes styled the Apocryphal New Testament. The above and other passages are given in "Debt and Grace," pp. 289-295; and still others in a pamphlet entitled, "The Old Paths," by H. L. Hastings.
And in the Epistle to Diognetus, the first work of a Christian writer in which the soul is called immortal, there is plain proof that he did not regard the soul as absolutely immortal, since he speaks of the eternal fire as "punishing unto the end those whom it receives." Upon which the best critics remark that the sense is extermination. A later writer says expressly, " They who do not repent shall receive their end by the punishment of fire; . . . punished with eternal fire, they shall after a time be extinguished."
Most of the early writers speak of the soul as absolutely neither mortal nor immortal, but capable either of living or dying. And Irenaeus (A. D. 178), opposing the philosophers or Gnostics who asserted absolute immortality, says: "Life is of becoming either; so that by keeping the command of God he might attain immortality as his reward, and become a god. But if he should turn to mortal things, and disobey God, he would be himself the author of his own death. For God made man free and with power of self-control" (Ad Autolycum, 1. 2, c. 37). He elsewhere calls man mesos, "intermediate." He seems to have held the orthodox view.
Lactantitus, " the Christian Cicero," (about A.D. 800,) was doubtless orthodox. But he says: " There would be no difference between the just and the unjust, if every man that is born were made immortal. Immortality, therefore, is not a law of our own nature, but the wages and reward of virtue.. .. For this reason God seeks to be worshipped by man as Father, that he may attain virtue and wisdom, which alone impart immortality." (Instt. Div. 1. 7, c. 5.)
These expressions of three different writers, and the last remark cited from Justin, are obviously inconsistent with their doctrine of immortal misery. And I have sometimes queried whether this apparent inconsistency might not be due in part to corruptions of the text. Indeed, Cotelerius, the editor of the apostolic Fathers, including the Clementine homilies, remarks on those passages that plainly teach the immortality of the righteous only, that they disagree with other passages asserting the eternal suffering of the wicked, so that " the Pseudo-Clement must have written inconsistently, or must have been here interpolated." I find but one passage in the Homilies plainly asserting immortal woe; hence I should suspect the interpolation to be not " here " but there. But waiving this question of genuineness to the profounder critics, I proceed with my citations.
Augustine, the great light of orthodoxy, applies the same view to man's bodily nature: " Before man's sin the body Might be called mortal in one respect and immortal in another; that is, mortal because it was capable of dying; immortal because it was able not to die." (De Genesi ad literam, 1. 6, C. 25.) His view of the soul's immortality is Platonic enough, and his arguments for it are worthy of the Schoolmen and of Samuel Drew.
And Justin Martyr himself, in his later work, the Dialogue with the Jew Trypho, says: "I neither regard Plato nor Pythagoras, nor any of their way of thinking. The soul either has life in itself, or it receives it from something else. But the soul partakes of life, because God wills it to live; and just so too it will no longer partake of life, whenever He does not desire it to live. For it cannot live of itself, as God does. But as the personal man does not always exist, and body and soul are not ever conjoined; but, whenever this harmony must be dissolved, the soul leaves the body and the man is no more; so likewise whenever it is necessary that the soul should no longer be, the vital spirit leaves it, and the soul is no more, but itself returns again thither whence it was taken." (c. 4.) He never spoke of the soul as absolutely immortal, and in one or two expressions of this dialogue, he distinctly withholds such an adjective.
Professor Hovey, in his " State of the Impenitent Dead," quoting a passage from Justin's Exhortation to the Greeks, says: " Mr. Hudson refers to the above, in proof, it would seem, of the following statement:
In the same treatise he names as truths held in common, by the philosophers and the Christians, the doctrines of the divine origin of the world and creation of man, of the soul's immortality, and of judgment after this life.' " (P. 137.) Again he remarks: " In the system of Athenagoras, says Mr. Hudson, the immortality of the soul is certainly of nature.' " (P. 139.)
I am much surprised that my learned friend should cite me thus, as if these were either concessions, or indications of the Christian doctrine of the age; making no allusion to my many quotations showing that the single expression of Justin about immortality did not represent the common sentiment, nor the mature opinion of Justin himself; and giving his reader no intimation that I regard Athenagoras as leading off a dissent from the common opinion, and preparing the way for the Restorationism of the Alexandrian school. (See Rejoinder, p. 423.)
The settled opinion of Athanasius, the "Father of Orthodoxy," on the main question, I think cannot be proven. On the question of man's nature, he says: " God desired man to continue in incorruption. But man, neglecting and departing from the knowledge of God, and devising and regarding that which was evil, incurred the threatened condemnation of death.... By transgression they reverted to their native condition; so that, as from non-existence they began to be, they must now in due time suffer the loss and destruction of their being.... For man is by nature mortal, seeing he was created from non-being. Yet, as made in the likeness of the true Being, to be preserved by the knowledge of him, he might have escaped the force of corruption and remained immortal." (De Incarnatione Verbi, c. 4.)
In the fifth century, Nemesius, a Neoplatonist, became a Christian and bishop of Emesa. He is a Restorationist. But he says: " Since the soul is not yet known in its essence, it is not suitable to determine respecting its energy. The Hebrews say that originally man was made evidently neither mortal nor immortal, but on the confines of either nature; so that, if he should yield to the bodily affections, he would share also the changes of the body; but if he should prefer the nobler affections of the soul, he should be deemed worthy of immortality." (De Natura Hominis, c. 1.)
I would call special attention to this passage, both as testimony of Hebrew doctrine needing special explanation in the New Testament if it was not to be strictly taken, and also as coming from a Restorationist.
Nicholas of Methone, of the twelfth century, is regarded by Neander as the most learned theologian of his age. He says: " It is not every soul that neither perishes nor dies, but only the rational, truly spiritual, and divine soul, which is made perfect through virtue by participating in the grace of God." (See Hagenbach, History of Doctrines, § 174.) I do not know his opinion on the main question.
Deferring the opinions of Irenaeus and of Arnobius for a moment, I come back to Athen9goras, the first of the post-apostolic Fathers who does not recognize the intermediate nature of man. We know little of his history, but we are told he was a catechist at Alexandria, before Clement. In the strength of his expressions, though not in their frequency, he makes very free of immortality, and he presses his argument for the resurrection as completing the being of man whose soul is immortal. The body, he says, was made originally immortal, yet continuing by the sole will of the Creator. But man has an unchangeable continuance with respect to the soul. (De Resur. Mort. c. 16.) I cannot give all my reasons for calling him a Restorationist. Some of his expressions might be taken as orthodox. Professor Hovey claims him as such. But he cites no expression strong enough, I think, to overrule the general tenor of his doctrine of man, and especially his argument that as man is an end in and to himself, no reason can ever occur why he should cease to be. (c. 12.) No orthodox view of the economy of eternal woe is at all admissible by the side of this statement. It is all that any Universalist can ask, unqualified as it is left. Hence I conclude that if Athenagoras was not consciously a Restorationist, he at least laid broad the foundations for the restorationism of the Alexandrian School.
I have spoken of a claim made by Universalists that there was restorationism before the time of Clement. This is done by Dr. Ballou, in the Expositor, May, 1834, p. 189, where he cites a passage in the second book of the Sibylline Oracles, of which, however, he makes little account. Dr. B. relies upon the date which had been usually assigned to this work; namely, the middle of the second century. But the critical labors of Friedlieb, who has edited the work, give the following results: Of the twelve books of these Oracles; the oldest was written about the year 160 before Christ; the latest towards the year 300 of the Christian era. The second is assigned to the beginning of the third century. Alexandre, another editor, agrees with Friedlieb in the main. My information is derived from a very able article on the subject in the Methodist Quarterly, 1855, pp. 510, 512.
The restorationism of Clement is not very explicit, though indubitable. He does not call the soul immortal, perhaps because this was a Gnostic style of speech, of which the Christians were somewhat shy. In one instance he speaks of the soul as saved, by present grief, from " eternal death;" but he uses the word offender against divine law into sorrow and obedience and love. And this leads us to another part of our discussion.
2. The whole theory of conversion by terror is a great and radical error. The theory, as such, is indeed being now more and more abandoned. But Christendom is not yet escaped from the influence of it, as we see in that oft-repeated misquotation, "Knowing, therefore, the terrors of the Lord, we persuade men."* Christians are yet too much alarmed for the safety of the universe if their doctrine of penalty should be untrue, and are too prone to think of man as "desperately wicked" instead of desperately weak,1- to cease their reliance on overwhelming fear as a leading influence in the changing of men's hearts. The title of that fearful sermon preached during the last century, and bringing the hearers to their feet for terror,—" Sinners in the hands of an angry God,"—still represents too much the sentiment of those to whom the gospel of grace is committed. A great and auspicious change of sentiment is begun and is far advanced. But the reform is retarded by the fact that many who proclaim that God is Love have affirmed the salvation of all. It will still require much time and labor for the church to give the divine love its true interpretation and its just supremacy. We simply remark here that God is not and cannot be Love, if any of his creatures suffer forever. He may be loving and kind, if he saves a share of his creatures at the expense of deathless anguish in others. But such a, limitation of goodness makes the attribute no longer central and ruling—it no longer represents or contains the true idea of GOD. And all preaching of the gospel along with the doctrine of ceaseless anguish, loses immensely the proper power of a gospel, or ceases to be a gospel. Involving the most grievous misrepresentation and calumny of the divine character, as unloving or as impotent, it. Our translation reads, "terror," but the original is "fear." The sense Is, "Fearing the Lord," etc. See Christ our Life. pp. 92, 93.
The original is enosh, which denotes as a substantive, man; as an adjective, frail, weak, unreliable. We might render the phrase, "desperately human" must often arouse feelings most unpropitious to conversion.
If evil is to be eternal, it must be because God lacks either the might, or the right, or the skill, or the will to bring it to an end, or let it die of itself. The skill and the will are conceded by all. The right is commonly denied indirectly, on the ground that evil extinguished in one form, would appear, or be aggravated, in another form, which involves a denial of the might. (See "Debt and Grace," cc. 2, 4; and ." The Rights of Wrong.")
Many, rejecting the doctrine, will say, and have said, "Your God is my devil." Others will be only hardened. There are brave and bold natures whom, the more you threaten them, the more you may. Many such are provoked into an attitude of defiance. Others receive the doctrine with little heart and less thought, until it develops in a morbid skepticism. "They preached the hell-fire doctrine," said one who was rejoicing in Christ as his hope of immortality, "until I believed it; and I believed it until it made me an infidel." How many have been driven away from God and from hope, into a forlorn feeling that Heaven is not their friend nor the friend of the Universe and that punishment is a police regulation, guarding the welfare of the elect, not rather the warning protector of life to all who love not death,—how many have failed to love God because they could not know Him as Love,—eternity alone can tell How, then, it may be asked, shall we account for the apparent effect of the gospel, as it has been preached for centuries, in leading men to Christ? The answer is: the doctrine of eternal suffering has been practically held mainly as a hyperbole. Men easily confound the immense with the infinite. The pulpit discourses of centuries past have contained the truth, in setting forth Christ as the only Savior, for an eternal life, and from an utter ruin. And that is the substance of the glad tidings of life and hope. What has been added respecting eternal misery has commonly had the effect of mere words. The words have been easily uttered and repeated. The arguments on the subject have been more or less current. But they have been only that verbal reasoning with which men often please or for a time deceive themselves. An able writer has told us eternal much as Maurice takes it, —as referring, not to duration, but to kind; death in sin and ignorance. He held all punishment to be chastening and reformatory, and speaks of a certain "discreet fire," or ignis sapiens, in a style suggesting the notion of purgatory, which was now taking its rise.
I need not tell my Universalist friends that Origen, " the Adamantine," was one of themselves. And I freely concede he was as adamantine for his virtues as for the power of his learning. I only ask that some regard should be had to all his opinions bearing on the question in hand. Neander speaks of him as attaching great importance to the natural immortality of the soul, as related to God. He is well known also to have held its preexistence. He made much of the doctrine of free will, supposing that not only the lost, including Satan, might be saved, but that the saved might be lost again; in other words, he made evil an eternal vicissitude. A passage cited by Tholuck on Rom. 5. 18, confirms the common belief that he regarded the doctrine of universal salvation as an arcanum, not to be generally published. And a passage in what may be called his Confession of Faith is remarkable for two reason's: it is the first in which the nature and destiny of the soul are told in extra-scriptural language; and it is hypothetically orthodox. He says: " Now that the soul hath its own substance and life, it shall receive according to its merits when it departs from this world; to possess eternal life and blessedness, if its deeds have secured this inheritance, or to be given over to eternal fire and punishments, if the guilt of its sins shall bring it to this doom." (De Principiis, Prmf. apud Rufinum.)
Of his allegorical method of interpretation I shall say nothing. He thought and spoke very much as I might have done, holding in one hand the doctrine of an indefeasible immortality, and in the other a Bible very infallible true, and as of very elastic interpretation.
Origen lived about A.D. 225. His Universalism, with all its modifications, was obviously a late and incomplete development of the doctrine if true. I think the history shows what I proposed,—that it was due more to Platonic philosophy than to exegesis; or to the doctrine of the soul's immortality super-added to the Scriptures.
I need not trace its history further. Some of my orthodox friends may need to know that more than half the Fathers of the Eastern Church were Restorationists; and Gieseler tells us that " the belief in the unalienable power of amendment in all intelligent beings, and in the limited duration of future punishment, was so general even in the West, and among the opponents of Origen, that it seemed entirely independent of his system, to which, doubtless, its origin must be traced." I need only show, in conclusion, that besides the orthodox opposition, two strong protests were made from the position I hold; one during the process of the change, and the other at a later date.
Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons, was a disciple of Polycarp, who had personally known the beloved disciple, John. He suffered martyrdom in A.D. 202. His principal work is a refutation of existing heresies, principally the Gnostic; and with Gnostic views the soul's strict immortality is associated in his book. Of his general merits of character the Restorationist Eusebius shall be our witness. Irenaeus says: The Scripture " saith oi the salvation of man, ' He asked of thee life, and thou gayest him length of days forever and ever;" the Father of all making a grant of continuance forever and ever to those who are saved. For life is not of ourselves, nor of our own nature, but a gift of God's favor. And therefore he who preserves the grant of life, and renders thanks to Him who bestows it, shall receive length of days forever and ever. But he who rejects it, and proves unthankful to his Maker for creating him, and will not know Him who bestows it, deprives himself of the gift of duration to all eternity. And therefore the Lord speaks thus to such ungrateful persons: If you have not been faithful in that which is least, who will commit much unto you? signifying that they who are unthankful to Him for this short temporal life, which is His gift, shall justly fail to receive from Him length of days forever and ever. . . . Souls therefore receive their life and their perpetual duration as a donative from God, continuing in being from non-existence because God wills them to exist and to subsist. For the will of God should have rule and lordship in all things; all else should yield and be subservient thereto. And of the creation and duration of the soul let so much be said." (Adv. Hier. 1. 2, c. 34, §§ 3, 4.)
Prof. Hovey (p. 141) raises a doubt whether Irenaeus really acid the opinion for which this passage is offered, and cites two authorities. I have not in my book ignored this doubt. But I have found the same doubt respecting Arnobius by one of his editors, which is as plausible as if he had said that daylight is green. I have found one editor of Irenaeus remarking that such a passage favors "the error of Arnohius." Cotelerias also, encountering the same " error " in the Clementines, says it is best explained by the passages in Justin, Irenaeus, and Arnobias. And I have met a very intelligent member of the Catholic clergy who remarked that Irenaeus had been criticized for the view. I may at some time present more fully the expressions of Irenaeus and the opinions of the critics. Of the two writers referred to by Prof. H., one takes no notice of § above quoted; and the other.— and he not alone — takes the significant expressions in the entire passage as meaning "eternal happiness," but without argument.
Prof. H. closes his "survey" with the following italicized statement: "The records of the primitive church, prior to A.D. 200, afford no evidence that a belief in the endless existence of the soul was brought over from pagan philosophy into the creed if the church.er " In his " survey " he ignores the entire history of opinion respecting man's intermediate nature, which Athenagoras alone did not hold. He ignores the suspicions of Justin's orthodoxy. He regards Tatian, whom nobody wants, as the first and only annihilationist; though I must think his orthodox expression even without note or comment stronger than that of Athenagoras, which he quotes. And he says nothing of the third century, in which was ripened the seed sown in the second.
Here I am tempted to add a word from Hagenbach, who, after stating the opinions of the soul's intermediate nature in the second century, says: " On the contrary, Tertullian and Origen, whose views differed on other subjects, agreed in this one point, that they, in accordance with their peculiar notions concerning the nature of the soul, looked upon immortality as essential to it." (Hist. of Doctrines, § 58). Tertullian was the great defender of the orthodox view, as Orig.= was distinguished for the restorationist view.
Prof. Hovey (p. 141) raises a doubt whether Irenaeus really acid the opinion for which this passage is offered, and cites two authorities. I have not in my book ignored this doubt. But I have found the same doubt respecting Arnobius by one of his editors, which is as plausible as if he had said that daylight is green. I have found one editor of Irenaeus remarking that such a passage favors "the error of Arnohius." Cotelerias also, encountering the same " error " in the Clementines, says it is best explained by the passages in Justin, kern:ens, and Arnobias. And I have met a very intelligent member of the Catholic clergy who remarked that Irenaeus had been criticized for the view. I may at some time present more fully the expressions of Irenaeus and the opinions of the critics. Of the two writers referred to by Prof. H., one takes no notice of § above quoted; and the other.— and he not alone — takes the significant expressions in the entire passage as meaning "eternal happiness," but without argument.
Prof. H. closes his "survey" with the following italicized statement: "The records of the primitive church, prior to A.D. 200, afford no evidence that a belief in the endless existence of the soul was brought over from pagan philosophy into the creed if the church.er " In his " survey " he ignores the entire history of opinion respecting man's intermediate nature, which Athenagoras alone did not hold. He ignores the suspicions of Justin's orthodoxy. He regards Tatian, whom nobody wants, as the first and only annihilationist; though I must think his orthodox expression even without note or comment stronger than that of Athenagoras, which he quotes. And he says nothing of the third century, in which was ripened the seed sown in the second.
Here I am tempted to add a word from Hagenbach, who, after stating the opinions of the soul's intermediate nature in the second century, says: " On the contrary, Tertullian and Origen, whose views differed on other subjects, agreed in this one point, that they, in accordance with their peculiar notions concerning the nature of the soul, looked upon immortality as essential to it." (Hist. of Doctrines, § 58). Tertullian was the great defender of the orthodox view, as Origen was distinguished for the restorationist view.
The second protestant was Arnobius, A.D. 303. He had been a rhetorician of Sicca, in Numidia, and so bitterly opposed to the Christian faith that the sincerity of his conversion was at first doubted. He therefore prepared his book, which ended the doubt. Neander says: " His work does not show the novice, who was a catechumen, but a man already mature in his convictions, if he was not orthodox according to the views of the church." The same historian speaks of the " free, independent manner in which he seems to have come to Christianity, through the reading of the New Testament, especially the Gospels."
Arnobius argues very fully the intermediate nature of man. His rhetoric is strong, but he shows a warm heart. He says: " Souls were formed not far from the yawning jaws of death, yet such that they might become long-lived by the gift and beneficence of the Sovereign Ruler, if they but endeavor and strive to know Him. For the knowledge of Him is, as it were, the leaven of life, preservative against dissolution." (Adv. Gentes, 1. 2, c. 32.) " Wherefore we should not be deceived or deluded with vain hopes, by that which a new class of men, elated with an extravagant opinion of themselves, tell us: that souls are immortal, next in rank of dignity to the Supreme God, derived from him as Creator and Father, divine, wise, inspired with knowledge, and free from stain of gross matter." (I. 2, cc. 14, 15.) " This we do hold and know; on this one clear and manifest truth do we take our stand, — that all the gifts of God are for the benefit and happiness of all; most full of delight, love, joy, and gladness; yielding pleasures incorruptible and ever-during; freely offered to the wishes and earnest efforts of all; and to be excluded from them is destruction and death." (1. 2, c. 55.)
Does the doctrine of the immortality of a class accord with a just philosophy and with the sentiments of humanity?
THE present and concluding chapter of my prolonged argument must be somewhat miscellaneous. I must touch briefly the supposed metaphysical proofs of man's immortality; a theological argument, or the doctrine of salvation; the supposed reformatory design of all punishment; and the questions, What is benevolent to man? and, What is worthy of God?
§ 1. The Ontological Proof of a Future Life.
The metaphysical argument for the soul's immortality is the lineal descendant of the Grecian philosophy, particularly the Platonic; though it is older than Grecian thought, as appears from Cicero's statements and from some of the Hindoo books. It is found most at length and in the most scholastic form in the early Christian literature, in Augustine. In modern times it is considerably broken down under the subtleties which the schoolmen have heaped upon it, and generally abandoned as unsatisfactory. Yet there is a very frequent presumption that the Scriptures teach or imply it, and that, therefore, we do well to prop it up, for the benefit of sceptics, by the support of pure reason.
The commonest rational argument is based on the immaterial nature of the soul. It is uncompounded —not made up of parts, and so cannot fall in pieces. Or, it is a spiritual substance, suffering no change or decay from physical causes and agencies. And, in obscure agreement with the latter view, it is often remarked that moral causes cannot change or affect the substance or being of the soul.
I grant the immaterial nature of the soul; for I do not make the mind out of the brain, however dependent it may be, in the present economy, on cerebral action; rather, I regard the brain and all organism as produced by vital forces. And all life, animal and vegetable, as well as spiritual, seems a higher sort of life than the mechanical or chemical properties of atoms, or even the so-called imponderable agents — heat, light, and the electric, magnetic, and galvanic currents. When we have passed these limits, we find ourselves in a world of myriad forms of life, some of which trench very close upon the human, so that the higher examples of brute life compete with the lower examples of human life, and even bear away the palm. For dignity of nature, perhaps Bucephalus was as worthy of a city for a monument, and as worthy of immortality, as a good many men have been. The rational distinction between the human soul and the brute soul is not very well settled yet; and the fact reflects no great credit on our sagacity, or boasted superiority. And in the question of moral capacity, some dogs seem to have as tender a conscience as some men ever had.
I say these things, not to jostle the human race into rank with the brutes, — for I am as proud as any one of my humanity, though sometimes very much ashamed of it,— but to raise the question whether differences of character may not be even more important than differences of race, in this question of the immortality of souls, whereof the Scriptures say naught. Many good men — Duns Scotus, Ramsay, Dean, Wesley, Clarke, Tennyson, Theodore Parker, Agassiz — have held or allowed the immortality of brutes; and Bishop Butler and Isaac Taylor have remarked that the metaphysical arguments for our immortality are about as good for the immortal life of our four-footed and our footless neighbors. There is something in them besides atomic pieces of matter. And that something else, it seems to me, may be vital, spiritual substance — a great deal more manifold in its kind than atoms are, of which we have found about seventy sorts — gold, silver, copper, nickel, and so on down. There is a common notion that all spiritual substance is homogeneous; whence it is inferred that God and we are made of the same stuff. So the Platonists believed, with inevitable consistency, that the soul is immortal because eternal and divine. I reject the conclusion, because I deny the premise; and I reject the premise, also, because I deny the conclusion. And if we once admit that spiritual substance is heterogeneous, we may, perhaps we must, allow that no kind of created spirit is absolutely imperishable; and the greater frailty of one kind may denote at least a measure of frailty in another kind. In God we live, and move, and have our being—Rot in ourselves. And whether we shall live in Him and with Him eternally, may depend on our observance of the precept, " Be strong; quit you like men."
If I am asked how the soul, as a spiritual substance, can perish from being, I will reply by asking how it comes into being. Or, rather,—not to debate the question whether it is created or propagated,—does the soul grow? and if so, how? Is the substance of the infant soul as entire and complete as that of the matured and full-grown intellect, master of a hundred arts and sciences? Is the quantity of being the same. in the one case as in the other? I do not ask if the one weighs as many ounces or measures as many inches; but is there, for substance and amount, as much soul in the one case as in the other? If so, then are all souls equal in quantity of being? and if thus equal, whence the manifest and striking differences in their original and native power and capacity? If the brain and the material organism make all these differences, then do disembodied souls retain any of these differences, or any differences of constitutional habit or quality, intellectual or moral? If two souls in very different bodies should make an exchange, would they at once exchange characters? and if not, why? Again, if there is acquired power or habit of the soul, is that a development of what was in the soul at the outset, or is it something superadded to its nature or being?
1 ask these questions for information. I cannot answer them myself. And until they are answered, I think we should not hold. with any dogmatism, that idea of the soul which makes it a pure entelechy —a logical entity or substance, imperishable as truth itself, and which must be precisely similar in all individuals. But if there are real differences in human souls, and real processes of growth, however unlike the growths of matter, then all argument for its proper immortality is at an end. Aside from revelation, we might suppose that the soul has a certain and fixed period of growth, maturity, and decay; a period much longer, possibly, than the three thousand years of the cedar, yet strictly a period beyond which it could not live. And with the revelation, I find nothing to oppose this view: viz., that even without a natural and necessary period of life, the soul may suffer in its very being by all that wars against its well-being. The disregarded laws of its life may become the laws of its death. If it may thrive, it may languish; if it may wax stronger, it may grow weaker; if it may become more, it may become less. If the true, the beautiful, and the good are for "the soul's health," the false, the gross, and the evil may give it ill health. If purity may adorn it, vice may contaminate it. If virtue and love may give it power, sin may give it disease. Sin is the transgression of law; and if the " wages of sin is death," that death may be something more than a metaphor, and the disease which causes it may be mortal disease —a sin unto death. I have already remarked that death "in trespasses and sins" probably signifies a sentence of death yet future. And I find nothing in the proper nature of the soul to rescue it from the analogies which make disease the symptom of decay and the pathway of death.
Here I meet the objection that moral causes do not directly produce physical effects. But I am not so sure of this. The indirect physical effects of moral causes are legion. The world is full of the produce of mind. We cannot glance amiss to see what thought has done. But by what intermediate stages has all the work of the human race grown out of its mind? It has not been by magic, as if we had the lamp of Aladdin; nor has it been done by Leibnitz's rule of preestablished harmony, which grew out of the notion that spiritual forces could not be harnessed to work in matter. Pyramids, temples, cities, steamships, and railroads have not sprung into existence because men have dreamed or wished them, nor merely because men thought them out. They are the product of thought applied; and applied with many zealous passions of the human soul, and with much labor of brain and muscle, with sweat and toil. At every inch of surface the spiritual force has touched and shaped the material effect.
And has the spiritual force itself been unaffected, unchanged? Many a human body has been killed by a blow of joy or grief struck through the human soul. The pang was first felt within. The outward death came of the inward agony. There are, indeed, trials by which, " though the outward man perish, yet the inner man is renewed day by day." But this is because the soul is wrought into harmony with a higher nature, or is made more completely a " partaker of the divine nature; "—is regenerated of an " incorruptible seed, which lives and abideth forever." And by the same reason, if worse and baser passions sway the soul, they may bring it down toward a real death. The decay of the faculties by vicious habits of thoughts—the deterioration and mental and moral disease so often observed —who shall say, in the assumption of an unrevealed immortal nature, that these are not incipient stages of dissolution, in which, unrested, the soul itself may become extinct?
The argument may be more plainly stated in its stronger form. The material produce of mind is the effect of an unlike cause. This is the marvel and the inscrutable mystery. But mind is like itself; and though the soul's substance is not itself thought, feeling, and purpose, yet it is far more like them than matter is. The soul's substance is the physical medium, as it were, by which thought, feeling, and purpose, have reached the outer world. The material produce is both unlike, and at second hand. So much the more may these spiritual agencies work changes in the being of spirit, as kindred substance, close at hand as substance to its attribute.
Another form of the metaphysical or psychological argument should be glanced at. I often hear persons say that they are conscious of immortality. Well, they have a higher power of consciousness than I have; yet I will confess no inferiority to them. To be conscious of immortality is to be conscious of being alive to-morrow, and a billion years hence, and every moment between. My friends do not mean that. They simply mean that they are conscious of a longing and aspiration after immortality; and so am 1. And this proves — indirectly, as we presume that God is too good to tantalize and trifle with us — that we were made for immortality. But then the argument comes to the same footing with other longings and aspirations, which are valid according as they are noble and good. It is strictly a moral argument; and its value is settled, I believe, by St. Paul, thus: " To those who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life."
§ 2. The Theology of Salvation.
In treating the question of universal salvation, we should inquire how the term salvation is used and applied in the Scriptures, and also what it implies. For it is an essential part of the doctrine of forgiveness, involving the question whether we are saved by justice or by grace.
The Greek word for salvation (soteria, soterion) and the corresponding verb (soz5) are used in the New Testament, with apparent reference to a final destiny, one hundred times. I may overcount a little; but I may safely say that if the word does not refer to man's final destiny in most of these instances, it does in none of them, and it assures the eternal life of no man. It is also worthy of remark that in the Syriac version it is rendered life, and the giving of life.
And of the hundred instances all except twelve apply the salvation to a class of men. Some of them do so very strongly. Thus Luke 13. 23, 24: "Are there few that be saved? . . . Strive to enter in at the straight gate; for many, I say unto you, will seek to enter in, and shall not be able." Phil. 1. 28: "An evidence to them of perdition, but to you of salvation, and that of God." 2 Tim. 2. 10: " I endure all things for the elect's sakes, that they may also obtain the salvation which is in Christ Jesus with eternal glory."
Some of the instances not obviously partitive will be claimed by my opponent as implying a general salvation. Thus John 3. 17: " God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved." (Compare chapter ma 47.) But here the previous verses make faith the condition of salvation, even while they commend the divine love: " God so loved the world, that whosoever believeth," etc. And " the world " may easily signify all nations as compared with the Jews, who were claiming a monopoly of salvation. Thus, in another of the passages my opponent may claim, Acts 13. 46, 47: " Seeing ye . . . judge yourselves unworthy of everlasting life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles. For so hath the Lord commanded us, saying, I have set thee, to be a light of the Gentiles, that thou shouldest be for salvation to the ends of the earth." The passage in John 3. 17, seems to me no more to prove the salvation of every human individual than the expression in verse 26, "all come to him," shows that every Jew was baptized of John. When the Pharisees said of Christ, " If we let him thus alone, all men will believe on him" (chapter 11. 48), and again, "Behold, the world is gone after him" (chapter 12. 19), we do nut suppose they meant every individual human being; yet in the last expression they use the same word which Christ used (kosmos, the world). Christ's promise might be as large, even larger than the Pharisees' complaint, and yet there be many unbelieving, and unsaved.
And when Christ says " the Son of man is come to save that which was lost" (Matt. 18.11; Luke 19. 10), the context will show a comparison made between the self-righteous Jews and those whom they hated and despised as having no inheritance with Abraham. Christ came to call not the righteous, or self-righteous, but sinners, to repentance. The poor in spirit, and the meek and lowly, were the true Israel. The passage indicates the non-salvation of those who rested securely and proudly in carnal hopes, i.e., in their Jewish blood, as much as it indicates anything.
So much for the extent of salvation as revealed in the Scriptures. And now for the nature of it. Universalists have well and truly insisted that Christ came "to save his people from their sins;" that salvation from sinfulness is more important than salvation from punishment — for sin is worse than pain; and that the doctrine of salvation from punishment, aside from the other salvation, is very pernicious, though there is too much of it in the world.
Here I may suggest to my orthodox friends that the doctrine of endless and infinite pain as the result of sin naturally tends to the evil just named. The self-love of man is in advance of the moral sense. And when he is told that he is in danger of undying agony, we may say what we will about his deserving it, still he will care more for the danger than for the guilt. The " great salvation" he will think of as the deliverance from the infinite peril; the deliverance from sinful bondage will be comparatively a slight thing. And this will explain the crouching and cringing attitude of some professedly Christian minds before God, and the professed feeling of some — we trust unreal — that if annihilation were the end of sin, they would no longer fear God or serve him.
Here I also recognize the Universalist opinion of salvation from this and that sinful habit as a real doctrine of salvation, though not the whole doctrine nor the true doctrine. It seems to me a subordinate sense of the term; though I am very glad if any hate sin enough to prize such a salvation very highly, and I am sorry if any cannot get any sense or meaning from the idea.
Yet a great question remains respecting the doctrine of salvation. Are we saved by grace, or by justice? Is there strictly any remission of the penalty of sin, or is there none?
I know that the doctrine of remitted penalty is liable to abuse; that corrupt human nature is willing enough to sin and then try to get rid of punishment — and that does not speak well or honorably for human nature. And I thank Universalists and Unitarians for insisting, very correctly, that certain bad consequences of sin are always inevitable; that it brings a bad and unhealthy condition of the soul, which no forgiveness or act of pardon can remedy at once; that the laws of our moral constitution, like all the laws of nature, are so wisely appointed that even Sovereign grace still respects them; and so when we sin we must suffer.
But here we come at the gist of our question: If a bad condition of the soul, that is, sickness and disease, be the punishment of sin, how long must it last? what is its natural termination? and may recovery be retarded by unforgiveness, or hastened and even secured by a work of pardon?
And here I think I find the common objection to Universalism well founded; viz., that in respect to penalty it has no doctrine of salvation. One cannot be saved from what he was never exposed to; nor can one be saved from what he actually suffers. The Universalist, denying both the orthodox and the destructionist view of penalty, finds no salvation in that direction. And the only penalty in which he does believe is always suffered in full tale. Thus, between what is unjust and what is inevitable, there is no salvation.
This result is expressly admitted by Dr. T. S. Smith, in his " Illustrations of the Divine Government." He says: " The advocates for the corrective nature of punishment do not believe that all men will be saved, but that, sinners having been reclaimed by the discipline through which they will be made to pass, all men will ultimately be rendered pure and happy." Again: "It is true, that all who suffer future punishment endure the penalty of the law, and therefore, in a popular sense, cannot be said to be forgiven." (Part 2. c. 3.)
The obvious conclusion is that we are saved not by grace, but by justice, if we are saved at all. Dr. S. endeavors to turn the edge of this objection by saying that penalty itself is merciful and gracious, of which hereafter. But regarding penalty in the light of justice, which Dr. S. himself must in some sense allow, I can offer no better comment than in the words of Dr. Bushnell:
"In the school of modern Unitarianism, it is held that God cannot deliver us of the just penalty of our sins at all; that we must bear it in the full and exact measure of justice, and that our only hope is to wear a passage through and get our deliverance, by the patient process of exhaustion. The argument is, that as God is just, his character requires him to do justice; that he is immutable and cannot reverse his decreed penalties; and especially that we are all under the penalty of justice now, in so far as we transgress; the penalty being executed in us by a necessary law of nature, which, as God cannot change it without a miracle, must pour its currents upon us, till we become good enough to go clear, under the same retributive laws of cause and effect, which grates in misery and bondage on our bad experience. There is no possibility of a sudden remission, apprehended by faith and sealed by a new spiritual birth. We must begin to grow better, by a regular process of culture and amendment, and we must go on till we run out the flow of penal consequence, and get the laws of retribution on our side." This view "wholly displaces the gospel, as a message of good news from heaven; denying even the possibility of pardon or remission, in any sense that gives it an effective value. Nothing can be said of pardon, save that it signifies a forgiving feeling in God to the penitent. It is that feeling, nothing more." (Christ in Theology, pp. 271273.)
And the denial of salvation from penalty vitiates the doctrine of salvation from sin itself. For punishment certainly does not save from the sin already committed. Even if we admit the notion of expiation or compensation, — so much pain paying for so much sin, — that is not salvation, but a compounding of losses. And there still remains the bad effect of the sin in the mental and moral habitude. The Universalist theory is that penalty is designed as a tonic to correct this, and so save from future sin. But this view formally rejects the notion of " remission of sins that are past " (Rom. 3. 25) and involves another serious difficulty. Punishment is no longer a thing of justice in any sense; it is not even just, but becomes a sheer experiment of discipline. Thus Dr. Smith says: " Punishment is not retrospective, but prospective. You are to be punished, not because you have yielded to an evil volition, but that you may yield to an evil volition no more." (Part 1. § 2.)
That is, one is to be punished at a venture for sins that may never be committed! The only escape from this absurdity is in another; viz., that guilt is ill-deserving not intrinsically but only because penalty is annexed; or that the punishment constitutes the crime. This I have endeavored to deduce in treating the difficulties both of the orthodox and the Universalist views on this subject. (Debt and Grace, c. 10. §§ 5, 6.)
We come round again to the question, Is the disease of sin in the soul healed by forgiveness? I think the affirmative answer avoids all the difficulties I have alluded to. But this supposes that the moral disease, unhealed, is mortal. For, if a personal immortality remains, that implies a continuance of all the faculties of personal and responsible being, including free agency, and involving the power of self-recovery; and then forgiveness is not needed. But if the disease is threatening, or if " the wages of sin is death," then forgiveness as a healing grace and power is legitimate. There is then " remission of sins that are past," for their penalty is revoked and their power is broken in the same work of the soul's recovery. Justification — or pardon — and sanctification are not divorced, but become inseparable. Mercy and truth are met together. Grace—or gratuitous favor and amnesty—is no repeal of law, but its reenactment, in the returning strength and life of one who was sinking into the outlawry of death.
Here I may remark that all the scriptural language which represents sin as disease and our Savior as a Physician, is specially pertinent to this view. The governmental system of the Roman Empire has, I think, made our theology too forensic, and the Schoolmen have made it too dialectic. Has it not yet to become, as it were, more therapeutic? And when we make it such, shall we not " hold fast the form of sound words" and of "sound doctrine" (hygiainouses didaskalias, healthy instruction, 1 Tim. 1. 10; 6. 3; 2 Tim. 1. 13; 4. 3; Tit. 1. 9, 13; 2. 1, 2)?
§ 3. The Nature and Design of Punishment.
A doctrine of punishment has extensively prevailed which is much like this: that crime and sin are infringements of law, upon which the law, or the majesty of the law-power, requires penal retribution, for which the severe name is vengeance. The law, it is commonly said, has been violated, " broken." And to " repair " this damage there is a demand for suffering, expiation, satisfaction.
The false element in this theory is indicated by the results to which it has been carried in views of the Atonement. The redemptive work of Christ has been regarded as a compensation, a payment of debt in the sinner's behalf, valid upon the sinner's acceptance of the substitute. That this idea does away with free grace on the part of God is confessed by one author who says: " Sure I am, that debt can never be forgiven which is paid." The difficulties of the theory are also betrayed by the connected question respecting the extent of the Atonement.
The Universalist theory of punishment as solely corrective and reformatory seems to me an extreme reaction from the above view. It has been favored also by the modern reform in criminal codes and prison discipline, and by the discovery that a humane ministry of penalty may reform, where rigorous and unmixed punishment only hardens. This view, however, may easily be carried to an extreme and false result. The transgressor of law may be regarded as simply unfortunate, and not as guilty; that which he needs may exclude all notion of what he deserves; he may be treated not as deserving any penalty, but as having special claims and rights, and as deserving to be reformed.
We need some view of the subject which shall avoid each extreme. And such a view I think is suggested by the Economy of Pain. To what purpose are the pangs and sighs and woes of which the world is so full? Are they all purely vindictive? Or, are they all reformatory? Neither the one nor the other. But they grow out of a natural system of penalty, very wise and merciful, yet no less just, which is exemplified on a large scale in the nervous system. The design of the nerves of sensation, with their exquisite susceptibility of pain, is the protection of limb, life, and health. Take out the nerves from the body, and it might be maimed or destroyed without one’s knowing it. They are the eyes and ears of the system, protecting it by their constant watch and their thousand alarms. Frost and cold are so fearful because they hurt so little, — benumbing and stealing away the senses, and taking the life unwarned. These troublesome nerves, with their magazine of pangs so like Pandora's box of all human ills, are the outposts and sharp sentinels that warn us of danger. They are all designed for our good. I thank God, therefore, for all the minis- tries of Pain. We could not live without them; and many would live longer and better if they had more of them.
At the bottom of Pandora's box, in the fable, was Hope. But do we find hope at the end of all human pains? I find this — that many men push against the terrible dangers of which their kind nerves admonish them, and make a complete sacrifice of health, or limb, or life. And this is done not by holy martyrs only, dying under some lower law, that they may live up to a Higher Law, but by men of the lowest aims, rushing upon ruin in defiance of all law. Men do this sometimes for lucre. They do it oftener for lust; gratifying their queasy or their vicious appetites, purposely "living fast" and slipping rapidly and painfully down into their graves. They do it to glut their revenge; pursuing a foe to the ends of the earth, willing enough to die when he is dead.
In all these cases the punishing nerves demand and receive their dues. But what is the result? They were all designed to reform and save. In the general economy, their pains were salutary and healing, but instead of that they have only killed. In short, they who disregard the lesson of penalty, perish under it, and with it. The pains are sharp and very torturing, because they were set to guard a precious treasure of life; and the beneficence which ordained their sharpness, holds out to the end, and lets them die out with the life. They are, like the gospel itself, a sweet savor — of life unto life, or of death unto death, according as they are used or disused. But the beneficence goes on no further than death. When the life is thrown away, the slighted mercy is not bound to restore the rejected boon. Why should it?
An old writer has laid down the principle thus: — All punishments reform—when they do not exterminate. And our question now is, — Is this true of all kinds of penalty, or of the physical only?
I reply, the examples I have offered have all the force of the argument from analogy. And the argument is made very strong by the immense number of the instances, and by the fact that we observe no contrary instances. So far as I know, in every department of nature, persistent action against the laws of being tends to deteriorate the nature and destroy the being itself. Real law can never be " broken;" it vindicates itself as immutable and sovereign, by breaking and crushing all that will oppose it.
But strong as the argument from analogy is, and much as it seems like a reason and nature of things, I doubt whether we are left to it alone. There are some things in the action of Conscience that suggest the same law as applying to man's moral nature. When its admonitions are disregarded, it becomes blunted. If one will do what he knows is wrong, his feelings of misgiving gradually die out; the twinges of conscience subside into a dull and dead pain; regret and remorse often give way to hard-hearted indifference; the distinctions of right and wrong are confused and obliterated. The talent disused wastes away. Capacity becomes incapacity. The whole doctrine of judicial blindness, which we discover in the Scriptures, may be a verification in the conscience of the rule: " He that hath, to him shall be given; and from him that hath not shall be taken that which he seemed to have." Dr. Bushnell gives, among his "Sermons for the New Life," one on this passage which so far suggests the thought of annihilation that he considers the doctrine and gives his reasons for thinking that conclusion cannot be reached. It should be compared with some expressions in his Discourse on " Endless Life."
But the conscience is, as it were, the nervous system of the soul. If it is not its vital faculty, — the very life of the moral and spiritual being,—it is at least the regulative faculty. When it is dead, the feelings and will may get a little remaining control from obvious convenience, or from conventional usage, or from the force of old habit; but there is nothing else to save one from ruin and death. And these mechanical forces cannot renew the spiritual life. That can come only from God; and by the supposition the holiness, the purity, the self-sacrificing love of God as exampled in Christ, have been declined. The economy of grace and truth which gave man a conscience is not bound to reinstate and renew it when man has dethroned and stifled it. That may be a sin unto death. And the natural penalty of the soul's death may be equally merciful and just.
Here, if I have named the true doctrine of natural punishment, I may suggest a view of artificial, or special and enacted penalty, for consideration. Is it not anticipative, —a hastening of painful results of transgression, to bring them into clearer view? a make-weight to get the warning of nature felt and heard? When the reformation of the individual is hopeless, the punishment is justified as protecting the society, and its measure to be determined by the wise discretion of the society. The natural law of punishment still remains, as a divine law; the final execution of which may be the " vengeance " ascribed to God (Rom. 12. 19).
§ 4. Is the Immortality of a Class unkind to Mem?
Here I must meet a very common objection based on the parental feeling, and will close with one or two direct argument:
1. It is not a hardship that one should fail to be a parent of immortality. Many persons, as deserving and as affectionate as the average, are never parents at all, and never will be unless there is marriage in the heavenly state. George Washington was the father of a country, but never of a child. It is not essential, then, to the blessedness of the saved, that they should be able to claim certain ones as their offspring. You may say that childless saints will be strangers to certain feelings of celestial joy; perhaps they will; yet in the resources of the celestial kingdom they shall lack no supply for any noble and holy capacity of their being; the Lord is their Shepherd, they shall not want.
But to be childless, says one, is not so hard as bereavement, and loss of children. And here I encounter the whole force of the Universalist sentiment: A parent would not let a child suffer or die, if he could prevent it. If the heavenly Father, who loves us better than we love our children, allows suffering and death, it must be because he has something better in store to prove his love.
Such is the argument, offered to show that each human family must find all its members in the heavenly mansions. It seems to me inadequate, for the following reasons:— (1.) Parental affection is commonly a modification of self-love. The child is a second self. That is why one cares more for his own child than for his neighbor's. But one's desire for a child's immortality should be of as high a moral type as the desire for personal immortality. The promise is no less rigid to the child than to the parent; " To those who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, honor, and immortality." If, then, the parental feeling, and I may add, the feelings that lead to parentage,—which, like other qualities, may be inherited, — if these are subordinate to the sentiment of piety, I do not know but one may have high hopes of reunion with the child. Something like this may be implied in 1 Cor. 7. 14. At least there is a " Christian nurture" which may devote and train the child for the higher life from its earliest infancy.
But if the parental regard is worldly, and the child is from the first devoted to and trained for the world, one cannot complain if it avails no further. And even if the parent shall rise to nobler aims, and shall deplore the fruits of past ungodliness, He who is "able of the stones to raise up children to Abraham " may grant other consolation than an unbroken family circle in the kingdom of eternal life. To be at all a parent of immortality is exalted honor. Is there unkindness if one is not more?
(2.) Although God is not bound, against the perversion of free will, to make each man's existence on the whole a blessing, still as matter of fact those who finally perish may have much to be thankful for. Most human beings seem to enjoy more than they suffer. And this may be true even if existence is finally lost. It may be almost a law of life that the pains of its decay should not outweigh the joys it brings. It may still be true that the failure of immortal life shall make it morally better that one had never been born. And they who perish may feel this on the same principle that disappointed lovers so often think life a curse — only with a million-fold more reason.
I have used the phrase " parent of immortality," but only for argument's sake. The Scriptures, I think, teach a higher parentage than human, for the immortal life. They who have " power to become the sons of God," are " born not of flesh, nor of blood, nor of the will of man, but of God." God is the " Father of spirits," and the distinction between soul and spirit may apply in this argument.
2. The power of evil habit and of memory may render immortality burdensome. The time has been when death was deemed an emancipation from all earthly habits and minor differences of character. The good, it was thought, would be perfectly blessed as soon as they were dead, and the bad perfectly wretched. And all the good and all the bad were respectively put on nearly the same level. In accordance with this philosophy, or lack of philosophy, some of the early Universalists regarded death as putting an end to all distinctions of character. Sin came of the body; and to be out of it was to be in holiness and in heaven.
Mature thought has changed all that. The soul, we now think, has its own laws, as every other real thing must have; and all its changes and improvements must observe those laws. Death is no longer the panacea for all its ills. The other world may be very unlike the present; yet it may bear strong analogies. Fatal as its atmosphere may be to those who have rejected its life, its gentle zephyrs may not at once heal all the soul's ills. Though God works miracles at sundry times in his teaching and training of the human race, we may doubt whether there are miracles in the general economy of man's destiny. The result is, we must have some apprehensions, lest the laws of our physical, and moral being may, even beyond the tomb, make death better than life.
In bodily sickness death is often preferred to the pains and weariness of slow convalescence. Just so evil habits of thought, feeling, and action, may require so long and weary a purgation on the other side, and may put one so far behind his companions in the heavenly race, that he would prefer not to tax their kindness, or seek their company. One may be so imbruted by habits of unbelief that the capacity for faith in disinterested kindness shall be gone. Cunning philosophers have doubted every such thing here; — who shall say they may not doubt there? Unhappy personal relations may fatally threaten all future happiness. The seducer may prefer never to meet the victim, all whose hopes he has sacrificed for lust. The murderer may decline the courtesies of heaven with one for whom he could find no room on earth. And if, as some have thought, the memory retains all one's past history, how many may be so burdened and stung with poignant recollections that even the freeness and largeness of divine mercy cannot give them rest? I believe in God's infinite power. But infinite power cannot work contradictions; and it will not disregard the laws of created being, or of man's moral nature. And if God, should administer the cup of Lethe to any, and so destroy or change a part of their personal being, out of kindness, he may also, for aught, we know, kindly let them die, and may fill his universal domain with those who have earlier and more fully consecrated themselves to goodness.
3. Many persons, not the worst of men, have no desire for immortality. This desire has been called natural and instinctive; and we hear of the inextinguishable love of being. But, granting that this is the rule, and that it proves the actual immortality of those who rightly cherish it, there are exceptions so marked as to claim attention, if not to limit the argument. And for examples I will not name those who have doubted immortality because they have never distinctly heard or thought of it, but those who have lived in the midst of the sentiment.
If I mistake not, Joseph Barker, well known as having renounced Christianity, eschews all faith in an afterlife, and, apparently, all desire therefor. I do not think him an immoral man, though he has shared as a " reprobate " in the honors of a book-dedication. I would not judge him, or say a word against him. I do not devote him to death. But I name him as one who has been an able preacher of the gospel; was specially likely to fall in love with immortality; and is too acute to be necessarily prejudiced against it by what others say or think about it. He now thinks this life and its comforts are as much as any of us ought to wish or care for. I am very sure if he should die out with the rest of us, he would be the last man to complain. And I verily believe if he should be called to die only with a few followers, he would not wish to be disappointed, but would bear his peculiar fate as proudly as a hero. I may be mistaken in my man; but are there not such?
A more noted example is David F. Strauss, the author of "The Life of Jesus," which has made such a stir with its mythical theory. His acquaintance with the doctrine of immortality is even larger than that of Barker; but he rejects it all. In his later work, entitled " Glaubenslehre," or the Doctrine of Faith, he concludes: " The idea of a future world is the last enemy which speculative criticism has to oppose, and, if possible, to overcome."
He, certainly, will not complain of death. I do not say how much such opinions may prove in the question of what will be; but in the present question we must consult the choice and preference of men as they are — especially if they be able men, who may speak for themselves. And upon their testimony I submit whether the doctrine I hold, which is infinitely better than their wishes, is at all unmerciful.
§ 5. Is the Selection of a Class to Immortality worthy of God?
I have freely admitted that God would not be just to himself if he were simply just to his creatures. True to his nature as love, he must bestow upon men more and better than they deserve. And because God is not only love, but infinite love, my opponent may think the conclusion direct and inevitable that God must bestow upon each moral creature the infinite boon of immortal life, for which his moral constitution adapts him.
From this conclusion I dissent, for several reasons.
1. All analogy favors the idea of a sifting of the human species, and a conservation of the best, or of the individuals that mature. I have not time to array the facts in this analogy, but may refer to what I have said elsewhere on the subject, and quote as follows: " A true analogy would make the probation of mankind not an exception to the rule, but the highest example of it. The law of selection in the case of man is different; the end is the same. The vegetable life is the sport of chance. The animal, with its spontaneity, can help and provide for itself— subject, however, to many dangers which it cannot avert, and to man's dominion. Man, by his free will, is elevated to a higher rank — beyond the reach of fate, but not of hazard. Indeed, the nations of men that have not heard the Word of Life are scarcely beyond the reach of fate; though strictly, as moral beings, they are salvable, and perish through unbelief in Him who is 'not far from every one of them.' Those who dwell in Christendom stand higher than they, and may fall further. Yet the design of the species is accomplished in those who are perfected, and who shall never perish, because moral perfectness is an end in itself, and when attained, may be ever maintained. Man, as a race, is still subject to the sifting analogies that underlie him. As free, he is called upon to choose for himself; to make his calling and election sure; to acquit himself as a man. Failing of this, he is rejected, or reprobate, as refuse and worthless. He is likened to tares; to the useless produce of the fisher's net; to the field of briers and stones, whose end is to be burned. Condemned as moray unworthy, his reprobation has a higher ethical significance, while its literal import remains." (Debt and Grace, pp. 239, 240.)
2. While God is bound, in justice or equity, not to make existence a curse, he is not bound to make it a blessing. That there is such an obligation is very strongly asserted by Mr. Ballou, in his " Divine Character Vindicated," where he thinks that t' human existence, if enforced at all, should be, to each and every individual, when taken as a whole, a good, and not an evil— a blessing, and not a curse." (P. 122.)
This would be true if man had no moral freedom, and were not capable of deserving evil as well as good. But this fact seems to me entirely overlooked in Mr. B.'s statement. But if man may deserve evil at all, he may deserve evil on the whole; and though his continuance in a sinful and evil immortality would be past all reason, yet there may be the best reason for his failure of immortality. And one may so fail that his brief existence shall be a loss rather than a gain. We may well suppose that this was the case with Judas. " Woe unto him by whom the Son of man is betrayed. Better were it for that man if he had never been born."
But if the individual man may deserve a balance of finite evil, much more may he forfeit an infinite good. The infinite boon may be infinitely desirable; and because we would like to have it, we may persuade ourselves that we have some claim to it, or that it is not fairly withholden from us. But if bestowed, it is and ever will be an infinite gratuity.
5. In the economy of God's empire of holy blessedness, a comparative claim of one individual may be overruled by the higher claim of another. In point of right, I must yield to anyone who can fill my place in the universe better than I can. Even in propriety and benevolence, I might wish to yield my place to such an one, for the general good. And if I have impaired my capacity of usefulness, it is not for me to say that infinite power, and wisdom, and goodness, too, cannot replace me; especially if incapacity and deterioration have gone so far that the process of recovery may be slow and difficult.
4. Virtue is heroic. And it may be worthy of God to select, and to elect, those who are morally heroic, for the inheritance of immortality. The forms of heroism may be as various as the Christian virtues and graces; yet it may be one essential element of all Christian virtue. Self-sacrifice, self-denial, is essentially and peculiarly Christian. "If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, — yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple. And whosoever doth not bear his cross, and come after me, cannot lie my disciple." Though we may not take those words of Christ literally, they will contain the principle I have named. God has a right to be choice respecting the members of his family, and to require of those who aspire to that honor the most strenuous efforts to prove worthy of it. With all their differences, a close resemblance has been observed between the stoic and the Christian systems of morals. And the stoics held the immortality of a class. Christ, teaching a higher virtue, and offering a higher glory, may bestow such immortality by a higher right. The Christian race differs from the Grecian games, as it has more crowns than one; yet we must strive, if we would triumph. It is a true hymn that says:—
Awake my soul, stretch every nerve,
And press with vigor on;
A heavenly race demands thy zeal,
And an immortal crown.
It is God's all-animating voice That calls thee from on high;
It is his own hand presents the prize To thine aspiring eye.
A cloud of witnesses around
Hold thee in full survey;
Forget the steps already trod,
And onward urge thy way.
My argument has already been drawn out to greater length than was anticipated, either by my courteous opponent or myself. A few points that might be touched must be passed by. Certain elements of truth, on which my opponent may insist, I have not recognized as fully as I shall be happy to do, though I fail to carry them to his results. I do not offer my argument as perfect, or free from flaws. I never yet saw such an argument on a theme so extended and so complex. I shall be happy to see all my errors corrected, whether essential or trivial. Of their importance, the reader will judge. I have tried to make as few as possible; and if my humble effort shall help anyone to think out for himself a solid, scriptural, and true opinion respecting our relations to the endless life, I shall not have written in vain. With sincere thanks to the editor and his readers for their liberal bearing of views from which they so much dissent, I bid you, for the present, farewell.
The doctrine of endless misery an occasion of skepticism.
Passages from the Epilogue to "Essays in Ecclesiastical Biography.' By Sir James Stephen, Vol. 2., pp. 462-507.
ON the original appearance, in the Edinburgh Review, of the Essays contained in these volumes, they were condemned, by some, as casting only a furtive and timid glance at those sacred topics which must lie at the foundation of all ecclesiastical biography. To the author himself, however, it appeared impossible to assign to such topics their due prominence in a journal devoted to science, to literature, and to politics. But, on republishing these papers in his own person, and with his name, he contracts, and acknowledges the obligation to supply, as far as may be in his power, the omissions which formerly appeared to him inevitable. He is even solicitous to avow, without reserve, the opinions which have been rather suggested or assumed, than explicitly stated, in the pre-ceding pages. Having celebrated, with almost equal zeal, the characters of many who maintained creeds and worshipped under forms widely contrasted with each other, he is desirous to disclaim that state of mind to which all religious distinctions are insignificant, and to explain why the reverence of all the members of the great Christian family is, in his judgment, due alike to many who have belonged to each of the great sections of which it is composed. Great as must be his liability to error on such a subject, he rejoices to know that such errors can hardly be injurious to anyone. No authority will be attached by any other inquirer to the mere " Guesses at Truth " of a man, who (unlike the profound and large-minded scholars who have appropriated that title to some of their mature thoughts) is destitute of the advantage of a theological education, and has throughout his life been deeply involved with scarcely any interval, in secular affairs. Yet, to assist as far as possible in the detection of any fallacies by which he may have been misled, he will attempt to render an account of the reasons by which he has been guided, taking his departure from principles which he supposes to be elementary.
From our Redeemer himself we have learnt what are the two commandments on which hang all the law and the prophets. From the disciple who lay in his bosom, and whom he selected as the channel of his higher revelations, we have learnt what are the two truths on which bang all the other doctrines of the Gospel. The first is, that God is light; the second is, that God is love.
God is light. He is light, inherent, pure, and inexhaustible. He is also light diffusive, or " the Father of lights." [The author goes on to say that from God we derive the light of our Instincts, — animal, sensitive, intellectual, judicial, moral, and social (pp. 463-466); the light of Understanding; of human Authority (pp. 466, 467); of Revelation (pp. 467-475); the light that emanates from the person of Christ himself; and that awful interior light of the Divine Spirit which the dying Savior promised, and which the ascending Savior bestowed (pp. 475-477).]
Perfectly to combine into one pencil all the confluent rays of these various lights from heaven, — harmoniously to unite in one strain all these voices, which reach us simultaneously from the same divine source of knowledge, — is an attainment so sublime and arduous as to baffle the utmost efforts of our unaided reason. Yet it is an attainment indispensable to the formation in the heart of man of that living similitude to Christ himself, in which all true Christianity consists. Reverently, therefore, but with unhesitating confidence, we turn to the revealed word of God for assistance in this great exigency of our intellectual and moral nature, and in that word we read that all-embracing truth, which Christ himself lived to illustrate in action, and which it was given to his beloved disciple to concentrate in speech,— the truth, namely, that " God is love."
. . . To human apprehension, at least, it is an impossibility that the subject of love should not desire to be the object of love. Accordingly, the first and great commandment was, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength." And the second was like unto it. The common Father of all mankind, regarding all his children with love, could not but desire, for the sake of all, that mutual love should prevail among them. He therefore commanded each one to love his neighbor as himself. . . .
But moral evil, or the withholding from the Author of our being the love which He demands, must be the parent of physical evil; that is, of pain, of suffering, or of sorrow. For that which infinite love, directed by omniscience, commands, must be the highest good of him to whom the command is addressed; and disobedience to such commands must consequently be the suicidal abandonment and rejection of happiness. To prevent that suicide, or to reclaim the self-destroyer into the ways of peace, love will resort to a discipline as stern, severe, and formidable, as the inveteracy of the moral disorder may require. Such love will never degenerate into fondness, nor shrink from the infliction of any remedial punishment, however protracted or acute.
As love can clothe and conceal itself in a wholesome rigor to the disobedient, so it cannot but manifest itself in an indignant jealousy to the faithless. The first injunction of the Decalogue is, that we regard Jehovah as our only God; the last is, in effect, that we do not alienate our hearts from Him to any sublunary good. The commands which intervene between these two, are all denunciations of His rivals in our hearts; that is, of idol worship, of irreverence, of irreligion, of self-will, of selfishness, of sensuality, of fraud, and of falsehood. With such rivals He bids us know that he will endure no compromise.
But love is prompt to pardon, easily entreated, long-suffering, and kind. The parental love, beneath the care of which we live, arrests the discipline, and restrains the holy jealousy which we provoke. He remembers that we are but dust, and will not always chide, nor keep his anger forever; ["For I will not contend forever, neither will I be always wroth; for the spirit should fail before me, and the souls which I have made." —Isa. 57. 16.] but exhibits to us a mercy as high as the heavens are above the earth, and puts away our sins from us as far as the east is from the west.
And love is ever prompt to make costly self-sacrifices. No speech or language in use among mankind can express, because no human intelligence can conceive, the true sense of that revelation which exhibits to us Him who is love, as becoming, in the person of his Son, a sacrifice for us. Alas, for the foolishness which has agitated the world in the attempt to embrace or to analyze so profound a mystery. . . . A darkness, which no inquiry tends to dissipate, and which no conjecture contributes in any measure to dispel, broods over all questions respecting the nature and the reasons of that obstacle, and respecting the meaning of that hypostatic union of the Logos with our humanity, and respecting the nature of Him by whom and in whom that union is effected, and respecting the sense in which His sufferings have made a propitiation for our sins.
All that is permitted to us is to adore, in silence, the awful image set before us of holiness, of woe, and of love unutterable. That God is love, is proclaimed from Bethlehem, and from Calvary, in a voice penetrating the inmost heart; but in a voice which addresses the heart only, and which summons us not to investigate, but to worship and to love.
[Showing how the various lights that come from God reveal his love (pp. 485-494), the author proceeds to say]
These intimations of the parental character of God are, indeed, made to all men, and not to those only to whom He has imparted the light of revelation; although to them the truth that "God is love," is disclosed in terms incomparably more dis-tinct than any which were ever employed by Natural Religion. And it is chiefly by the light which the inspired volume throws on the condition of human nature and of human society, that we are enabled to discern in that system of things so many evidences of the divine benevolence, and of our own corresponding obligation to render our tribute of filial love to Him by whom that economy has been constructed.
And yet, whoever meditated on the character of God, and on the divine dispensations as they are made known to us in the Holy Scriptures, without the oppressive sense of a mystery beyond expression, momentous, fearful, and inscrutable? How terrific is the emphasis which the history of the Bible gives to the menaces of the Bible. Retribution is stamped on every page and line of that awful volume; and he who does not discern that impress on the sacred text, must interpret it by some canons of criticism which would be universally rejected as altogether extravagant and wild, if applied to any other writing. Such canons are, however, in our own times, diligently employed by the learned, and eagerly welcomed by the unlearned. That mythic theory of which Strauss is the great modern teacher, when filtered through various mediums, and purged of its coarser ingredients, is imbibed by multitudes amongst us, and is producing in their minds results not dissimilar in kind, and scarcely inferior in degree, to those which were induced by the skepticism of the eighteenth century.
The real, though often avowed, ground of the doubts which are thus overclouding the spirits of so many of the nominal disciples of Christ, is the hopeless dejection with which they contemplate that part of the Christian scheme which is supposed to consign the vast majority of our race to a future state, in which woe inconceivable in amount, is also eternal in duration. From this doctrine the hearts of most men turn aside, not only with an instinctive horror, but with an invincible incredulity; and of those who believe that it really proceeded from the lips of Christ himself, many are sorely tempted by it either to doubt the divine authority of any of His words, or to destroy their meaning by conjectural evasions of their force.
There are, indeed, others to whom it appears irreverent and even impious to hold parley with such doubts at all. They forbid us to inquire whether the generally received sense of our Redeemer's language on this melancholy and overwhelming theme, be really the sense in which He spoke. They resent, as mere conceit and arrogance, the opposition of the human understanding to what they consider as the unequivocal declarations of the Son of God himself; and demand that every voice which would presume to controvert those declarations should be-subdued into a submissive silence. And most just is the rebuke, and most reasonable the demand, if it be indeed the fact that our Divine Teacher has really revealed to us the eternity of the punishment inflicted in a future state for the sins of men in this life. For, as the truth of God is the corner-stone of all religion, so the truth of Christ is the corner-stone of Christianity.
Disclaiming, therefore, the very slightest sympathy with that arrogance which would reject any part of divine revelation on the ground of its inconsistency with the dogmas of human wisdom, we would yet (in the exercise of that freedom which all Protestants, in terms at least, assert for themselves and allow to others) venture to inquire, or rather to suggest the inquiry, whether any sufficient authority really exists for asserting that either Christ himself, or His apostles, taught the doctrine of a penal retribution which is to be " eternal " in the sense in which we believe the Deity himself to be " eternal."
With the exception of one dubious expression in the book of Daniel, the Old Testament is entirely silent on the subject of the eternity of future punishment. The same thing is true of a very large majority of the books of the New Testament. But in the 44th, the 46th, and the 48th verses of the ninth chapter of the Gospel of Saint Mark, we find our Savior speaking with the most emphatic iteration of "their worm" which "dies not," and of " the fire " which " is not quenched;" and in the 43d and 45th verses of the same chapter, He, with yet deeper emphasis, refers to "the fire that never shall be quenched." Words, doubtless, of fearful significance! — words which, however understood, can intimate nothing less than a danger, at the thought of which the stoutest heart should quake, and the holiest stand in awe But while the reverence due to our Divine Teacher forbids us to subtract one jot or tittle from the force of his expressions, it no less distinctly forbids us to enhance their force by adding one jot or tittle to them.
Moses Stuart cites the words, " The wages of sin is death, but the gift of God eternal life," and asks: " Is it in the power of language to convey a stronger impression of the retributions that will be made in the invisible world, than such an expression conveys " (Essays, p. 104.) We wish Christians might believe this, and act upon it. In doing so, they would say nothing of the immortality of the lost, as the Scriptures make no mention of their living forever, nor of their souls as immortal. The spirit of the rule —neither add to nor take from the words of life—would also require that Mark 9. 43-48, Matt. 25. 46, and all words supposed to imply endless woo, be quoted with the same comparative frequency as other passages of Scripture, and no greater; lest they unduly interpret the general tenor of the Bible, instead of being interpreted by that general tenor. Yet we earnestly ask that these expressions be examined in their proper sense..
Let it, then, be considered, first, that the words quoted from the 43d and 45th verses (" the fire that never shall be quenched "), are rejected by some eminent critics as a spurious interpolation; and, secondly, that, supposing the text to be genuine, the words mean, not " the fire that never shall be quenched," but "the inextinguishable fire;" and, thirdly, that no one of these five verses in St. Mark's Gospel asserts, either in express terms or by any necessary implication, that the pains to which they refer will be endured throughout eternity. They assert only that the agent or instrument by means of which those pains are to be inflicted is of an immortal or an indestructible nature.
The illustration given in Matt. 3. 12, Luke 3. 17, of the effects of " the unquenchable fire," clearly denotes that it consumes and destroys. Compare Ps. 1. 4; John 15. 6; 2 Kings 22. 17; Ps. 118. 12; Isa. 1. 28, 31; Jer. 4. 4; 7. 20; 17. 27; Ezek. 20. 47, 48; Amos 5. 6. Eusebius uses the same phrase in speaking of the martyrdom of Christians burned at the stake. (Eccl. Hist. b. 6, c. 40.) On the equivalent phrase, "eternal fire," as used in Judo, verse 7, various commentators remark that it properly denotes a complete and irrevocable destruction. And as the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah is made "an example," to which frequent allusion is made in the Scriptures and elsewhere (see especially Jer. 20. 16), it is natural to suppose that the same phrase bears the same sense in Matt. 18. 8; 25. 41.
Let us look then at the remark of Richard Watson on the phrase in question: "As the worm itself dies not, but destroys that it feeds upon, and as a fire unquenched consumes that upon which it kindles, so when temporal judgments are expressed by this phrase, the utter destruction of persons, cities, and nations, appears to be intended; but when it refers to a future state, and the subject of punishment is, in itself, or by divine appointment, immortal, the idea is heightened to its utmost terror." But he elsewhere says: " That the soul is naturally immortal . . . is contradicted by Scripture." (Institutes, 2. 83) And unless its actual immortality is made out from other passages, this passage, by his own showing, fairly denotes the eternal extinction of the lost.
On the state of the text in Mark 9., 43-48, to which Mr. S. alludes, see the critical editions, and T. S. Green's "Developed Criticism."
It must, however, be acknowledged that the language of Christ, in the closing verse of the twenty-fifth chapter of St. Matthew, is perfectly clear and unambiguous, as it stands in our English Bibles. "These," he says, "shall go away into everlasting punishment." It therefore is of infinite moment to inquire whether the words which our translators have thus given us really correspond with the words which our Savior himself uttered.
Now no human being knows, or ever can know, what were the very words which thus fell from the lips of Christ. They were spoken in a dialect of the Syrian-Chaldaic. No one even knows with any certainty whether our extant Greek version of them proceeded from the pen of St. Matthew. On the hypothesis adopted by many high critical authorities, of an intermediate Hebrew gospel, we must believe the contrary. Assuming, however, that the hand of an inspired writer did trace the very words, it will yet not necessarily follow that either of those words is a precise equivalent for the original which it represents; because, for terms so abstract, perfectly precise equivalents can seldom, if ever, be found in languages so essentially dissimilar in their structure and genius as the Syro-Chaldaic and the Greek. Let, however, the sacred text be read on the supposition, however unfounded, that our Redeemer himself actually pronounced the very terms which now stand in the Greek Testament. On that supposition can we really find in them the terrific and overwhelming sense which the popular opinion attributes to them?
It would be a mere impertinence if the writer of these pages should presume to engage in a critical discussion of the precise force and meaning of any passage in a Greek author. It would be still more extravagant, if he should lay claim to the skill requisite for analyzing the sense of any Greek expressions deeply imbued in Syriac and Hebraic idioms and allusions. It is sufficient for the immediate purpose to say, in reference to the merely critical or grammatical inquiry, that the words in question are manifestly susceptible of the different meanings which so many scholars have at different times pointed out. They might, for example, be rendered with literal accuracy either by the words "into lifelong punishment "— or by the words "into perpetual abscission."* But if the meaning of those expressions be really ambiguous or equivocal, then we are not only free, but bound, to adopt such a construction of them as may be derived from the probabilities in favor of any one or other of the possible meanings. What, then, are those probabilities?
First, then, let it be considered that the doctrine of the eternity of the future retribution forms no necessary substratum of any other Christian doctrine. If it could be completely disproved, its disappearance from the Christian system would not dissolve, nor apparently impair, the strength of any other part of that mighty fabric. Every argument, every narrative, every expostulation, every warning in the Bible would be as complete and as intelligible, if not as emphatical, with it as without it. The same thing cannot be said of any other of the main truths revealed in the Holy Scriptures. Each of them is an integral part of the system to which it belongs. Is it, then, probable that a doctrine which, if true, infinitely outweighs in importance all the Test of the articles of our creeds, should have been propounded as a mere isolated truth, standing in no necessary connection with the rest? Is it not far more probable that there is an error in that construction of our Savior’s words, which would render Him the promulgator of it?
Mr. Landis here speaks of "the singularly appropriate term, punishment by rejection, or cutting-off from, or by deprivation of, that happiness which the saved enjoy." (Immortality of Soul, p. 480.) We quote these words more as a concession than for their critical value. Substitute for "happiness " the "life eternal " contrasted with the punishment, and there could not be a better exegesis for our view. We prefer, however, to allow the generic sense of "punishment," showing from the Septuagint use that it need not be torment, and remarking that various and eminent orthodox writers allow that eternal extinction would be eternal punishment. See " Debt and Grace," pp. 187-194,418-425; and " Christ our Life," Chapter 8.
The angel who descended from heaven and proclaimed to the shepherds the incarnation of the Redeemer, announced himself as the herald "of good tidings of great joy which should be to all people." But if it be indeed true, that He who was thus made incarnate, proclaimed an eternity of unutterable woe to the vast majority of those who, from generation to generation, throng our streets, our marts, and our churches, how shall we reconcile the angelic announcement with this awful proclamation? The Gospel is, indeed, intelligence of blessedness, surpassing imagination, to " the few who are chosen," but that same Gospel is, on the popular hypothesis, not less intelligence of wretchedness, surpassing imagination, to "the many who are called." Is not, therefore, the accuracy of that hypothesis involved in much improbability?
The Bible teaches us that Christ came into the world to bruise the serpent's head, to destroy the works of the devil, and to establish the kingdom of God; and Christ himself declared that " He saw Satan like lightning fall from heaven." Is it reasonable to accept any construction of the other words of Christ, which would seem to ascribe to the Spirit of Evil an eternal triumph over the Spirit of Good, in the persons of the vast majority of the race whom He lived and died to redeem?
In our present life, trouble, pain, and sorrow, are, indeed, thickly sown. But they exist among us as anomalies, not as laws,— as the medicinal and remedial provisions which the Creative wisdom has infused into this economy of things, not as the ultimate end contemplated by that wisdom. In this world "nothing terminates on evil; " although, in this world, evil so unhappily abounds. Do not, therefore, all the analogies of the Divine government raise a strong presumption against that interpretation of our Savior’s discourse, which represents Him as foretelling a future economy of things, in which evil, not remedial but penal, not transient but eternal, is to be the doom of the vast majority of the children of Adam?
Throughout the Holy Scriptures a constant appeal is made to those moral sentiments which God has himself implanted in our nature. Our heavenly Father has graciously condescended everywhere to point out to us the sacred harmony between His law as revealed by prophets and evangelists, and His law as written by himself on our hearts; and from that harmony we are taught to draw the best and highest proof of the inspiration of those sacred writings. Deeply conscious with what profound reverence it behooves us to apply that test of truth to any opinion deduced by the Church at large from Holy Scripture we may yet venture to inquire whether it could be successfully applied in the case under consideration? If the words ascribed to our Savior are not inexorably bound down to the construction they usually receive, by the absolutely inflexible force of the text and of the context, is it not most reasonable to adopt some other construction, to which our own natural sense of justice and equity can respond as clearly as it responds to all the rest of the inspired canon?
So inveterate is the corruption of the human heart, that in the judgment of some, the infliction and announcement of no penalty less than that of eternal misery would be sufficient to turn it aside from present sinfulness. But does the dread of that terrific penalty really stem the headlong current of iniquity Is it really productive of any corresponding alarm? Does it produce an alarm equal to that which would have been excited by the announcement of a penalty of infinitely less moment, but definite and intelligible? Does the world — does the Church — do her ministers — do her saints — really believe this part of the language of our Redeemer in that sense in which they familiarly interpret it? Is any human mind so constituted as to bear the incumbent weight of so fearful a probability of an evil so utterly beyond the reach of exaggeration? Is the texture of any human body vigorous enough to sustain the throes of so agonizing an anticipation? What means the whole course and system of life which is passing hourly before our eyes, and through which we are ourselves passing? Why have our preachers time to engage in study, to harmonize the periods of their sermons, to give heed to our wretched ecclesiastical disputes, to devote one superfluous instant to food, to repose, or to occupy themselves with any other thing than the proclamation of the horrors of the approaching calamity, and the explanation of the only way of escape from it? Let any honest man fairly propose to himself, and fairly answer the question, whether the unutterable disparity between his actual interest in all the frivolities of life, and his professed belief in an eternity of woe, impending probably over himself, but certainly over the vast majority of the human race, does not convict him of professing to believe more than he actually believes? And, if so, is there not some reason to doubt whether he has not erred in attributing to his Savior a meaning for which, after all, he cannot find any real place in his own mind, or any vital influence on his own heart?
Nothing can be more remote from the design with which these pages are written than to suggest a doubt whether penal retribution in the future state does really await " the many who are called," but who throng "the broad way which leadeth to destruction." Neither does the writer of these pages presume to intimate that either the nature or the continuance of that penalty are such as to be fitly contemplated by any soul of man without the most profound awe, and the most lively alarm. To propagate or to entertain such opinions would be to question the truth of Him who is emphatically himself" The Truth." The questions proposed for inquiry are — whether He, or any one of His inspired Apostles, has really affirmed, in express words, that the retribution shall be endured eternally by those on whom it shall fall?— whether all the words employed by Him, or by them, on the subject, are not satisfied by understanding that the punishment is eternal only inasmuch as it involves the ultimate destruction, or annihilation, of those on whom it is to be inflicted?— whether the sense usually ascribed to this part of Holy Scripture is congruous with the spirit of the rest of the revealed will of God? — whether it is not really derived from ecclesiastical traditions, rather than from any sound and unbiassed criticism?—and whether our own translators have not been induced, by those traditions, to enhance the real force of our Savior’s words by a forced and exaggerated version of them?
These suggestions or surmises are, however, opposed to the commonly received opinion of, perhaps, all the Christian Churches. The most learned could not, therefore, offer them, except with the most extreme diffidence. By one who can make no claim whatever to learning, properly so called, either as a theologian or as a linguist, they are proposed with the deepest possible consciousness of his liability to error. He knows how weighty is the presumption in favor of the construction which the Church of Christ has, in all ages, given to words, which, however understood, are the most terrific which have ever been spoken in the ears of man. And if, indeed, that construction truly represents the real meaning of these fearful words, what remains for him who revolves the prospect they open to that great human family of which he is a member, except to repose the aching heart on those declarations, so copious, so unequivocal, so interwoven with the whole scheme, structure, and system of our faith, which concur in assuring us that " God is love," and which will still encourage or rather constrain us to, hope even against hope, that no rational being throughout His vast universe shall ever be so entirely exiled from His fatherly presence, as to be unable to turn to Him with penitence, or as to be beyond the reach of that mercy of which we are so often assured that it " endures forever "?
This digression (if such it be) from the more immediate subject of these pages, has been suggested, and may, it is hoped, be vindicated, by the consideration that the generally received opinion regarding the endless duration of a state of punishment, is among the most effective of all the mixes which are at present inducing amongst us that virtual abandonment of Christianity, which assigns a mythical sense to almost every part of the sacred oracles. Learnedly and wisely as that fallacy has been combated by many, their yet more serious attention might, perhaps, be advantageously given to the inquiry whether that opinion, which is to so large a number an insuperable rock of offence, might not be either retracted or qualified without any sacrifice of truth; and whether, if so, they would not contribute, by such an acknowledgment, to reclaim the deserters to the camp much more effectually than by any assault on the positions in which they have openly entrenched themselves.
* Jeremy Taylor, having cited Justin Martyr and Irenaeus as holding that the lost will become extinct, says: " Concerning this doctrine of theirs, so severe, and yet so moderated, there is less to be objected than against the supposed fancy of Origen; for it is a strange consideration to suppose an eternal torment to those to whom it was never threatened, to those who never heard of Christ, to those that lived probably well, to heathens of good lives, to ignorant and untaught people, to people surprised in a single crime, to men that die young in their natural follies and foolish lusts, to them that fall in a sudden gayety and excessive joy, to all alike; to all infinite and eternal, even to unwarned people; and that this should be inflicted by God who infinitely loves his creatures, who died for them, who pardons easily,-and pities readily, and excuses much, and delights in our being saved, and would not have us to die, and takes little things in exchange for great: it is certain that God's mercies are infinite, and it is also certain that the matter of eternal torments cannot be truly understood; and when the schoolmen go about to reconcile the Divine justice to that severity, and consider why God punishes eternally a temporal sin, or a state of evil, they speak variously, and uncertainly, and unsatisfyingly." (Christ's Advent to Judgment, Sermon 3.)
To the above passages we will venture to add a few words, to show that the doctrine in question is still a just occasion of offence, notwithstanding the modifications that have been put upon it.
Remarking on the anathemas of Tillemont, who " inculcated the horrible doctrine that the very best of Pagans, heretics, and schismatics are condemned to suffer eternal tortures," Dr. Jortin says: " These are doctrines that have unhappily helped to propagate atheism or ' deism, and have made many a man say to himself, If this be Christianity, let my soul be with the philosophers." (Eccl. Hist., 1. 231.) Yet Tillemont is described as "pious, humble, meek, and modest."
It is not indeed the custom of Protestants to devote whole races and classes of their fellow-men to endless torment of body and soul. They suppose that even those who never heard of Christ, who "do justly, and love mercy, and walk humbly before God," are saved. And they commonly repudiate the notion of physical infliction of pain upon the lost, regarding their anguish as mainly the remorse of conscience. The measure and degrees of anguish are so modified that some, just failing of heaven, are thought of as in a pensive melancholy, penitently bewailing their loss, not far from the gates of the heavenly city. And the notion of absolute reprobation is almost unknown. Thus is the doctrine of eternal suffering greatly mitigated.
And its application is immensely changed, almost to the point of abrogation. All dying in infancy are now saved; and the age at which this happy infancy ends is left undetermined. They who have died on this side of the fatal Rubicon, without apparent piety, are left " in the hands of a just and merciful God." Even they who have lived very wickedly and have " died in their sins " not only find decent Christian burial, but full benefit of the maxim that "only what is good should be said of the dead." And of the heathen we only know that they are just objects of Christian concern and missionary effort. Thus the doctrine is almost wholly withdrawn from practical use. Even in our last general revival it was but slightly apparent.
It is expected only in the theological treatise, or lecture, or sermon.
And yet, while we shudder at the anathemas which Popes and Councils have fulminated, there is one feature of Romish doctrine more mild than Protestants have allowed. We refer to the tenet of Purgatory. However grossly this may have been abused, — to fill the coffers of the priesthood, or in the system of indulgences,—its origin was in a sentiment of humanity which hesitated to consign any soul to unending misery. The early prevalence of Restorationism, which soon followed the faith of an absolute immortality, was not due to the influence of Origen, but to human nature itself. " The belief," says Gieseler, "in the unalienable power of amendment in all intelligent beings, and in the limited duration of future punishment, 'was so general even in the West, and among the opponents of Origen, that it seemed entirely independent of his system, to which, doubtless, its origin must be traced." Augustine betrays the extent and the source of the doubts on this subject when he says: "In vain do some, yea, very many, pity with human sympathy the eternal punishment of the damned, and their perpetual, unremitting torments, and believe it will not so be; not indeed denying the Scriptures, but, by some method of their own, modifying the severer declarations to a milder sentiment, taking them as uttered more for effect than for exact truth. For, say they, God will not forget to be compassionate, nor in his wrath restrain his mercies." (Enchirid. ad Laurent., c. 112.) Augustine himself was of the opinion that the torments of the lost might be mitigated at times, though never finally. And he, with Jerome, treated the doubts he could not encourage, with evident respect.
We may therefore accept the statement of Milman, when he says: " Purgatory, possible with St. Augustine [De fide et oper., c. 16], probable with Gregory the Great, grew up, I am persuaded (its growth is singularly indistinct and untraceable), out of the mercy and modesty of the Priesthood. To the eternity of Hell-torments there is and ever must be —notwithstanding the peremptory decrees of dogmatic theology and the reverential dread in so many minds of tampering with what seems the language of the New Testament — a tacit repugnance. But when the doom of every man rested on the lips of the Priest, on his absolution or refusal of absolution, that Priest might well tremble with some natural awe—awe not confessed to himself —at dismissing the soul to an irrevocable, unrepealable, unchangeable destiny. He would not be averse to pronounce a more mitigated, a reversible sentence. The keys of Heaven and Hell were a fearful trust, a terrible responsibility; the key of Purgatory might be used with far less presumption, with less trembling confidence." (Latin Christianity, b. 14, c. 2.)
While the Protestant minister disclaims the power either to absolve or to condemn the dying, and forbears to judge harshly of the dead, yet he allows no resort to the milder view, but maintains the more fearful doctrine as expressing the original sentence of a fallen race. And, thus retained, it retains its whole power of mischief with thinking minds. For, if it is claimed to be true, it must have all the import of a truth, both in theology and in practical application. Then we at once encounter most perplexing questions. Are all infants saved? If so, from what are they saved, and upon what terms? What would be their case if there were no Redemption? Was that work a gratuity offered to man, or was it due to the race? That is, were mankind justly exposed to eternal misery, aside from any offer or hope of deliverance? Again, the fond hopes of many respecting those deceased are poorly encouraged by our Savior’s answer to the question, " Are there few that be saved?" They who despair of the salvation of departed friends are sometimes driven, by the immortality which is asserted of the "second death," to madness. And though the physical torment of the lost is not now asserted, yet how is anguish of spirit any more endurable? (Prov. 18. 14.)
And the view commonly taken of the heathen is very unsatisfactory. They are supposed to perish not by their invincible ignorance, yet in fact, and because they have not the gospel. And the received doctrine of perdition is infinitely more terrible than any that prevails among the heathen. Appeal is sometimes made, in support of the received doctrine, to the views of the ancient Greeks. But Plato consigned to eternal torment only tyrants, who had done wickedness on a grand, national scale, such as private citizens are incapable of. And the doctrine of the poets was little different. The Persians held the final salvation not only of all men, but of Ahriman himself, the prince and principle of darkness and evil. And no Hindoo doctrine of metempsychosis can at all compare with the notion of endless woe; as nothing finite can compare with infinitude. Hence we need not be surprised if a faithful missionary sometimes meets the rude reception: " Our God punishes men only a thousand years. So we will not have your American God in Siam."
Thus the doctrine retains all its substantial difficulties, and remains infinitely burdensome, notwithstanding all the attempted mitigations of it. All that is said of the inherent mystery of sin or moral evil, though perfectly true, can never bridge the chasm between the temporary and the eternal. Those who insist less upon the sovereignty of God, and more upon the free-will of man, find no relief from the pressure which the doctrine creates. They can vindicate the goodness of God only at the expense of his power, or of his right to people his own universe with the subjects of a final holiness and blessedness. The tenet still involves a future eternity of evil which God may not forget into nothingness, yet which can be upheld in being only by his power.
For thinking men, then, who look at the logical bearing of doctrine, the full temptation remains to say: " If this be the religion of the Bible, the alleged truth of Revelation, let my soul be with the God of Reason and Nature." And the temptation will be all the stronger if one so loves his fellow-men that he cannot think of eternal pain without anguish, or of eternal sinfulness without horror.
We have an example of skepticism produced directly by the doctrine in question, in the Earl of Shaftesbury. "In a moral point of view his character was very estimable, both as a public and as private man, and obtained the suffrages of all who knew him." He was a firm believer in the fundamental doctrines of natural religion, and wrote an eloquent defense of the doctrine of a Deity and providence, which is ranked by Bishop Hurd among the most finished productions of the kind in the English language. He also professed a respect for Christianity. But, Dr. Kippis tells us, "there is a tradition that, amongst other difficulties which occurred to him in regard to the truth of the Christian Revelation, he was startled at the idea of its containing the doctrine of the eternity of hell-torments; that he consulted some eminent churchmen whether the New Testament positively asserted that doctrine; and that, upon being assured that it did, he declared himself incapable of assenting to a system of religion which maintained a tenet so repugnant to all his views of the great Government of the Universe." The difficulties of the received view are more and more acknowledged. From the frank statements recently made on this subject we select a single one. Albert Barnes says: "I confess, when I look upon a world of sinners and of sufferers; upon death-beds and graveyards; upon the world of woe, filled with hosts to suffer forever; when I see my friends, my parents, my family, my people, my fellow-citizens; when I look upon a whole race, all involved in this sin and danger, and when I see the great mass of them wholly unconcerned, and when I feel that God only can serve them, and yet he does not do it, — I am struck dumb. It is all dark, dark, dark to my soul, and I cannot disguise it." (Sermons, pp. 124, 125.)
Such sincere words, uttered by good and noble men, go very far to promote a general confidence in Christianity, because they meet a strong prejudice against orthodox divines as being blind to the difficulties of their system, or as heartless, careless of the future woe of myriads. There is more argument in the tears of one Jeremiah than in all syllogisms. Yet even this argument, when fairly examined, may show only the general integrity of the system which the man accepts, of which the lamentable doctrine really forms no part.
And while men are softened with the dew of these tears, there is too much that will harden and repel, frequently uttered. Thus Mr. Roy, the author of a Hebrew and English Lexicon, having inferred eternal suffering from Rev. 14. 11, though others explain the passage of the scenes of time, says: " He that believes to the contrary is an unbeliever in the Divine Revelation, and can have no claim whatever to Christianity. Let him, if he has any moral honesty about him or in him, come out in his true character, and declare to the world what he really is, an infidel." And a leading religious journal has lately spoken of " all nature, all law, all revelation, uttering the doctrine, so that it is an amazing stretch and energy of unbelief not to believe it, — implying a moral state and position that will not receive it on any testimony; however clearly, and unqualifiedly, even to the exhaustion of the capabilities of language, God himself may declare and affirm it." (The Independent, Jan. 5, 1860.)
Such language, impeaching either the integrity of those who doubt the most appalling of all doctrines, or the sobriety of those who thus affirm it, is apt to promote the skepticism which it accuses. Let the hasty words of these Christians be answered by a Christian, who says: "Imagine a creature, nay, imagine numberless creatures produced out of nothing, . . . delivered over to torments of endless ages, without the least hope or possibility of relaxation or redemption. Imagine it you may, but you can never seriously believe it, nor reconcile it to God and goodness." (Bp. Newton, Dissert., No. 60.)
Thus do sincere believers dispute respecting a tenet which a trembling and dying world hesitates to accept. And who does not see that multitudes will either accept the Christian system with secret reservations touching the doctrine so burdensome and so disputed, or will wholly reject Christianity itself? For this double evil it much behooves the watchmen of Zion to seek a remedy.
The words last quoted fairly suggest that the doctrine of unending misery has been apparently believed simply because its import has not been apprehended. We know thinking men who have renounced it saying they did not really believe it when they supposed they did. A preacher of the Gospel has told us he did not dare to meditate upon it, for fear he should doubt it. Have not the words containing it, then, served rather as a hyperbole, truly conveying the notion of a fearful and overwhelming ruin; yet utterly false and mischievous when urged in their strict and full import?
If any, then, will receive the doctrine as a hyperbole, let them so hold it. But the doctrines which the Church proclaims to the world cannot be so understood. And the true remedy for the evil is found, we think, in that first principle of Protestantism which declares a right of private judgment, insisting only on that which is essential to Christianity, as the general and truly Catholic faith. Let the distinction between that which is fundamental and that which is not, be plainly made and carefully guarded. On all points not clearly essential, where truth-loving men may honestly differ, let each one be fully persuaded in his own mind. But from the symbol, in which, as a psalm of confession, all Christian voices should freely unite, let the burdensome test be removed; lest it perpetuate " a theology that is confused, entangled, imperfect, and gloomy; a theology which, while it abundantly breeds infidelity among the educated classes, fails to spread through the body of the population, and but dimly, or only as . . . a flickering candle, illumines the world." (Isaac Taylor, Fanaticism—of the Symbol.)
This writer had just before said that we have " not a false theology — thank God." But the following passage, in a work written several years later, fairly indicates, we think, an opinion that the theology of punishment is to be immensely changed. Without pretending to interpret him, we may listen while he says: — · " When once this mighty question of the afterlife has been opened, and when it shall have come into the hands of well-informed Biblical interpreters, a controversy will ensue, in the progress of which it will be discovered that, with unobservant eyes, we and our predecessors have been so walking up and down, and running hither and thither, among dim notices and indications of the future destinies of the human family, as to have failed to gather up or to regard much that has lain upon the pages of the Bible, open and free to our use. Those who; through the course of years, have been used to read the Scriptures unshackled by systems, and bound to no conventional modes of belief, such readers must have felt an impatience in waiting —not for the arrival of a new revelation from heaven, but of an ample and unfettered interpretation of that which has so long been in our hands.
Thus the future Methodism, as we assume, will feel the need of, and will squire for itself, under pressure of the most urgent motives, an incontrovertible exposition of the Scripture doctrine of the future administration of justice; but then it will not make this acquisition as if it could be held as an insulated dogma; for, whatever is further ascertained on this ground, will come to stand in its true relationship to much beside, which, in the course of the same argument, will have started to view, as the genuine sense of the inspired books. The doctrine of future punishment, as a belief drawn from Scripture, and so drawn as to dissipate prevalent illusions, and to spread on all sides a salutary and effective alarm—such a belief will take its place in the midst of an expanded prospect of the compass and intention of the Christian system.
The past Methodism was far from being a message of wrath, proclaimed by men of fierce and fanatical tempers — it was a message of joy, hope, and love, and it made its conquests as such, notwithstanding those bold and unmeasured denunciations against sin which it so often uttered. And so it will be with the future Methodism; and although it will rest itself upon a laboriously obtained belief concerning the wrath to come'— a belief that will heave the human mind with a deep, convulsive dread, yet, and notwithstanding this preliminary, the renovation which we look for will come in as the splendor of day comes in the tropics — it will be a sudden brightness that makes all things glad " (Wesley and Methodism, pp. 289, 290.)
The silence of the scriptures respecting the immortality of the soul, or of the race, or of the lost.
By C. F. Hudson.
God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. - John 3.16.
NOTHING can be unimportant which concerns our interpretation of the infinite love of God. If we think that he loves us little, we shall surely love him little. If we feel that he loves us immensely, we shall love him much. And we need to understand not only the measure and degree of God's love, but also the kind and quality of it. Whether we regard him as caring most for our mere comfort and enjoyment, or as seeking our moral and spiritual welfare; whether we regard him as striving to save us specially from an infinite evil, or for an infinite good; whether we regard him as saving us all absolutely, or as soliciting or requiring our acceptance of his aid, and our cooperation; — in either case our gratitude and the tenor of our life will answer to our notion of the divine love.
But though the question, How does God love us? is so important, it has been answered by those on whom the love has been lavished, in these infinitely different ways. To those who affirm the final salvation of all, we may reply, however, that a condition of salvation (which seems to be contained in the text) is no limit to the infinitude of God's love. His universe may yet teem with holy and blessed life, though many of the sons of men should prove faithless and unworthy of eternal life. And precisely because the offered boon is infinite, so far from being our due, God has a special right to bestow it on those who with noble aspiration seek for it.
To those, again, who tell us that God saves us from eternal suffering, we reply that so far from proving infinite love, that would scarcely prove any love whatever. We do not know that even Nero, though he could enjoy the conflagration of Rome. would not have relented if he had thought of his subjects as burning without consuming, or as wailing and pining without dying. One who fears not God nor regards man, may be wearied, rather than regaled, with the importunities of anguish. But He whose tender mercies are over all his works, surely need not tell us of rescue from infinite pain, from which 'annihilation would deliver us, to prove that he loves us.
Nor do the Scriptures allege any infinite guilt in 'man, the pardon whereof shall prove God's love infinite. Two passages, sometimes alleged as asserting infinite or eternal sin (Job 22. 5, and Rev. 22. 11), are otherwise explained by orthodox writers. And though more than twenty arguments from reason have been adduced to show such guilt in man, they have failed to satisfy the minds of many.' Let us inquire, then, if the more literal sense of our text does not stand clear of these difficulties, and yet save the infinitude of God's love. He so loved that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life. " He that eats of this bread," says Christ, "shall live forever." We propose to infer that he that eats not of this bread shall not live forever. May not the righteous have eternal life in such sense that the wicked will not at all live eternally? May not God's love, conspiring nut only with a wisdom that requires us, " by patient continuance in well doing, to seek for glory, and honor, and immortality," but also with a holiness that forbids the eternity of the sin which it abhors, — point thus to a final universality of holy blessedness throughout his dominions?
See a statement and examination of these Theodicies in "Debt and Grace," chapter 3; and the remarks of Albert Barnes, cited pp. 64, 55.
In support of the literal sense of the terms " perish " and "everlasting life," we may remark that when Christ was on earth there was a prevailing despair of all after life among the Gentiles, and among the Jews Sadduceism had become quite respectable. It was, therefore, specially natural that he who brought life and immortality to light, should use the words denoting life and death in their plain and ordinary sense. Hence it is at least not absurd that John Locke should say, respecting those who perish:— They shall not live forever. This is so plain in Scripture, and is so everywhere inculcated, that the wages of sin is death, and the reward of the righteous is everlasting life, —the constant language of the Scripture in the current of the New Testament as well as Old, is life to the just, to believers, to the obedient, and death to the wicked and unbelievers,—that one would wonder how the reader could be mistaken where death is threatened so constantly, and declared everywhere to be the ultimate punishment and last estate to which the wicked must all come. To solve this, they have invented a very odd signification of the word death, which they would have stand for eternal life in torment. They who will put so strange and contrary a signification upon a word in a hundred places, where, if it had not its true and literal sense, one would wonder it should be so often used, and that in opposition to life, which in these places is used literally, ought to have good proofs for giving it a sense in those places of Scripture directly contrary to what it ordinarily has in other parts of Scripture, and everywhere else. After treating the question at some length, Locke concludes: " Taking it then for evident that the wicked shall die and be extinguished at last," etc.— (Life by Lord King, pp. 319-322, Bohn's ed.)
In a hundred places, says this writer, is the doom of the lost called death. I am not specially fond of the arithmetical argument. But it has its use when it can show a general tenor of the language of a book. Sitting down once to count out this argument in the Scriptures, I reckoned about five hundred instances in which the terms "life," "everlasting life," to "live forever," etc., and, on the other hand, "death," "destruction," to be "consumed," etc., are applied apparently to the final destiny of the righteous and the wicked respectively. And now we ask, are all such passages to be taken in a metaphorical sense, or in the usual and ordinary sense of these most important terms? When the wicked shall " utterly perish," will they retain immortality? Do they who fail of eternal life still live eternally?
Now it is an admitted rule of interpretation that the literal or usual sense of words is prima facie, or presumptively, their true sense; and it is overruled only by special considerations, derived from the nature of the subject, or from the context or the general style of the book. Moreover, we sometimes hear persons speak of the eternal life of the lost; it is sometimes said that the wicked will not finally die or be destroyed; and we are frequently told that such and such words are not to be taken literally, — as if they might be so taken if no caution were given. Whereas, we are often tempted to remark, when various passages of Scripture are cited, That is Bible language —why not Bible doctrine?
Is there, now, any good and sufficient reason why the five hundred passages I have alluded to should be taken out of the ordinary sense of the words, and in a metaphorical sense? There is one reason alleged, which I propose to consider. THE SOUL, it is said, Is IMMORTAL. This immortality of the soul is regarded by some as inherent, by others as dependent on the upholding power of God. We are not now concerned with the nature or mode of it; let us inquire respecting the fact, in the light of the Scriptures.
A doctrine may be contained in a book in either of three different ways. 1. It may be directly and expressly asserted and declared. 2. It may be mentioned or spoken of as true. And this mode of statement is sometimes the strongest, as it is most suitable for truths most obvious and unquestioned. 3. A doctrine may be involved or implied in other forms of expression, while itself is not named by any proper or descriptive term. Does the Bible contain the doctrine of man's immortality — the immortality of the soul, or of the race, or of the lost —in either of these three modes?
2. We will inquire after the first and second of these modes together, by examining the use of terms that would assert or mention the alleged immortality, if the doctrine is true. Such words are,
1. Immortal.
This occurs in our translation only once, namely, 1 Tim. 1. 17, where it is applied not to man but to God: "Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible," etc. But the same Greek word, rendered incorruptible, also occurs in six other places, namely, Rom. 1. 23: " The glory of the incorruptible God;" 1 Cor. 9. 25: "They, to obtain a corruptible crown; but we an incorruptible;" 15. 52: "The dead shall be raised incorruptible;" 1 Pet. 1. 4: "An inheritance incorruptible, and undefiled, and that faded' not away;" verse 23: " Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which lives and abideth forever;" 3. 4: Let their adorning be " the hidden man of the heart. in that which is not corruptible," etc.
In most of these instances, if not in all, the word is used in a literal sense, which is so far good reason for its being taken in the same sense when applied to any class of men. And if it is so taken in 1 Pet. 1. 23, there could hardly be a plainer statement of immortality by regeneration: " Born again, not of mortal or perishable seed, but of immortal and imperishable," etc. In 1 Pet. 3. 4, the term can hardly be applied to all mankind, as the distinction of the outward man and the inward man is commonly made of the regenerate. In 1 Cor. 15. 52, which is applied by most orthodox writers to the righteous, the doctrine is plainly that of immortality perfected in a glorious resurrection, in the spiritual body, which the wicked surely do not inherit.
2. Immortality.
This word, used to render two Greek words, occurs five times in our version, namely, Rom. 2. 7: "To those who by patient. continuance in well doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life;" 1 Cor. 15. 53, 54: "This mortal shall put on immortality," etc.; 1 Tim. 6. 16: "Who (that is, God) only hath immortality;" 2 Tim. 1. 10: " Christ hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel." How can this expression imply the immortality of mankind, if Christ has never said that all men are, or are to be immortal?
We should add that the first Greek word, above named, is also rendered incorruption in four places, 1 Cor. 15. 42, 50, 53, 54, applied by nearly all orthodox writers to the resurrection of the righteous. The contrasted Greek word is used in Gal. 6. 8: " He that soweth to the flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption; but he that soweth to the Spirit shall of the spirit reap life everlasting."
3. Everlasting life.
This phrase, or the phrase eternal life, for which the Greek is the same, occurs forty-five times, and is uniformly applied to the destiny of the righteous. We are often told that it does not denote mere eternal existence; to which we reply that it does not denote mere eternal happiness. It certainly includes the sense of living forever, and none the less because an immortal life may be a blessed life. And if Christ came to reveal an immortality not understood before, then the literal sense of the phrase would seem to be primary and ruling, and the sense of blessedness accessory.
4. Life.
In one place this word, apparently denoting eternal life, is claimed by Universalists as applying to all mankind, Rom. 5. 18: " Even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon (eis) all men unto justification of life." But in chapter 3. 22, the same justification is said to be "unto all, and upon all them that believe." Here is an obvious distinction between salvation adequate for all, and salvation attained by a class. And simple consistency in our translation would have allowed the same distinction in chapter 5. 18, thus: "Unto all men," etc.
5. Endless Life.
Heb. 7. 16: "After the power of an endless life; " said of the priesthood of Christ. Compare John 14. 19: " Because I live, ye shall live also." So far as the phrase concerns our hope of life, it would indicate the immortality of those who are branches of the true Vine.
6. To live forever.
This phrase occurs twenty-three times. It is applied to God eight times, Deut. 32. 40; Dan. 4. 34; 12. 7; Rev. 4. 9, 10; 5. 14; 10. 6; 15. 7; as a prayer for the king, equivalent to our " Long live the King! " seven times, 1 Kings 1. 31; Neh. 2. 3; Dan. 1. 4; 3. 9; 5. 10; 6. 6, 21; as a question respecting the prophets, once, Zech. 1. 5: " Do they live forever? " to Christ once, Heb. 7. 25: " He ever lives to make intercession for us; " to the word of God once, in the remarkable passage above noted, 1 Pet. 1. 23; as showing what man lost by sin, twice, Gen. 3. 22: " And now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever; " Ps. 49. 7-9: " None can by any means redeem his brother, nor give to God a ransom for him; (For the redemption of their soul is precious, but it ceases forever;) That he should still live forever, and not see corruption; " and to denote the destiny of the righteous, thrice, Ps. 22. 26: " They shall praise the Lord that seek him; your heart shall live forever; " John 6. 51: " If any man eat of this bread, he shall live forever; " verse 58: " He that eats of this bread shall live forever."
The literal sense is questioned in none of these instances ex-sept where the eternal destiny of man is concerned!
7. Length of days forever and ever,
Ps. 24.; one of the most explicit phrases for immortality that could be used, and applied to those who ask of God life.
8. To abide forever. 1 John 2. 17: " He that doeth the will of God abideth forever." Here the literal sense and its application to a final destiny are unquestionable. Compare the same phrase in 1 Pet. 1. 23.
9. Not to perish.
See John 3. 15, 16; 10. 28: " I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish;" 1 Cor. 15. 18: "Then (that is, if Christ is not raised) they which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished;" where orthodox writers have ventured to say the word means, "to be deprived of being."
10. Not to die. This phrase occurs seven times, namely, Isa. 66. 24: "Their worm shall not die;" repeated in Mark 9. 48 (only once, according to Tischendorf, Alford, and Green; of the sense, hereafter). Luke 20. 36: "Neither can they die any more. John 6. 50: "This is the bread that corned: down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof; and not die." John 11. 26: " Whosoever lives and believed: in me shall never die." Rom. 6. 9: "Christ, being raised from the dead, dies no more." The remaining instance is the only one in which the phrase is applied to man as man, and we cannot thou believe the witness, Gen. 3. 4: "Ye shall not surely die."
The passage in Luke has been applied by one orthodox writer to all mankind, by a lengthy argument designed to meet the apparent silence of the Scriptures respecting the alleged immortality of' the race. But the context would evidently carry the argument to the Universalist conclusion. (See it examined in "Debt and Grace," p. 161, and "Christ our Life," pp. 7-15.)
Here are ten different forms of expression, all occurring in the Scriptures, some of which might have been, or rather, must have been employed in any plain declaration or mention of the supposed immortality of mankind. Two of them, Rom. 2. 7 and 1 Cor. 15. 52, are cited for this express purpose by the compiler of the " Bible Text-Book," recently published by the Boston American Tract Society. But a glance will show that when applied to man at all, they promise immortality only by redemption through Christ.
And I here venture to say that it is impossible to put the now popular doctrine of immortality into proper words, without at least a verbal contradiction of the Scriptures. I know that there may be a double use of words which involves no real contradiction. The Bible tells us we should "answer a fool according to his folly," and that we should answer him "not according to his folly;" that we should " bear one another's burdens," and that "everyone shall bear his own burden;" that Christ said the sickness of Lazarus was " not unto death," and afterwards, " Lazarus is dead." All this gives us no trouble, for we find a like varying use of words in all books. And all this is within the lids of the Bible. But when Jehovah says, "Dying thou shalt die," and expositors say that the lost " in dying shall never die;" when the prophet says, "The soul that sinned, it shall die," and we are afterwards told, " When you hear that there is a death of the soul, do not think that the soul dies; for it is immortal;" when the apostle declares, "No murderer hath eternal life abiding in him," and it is explained that there are "two kinds of eternal life," one "in shame and everlasting contempt;" 2 then we insist that there is a verbal contradiction between the words of the Holy Spirit in the Bible, and the words of man outside of the Bible; it is presumptively a real contradiction; and it must be a real contradiction unless the supposed immortality of man is shown to be implied, though not named, in one or more scriptural expressions.
Is the doctrine contained, then, in the third possible mode which we have stated?
Men are so ready to infer what they believe, from the remotest intimations, that we should not wonder if numerous passages had been claimed as implying their immortality. And I cannot here examine all that have been thus claimed. But a word or two upon a few of those most frequently alleged will suffice to show how hastily men have deduced their immortality, sometimes from expressions which prove the very opposite.
1. Man's creation in the divine image certainly does not imply that we are like God in all respects. And if the expression in Gen. 1. 27 is not said to denote our immortality, it may be otherwise explained. And it has been more frequently interpreted in other ways, by learned Jewish and Christian writers of all ages.
2. "Man became a living soul." But the phrase "living soul" (Heb. nephesh chajah) is applied in Gen. 1. 30 to " every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to everything that crept upon the earth." In Rev. 16. 3, "Every living soul died in the sea," the equivalent Greek phrase is used; which is put in significant contrast with the phrase " quickening spirit" in 1 Cor. 15. 45. Its grammatical sense is simply, " a living creature."
3. "Their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched." Isa. 66. 24; compare Mark 9. 48. The reader will see at once that any argument which infers the immortality of the soul from the phrase in Mark, must also infer the immortality of "carcasses " from the verse in Isaiah. But Dr. Richard Watson is amply supported when he says: " As the worm itself dies not, but destroys that it feeds upon, and as a fire unquenched consumes that upon which it kindles, so when temporal judgments are expressed by this phrase, the utter destruction of persons, cities, and nations, appears to be intended." And we need only ask, How can a symbol and picture of " utter destruction " become the proof and demonstration of any immortality?
4. "Unquenchable fire." Which "burns up" chaff and felled trees, to which the wicked are compared, Matt. 3. 12; Luke 3. 17. So a Jewish writer calls an incurable fever an unquenchable fire; but who infers the immortality of the patient? And Eusebius speaks of Christian martyrs as carried to the stake and burned with an unquenchable fire. The entire usus loquendi makes the phrase decisive proof that out of Christ we strictly perish.
5. "Everlasting " or "eternal fire." Matt. 18. 8; 25. 41; Jude 1.7. Taken by numerous orthodox writers to denote the eternity of effect.1 The fire consumes utterly and forever. So the writer of the Epistle to Diognetus (A. D. 135) speaks of the lost as "punished unto the end" by this fire, and good critics understand him as meaning extermination.2 And in the Clementines " we have this passage: "They who do not repent shall receive their end by the punishment of fire; punished with eternal fire, they shall after a time be extinguished." (Hom. 3. 6.)
6. " Everlasting punishment." Put in contrast with "life eternal," Matt. 25. 46. The current doctrine here deduces immortality from the opposite to eternal life. But if this phrase includes the literal sense, how unnatural to say, The righteous will live forever, and the wicked will suffer forever. Numerous orthodox writers allow that eternal death in the literal sense would be eternal punishment. And in most of the twenty-eight instances where the Greek word occurs in the Septuagint, the actual punishment is death. And classic Greek writers use the phrase, "to punish with death."
7. "And in hell (Hades) he lifted up his eyes, being in torments," etc., Luke 16. 23. But the five brethren of the rich man are still alive. The scene is laid before the resurrection and final judgment, when " Death and Hell (Hades) are cast into the lake of fire, which is the second death." (Rev. 20. 14.) Orthodox writers allow that Hades is thus utterly destroyed. And they who are appointed to the same lake of fire (or " eternal tire") may strictly perish in the second death.
8. Satan, the Beast, and the False Prophet are described as " tormented, day and night, forever and ever," Rev. 20. 10. But the Beast and False Prophet are regarded, by numerous orthodox writers on chapter 19. 20, as utterly destroyed, like Death and Hades. And in the original of Ps. 83. 17 there are quite as strong words, which are never understood to denote endless woe: "Let them be confounded and troubled forever and ever; yea, let them be put to shame and perish."
To the instances cited in "Christ our Life" we may here add that Van der Palm, a learned and orthodox translator of the Bible, says on Jude 1.7: "As this, according to the Greek text, is said of the cities, we must here take the words eternal fire in the sense of a fire which cannot be extinguished until it has consumed everything and reduced it to ashes." See the above and other passages examined more at large in "Debt and Grace," pp. 185-218, and in " Christ our Life," pp. 82-158.
I have thus endeavored to show that the doctrine of a general immortality is neither declared, nor named, nor implied in the Scriptures. In the last feature the argument is of course incomplete in details; but the whole may suffice as a reason for reconsidering the popular opinion. To very many persons it is now becoming clear that, on Scriptural grounds, we must believe in the most absolute sense, that in Christ we live, out of Christ we die. "The doctrine of the immortality of the soul," says Olshausen, "and the name are alike unknown to the entire Bible." And even the Chevalier Bunsen has remarked: " The idea of the philosophers of the last century as to a general immortality of the soul is a delusion; this doctrine is as untenable in philosophy as it is in theology."
If our argument is valid so far, and the alleged doctrine is contained in the Bible in neither of the three only possible modes, you may say that nothing more need be said, for demonstration can no further go. But that which seems to me the main argument is yet to come.
For, it has been said that the alleged immortality is rather assumed or taken for granted than expressly revealed in the Scriptures. As much as to say, though the doctrine is not apparent in the language of the Bible, it is, nevertheless, under it, or it underlies it as a basis or foundation truth.
Now it would seem strange if an important doctrine were so contained in a book as not to appear in it. If a house is set so far down in the ground that we cannot see the foundation, we begin to doubt if it has any. We would not risk our safety or our comfort to live there until we have seen the foundation. And even they who tell us that immortality is assumed, are constrained to argue that the language of the Bible is colored by their alleged doctrine, in those passages which, they say, imply it.
But how shall we refute the assertion? When an important doctrine is said to be a primary truth, a self-evident axiom, he who denies it must appear almost a fool in the eyes of him who asserts it. The parties seem so far apart that reasoning between them is impossible, and the dispute may pass into angry and vehement contradiction.
We are saved from this danger by a peculiar mode in which it has been asserted that man's immortality is a primary and assumed truth of the Bible. The doctrine is sometimes coupled with that of God's existence, and the two are alike said to be taken for granted in the volume of revelation.
Abp. Tillotson, Sermon 100: "The immortality of the soul is rather supposed, or taken for granted, than expressly revealed in the Bible." A. Vinet, A Characteristic of the Gospel: "The doctrines of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are everywhere taken for granted in his [Christ's] words, but are never proved." Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Preface: "The assumption—as the practical interests of morality require—of God, Freedom, and Immortality." (The last we affirm, as the end of virtue.) Dr. Proudfit, Bibliotheca Sacra, 1858, p. 804: " That best and highest of revelations ... announces, not an immortal soul (that is everywhere taken for granted in the New Testament), but an immortal man." The Presbyterian Quarterly, 1860, p. 600: "The Bible generally assumes the immortality of the soul, as it does the existence of God." The Oberlin Evangelist, June 19, 1861: "He [Satan] assumed most fully that the death threatened [in Gen. 2. 17] would be a form of existence, not non-existence. The devil could not hope to be believed if he had given that word the sense of annihilation." The Boston Review, 1861, pp. 446, 452: The intuitional persuasion We know that the soul is immortal, as we know there is a God.' " " The whole projection of a rational being assumes the fact of its inherent immortality." The Am. Theol. Review, 1862, p. 180: " Christ's teachings presuppose monotheism and immortality." (Did Christ assume as already known that which he came to bring to light?)
Isaac Watts, so far from assuming immortality, says: " Nor do I think we ought usually, when we speak concerning creatures, to affirm positively that their existence shall be equal to that of the blessed God, especially with regard to the duration of their punishment." (World to Come, Disc. 13. § 2.) And we have heard a thoughtful divine say the wonder is, not that any should become extinct, but that any should live eternally.
This statement, happily, gives us a platform of argument, the "standing place," from which the assertion can be shaken, if it is not a fixed and settled truth. We have now two doctrines, said to be alike assumed or taken for granted, in the same book of final authority in religion. And we may now inquire how the two doctrines would most naturally appear, and how they actually do appear, in the revelation which God has given.
If equally true, they would appear, I think, in substantially the same manner in the Scriptures. For, they are of the same final importance to mankind. Not, indeed, of the same importance in the universe. For, though all human souls should perish, nay, though the heavens should fall and all created worlds crumble back to dust, yet, if God still lives, the hope of the universe remains. In a new dawn of creation the morning stars might yet sing together and all the sons of God again shout for joy. To God himself, then, and for the interests that center in Him, his being is of infinitely more account than man's immortality. But to man, to you and to me, God and immortality are of precisely the same account. That is, we are equally concerned and our welfare is equally involved, whether a thousand years hence we are dead to God, or God is dead to us.
And the revelation which we have, and which is given for our special instruction and benefit, relates as really to the one question as to the other. If there were two Gods, as the Persians held, and if the Bible were made up from their diplomacy, state papers touching the affairs of the astronomical universe, then there might have been a bare allusion to our human race, and not a word saying whether we are mortal or immortal. But the Bible is no such book. It lets alone almost all geology and astronomy, all questions about the Milky Way and other nebula, just because it would fain tell man what he has been, what he is, and what he may yet be. In such a book we may safely say that our immortality, if it be real and true, would be treated in much the same way with the existence of God. If these are two cardinal doctrines, and if one of them is explicitly stated and declared; or is frequently named and mentioned as if already understood; or is never named, but silently assumed, as if too obvious or too sacred for utterance;— then we might expect the same of the other.
And now what are the facts? The existence of God is indeed never in the Scriptures directly asserted, or made the burden of a proposition. There is a single approach to this form of statement (in Heb. 11. 6); but there the nature of faith is the leading theme, and the clause, " that God is," is subordinate. In numerous other instances, especially in the Old Testament, it is said that there is one God rather than many gods; but these statements are made against polytheism rather than atheism. The doctrine of some divine existence is assumed, as too clear for argument or even for declaration, as an axiom or primary truth of the religious consciousness, to prove which would be preposterous. It is only the fool that says in his heart, " There is no God." But, so far from being silently assumed, the divine existence is mentioned, and alluded to, and involved in various forms of speech, continually. It stands out, in bold relief, on almost every page of the Bible. It meets the reader at every turn. There are just two short books (that of Esther and the Song of Solomon) in which the name of God does not appear; and their inspiration has been questioned on that account. They are retained in the sacred canon, notwithstanding the objection, for special reasons. In every other book the existence of God is the apple of gold in the picture of silver. It is the central diamond, the Kohinoor or "Mountain of Light" that illumines the volume. It is the all-pervading truth that renders the Bible a Discourse of God — the Word of God. It is the Shekinah that imparts sacredness to the Word, so that even sceptics have approached it with awe, as holy ground. And, lest this one great truth should weary the devout reader with monotony, it is mentioned in endlessly varying forms, in manifold names of the Divine Being and of His glorious attributes. And, to arrest the attention and invite the study of reluctant men, the Bible yields a thousand expressions of the power and wisdom and goodness of God. If we strike from the record all those passages that tell of His being and His works, we reduce the dimensions of the volume almost by half, we make it a book without sense or meaning, we exchange the light of the revelation for midnight darkness.
I think it will be found that all primary truths of morals or religion are similarly incorporated in the language of the Scriptures. The responsible freedom of man, e. g., though not put into a thesis, such as, "the freedom of the will," is really named in all such expressions as "willing," "choosing," and "refusing." Though not stated abstractly or even directly, it is plainly mentioned in the concrete.
But if we expunge from the same book all those passages in which the immortality of the soul, or of the race, or of the lost, is mentioned or expressly assumed, we leave the volume untouched—it remains as it was. It might have been written just as we have it, and the revelation would have been full as clear and complete as it is, if the sacred writers had combined and conspired with uniform consent to avoid all allusion to that form of doctrine which is sometimes called one of the two cardinal doctrines of all religion.
Whence this contrast in the Scriptural treatment of these ideas? Does anyone say that man's immortality is sufficiently clear to his unaided reason? But that important truth ought to be surpassingly clear to human reason which need not be named in a revelation. And, if we suppose the more obvious truth to be named less frequently because clearer and more obvious, then should man's immortality be a thousand-fold clearer than God's existence; nay, clearer beyond all possible comparison, as any large number is incomparably greater than a cypher.
I know it will not be claimed that man's immortality is so clear, past all shadow or dream of doubt. But if we grant, for argument's sake, that it is too clear to need explicit mention in the Bible, we only encounter a new difficulty. For, the revelation that God was to give to man is necessarily given in man's language. Not only in the single words they use, but also in the current forms and proverbial phrases of human speech, so far as these were not false, or to be corrected or modified by the revelation. But if man's immortality were so clear a postulate of human reason, it must be a most cherished sentiment, and must give rise to many familiar expressions, household words of natural theology. In fact, wherever the doctrine has been held, whether in ancient or modern times, it has created various forms of expression that reveal the sentiment. Hence we now hear so often of "the immortality of the soul." Why, then, are such expressions altogether avoided and ignored in the Bible? Why should the Holy Spirit, so ready to catch the language of the mortals who were to be taught the way of life, have failed to conform to their style of speech in so important a matter as their supposed immortal nature? Why, if God has told men that they must enjoy or suffer eternally, has he never given his invitation or his warning in the name of the immortality with which he is supposed to have endowed them? Such a gift, surely, would be preeminently worthy of mention to those who think and say so much of their supposed possession of the boon. Did God not desire men to be grateful for a gift in which the divine image is so often alleged to consist?
Such are the difficulties of supposing that man has an immortality too clear and indisputable to need mention in a revelation. But we encounter still a new difficulty when we consider the actual and anxious doubts of men, for thousands of years, on this very subject. Because man was a candidate for immortality, we find in the ruins of his fallen nature, through all history, some sentiment of the birthright he had lost. Subject to death, he yet finds, or thinks he finds, some remnant within him of that which is too good to die. Hence that Question of Ages, "If a man die, shall he live again?" But, aside from revelation, the question has been ever answered doubtfully. And far more so than that of God's existence; for, while atheists have been so rare that some think real atheism is impossible, many individuals and even whole nations, believing in God, have denied man's personal immortality. [On this point see "Debt and Grace," pp. 265-858.] And, just before the true Light came, in the person and words of Christ, there was more doubt, both among Gentiles, and perhaps the Jews themselves, than ever before. Yet, when the long questioning was answered, and Life and Immortality were revealed, there was not a word uttered respecting the immortal nature or destiny about which there had been so much speculation. He who had the words of eternal life, never said that all men were to live forever. And he never spoke of the life that he gave as a happy form of some immortality which they already possessed.
One fact makes this silence of the Life-revealer even yet more significant. Man had come under the power of death by giving heed to the flattering suggestion that he should " not surely die." And we have found that statement to be the only instance in the Scriptures in which man is spoken of as immortal. If now, that lie of Satan contained any truth whatever, if it was properly one of those -half truths which are the most pernicious falsehoods, then there was special need that the perverted truth should be redeemed from its lying service, and put into its true form and relation. If a jewel of priceless value has received a false setting, all who know it’s worth will clamor for its being set anew, so that its real beauty shall appear. If plundering and murderous wreckers have displaced the lights of a harbor, to lure the sailor to his ruin, humanity cries out not only for their condign punishment, but for the instant restoring of the lights to their true position. But when that "liar from the beginning" threw out his lure for the mariner toward immortality, his false light is left as his own proper utterance, unrenewed, unredeemed. He who was appointed to crush out this serpent's head, finds no truth in him at all worth saving, but warns us that except by union with himself we have "no life in us."
Someone may say that the Jews were an unphilosophic people, too full of national conceit to think of an immortality in human nature itself, good for all nations and all men. But Paul surely suffered no such lack of culture, nor such narrowness. The Apostle to the Gentiles, who knew how to quote the Greek poets and was a master in the art of reasoning, must have known what the philosophers had said of immortality. Why, then, did he never speak of the immortality of the soul, or of mankind? If, he thought the Gentiles were right as to the fact of a general immortality, but wrong as to the manner of it, why did not he who was all things to all men recognize their doctrine so far as it was true, and carry it out in its proportions of symmetry and beauty? When some mocked at his preaching of Jesus and the Resurrection, why did not he who warned every man day and night with tears appeal to what they had heard of an immortality they could not escape?
Finally, if it is said that the wicked are not called immortal because their endless existence is unworthy of that name, then why should we call it immortality? And by what warrant is it said even that they will exist forever, when the Scriptures use no such language, but tell us, " He that doeth the will of God abideth forever?"
The sum of the argument is this: The alleged immortality, if true, is as important to man as the existence of God. And the Scriptures are wont to recognize and incorporate all great and primary truths of religion. But, while they plainly speak of God's existence many hundreds of times, they name the immortality of man not once. And that, too, when there was special doubt among the nations, and special need of revelation on the subject, and the Scriptures explicitly profess to make the subject plain and clear. An early assertion of exemption from death, made by the author of death, the Life-giver leaves with him who made it. The most cultured of the inspired writers is as silent as all the rest, respecting the immortality now commonly alleged. And, to crown the whole, the Word of Life does copiously employ the terms which would name the doctrine, such phrases as " to live forever," " everlasting life," " length of days forever and ever," " never to die," " incorruption," " immortality," and " to abide forever," but ever applying them to the righteous and never to all mankind.
If, then, some of us choose to copy the style of the Scriptures on this subject and never speak of man or of the soul as immortal, if we even say that the assuming or taking for granted of man's immortality is wholly extra-scriptural, let our friends, respect what may be the just scruples of honest minds.
This argument, the main features of which have been offered to the public in three different books, is regarded by friends and opponents as requiring special attention. But it has been noticed by only three among more than a dozen critics. One replies, for substance, that the " immortality of the soul " is an abstract or metaphysical style of expression, not falling within the design of a revelation. (Bibliotheca Sacra, 1858, p. 635.) Another rays, in the same style: "Neither do the Scriptures lay down in scientific term various other great principles of metaphysics. (Oberlin Evangelist, June 5, 1861.) But the statement in " Debt and Grace," p. 162, specially guards the argument against so narrow an application, and we need only reply: Just as if our Heavenly Father could not or would not call us immortal, if we are so, without a formal or metaphysical statement! The third reply is that offered by the Rev. Mr. Cobb, in our Discussion, pp. 193-195. He objects that existence and duration are not comparable. "Stature and complexion are not comparable traits of being. So my opponent, by comparing the Bible treatment of the existence of God with that of the immortality of man, forces into connection two things which in their nature can bear no comparison." Mr. C. thinks being should be compared with being, and immortality with immortality, in each subject.
But his objection is answered from the terms in which he states it. It was the "Bible treatment" of two doctrines alleged as alike assumed for primary truths, that formed the matter of comparison. And the contrast discovered is not denied. And, accepting for argument's sake the terms of comparison he offers, I find God's immortality, or his eternity, asserted or mentioned scores of times, but man's immortality not once. (P. 429.)
To my statement that the compared doctrines, if alike true, are equally important to man, Mr. C. replies that "these two truths as subjects of revelation to man, especially in the infancy of the race, bear no comparison." (P. 216.) And the difference is important, he thinks, because the knowledge of God's existence is essential to all religion. The fact is true, but it does not touch my statement. Our welfare is equally related to God and immortality, whether the latter is revealed sooner or later. And when the immortality comes to be revealed, it is the righteous, not all men that have the promise of it.
If we are in a great error, may we not ask instruction by better replies than three, to our leading argument?
You will bear with an illustration. The true mountain, upheaved from the lower strata of the earth's surface, reveals the granite haze of all the mountains. It offers granite everywhere, and in all forms; in strata, cropping out in various lines and inclinations; in massive boulders, and in scattered stones and debris. The mountain acquires the cast and air of granite, and tells you thus of the foundations on which the earth rests.
So the Bible is, as it were, a Mountain of God. In a thousand passages it tells you plainly and explicitly of the I AM, who sustains and upholds all things. The grandeur and sublimity of the Bible is largely due to this feature of it. Its massive truths are all about God, and man's relations to God. And, to relieve and invite the mind, the sentiment of the divine appears in manifold variety, in all the region of sacred truth.
But if we explore this same Mountain of God over all its surface and through all its folds and implications for a revelation of the immortality of the soul, or anything equivalent, we shall find not a single boulder, or stone, or pebble, that shall stand as a proper monument or memento of that doctrine which has Veen assumed for a primary truth of the divine Word.
Again, I say, if some of us decline the current phrases respecting man's immortality, call it not heresy; for heretical persons, if I mistake not, are those who will not be bound by the terms of Scripture.
Two things," says Baxter, "have set the Church on fire, and been the plagues of it above one thousand years: 1, Enlarging our creed, and making more fundamentals than ever God made. 2, Composing, and so imposing, our creeds and confessions in our own words and phrases." —(Works, Vol. 3. p. 76.)
But the argument does not end here. Mountains have their adjacent valleys and plains, with transported rocks from their own material, indicating their structure. So, after the revelation was complete, we might expect to find in the language of the early Christians much of the style that pervades the Scriptures. They were a sincere, plain-minded people, easily impressed by the words they loved. In their own writings they quote largely from the Testaments, Old and New, while they amply employed their own language. showing how they understood the sacred words. But while they went everywhere, holding forth the word of life, they did not for a full hundred years after the death of Christ speak of man as immortal, nor of the lost as suffering forever. Let the following passage from one of their martyred bishops tell their views: "The Father of all makes a grant of continuance forever and ever to those who are saved. For, life is not of ourselves, nor of our own nature, but a gift of God's favor. And therefore he who preserves the grant of life, and renders thanks to Him who bestows it, shall receive length of days forever and ever. But he who rejects it, and proves ungrateful to his Maker for creating him, and will not know Him who bestows it, deprives himself of the gift of duration to all eternity." And he concludes: " Of the creation and duration of the soul let so much be said."
Irenaeus, A. D. 178. Our early conjecture that even Athanasius, the " Father of Orthodoxy," would be found on the whole supporting our view, is confirmed by a recent German writer, Hermann Schultz, who interprets him as saying that sin carries its unredeemed subject "through corruption, back to non-existence."
How, then, you will ask, did Christians first begin to speak of the soul as immortal? The phrase first occurs in the Epistle to Diognetus, but in such connection as to show that the writer regarded immortality as man's proper destination, but not his absolute destiny. (See above, p. 10.) A few years later, however, Justin Martyr appeared as a defender of Christianity. He had been a philosopher, and continued to bear that title, "hoping," says Milner, "to conciliate the affections of philosophers, and allure them to Christianity. To draw gentlemen and persons of liberal education to pay attention to Christianity appears to have been his chief employment." "Justin was the first sincere Christian who was seduced by human philosophy to adulterate the gospel, though in a small degree." (Chh. Hist., Cent. IL) And Jerome, having complained that Aristides (A. D. 125) " not only retained his philosophic garb and profession, but also interwove his philosophical opinions in his book," adds: "which was afterwards imitated by Justin Martyr." (De Viris Illus., c. 20; Ep. 83, ad Magnum.)
In his "Apologies" Justin employs strong and extra-scriptural language that seems to imply eternal conscious punishment. And in his " Exhortation to the Greeks " he states, as truths held in common by philosophers and Christians, the divine origin of the world and creation of man, the immortality of the soul, and judgment after death. Thus the modern doctrine was fairly named; and the words passed gradually into a formula of faith.
Yet in the same treatise, Justin speaks of believers in Christ as alone "immortalized," the expression apparently denoting an unsettled opinion. And in his " Dialogue with Trypho," he explicitly discards the teachings of Pythagoras and Plato on immortality, declares that "whenever it 'is necessary that the soul should no longer be, the vital spirit leaves it, and the soul is no more, but returns again thither whence it was taken;" and he is regarded by numerous critics as having been martyred in this faith.
The soul was also held by the earlier Fathers to be of an " intermediate " nature; that is, it could either live or die. And when its absolute immortality was asserted, the principle that " where there is life there is hope," produced in due time the reaction of Restorationism, which settled in the doctrine of Purgatory. Well might a Catholic bishop speak of the Universalists as " our estranged brethren."
In conclusion I have a single proposition to offer. We have seen that the volume of revelation was made complete without a word said of the immortality in question. Four thousand years of converse between God and man elapsed in entire silence respecting that doctrine which some of you regard as of primary importance. Also, Christianity was inaugurated into the world, and held its way triumphantly for a full century, with a silence on this subject no less profound. And that, too, when, if ever, prevailing wickedness required the terrors of eternal woe. Grant, now, gentle reader, for argument's sake, that your doctrine of immortality is true. Yet, forty-one hundred years of revelation and of missionary work were achieved, so far as we can see, without mention of it. If the doctrine was true, the long silence did it no damage whatever. You have heard of the fabled river, whose waters ran into the sea and through it, reappearing unsalted and pure in the fountain of Arethusa, hundreds of miles away. That stream is a picture of the doctrine of man's immortality during forty-one hundred years, if it was true. And if it was safe during all that silence, never rising to the surface in sparkling beauty until a hundred years after life and immortality were brought to light, then the doctrine will incur no danger if it tries the same silence once again. Hold it, then, if it seems to you true. But trust the experiment of holding it in silence. If prophets, and the Messiah, and apostles, and the early martyrs held it without saying it, you can confidently do the same thing. You can spare the time and effort of all the words that utter it. You can fearlessly drop all the phrases about the soul's immortality, and the like, and content yourself with the scriptural expressions on the nature and destiny of man. Use, then, by way of experiment, the inspired words. Use all the sacred phrases, whichever way they may seem to look. Only let me suggest that you employ them in the ratio or proportion in which they occur in the Bible. If "life" and "eternal life" are familiar scriptural expressions, let them be favorite with you. If some expressions, which you deem specially fearful, occur rarely, repeat them rarely for this reason: if a false doctrine once obtains, it is apt to bring into undue prominence unique passages, interpreting the whole Bible by them; whereas they should be, perhaps, explained by the general tenor of many other expressions.
In this experiment you should avoid all unauthorized comment, and especially all misquotation. If you read of eternal " destruction " do not call it banishment. If you find " everlasting punishment" revealed, you will neither prove nor improve anything by calling it punishments? And, when convenient, allow and invite the Scriptures to explain themselves by the proper context, or by contrasted or parallel passages. Short of all this, you may be unwittingly travelling out of the record, and growing wise above that which is written.
The compiler of the " Bible Text-Book," published by the Boston Am. Tract Society, tells us that " eternal death" is "described as banishment from God " in 2 Thess. 1. 9, thus stereotyping the popular misquotation. For proof that the phrase "from the presence," etc., denotes not banishment, but the source of the " destruction," see " Debt and Grace," p. 187; " Christ our Life," pp. 120, 121.
The old Latin version renders 2 Thess. 1. 9 thus: "Who shall suffer the eternal punishments of destruction," etc.: and the Vulgate likewise, with the difference of "in destruction." The Latin translation which we have of Irenaeus gives a similar reading, but his Greek was probably more correct. Now, while many allow that extinction would be an eternal punishment, none would call it eternal punishments. The above twofold mistranslation, in a Version of paramount authority for a thousand years, goes far to explain the prevalence of the common view, supposing it to Le erroneous.
In the condensed edition of Cruden's Concordance, under the word " Persuade," the passage in 2 Cor. 5. 11 is given with the plural, " terrors." On the importance of this error see " Christ our Life," pp. 92, 93.
Judging both from experience and observation, I predict that this experiment will cost an effort. Those who have heard the soul called immortal from their childhood will find that unruly member, the tongue, betraying them into such words in spite of great vigilance. But, if the doctrine is unnamed in the Scriptures, and if it may possibly be unscriptural, the harder it is to forbear naming it, the more it is your duty to try. We ought ever to find it easy to use the dialect of the inspired writers And if we find this is not easy, it is time for us to suspect and beware.
Believe, then, that the soul is immortal, if you must; only try this experiment. I will not frighten you with any predictions as to the result of it. No opinion that I or your neighbors may entertain ought either to prevent the experiment, or to mar it. And I will not say how long you should continue it. I will only say that if Christians should say nothing about the alleged immortality for a full hundred years, and if the doctrine is nevertheless true, another Justin Martyr will again put it into words; the fountains of so great a truth will in other generations break forth full and clear as ever; and, so far from suffering any loss, we shall at least have learned to say the words of revelation aright.
And yet, important as this experiment with our tongues and thoughts may be, it would be quite worthless if we did not also school our hearts to receive the import of the revealed words. "Keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life." The burden of revelation is the love of God, requiring, under forfeiture of an infinite boon, the return of our own love. " God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." All our inquiries into the meaning either of God's works or hid word should be, that we may begin to love him truly, or that we may learn to love him more. In vain do we prove or accept the sense of his revelation, if we do not his will. But if we live unto him, then may we dwell with him, in that immortality which he alone can give.
Eternal death in the literal sense is eternal punishment.
These shall go away into everlasting punishment; but the righteous into life eternal.—Matt. 25. 46.
THIS passage is commonly regarded as the strongest scriptural proof of the eternal suffering of the lost, implying their immortality. We propose to show that it implies no immortality in sin or suffering, but readily agrees with the view that the wicked will finally die and become extinct, — not to say that such is the natural and obvious import of these words of our Savior.
This may be argued, 1. From the Scriptures. 2. From reason, or the nature of the case. 3. From the consent of various orthodox writers that final extinction would be an eternal punishment.
1. The passage itself yields an argument for death in the strict sense, as the final and irreversible penalty of sin. The contrast is drawn between everlasting life, and something opposed thereto. The righteous are to live forever and eternally. This is an essential part of their glorious destiny, and it is the literal import of the phrase, "life eternal." The natural opposite to this is, eternal, literal death. And though it is true that the righteous will be forever happy, that does not require that the wicked should be forever miserable. Nor does the phrase " everlasting punishment" require this, unless it is first clearly shown that the Greek word rendered " punishment " denotes misery in all cases and without exception. Even if the English word " punishment " always implied misery (which it does not), he must still resort to the Greek who would prove from this passage that those doomed to the second death will live forever. Can we, then, deduce immortal life from that which is here put in contrast with eternal life?
Now the Greek word in question, (kolatris), occurs elsewhere in the New Testament, as noun or verb, only in Acts 4. 21; 2 Pet. 2. 9; 1 John 4. 18. In the two former instances it will not lag claimed that it should be rendered "tormented." And though our English version renders it by " torment" in 1 John 4. 18, the propriety of this is questioned by Grotius, Hammond, Beausobre, and L'Enfant, and Schleusner, for various reasons; and it is otherwise rendered in the Syriac, the Arabic, and the Vulgate. And the sense of " torment " is given by only one lexicographer of the Greek at large, Sturz, who offers this as a fifth sense, citing a single passage, and allowing even there another sense instead.
Moreover, in the Septuagint Greek the word occurs twenty-eight times, the actual punishment being literal death in almost every instance. In one case a senseless idol is said to be punished. And in the classic Greek the phrase " to punish with death" frequently occurs.
The added expression, "from the presence of the Lord," etc., is commonly taken as signifying banishment. But it really denotes, the origin or source of the destruction. Compare Levit. 10. 2; 2 Kings 1. 10, 12, 14; Rev. 20. 9; Acts 3. 19. (See " Christ our Life," p. 121; " Debt and Grace," p. 187.) One orthodox writer renders by the Latin " coram," "before the presence," etc. (Bullinger, Adv. Anabaptistos, p. 78) Compare Luke 19. 27.
Again, we read in 2 These. 1. 9, that the wicked "shall be punished with everlasting destruction."* Here the term "destruction" is a defining word, used to show the mode or nature of the punishment, and is presumptively to be taken in its ordinary or literal sense. If it had been said, " They shall be destroyed with everlasting punishment," then it might with some reason be argued that the " destruction " is not literal. But, as the phrase stands, we may infer that the destruction is one by which the lost will strictly perish; and the more confidently, since the phrases, to be "destroyed forever," and to "perish forever," are frequently used, and in a literal sense. See Job 4. 20; 20. 7; Ps. 9. 18; 52. 5; 92. 7; and compare Ps. 9. 5; 83. 17.
Once more, the literal sense of the term "life," so often applied to the final destiny of the righteous, is insisted on by able writers not partial to our view. Thus Fritzsche says: "The primary sense of 'eternal life,' and that which is expressed in the words themselves, is that of a life everlasting, not ending in death; the secondary sense, not expressed by the words, but otherwise derived (from the Christian hope, resting on the promises of Christ), is of a blessed life." (Comm. on Rom. 5. 12.) And Bretschneider concludes a lengthy argument thus: "As one reviews this whole series of representations and expressions, one sees how far from correct they are who either take death for a miserable life, or render it by unhappiness,' and ' life,' or eternal life,' by, 'happiness.' Rather, 'death' never means unhappiness, nor 'life' happiness; but the former is always death, and the latter is always life; and the implied conception of wretchedness and happiness is purely accessory, and can never constitute the fundamental signification." (Evang. Pietismus, p. 264.) And De Wette remarks on our passage: "Zoe (life) is perhaps not merely blessedness but life in the most absolute (tiefsten) sense of the word; contrasted with it would be, properly, annihilation."
Hence, when Alford says that "the life here spoken of is not bare existence which would have annihilation for its opposite," we need only reply that life is existence, and so justifies the contrast he alludes to. And more, since conscious existence is the leading sense of the word, it properly determines the matter of contrast.
A writer in the New Englander (Jan. 1861) observes that we allow to the term "life " the accessory sense of blessedness, and thinks misery may by a similar argument, ever attend death. In other words: If the eternally living may be forever blessed, why may not the eternally dead be forever wretched! He forgets that literal life is naturally blissful (i.e. all healthy life and action, whether physical, mental, or spiritual, is essentially happy, — indeed happiness consists in nothing else), whereas literal death precludes the accessory sense of misery. There is pain in dying, but it is a pain that kills. They who insist on a secondary sense of the word " life " as the ruling sense, seem to us like one who should cut away the original trunk of the banyan-tree, out of respect for the accessory supports it has produced!
We might give at much greater length the scriptural argument against inferring a baleful immortality from the blessedness of eternal life. Most important is the fact that neither the soul, nor the race, nor the lost, are ever called immortal, or said to live or exist forever, in the entire Bible. But we will simply add the words of John Locke, who says of the wicked: "They shall not live forever. This is so plain in Scripture, and is so everywhere inculcated, — that the wages of sin is death, and the reward of the righteous is everlasting life,— the constant language of Scripture in the current of the New Testament as well as the Old, is life to the just, to believers, to the obedient, and death to the wicked and unbelievers, that one would wonder how the reader could be mistaken where death is threatened so constantly, and declared everywhere to be the ultimate punishment and last estate to which the wicked must all come. To solve this, they have invented a very odd signification of the word death, which they would have stand for eternal life in torment. They who will put so strange and contrary a signification upon a word in a hundred places, where, if it had not its true and literal sense, one would wonder it should be so often used, and that in opposition to life, which in these places is used literally, ought to have good proofs for giving it a sense in those places of Scripture directly contrary to what it ordinarily has in other parts of Scripture, and everywhere else." After treating the question at some length, Locke concludes: "Taking it then for evident that the wicked shall die and be extinguished at last," etc. (Life by Lord King, pp. 316-320, Bohn's ed.)
2. We are next to show that, in the nature and reason of the case, it is an eternal punishment to be deprived of immortal life. Here a few words should be said by way of explanation.
We regard man as created a candidate for immortality. He is not absolutely mortal, like the brute; for then death would be a natural destination, and no penalty. Nor is he absolutely immortal; for then death would be impossible.
In order that death should be penal, life must be held out before man as a boon that may be gained or lost. This we claim to be his actual relation to immortality. And if he loses immortality, that, we affirm, is eternal loss and punishment. Here, at the outset, we will reply to a few objections.
1. It is urged that man must be either mortal or immortal in his very nature, and that immortality cannot depend on any conditions, nor be specially bestowed on a certain class or character. Thus we are told: "If man be not physically immortal, if immortality be not a physical constituent and determination of his being, — not his appanage, but his nature, — we may inquire, how can its forfeiture be penal? " And the same writer goes on to maintain that what is not strictly of man's nature cannot be his, and cannot be lost. (R. W. Hamilton, Rewards and Punishments, pp. 437, 438.) And another writer, alluding to the statement of our view by one of the early Christians, says: " To say that man in his primitive state was neither mortal nor immortal, is indeed, as Theophilus saw that his hypothesis would import to his readers, to say that he was nothing at all." (S. Cobb, Human Destiny, p. 159.)
In reply to this we remark: — (1.) Our view of man's candidate relation to immortality, sometimes called his intermediate nature, was held by the early Christians generally, notwithstanding their various opinions respecting the final destiny of the wicked. It was plainly stated by Justin Martyr, Tatian, Theophilus, Irenaeus, Lactantius, Arnobius, and others. Athanasius, reputed as the "Father of Orthodoxy," says, in a similar strain: "Man is by nature mortal, seeing he was created from non-existence. Yet, as made in the likeness of the true Being, to be preserved by the knowledge of him, he might have escaped the force of corruption and remained immortal." This was opposed to the doctrine of the philosophers, who regarded the soul as inherently immortal, uncreated, and eternal. The first Christian writer who dissented from this view was Athenagoras (about A. D. 175), of whom Olshausen says: "Following the Greek philosophers, he more than once professes that souls are immortal in their own nature, which is wholly foreign from the opinion of Justin and others." And Hagenbach, after stating the prevalent opinion of the soul's intermediate nature, in the second century, remarks: "On the contrary, Tertullian and Origen, whose views differed on other subjects, agreed in this one point, that they, in accordance with their peculiar notions concerning the nature of the soul, looked upon immortality as essential to it." Extremes meet. Tertullian was the first great defender of the doctrine of deathless torment, and Origen was the cynosure of Restorationism.
The Christian view is well stated, we think, by Jeremy Taylor, who says: "Whatsoever had a beginning can also have an ending; and it shall die, unless it be daily watered from the streams flowing from the fountain of life, and refreshed with the dew of heaven, and the wells of God. And therefore God had prepared a tree in Paradise to have supported Adam in his artificial immortality. Immortality was not in his nature, but in the hands and parts, in the favor and superadditions, of God." And we welcome the token of a returning sense of man's dependence on God for his continued being, when such a writer as Bunsen says: "The idea of the philosophers of the last century as to the general immortality of the soul is a delusion; this doctrine is as untenable in philosophy as it is in theology." (Christianity and Mankind, 4. 336.)
(2.) We think he is wise above what is written who says that a conditional immortality' is impossible. A man may be naturally or constitutionally long-lived; and yet, by a habit of vice, or as the penalty of crime, he may suffer a premature and unnatural death. So plain is the case in respect to the bodily life. And do we know the sources of the unseen life so well, that we may say the soul must either have immortality already in its possession, or it can never be immortal? We live and move, and have our inmost being, in God; not in ourselves. No man has ever touched the link that binds his existence to-day with his existence to-morrow. Who knows that his life a million years hence may not require a closer union with the Life-giver than he now holds? Who knows that the attitude of faith and love may not, by God's grace or even by his ordained law, strike a deeper root into the sources of all life? It is better to say, with Nemesius, " Since the soul is not yet known in its essence, it is not suitable to determine respecting its energy. The Hebrews say that originally man was made, evidently, neither mortal nor immortal, but on the confines of either nature; so that, if he should yield to the bodily affections, he should share also the changes of the body; but if he Should prefer the nobler affections of the soul, he should be deemed worthy of immortality." (De Natura Hominis, c.1, 5th century.)
And when it is said that immortality must be a "physical constituent and determination of man's being," we see not how the doctrine of fatalism is to be avoided. If this is true of the substance of man's being, it may be equally true of the qualities of his being. We know it is often said that moral character cannot affect the physical nature of the soul. Bat this notion makes the soul an exception from the rule that holds everywhere else, viz: that substance and qualities precisely correspond; whence it is so often re-marked that we know the substance of things only by their qualities. This view also requires that the soul should be unchanged by any increase or diminution of knowledge, or even of mental and moral capacity. Thus it leads, we think, to the Gnostic doctrine that the soul is untarnished by any vice in which we may long indulge. Shall we wonder if Universalists have said that death will emancipate the soul into perfect purity and blessedness? Rather, if we live not unto God, how can we live eternally, either in him or out of him? If character may at all rule our destiny, may it not rule the destination of our being itself?
2. Another objection is urged from the moral relations of man to the future, as follows: " Forfeiture," we are told, "is punishment, when it is the withdrawal of a right, — of that which is one's own, — not merely the refusal to extend a gift or gratuity. Human government, for instance, that aims at the prevention of crime rather than the satisfaction of justice, does not content itself with saying: ' If your .conduct is virtuous and meritorious, we will bestow upon you honors and emoluments; but if you commit crimes, we will simply not bestow them; will simply let you alone, do nothing for you, do nothing to you.' The loss of an attainable or proffered heaven is not properly an atonement. For it was never the soul's right, property, or prerogative. The withdrawment of life was simply the discontinuance of a gratuitous boon, and NOT TO BE was simply NOT TO SUFFER; a mere negation of all punishment, as well as of all favor." (T. M. Post, New Englander, Feb. 1856, pp. 134, 135.)
We reply, from this reasoning, it would appear that the Egyptians were not punished in the death of their first-born. All their other plagues might be penal, for they destroyed property, or rendered it useless; and to their property they held legal claim, at least against the claims of others. But to the continued lives of their children they could urge no right. Here they had no property or prerogative, any more than we have in immortality. The divine withdrawal and smiting down of these lives was simply the discontinuance of a gratuitous boon. And if they suffered, it was simply because they longed and grieved for that which was not their own. They should have thanked God for the past, and have been content. They had lost no right, and they suffered vexation only, not punishment.
And by similar reasoning we might show that there is very little punishment in the world. But the fallacy is manifest. Our author regards a proffered boon — even if it be of infinite worth — as nothing to man unless he can claim it by right. But if immortality is freely offered, to all who seek it by patient continuance in well-doing, then man clearly holds a high moral relation to it. If it is glory and honor to attain it, it is shame and ignominy to fail of it. The loss is penal because it is deep and overwhelming degradation and ruin, and entails everlasting contempt. And the loss is no less real because the ruined soul shall be too dead to realize or know it.
The illustration adduced by our author from the methods of human government is not good, because a citizen can be "let alone" by the magistrate, and suffer little if any harm. Secessionists might almost think themselves in heaven if they were let alone. But the soul cannot so happily secede from God. When he adopts the let-alone policy with any creature, the anathema is fatal. And the true illustration from human government would be in a case of execution for crime. That is commonly called capital punishment.
When it is said that "loss is not properly an atonement," and that "not to be is simply not to suffer," we remark that positive malignity and guilt doubtless deserve not only loss but also pain. But, until it is shown that temporary guilt in a finite creature deserves infinite or endless pain, nothing is' effected for the orthodox argument. The fact that extinction is eternal privation, remains; and that may constitute the eternity of the final punishment, after all or any suffering which sin may require.
3. It is often said that annihilation is just what the wicked would desire. And hence it is objected that the literal death of the soul cannot be the appointed penalty.
Is it meant by this, that God is bound to refuse to the lost anything which they might wish? That is simply saying that he ought to tantalize and torment them, at all hazards, and to all eternity. Is that a conception of the great God, worthy of any Christian man? But perhaps it is simply meant that the lost would prefer extinction to eternal woe. Very well. They would also prefer ten degrees of eternal anguish to a million degrees of eternal anguish. Should God therefore inflict the million degrees?
The objection is plainly either churlish, and grudges to the lost any relief from woe without respect to justice; or, it assumes that endless woe is already justly deserved. Let this be shown, and we need then say nothing about the likes or dislikes of the lost. Wishes prove nothing either way. The moral laws of the universe were not framed either to suit or to vex the tastes of any.
The fallacy of the argument seems to be this: Extinction is compared with undying anguish, and is doubtless infinitely preferable. But, compared with eternal glory, it is an infinite loss; and infinitely undesirable. Which is the true contrast? If the former, then extinction is, as one writer has said, "eternal deliverance." But if the latter, then, by the same law of comparison, extinction is eternal punishment.
We suspect the former contrast is made so often and persistently as it is, because salvation has been thought of too much in a negative sense. Salvation has come to mean rescued from an infinite evil, more than renewal and fitness for an infinite boon. Hence men say so much about being prepared to die, and so little of being prepared to live forever.
And again, when the supposed preferences of degraded, thoughtless, or tortured minds are referred to, we beg leave to appeal to a higher tribunal. If someone, half dead by nature or by sin, reckons the immortal prize which God offers at infinitely less than its true worth, is his estimate to be called, by the law of contraries, a verdict respecting God's judgments? Shall we thus virtually reason the matter before a jury of fools who say in their hearts, No God? Shall we not rather say with Dr. Bentley: " O dismal reward of Infidelity 1 at which nature does shrink and shiver with horror. What some of the learned doctors among the Jews have esteemed the most dreadful of all punishments, and have assigned for the portion of the blackest criminals of the damned, — so interpreting Tophet, Abad-don, the Valley of Slaughter, and the like, for final extinction and deprivation of being, — this Atheism [worthily of itself] exhibits to us as an equivalent to heaven." (Boyle Lecture, Sermon 1.) Shall we not rather say of those who have sunk so low, as Christ said of those who loved empty praise: " They have their reward?"
4. But it is most commonly objected that annihilation is not punishment because nonentity cannot suffer or be punished. This is the hackneyed fallacy, that it is nothing to be reduced to nothingness. Thus a late writer seems to argue that when one is deprived of being, the privation ceases with the existence, for nobody is then deprived. He thinks that if such absurd and contradictory privation is called punishment, all created beings were suffering a punishment, eternal, a parte ante, until their creation. And he concludes: " It is just at this point of confluent absurdities that the theory of Prof. Hudson explodes."
Rev. N. Rounds, D.D., Ladies Repository, May, 1859, pp; 278,279. Compare Professor E. P. Barrows: " We can as well conceive of a man as punished a thousand years before he begins to be, as a thousand years after he has ceased to be," (Bibliotheca Sacra, 1858, p. 653;) and Dr. C. Long: "If no person is punished, there is no punishment," etc. (Ibid. 1860, p. 114. For re p1, see " Christ our Life," p. 149.)
We are often asked, with an air of triumph, if one can punish nothing. " How can nonentity be said to be punished? But we do not say any such thing. It is when something is reduced to nothingness, life to death, that the extinction, privation, and punishment occur. And it is because that which might have lived forever is debarred, and shut up in the darkness of hopeless non-existence, that the punishment is eternal. They who speak on this subject as if nothingness covered the whole ground from first to last, seem to us to be so sharp-sighted that they can see and think of only nothing.
* Now all this would be very good reasoning if a person could with any propriety be called dead a thousand years before he was born. But death is not the mere absence of life: it is the extinction of life. If there had been no creation, there could be no death.
And the argument further mistakes the nature of things because it ignores the possibilities of things. If one is deprived of a possible being or endowment, there is loss. But to talk of the loss of an impossible existence is as absurd as the complaint of a child that its nurse will not give it the sun or the moon. If an eternal past existence had been possible, and we had missed it by any wickedness, then would the loss be real and penal. If we could have been created for both eternities, the past and the future, then to hate wisdom, and to love death, would bring a double eternity of penal privation. Would that be nothing to speak of?
Death, we say, is not mere absence of life, but its extinction. It ever refers to a past life, that has been cut short.
And when death is punishment, it refers to a life that might have continued, but which has ended prematurely, and as a special judgment, a judgment answering to personal and special guilt.
In this view, we must not regard the dead as we would regard that which is and ever has been nothingness. The life which was lived and which might have continued gives to death a character of reality which appears in such a dramatic description as we find in Isa. 14. 4-27, where the dead are pictured as really dead carcasses, and yet as speaking, and as exulting over the ruin of a mighty kingdom, whose princes cannot escape the power of the last enemy. " Sheol from beneath is moved for to meet thee at thy coming;. it stirred up the dead for thee, even all the chief ones of the earth." "Art thou also become weak as we? Art thou become like unto us? Thy pomp is brought clown to the grave, and the noise of thy viols; the worm is spread under thee, and the worms cover thee."
The state of death is dramatized also by the author of Ecclesiasticus, thus: "He that joined himself to harlots will be reckless; rottenness and worms shall inherit him; and he shall be lifted up for a greater example; and his soul shall be taken away out of the number." (Chapter 19. 8.) And in the Septuagint and Vulgate versions of Job 10. 21, 22, where he who was weary of life is made to say: "Before I go and return no more, to a land that is dark and covered with the mist of death; a land of misery and darkness, where is the shadow of death, and no order, but eternal horror dwells."
Here the thoughts of the living about the dead are transferred to them, by a figure of speech; as if their loss of life were as sensible as it is real. And so natural is this mode of speech that one of our most strenuous opponents, Mr. I. P. Warren, confuting the materialist view says: "To what end should the wicked, once annihilated, be thus 'raised' Is it to suffer the penalty of hod's law? But this they have already suffered; they are still suffering." (Sadducees, p. 46.)
And to illustrate, in this view, how literal death may be punishment, we will repeat what we have elsewhere said under the title of
UMBRELLA PUNISHMENT.
A gentleman, telling me that whatever could not feel could not suffer nor be punished, began to brandish his umbrella as if he had ready a knock-down argument, and asked: " Is there any feeling in that? Can you punish it? And how can a man be punished when he has ceased even to exist?"
Very well, sir, said 1. Grant that a nonentity cannot be a subject of punishment, and that your umbrella cannot be punished. But all that does not touch the case in hand. We are not talking about umbrellas, but about men; men created in the image of God, and created to be immortal; their being granted them that they might have it for an eternal blessing. Such are you and I; and we shall be very foolish and very wicked if we do not attain to that.
Now you know that the ancients said a good deal about metamorphoses, — men being changed into brutes and things, and changed back again. What if you, for some guilt of yours, were changed all at once into an umbrella! Would you think that no punishment? Everybody would say, not that the umbrella was punished, but that you were punished in the umbrella, and that, as long as you remained nothing but an umbrella. And I can think of only two ways in which that would not be a punishment. One is this: Without any fault of yours, your life might be a hardship, and likely to be so for always. Then you might choose to be an umbrella to be rid of ceaseless pain. The other is this: You might choose out of the abundance of your good-will, and by the consent of your heavenly Father, just to resign your immortal being in favor of your umbrella. And, to gratify your self-denial, He who is able of the stones to raise up children unto Abraham, might allow you and your dead umbrella to change places for all eternity. So we will suppose the umbrella is exalted and glorified, as one of the sons of God, to shine as the brightness of the firmament, and as the stars forever and ever. What a splendid career! What unspeakable honor and glory for that which was a poor, paltry umbrella, only just one whit better than you and I before we were born. And the umbrella could not be honored alone. You who consented to take its place, with greater love than he Who gave an enemy his plank,
Then turned aside to die, would certainly be taken as a splendid trophy of an umbrella, and preserved in the halls of the eternal mansions as a monument of one who gave his eternal life for a mere thing, not expecting to receive as much again, but only wishing that the dead utensil might have eternal joy.
In these two methods, your umbrella hood might be no punishment, but an honor. But suppose, now, that you were made into an umbrella for some foolish act, as when Esau sold his birthright for a mess of pottage; or for some mean act, sheep-stealing, for instance; or for some splendid crime, conquering a hemisphere just for the glory of it, while a million widows and orphans cursed you for it; — suppose in that way you got to be an umbrella, instead of being a mighty angel, would you think that no punishment? Suppose the saved widows and orphans, or the good neighbor whose sheep you stole, sitting at the marriage supper of the Lamb, were shown the identical umbrella into which you were transmuted, — your very humble self; — how would they laugh you to scorn! And would you take comfort now to think you could not then, feel your shame? Even that last consolation, to know that you were beyond the reach of pain, or care, or shame, — if that be a consolation, — would be denied you.
But, if you would deem it a very poor sort of impunity to be forever a senseless umbrella, the laughing-stock of all immortals who ever knew or heard of you, how much better off would you be in being made into nothing at all? If we may trust the fancy of Milton, did not even Belial think wiser when he said
“For who would lose, Though fall of pain, this intellectual being, These thoughts that wander through eternity, To perish and be swallowed up and lost In the wide womb of uncreated night, Devoid of sense and motion?"
So much for the umbrella. We conclude it is one thing that the skill of man should construct such a thing from suitable materials; that a son of man should be reduced to an umbrella by the judgment of God, would be a very different thing; it might be eternal degradation and punishment.
If someone says that we have supposed an absurd and impossible thing, since a man cannot actually be changed into an umbrella, I might reply that this will not at all affect the validity of the reasoning, or the force of the illustration. Logicians never object to supposed cases that cannot really occur; for they are of use to set one a thinking, and to suggest the real nature of things. But, since men sometimes stumble at such suppositions, we will illustrate from a case that is possible, at least in the power of God.
UNCONSCIOUS PUNISHMENT.
We will suppose, then, that a person falls into a state of suspended animation; that while he is not actually dead, but the vital principle remains, yet he can neither move, nor breathe, nor think, nor feel; that the body does not decay, and the soul is not extinguished; only the person ceases from all vital action. In short, that he exists whole and entire, without at all living.
Now this really happens, in part, when one sleeps soundly and without dreaming, and time passes unnoticed. That is refreshment, recreation, reinvigoration of the powers and faculties. Such repose is followed by more than ordinary wakefulness and enjoyment. When sleep is thus serviceable, it is not lobs, but gain.
But suppose that sleep, that twin brother of death while it lasts, is made a little too much like death; that some magician administers morphine, not enough to kill, and yet enough to prevent one's ever waking again. Suppose that, while no friend suspects it, one thus enters at night upon an eternal sleep. Then, when morning calls, and the sleeper answers not, someone says, " He rests well; give him his time." But the morning lengthens on today, and his time does not come. Then what fears, that dare not be told, seize every heart! You go to his room, and call him tremblingly; you open his door, and look, and call again. His look is that of repose, but he will not speak. You try to rouse him: he is not cold; you do not touch a corpse; but he will not move. He is not dead; he only sleeps like one dead. Day after day passes, and the form neither breathes nor decays. Still. noble to look upon, and too good for worms and the grave, needing no embalmer's art, it is laid away, — not out of sight, nor even out of mind, — a lasting and eternal monument of life not yet gone, and of death not yet come; but the form, too senseless to know of that endless questioning, whether Life or Death shall gain the victory. Some power, divine or diabolic, has stereotyped it beyond all power of man to destroy or quicken, it.
Meanwhile, what sighs, and sobs, and shrieks have been uttered; while those who survive (as we suppose) in endless and conscious life, doubt whether the sleeper will yet live, and ask why he should thus seem to die. Did God not love him well enough to let him wake again? Was God angry with him for some impiety or crime? Or has God forgotten to awaken him from sweet repose, in carelessness, or in perplexity for the million times ten million cares that burden him? Why has this irrevocable calamity come upon one so dear, and who might have lived as long and as nobly as any?
All the answers that are worth a fig for any moral import are reduced to two. If this wakeless slumber was not an accident, and God himself an accident accordingly, then this non decaying repose of the noble form was, 1st, a reward of some good thought or deed. Thus the Egyptians, some think, tried by the art of embalming to bestow the semblance of immortality on those who were thought worthy of eternal life. Or, 2dly, that eternal lethargy was the palsying stroke of an. offended Maker, or it was an ordained natural penalty of guilt; and every tear that is shed for it should be a prayer that we may be saved from the like guilt.
Show me the man who thinks such a doom would not be a most fearful unconscious punishment, who would not look forward to it with shuddering and horror, and I will show you a man who is either not full grown to the proper sentiments of a human being, or who. has outgrown them, and is reprobate. We accept neither character as a standard by which to interpret the dealings or the word of God. He need not immortalize such persons for ceaseless pangs, so that they may forever know that they are punished. If knowledge is a good thing, it is too good to be lavished as a consciousness of pain, and accompanied with a love of evil, in eternal enmity against the All-Good.
Need we say that, if an eternally suspended animation would be an eternal punishment, extinction would be the same? It certainly could not be better; for loss of being cannot be better than unconscious being. It might at least seem worse; for, while even the form of existence remains, there may be a shadow of life; but extinction and annihilation cut off all hope forever. That which has ceased to be, can never be itself again.
3. We now come, in conclusion, to the argument, from the consent of various orthodox writers, that extinction is eternal punishment. They have expressed this sentiment in a great variety of ways, and in almost every age.
We will begin with the younger Edwards, who has stated the matter repeatedly, and with express and clear argument, in his reply to Dr. Chauncy. He says, "It appears that the doctor held that endless annihilation would be no unjust punishment of sin. But endless annihilation is an endless or infinite punishment. It is an endless loss not only of all the good which the man at present enjoys, but of all that good which he would have enjoyed, throughout eternity, in the state of bliss to which he would have been admitted if he had never sinned. This, in an endless duration, would amount to an infinite quantity of good. Annihilation, therefore, is an infinite punishment, both as it is endless, and as the quantity of good lost is infinite; and Dr. C., in allowing that endless annihilation would be no more than a just punishment of sin, allows that sin deserves an infinite punishment, or that it is an infinite evil, though it be the fault of a finite creature, in a finite life, and the effect of finite principles, passions, and appetites. If, therefore, it be a difficulty hard to be solved, that a finite creature, in a finite life, should commit an infinite evil, — meaning a crime which may be justly punished with an endless punishment, — it is a difficulty that equally concerned Dr. C. as myself; and it was absurd for him to object that to others which lay equally in his own way.
Though annihilation may be inflicted in such a manner as to be no punishment, yet, when it is inflicted with the declared design of exhibiting the divine displeasure at sin, it is a far greater punishment than a very great and long temporary misery. That annihilation is an evil, no man will deny who allows that existence and happiness are good. And if it be an evil, it is an evil equal to the good lost by it, taking into view the continuance of that loss; and as this is infinite, final annihilation is an infinite evil; and whenever it is inflicted in testimony of disapprobation of the conduct of the sinner, it is an infinite punishment.
And, meeting the objection that endless suffering is a greater degree of eternal punishment than extinction, he says, " Endless annihilation is equally and as truly an endless punishment as endless torment. Nor is there any ground of objection to the one more than to the other, on account of any difference in duration, or that in which alone the infinite consists. But the ground of objection to endless misery, rather than to endless annihilation, is, that it is a greater, more dreadful, more intolerable punishment, or a greater punishment in degree.
Besides, not every degree of endless pain is a greater evil or punishment than endless annihilation. No man will pretend that any slight pain continued to eternity is so great an evil as endless annihilation, and the endless loss of all enjoyment and existence.
By these arguments, Dr. E. endeavors to indicate the justice of eternal suffering. What degree of eternal suffering is just, he does not tell us. For aught he says, such a doom might be so little worse than extinction that the difference would be finite. Nay, he might agree with the Rabbi who said that a certain class of the wicked suffer forever, and a worse class are annihilated.
We cannot here give all the proofs that the early Christian doctrine was that which we offer. But one or two expressions will show their use of terms. In the "Clementines" we find it said: "They who do not repent shall receive their end by the punishment of fire; . . . punished with eternal fire, they shall after a time be extinguished." (Homily. 3. c. 6.) "By the greatest punishment they shall be utterly extinguished." (Homily. 7. c. 7.) And Arnobius (A.D. 303) says: "Reduced to nothingness, they vanish away in the abortion of an eternal destruction." (Adv. Gentes, 1. 2, c. 15.)
The remark of Dr. Bentley, cited above (p. 10), is warranted by Maimonides, "the eagle of the Jewish doctors," and other rabbis, who say that extermination is the greatest of all punishments. One of these speaks of "perfected punishment, and excision absolute, and perdition and corruption, which is never reversed, and is the greatest of all punishments."
Chrysostom affirms the punishment of loss in the following strong language: "Hell is intolerable; indeed, exceedingly unendurable. Yet, it seems to me more intolerable to have failed of the kingdom," (Ep. ad Phil. cap. 4. Ham. 13.)
Would this father have called the loss of immortality an exemption from punishment?
And Augustine speaks thus: "If any one shall say, would rather not be, than be in misery,' I would reply, You say what is false (mentiris)'" (De Lib. Arbit., 1. 3, c. 6; compare cc. 7, 8.) And Dr. Twisse, the prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly, indorses this sentiment, and cites others as doing so, thus: "Not only according to the Schoolmen, but to Augustine also, even according to the truth itself, it is more desirable to be, though in any pain whatever, than not to be at all." (Vindicke, 1. 2, pars 1, § 5, p. 17.)
The same sentiment appears in the following passage from Isaac Taylor, which we cite here because it resembles some things in Athenagoras, the first Christian assertor, we think, of an absolute and natural immortality in man, whereby he is elevated above the brute. Mr. T. says: " The spiritual life, or the first stage of the life eternal, is a recognition of the immutable law of purity, rectitude, and love, not merely as abstractedly good, but as good to be applied to man, how disastrous soever the consequences of that application to him in his now actual condition. Better were it for him to be condemned by such a law, than to find himself villainously discharged from court on the ground that his nature does not admit of the application of a rule so high. Better that he should be condemned as guilty than vilified as pitiable. Better for man to endure his doom among beings that have fallen, than that he should take his place among the most unfortunate of the mammalia." (Restoration of Belief, pp. 333, 334.)
This agrees with what we have said of the orthodox view as sparing the dignity of man, even in a supposed eternal wickedness. However horrible or execrable the undying guilt of the lost, they seem nobler in it than they would seem, if, "like natural brute beasts," they "utterly perish in their own corruption." But does God lift man above the brute at the expense of a rebel lion which he has no power or right to suppress? Does he thus humble himself before a supposed immortality which he cannot control?
Richard Baxter reaffirms the verdict of Augustine, and says, "I would ask you, do you not know that you and all men must die? and would you not be contented to suffer a terrible degree of misery everlastingly, rather than die? Whatsoever men may say, it is certain they would. Though not to live to us is better than to live in hell, yet men would live in very great misery, rather than not live at all, if they had their choice." (Works, 20. 31; Loud. 1830. See his argument based on this, examined in "Debt and Grace," p. 154.)
Dr. Gordon, on his dying bed, remarked: " So dreadful do I think annihilation, that I would rather live in pain than not live at all." (Hall's Memoir, p. 95.) And almost every reader has heard similar expressions of sentiment, which are rendered classic by the passage above cited from Milton.
Mr. Earbeny, an orthodox translator and annotator of Burnet's work " On the State of the Dead," says: " The doctor pleads hard for annihilation, if this incurable scheme must take place; not considering that annihilation itself is an eternal punishment to a rational creature, and is as incurable as any state he so much regrets," (p. 114.) Daubuz, an able orthodox commentator on the Apocalypse, speaking of the Epicureans, who offered to relieve the case of the drowned souls, debarred from Hades, by denying the immortality of the soul, says: "But the remedy is worse than the disease." (On chapter 20. 12.)
Peter Jurieu, sometimes called " the Goliath of the Protestants," defends eternal woe by asking: "When a criminal is condemned to death, is not that an eternal punishment? Does the judge order him to be resuscitated in the course of a year?" and concludes: "It is, therefore, to mock religion, to allege this seriously as a dogma opposed to the light of reason." (L'Unite de l’Eglise, p. 380.) i.e. eternal torment is just, because eternal extinction is just! So easily, under the common name of eternal punishment, do frail theologians content themselves with an eternal continuance of sin and evil. But the earthly judge does not consign the criminal to that. His sentence is that he become "dead, dead, dead," with some hope and prayer for mercy, on his soul. Death is the punishment, and it is such as long as the life might have lasted.
Isaac Watts, having spoken of extinction as "in some measure commensurate to the infinite evil contained in sin, as it is a loss of all blessings for an infinite duration, that is, forever and ever," inquires: " Who can say whether the word death' might not be fairly construed to extend to the life of the soul, as well as the body, if God the righteous governor should please to seize the forfeiture?" (Ruin and Recovery, q. 9, prop. 5.)
Herman Witsius, whose "Economy of the Covenants" is of unquestioned orthodoxy, says: " I know not if it can be determined whether this eternity ought necessarily to consist in the punishment of sense, or whether the justice of God may be satisfied by the eternal punishment of loss, in the annihilation of the sinful creature." "May it not in a measure be reckoned an infinite punishment, should God please to doom man, who was by nature a candidate for eternity, to total annihilation, from whence he shall never be suffered to return to life? I know God has now determined otherwise, and that with the highest justice. But it is queried, whether, agreeably to his justice, he might not have settled it in this manner: If thou, O man, sins, I will frustrate thy desire of eternal happiness, and of a blessed eternity, and on the contrary give thee up to eternal annihilation. Here, at least, let us hesitate, and suspend our judgment." (Book 1, c. 5, §§ 41, 42.) But can either of two penalties infinitely different, be agreeable to God's justice? Justice is exactness in moral relations. And if eternal death is just, eternal life in misery is unjust.
We conclude in the words of Dr. R. W. Hamilton, one of our most eloquent opponents. He says of those who hold this view: " With them most assuredly rests the charge commonly, and not invidiously or unjustly raised against us, of following sin with eternal ban and loss. What do we more than they? [Here again is the confusion we noted in Jurieu.) They, in the destruction of immortal susceptibilities, write the eternal doom of sin! They, in the deprivation of eternal happiness, show how the sinner is eternally treated and condemned! They mark, in the sudden wreck of immortal hopes and powers, that only an eternal sentence can satisfy! They go further than others; they do not wait; they precipitate the endless award!" (Rewards and Punishments, pp. 114, 445.)
The writer of a late notice of our argument, who would fain reconcile deathless pain with divine love, thinks that our view "neither solves nor cuts the difficulty, because the loss of existence is an evil of more terrible magnitude than even that of perpetual punishment." (The National Magazine, September, 1858, p. 279.) But how can that which is not eternal punishment be worse than eternal punishment? "The loss of existence" is for man the loss of eternal existence — an eternal loss.
It is true that no one would deliberately, and upon the sober, second thought, prefer endless suffering to eternal extinction. Yet such language, often used, has great and real significance. When persons say that they "would rather live in hell than die," or that they "would rather be damned than dead," and with a tone of earnestness that shows they are not merely trying what they can say, we may safely conclude that human nature itself regards the loss of being as real and eternal loss and penalty. And it is only when this nature is deadened by spiritual sloth, or deceived, by a false contrast with deathless penalty, that the human mind can regard extinction as no penalty, or as a welcome relief.
A writer in the American Theological Review, January, 1862, says: —" Eternal death, as the opposite of eternal life, must mean pain rather than non-existence." As much as to say, If the righteous not only live forever, but are also forever happy, then the eternal death of the wicked cannot possibly mean that they will be eternally dead! If the saved were barely to live, then the lost might die, and evil come to an end. But, alas eternal life is to be a blessing; therefore, eternal death must be deathless anguish, —the curse is gone if the death should actually kill I Heaven is to teem with eternal joy; therefore hell must writhe in eternal woe! The law of contrast in language is supposed to imply a universe so divided between God and Satan! Although the phrase " eternal life " names life, rather than happiness, as if the happiness were sure if the life is secured; and although Christ came to "give life," and "to destroy the works of the devil." Shall the masterpieces of Satan's skill, — sin and the pains that grow out of it, — be eternized by such a contrast? Can a figurative sense of the phrase " eternal life," which cannot annul its literal sense, yet destroy the literal sense of the phrase " eternal death "? Are they, who " shall not see life," to be immortalized by the fact that the heirs of life are blessed?
But, we are told, " The only real question is, whether we shall explain an ' everlasting destruction' to be a destruction that lasts forever, or one that lasts but an instant." (Oberlin Evangelist, August 28, 1861.) Precisely so. And when a thing is destroyed utterly, and out of all existence, does it cease to be destroyed? Does it become, on the instant of annihilation, the same as if it were not destroyed at all? Is complete extinction another name for existence?
But the writer, doubtless, means that the process of destruction ceases when it is complete, which is true enough; and we might grant his nice use of words if he did not also seem to deny all result when extinction occurs. "Annihilation," he says "cannot be taking effect forever. It must exhaust its effect in a twinkling, and beyond that be utterly void of effect." (September 25.) And he strives to show that extinction, if called eternal, must be forever taking effect on nothing, which seems to him very absurd.
But will he say that the eternal continuance of the state of annihilation or of non-existence is an absurd expression? Did not the world continue in non-existence from eternity until its creation? Or, will our critic say that the world could not be in non-existence, and that nothing was in that state before creation, puzzling his reader with the double sense that so often attaches to negative terms? Or, to return to his own words, does annihilation effect nothing beyond its own process? Must it " exhaust its effect in a twinkling, and beyond that be utterly void of effect? " Is it suicidal? Does it destroy itself instantly? Is there no eternal result, difference, consequence, or effect, if blank death takes the place of an immortal life which the redeemed sinner might have lived? And when we read that "the redemption of the soul is precious, but it ceases forever," shall we say that no eternal loss or penalty occurs if the soul ceases forever?
The parable of the rich man and Lazarus.
Does it imply eternal future suffering?
THE well-known passage in Luke xvi: 19-31, has been recently cited to sustain the above named doctrine, in such a way as to justify some inquiry into its proper import. The reviewer of an argument on the final extinction of the wicked and the end of evil, ranting that the passage is " a parable, and not real history," and that " the fire in which this rich man is tormented, with the other drapery of the parable, is symbolical," says; — It is conceded, once more, that this man is in Hades, not in Gehenna. The scene is laid before the final judgment, for his five brethren are yet living on earth. We are not certain, however, that our Lord meant to lay any stress on this distinction. It is very possible that he intended simply to represent the awful reverse in the condition of wicked men after death, taken as a whole. But if the distinction between Hades and Gehenna be insisted on, this only makes the representation tenfold more terrible. For the New Testament teaches, beyond the possibility of doubt, that the happiness of the righteous and the misery of the wicked are consummated, not in the intermediate state, but at the resurrection. It is when Christ comes to be glorified in his saints, that he also takes vengeance on them that know not God. If now this rich man, tormented in the flames of Hades, and asking in vain for a drop of water to cool his tongue, is yet waiting with horror for the day of Christ's vengeance, what must be that vengeance! Can it be the everlasting cessation of all suffering by annihilation? To believe such a contradiction is impossible.
The reader is especially requested to notice the fact that in this parable fire is employed, in entire accordance with Jewish usage, as the symbol of torment, not of destruction: ' I am tormented in this flame.' No intimation is given that in this torment there is any approach towards annihilation. On the contrary, his state of misery is regarded as fired: `Between us and you there is a great gulf fixed: so that they which would pass from hence to you, cannot; neither can they pass to us, that would come from thence ' — and there he is left."
Most Christians in this country are so little acquainted with the distinction of Hades from Gehenna, that we are gratified with this clear statement of it by an eminent biblical scholar and teacher. It will be my aim to show that his concessions are warranted by the history of Christian doctrine, are important, and preclude the inference which he himself draws from the passage.
The argument will be, 1st, to show more at large that the passage in question is a parable; 2dly, to state some of the interpretations or applications of it; 3d1y, to inquire what it implies respecting the present and future state of the dead.
1. That it was regarded as a parable by many of the Christian Fathers will be readily inferred from the applications which they made of it. And this opinion was so strong that in some manuscripts it came to be expressly called a parable. A manuscript of the seventh century prefaces it thus: "And be spoke also another parable." Another of the tenth century reads: "The Lord spoke this parable;" and with this agree some copies of the Gospels. The scholiast in a few later manuscripts says: " The scope of the passage respecting the rich man and Lazarus is a parable, and it was spoken parabolically, if indeed the evangelist did not prefix this title to the account." (See Tischendorrs N. T., 1859.)
Among modern writers we may cite as follows:— Lightfoot remarks: " Whoever believes this not to be a parable, but a true story, let him believe also those little friars, whose trade it is to show the monuments at Jerusalem to pilgrims, and point exactly to the place where the house of the rich glutton stood. That it was a parable, not only the consent of all expositors may assure us, but the thing itself speaks it." (Hebrew and Talmud Exercit., in loco).
A similar account is found in the Talmud, which was a body of Jewish tradition. Lightfoot renders it as follows: " There was a good man and a wicked man that died. As for the good man he had no funeral rites solemnized; but the wicked man had. Afterward there was one saw in his dream, the good man walking in gardens, and led by pleasant springs; but the wicked man, with his tongue trickling, drop by drop, at the bank of a river, endeavoring to touch the water, but he could not." (Jerusalem Talmud, in Chagigah, fol. 77, col. 4.) With this compare the following, taken by Hammond from the Babylonian Talmud (ad cod. Berachoth): " A king made a great feast, and invited all the strangers; and there came one poor man, and stood at his gates, and said unto them, Give me one bit or portion; and they considered him not. And he said, My lord, the king, of all the great feast thou hast made, is it hard for thee to give me one bit or fragment, among them?" And the title of this passage there, is, "A parable of a king of flesh and blood." Whitby and others have referred to the last passage.
These extracts are important as showing that there were different versions of the account, and thus incidentally confirming its parabolic character. They also show that it did not originate with Christ, — the Nazarene whom the Jews devoted to the cross; for then they would never have received and incorporated it among their traditions. I infer that Christ found the parable already existing, and made his own use of it.
We conclude this point with the remark of Wakefield: " To them who regard the narration as a reality it must stand as an unanswerable argument for the purgatory of the Papists."
2. What is the interpretation or application of the parable? Whatever the passage may imply respecting the future destiny of the individual soul, it cannot be directly thus applied, for it would then cease to be a parable. As a parable it was designed to teach some other lesson; either of temporal judgment upon persons or nations, or—in a way not literally described — of reverse of earthly fortune after death.
Here I need not insist upon any of the various views that have been offered. In my own opinion there is a reference to the covetousness and pride rebuked in verses 14 and 15, and the parable is an admonition that the rich who now despise the poor will yet be glad of their pity. When this reverse of fortune will happen, — whether on this side of the grave or beyond it, — concerns the implications of the parable, of which hereafter.
But in its application no small range is allowed by the following rule of Moses Stuart: "Allegory differs from parable only in the style and mode of expression. Take an allegory and express it in the historic style, and you convert ft into a parable. Hence the same rules of exegesis apply to both." (Notes to Ernesti's Principles of Interpretation, §160. Mr. S. refers to Beck, Neil, Seiler, Storr, and Lowth.)
Under this rule I may refer to other applications of the passage, if it were only to check the proneness of some minds to confine the parable to a general description of the future state.
Tertullian (A.D. 220) connects the passage with what is said of John the Baptist in verse 16, and of the nature of adultery in verse 18, and makes a special application of it to John and Herod Antipas (Matt. 14. 1-10). The same view is taken by Schleiermacher. Tertullian, however, interprets the drapery of the parable quite literally, though he regards Abraham's bosom and Hades not as final but as intermediate states. (Adv. Marcion. 1. 4, c. 34.)
Another application of the parable is thus stated by Dr. Trench:— It is worthy of notice that besides the literal and obvious, there has also ever been an allegorical interpretation of it, which, though at no time the dominant one in the Church, has frequently made itself heard, and which has been suggested by Augustine, by Gregory the Great, by Theophylact, and by more modern commentators than one. According to this the parable, like so many others exclusively given by St. Luke, sets forth the past and future relations of the Jew and Gentile. Dives is the Jew, or the Jewish nation, clothed in the purple of the king and the fine linen of the priest, the kingdom of priests.' He fares sumptuously, — that is, the Jews are richly provided with all spiritual privileges, not hungering and thirsting after the righteousness of God, but full of their own righteousness; and who, instead of seeking to impart their own blessings to the Gentiles — to the miserable Lazarus that lay covered with sores at their gate—rather glorified themselves by comparison in their exclusive possession of the knowledge and favor of God. To them is announced—that is, to the Pharisees, who might be considered as the representatives of the nation, for in them all that was evil in the Jewish spirit was concentrated — that an end is approaching, nay, has come upon them already: Lazarus and Dives are both to die—the former state of things is to be utterly abolished. Lazarus is to be carried by angels into Abraham's bosom — in other words, the believing Gentiles are to be brought by the messengers of the new covenant into the peace and consolations of the Gospel. But Dives is to be cast into hell,—the Jews are to forfeit all the privileges which they abused, and will find themselves in the most miserable condition, exiles from the presence of God, and with his wrath abiding upon them to the uttermost, so that they shall seek in vain for some, even the slightest, alleviation of their woeful estate. (Notes on the Parables, pp. 369, 370.)
Dr. T. thinks that "if the present had been expressly named a parable, it would tend to confirm this or some similar interpretation; for according to that commonly received it is certainly no parable." This question he does not decide; but, after giving his exposition of the passage in its details, he concludes by repeating the allegorical interpretation more at large. (pp. 386-390.)
Without adopting or condemning any of the more specific applications, we repeat that it plainly teaches a divine providence and judgment. God may allow the bad to prosper, and the good to suffer, even until life is ended. But it shall not be so always. However unequal their lot may be in this life, we may still say of the righteous man, It shall be well with him, and of the wicked, It shall be ill with him. Yet, in such an application of the parable, we need no more press the literal sense than we would assert the literal truth of the descriptions in Dante's Divina Commedia, or in Milton's Paradise Lost. For parables are poetic; and the truth of poetry consists in its accordance with just sentiment and principle, not in its detail of incidents.
We now pass from the practical to the doctrinal question.
3. What does the parable imply respecting the present and future state of the dead? That it implies something, is manifest; for such a parable could not have been made if there were no future state. If all men's hopes and fears were buried in the grave, and if death were the end of all things, there would have been no material out of which to create such a description for any application whatever. We therefore freely say that the parable, whatever it may or may not teach, assumes and implies a judgment, or some kind of retribution, after death.
But what judgment? Here we meet the obvious and acknowledged fact that the rich man is said to be not in Gehenna, but in Hades. Hence the parable does not indicate the final condition of man, nor declare the final judgment. The statement that " a great gulf is fixed " fairly implies, indeed, that the case of the rich man is hopeless; but as it cannot imply the perpetuity of Hades,—for that is elsewhere expressly said to be destroyed,—it cannot teach the final condition, nor the immortality, of any occupant of Hades.
Unfortunately the distinction between Hades and Gehenna is not made in our English translation. But the words are very different in their origin and use. The latter is derived from the "valley of the son of Hinnom," near Jerusalem; an execrated place, whither carcasses were carried, to be consumed by worms or by fires which were almost constantly fed. Hence the expression in Isa. 66. 24, respecting " the carcasses of the men that have transgressed" against the Lord; for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorring unto all flesh.
Here note that the same reasoning which deduces the immortality of the lost from Mark 9. 43-48, will also prove the immortality of "carcasses" from the passage in Isaiah. But the scriptural use of the term " unquenched " indicates a complete destruction of that upon which the fire is said to act. (See 2 Kings 22. 17; Ps. 118. 12; Isa. 1. 28, 31; Jer. 4. 4; 17. 27; Ezek. 20. 47, 48; Amos 5. 6; Matt. 3. 12; Luke 3. 17.)
The term Gehenna was used by the Jews, apparently to denote the final destiny of the lost. It occurs in Matt. 5. 22, 29, 30; 10. 28; 18. 9; 23. 15, 33; Mark 9. 43, 45, 47; Luke 12. 5; James 3. 6;— in books of the New Testament which would fall most directly into hands of Jewish readers. It is not used by Paul, Peter, or John. Two or three expressions seem to be equivalent, viz: " furnace of fire," (Matt. 13. 42, 50); " lake of fire," (Rev. 20. 10, 14, 15.) The connected expression in Matthew, "there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth," will hardly prove a continuous life in Gehenna; it may be explained by the passage in Ps. call. 10: " The wicked shall see, and shall be grieved; he shall gnash with his teeth, and melt away; the desire of the wicked shall perish." The connected expression in Rev. 20. 10, " shall be tormented, day and night, forever and ever," should be compared with the previous verse; and it should be remembered that "the Beast and the False Prophet" are not persons but systems, and that the whole book is of a highly symbolical character. That the fire of Gehenna is a symbol not of mere torment, but of destruction, might be inferred from a manifold use of the term fire in the Scriptures, and from other Jewish writings. Thus the Targumist on Gen. 3. 24 speaks of Gehenna as "burning up the wicked," and on Eccl. 8. 10: "They have gone to be consumed in Gehenna." Hence it avails nothing for their immortality, if the "flame" of Hades does not destroy them. He who is " a consuming fire " may frown more fiercely beyond the judgment— He who says of the contrite: "I will not contend forever; neither will I be always wroth; for the spirit should fail before me, and the souls which I have made." (Isa. 57. 16).
That Gehenna does not destroy is sometimes inferred from the different manner in which two evangelists report a question of the evil spirits: "Art thou come to destroy us?" (Mark 1. 24;) and, "Art thou come to torment us before the time? " (Matt. 8. 29.) But the argument proves nothing; for the first question may equally mean: " Art thou come to destroy us before the time?" Just as a prisoner awaiting execution may inquire of the officer: " Have you come to lead me to the gallows" 1.e. before the time. (See also Eccl. 7. 16, 17.)
The other word, Hades, is used much more frequently, and in a more extended sense. It constantly occurs in the Septuagint as the Greek equivalent of the Hebrew Sheol. And Sheol appears as the common receptacle of the dead, without respect to character. The term is commonly rendered "
but very improperly, as may appear by a few examples. Thus we read in Ps. 16. 10, quoted in Acts 2. 27: " Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell " (Sheol). In Ps. 139. 8 " If I make my bed in hell (Sheol), thou art there." In Amos 9. 2: "Though they dig into hell (Sheol), thence shall mine hand take them." In Jonah 2. 2: " Out of the belly of hell (Sheol) cried I, and thou heard my voice." To avoid this incongruity our translators have sometimes employed another word thus in Gen. 37. 35: " I will go down to the grave (Sheol) unto my son mourning; " and chapter 42. 38: " Then shall ye bring my gray hairs with sorrow to the grave " (Sheol). Compare 1 Sam. 2. 6; Job 14. 13; 17.13; Ps. 6. 5; 30. 3; Eccl. 9. 10; Isa. 38. 18; Hos. 13. 14, cited in 1 Cor. 15. 55.
The general sense of Sheol is manifest from these passages. It means the state of death, or the abode of the dead. It is more than the grave, to which some would confine it; yet it is not the place of future punishment, though in a very few instances it is apparently synonymous with " death " as denoting punishment. Thus " the wicked shall be turned (back) into hell (Sheol), and all the nations that forget God " (Ps. 9. 17); "Let death seize upon them; and let them go down quick into hell " (Sheol, Ps. 55. 15).
The term Hades occurs in the N. T. in Math 11. 23; 16. 18; Luke 10. 15; 16. 23; Acts 2. 17, 31; 1 Cor. 15. 55; Rev. 1. 18; 6. 8; 20. 13, 14. In every instance except the passage in hand, the sense obviously agrees with that of Sheol in the O. T. It is equivalent to the term Death, that last enemy which is to be destroyed. The " gates of Hades " (Math 16. 18) are the powers of Death; and they shall not prevail against the church of Christ. lie has overcome and conquered, has taught the song of triumph over death (1 Cor. 15. 55), and the keys of Death and Hades are the symbol of his victory.
The distinction between Hades and Gehenna is observed in the early Syriac and Arabic versions, in most if not all the Latin translations, in the Geneva French, that of Diodati, the Spanish, and others. In the German of Luther the distinction is not observed. This reformer was led by doctrinal reasons to render Hades and Gehenna by the same word Hale, though this gives the Restorationist the advantage in 1 Cor. 15. 55: " O hell! where is thy victory? " Luther found the notion of Hades as an intermediate state perverted into the doctrine of Purgatory, and in opposing this he took away in his translation the material proof of the intermediate state itself, though he elsewhere confessed the doctrine. The effect is well stated by Stilling:
They [the reformers] extinguished the flames of Purgatory, and enlarged the bounds of Hell by adding Hades to it. No middle state or place was any longer believed in, but every departed soul entered immediately upon its place of destination, either heaven or hell. They carried this point too far. It was wrong to make a Purgatory of Hades; but it was also going too far to do it away together with Purgatory." (Pneumatology, pp. 10, 11.)
The distinction between Hades and Gehenna is ably shown by Dr. Campbell, in his Dissertations on the Gospels (Diss. 6., Part 2.). He would have the former term transferred to our Bible, and the latter translated as it now is. Besides many others, Dr. Trench has also stated the distinction, thus: "'Abraham's bosom' is not heaven, though it will issue in heaven; so neither is Hades ' hell,' though to issue in it, when death and Hades shall be cast into the lake of fire, which is the proper hell (Rev. 20. 14)." (Notes on the Parables, p. 379.)
Passing from the verbal distinction to the doctrine of Hades, we remark that the present passage is the only one which seems to imply that it is a special place or state of punishment for the wicked. The rich man is there, and "in torments," as if that were "his own place;" while Lazarus is carried to Abraham's bosom as if that were his proper home. And this would be the just inference if the Scriptures told us nothing else of Hades. Even as it is, some have thought that the Gentile doctrine of Tartarus and Elysium, as different departments of Hades, had given a special coloring to this narrative; and this is probable. But to say more than this, — that Abraham's bosom is heaven and that Hades is Gehenna, — would be wholly without warrant, opposed both to the current use of language, and to the opinions of Jews and early Christians. The Jews, regarding the resurrection as still future, did not conceive of the patriarchs as yet living. The God of the living was their God because they were to live, and thus Christ proved the expected resurrection. See Luke 20. 37, 38, and Acts 2. 29-34. "Thou shalt be rewarded at the resurrection of the just," said Christ (Luke 14. 14), in a passage not unlike our parable. The punishment of the wicked begins no sooner. And the early Christians *very uniformly regarded Hades as a state of " detention " for all souls, excepting martyrs as perhaps worthy to enter heaven at once.
How, then, shall we explain the drapery which in Luke 16 is thrown around the intermediate state, making it so much like a world of retribution? I think there is an easy solution of this difficulty, without regard to the question of consciousness or unconsciousness in the disembodied soul. It is simply this The final judgment is anticipated. This anticipation may be either actual, in the expectant thoughts and feelings of the rich man and Lazarus; or it may be dramatic, transferred to the dead from the thoughts of the living.
The former view is supported by Dr. Trench, who says: "To be in Abraham's bosom was equivalent with them {the Jews] to being ' in the garden of Eden,' or ' under the throne of glory,' they being gathered into the general receptacle of happy but waiting souls. (See Wisdom 3. 1-3.) The expression already existing among them received, here the sanction and seal of Christ, and has come thus to be accepted by the Church, which has understood by it in like manner the state of painless expectation, of blissful repose, which should intervene between the death of the faithful in Christ Jesus, and their perfect consummation and bliss at his coming in his glorious kingdom. It is the ' Paradise ' of Luke 23. 43, the place of souls under the altar (Rev. 6. 9); it is, as some distinguish it, blessedness, but not glory." (Pp. 376, 377.) He adds in a note: " Lim-broch (Theol. Christ., L 6, c. 10, § 8) has a striking passage, in which, starting from the Scriptural phrase of death as a sleep, he compares the intermediate state of the good to a sweet and joyful dream, while the wicked are as men afflicted with horrible and frightful dreams, each being to waken on the reality of the things of which he has been dreaming; in this agreeing with Tertullian, who calls that state a foretaste of the judgment.
In support of the other view, — that the "torment" in Hades is a dramatic anticipation of the judgment, the thoughts of the living being transferred to the dead,—the passage above referred to might be cited, Wisdom 3. 1-4: " But the souls of the just are in the hand of God, and torment may not touch them. In the sight of the unwise they seemed to die, and their exit was reckoned a calamity, and their departure from us utter destruction. But they are in peace; for though in the sight of men they are punished, their hope is full of immortality." Here the question seems to be debated whether the righteous have hope in their death, or become extinct. The latter is the opinion of " the unwise." Yet the supposed extinction is spoken of as a "punishment," and even as a continuous "torment" The same lively conception of utter death as most horrible appears in the Septuagint and Vulgate versions of Job 10.21, 22: " Before I go hence and return no more, to a land that is dark and covered with the mist of death; a land of misery and darkness, where is the shadow of death, and no order, but eternal horror dwells." And this notion of death as evil and gloomy, even without respect to future suffering, nay, even in the hope of a resurrection, gave rise to a proverbial expression among the Jews. Thus David speaks of the " sorrows of death," the " sorrows of Hades," the " snares of death," and the "pains of Hades " (Ps. 18. 4, 5; 116. 3; 2 Sam. 22. 6). And Peter, speaking of the resurrection of Christ, says: " Whom God hath raised up, having loosed the pains of death, because it was not possible that he should be holden of it" (Acts 2. 24). On which Lightfoot remarks: " By the pains of death we are not to understand so much the torments and pangs in the last moments of death, as those bands which followed, viz: the continued separation of soul and body, the putrefaction and corruption of the body in the grave." This view of Christ as subjecting himself to the power of death found expression in the Apostles' Creed: " He descended into Hades;" where the mistake of Hades for Hell has given rise to the notion that Christ actually suffered before his resurrection " the torments of the damned."
It is thought by some that the cry of the souls of those slain for the word of God, under the altar (Rev. 6. 9), may be explained dramatically, as the blood of Abel was said to cry from the ground for the vengeance of his murder. This view at least relieves the difficulty of supposing that the martyrs feel the impatience and unhappiness which might' be indicated in verse 10.
But if Hades may be thus represented as a state of suffering, even for the heirs of life, how much more for the heirs of death! And this, either with or without reference to future actual suffering. Thus in Ezek. 32. 24, 25, 30, the enemies of Israel are spoken of as " enduring shame," while they are described as " slain," " fallen by the sword," " gone down to Sheol," or to " the pit," and in their graves. And the word "shame" is rendered in the Septuagint by " torment." And in Isa. 14. 4-27, we have a picture of the occupants of Sheol as living and speaking, to welcome the fallen Babylon, along with various designations of Sheol as the home of the dead. " Sheol from beneath is moved for thee to meet thee at thy coming; it stirred up the dead for thee, even all the chief ones of the earth; it bath raised up from their thrones all the kings of the nations. All they shall speak and say unto thee, Art thou also become weak as we? Art thou become like unto us? Thy pomp is brought down to the grave, and the noise of thy viols; the worm is spread under thee, and the worms cover thee." " Thou shalt be brought down to Sheol, to the sides of the pit. They that see thee shall narrowly look upon thee, and consider thee, saying, Is this the man that made the earth to tremble, that did shake kingdoms?" " All the kings of the nations, even all of them, lie in glory, everyone in his own house [or sepulcher, buried with honor]. But thou art cast out of thy grave like an abominable branch, and as the raiment of those that are slain, thrust through with a sword, that go down to the stones of the pit; as a carcass trodden under foot."
Even in this picture there is no anticipation of future torment. There is no reference to a future and a divine judgment, but only a dramatic judgment of the dead, before a tribunal of dead ones. And there would be no strain upon the language if we should interpret the parable of the rich man and Lazarus by the same dramatic method. The moral lesson which it was designed to convey, whether of personal warning or of a judgment upon the Jewish nation, would lose none of its force. In any case the picture of a final acceptance of the meek and lowly, and a final rejection of the luxurious, the selfish, and the proud, remains, and retains all its high and instructive colors.
But if anyone thinks that the anticipation of judgment is more than dramatic, that here is an account of real thoughts and feelings, joy and anguish, before the resurrection, we are willing, for argument's sake, to admit this. Of the disembodied soul the Scriptures say very little. The chasm between death and the resurrection must indeed be bridged over by some principle of personal identity, so that in the future life we may still be our own selves, and not new beings. Yet the Scriptures reveal the chasm, and the brink beyond it, more than the connecting bridge. While I shall not affirm the absolute unconsciousness of the dead, I cannot, on the other hand, discover any proof of high happiness, or of extreme suffering, enjoyed or endured for five or six thousand years before the judgment. This view is specially unwarrantable if we refer the account in Matt. 25. to the final judgment; where those judged appear uncertain whether they shall be accepted or rejected.
Yet I will admit, for argument's sake, that there is active life in Hades. I thus admit it, because I would fain examine each link of the chain by which the doctrine of eternal woe is thought to be connected with the parable. If I have shown that the premise — the supposed activity of the intermediate state — is untenable, I wish also to show that the conclusion commonly derived would not follow from it.
For we have only to suppose that the rich man feels in Hades what the reprobate often feel in this life, — gnawing remorse, and "a fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries" (Heb. 10. 27), and his terror and torment will be amply accounted for. To say that the distinction between Hades and Gehenna " only makes the representation ten-fold more terrible," and to infer that final annihilation brings an incredible contradiction, —seems to me inconsiderate. By such reasoning I could show that capital punishment is not fatal because its pain and agony and shame give disquieting and tormenting anticipations. But capital punishment is fearful even without respect to the divine judgment which lies beyond it. Many a convict has committed suicide in prison, to avoid the disgrace of judicial execution. Such an one might say, consistently with the argument we examine, that the pain of dying ends in painlessness, and he has nothing more to fear. Yet the horror of such a death frightens him into suicide, and hurries him with the guilt of a fresh crime before the final Judge.
· But really the argument in hand overlooks the agony in which the being of the soul may expire. The writer thinks of annihilation as of falling into sleep; he ignores the woes which may culminate in the second death. For as physical death is complex, — dying and being dead, — so we may presume that annihilation is complex, — the process, and the eternal night, the " blackness of darkness forever," in which the process ends. This result, even without the dire process, is so appalling that many say they would prefer eternal pain.
For who would lose, Though full of pain, this intellectual being.
And, — if we must account for the pangs of Hades, — aside from the anticipated woes of expiration, we might speak of the woes of retrospect; — the harvest past, the summer ended, the soul unsaved; one's good things all enjoyed, and a poor and despised fellow creature now comforted with immortal hopes. How suitable to such a case the reflection of the Psalmist: " He shall gnash with his teeth, and melt away; the desire of the wicked shall perish!"
One expression of the writer we have cited is specially worthy of notice. He says the rich man's "state of misery is represented as fixed: ' Between us and you there is a great gulf fixed: so that they which would pass from hence to you, cannot; neither can they pass to us, that would come from thence '— and there he is left."
The writer here forgets, for the moment, his own distinction between Hades and Gehenna. " Death and Hades are cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death. And whosoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into the lake of fire." When it is shown that the rich man survives the agonies of this second death, and long subsists in an element best adumbrated by a "lake of fire," then the immortality of "them that perish" may be argued. But until then we must respect those early Jewish expressions of which here is an example: "They shall die the second death, and shall not live in the world to come, saith the Lord."
But there is another argument for such immortality, based on the justice and revealed fact of degrees in future punishment. There are, it is said, inequalities of misery during the intermediate state,—those who died earliest suffering longest, — and there are no degrees in annihilation. Hence future misery cannot end in annihilation.
For arguments sake we admit the alleged differences of suffering before the judgment. But the conclusion will not follow. For, as already remarked, annihilation is complex; and in the process of the second death that divine justice which awards "many stripes" and " few stripes" "according to the things done in the body," and which will never inflict or allow an undeserved stroke of penalty, may find as many degrees of suffering as there are degrees of human guilt. By a law of nature the inebriate and the profligate often die hard, suffering special pangs for special contempt of the laws of life and health. By analogous retributions of remorse and shame the guiltier soul may die with heavier woes.
But if it is said, again, that flix thousand years and a very few hours of misery in Hades are too unequal to be balanced by any natural law of death in Gehenna, the inference of eternal woe is not justified even then. We cannot infer the infinite from the vast. Even if immense differences of punishment should accrue, that does not prove that there is no limit of just suffering, or that God cannot easily observe such limit in the suffering that remains. Justice is equity, — exactness in moral relations; and the justice of the Infinite One is infinite equity and exactness. And He who counts the hairs of every head, and with whom a day and a thousand years are equally regarded, may note the expiring sentence of each culprit with scrupulous exactness, if need be, forgetting him into nothingness when a human judge would have forgotten him altogether. If degrees of suffering are at all worth looking after when the loss of an infinite boon has been incurred, we need not fear that the wisdom of the Eternal will be perplexed in such matters. And it is specially futile to suppose that inequalities of temporary suffering are to be corrected by differences of eternal anguish. It may seem convenient to leap from a supposed immensity, to infinity; but those who reason thus only rush from apparent finite difficulties — which can be no difficulties at all with God — into a confessedly appalling doctrine of endless and infinite guilt, suffering, and evil, as a dire necessity from which Omnipotence may not escape I The reader will remember that we do not admit as fact several thousand years of suffering before the judgment, for the sins of life;— we simply wish to try the argument for eternal woe. But if any one shall still say, Six thousand years is so long! and if a single soul lives and suffers during that period, why not forever?— we will ask the astronomer to enlarge our conceptions a little, and let any one say how much the argument is worth.
To find the distance of an object that cannot be reached, we move a certain distance to the right or left, and observe the difference in the direction of the object. The desired distance is then found by a simple calculation. And the difference or change in the direction of the object is called a parallax.
Now most of the visible stars are so distant that when the earth has moved nearly 200,000,000 miles, they still appear in precisely the same direction. The nicest observations detect no change, or parallax. Yet all these stars are comparatively very near to us. If they were the smallest assignable fraction of an infinite distance away from us, they would be beyond the reach of vision, out of sight ten thousand times over. And if we supposed them then to remain visible, the base line of 200,000,000 miles, which now gives us no parallax, might be multiplied by all the numbers in the world, and we should be without a parallax still.
Passing from the overwhelming computations of unfathomable space to the estimates of our future duration, we find offered to us, so to speak, a base line of 6000 years from which to gain a parallax of the lost soul's immortality; or rather, to show that there can be no parallax, no change, no shadow of wasting or decay, though the stranded soul is beaten by eternal waves of punishment, the famished soul fed only by the fires of hellish passion so much fiercer and hotter than those of Hades, —yet that there is no swooning or sinking into death so long as God's own Eternity holds out!
He would be a poor astronomer who should regard a thousand times six thousand miles as of any account in computing the stellar distances; — much more, if he should infer, because he then found no parallax, that the stars are at an infinite distance. And if modesty becomes us in the reckoning of dead and empty spaces, how much more does it become us in reasoning out living years and centuries and eternal ages of joy, or of supposed agony! We can commend the rare modesty of Watts, who was staggered at the thought even of a good man's immortality; and yet more, at the thought of a deathless guilt. He says: "Nor do I think we ought usually, when we speak concerning creatures, to affirm positively that their existence shall be equal to that of the blessed God—especially with regard to the duration of their punishment." (World to Come, Discourse 13. § 2.)
The "discourse concerning hades."
Not written by Josephus.
A so-called " Extract out of Josephus's Discourse to the Greeks concerning Hades" is found in Whiston's translation of that writer in the religious libraries of so many families, and is so often taken as a genuine work of Josephus, and as truly stating Jewish opinions, — which Christ by his silence is supposed to have sanctioned,— that we may very properly here give some facts in the case.
The internal evidence alone would show, past all intelligent doubt, that this " Discourse " was never written by Josephus. It indicates great familiarity with the books of the New Testament, which Josephus was little likely to know, and still less likely to quote. Whiston himself notes about forty passages in it as savoring of the phraseology of the Gospels and Epistles. But these were not all even written in Josephus's time; and those which were extant were circulated mostly in a private way among the Christians, who were still a very despised sect. Even the writings of the so-called Apostolical Fathers, who lived nearly a generation later than Josephus, do not quote the New Testament books so frequently as they appear in this " Discourse." That Mr. Whiston should infer the authorship by Josephus from this feature of the document, accords well with the fact that he stands almost wholly alone in his opinion. No respectable modern scholar agrees with him. One writer remarks that " Whiston does not say where he found the original," and says: "Judged from internal evidence, it appears to be partly or wholly a pseudo-Jewish document, forged in the name of Josephus by some Christian, and a portion of it was intended to countenance the interpolation concerning Christ now extant in the works of Josephus." (Huidekoper Christ's Mission to the Underworld, p. 169.)
A more probable opinion, however, takes it as not a forgery, but as written for another purpose, by Hippolytus, Bishop of the Harbor of Rome, about A. D. 225. It is published as his by Fabricius, Gallandius, Hearne, Wordsworth, and Bunsen. It is apparently part of the lost work, "Against the Greeks and against Plato," or, "Of the Universe," as it is also named on the statue of Hippolytus preserved in the Vatican. Wordsworth remarks: " We find much resemblance, both of thought and language, between it and the latter part of the recently discovered Treatise on Heresy. They mutually illustrate each other." There are also found " other resemblances" and proofs of the authorship by Hippolytus. But in the confusion on the subject in the ninth century someone ascribed it to Josephus, and this is a main point in Whiston's argument. Bunsen, alluding to this opinion of "some wiseacre of the Byzantine age," by which even Photius was misled, says: " Poor Hippolytus A patriarch of New Rome, in the ninth century, the most learned man of his age, has become so hardened in his formularies, that he takes a work of yours for that of a Jew, who, he thinks, did honor to the philosophy of his nation; and then he wonders how, with all that, you could speak almost of Christ as if you were a Christian!" (Hippolytus and his Age, 1. 401, 402.) Yet Photius has his misgivings, and " finds that in the marginal notes the author is called Caius, the Roman Presbyter " (a contemporary of Hippolytus); which opinion, though held by a few persons, cannot be sustained.
But some will say, if Hippolytus, a Christian bishop, whom Wordsworth styles " one of the greatest Doctors of Antiquity," wrote this piece, is it not even a stronger argument for eternal misery than if it had come from Josephus? We reply that it hardly represents the opinion of the age to which it belong; and Irenaeus, of whom Hippolytus was a disciple, seems plainly to state the doctrine of immortality as a gift of grace. (Adv. Her., 1. 2, c. 34, §§ 2-4; cited in Debt and Grace, p. 301.) Bunsen thinks that the writer simply " opposed to Plato's myth, in the Gorgias, something of the same nature," and says: " I have no doubt that Hippolytus did not give his description of Hades as a revelation, but as a Christian picture." (P. 402.) " He evidently intends, in this piece of rhetorical description, to emulate the celebrated myth, which in the Gorgias we find placed in the mouth of Socrates, respecting the judgment and the state of the soul after death. Nor do I think that it ever entered the mind of Hippolytus to attribute any authority to his rhapsody. But in process of time some of his phrases got into the liturgies of both churches, and were then canonized by those who canonized liturgies and rubrics. Hippolytus dreamt of no such thing, for the Gentile tales he substituted a Christian tale, founded on some symbolical expressions in the parables and the Apocalypse, or on certain phrases in some apocryphal work, availing himself also, judiciously, of a beautiful line in Pindar or in Plato. Why should he not do so? Was it his fault that later dark ages misunderstood such innocent poetry?" (Pp. 450, 451.) Hippolytus, in a similar passage, speaks of the righteous as attaining an " immortal body, together with an imperishable soul," and as "being born again immortal."
But we have not yet done with Josephus. His genuine writings doubtless describe the Pharisees as holding eternal torments. To the argument hence derived for the truth of that doctrine we have replied at large, among other reasons impeaching
THE RELIABILITY OF JOSEPHUS.
This we have found disputed by Harmer, Pocock, Moyle, Matthaei, Bretschneider, a writer in Kitto's Journal, Charlotte Elizabeth, and Prof Norton. To the bare remark of a reviewer that the authority of Josephus " is unimpeachable, our author has been able to allege nothing valid against it" (Bibliotheca Sacra, 1858, p. 638), we have replied by simply adding the testimony of Kauffer and of Dr. Kitto. (Christ our Life, p. 154.) And we have since remarked that " the half-score are supported by Usher and a dozen others, cited by Fabricius (Bibliotheca Graeca, 1. 4, c. 8.) " — (Reviewers Reviewed, p. 6.)
See Debt and Grace, pp. 216-226, 335-341. The statement of Tacitus, which we opposed to that of Josephus, is worth repeating here. He tells us that among the Jews " infanticide is a crime, and the souls of those dying in battle or by torture are eternal; hence a love of offspring, and contempt of death." Upon which one of his editors remarks the fact that "certain Jews have supposed that the souls of the ungodly are utterly cut off, and perish like the brutes; to which, perhaps, Tacitus alludes." (Ruperti, note on the Hist., 1.5, c. 5.) And the learned Selden adduces the same passage in his account of the Hebrew legislation, where he gives a full account of the same doctrine.
We have since met the following statement of Bishop Hampden, which is in place here, though he makes the doctrine he names more prevalent among the Jews than we should. He says: "The Jews then entertained a philosophical belief of a future state, founded on the doctrine of man's natural immortality. Our Lord tacitly reproves an assurance on such grounds by his strong reference to himself, I am the resurrection and the life; whosoever believeth in me shall live though he die.' " (Bampton Lectures, p. 310.)
Let us hear what some of these, and some others, have said.
Usher remarks: It is not to be disguised that, having promised to derive his materials from the sacred records of the Hebrews, without diminution or addition, he has done this with little fidelity. With the same design with which the Jesuit, Jerome Xavier, lately gave an interpolated gospel history to the Persians, he likewise gave his account of transactions recorded in the Old Testament," etc. Bayle "had long been indignant with Josephus, and with those who have spared him in this matter." Fabriciut himself, though he thinks one of the critics too severe, and remarks that " Josephus very well understood that nothing is more necessary in a historian than a love of truth," yet says: "If any one will carefully compare his 'Antiquities' with the Sacred Writings, he will find that he has often used great liberty, or been guilty of intolerable negligence."
Prideaux, in his "Connexion," refers to Josephus only to correct his corruptions, "mistakes," and "blunders." Another writer, who thinks "his credibility as a historian is in general raised above all doubt," says: " The few instances, where he evidently or apparently colors the truth, or gives not the whole truth, which he must have known, betray, nearly always, a national or personal apologetic interest." (H. Paret, Herzog's Cyclopedia, Art. Josephus.) In this "national interest" Warburton explains the fact that Josephus says not a word of the golden calf. "This solution," he says, "clears up all his difficulties, and shows the historian's great consistency, as Well as artful address, throughout the whole work." He cites the censures of Bishop Hare; admits that the license taken by Josephus was "surely to be condemned," though more excusable than is generally supposed; gives two instances of gross departure from the Scriptures, and exclaims, " And now was not that a wise project [of Whiston] which proposed reforming the sacred text by the writings of Josephus?" (Divine Legation, b. 5, §4.) In a note he cites a passage in the tract against Apion and says: " This was carrying his complaisance to the Gentiles extremely far. But the necessity was pressing; and he misses no opportunity of conciliating their good-will." Mosheim remarks that " Josephus, as is well known, attempted to show that there was less difference between the religion of the Jews and those of other nations, than. people generally supposed; in which he very frequently exceeds all bounds." (Notes to Cudworth, Vol. H. p. 182, Harrison's ed. Compare p. 303; and p. 650, where Mosheim remarks that Josephus attributes to the Pharisees the doctrine of transmigration.)
Neander, indeed, ever mild in his judgment of persons, says: "Although Josephus was himself a Pharisee, yet we have no reason to suspect what he says of the Sadducees, for he constantly shows himself impartial in his judgments." (Church History, 1. 42, Torrey's translation.) "But Josephus wrote," says Abarbanel, "placed in the hands of his masters, under their eyes, and trembling under their law." And a late writer, in an elaborate treatise on the subject, says of the apologetic labors of Josephus " The conception of the whole is so strong, so well sustained, and so homogeneous, that one must admire the structure and the cohesion. It is a masterpiece of finesse; never was the truth falsified with a skill more resolute, more subtle, and more deceptive." Among the " contradictions," however, be remarks a different account of the Pharisees in Antiq. b. 17. c. 2, § 1, from that given in b. 18. c. 1, § 3. He concludes: "Josephus, a man of versatile talent and great sagacity, might have been a great historian if he had been an honest man." (Chasles, Etudes sur les premiers temps du Christianisme, pp. 1-73; Paris, 1847.)
If this may seem a severe and partial judgment, let us hear the frank concessions of Dr. Traill, the translator of the " Wars," who, in his essay " On the Personal Character and Credibility of Josephus," maintains the general historic value of his writings. He says: — At the present moment, no well-informed writer, taking the religious side of the argument, would think of defending the Jewish historian, or of vouching for his affirmations, in the manner which was once deemed to be incumbent upon the champions of Belief. (P.1.)
In deciding to call himself a Pharisee, he manifestly reserved to himself the liberty of being such only to the extent that might be necessary to secure his objects in making the profession. A Pharisee, indeed, was Josephus but his Pharisaic, we may conjecture, was not much deeper than the thickness of his phylactery I (Pp. 6, 7.)
But, then, on the other hand, if it were attempted to make good, on behalf of our author, a claim to implicit reliance upon his simple testimony, — such a reliance as is placed upon the non sustained evidence of writers whole integrity has never been called in question, — we must plainly declare our disinclination to yield this sort of deference to Josephus. Taking himself as our guide and authority, we are compelled to deny him the respect which attaches to high principles of conduct, to lofty moral courage —to the temper and the determination which may prompt self-sacrifice and a generous devotion to the welfare of a party, a class, a people. The virtue of Josephus was of a more vulgar stamp; his integrity was the integrity of calculation, of discretion, and of intelligence. r (P. 20.)
Thus is our original number of witnesses against the reliability of Josephus quadrupled. We submit that something more than assertion is needed to render him serviceable to the prevailing doctrine of future punishment.
And may we not be amazed that so momentous a question should have been so much referred to a testimony, so indirect at the best, and which itself requires so rigid a cross-examination? Can any eternity of evil begin to be proven thus? If God shall bestow immortal life upon those who love him, he is not bound to reveal it beforehand; for the infinite boon and the promise of it must be alike gratuities, undeserved favors. A gospel of unsearchable riches, of divine love that passes knowledge, precisely because it is, as it were, too good to be true," and may stagger the faith of men, may be long withholden and no wrong be done. All free gifts and rich blessings lie beyond the sphere of justice. But if God is to inflict, or to allow, an infinite evil of eternal anguish, justice comes in to require a warning as clear and distinct as the danger is immense. If the alarum were daily thundered from the heavens, in the mother tongue of every human being, the terrible admonition would be only suitable to the inconceivable peril. And are we left to remote writings, of uncertain authors, for laborious proofs of an impending calamity fearful past all computation?
The inspired Apostle offers no argument to prove the penalty of sin which he alleges, but names it as something well understood by the heathen themselves. He closes the dark catalogue of their crimes by speaking of them as "knowing' that they who do such things are worthy of death." Are not the Law and the Gospel distinctly told in those all-important words, " The wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord? "
The rights of wrong; or, is evil eternal?
IN a recent conversation on the subject of future punishment, we heard something like the following dialogue:—
A. Can justice require the endless suffering of the lost?
B. But an end of their sufferings is just what the wicked would desire; and God is not bound to gratify them, as he would by annihilating them.
A. What would gratify them proves nothing either way. The question is, What do they deserve? They have at least one valid claim, — a claim to justice.
B. They have no rights whatever.
A. What! not even to strict justice?
B. They are wholly undeserving; they have forfeited all rights.
A. Then they have no right to live forever!
We think the last inference was fair, at least as showing that B.'s particular theory of " infinite justice" was suicidal. He could no longer claim that the lost should exist forever in order that they may suffer forever; for by his own showing they have no right to existence.
But we may not condemn the prevalent doctrine of eternal punishment for the weak arguments of B., or of any other man. We will therefore state the common view, and reason upon it independently.
The wicked are supposed to suffer forever. That eternal woe is either something which they may claim in their own right, or, if they " have no rights," it is demanded by some dread nature of things. Either God has no power to destroy the wicked; or his wisdom forbids it, lest worse evils should follow in the wake of their annihilation; or he has no right to let them perish.
1. his power to destroy them is sometimes denied, as in a late assertion that " annihilation is impossible; " though the expression was perhaps not designed to be strictly taken. It is also sometimes said that the soul is divine, and a part of God; but this statement will not be pressed, as it would evidently prove too much. The common argument from the soul's immaterial and uncompounded nature would also prove the immortality of the brutes, as seems to be admitted by Bishop Butler, and is remarked by considerate writers. Hence it is better to say with Jeremy Taylor: " Whatsoever had a beginning may also have an ending; and it shall die, unless it be daily watered from the streams flowing from the fountain of life, and refreshed with the dew of heaven, and the wells of God. Immortality was not in Adam's nature, but in the hands and parts, in the favor and superadditions of God." At least we should not, as many do, infer the immortality of the lost from the words of Christ in Matt. 10. 28.
2. If it would be unwise for God to destroy the wicked, it must be for some such reason as this, — that their eternal sufferings are needed, either as an example, to restrain other beings from sin and death; or as a means of impressing the glorified saints with the greatness of their salvation, and thus of increasing their blessedness; or as an instructive display of the holiness of God in his " infinite justice."
But the first of these suppositions implies that God could never, to all eternity, raise up and discipline in holiness the beings who should ever love and enjoy him, without a coeternal woe in myriads of the lost. The second implies great and eternal imperfection in those who are saved; viz., that they do not love God and goodness heartily enough for their own sakes or for their proper bliss; perhaps not enough to save them from plunging into annihilation if they might die. The third implies that God's " infinite justice " binds him to the eternal existence of those 'who rebel against him. And this is the third case first supposed.
3. If God has no right to destroy the wicked, then, whatever rights they may have or may not have, wickedness has claims obviously implied, and which we propose seriously to consider.
We shall not stop long to show that an eternal suffering of the lost would imply an eternity of wickedness and of evil. Even if the lost should not actually sin forever, — adding ceaselessly to the number of their transgressions, — still they are supposed to remain forever guilty and wicked. If they never change for the worse, neither do they change for the better. In their immortality wickedness appears as forever actual. And if wickedness is an evil in itself. the eternal wickedness is an eternal evil.
Nor will it be any less really an evil because forever punished, or eternally overruled for good. The punishment would be — or would be thought — an expression of God's hatred of the evil; and the good supposed to accrue would be strictly by an overruling of the wickedness, and not its legitimate fruit. Like begets like, and evil naturally produces only evil.
Hence it appears to us that the immortal misery of the lost, making evil coeternal with God, implies very important rights and claims on the side of evil. If these rights do not inhere in the persons of the lost, they are the rights of wickedness itself. If the former have forfeited all claims whatsoever, the latter retains an inalienable right — if not to liberty and happiness, at least to life in bondage, and the pursuit of misery.
How such an eternal opposition to the justice and holiness of God should be consistent with his justice and even required by it, many theories have been advanced. We shall not examine those theories here. We only remark that the justice of God should never be called " infinite " with respect to any single or finite fact; for the very idea of justice implies a limit. Justice is exactness in moral relations. It regards that which is right and equal. If divine justice is " infinite," it is such simply for the infinite range and the endless round of its applications, and in no other way.
And to the common objection — the argumentum ad invidiam — that an end of suffering would please the lost (which proves nothing either way), we may further reply that an end of wickedness and woe is just the thing which would not please Satan. Nothing could be more to his wish than that sin which God abhors, and pain which he pities, should run parallel with the eternity in which he dwells. And though Satan should suffer with the lost, he would be no less pleased with the company of their misery. Is God bound to gratify him? And this question is equally pertinent whether we regard Satan as a single person, or as the "aggregate of evil spirits," or as a personification only of the power of evil. The rights of wickedness would be the same in either case.
Now we assert, against all theories of immortal woe, that WICKEDNESS HAS NO RIGHTS. It has none because it is essentially and eternally wrong. It is just the thing in all the universe which ought not to be. It has, therefore, at the outset, no right to exist. And of course, where it starts into existence, it has no shadow of right but to come to an end; if not by reformation, then by execution and extirpation. It can come into being only by fraudulent or violent intrusion. It is an outlaw that knows no rule, and has no proper place in all the world. It has no right of possession anywhere. Its only possible pretense of right is at best a " squatter's claim." It can assert no such right by any title that is known or customary in the world. It has never created, nor inherited, nor received by grant or purchase, nor obtained by first discovery, nor gained by occupancy undisturbed, nor has it earned by honest labor, nor won in manly trial of strength or skill, a single cubic inch of space for a home in all the universe of God. Nor is there any supreme Law of Nations that should give it a right of conquest in any realm of the King of kings. It begins only as rebellion, and has only a rebel's right either of citizenship or of residence. It lives only as revolt from God; and " what world shall receive any of those who run away from him?" Nor is its right of sufferance any better than its right of possession. Because it is only evil and wrong, it has no " city of refuge " anywhere. There is no sacred altar to which it can cling, no inviolate temple to which it may flee for safety. It has no right of sanctuary or asylum or retreat, to save its life, in all the dominions of God. Neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor under the earth, can it find just or permitted hospitality or protection. Though it gain admittance in the thoughts and hearts of men, — nay, a second and a seven-fold admittance in a house empty, swept, and garnished, — it has gained no right even there. And if it would seek a resting-place in the supposed " world of woe," even at the gates of Pandemonium it must become a suppliant to the divine mercy for admission. It does not change its hateful nature by crossing the threshold of the " abodes of eternal despair;" for grim despair must drive it even thence. Because its nature is wickedness, He who forbids and abhors it wholly, abhors and forbids it there.
Nor has it the right of a fugitive and vagabond life, to roam homeless forever, seeking rest and finding none; that would be a right of existence which it has not. Its only right is " beyond the bounds of time and space" in the strict sense of the phrase; a doom which in fact is commonly assigned to it by the theology of men's hearts and sentiments, truer than that of the schools and systems. For when divines are asked where is the eternal abode of Satan and the lost, they commonly, do not know where, which is practically not far from nowhere.
And here again is the theology of men's feelings truer than their reasonings. The thought of eternal evil is as painful to good men as the fact must be hateful to God. Hence good men think little about it; it enters little or not at all into their schemes of future blessedness. They give it no place in their expected hallelujah. It is out of their thoughts, and thus practically out of the world—the same as if it were not. They simply regard the wicked as finally lost and gone, as we think the Scriptures also regard them.
Such was the true scope and import of the anathema that lies on the pages of the Bible. It was a devotement to death. Of the Hebrew chereth or excision there were various degrees, of which the last and uttermost could only be fatal to the being of him that suffered it. Such an one was ".an abomination, to be detested and removed from the sight of God 'and men." From the sight of men, for evil is painful to the moral sense; all good angels and all good men and other creatures in all the realms of God, do join with one harmonious voice in that prayer of David: " Oh, let the wickedness of the wicked come to an end!" And it can vanish from the sight of God only by dying out from the fair universe of which he is the Creator and Sovereign Lord.
But here it is objected that sin and wickedness hateful and abominable though they be — do actually exist; and hence our argument proves too much; for, if valid, it would as much prove that evil cannot exist at all, as that it will not be eternal; for evil is intrinsically as wrong and detestable for a moment as it would be existing forever. And so the argument proves nothing.
Dr. T. M. Post, New Englander, Feb. 1866, p. 148; —Dr, 1. Strong, Methodist Quarterly, July, 1868, p. 417; — Prof. B. P. Barrows, Bibliotheca Sacra, July, 1858. p. 629; —Prof. A. Hovey, The impenitent Dead, pp. 146, 146. Dr. Whately states the same difficulty in his " Scripture Revelations of a Future State," chapter 8. But here, as throughout the book,—which is a series of checks to dogmatism, — the design of his argument is negative and not positive. It is commonly inferred from the whole chapter that he holds immortality of the good alone.
The objection seems to us only plausible. We think the common sense and instinct of mankind finds a real difference between evil temporary, and evil eternal; between evil doomed, and evil spared; between evil under sentence of death, and evil in immortal life; between evil transient, and evil abiding forever; between evil unsettled, fugitive, fleeting, and evil fixed, enduring, permanent; between evil frail and vanishing, and evil indestructible, irreducible; between evil casual — incidental to the trial of new-created beings, and evil constant — ever inseparable from a perfected and matured system. To deny the difference between these seems to us like arguing that the unsightly poles and scaffolding used in erecting a building may never be removed, because if they are endurable a week they are endurable forever; or that they who languish with disease should remain immortally sick if they do not get well. And all the differing features of temporary and eternal evil betoken to us a difference not in their amount only, but in their relations, and power, and kind.
But if common sense should not at once discover this difference, crying out that nuisances must be seasonably abated, and restrained wrath yet cease from all God's fair domain, some things further may be said. An ancient wit tells us of a scholastic, who, having a house he wished to sell, carried about a brick as a sample and advertisement of it. Now he doubtless selected such a brick as would speak well for the house, — one that would appear and endure well. But our divines seem not so wise as that. If the scheme of God's eternity is to be represented by some specimen Moment of duration, the fairest one of all would fain be chosen. Instead of that we are offered the first that comes, — the nearest at hand, — the poor and transient Now. The model Instant is taken out from the history of a fallen, rebel world, with rebellious angels for wicked and wretched company. The world of- men quite young, and that of the fallen spirits not very old. And there is something too, in the history, about a song of the morning stars, and sons of God shouting for joy, and all things being made very good, — as if there might have been no evil once. Yet from the present evil age the minute is selected to mirror forth the eternal future; here, and in this part of the universe, the brick is chosen that shall represent the plan of the eternal realm. A very poor brick: taken from the feet of a certain image, — iron mixed with potter's clay; — misshapen, bearing the footprints of a wild beast that has sunk in to mar and destroy; such a brick as common builders will not use, nor have, but throw away. Such are the pattern moments shown us in this world half recovered from a sad ruin; and we are told that the Great Architect may have such, and use them, and show them, in his grand and glorious Cosmos, forever!
But this is not all. The objection that our argument against the eternity of evil proves too much may be retorted. If the argument from a specimen Moment avails to show that evil forever may exist, it equally proves sin may forever have existed. For, a moment in the past eternity is intrinsically no different from a moment in the future eternity; and if the moment Now is a sample of all the other moments in the world, it follows that evil has existed eternally. The instant in which it did not exist cannot be claimed by our divines. Their logic cannot save from its contamination a fleeting second of the unbeginning past. It not only will live as long as God does, but it is already as old as he is. Hence it never began to exist, but is self-existent, un-created, unoriginated, divine. Here we have a plain doctrine of two coeternal principles, and may as well at once confess ourselves Manicheans in full bloom, — if this method of gauging Eternity by its bits and fragments is sound reasoning.
But if we grant that what has begun to be may cease from being, then, ere we stamp aught with the signet of eternity, we must look beyond the bare fact of its existence to the nature and reasons of it; we must discover in it the qualities that fit it for endless duration. We do not know that sin or evil has one such quality. Nay, it is a very common saying among philosophers, ancient and modern, that evil is privation and negation, akin to nothingness, and the like. Thus the Father of Orthodoxy: " Evil things are not entities; but good things are entities, since they are of God who truly is." If, then, God chooses that evil should exist forever, or if he lacks the power or the right to bring it to an end, or to let it die, the proof of its sad eternity must be a plain declaration from God himself that such is his free choice or his dire necessity. The doctrine finds the slenderest support in human reason. Let us see if the Revelation unveils and declares it.
We cannot in this brief tract give even an outline of the scriptural proof that wicked beings are not immortal. But a few striking features of the argument may suffice to call attention to the subject.
The most obvious fact, in a cursory reading of the Scriptures, is the entire absence of all mention of the immortality of the soul as such of mankind as a race, or of the wicked as a class. " The doctrine of ' the immortality of the soul' and the name are alike unknown to the entire Bible." (Olshausen, Comm. on 1 Cor. 15. 19, 20.) And because the doctrine is not mentioned or spoken of, those who hold the prevalent view must suppose one of three things: either that the immortality in question is assumed or taken for granted as too clear to need express mention, or that it is implied and easily made out from the revealed rewards and punishments, or that the eternal existence of the lost is unworthy of the name of immortality.
1. Is the immortality in question assumed? In support of this view it is often urged as a parallel case that the divine existence is assumed without being expressly asserted. Very true; but there is this difference in the cases: the existence of God, while assumed as too clear for doubt, is named, spoken of, alluded to, and otherwise explicitly assumed, in many hundreds of scriptural expressions. But the immortality in question, if assumed, is never at all alluded to, but is treated with utter and profound silence. This difference cannot be explained by supposing the immortality of man so much clearer than the divine existence; for the former has been far more doubted by mankind than the latter. Nor is the difference due to the higher importance of the doctrine of God's existence; for though the being of a God is of more account to the universe than the immortality of man, yet to man himself it is not more important. And the Bible is given not to the universe at large, but as a special revelation to mankind, to instruct them in their duties and their destinies; — given to bring life and immortality to light.
2. The immortality of the lost is not implied in the Scriptures. The Hebrew phrase, "living soul" (Gen. 2. 7), is ap plied also to the brutes (Gen. 1. 30). The creation in the divine image may include the notion of man as designed for immortality, but then the immortality is lost with the divine likeness, and regained only with it (Eph. 4. 24; Col. 3. 10). And the Scriptures in their general tenor expressly promise to the righteous " life," " eternal " or " everlasting life," " life forevermore," " length of days forever and ever, " immortality," "in-corruption," and that they shall " live," " live forever," and be " incorruptible." On the other hand the destiny of the lost is called " death," " second death," " destruction," " everlasting destruction," " perdition," " corruption; " and they are said to " die," " surely die," to be " destroyed," " destroyed forever," to " perish," " utterly perish," to be " consumed," " burned, " devoured," " cut off," to be " as nothing," and " put away as dross." These expressions are employed in about five hundred and fifty instances in the Bible, with apparent reference to the final destinies of men as good or bad. Some of the examples in the Old Testament may indeed be claimed as referring to temporal deliverances and destructions; but even these may be fairly taken as containing a principle, or as stating in a general way the proper retribution of the classes named. To the Hebrews such a general application of them would be most natural. And in this way almost every doubtful passage has been taken as a text for a discourse on the final judgment of mankind.
Now it is a rule admitted by all interpreters that, prima fade, the true sense of an expression is the literal sense; 1.e., the common, ordinary, usual, obvious sense, which first strikes the mind of the reader. This sense may of course be overruled; for the whole meaning of the Bible does not lie on its surface; the book contains more than meets the eye in a casual reading. Still the rule bolds good, that the common sense of words is overruled only by special considerations, which appear in the context or in the general structure of the book.
But the doctrine of the immortality of the lost gives to all these five hundred expressions a metaphorical sense. The ordinary and indigenous sense is thrust out, to make room for an extraordinary and exotic sense; and " life " and " death," and all their kindred words, are taken to mean, not conscious existence and its opposite, but happiness and misery. And our Christian literature and modes of thought are so accustomed to this metaphor, that we are sometimes told it is of course the true interpretation, and can hardly admit of an opposing argument.
But this " of course " flies in the face of the universal rule giving the literal sense a first choice. And what season is offered for the metaphorical sense, in so many hundred phrases, comprising the general tenor of the Revelation itself, and involving the question of immortal woe and eternal evil? What reason for an "of course " so infinitely dreadful? If in one single instance the soul or mankind or the lost were called im-mortal, then so much of logical and fair reason for the procedure would be apparent. But no such reason is given. By a single writer, who betrays the force of the difficulty, a solitary passage is offered as asserting of all mankind that they " cannot die any more" (Luke 20. 36); but his interpretation finds few if any supporters. Yet other reasons are more commonly offered. There are about twenty passages in which the punishment of the lost, under various names, is called eternal. But here the slightest attention will discover a remarkable fact: that, with a single apparent exception, the punishment of the lost is never called eternal misery. When it is called suffering, it is not said to be eternal; and when it is called eternal, it is not said to be suffering. These two fearful words, which have had continual wedlock in our modern religious dialect,— as if such rights of wrong had been established from of old, — are carefully and sedulously divorced in the language of the Scriptures. The apparent exception is a single instance, and this claims brief attention.
The passage is found in Rev. 20. 10: " The devil that deceived them was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and false prophet are; and they shall be tormented day and night forever and ever." This is the first passage appealed to by a late writer, beginning his direct scriptural argument for the common view. Other passages are often adduced to show that the death threatened to Adam was not literal; but this is the first and only one that can be even offered as portraying immortal woe.
Here several facts are obvious to remark:-
1. The picture is placed at the end of the revelation of the just judgment of God, whereas, if it be a ruling text, it would seem most in place at the beginning of the sacred volume. This supposed unveiling of undying woe is found not in the first year of man's history, but in the Year of the World 4068; about 140 generations after the first man was put on trial for immortality with the express condition that if he ate of a certain forbidden fruit he should surely die. If then, when, in the childhood of the race, the plainest instruction was needed, —" line upon line and precept upon precept," — if then it had been said, " If thou eats thou shalt surely not die—thou shalt be tormented day and night forever and ever," from such an adamantine bolt, driven with a divine and omnipotent emphasis, the received chain of argument might be safely suspended. The reverberating thunders of such a sentence might have secured an "orthodox" interpretation of every subsequent allusion to man's destiny. We might then have been sure, when we read of " death " and of " destruction," and of " perishing," and so on, that these expressions were not to be taken in their common sense, but as intimating "torment day and night forever and ever." But such plain warning of a twice infinite danger — deathless pain added to the loss of endless joy — was deferred for more than four millenniums, and given at length, not in the hearing of all human ears, but to one in visions on the isle of Patmos.
The highest crime which history records against Caligula is that he pretended to publish his laws by posting them on pillars so high that none could read them, and then punished his subjects for not obeying them. No man believes that the faithful and just God has done any such thing; but, as we would shun the very appearance of evil, we should have some care lest our interpretations of his word suggest a procedure which would be infinitely worse.
2. The only plain and unequivocal announcement of endless woe should be found in a book of unquestionably canonical character. The adamantine bolt should be planted in a rock that can be riven or shaken by no honest criticism. But the Apocalypse is the very book whose place in the canon has been most disputed, and that by orthodox divines. It was not read in the early Syrian Churches. Its canonicity was denied by Dionysius of Alexandria, Cyril of Jerusalem, and other Fathers, and was generally doubted in the Greek Church. It was decidedly questioned by Erasmus, Luther, Carlstadt, and Zwingli, and, lately, by Bleek, Lucke, De Wette, Neander, and others. These opposing suffrages do not and cannot destroy the book — as it cannot be either destroyed or established by mere authority. We find the proofs of its inspiration in its marked contrast with other Apocalyptic books of the time; in the chastened glory of its imagery, and in the comfort and support to faith it has yielded in times of persecution and fiery trial. Yet the interpretation of it requires caution and modesty, lest the remark of Calvin, who professed not to understand it, should get some shadow of truth: "It either finds a man mad, or it makes him such." Such a censure of these who overworked the book in one direction may check the confidence of these who press it with rigor in another direction; who find in its " second death," its blotting from the " book of life," and its barring from the " tree of life," no bar against immortal woe; who, having abandoned the literal and prima facie true sense in more than five hundred instances, at one late passage insist that such a sense is to be taken without question lest we be found tampering with God's word.
But if the literal sense is to be overruled in any case, there is, a priori, as good reason for doing this once, and against the claims of eternal evil, as for doing it five hundred times, in favor of those claims. We think it is not rationalistic, but rational, to say as much as this. And in this view the wards of Paul in Rom. 9. 20, sometimes cited in this argument, might be retorted, with an emphasis. Our hermeneutics should not readily decide the claims of a final and universal holiness and blessedness— "against God."
3. On the meaning of the passage in question we should add that the same strictness which would prove the endless misery of " Satan, the Beast, and the False Prophet," would prove from the context the literal destruction of another host. " Fire came down from God out of heaven and devoured them." But the highly dramatic character of the book forbids exegetical rigor. In a dramatic view there is some reason — supported by other passages of Scripture — for supposing that the " torment " is not literal but figurative, describing the utter and total extinction of the powers named. Aside from this, the " lake of fire and brimstone " is by some taken as a symbol of earthly calamities, to which these powers shall be subject "day and night forever and ever." Better than this would be the view that takes the last phrase — " forever and ever "— in the sense of " during the existence of the thing," — the Latin perpetual;— a sense in which it doubtless occurs in the Scriptures.
We have spoken of other arguments to show that the terms " life " and " death " are used in a metaphorical sense in the Scriptures. The passages most frequently adduced are Matt. 8. 22; Eph. 2. 1, 5, and Col. 2. 13 (" Dead in trespasses and sins "); 1 Tim. 5. 6. To these may be added Rom. 6. 11; 8. 10; Heb. 6.1; 9. 14; James 2. 17, 20, 26; Rev. 3. 1 If a moral or spiritual death is intended in these passages, then, it is claimed, the sentence in Gen. 2. 17, may not imply the death of the soul. The argument is of course negative. It cannot directly or positively show the immortality of the lost for it would be absurd to deduce immortal life out from the dregs of spiritual death; though we find one instance in which this is done, by Augustine (In Job. Evangel. Tract., c. xlvii. § 8).
· To this negative argument there are three replies: 1. We are inclined to deny that " spiritual death " is the proper or primary import of these passages. There is another interpretation; viz., that " dead in trespasses and sins " signifies, subject to death by reason of trespasses and sins. The reference is to a future death, incurred by sin; and this may be death of body, or soul, or both. The figure is that of prolepsis, or the anticipation of the future as already present. This figure is undoubtedly of frequent occurrence in the Scriptures, and we have found it applied in various early versions and by various commentators, to the sentence in Gen. 2. 17. And the same exegesis is given by many others, in the most important of the other passages.
2. Granting the sense of " spiritual death " in the other passages, it would still remain to be shown that the term death a/-ways has that sense; or that it has that sense in all the passages relating to man's final destiny; or that it never indicates or implies a literal death of the soul.
3. Granting the metaphorical sense, we may yet claim that instead of being sundered from the literal sense, it still hovers round it as being derived from it. We have an illustration familiar to all. It is often said of the drunkard that he has " destroyed " himself. Do we infer that because he cannot be more than destroyed, and is not dead yet, therefore he will live forever and never sink to a drunkard's grave? Just the opposite. And the reason is that the term " destroy," though used in a slightly metaphorical or proleptic sense, still anchors in the original and literal sense. The drunkard will die because he has destroyed himself. So " spiritual death " may very aptly — as the penumbra of a total eclipse — foreshadow and atmosphere an eternal death that leaves no trace of life nor gleam of hope.
The other phrases supposed to imply the immortality of the lost, such as " their worm dies not," etc., " unquenchable fire," "everlasting punishment," cannot here be considered. We need only remark that the latter phrase is put in contrast with " life eternal," and for that reason the implication of immortal life is unnatural. And orthodox writers concede that extinction would be eternal punishment. The common argument from the other phrases would prove far too much, as the immortality of carcasses (Isa. 66. 24), of tares, chaff, and felled trees, and even the eternal woe of Christian martyrs, who, as Eusebius says, were burned at the stake in "an unquenchable fire."
The parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, if taken literally, describes only the intermediate state, and proves nothing beyond the judgment. " 'Abraham's bosom' is not heaven, though it will issue in heaven; so neither ' Hades' is hell, though it will issue in it, when death and Hades shall be cast into the lake of fire, which is the proper hell" [and the second death. Rev. 20. 14; cf. Matt. 10. 28]. (Trench, On the Parables.)
3. We named one other argument of those who hold the common view; viz., that the eternal existence of the lost is unworthy of the name of immortality, and therefore they are not called immortal. Very true; but this reasoning may go further than it was intended. The Bible is peculiarly apt to call things by their right names. Now "eternal conscious existence" is the right name for eternal conscious existence. But the Scriptures never assert, even that of the wicked; and those who use the phrase, as some carefully do, are inconsistent by their own showing; they travel out of the record, and are "wise above that which is written." If these good people — and Christians generally — would adhere more closely to the words which are " profitable for correction," this sad controversy about immortal woe and eternal evil would soon come to an end.
It hardly needs to be said that, while we deny the eternity of evil, we affirm its actual temporary existence, and its guilt on the part of man. We are not deists or pantheists, that we should exculpate man by calling his sin only relative and apparent. We affirm also that there is a true and valid doctrine of the " wrath of God;" — a displeasure against every evil work, which will destroy along with sin all those who love and cherish it. And over against this only right of guilt we find a proper Gospel of grace: " God so loved the world that be gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him might not perish, but have everlasting life."
We may suggest, in conclusion, that the doctrine of undying evil has a practical bearing. If God, the Lord of the Universe, cannot avoid an eternal continuance of evil, then poor, weak man, in his petty relations to the world, may think it no sin to allow some things not the best. " Necessity knows no law;" and the higher necessity may lend its sanction to the lower. Individuals and communities may tolerate peccadilloes and social mischiefs because worse things shall ever be; which would be thrust away by a prevalent feeling that EVIL HAS NO RIGHTS, and will in due time be swept away from the whole realm of God.
Postscript.
THE following passage in Dr. Mansell's " Limits of Religions Thought" has been largely republished by the religious press, and seems to require some notice:— It is urged that sin cannot forever be triumphant against God. As if the whole mystery of iniquity were contained in the words forever! The real riddle of existence—the problem which confounds all philosophy, aye, and all religion, too, so far as religion is a thing of man's reason—is the fact that evil exists at all; not that it exists for a longer or a shorter duration. Is not God infinitely wise and holy and powerful now? and does not sin exist along with that infinite holiness and wisdom and power? Is God to become more holy, more wise, more powerful hereafter; and must evil be annihilated to make room for His perfections to expand? Does the infinity of His eternal nature ebb and flow with every increase or diminution in the sum of human guilt and misery? Against this immovable barrier of the existence of evil the waves of philosophy have dashed themselves unceasingly since the birthday of human thought, and have retired broken and powerless, without displacing the minutest fragment of the stubborn rock, without softening one feature of its dark and ragged surface.
It is worthy of remark that Dr. M. had just spoken of "arbitrary and summary decisions of human reason on the most mysterious as well as the most awful of God's revealed judgments against sin,—the sentence of Eternal Punishment." He also says it is " assumed " by objectors, that God's punishment of sin in the world to come " will take place as a special infliction, not as a natural consequence;" and that it "will be inflicted solely with reference to the sins committed during the earthly life; — that the guilt will continue finite, while the misery is prolonged to infinity."
These preliminary statements seemed to us, in several points, inaccurate. Many defenders of the doctrine have regarded eternal suffering as a divine infliction, and some still so regard it. Again, the eternal suffering has been regarded, until recently, as deserved by an "infinite guilt" contracted in this life; and the objection has been, that infinite guilt within this life is impossible. Again, when orthodox writers have attempted to justify eternal pain on the supposition of eternal sinning, the objector has urged that there can be, in all reason, no eternal sinning. Moreover, that theory of unceasing misery hardly escapee the objection raised against inflicted punishment. For, since no created being is self-existent, it must still be supposed that God forever holds the sinner in being, and thus conserves him ever, as it were, on the rack. If God does not scourge the recreant with his right hand, he still appears as grasping him by the left hand, while the process of anguish goes on unceasingly. It cannot be maintained that God merely allows the sinner to reap the fruit of his own doings, leaving him forever alone. For, when the Creator shall let any creature utterly and finally alone, the anathema is fatal. None can live without God.
It may be suggested, then, that "the arbitrary and summary decisions of human reason" are possibly on the side of the "most mysterious and awful judgment;" the more properly, since the author "assumes" to speak of an " immortal soul" which the revelation never calls immortal. The revealed word also calls the final punishment an "everlasting destruction," and speaks of the judgment as manifestly just, never as mysterious.
Our author appears inaccurate, also, in the larger extract we have cited for examination. Who says that "the whole mystery of iniquity is contained in the words forever"? Deists and rationalists, for whose benefit he speaks, do indeed most earnestly protest against that doctrine which he calls " most mysterious." But very many of these persons regard moral evil as a stage of natural development, and thus deny that sin " exists at all." On the other hand, orthodox divines usually aver that sin is an unnatural and perverse action of free will, and that all sin, however temporary, is a pr- er mystery. Hence the argument of Dr. M. seems to us both inadequate and irrelevant: he has admitted the notion of eternal woe to be "most mysterious " and "awful," and thus apparently not on the same footing with temporary evil; and his principal objectors deny the chief element in the mystery to which he makes his appeal.
This inadvertence is explained by that which is the main argument of Dr. M.'s book,—his large use of the mysteries in nature and revelation, reducing the exercise of reason, be thinks, within certain rigid limits. Every new or grand mystery he can show, adds to the force of this main argument. Thus it is for his interest to add the dire tenet of immortal woe to the cloud of his witnesses. He brings this doctrine upon the stand, not simply because he regards it as true, but that its overwhelming mystery may check the rash presumption of man's knowingness, which he would fain rebuke. Therefore does he tell us that, if we admit the existence of temporary evil, we cannot disprove its eternal continuance.
The interested nature of his argument makes his inadvertent concession the more important. And the authority of his name and great ability is, in this matter, more than balanced by that of several writers who have held the eternity of future suffering, but have expressly admitted that it is the special difficulty of the received theology. Thus a learned reviewer of the controversy between Peter Bayle, who offered the Manichean hypothesis, and his opponents, said: "No one can deny that the very great difficulties which press the doctrine of the origin of evil and its reconciliation with the justice and goodness of God, could be more easily overcome if an end of hell-punishments is supposed, and not their eternity." (Buddeus, Inst. Theol. Dogma, L 2, c. 3, § 17.) And Dr. Muller closes his elaborate work on "The Christian Doctrine of Sin" by saying: "A purely theoretic solution of the problem of the world would be possible if the evil were not;—the evil which does not resolve itself as a passing moment in the process of the development of the world, but is capable of being maintained, by the will of the creature persistently hardening itself, through endless ages." (The reader will observe that the burdensome doctrine is here stated in the precise form in which Dr. Mansel thinks it most mild and rational.) And to the question, " Shall Eternity be begloomed with sin forever unconquered, unconquerable? " — Dr. Young replies: "The thought is unutterably affecting. Far, far without — not beyond the range of celestial vision, but not obtruding upon it—there may be s dim and dark and mysterious phantasm; the only speck in a universe of light, and too remote withal to cast upon it even the faintest shadow." (The Mystery, p. 335.) Thus would an orthodox writer put the supposed infinite evil so far out of the way, and so nearly out of the world, that it should be reduced to a finite thing, even a "speck." (Shall Heaven be poorer if the mote disappears?)
For its inaccuracies, and by these and other authorities, the plea of Dr. M. might be ruled out of court. But we have not yet done with this attempt at reasoning from the finite to the infinite. We think it ought to hold as well in respect to physical evil and mystery as to moral. Let us see what it might prove.
A gentleman once attempted to analyze the venom of the rattlesnake, but without success. His most powerful reagents produced no effect upon it; and its nature remained to him a profound secret.
The authority of Dr. Whately, who employs a similar argument, may here be alleged. But Dr. W. avoids the inaccuracies we have pointed out, and shows in the same treatise that he does not hold the eternity of future suffering. We have examined the point he makes in " Debt and Grace," pp. 147-161
Let us suppose that this were a chemical mystery, never to be solved by the reason or advancing knowledge of man. Poison, then, is a mystery—perhaps in more senses than one. Most of the reasons against the eternity of poison might be urged to show that it should not and does not exist at all. For, its nature is a mystery, without respect to its quantity. It is such examined by the grain—a ton of it is no more so. Insoluble when 'diffused through the space of a cubic inch, it is no more so if spread over a continent. Inscrutable in the days or years of time, it is no more so in the cycles of eternity. Hence, if there is to be an eternal world of moral evil, not infringing upon God's sovereignty nor encroaching upon his holy kingdom, so there may be a corresponding thesaurus of venom, forever undissolved, stored in long rows of colossal demijohns, tier upon tier; vessels of adamant that shall ever restrain the virus from breaking forth in mischief, yet all eternally conserved — for a display of the terrible import of that dark mystery, Poison, or for whatever other reason may be supposed.
Why not? —since venom is confessedly a gentler form of evil than sin. Nay, even if the poison were allowed to course through the veins of living creatures, causing deathless yet guiltless pangs, that were better than eternal hate and rebellion against the All Good.
Rather, who does not say that the more crying evil of sin is the very reason why it of all things should not be eternal? Precisely because it is a very special mystery, and perchance the only absolute mystery, it should come to an end. God knows the frame and constitution of all created things; but sin, perhaps, even he does not understand, and therefore he cannot speak for the sinner when he shall stand speechless. Sin is pure monstrosity, rising out of lawlessness, and therefore knowing no principle of action or of continuance, but speedily dashing and destroying its subject against the laws of being which are eternal. When a frail creature, born of yesterday, chooses to act madly and wildly, that is no reason why he should have power to do so forever, but just the contrary. But the usual mode of arguing from "the evil of sin " seems to make its enormity a reason for its perpetuity; — as if it were too evil to come to an end.
The remaining argument of Dr. M. would prove, we think, a great deal too much. " Is God," he asks, " to become more holy, more wise, more powerful hereafter; and must evil be annihilated to make room for His perfections to expand? " By such reasoning we might show that God needs never to have done anything, but might be as Brahma —eternally quiescent. Was He not all holy, and wise, and mighty, from the beginning? Why, then, should Chaos and old Night give way to light and order? Must God find room for His perfections to expand? Why should He visit the earth with a deluge, and purge it of abounding wickedness? Was the remaining Universe not wide enough for display of His glory? Why should He hear the cry of the children of Israel, and " triumph gloriously " over their oppressors? Must the Eternal Sovereign achieve a victory? Why appoint a day of final judgment, and a "restitution of all things "? Why not stereotype the Universe at any instant of its progress, and tell His creatures that His divine perfections require no advance of the world,—in whatever condition they are, they must adore Him and be content?
But the Father "worketh hitherto," and rests never until he can pronounce all things very good. Nay, just because his are active perfections, progress is the law of all his intelligent creation. Hence it is simply consistent in theologians to say that hell itself comes to no stand-still, but its guilt and woe are ever augmenting. But the eternal progress of woe which God pities, and of guilt which he abhors, would be an advancing triumph over him. In order to this, some space or sphere of his realm must be, in the received theology, consigned away from him, and devoted to the Adversary whose works he sent his Son to destroy. Has the Universal Ruler endorsed the consignment?
At this point we may quote the words of a reviewer of Dr. M.'s book: " Much is made of the familiar commonplaces, about creation involving a change to the Creator, either from worse to better, or from better to worse, from a lower to a higher, or from a higher to a lower mode of being, or from one state to another, the change being purely indifferent. On all which, for my part, I do not feel called upon to say one word—inasmuch as the same things advanced by infidels of different schools have been met, so far as they can be met, many times over. This newer skepticism—for such essentially I hold it to be, of course without the remotest suspicion of the lecturer's personal faith—contains only the old poison not even changed in form." (J. Young, ' The Province of Reason,' p. 89.)
Mr. Maurice, reviewing Dr. Mansel in his work entitled, " What is Revelation? " makes the same point which we noted on p. 16. He says
“What I was, in my haste, about to condemn in Mr. Mansel, is in you and me. We have been tolerating evil; we have been believing that because it exists, it may just as well be immortal. This is the unbelief which has paralyzed all our arms and all our hearts. This it is which makes us patient of baseness Sand cowardice in ourselves, which makes us indifferent how much of moral corruption there is in the world. We have said to ourselves, What is there in that little word ' forever'? Is not God good now? Yet He suffers evil. We who are pledged by the vows of our Ordination, as well as by the vows of our Baptism, to resist evil to the death,—we have been actually propagating this accursed denial, we have, been investing it with sacred names, we have been making it a part of our orthodoxy. Do you think that this can go on? Is not this habit of mind destroying the vitals of the Nation, the vitals of the Church? —Pp. 436, 437.
Citing Dr. Mansel's allusion to " the great and terrible mystery of Divine Judgment," Mr. Maurice speaks of all things in earth and heaven being made subject to Christ, and says:—
“Such a Judgment,—that which is called, in the New Testament, the unveiling of the Son of Man, the discovery of the real Head and Source of all Life, Order, and Peace, in God's universe, the overthrow and destruction of all Death, Disorder, War,—the Judgment which has cheered the heart of the sufferer on sick-beds, the lonely prisoner, the martyr at the stake, not because he expects some reward for himself, but because he shall see Righteousness and Truth triumphant; because he hopes to hear his prayers answered, that God's Will may be done at last throughout His Creation; such a Judgment we must banish from our thoughts. By proclaiming, that all the Divine Government and Education of mankind have not been necessarily tending to this issue, that the contradictions which every true man reels to be agonizing may be immortal, the idea of Judgment is destroyed.”
Supposing that evil were to be eternal, he says: " We shall not be able to stop at Mr. Mansel's point; we shall be certain that Evil must reign for. ever and ever, must drive out all that is opposed to it." Is there not indeed an "irrepressible conflict," which must issue in a Universe either all good, or all evil? We rejoice, with Mr. Maurice, in the conflict of opinions on this subject,—and conclude in his words:
“If private Christians may discover that the notions they have cherished on the subject of the future world, its joys and its terrors, have darkened the Universe, as well as the Gospel of God's Kingdom to them,—surely, the preachers of that Gospel have more need still to be inquiring whether they have not entertained theories which go near to make their preaching utterly vain, a tissue of empty truisms, or flagrant contradictions. Mr. Mansel's words may be most effectual for bringing this question to a trial.—P. 440.
Dr. Richard Rothe is well known, where he is known at all; as perhaps the foremost theologian of Germany. Dr. Schaff says of him: "He enjoys the respect and esteem of all who know him personally, as a most excellent man and humble Christian." " We must assign to Rothe the very first place among the speculative divines of the present day. He surpasses even Nitzech, Muller, Dorner, Mortensen, and Baur in vigorous grasp and independence of thought, and is hardly inferior in this respect to Schleiermacher." A late writer in the Bibliotheca Sacra (April, 1860) speaks also in the highest terms of him, and of his chief work, the " Theological Ethics." From this we offer the following extracts:—
Evil can therefore be for God only an object of absolute negation, and his agency in respect to it only an absolute reaction against it for its complete removal; which, as divine and absolute, must be absolutely efficient. This absolutely efficient, unconditioned, negative reaction of God against sin, is his punitive agency. Thus, in general, the conception of punishment as divine is, that it is the absolute and purely efficient reaction of God, on the side of his omnipotence, against sin, whereby he removes it absolutely.
He then shows how the divine abhorrence of evil co-operates with a regard for the sinner, and modifies punishment, — God seeking first to destroy sin by separating the sinner from it, directing the painful consequences of sin against the transgressor in the form of chastisement and correction, — and thus concludes
"But penal retribution cannot enforce the attainment of its primary object with reference to the sinner; viz., his separation from sin, or his amendment. By means of his power of self-determination the sinner is able to harden himself against it. Yet he cannot thus annul or frustrate the divine punishment, but by so doing he gives it a changed direction. Divine penalty is essentially divine negation of sin, divine reaction against it; and, as divine, simply absolute. It cannot relax until it has actually removed the sin. If the sinner does not separate himself from the sin, if he identifies himself with it finally, then the punishment is directed against himself, and fulfils the divine judgment upon sin in himself, by the abolishing of his own being. For, evil must be done away absolutely, as certainly as it is opposed to God, at whatever cost. If the sinner will not cease from it, then must he share its doom; successfully mock God in his defiance, he cannot. Thus divine retribution results at last in the annihilation of the sinner; even by means of the evil impending. over him as consequence of hie sin, through and in it the divine punishment culminates. This annihilation of the sinner—this death in the New Testament sense—is accordingly the final aim of the divine punishment; and the necessary final result, lying in its very idea, of sin consistently and completely fulfilling itself." . . . "If punishment is executed completely, then its consequence is ever the annihilation of the sinner himself. As punishment, that is, when it remains punishment and is not removed by forgiveness, it ever ends with the death of the sinner in this sense." (Theologische Ethik, § 490; Vol. 2. pp. 195-197.)
And when we follow Dr. Mansel's appeal to " God's revealed judgments against sin," we find every reason to hope that evil will come to a full end. The first great act in the drama of divine judgment was the Deluge; a cleansing of the earth from the violence with which it 'was filled. In the full account of this, and in all the scriptural allusions to it, not a word is said of any transfer of the sin and woe, to subsist forever in another sphere. Then came the oft-named "overthrow" of the cities of the plain; the " eternal fire " of their visible -and exemplary doom denoting, even with orthodox writers, an utter 'and irreparable destruction. And this "example," we believe, shows 'the true import of the great judgment named in Matt. 25. 41, 46, which is described as an "everlasting destruction" in 2 These. 1. 9. Then there are psalms of imprecation, which ask nothing worse than death. Is not the key to the difficulties they have mad to be found in that prayer of all the righteous, " Oh, let the wickedness of the wicked come to an end "?
In the New Testament, the parables of the Wheat and the Tares, the Net and the Fishes, the Vine and the Branches, show that evil will have no eternity. And what can be a stronger intimation of this than the words in Heb. 10. 27, "A fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries"? The doom of the mystical Babylon, of the Beast and the False Prophet, and of Death and Hades, indicates no perpetuity of evil. Christ shall also "destroy him that hath the power of death; " and he shall " destroy the works of the Devil;" which could hardly be true if any doing of Satan should be eternized. And those sublime expressions of God's sovereignty, —" Of Him, and through Him, and unto Him, are all things;" and, " That God may be all in all; "— must be sadly qualified if we allow a sphere of eternal rebellion, either as counterpart, or as part, of the divine realm. The passage in Phil. 2. 10, may denote an unwilling subjection. But the parallel passage in Rev. 5. 18 employs the same phrases by which the ancients described the universe; and we there read: " Every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, even all that are in them, heard I saying, Blessing, and honor, and glory, and power, be unto Him that sits upon the throne, and unto the Lamb, forever and ever." Could this be true, if evil is to be eternal?
Immortality through Christ alone.
The doctrine safe and salutary.
By C. F. Hudson.
Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.—Matt. 10. 28. Compare Luke 12. 4, 5.
UPON this passage a late writer has alleged: "The Sav-_ four's argument is, Know, therefore, that ye possess immortal souls, which come not under the power of men, but are subject to the power of God alone." And he concludes, "This text, therefore, must continue to stand as the testimony of the Son of God in favor of the soul's immortality, and his solemn condemnation of the soul-ruining error of annihilation and Sadducean doctrine." [R. W. Landis, Immortality of the Soul. pp 179-181.]
Let us inquire whether the doctrine of no immortality out of Christ is indeed thus dangerous and pernicious, or whether it may not be true, safe, and salutary.
The truth of the doctrine seems to lie on the face of the passage itself. If Christ had said, "Fear not man, who can do all things possible in heaven or on earth, but who cannot kill the soul," and if nothing more had been said, then the soul's immortality would have been very plainly declared. But we have no such text. If Gold should say to Silver, "Do not be afraid of water, which may cleanse but cannot harm you, but beware of aqua fortis, which can dissolve you so you will vanish," who would infer that silver is insoluble? Yet such an inference would be precisely equivalent to the reasoning which deduces immortality from our Savior's warning.
But some of those who affirm the soul's immortality have remarked that Christ did not say, according either to Matthew's or Luke's account of his words, that God can kill the soul. And for the phrase, "able to destroy both soul and body in hell," Luke uses the expression, " hath power to cast into hell." Hence it is argued that the term " destroy " may be taken in a metaphorical sense. God may destroy the soul in such a way as to leave it literally undying and imperishable.
But such a metaphor is plainly only an abstract possibility, without a shadow of proof of such actual use of the term, and in the face of three important facts.
1. God can destroy the body as well as the soul. In what metaphorical sense will it be destroyed?
2. The destruction is to be "in hell." And this is not the "hell" or Hades in which the rich man is described as in torment (Luke 16.19-31), and which is destroyed when Death and Hell (Hades) are cast into the lake of fire. (Rev. 20. 14.) The true and final hell, or Gehenna, is that lake of fire itself, and hence is called "hell-fire," or the Gehenna of fire (Matt. 5. 22; 18. 9). The name is derived, as is well known, from the valley of the son of Hinnom, before Jerusalem, also called Tophet, Abaddon, and Valley of Slaughter. This was no abode of life, but a region of desolation and death. Hither were carried carcasses and other filth of the city to be destroyed by worms and fire. The abatement of all nuisance was comprehended in the idea of Gehenna. This idea is recognized by the lexicographers in the word anathema, of kindred import, which Schleusner defines as "an abomination, to be detested and removed from the sight of men; an abominable thing, to be removed from the sight of God and men." The same idea appears in the remark of an orthodox writer on Mark 9. 43-48, where the sense of Gehenna is in question. Dr. Watson says: "As the worm itself dies not, but destroys that it feeds upon, and as a fire unquenched consumes that upon which it kindles, so when temporal judgments are expressed by this phrase, the utter destruction of persons, cities, and nations appears to be intended." Such was the type. And that the type or final Gehenna also "utterly destroys" is indicated by the earliest Jewish writers. Thus in their Targum or paraphrase of Ps. 38. 20 we read: "They shall be consumed in the smoke of Gehenna." And on Eccl. 8. 10: "They have gone to be consumed in Gehenna." Hence Wetstein remarks on Matt. 5. 22, that Gehenna denotes "the excision (chereth) either of body, or of soul, or of both."
3. The early Christian writers plainly understood our word destroy in its literal and ordinary sense. Tertullian paraphrases the passage thus: " Who is able to kill and destroy (occidere et perdere) both soul and body." And Cypriot': "who can slay (occidere) both soul and body." Likewise Jerome and Augustine. And Origen says: " Who is able to destroy and blot out both soul and body, either in Gehenna or as he may choose."
And not only do the other terms used require the literal sense of the word "destroy," but the reason of the case demands it. Christ was " the faithful and true witness." And would he give his most solemn warning in ambiguous terms? The ordinary sense of these words plainly names an infinite loss—the loss of being, and of eternal life; the literal loss of the soul. The same faithful witness elsewhere reminds us that to gain the whole world and lose the soul is a foolish exchange. Did he here expect us to understand that the soul is imperishable, that it can never be strictly lost, 'hut that we have something infinitely worse to fear? "Endless annihilation," says the younger Edwards, " is an endless or infinite punishment;" and the ordinary sense of Christ's words denotes extinction. Did he mean a twofold infinitude of punishment?
But it is sometimes said that though God can destroy the soul, it is not said he will do it. What then will he do? If we suppose that Christ warns by indirection, naming one danger not to be feared, but meaning something else which is to be feared, what is that other danger? Again we ask, is the tinted peril infinitely greater than the peril named, or may it be infinitely less? If Christ did not speak plainly, and if we must resort to a hidden sense behind his utterances, how shall we most honor God and his word by our interpretations? There are many who say that the final destruction of the wicked denotes not that themselves or their being is destroyed; not that their happiness is destroyed, for God desires their welfare; but that their wickedness is destroyed, which God surely abhors and will bring to an end. And so it is argued that the wicked race will cease to be. If, now, we are to interpret God's word by metaphor or indirection, what better method than that which infers the final holiness and happiness of all? Such methods were soon employed in the early Christian church, after a general immortality was asserted. But when Augustine speaks of the soul as having only a dependent immortality, we may take his words in their full force when he says: "The soul can die, it can be slain." "If the soul cannot be slain, how should our Lord, warning us, say, 'Fear Him'?"
And our passage, however severely or mildly interpreted or misinterpreted, sufficiently condemns all supposed demonstrations of the soul's immortality from its nature and essence. It plainly declares the soul to be destructible. He who can create can also uncreate. And this most absolute power includes all other processes short of metaphysical annihilation, by which man may cease to be an individual and personal being.
When we read, then, that the "wrath of God abideth" on those who believe not, the words in Isaiah 57.16 may be fairly taken to show the effect of God's continued displeasure. In his mercy he says: "For I will not contend forever, neither will I be always wroth; for the spirit should fail before me, and the souls which I have made."
Here is but a small part of the argument that might be adduced to show that the doctrine of immortality through Christ is scriptural and true. But it must suffice for the present. And we proceed to the question proposed: Is this doctrine also safe and salutary? If it is true, is it also useful to be presented as a motive to repentance and faith? Will it contribute, as a part of the gospel scheme, to the salvation of men?
Some readers will be amazed that such a question should be raised. All scriptural truth, they say, is of course safe and proper to be known and declared. And to doubt this is to doubt the expediency of telling others, and even of believing for ourselves, what God has revealed to mankind.
Yet we are compelled to say that the question is too often asked: "What good will the doctrine do, even if it is true?" We sometimes reply by asking: What good will the truth do, even if it is true? If we cannot trust the truth as safe and salutary, what can we trust? Where shall our reliance be placed? Will error, falsehood, or delusion be more safe? Shall we lie for God?
Surely, no one will say that in general truth is unsafe, or that error is safe. And especially will no one say deliberately, that the doctrine of deathless woe and eternal evil, even if it be an infinite error, can do no great harm. Yet, for various reasons, many persons require to be satisfied how the doctrine we offer will do good, even if true. They think the precise truth on this subject cannot be very important. They think the gospel of Christ has had as large a success as was to be expected, or that, at least, no very serious error has been held, for hundreds of years, respecting man's future destiny. Hence many deprecate the agitation of this question, as if it could contribute nothing to the saving influences of truth, and as if it might divert men's attention from doctrines confessedly true and important.
All these doubts, we trust, will be removed as we proceed. But we will venture to open the question by asking which of the doctrines ought to be true. Those who persist in sin and impenitence will either suffer eternally, as immortal beings, or they will utterly perish in the second death. For the good of mankind, and for the welfare of the universe, which of these two is the more proper doom? Let us count the cost of these two doctrines respectively.
The chief end of man, and of all created beings, is to love and serve God, and to enjoy him forever. A certain number, known to God alone, —and which, perhaps he alone can know, because it may be infinite,— are appointed heirs of this eternal glory. How is this number to be made out? Shall it be by the deathless anguish of the unsaved, warning and impelling others to accept the great salvation? or, shall it be by the selecting of the faithful for immortality, while the faithless are left as refuse to perish?
Here the so-called orthodox party will urge that many are saved by the fear of eternal suffering, who would not be moved by the fear of utter death. For argument's sake we will grant this. But what then? It is conceded that many are saved without any special fear or thought of eternal woe. Now if only one person were thus saved in a hundred years, a little arithmetic will show that in the very infancy of Eternity the sacred number of the redeemed—at least the quota due, if we may so speak, from the nebula to which our solar system belongs—would be full, and the Universe would be free from the stain and blight of evil and sin. Whereas, if the unsaved are immortal, though the number of the saved might be made out sooner, it could not be larger, and it would be filled at the expense of eternal wretchedness, and sinfulness, and evil.
This proposal to count the cost of the two doctrines and then say which ought to be true, may seem to savor of rationalism. But we make the proposal boldly, because we find in the Scriptures no proof that evil is to be eternal. And especially we find no shadow of warrant for those fears now so common, that the Universe would suffer detriment if the wicked should utterly die, and their wickedness thus come to a full end. Such fears have been over and over again proclaimed in works of divinity, and from the pulpit. But we do not recollect that a single passage or word of Scripture has ever been adduced, naming or hinting such a peril to the divine government if sinners should lose the being of their souls.
Hence we boldly suggest that this alarm is only a panic. We think the doctrine of eternal suffering is easily accounted for, in part, by the traits of human nature that produce and mark the state of panic. The fear of a certain real danger often so startles the mind that the danger is not only magnified, but one is unfitted for any calm estimate of the real facts in the case. And such a terror may become a chronic state of the mind. Especially may it be so when an infinite but unseen peril is asserted. The infinitude of the alleged danger often becomes a reason of its being believed, when it should be a reason for doubt. Tell a man that an evil of a thousand degrees in magnitude threatens him, and, though he is startled at first, he soon regains his self-possession and tries to discover how much is really to be feared. But multiply the thousands and degrees into infinitude, and he may be overwhelmed and crushed by the terror. And most of all, if you tell him that it is perilous to doubt such a danger, you may bring him completely and hopelessly into the bondage of so great a fear.
We have more than once met those who wished dearly to read the argument for immortality through Christ alone, but did not dare to do so lest they might believe the doctrine and it might finally prove untrue. Such persons, and many others, virtually assume that the importance of the subject is thrown all on one side—and where the truth may not be—by the necessity of terror to restrain man's evil nature. And others have said they would not preach the doctrine in question, even if they believed it. But all such distrust only awakens suspicion among those who hear of it. And persons of the latter class leave us uncertain how far they believe what they do preach
And though human nature will not allow a constant agony of terror, though the sense of fear may be blunted and paralyzed, and one may live as if he were not about to drop into the abyss of woe which is said to yawn before him, still the doctrine may be retained in the mind, and in the creed of the church it may be a standing source of panic from age to age.
We are apt to think there can be no great error in our theology, because we live under the Reformation. But an eminent French Protestant, Dr. Vinet, has remarked, Even now, after eighteen centuries of Christianity, we may be involved in some enormous error of which the Christianity of the future will make us ashamed." And another careful writer has said, on the subject in hand: "When once this weighty question of the afterlife has been opened, and when it shall have come into the hands of well-informed biblical interpreters, a controversy will ensue, in the progress of which it will be discovered that, with unobservant eyes, we and our predecessors have been so walking up and down, and running hither and thither, among dim notices and indications of the future destinies of the human family, as to have failed to gather up or to regard much that has lain upon the pages of the Bible, open and free to our use." And he concludes by speaking of a future "belief concerning the 'wrath to come'—a belief that will heave the human mind with a deep, convulsive dread;" and yet says, "the renovation which we look for will come in as the splendor of day comes in the tropics—it will be a sudden brightness that makes all things glad!" (I. Taylor, Wesley and Methodism, pp. 289, 290.)
These remarks may suffice to raise a probability that the current doctrine of deathless woe, or of eternal evil, has grown out of a false interpretation of the Scriptures and a false action and direction of the human mind. And we are now prepared to consider the actual effect of this doctrine, and the probable effect, if not the actual historic influence, of the faith of immortality through Christ alone.
1. The doctrine of eternal suffering, we hold, fails to produce a salutary fear by reason of several forms of reaction. That which. is too fearful—is not feared. And though this may seem strange and paradoxical, the principle finds abundant illustration in the case in hand.
1. As we have already remarked, the terror of deathless woe may end in insensibility and paralysis. The constant or excessive pressure of fear may disturb the balance of the mind, before the emotions are thus worn out; and we may thus explain many instances of morbid religious melancholy and insanity. But a robust frame of mind may outlast the sense of fear; and, while the faith is unchanged, there may be little or no feeling left. Hence many have apparently made up their minds to dwell in a supposed Pandemonium, who still engage in this world's affairs as if such a future were hardly to be called a doom. And we know one person who deemed himself reprobate, who was accustomed, when restless at night, to compose himself to sleep by thinking of his supposed destiny.
Saurin characterizes the doctrine he depicts as, "A mortal poison which diffuses itself into every period of my life, rendering society tiresome, and life itself a cruel bitter. I cease to wonder that a fear of hell halt made some melancholy and others mad; that it has inclined some to expose themselves to a living martyrdom by fleeing from all commerce with the rest of mankind and others to suffer the most violent and terrible torments."
2. The more common, if not the more healthy reactions of the doctrine, are those of doubt. Most men in Christendom either reject the doctrine as false, or evade the application of it. It is false, say increasing multitudes, because evil cannot be eternal. The government of Him who is almighty, all-wise, and all-good, must result in the overthrow of all systems of wrong and in the removal of every vestige of sin and iniquity. He who causes even the wrath of man to praise him, must .so restrain the remainder thereof that it cannot mock and defy him forever. Hence every doctrine of eternal sinfulness is repugnant to all proper theology. Many, denying the eternity of evil, and yet holding a general immortality, endeavor to show that the Scriptures teach the final salvation of all others, who cannot so interpret the Scriptures, reject the blessed volume along with the incredible doctrine which they suppose is contained in it. Defrauded of its divine light by a cruel error, they become rationalists, deists, pantheists, or sceptics of some other type.
1. Multitudes escape the application of the doctrine by the fond hope that even if it is true they are not bad enough to suffer forever. They do not stand convicted, at the bar of their own conscience, of infinite criminality and guilt. And they have no fear that they shall be perpetually and forever sinning. However fallen and depraved others may be, they have not yet arrived at such a pitch of wickedness or abandonment as to be at all alarmed by the current doctrine. And, if they- are immortal, the fearful doctrine may only encourage their hope of final salvation. They may confess to great imperfection and to deplorable ungodliness; they may not claim to be worthy of the name of Christian. But they may be all this, and yet be far enough from fiendishness; they are not demons in human form. Let the doctrine be applied to tyrants and giants in wickedness, if it will do such any good; as for themselves, they need not be disturbed by it. To some persons the fearful doctrine may be even a comfort: to believe the worst is to hope for the best.
4. There is yet another large class, of those who confess their need of repentance—and yet never repent. Why do they procrastinate? Besides the natural aversion and reluctance of fallen man against duty, we believe that multitudes delay repentance because the justice of eternal suffering is a mystery to them. This mystery does not grow out of their blindness or hardness of heart. It is not solved by the statement that no criminal who was ever convicted or condemned to any punishment, cherished a "good opinion of the law " under which he suffered. For the riddle is, How can justice torture forever without killing? And of over twenty theories that have been offered to solve the difficulty, each has been censured, and all are rejected as inadequate, by various orthodox divines. Thus Albert Barnes says: "I have read to some extent, what wise and good men have written. I have looked at their theories and explanations. I have endeavored to weigh their arguments; for my whole soul pants for light and relief on these questions. But I get neither; and in the distress and anguish of my own spirit, I confess that I see no light whatever."
Now, when such confessions are made by eminently devout men, we need not wonder if unconverted men, trained in the orthodox belief, are still more perplexed. And, while they do not reject the doctrine, its mystery must be unfavorable to that clear and full conviction of guilt which impels to immediate and penitent action. Their mental perplexity inclines them, not at once, to cease to do evil and to learn to do well, but to speculation. In the obscurity of their conviction, the sense of danger passes away. Then procrastination becomes a habit. And then follows the new peril of doubt respecting any final and fatal danger awaiting them. Whereas, if they were told that God may utterly destroy both soul and body, if they were warned of that "judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the adversaries," a clear sense of God's justice might lead them at once to accept his mercy as their only hope. Thus we have tried to show how the too fearful is unfeared. We shall give examples of this, on the subject in hand, ere we close. But the principle may be illustrated from the English criminal code of the last century and the controversy through which it was reformed. Death had been declared the penalty of one hundred and sixty different offences, from the crime of murder down to petty larceny. This system of penalty arose, doubtless, mainly from the desire to protect society and to restrain individuals from crime. But what was its actual effect? "So dreadful a list," said Blackstone, "instead of diminishing, increases the number of offenders. The injured, through compassion, will often forbear to prosecute; juries, through compassion, will sometimes forget their oaths, and either acquit the guilty or mitigate the nature of the offense; and judges, through compassion, will respite one half of the convicts, and recommend them to the royal mercy. Among so many chances of escaping, the needy and hardened offender overlooks the multitudes that suffer; he boldly engages in some desperate attempt, to relieve his wants, or supply his vices; and, if unexpectedly the hand of justice overtakes him, he deems himself peculiarly unfortunate, in falling at last a sacrifice to those laws which long impunity had taught him to contemn."
This system of severe legislation had long been censured, on the ground that the certainty of punishment, more than its threatened severity, restrains from crime. And it was confessed generally that the unvarying execution of the statutes would be barbarous. And many saw and felt that the law was too often a dead letter, and even worse. And yet, when the reform was proposed and undertaken, it met opposition from all classes. To reduce the penalty seemed a removal of restraint. The proposed reform seemed a proclamation to evildoers of comparative impunity. They who were or who should be on their way to Tyburn might hold jubilee. "The excitement caused by this attempt to narrow the scaffold," we are .told, "is at this day incredible. . . . All entered the lists to crush the disciple of Jeremy Bentham, and demolish his dangerous heresies. . . . Jack Ketch was no longer to hang men for stealing a cast off coat worth five shillings and sixpence, and what would become of England!" But the reform was carried through, on the ground not of justice only, but of expediency and public safety. And instead of the general ruin that many feared, there followed quiet and a new sense of security. Many who had bated a cruel law and were enemies of a social system that seemed to know neither justice nor mercy, have found that law is not the symbol of oppression and cruelty, but is the true friend of all mankind. And this new aspect of law and government has changed many foes and outlaws into citizens and friends.
God's law cannot err into cruelty and injustice, though man's legislation may. But the same traits of human nature that have led to wrong legislation may produce wrong interpretation of the divine law and penalty. The wonder would be if such had not been the case. And a close parallel might be run between the fears of Englishmen if their code should be reformed, and the fears of theologians and of many Christians if their creed should be reformed, and if men were told that they might utterly die in and by their sins. But the same principles that have so happily disappointed these lively fears, have operated and will operate to reduce the hard and obstinate offender against divine law into sorrow and obedience and love. And this leads us to another part of our discussion.
2. The whole theory of conversion by terror is a great and radical error. The theory, as such, is indeed being now more and more abandoned. But Christendom is not yet escaped from the influence of it, as we see in that oft-repeated misquotation, "Knowing, therefore, the terrors of the Lord, we persuade. men."* Christians are yet too much alarmed for the safety of the universe if their doctrine of penalty should be untrue, and are too prone to think of man as "desperately wicked "instead of desperately weak, to cease their reliance on overwhelming fear as a leading influence in the changing of men's hearts. The title of that fearful sermon preached during the last century, and bringing the hearers to their feet for terror,—" Sinners in the hands of an angry God,"—still represents too much the sentiment of those to whom the gospel of grace is committed. A great and auspicious change of sentiment is begun and is far advanced. But the reform is retarded by the fact that many who proclaim that God is Love have affirmed the salvation of all. It will still require much time and labor for the church to give the divine love its true interpretation and its just supremacy. We simply remark here that God is not and cannot be Love, if any of his creatures suffer forever. He may be loving and kind, if he saves a share of his creatures at the expense of deathless anguish in others. But such a limitation of goodness makes the attribute no longer central and ruling—it no longer represents or contains the true idea of GOD. And all preaching of the gospel along with the doctrine of ceaseless anguish, loses immensely the proper power of a gospel, or ceases to be a gospel. Involving the most grievous misrepresentation and calumny of the divine character, as unloving or as impotent, it must often arouse feelings most unpropitious to conversion.
If evil is to be eternal, it must be because God lacks either the might, or the right, or the skill, or the will to bring it to an end, or let it die of itself. The skill and the will are conceded by all. The right is commonly denied indirectly, on the ground that evil extinguished in one form, would appear, or be aggravated, in another form, which involves a denial of the might. (See "Debt and Grace," chapters 2, 4; and "The Rights of Wrong.")
Many, rejecting the doctrine, will say, and have said, "Your God is my devil." Others will be only hardened. There are brave and bold natures whom, the more you threaten them, the more you may. Many such are provoked into an attitude of defiance. Others receive the doctrine with little heart and less thought, until it develops in a morbid skepticism. "They preached the hell-fire doctrine," said one who was rejoicing in Christ as his hope of immortality, "until I believed it; and I believed it until it made me an infidel." How many have been driven away from God and from hope, into a forlorn feeling that Heaven is not their friend nor the friend of the Universe and that punishment is a police regulation, guarding the welfare of the elect, not rather the warning protector of life to all who love not death,—how many have failed to love God because they could not know Him as Love,—eternity alone can tell.
How, then, it may be asked, shall we account for the apparent effect of the gospel, as it has been preached for centuries, in leading men to Christ? The answer is: the doctrine of eternal suffering has been practically held mainly as a hyperbole. Men easily confound the immense with the infinite. The pulpit discourses of centuries past have contained the truth, in setting forth Christ as the only Savior, for an eternal life, and from an utter ruin. And that is the substance of the glad tidings of life and hope. What has been added respecting eternal misery has commonly had the effect of mere words. The words have been easily uttered and repeated. The arguments on the subject have been more or less current. But they have been only that verbal reasoning with which men often please or for a time deceive themselves. An able writer has told us that he was once a strong defender of the doctrine in question. He thought the fact and justice of eternal suffering all clear and plain. But as he came to know his own thoughts better, the whole dropped away as a sheer logical figment which had never been a part of his real mind or heart. And we met a short time since a fine instance showing how short a time may pass for as good as endless duration. A friend remarked that if the glorified state of the saints did not begin until the final resurrection it seemed hardly worth living for. The interval I was his eternity. The infinite beyond eluded his thought.
And this may explain the fact which so much amazes and distresses many devout men,—the indifference of men generally respecting the danger they are supposed to believe. "I confess," says Albert Barnes, "when I look . . . upon the world of woe, filled with hosts to suffer forever; when I see my friends, my parents, my family, my people, my fellow citizens; when I look upon a whole race, all involved in this sin and danger, and when I see the great mass of them wholly unconcerned, and when I feel that God only can save them, and yet He does not do it,—I am struck dumb. It is all dark, dark, dark to my soul, and I cannot disguise it." Here it must impress our minds that the great mass of men are "wholly unconcerned" about this supposed danger, when they seem to believe it, because they do not and cannot comprehend infinitude. They only grasp the finite. And the thought of eternal suffering may sometimes only weary the mind, when it does not stagger the faith.
"Imagine a creature," says Bishop Newton, "nay, imagine numberless creatures produced out of nothing, . . . delivered over to torments of endless ages, without the least hope or possibility of relaxation or redemption. Imagine it you may, but you can never seriously believe it, nor reconcile it to God and goodness." (Dissertations, No. 60.) And in fact, when the worst men come to die, most orthodox men, in the funeral discourse, are wont to "leave them in the bands of a Just and merciful God." And if we affirm a general immortality, there is much force in the remark that has been made, "We are Universalists when we lose our friends."
But it may be said that all this reasoning about the proper effect of a doctrine of penalty is very fine—where are the facts that support it? And some may think the argument is too negative, showing, perhaps, that the doctrine we oppose is sometimes hurtful, but not directly vindicating the view we hold. Let us proceed, then, to the argument from the history.
3. For a full century after the death of Christ we find no proof that the early Christians held any immortality out of Christ, or any doctrine of eternal misery; but we find every indication of the contrary. The epistles of Clement of Rome, Ignatius, and Polycarp, that ascribed to Barnabas, and the Shepherd of Hermas, are documents amply large and sufficient to show the opinion of that age on so important a subject as the nature and destiny of man. While these writers quote the Scriptures freely, they also employ their own language sufficiently to show how they understood the inspired words. But they never speak of the soul, nor of the race, nor of the lost, as living or existing forever, nor of the lost as suffering forever. Ignatius speaks thus: "Be vigilant, as God's athlete. The need is incorruptibility, and life eternal." "The bread of God I seek, which is the body of Christ; . . . and his blood, which is love incorruptible and perpetual life." And such is the general tenor of all these writings.
The works of the so-called Apostolical Fathers are found translated in a book sometimes styled the Apocryphal New Testament. The above and other passages are given in "Debt and Grace," pp. 289-295; and still others in a pamphlet entitled, "The Old Paths," by H. L. Hastings.
And in the Epistle to Diognetus, the first work of a Christian writer in which the soul is called immortal, there is plain proof that he did not regard the soul as absolutely immortal, since he speaks of the eternal fire as "punishing unto the end those whom it receives." Upon which the best critics remark that the sense is extermination. A later writer says expressly, " They who do not repent shall receive their end by the punishment of fire; . . . punished with eternal fire, they shall after a time be extinguished."
Most of the early writers speak of the soul as absolutely neither mortal nor immortal, but capable either of living or dying. And Irenaeus (A. D. 178), opposing the philosophers or Gnostics who asserted absolute immortality, says: "Life is not of ourselves, nor of our own nature, but a gift of Gods favor. And therefore he who preserves the grant of life, and renders thanks to Him who bestows it, shall receive length of days forever and ever. But he who rejects it, and proves unthankful to his Maker for creating him, and will not know Him who bestows it, deprives himself of the gift of duration to all eternity." And Arnobius (A. D. 303) speaks of "that which a new class of men, elated with an extravagant opinion of themselves: tell us: that souls are immortal, next in rank of dignity to the supreme God, derived from him as Creator and Father, divine, wise, and free from stain of gross matter." On some of these expressions we shall remark hereafter.
We may, then, safely say that the earlier Christians knew no immortality out of Christ. Their gospel was strictly a message of life; glad tidings in an age of general despair respecting any life beyond the grave; an assurance, in the name of Him who was dead and is alive again, that because he lives we may live also. That phrase, "Jesus and the Resurrection," which seemed folly to the Greeks and which modern Platonism has made well-nigh obsolete, expressed the fondest and dearest hopes of those who first believed. Scattered by persecution, they went everywhere preaching the word; holding forth the word of life. "He that eats of this bread shall live forever." "I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish." "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." They who went forth with such inspiring words, and for the joy they felt for themselves and in the hope they proclaimed in the ears of all, counted not their lives dear unto them,—would have been shocked and confounded by those wails of modern theology: "If Christianity be true, it is tremendously true; " and, "Alas! IMMORTALITY is not Life."
It Is now often argued that the soul has an infinite value both on account of what it may enjoy and what it may suffer. But the fallacy is manifest. The alleged peril does not add to the soul's value, but detracts from it. SS the writer just quoted is constrained to add that the" ravishment" of human nature "with the hope of immortal existence disappears." "From the presages of Nature she Starts back with fear, and is almost ready to let fall from her lips the cup God has proffered of immortal existence." (T. M. Post, Bib. Repos. Oct. 18-14.) Hence, if we suppose that for a given soul the chances of joy and woe are equal, the value of that soul is zero. Existence on such terms is worth simply nothing. If some would accept it with hope, others would reject it with fear and horror. Salvation would be not only of infinite worth, but it would have two infinite values: rescue from the infinite evil, even by annihilation; and eternal life and glory. But while those two values should be added to find the worth of Salvation, the infinite peril must be subtracted from the infinite boon to find the worth of the Soul.
So the fictitious worth of the salvation logically destroys "the worth of the soul," though the phrase has been retained. In the true doctrine the value of each is equal and infinite. And in the Syriac version they have each the same name—Life.
And what was the effect of their preaching? Here we meet a very important fact, which makes their silence respecting immortality out of Christ, or a wretched immortality, peculiarly significant. The deplorable wickedness of that age required the mournful and startling message of immortality for weal or woe, if ever that was needed. That picture of general corruption and abandonment which Paul gives in his epistle to the Romans, which makes our ears tingle as we read it, is endorsed as true by heathen writers of that time. "All is criminality and vice," says Seneca; " indeed, much more of these is committed than could be remedied by force. A monstrous contest of abandoned wickedness is carried on. The lust of sin increases daily, and shame is more and more extinguished. Discarding respect for all that is good and sacred, lust rushes on wherever it will Vice no longer hides itself. It stalks forth before all eyes. So public has abandoned wickedness become, and so openly does it flame up in the minds if all, that innocence is no longer a rare thing, but has wholly ceased to exist."* Then, if ever, was the doctrine of endless anguish needed, to beat down the raging passions of men, and burn out their fiery lusts, and by such sharp methods prepare their obdurate hearts for the gentler work of the Heavenly Spirit. And the early Christians knew how to treat the differing characters they met, having compassion on some, and saving others with fear, pulling them out of the fire. But they never told of un consuming flames. With them, the unquenchable fire burned on and consumed because not quenched. [See Jer. 7.20; Christ our Life, pp. 96-106.] But the leading feature of their gospel was its message of life. The "great salvation" was, with them, rescue not from infinite evil, but for an infinite boon. It was not "preparation for death," but to be fitted and furnished for an endless life. It was the "unspeakable gift," which did honor to the munificence of Heaven. It was the unsearchable. riches of Christ. It was to be made partakers of the divine nature. It was to be rooted and grounded in Love, and enabled to comprehend, with all the holy ones, what is Breadth, and Length, and Depth, and Height, even to know the love of Christ, which passes knowledge, that we might be filled with all the fulness of God.
Such a gospel, making a gift of Heaven with all its wealth to earth in its abject penury, and so called a gospel of the Kingdom of Heaven, fell upon the ears of men like gentle showers upon a parched soil, turning despair into hope, savageness into meekness, hatred into love. And, besides the entire absence of that formidable motive that many now think so needful, it had every disadvantage of position. Its author had been crucified; which was much the same as if in our age he were gibbeted or hanged. Its heralds were fishermen. Its ablest champion was in bodily presence weak, and his speech contemptible. Its power was not from beneath. The gospel made death terrible, not by putting life into it, but by setting life over against it. It was sad, yet not reproachful, to die, if death were a natural destiny and fate. But to die when one might live forever, was deep shame, everlasting contempt, eternal infamy. So the whole power of the gospel was from above. And as its Author was Love, the strength and virtue which made the word of life to be for the healing of the nations, was the power of love. The miracle which gave the despised name of Jesus a triumph over all the religions of that evil age, was a miracle of love. Human nature knows few things more awful than the presence of a goodness that condemns its unworthiness, and bids it to seek that holiness and purity of heart whereby we shall see God. And in the gospel the prophecy of Hosea began its fulfillment: "They shall fear the Lord and his goodness in the latter days.".
Such a gospel, which gave all preeminence to Him who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life, could withstand every thing but its own corruption. The earliest and most flagrant corruption of the doctrine of life was a Gnostic sentiment which declared some souls to be inherently and absolutely immortal, having nothing to fear from death or from sin. As gold is not tarnished with filth, it was said, so the soul is not corrupted with vice. But vice would, soon bring such a doctrine into bad odor, though the vanity and evil of human nature might render it too inviting and meretricious. This Gnosticism is that which Irenaeus, and Arnobius in the words above cited, specially censure. But the notion of a general immortality without such gross abuses, a notion plainly derived from the gentile philosophers, began more and more to prevail. This at first produced the doctrine of eternal suffering, of which the fierce Tertullian was the first great defender. But there was a speedy reaction of Restorationism, which was fully developed in Origen, and can be traced in the writings of about half of the Greek fathers. And Gieseler remarks that "the belief in the unalienable power of amendment in all intelligent beings, and in the limited duration of future punishment, was so prevalent even in the West, and among the opponents of Origen, that it seemed entirely independent of his system, to which, doubtless, its origin must be traced."
Extremes meet, even among those who affirm immortality out of Christ. Hagenbach having remarked on the more prevalent doctrine of the soul's intermediate nature, says: "On the contrary, Tertullian and Origen, whose views differed on other subjects, agreed in this one point, that they, in accordance with their peculiar notions concerning the nature of the soul, looked upon immortality as essential to it." Hist. of Doctrines, § 58.
The words of Augustine so illustrate the principles we have advanced that we will add them here. He says: "In vain do some, yea, very many, pity with human sympathy the eternal punishment of the damned, and their perpetual, unremitting torments, and believe it will not so be; not indeed denying the Scriptures, but, by some method of their own, modifying the severer declarations to a milder sentiment, taking them as uttered more for effect than for exact truth. For, say they, God will not forget to be compassionate, nor in his wrath restrain his mercies." (Enchiridion ad Laurent c. 112.)
Augustine himself was very prone to argue the soul's immortality by the Platonic methods. And it was very easy to extend the adage, that "where there is life there is hope," beyond the grave, and say: Where there is immortal life, we may have immortal hope. The history amply warrants the remark of Archdeacon Blackburne: "The more anyone is convinced of the immortality of the soul from the principles of Aristotle and Des Cartes, the less will he concern himself about the Gospel account of futurity." (Works, Volume 3. pp. 121-122. Cambridge, 1804.)
We believe that the darkness of the Middle Ages was largely due to the intolerance produced by the doctrine of eternal evil. We have not space for the full proof here; but we may cite the words of a careful writer, who says: "Whatever of degrading superstition, whatever of sanguinary fanaticism, whatever folly, whatever corruption, whatever cruelty belonged to the religious condition of Europe under the sway of Hildebrand, may be assigned (as a true consequence) to the part taken, and the course pursued by the great men we have named: —the fate of mankind through a long night of ignorance and malign tyranny was sealed when Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome combined to crash dissent. [L Taylor, Nat. Hist. of Fanaticism. See Debt and Grace, pp. 825-333.]
Among the earlier events of the Reformation was Luther's protest against the decree of the immortality of the soul, with other matters, as articles of faith. But the doctrine of immortality through Christ alone was first fully revived by the Socinians. Their system of theology, especially their view of the nature of Christ, is not that of the present writer. But in a controversy which arose respecting the tendency of their doctrine of final extinction, we find this declaration: "It is matte' of public notoriety, that in respect to morals no sect has approached more nearly to the simplicity and strictness of the early Christians than the Socinians." And the party which impugned their doctrine,' instead of denying this statement, attributed to the machinations of Satan the virtues which gave a dangerous respectability to their errors.
The high character of John Locke as a truly Christian man will not be doubted. And because he has been claimed as recognizing "the existence of God and the immortality of the soul," and as "holding the perpetuity of the sufferings of the lost," it is proper to repeat his remark on Gen. 2. 7: "It seems a strange way of understanding a law, which requires the plainest and direct words, that by death should be meant eternal life in misery." And he says of the wicked: "They shall not live forever. This is so plain in Scripture," etc. And he concludes by "taking it then for evident that the wicked shall die and be extinguished at last.1 The more recent discussions of this subject in England are led chiefly by the Rev. H. H. Dobney, of whom we have heard as an excellent and useful man, through an orthodox gentleman once his neighbor; and by the Rev. Edward White, of London, of whom we have heard likewise. He has been appointed editor of a monthly religious periodical notwithstanding his views on this subject. And his church has been represented as comparing well with any in that city, for piety and Christian usefulness. [See Debt and Grace, pp. 350-351. Life by Lord King, pp. 819, sq., Bohn's ed. See our tract on "The Silence of the scriptures,' etc.]
In Germany the suspected doctrine is most ably represented by Dr. Richard Rothe, of Heidelberg. Besides assigning to him "the very first place" among the theologians of the present day, Dr. Schaff says: "He enjoys the respect and esteem of all who know him personally, as a most excellent man and humble Christian." And a late writer in the Bibliotheca Sacra (April, 1860) speaks in the highest terms of the man and of his principal work. The doctrine is defended more at length by Dr. Hermann Schultz, of Gottingen, in a work* of apparently true devoutness, and we think the man is well regarded by those who know him. [The Presuppositions of the Christian Doctrine of Immortality. Gottingen, 1881.]
In our own country the doctrine is new held, to our knowledge, by over forty ministers in orthodox connection. Some of these are eminent in ability and station, and all are respected for their piety. Of one of them it has been said to us: "If the Catholics had him they would canonize him for a saint." He has been recently censured for his "heresy," or gazette by an ecclesiastical caveat. One effect of this was an urgent invitation from one of the best churches in the state where he resides, to supply its pulpit during the annual vacation of its pastor.
The doctrine is most extensively held in this country among those who have despaired of the conversion of the world into a church, or of any settled peace until the coming of the Prince of Peace. This is a growing opinion in many quarters in this age of war and preparation for war. It is natural that the Millenarian or Advent faith should include a great variety of character, and that some should embrace it simply as a dogma, or even from a general feeling of despondency, without the joy and peace of the Christian. So when David was a fugitive from the malice of Saul, "every one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt, and every one that was discontented, gathered themselves unto him; and he became a captain over them." He was the anointed king of Israel nevertheless.—And it is no disparagement to the doctrine of a "new earth" as well as a "new heaven," if some cry "King Jesus " only as partisans or Fifth-Monarchy men, and not from true delight in him who was meek and lowly. But we know very few such. And if multitudes are looking and waiting for an end of evil because they have tasted and felt its bitterness, or because they hate and abhor its monstrousness. let no one contemn the faith of such.
Among those who make the most of God's direct, personal, and finally universal reign, we have found many models of piety and usefulness. By them the faith of immortality through Christ alone has been most preached and proclaimed. We might name such, who love to address God's truth to the hearts and consciences of men, who are constant, abundant, and self-denying in labor for the salvation of souls. And we might name places where the fruits of their labor have appeared, constraining even those who did not embrace their views to say they had done a good work. We know among these people many Christian families where God and Christ are in all the thoughts; where prayer and praise are a delight; and where religious inquiry and exhortation are customary, words. The personality of God does not limit his being, but. invites, in behalf of finite beings a manifestation of God under forms of limitation, such as was the Incarnation.
We might give numerous instances of individuals saved from indifference or skepticism by the presentation of Christ as the only hope of immortality. The following is an example. The captain of a boat was well known on the wharf at Cincinnati as a profane and " wicked " man. In conversation with the chaplain of the Bethel church he said that he had no fear of eternal suffering. He believed no such doctrine. 4' Neither do I," said the chaplain; and he offered him that of no immortality out of Christ. The captain recognized this as a most fearful doctrine of penalty, and yet as just. He went home under concern and conviction, and became a man of faith and prayer.
In conclusion we will recur to one or two forms of the safe-side arguments which are often used. Apparent instances have been alleged of persons who had been alarmed about eternal suffering, but who lost their concern when told that they might utterly die. But their indifference and love of death is no reason why they or others should suffer forever, and evil be eternal. Again, there may be a dead heterodoxy as well as a "dead orthodoxy." They who object against a doctrine that it does not save all who embrace it, should first show that their own doctrine possesses such virtue. And again, the indifference of these persons map be due to the fact that no one presses on their minds the truths they do admit. And they may even feel a dislike toward those who rigidly maintain the doctrine of eternal suffering, even if this is not urged arm them.
The safe-side argument has been recently advanced by a writer who compares the two doctrines to two different platforms, one above the other. He says: "It is plain to see what course prudence dictates—it is to take the higher platform. For though this fails, and the lower and liberal scheme is found the true one, still those on the higher ground are safe; they fall from this and the lower catches them."
Here again is the fallacy of supposing that severe doctrine, even if false, is most safe. He who repents simply or mainly because he may suffer forever, stands ready to recant his repentance when he thinks there is no such danger. This, we believe, is the real attitude of many who have been brought into the church by the alleged "terrors of the Lord," but who have never been brought to Christ. They have no divine love in their hearts, and no Christian vitality. And discerning pastors lament their presence in the church as a great burden and clog to its proper usefulness.
And the panic which we have named explains this blind proneness to a "safe-side" disregard of the truth. The sad effect of the doctrine we oppose is that it degrades the meaning of the word salvation to a negative sense, as if it consisted mainly in deliverance from pain. Hence the frequency with which men confound the doctrine we hold, with the Universalist faith. One writer has said that, though these are not the same doctrine, still, between the two there " is not much to choose." That is, there is small difference between eternal extinction, and final salvation I Another, a doctor of divinity, has said of these two doctrines that there is also "a difference betwixt two peas." Thus does eternal glory dwindle to comparative insignificance before the doctrine of eternal woe.
Besides the mischievous reactions we have endeavored to show, we think this fearful doctrine naturally tends, by the shifting and " safe-side " resorts of expediency, to undermine confidence in the truth, to ensnare the conscience, to promote spurious conversions, to corrupt the church, to produce a timid fear even of inquiry, and so to perpetuate the error from age to age.
The only deliverance from this bondage is in a bold stand for and upon the truth, taken by those who can trust the truth. We are willing that they who love the truth should dread error; and we wish all change of opinion should be cautious and deliberate. But we must prove all things if we would hold fast that which is good. And if there is reason for supposing that the doctrine of eternal evil may be false, and that immortality through Christ alone may be the true view, that is a sufficient and imperative reason for the most earnest inquiry and patient investigation on the subject. Let none be jealous or self-suspicious because the hope of an end of evil would be so pleasing, or may seem "too good to be true." Such jealousy is as good a reason for renouncing the hope of life for the righteous, as for declining the doctrine of literal death for the wicked, And if it may require years to deliver the church and Christendom from the fear of an "immortality" which "is not life," they who are already free, and who can look upon the future of the' Universe with fulness of hope and joy, should show their courage in the calm, quiet, and earnest avowal and maintenance of their faith. Wisdom is justified of her children. Let those who regard Christ as their only hope of immortal life so honor him, by their lips and in their lives. And the same gospel in its complete joy and gladness, which triumphed so gloriously in its youth, may renew its strength and its victories; and stout hearts that are unmoved by terror may again "fear the Lord and his goodness in the latter days."
The main points made in the argument are as follows:
1. The eternal sinfulness of wicked beings would involve perplexing relations to the Divine Government, and give a kind of dignity to the wicked themselves And eternal wickedness, though in punishment, and however overruled for good, would be an eternal evil. This must be either God's choice, or his necessity; and either view brings insuperable difficulties into our theology. But temporary evil may be neither God's choice nor his necessity, being simply permitted, in a system of probation or of recovery. The distinction between evil temporary and evil eternal appears important from such facts as these: A learned writer closes an account of the dispute between Bayle and his opponents by saying, "No-one can deny that the very great difficulties which press the doctrine of the origin of evil and its reconciliation with the justice and goodness of God, could be more easily overcome if an end of hell-punishments is supposed, and not their eternity." And Dr. Muller concludes his work on " The Christian Doctrine of Sin" thus: "A solution of the problem of the world would be possible, if the evil were not; —the evil which . . . is capable of being maintained, by the will of the personal creature, persistently hardening itself, through endless ages."
2. The scriptural doctrine of a Future Life is, endless life for the righteous. " The doctrine of the immortality of the soul' and the name are alike unknown to the entire Bible." (Olshausen, on 1 Cor. 15. 19, 20.) This supposed fundamental truth is treated with profound silence in the Scriptures, while the Divine Existence, with which it is often compared, is named continually. The phrase "everlasting punishment," put in contrast with "eternal life," does not imply immortal life in suffering. This is shown from the terms used, from Jewish opinions, and from the concession of orthodox divines that eternal extinction would be eternal punishment. The phrase " their worm dies not, etc.," (Ise. 66. 24; Mark 9. 44,) as much proves the immortality of carcasses as of souls. The phrase "unquenchable fire" was used by Eusebius in speaking of the martyrdom of Christians. These and other like expressions properly denote a complete and utter destruction of that to which they are applied.
8. The phrase "immortal soul" is not found in a Christian document until A. D. 185; nor such phrases as "eternal misery" until a later period. Such expressions resulted from the combination of Christian doctrine with Platonic opinions. This combination is apparent in the earlier writings of Justin Martyr, A. D. 140; but his later writings warrant the statement of Gieseler, that he "appeared to regard it as possible that the souls of the ungodly will at some time be wholly annihilated." Irenaeus, (A. D. 178,) opposing the Rationalism of his day, speaks very plainly of "continuance forever and ever to those who are saved;" and of others as " depriving themselves of the gift of duration to all eternity." It would be easier to show that even Athanasius, the " Father of Orthodoxy," held this, than that he held the now orthodox view. The results of the above named combination were, Manichean difficulty on the one hand, and Restorationism on the other. The latter, unknown before, soon prevailed extensively, produced the doctrine of Purgatory, and continues to this day.
4. The practical tendency of the view here offered is suggested by the last statement. A punishment too fearful — is unfeared. This is illustrated in the history of the English criminal code, ere its reform by the efforts of Romilly and his coadjutors. And the history of the Church goes to show that the new — rather, old and forgotten — doctrine of Life in Christ only, would give the Gospel new energy and power.
Reviewers Reviewed.
IT is now three years since the work entitled, "Debt and Grace, as related to the Doctrine of a Future Life," was given to the public. The notices of the press, even where the author's solution of theological difficulties was strongly objected to, have been more favorable than he had reason to hope. With no advantage of position, known only as discarded for a supposed error, cut off from all appeal except to the calm reason of his readers, his very weakness was, perhaps, the secret of any success his book has met.
One writer has remarked that "for a rarity, he does not complain of his reviewers." Through the public religious press he could rarely reply to them if he would; yet he tenders thanks for some courtesies in that way. And he does not now write to complain. He would fain correct some errors and misapprehensions into which he thinks his reviewers have fallen; reply to some arguments they have advanced; offer some views which they have suggested; and, in general, indicate the state of the controversy, if such it may be called. He accordingly notices some writers who cannot be considered his reviewers.
Believing that a growing acquaintance with the doctrine of an End of Evil, by Immortality throng!? Christ alone, gains for it tolerance and frequent hearty acceptance, he would fain leave the discussion with the more eloquent friends of the view, and, in due time, to the lecture room and the religious press.
NOVEMBER 1, 1860.
THE THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY JOURNAL. NO. 40. April 1858. Pp. 592-624.
This reviewer endeavors at the outset to show that " the Bible is not the real ground of our faith," though perhaps unconsciously to us, because we treat so fully the speculative argument in the case. To this we have replied in the preface of "Christ our Life." We may certainly follow the reasonings of orthodox divines, and show, if we can, that their efforts to relieve the difficulties of their tenet are vain, and their only refuge is in mystery.
The reviewer's first attempt at criticism is remarkable. Citing a part of what we say of " The Dignity of Wickedness" if there be an irreducible power of rebellion (pp. 16, 17, 115), but overlooking what we quote from Milton and Aeschylus, and our remark that "this sentiment of the dignity of eternal rebellion of course belongs properly to the old gentile conception of a divine nature without a divine goodness," he exclaims: "We have never met a more audacious, though solecistical and self-confuting denial of the fundamental truths of religion and morals than this." We need only reply, it is no wonder that be proceeds to deduce all manner of horrible things; that he says we "represent that sin" may "become intrinsically good; " and that we "imply that the persistent rebellion of fallen creatures, and a continual advance in malignity, is not only justifiable, but a duty;" and that we "deny the right of God to the homage of his creatures." Really, the reviewer seems to be taking windmills for giants, and to justify a remark we have heard on his mode of attack, that " he cuts right and left with his eyes shut." How else could he say that we "ascribe utter heartless-ness to God in regard to his own rights, the extent to which his creatures carry their rebellion," etc., directly after quoting our words: " Yet, because he hates them not, their sin is a grief which his love both creates and freely endures"? (P. 600.) How else, after quoting a passage in which we speak of evil "appearing thus even forever as a vagabond without a home in the universe;" and, regardless of " an infinitely infinite," a "compound infinity of good," an "infinity of the second order," which we offset against the supposed lingering and dying evil,—how else could he deduce the conclusion that "holiness and happiness are to have no place in " the universe, " except in the few human individuals in whom they are reproduced through the work of Christ"? How else could he venture to say, " Such is the horrible picture which Mr. H. draws of the divine administration and empire!" — and again, "If the whole circuit of worlds, if the whole aggregation of moral beings revolt, and —with the exception of a few "—"are at length dashed in wrath down the bottomless precipice of annihilation, Mr. H.'s beau-ideal of God and the universe is verified!"? (Pp. 602, 605, 606.)
That one who calls this " the work of Mr. Hudson's rationalism, or speculation, independently and in contravention of revelation" (p. 606), and who says of our book that "its whole aim is to determine the question on the ground of rationalism, against the doctrine of the Bible " (p. 623), should quite ignore our chapter of " Scriptural Argument," was, perhaps, to be expected.
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA. VOL. 15. July 1858.
The Scriptural Doctrine of a Future State. By Prof. E. P. Barrows. Pp. 625-661.
This reviewer also begins with a sweeping charge of rationalistic modes of thought against those who deny eternal future suffering. Of this he thinks our book is a "striking illustration," remarking that " only 67 pages are devoted to the ' scriptural argument,'" that eleven of these are concerned with the opinions of the Jews in the time of Christ, and that this argument is preceded by 169-pages— his printer should have said 159 — of criticism upon the philosophical grounds alleged in support of the doctrine we deny. To this we have replied above, and here say again that a scriptural argument in the case may well be brief if the Bible gives any plain verdict on the great question.
The reviewer's reply to our rational argument requires some remark.
On page 626 he quotes a passage in which we suppose an extremely harsh government, and a very mild government of rewards without inflictions, and ask which is the stronger. (Pp. 84, 85.) Overlooking the point of comparison, he says we "assume that, in a moral government rightly constructed and administered, ' the mere loss of place or favor,' without any positive infliction of penal evil, should be a sufficient protection against sin and its consequences." The reader will say if we assume any such thing. We might also ask where God's actual government is the strongest? Is it in heaven, or in a supposed world of sin and woe?
On the same page the reviewer quotes our statement that "if man is created absolutely immortal, subject to the alternative of eternal happiness or eternal misery," he should now be exposed to no dangerous temptations, should be furnished with every motive to virtue and find no motive to sin. (P. 240.) Overlooking our grave supposition, he says we "assume again, that a moral government administered by law over free beings may be so constructed as to exclude all dangerous temptations." In reply, we simply repeat, that if the incurring of infinite woe were abstractly possible, infinite love would, in all reason, sedulously guard every creature against the awful danger. We also believe that the danger of infinite misery is avoidable, in a divine, universal, and eternal government. Hence our argument that the supposed necessity of eternal evil is a limitation of God's sovereignty, and is dualistic.
To this the reviewer replies by alleging the moral necessities that pertain to the divine perfections: "It is impossible for God to lie" (p. 628). As if the necessity of God's doing right could at all illustrate a necessity of eternal sin and wrong in his universe But, it is added, "It is impossible that he should not love and reward holiness. It is equally impossible that he should not hate and punish sin — and, for anything that our finite reason can determine, punish it eternally." To which we reply that by the concession of various orthodox writers; annihilation is eternal loss and punishment. But that is an infinitely different thing from an endless perpetuity of the sinfulness which it is impossible that God should not abhor.
On page 629 we read: "A fallacy which runs through the present treatise is the substitution of the quantitative argument, where sound logic absolutely demanded the qualitative." Yet on the next page the writer quotes us saying: "The distinction of evil as much or little, lasting or fleeting, will be almost worthless if it can be denied from no principle." (P. 148.) Thus we plainly recognize the true mode of reasoning which we are charged with wholly ignoring. Whether we have with any fidelity observed the rule we so plainly laid down, the reader I must judge. On page 631, the reviewer quotes our conclusion that "we may then say of it [sin] that it inheres in no principle, and finds no sanction. It is neither God's choice nor his necessity. It is only an incident of his majestic forbearance. It lingers between life and death, being and not being. It is transient because transitional, and pertaining to no system. It is not of the Creator, but of the creature; not of the Infinite, but of the finite; not of the Eternal,—how then can it attain to eternity?" (P. 152.) Upon this he remarks that by our own showing certain "elements of sin "—man's freedom and God's sufferance—pertain to the actual system. Now these very good things which are thus called " elements of sin" are certainly not designed to effect sin as an end. They are not even proper occasions of sin. They simply allow a possibility of sin. They are more properly elements of holiness, — even God's long-suffering specially granting a space for repentance, which is the only reason why sin subsists even for a moment. And when the reviewer comes to " ask in turn: if sin is not of the eternal? "—we must inquire what he means.
Of the twenty-two "theodicies," or theories of the justice of endless suffering, which we criticize, the reviewer notices only one. This is, "The Imperative Nature of Duty." He thinks our statement of it is " very well said," and wishes, since it was once our own, that we "might return to it." To our critique he replies that though "penalty does not satisfy the requirement of the divine law, which is obedience," still it "does and must satisfy divine justice." (P. 633.) But how can divine justice be better satisfied than when all things contrary to justice are done away? — which we think is the import of the scriptural anathema. The excellent remarks of Dr. Rothe on the import of the divine wrath are also here pertinent. (See "The Rights of Wrong," p. 23.) Our reviewer thinks our distinction between the infinite and the. absolute is the same with that which he makes between the "absolutely infinite" and the "relatively infinite." But we doubt this; and, if it were so, he must grant that annihilation, or the loss of an infinite boon, is a relatively infinite punishment.
We are surprised that our reviewer should say that we discuss the question of man's "natural immortality" under the head of the scriptural argument (p. 634), when in fact, after that argument, we devote an entire chapter to the "rational argument," and another whole section to history of the early Christian doctrine; which was, that the soul is absolutely neither mortal nor immortal, but capable of becoming either. We. think our reviewer need not have been "surprised," and would not have raised a false issue, if he had noted our effort " to divest the argument of its appendages," on page 162. Why, we asked again and again, if any sort of general immortality is assumed in the Scriptures,—the very thing alleged by various opponents, — why is the Bible so profoundly silent respecting so all-important a fact? The silence respecting man's immortality, contrasted with the constant mention of a truth that is assumed, is regarded by good judges as the main scriptural argument of our book. To say that a knowledge of the nature of the soul is not essential to religion, or important in a revelation, is to say what is very true; but it is no reply to our argument.
On the term Gehenna, and the passage in Isa. 66. 24, the reviewer gives some history of Jewish opinions, differing not materially from that which we presented. To his remark that we " have been able to allege nothing valid against" the authority of Josephus (p. 638), we have replied by adding two witnesses to the eight whom we adduced to impeach that testimony. (Christ our Life, p. 154.) And the half-score are supported by Usher and a dozen others, cited by Fabricius (Biblio-theca Graaca, 1. 4, c. 8). To the remark that "for the very reason that the fire and the worm are symbolic, not literal, both can exist together; and, for the same reason, both can prey upon their victims without end" (p. 637), we reply that such an abstract possibility makes nothing whatever against the natural import of the symbol; and, in the type, there was nothing else than loathsome yet complete destruction.
To all that is said respecting spiritual life and death (pp. 641-646), we need not reply particularly. We do not see that our argument for a proleptic sense of the terms in question, supported by early versions and numerous authorities to which we have since added others, is at all impaired. And, if it were impaired, the notion of immortal spiritual death would not follow.
In a single passage, Col. 3. 1, the reviewer has pointed out an apparent error in our exegesis (p. 175), which we have corrected in subsequent editions. We would here also acknowledge a correction made by the Congregationalist (Nov. 5, 1858), of a statement which we found to be too general, respecting the sense of it (p. 177), which is amended.
Freely assenting to the four rules of interpretation laid down by the reviewer (pp. 646-7), we come to his argument on the passage respecting the Rich Man and Lazarus. To this we have replied in a separate tract. See also Olshausen, as cited in " Christ our Life," p. 132. We have met one intelligent Congregational minister who seemed surprised that the passage should be adduced to show eternal future suffering. We may also reply further that the argument for this, from the horror with which the rich man awaits his consignment to Gehenna, seems to assume that Gehenna cannot be exceedingly fearful unless its tenants are immortal. So readily do men confound the vast with the infinite.
The remark that, "in this parable fire is employed, in entire accordance with Jewish usage, as the symbol of torment, not of destruction," has been quoted by a subsequent writer (Dr. Thompson, " Love and Penalty," p. 323), and requires some notice. By the reviewer's own showing the entire "Jewish usage " would not forbid our view; for he quotes the famous twelve months' torment in fire that then and thus destroys (p. 639). But we submit that the general usage of the term fire in the Scriptures shows that its proper office is to consume. Even Matt. 13. 42 will best agree with this view, when compared with the rest of the chapter and with Ps. cxii. 10.
The reviewer thinks our exegesis of the phrase "everlasting fire," as denoting the eternity of effect, is unnatural (Pp. 651, 652.) But he does not notice the half-dozen orthodox authorities, and parallel examples, by which it is supported. We have since added others, including the following passage from the Clementines: " Punished with eternal fire, they shall after a time be extinguished. For they cannot now exist forever, who have ever and only dishonored God." (Horn. 3. c. 6. See "Christ our Life," pp. 156, 109-115.) And we find that Otto understands the phrase in the Epistle to Diognetus, c. 10:—" Eternal fire, which will punish unto the end those whom it receives," — in the same sense with ourself. (De Justini M. Scriptis et Doctrina, p. 191, note.) We remarked, " This cannot denote the common view of punishment without end; it may mean: ' will exterminate.' " (P. 299, note.)
Passing over several pages which may be left with the reader of both sides, we notice the statement that " we can as well conceive of a man as punished a thousand years before he begins to be, as a thousand years after he has ceased to be" (p. 653). Of this hereafter. The writer admits that "eternal death, as the penalty of sin, in the sense of annihilation, is an intelligible idea." Would he speak of a person as "dead" a thousand years before he is born?
The argument from the "destiny of Satan" (pp. 688, 689) is examined more at large in " Christ our Life," pp. 71, 136-148.
In a review article we cannot ask a thorough examination of our argument. Yet we think that in the passages examined there might have been more frequent allusion to our modes of interpretation, and further recognition of our authorities. We would instance Gen. 2. 17; Mark 9. 43-48; Matt. 3. 12; 25. 41, 46; John 3. 36; 2 Thess. 1. 9; and the phrases " Gehenna," and " second death." By his inaccurate citation of John 3. 36,—" Abiding under God's wrath" (p. 658),—our author not only ignores the view of it which we support from Calvin, but he apparently glosses the words of Scripture with a sense which they may not bear. See Isa. 58. 16.
The reviewer endeavors to support the eternity of future suffering from "the stupendous miracle of the resurrection" of the unjust. (P. 660.) This reasoning seems to us not "qualitative" but " quantitative." It means this: only infinite guilt can require a stupendous miracle in the path of punishment. But if the pain deserved by unrepented sin is in its nature irremissible, it is so in any measure, great or small. A slight claim of justice would be as inexorable as a large demand, and would justify an adequate miracle for its execution, however stupendous. The quality of justice does not depend on the quantity of guilt. The argument here offered gives indirect confirmation of our reasoning in the book reviewed, pp. 396-400.
Are the wicked raised up with spiritual bodies; or do they put on incorruption, or immortality?
We can hardly claim that the article entitled " Objections from Reason against the Endless Punishment of the Wicked," by Dr. Long, Bibliotheca Sacra, Jan., 1860, pp. 111-134, is a review of our book. Yet we have found occasion to notice one or two points of the writer, in " Christ our Life," pp. 73, note, 149,150. We here add that we were not prepared to assent to his statement that "there is in truth a greater mystery in the permission of sin in the present world, than in its continuance in a world of retribution" (p. 123), until we found him describing punishment as a " blotting out" of sin. He says: "The sin which was not prevented must be blotted out." By an adequate penalty God "maintains his character as a righteous Sovereign, preserves among his subjects a state of moral order, and makes perfect satisfaction for sin." " He blots out the sin he permits." (P. 133.) Can this writer affirm any eternity of sin? Can it be cancelled and yet perpetuated? In his view eternally punished sin appears not to be an evil. But he must differ from the common view, of sin as eternally persistent and defiant, ever subsisting under punishment and in spite of it. Would he accept the orthodox descriptions of "constant and everlasting warfare," cited in " Debt and Grace," pp. 49, 50, 118, 122? We may also inquire if final punishment brings about "a state of moral order" among all the proper subjects of divine government; or if, in the common view, it does not divide that government by setting apart a world of disorder and anarchy?
THE METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW. Vol. 40 July, 1858.
Art. 5. Hudson on a Future Life. By James Strong, S.T.D. Pp. 404-418.
This writer gives a very good account of our opening argument, and names most of the "theodicies" which we examine. He rejects those which infer infinite guilt from the infinite attributes of God, and accepts the theory of eternal sinfulness. He supports it by the current arguments, but without following our critique upon it. We need then only reply with the remark of a paper of his own denomination, in a notice of this article,—that threescore years and ten are a very short base-line from which to get a parallax of eternity.
He occupies two pages (408-410) with objection on the score of differences in guilt, and the difficulty of supposing degrees even in lingering annihilation. As if these could be more troublesome to God than eternal guilt, or the precise measure of its punishment!
Of our scriptural argument he notices only our examination of Matt. 25. 46 (pp. 411-413), tells us in strong language that this passage is decisive against us, but does not follow our inquiry into the Septuagint use of scacsatc. He thinks that by our view the whole passage is " at last reduced to this frigid meaning: These shall forever be blotted out of being, but the righteous shall possess immortal blessedness." As if it were a small matter to be utterly consumed.
To his argument from Rom. 2. 5-10, and Luke 16. 19-81 (pp. 413, 414), which he seems to think "quite conclusive," we have replied in " Christ our Life," pp. 135, 136, and in the tract above referred to.
He alludes to our argument from the history of Christian doctrine with the remark that " almost every form of false doctrine in vogue in the Church" has been supported in the same way. (P. 416.) If this needs any reply, we will simply say that if our historical argument has any force, it is not that of a mere precedent for our view; but it consists in showing that the modern doctrine is an innovation, clearly traceable to a given period, to assignable causes, and in characteristic effects.
The other, matters are left with the reader. With the exception of one or two expressions we acknowledge the tone of the review as hardly proscriptive, and, in various matters, appreciative.
A notice of " Christ our Life" in the Methodist Quarterly for July, 1860, pp. 510, 511, here requires some attention. After saying some good things for the book, the writer criticizes as follows: " 1. Mr. Hudson's theory is constructed by effecting a systematic change in the definition of a number of words in Scripture and established theology." This he regards as a departure from the sentiment of the Church through ages; and he thinks that by the same method Pantheism or Atheism might be substituted for the Theism of the Bible.
Now we think that if the writer had told his readers that we take the terms " life," " death," to " live forever," to " perish," etc., when applied to man's final destiny, in their literal sense, they would have understood more than they now do, and some of their fears might have been spared. Says a reviewer of our doctrine: " Here lies the great error of the system: interpreting the Scriptures literally, when they should be understood figuratively."
J. G. Stearns, "Immortality of the Soul," p. 59. The Essay was pro- cured and is recommended by the Ontario Baptist Association, in 1852. We observe that it repeats the common allegation that the Bible "takes for granted" the immortality of the soul. (P. 28.) Expressions in pp. 38, 39, 51, are worthy of note as a virtual concession that annihilation is an infinite punishment. Even a temporary sleep of the soul would be "immense loss." "Paul would infinitely rather live on here in the flesh, and suffer what he did, than that soul and body should fall asleep in death." See also Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct., 1860, p. 802.
Curiously enough, the last tract we have seen published against our view makes an effort to show that the so-called figurative sense of the terms " life " and " death " is the literal sense!
The reviewer says further: " 2. Adopting in the terms significative of duration the Universalist modes of argument, Mr. H. incurs, we think, the ultimate consequence of abolishing absolute eternity from the Bible. Not for penalty alone can their equivalent phrases, be made to designate the temporary." Etc.
But in the very preface and " contents " of the book reviewed we plainly show our opinion that "eternal death is eternal punishment." On page 4 we say: " We regard the loss of immortality not only as penal, but as an eternal punishment." Coming to the locus classicus in this controversy (Matt. 25. 46), we repeat that " we shall not at all insist on the acknowledged fact that the word eternal is often used in a limited sense." (P. 122; com. pp. 127, 128.) And the "Scriptural Argument " in our larger work opens as follows: " It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that the question we raise is not respecting the duration of future punishment, but respecting its nature. We are to show that exclusion from all life is a punishment, and that it is the revealed punishment of the lost. If it be so, then we may at once admit the words ' eternal," everlasting,' and similar phrases, used to indicate duration of the final doom, as denoting an absolute eternity; we shall waste no efforts to reduce their significance in the least." (P. 160; compare pp. 187, 418, 420.) We confess that our reviewer's entire failure to recognize these professions — even if he thought us unfaithful to them, which he does not say — is somewhat trying to the "general good temper" which he accords to us.
His manifest inaccuracy casts suspicion on his third count, which he concludes as follows: " The diminished sinfulness of sin can dispense with an atonement, quite discards a Divine Mediator, and finds the Trinity decidedly useless. Mr. Hudson himself finds and exemplifies these consequences. His own theology is disorganized. His theory is a stupendous step in the direction of no religion at all."
This charge, supported by no specification, is too sweeping to allow or to require particular notice. We may cite, in reply, from our larger work: " We prefer to derive the divine nature of the Redeemer, not from the greatness of the evil He has removed, but of the good He has achieved; not from that which He has undone, but from the nature and vastness of that which He has done." (P. 404.) And, in pp. 3931,394, we endeavor to show that the rationalist doctrine of self-salvation is fairly deduced from the notion of an unimpaired immortality. Religion is a cherished sense of our dependence on Him in whom we live and move and are; which feeling, we humbly believe, is best promoted by the view we hold.
If we mistake not, the above examples are not the only inaccuracies of the reviewer, in treating the question of future punishment. In the " Notes on the Gospels" by Dr. Whedon, the comment on Mark 9. 43-48 insists on the word "never," used by our translators in verses 43, 45; and also on the threefold repetition, in verses 44, 46, 48. These common errors are very excusable in one who is not versed in Greek or in the criticism of the text; but we think they ought not to be made by a scholar. (See our remarks upon them in " Christ our Life," pp. 96, 97.)
THE NATIONAL MAGAZINE. September, 1858. Pp. 279, 280.
The writer of a notice, whom we happen to know as a Doctor of Divinity, here repeats some of the objections already noted, and says that our view "neither solves nor cuts the difficulty, because the loss of existence is an evil of more terrible magnitude than even that of perpetual punishment." This severe judgment is a very helpful offset against the opposite criticism, and may save one the trouble of changing the name of the next reviewer into a note of exclamation.
THE LADIES' REPOSITORY. May, 1859. Pp. 278, 279.
Here the Rev. N. Rounds, D.D., while charging us with " sophistry," repeats, we think, the hackneyed fallacy that it is nothing to be reduced to nothingness. He in fact tells us that when one is deprived of being, the privation ceases with the existence, for nobody is then deprived. He thinks that if such absurd and contradictory privation is called punishment, all created beings were suffering a punishment, eternal a parte ante, until their creation. Which demonstrates, he thinks, that annihilation is no everlasting punishment at all. "And it is just at this point of confluent absurdities that the theory of Prof. Hudson explodes." (!)
If this argument needs any reply we will simply remark, that the nature of things corresponds with the possibility of things. The deprivation of a possible being or endowment is loss. But a mathematical line, whose richest being is pure length, is no loser because it has not also breadth. To talk of the loss of an impossible existence is as absurd as are the tears of a child imploring of its nurse the sun reflected from the surface of a stream. If our eternal past existence had been possible, and we had missed it by any wickedness, then would the loss be real and penal. If we might have been gods, deep were the guilt that should degrade us to the rank of creatures. If we could have been created for both eternities, the future and the past, the stream of Time bearing our bark both ways, then the purpose to live and know the future alone would be a guilty forfeiture of the eternal past. And death would then bring a double eternity of penal privation. Would that be nothing to speak of?
And in a very important sense man is made for both eternities. To know the past is to live it. As the memory of bygone days recalls them into the present, so to be master of the world's history is to live anew the world's life. Geology carries back this life into the untold ages. Man is not only a microcosm, to mirror the universe, but his dial is shadowed from eternity. Can the eternal future ignore the eternal past? Will not the heirs of Immortality roam, in thought and ever growing knowledge, as far in the ages gone by as they shall live in the ages to come? For that inner experience which is so much better than the outward, is there any limit to our best being, either way? And while they who never can exist can never lose existence, will not those children of Adam who care not to be sons of God, suffer penal loss, in a real sense, of God's own Eternity?
THE STATE OF THE IMPENITENT DEAD. By Alvah Hovey, D.D. Pp. 168, 12mo. 1859.
We have elsewhere pointed out what we regard as serious historical errors in this book. (Human Destiny, pp. 116, 118, 123, 423.) Since Dr. Brown, in the tract above referred to (p. 27), renews to us the grant of Tatian, much against our will, we will here add other words of. that hard-thoughted Father. He says: "As we who can now die easily shall hereafter receive either immortality with pleasure or pain with immortality; so likewise the daemons, abusing their present life by sin, perpetually dying while they live, shall afterward receive the same immortality." (Ad Graecos, c. 14.)
We commend Dr. H.'s " remark, that neither science nor revelation assures us that Adam had observed the phenomena of death in the brute creation before the fall" (p. 95), to the attention of scholars. And if our first parents knew nothing about literal death, why should other evils incurred by sin be threatened under the name of death? 'Did the metaphorical sense of this word come first, and the literal or radical sense afterwards? And, is the figurative sense any more suitable in declaring a law, than the proleptic sense to which he objects, while he recognizes none of the many authorities, even of early versions, by which we support it?
When this writer "rejoices to find that Dobney hesitates to deny the eternal misery of Satan" (p. 83), we think his eagerness betrays him. Mr. D. simply chooses not to " inquire into the late of fallen angels" in his present argument, but to show that no eternal misery of men can be inferred from Rev. 20. 10. (Pp. 229, sq.) The reader will say if the reviewer meets that argument. And we think it is with an ill grace that one who takes hundreds of important passages in a figurative sense, insists on a passage in the most figurative of all the scriptural books, warning us that "to attempt any modification of its prima facie import" seems "a perilous tampering, with the word of God." We might with more reason utter this caveat on Ps. 21. 4; Ezek. 18. 4; Matt. 10. 28; Luke 20. 36; John 3. 16; Rom. 6. 23; Heb. 10. 27; 1 John 2. 17, etc., and then retort our author's motto: " O man, who art thou that replies against God?" But we prefer that others should speak thus ex cathedra. And when those words of Paul are put foremost, in a work maintaining the eternal continuance of that which is most opposed to God, let Paul's conclusion be the reply: Rom. 11. 36.
Our author's statements on pp. 89, 90, seem to us bold; and we commend them, with the rest of the book, to those who read both sides.
His theodicy (pp. 157, 158) seems to be that which we have examined under the title of "Infinite Motives" (pp. 104-107).
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
And the Final Condition of the Wicked carefully considered. By Robert W. Landis. Pp. 518. 12mo. 1859.
We are aware that the objurgatory style of this book is not liked by many who hold the view it gives. Yet the wide circulation which a very respectable imprint has given it, will justify some notice of its errors. Some of these are pointed out in " Christ our Life," p. 99, note. We may also refer to various and serious criticisms made in some numbers of the "Bible Examiner," by George Storrs, during the current year.
The work is largely devoted to confutation of those who deny the separate nature and existence of the soul. This is very proper, in a writer who constantly confounds separate existence with immortality, and who infers the general immortality of the soul from the rapture of Enoch and Elijah, and from Gen. 2. 7; 37. 35; Eccl. 3. 21; 12. 7; Zach. 12. 1, and Matt. 10. 28. That he should persistently characterize the doctrine of immortal life for all righteous persons and none others, as Epicureanism and Sadduceeism, is nothing strange. But it may be of use to remind his readers that even the Chevalier Bunsen, who severely censures a materialistic philosophy, yet says: " The idea of the philosophers of the last century as to the general immortality of the soul is a delusion; this doctrine is as untenable in philosophy as it is in theology." (Christianity and Mankind, 4. 336.)
To the author's citation of that unknown book, the Targum of Daniel, we will add another instance of his facility in valuable authorities. In a note on p. 313 he quotes as " a work of the second century, which, though strictly speaking anonymous, has ever been of high authority," the "Quest. et Resp. ad Orthodoxos," printed with the works of Justin. "Anonymous" is a gentle name for what the critics usually call "spurious;' or "adulterinum," as Otto styles this treatise, citing authority for a "cloud of witnesses." He and a dozen other critics assign it to various periods, from the end of the fourth to the beginning of the sixth century. Bellarmine alone, so far as we find, assigns it to the second century; and he sometimes takes it for Justin's own, though the writer contradicts Justin, and gives, says Otto, "not even a syllable of Justin's opinions." The internal proofs of its later date —in that it mentions Irenaeus, Origen, the Manichee’s, and the monks—plainly warrant Ma-ran in thinking it " strange " (mirandum) that anyone should call it Justin's.
In a note on page 371, Mr. L. attempts to convict Albert Barnes of what " deserves to be reprehended severely." Let us see how he succeeds. Mr. Barnes (Defense, p. 233) alleges that Grotius, in his " De Jure," uses the terms guilt and punishment in their proper sense; but, "when, he had a controversy with Socinus, and a theory to defend," he takes them as some-, times used without reference to personal ill desert. To this statement Mr. L. objects that Grotius did not write his " De Satisfactione" until 1616 (we find the date 1617), whereas Socinus died in 1604; that he then had no peculiar theory to defend; but that he had a specific theory when he wrote his " De Jure."
We hardly need reply that authors have two lives, and may be "controverted" after they are dead. Moreover, the very title of the "De Satisfactione" puts it " adversus Faustum Socinum," whose name appears in almost every page. And in chapters 4., 6., Grotius says that elitist was "justly punished" for our sins; while in his " De Jure " (b. 2, c. 21, § 12) he says that " no innocent person can be punished for the guilt of another." Finally, in the letter to which-Mr. L. refers, Grotius states his "theory" thus: "In the work De Jure Belli et Pacia I had this special purpose in view, to soften down that savageness, unworthy not only of Christians but also of men, in raising and waging wars at pleasure, which I see daily growing, to the detriment of so many nations." (Epist. 280.) If our pugnacious author had conned this "theory" better, he might have spared his thrust at a reputation which needs no defense.
On page 466, offering some account of the early Socinians, Mr. L. says: " Wolzogenius also, though with some of his brethren a little inclined to favor the doctrine of the ultimate annihilation of the wicked, says on Matt. 3. 12: ' Unquenchable fire. By this fire is signified an eternal condemnation, from which the wicked shall never at any time come forth or be set free." (The first italics and the translation are ours. Mr. L. proceeds:) " And on Matt. 10. 28, in a passage already referred to, he says: ' Since Christ here names the place, even Gehenna, where God shall destroy the soul as well as the body, it appears that he by the word destroy did not understand simply to kill or reduce to nothing — in nihilism redigere, (for God can do this immediately while the soul is separated from the body,) but torment and torture, sed torquere et cruciare.' See his powerful note also on John 5. 29."
These passages describe an " inclination " quite away from the annihilation view. But to the first extract Mr. L. might have added: " The word unquenchable does not here denote a fire such as burns the wicked ever and eternally, and never consumes or destroys them, but such as so burns them up and annihilates them that they shall never revive." And the context of the other extracts, with references to other statements, show that Wolzogenius did not waver in the belief thus declared.
It is not clear how much Mr. L. intends by the statements here made. But he is very welcome to call them "an offset to those false representations of Mr. Hudson, and others."
On page 399 he says of "future rewards and punishments" that Locke " believed in their perpetuity." The language quoted does not prove this; and the passages referred to (Essay, b. 2, c. 28, §§ 8, 12) assert only what all admit respecting the power of God. Setting out from this point he elsewhere says: God " cannot be supposed to make anything so idly as that it should be purposely destined to be put in a worse state than destruction (misery being as much worse a state than annihilation," etc.) (Journal, Aug. 7, 1681.) And the whole passage, coupled with the language we quote from his " Reasonableness of Christianity," makes the opinion attributed to him, we think, more than doubtful. We do not here charge Mr. L. with flagrant error, but he overlooks that which required his attention, and proves his own points too easily. (See below, p. 36.)
For Locke's opinions on the "immortality of the soul" we may also refer to his Journal, April 20, 1682.
A few words more respecting the "false representations" alleged against our book. The accuracy of the accuser appears on page 308, where he says that we "quote with approbation" a passage which we distinctly cite as one of " the severest reproaches and calumnies." (P. 259.) Mr. L. had just given several pages to convict us of "egregious and criminal misrepresentation," such as implies " the grossest incompetency," or else renders the supposition of our moral honesty "utterly inconceivable." (Pp. 304, 306.) This invective is certainly eloquent. And how convincing, too, side by side with gentle instruction of "our German cousins," who "seem unable to comprehend these plain distinctions " which Mr. L. lays down, and thereby have " made the ' confusion worse confounded." (Pp. 294, 295.)
What have we done? Mr. L. alleges that in the Pagan philosophy the term (commonly rendered immortal) denoted underived existence, and was synonymous with eternal (sempiternus); while the Christians applied it to man either in his composite nature, or, in the metaphorical sense of salvation; and that we, utterly heedless of all these distinctions, take it uniformly in the sense of continuance of being, and thus gravely impose either on ourself or on our readers.
Now, while we do not think it was ever a strict synonym of sempiternus, our readers are amply informed that the philosophers held the soul to be immortal because eternal. (Pp. 269-274, 298-301, 316.) And we afterwards (p. 322) call the phrase "immortal soul" "a Gnostic style of expression, in which Christians did not yet freely indulge; " though they bad begun to regard all souls as exempt from death. Again, while we quote several Fathers saying the soul is not immortal, in not a single instance do we thence infer that the writer held the actual extinction of the wicked. For other reasons we claim two, and only two, of the post-apostolical Fathers as holding our view. One of these, Arnobius, is conceded by Mr. L. The other, Irenaeus, is claimed against us by Prof. Hovey, to whom we here further reply that our claim is supported by Huet and some others. Since Mr. L. does not notice the passages we cite in proof, nor the grounds of our approval of Gieseler, who says of Justin that he "appears to regard it as possible that the souls of the ungodly will be at some time wholly annihilated," he is welcome to sneer at the "literary pretensions" of those who find traces of this doctrine in Irenaeus and Justin. (P. 295.) And when he thinks it " hard, very bard" to believe we "could purposely and designedly thus pervert facts " (p. 807), the reader may also think this is hardly credible, and repose his confidence where he sees fit.
We might forbear further criticism. But our historian must needs be an interpreter and theologian likewise, and we will add a word. He who tells us that " (kiln.) alone means simply to ascend" (p. 210), can easily find that we "pass from death unto life" in conversion (pp. 167, 329), and yet apply the same passage (John 5. 24), and Rom. 7. 24, .to the event of physical death (p. 330). Let him also refer Ps. 6. 5; Isa. 38. 18, 19; Job 28. 22; Ps. 30. 9; 88. 10-12; 115. 17; 118. 17-19; 1 Sam. 2. 9, to spiritual death (p. 322), and then set about correcting the " wretched shallow theologizing" that has been done upon Gen. 2. 17, apparently by Augustine, Calvin, and Turretin; informing us that neither toil, nor remorse of conscience, nor corporeal dissolution, nor eternal misery is the penalty there threatened, but these things are only consequences. (Pp. 322-326.) And since he tells us that " Christ has satisfied the law, and endured its full penalty for his people" (p. 129), we are sure that it is not spiritual death. Was it death in the abstract? Our author seems to think that "separation from God" is the true sense, and that this clears the divine justice. (P. 320.) One who justifies an eternity of woe so easily, may elsewhere tell us, respecting "the infinite evil of sin," that the expression "was originally derived from the Bible —Job 22. 5" (p. 398), ignoring the common consent-of commentators that the phrase there used bears no such sense.
Mr. L. hesitates to apply his doctrine to the case of the heathen. "What propriety is there," he asks, " in endeavoring to drag into the issue the question " respecting them? (P. 403.) If his pen had not on the same page grown petulant, and if he had not afterwards charged with "open and iniquitous trifling" (p. 500) those who, in seeking to justify the ways of God to man, offer a view of future punishment which admits an end of evil,—one might hope something from his anxiety on this grave question. May not the apparent doubt even in his mind make some others less dogmatic?
A passage in his title-page is very suggestive. We translate it thus: " All souls are immortal, even those of the ungodly; for which it were better not to be imperishable. For, punished in unquenchable fire with limitless punishment, and dying not, they can find.no end to their misery."
We have looked for this morsel, paraded thus without a name, but do not find it. It may have been written in the darkening ages; we are confident it is not from the earlier Fathers. So apt a motto, supported by a great and good name, would weigh something. And if, of its four unequivocal expressions of the immortality or of the eternal misery of the wicked, a single one had been found in the Scriptures, there might be an end of controversy. But though our author speaks of "a few of the texts" in which the soul is declared to be immortal" (p. 179), he offers no similar expression from the blessed volume. Yet a clear revelation of the received doctrine required expressions no less explicit, which are found in most other pretended revelations, and which so abound in modern theology. Their entire absence from the Scriptures has a significance which is beginning to be felt. (See below, pp. 36, 37.)
SADDUCEEISM. A Refutation of the Doctrine of the Final Annihilation of the Wicked.
By Rev. Israel P. Warren. American Tract Society. Pp. 66, l8mo.
To what we have already remarked upon some of the statements and reasonings of this writer (" Christ our Life," p. 150, note), we add a few words here for reasons which will appear.
When we saw the tract announced we thought of the probable embarrassment of a genuine disciple of Sadoc, if he were asked, " Do you believe in the final annihilation of the wicked? " "What do you mean," he would inquire, "by speaking of the wicked? I regard death as a law of nature, and an eternal sleep for all, however bad or good."
But the effort of this writer to make his epithet carry is so persistent that he does not hesitate to describe the doctrine he " refutes," thus: " All men, the righteous and the wicked, alike suffer the full penalty of the law; they cease to exist. There is no remission of the penalty, no forgiveness, no salvation." " Let them sin however much, they can incur nothing more. The worst that can happen will happen, at all events." (Pp. 63, 64.)
The essay is plainly, then, something more than a criticism upon erroneous arguments of some annihilationist’s. Deriving the doctrine from speculations in Egypt, Babylonia, and Greece, through the Epicureans and the Sadducees, and telling us that "a large portion of the modern Universalists hold it, with some modification, at the present time," (!) sedulously ignoring both the Christian tenets of those whose philosophy he censures, and the fact that many among us do not reason the matter thus, he presumes to say: " Such are the principal arguments relied on by its advocates in support of the doctrine of annihilation," and that all their other reasons "are of secondary importance" (P. 34.)
We say that he "sedulously ignores." He does more. Quoting these words from Mr. Dobney: " We understand the resurrection to condemnation to be a retributive resurrection to a second death;" he comments thus: " That is, to a second annihilation." (P. 10.) Yet Mr. D. expressly disclaims the view here imputed to him, saying that he is " as far from being a materialist as any of his readers." (Fut. Pun., p. 93.) There is, in fact, nothing in the words quoted to support the view — nothing which Mr. W. could not himself avow as his own belief.
In the next clause Mr. W. proceeds to quote, with some disregard of italics, the following sentence from our book, page 400: " The second death we regard as not the object or purpose of the resurrection of the unjust, but its result." This is proof with him that we are a materialist, though we devote whole pages to refutation of that view; and a random passage from Blackstone's Commentaries would have been as apt to his purpose. He seems so blinded by his zeal that the scriptural phrase, " second death," quoted by us in whatever connection, is with him proof of our " Sadduceeism."
It is fit that such a writer should seem to us to reason very crudely as well as confidently. We have already remarked his opinion that "even if the soul does die" it may still exist, and, we suppose he means, be immortal. (P. 16.) We will notice a few other things.
Quoting the Cyclopedia of Dr. Kitto (pp. 6, 7), he fails to distinguish his labors as author and as editor, and thus imputes to himself what is said by another writer. He is also careless in quoting Mosheim (pp. 56-58), omitting several lines without intimation, and also the modest introduction, "Unless I am altogether mistaken." The sense is scarcely affected, but the procedure is not scholarly nor safe.
The passage quoted from Dr. Mosheim gives his opinion that the passage respecting the Rich Man and Lazarus was directed by our Savior against the Sadducees. Mr. W. thinks the application is " undoubtedly " correct (p. 7), and that the " narrative" might "settle this matter forever, with all who receive the truth in simplicity and sincerity." And, much pleased with Dr. M.'s account of its import, he says: " Its correctness is apparent at a glance." Now, without pretending to exegetical skill, we may remark that most commentators have " glanced" at this passage with other eyes. Only Wetstein, so far as we now know, saw it in the same light with Mosheim. The work. of Dr. Trench on the Parables is considered pretty good authority; and he dissents decidedly from Mosheim, with counter-arguments which Mr. W. will do well to answer. Even more, Dr. T. thinks the parable was directed against the very Pharisees whose doctrine of the soul our author so warmly espouses. He says: " However loosely strung together, at first sight, verses 15-18 may appear, there is a thread of connection running through them all, and afterwards joining them with the parable, — there is one leading thought throughout, namely, that in all is contained rebuke and threatening for the. Pharisees." (P. 366.) He speaks of it as " being evidently addressed to the Pharisees" (p. 367); and as " announced " " to the Pharisees, who might be considered the representatives of the nation, for in them all that was evil in the Jewish spirit was concentrated." (P. 369.)
And with this application of the passage many, if not most, commentators agree. We may name Grotius, Bengel, De Wette, Olshausen, Ripley, and Barnes.
Another instance of our author's facility of proof, by authorities which he extols, is worthy of notice. Though the opinion is with some a rank heresy, it will serve his purpose if he can show that some kind of resurrection occurs at death, or that the term anastasis signifies the future state. Dr. Dwight offers to his hand, and is with him " the best authority." (P. 53.) Mr. W. quotes his exposition of the passage in Luke 20. 27-38, and says: "Of his competence to understand it and to speak of the meaning of the original word, we surely shall not doubt. Nothing can be more directly to the point before us — nothing more conclusive."
Perhaps so. Yet many good Christians think otherwise, and we find not a few good writers who support another interpretation. Alford speaks of the "striking remarks" of an able writer, " showing that the phrase children of God' is used by Matthew and Luke only of the state after the Lord's coming." (Christ our Life, pp. 53, 54.) And a recent writer, who is very orthodox, speaks of those who "quote the loose and rickety statements of Dr. Dwight in full, on the meaning of it, and then blink the whole question of the uses loquendi of the language itself." (E. Russell, D.D., Bibliotheca Sacra, October, 1860, p. 775.)
One example of strong language is worthy of note. "It is scarcely possible," says Mr. W., "to put into words a more glaring tissue of absurdities and profanations of truth than attend the doctrine of a resurrection, if man has no immortal soul." (P. 44.) But some of the writers we have just referred to take pains to say that " the immortality of the soul" does not explain the passage in Luke 20. 36. And Olshausen, commenting on that noble argument in which Paul refutes genuine Sadducees so much more gently than our author assaults those who daily speak of Jesus and the Resurrection, says: "The doctrine of the immortality of the soul and the name are alike unknown to the entire Bible."
We scarcely need to say that we regard this shaft, pointed with a false epithet, as deriving its force from the long bow that carries it. To the Boston American Tract Society we owe no ill-will. We bore a humble share in the early discussions on that silent policy which made another Society a refuge of oppression, and shall ever rejoice in the work for human freedom that grows from the recent separation. That the officers of this Society should be good, orthodox gentlemen, lies in the natural course of things. And we are willing that they should maintain their own views, though they duly criticise and "refute" those we hold. But we are sure that five years hence they will have treated us more justly than now. And we thus write because we think the wise friends of the Society will not ask so long a delay.
HUMAN DESTINY. A Discussion. Pp. 478, 12mo. 1860. Closing Review, pp. 443-478.
Our opponent in this discussion is clearly one of our a reviewers," and, as his " say " was somewhat the longer, he will allow us a few words here; the more readily, as we shall leave the main argument to speak for itself; and touch only trifles.
On page 469, Mr. C. thinks we make too strong a statement, in saying that aphtharsia " never means moral incorruptness, according to Passow, Schleusner, Bretschneider, Wahl, and Robinson." And he proceeds to infer that they regard it as having this sense, though they do not name it. As if a lexicographer might fail to mention a sense which he supposed a word to bear! Mr. C. appeals to Parkhurst and Robinson who do name such a sense, and the appeal is fatal to his previous argument.
He then attempts another inference. " Schrevilius defines thus: aphtharsi — immortality, incorruptible.'" Here the two Latin words are evidently taken in the same sense of immortality. But our friend thinks he finds that "incorruptible" bears also the sense he wishes to make out, and, translating a noun by an adjective, jumps to his conclusion.
We have sought for the list of adjectives he cites under the noun above named, and find them in Ainsworth. Of course, not under that word, but under incorruptible; and, what is more, the rare word incorruptible is not given by Ainsworth at all.
To render a noun by an adjective is an error not only in form but in fact; for every scholar knows that a noun may not have the same range of significations with the derived adjective. This is specially true in the present instance. All the lexicographers — at least the half-dozen we have examined — give a secondary and "figurative" sense of incorruption. But to neither of the noun forms, incorruption, does either of them assign a metaphorical sense. Some of them cite the Vulgate in Rom. 2. 7; Eph. 6. 24, and elsewhere, but they all give the sense of the noun, in whatever form, as uniformly literal.
In our Affirmative Argument, page 69, we gave aphtharsia as occurring in Tit. 2. 7, in the sense of " incorruptness." This error is corrected on page 434, and we remark: " My friend, also, must mend his Greek." Hence comes an odd tissue of errors. Mr. C. is sure that he need not mend his Greek, though he fails to understand my correction. He appeals to Griesbach: — PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY REVIEW. 27 Griesbach has adiaphtharia, as Mr. H. informs us. We will not differ from Griesbach. But the very thing we said was that the received text has adiaphthoria, and also aphtharsia, the word in question, which the critical editors omit, leaving only adiaphthoria, which is the proper term for " incorruptness." So our friend does differ from Griesbach, in supposing that he gives one of the above words instead of the other. He speaks of "the choice of MS. for the reading of this word." But the choice is between one word and two words.
The next paragraph we are not sure that we understand; but if we do, it " discovers " that we had made the very error which we were trying to correct for our mutual benefit. We can only decide one point wherein our friend is " not certain." " Griesbach's version," surely, does not " mend our Greek." And we know no " Greek version " of the Greek.
THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY REVIEW. Vol. 8. April, 1860. The Annihilation of the Wicked. Pp. 594-626.
This article is prefaced with the titles of several works, among which the writer speaks courteously of our own. But the care-lessness by which our name is twice mistaken will be found to extend, we think, to more serious matters.
The obnoxious doctrine is traced at the outset, by a plain argumentum ad invidiam, to the excitement a few years since respecting the end of the world. The so-called " Millerites," " partly to cover their retreat," " revived the old dogma." By similar reasonings the Romanist ascribes the Reformation to various frailties of human nature.
And when, some pages after, the writer speaks of various feelings which make men wish that suffering and sin might end, and yet says " Eternal suffering — it is an awful idea I We stand aghast before the terrible mystery" (p. 621), he betrays the " self-suspicion " which we have assigned as a perpetuating cause of the distressing doctrine. We wish his jealousy had made him more scrupulous in other matters.
For, on page 602, he sets down Mr. Dobney as a materialist for the following words: " The death threatened to Adam was the death of the entire man," "the extinction of being." Has he fairly read Mr. D.'s book?
Dwelling at large on the materialist view, — which he may refute a thousand times without proving either the immortality of all spirits or the eternal corruption of evil souls,— he at length says that our view " cannot fail to rob" not only " hell of its terrors," but " heaven of its glory." (P. 612.) How is this? Why — " Hell is simple death; and of course, heaven is simple existence"! To such wonderful facility of adverse argument we can only reply by referring to extended statements of our view that the literal sense of the phrases, " everlasting life," and, " to live forever," is primary, and the sense of blessedness, accessory. See " Christ our Life," pp. 45, 75-77, 127. To the words of Fritzsche there quoted, we here add the statement of Bretschneider, who closes a lengthy argument thus: "As one reviews this whole series of representations and expressions, one sees how far from correct they are who either take death for a miserable life, or render it by ' unhappiness,' and ' life' or 'eternal life' by 'happiness.' Rather, 'death' never means unhappiness, nor' life' happiness; but the former is always death, and the latter is always life; and the implied conception (Nebenbegriff) of wretchedness and happiness is purely accessory, and can never constitute the fundamental signification (Grundbedeutung)." (Evang. Pietismus, § 22, p. 264.) Does our author mean that the literal sense of immortality cuts off the hope of eternal blessedness? He almost says as much, when he attempts to criticize our view of the atonement as follows: " Mr. Hudson says, ' eternal existence,' not eternal blessedness, through holiness in Christ, ' eternal existence is of grace.' " (P. 623.) But if "life is more than meat," the gratuity of immortal life may extend to its blessings.
Omitting all recognition of the sense in which we take Eph. 2. 1, as well as of our authorities, the writer comes to Mark 9. 43-48, repeats the argument from the threefold repetition which we have before remarked, and concludes: " All going back to Isaiah 66. 24, to break the force of these words; to Ecclesiasticus and the Targum of Jonathan;' all the explanations about 'Tophet' or the Valley of Hinnom,' which the Annihilationist’s borrow from the Universalists, make but a puerile and miserable piece of pettifogging." To this protest against the comparing of a passage with its only parallel in Scripture, we must reply by saying what this critic may need to know,—that good orthodox commentators do freely refer to these same sources of illustration; and if he will show that they support any other doctrine than our own, he shall be our faithful instructor.
LOVE AND PENALTY; Eternal Punishment consistent with the Fatherhood of God.
By Joseph P. Thompson, D.D. Pp. 358, 1860.
In a course of lectures addressed to a mixed congregation we cannot expect a full account of the arguments offered for views that are combated. And when our author exclaims, "Away, then, with the gloomy retreat of the annihilationist" (p. 263), and adduces Gen. 2. 17; Isa. 33. 14; Matt. 8. 12; 25. 41; Mark 9. 43-48; Luke 16. 19-31; John 3. 36; Eph. 2. 1; 2 There. 1. 9; Rev. 14. 10, 11; 20. 10, in support of an infinitely gloomier doctrine, we need not be surprised if he fails to recognize our exegesis of these passages, supported by various orthodox writers. Nor will he be surprised if he fails to convince us of our " error," or — if we may quote a pleasantry of his— to "annihilate " us. Arguments are often advanced, not to change the opinions of men, but to prevent their being changed.
And yet desirable changes may grow out of such efforts. Thus, when we are told that the Old Testament "assumes" the immortality of the soul, and illustrates it as a truth too deeply imbedded in the soul to call for argument" (p. 254); and that Christ "assumed it as a familiar truth" (p. 258); and yet no proper expression of the idea is cited from the Scriptures, in a book full of varied expressions of it; — some will ask, Why have the inspired writers never named that which it is so hard for uninspired writers not to name?
Again, our author illustrates the primary importance, and we think also the weakness, of Matt. 25. 46, in the orthodox argument. "These shall go away into everlasting punishment; but the righteous into life eternal." Without reciting our half-dozen reasons why immortal life should not here be inferred from that which is put in contrast with eternal life, we may notice two or three things in the extended argument here offered (pp. 303—. 319) to show that the term in question, Kaanic (kolasis), excludes the idea of annihilation.
It is urged, negatively,—and the statement is six times repeated, finally in small capitals, — that this word does not mean annihilation. Who says that it does? There are those who hold that it may mean "cutting off," or "abscission." Thus Sir James Stephen, and even Mr. Landis. And such a sense would "cut off" all proof of deathless suffering from the passage. But neither of the three writers named by our author in connection with our view (p. 205) take the term in that sense. Neither the sense of abscission, nor of annihilation, is at all essential to our argument. And we think our author's repeated negative is apt to produce a false impression, and to mislead some readers. Others will perceive that all this negative argument is quite irrelevant.
But while we have no occasion to say that kolasis means annihilation, and regret this occasion even for explanation, the converse statement, that annihilation is punishment, has been so often made by good orthodox writers that we scarcely need re-peat it. Thus the younger Edwards, in the very essay from which our author quotes what he calls "an argument of irresistible force," says: " Endless annihilation is an endless or infinite punishment." (Works, 1. 80.) And when this concession is made by various great and good men, shall we suppose that mankind must still find eternal evil revealed, and most explicitly, in this single passage?
Besides the general difficulty of proving a momentous doctrine from any single word in either of the four Gospels, written in another language than that which Christ spoke, it is an open question whether Matthew wrote in Greek, or we have only a translation from a Hebrew original. The force of these facts is very well stated by Sir James Stephen, in the "Epilogue" from which we have published some extracts.
But our author does not endorse the concession, and therefore gives a more direct and positive argument, to show — what? That kolasis means torment, or suffering, or pain, uniformly? Nothing of the kind, though this is essential to his conclusion. He endeavors to show that it sometimes has the sense of torment, which we need not deny. Yet this sense is found among the lexicographers with difficulty. We discover it only in Sturz's Lexicon of Xenophon, and in Sophocles' " Glossary of Later and Byzantine Greek," to which our author appeals. That the final kolasis should be supposed to mean torment, after the soul began to be called immortal, was a matter of course. But the very name of the Glossary shows that its testimony does not reach the case. And the other witness, Sturz, who gives "torment" as a fifth sense, citing a single passage of Xenophon (Cyrop. 3, 1, 13), and 1 John 4. 18, — offers another sense as allowable instead.
And on 1 John 4. 18, to which our author also appeals, we find that Pickering defines thus: "A hindrance, an obstacle; ' fear bath an impediment,' i.e., by apprehension of punishment." He cites another instance where the word means " obstacle," remarks that the proposed substitution of another term is unauthorized, and that the same reading by Grotius in 1 John 4. 18 is incorrect.
Thus the authority for the sense of "torment," even in very rare cases, is either too late, or too doubtful, for the great argument. And in the two places where the verb occurs in the New Testament, Acts 4. 21, and 2 Pet. 2. 9, no one claims that it should be rendered "tormented."
The sense varied with time, and we think with dialect. In the record we have of Christ's teachings it occurs but once. If the somewhat uncertain note of such a rare word is the most distinct assurance of a penalty of deathless woe — elsewhere called death —to millions, we may well ask, What is Revelation?
The precise phrase in question, occurs in Philo, where it cannot possibly denote " eternal punishment." (See Debt and Grace, p. 118; Christ our Life, p. 123.) Though orthodox writers certainly will not fear to notice, and thus publish, this fact, yet such publication will, we think, mark a new stage of the discussion.
Nor is this alleged as the proper sense of the word in any of the twenty-eight examples of its occurrence in the Septuagint Greek. So far from this, our author, arguing against the favorite Universalist sense, of corrective chastisement, adduces two or three instances of punishment by death. And these are some of the instances we have offered against the current argument on Matt. 25. 46. In a death-penalty, kolasis loses not only its character of chastening and discipline, but also the sense of infliction that ends in pain. We may speak of a person as "tormented to death;" but kolasis hardly means torment. We may speak of a person as " punished to death;" but this is not the form of speech in the cases in hand. It is punishment by death. Death is the punishment; not the pain of dying, but the loss of life and all its joys. Thus kolasis acquires a more general sense than the original one of "trimming" and chastisement, and applies to anything that may be considered as penalty. Hence the phrase we adduced from 1 Esdras 8. 24: "They shall be punished, whether it be by death, or banishment, or confiscation of goods, or imprisonment."
Though the term kolasis, then, does not mean death, yet death is kolasis. And if the soul can die, or be by any divine judgment condemned to perish, that death will also be kolasis. And if annihilation is eternal death, it is also eternal kolasis — ever-lasting punishment; and no argument for the "immortality of the soul" can be made from that final and decisive judgment.
We remarked that our author adduces two or three instances from the Septuagint of kolasis by death. But death is the actual punishment in most of the twenty-eight passages where the word occurs. And there is one example which Dr. T. fails to notice, but which shows that there might be kolasis without the possibility of pain. A lifeless block of wood might be the subject of it. The author of the Book of Wisdom says of an idol image: "That which was made, together with him who made it, shall be punished. For neither were they from the beginning, neither shall they be forever." (Chapter 14. 10, 13.)
We need not dwell further on the fact which our author has thus brought out. But it is proper to remark that the phrase "to punish by death," is not rare in the classic writers, though they illustrate the usus loquendi of the New Testament less directly than does the Septuagint. We find instanced Euripides (Helene, 1171; Orestes, 762-3; Electra, 1028); Appian (Bell. Pun. 15; Bell. Civ. 2, 90); Xenophon (Cyrop. 3, 1, 13); Plato (Repub. 492 D.; Laws, b. 9. 863 A.) And Pape, in his Lexicon, speaks of the phrase as occurring "frequently."
By our author's own showing, then, we think that the term kolasis, so rarely used in the New Testament, does not prove the immortality of them that perish. But this is not all. He concludes an important discussion preliminary to his argument (pp. 297-303) by laying down a rule of interpretation very unfavorable, we think, to his result. Showing that various scriptural expressions of future punishment must be taken in a metaphorical sense, he remarks that such a sense cannot be allowed here. These special words of Christ, in a solemn account of the final judgment, must be understood strictly. He says: "The language of the text is not figurative." "The figurative language of the other passages must be interpreted by this exact and literal statement." The phrase "life everlasting," then, must be taken literally. The righteous shall "live forever." They " cannot die anymore." They shall have " length of days forever and ever." This literal sense, which we regard as supported by the weightiest reasons, and by the entire general tenor of the Scriptures, is the head and front of our offending. We simply insist that the obvious sense of our Savior's words, immortal life, is primary and ruling, and that immortality cannot be made out from the death, destruction, or kolasis contrasted therewith. Are these terms defrauded of any sense justly belonging to them, or is heaven despoiled of any glory, if this interpretation be allowed?
Love and Penalty. To reconcile these is the problem that presses every sufferer, and everyone who pities others' woes. The view we offer is supported, we think, by all analogy, since every serious and irreparable injury shortens life or precipitates death.
But when we suppose a final and extreme penalty —a last resort— which neither heals nor kills, the problem presents frightful if not insuperable difficulties. Given Infinite Love, to reconcile therewith—nay, to deduce therefrom—the ceaseless woe of millions of creatures of that Love. For, however rebellious any may become, — however they may seem to be verily children of the Wicked one, — yet we are all-an offspring from God, and we can exist only by his sufferance and upholding power. That eternal evil — rebellion forever — accords with no rational view of God's universal sovereignty, we have endeavored to show. And — to say nothing of the love of Him whose tender mercies are over all His works — we think no human reason can harmonize deathless pain with divine justice. Our author gives, in various pages, snatches of five or six of the theodicies we have examined. He advances nothing new, that we discover. But we may close with a few words upon his leading argument, which is in the general strain of Dr. Taylor's Lectures on the Divine Moral Government.
The demerit of sin, we are told, " must be determined from the nature and value of the law which it violates." And again: " The violation of this law is a deadly blow aimed at the happiness of the moral universe." (Pp. 140, 143.) The italics are ours. It seems to us that centuries of very weak human government have vitiated our views of the government that is divine. The last enactment of that government invites us to LOVE. And it gives commandment to love, not for the safety of the government, but from pure love to the governed, and with oft-repeated promise of "eternal life" to those who obey. Instead of this "new commandment," another Decalogue, it seems to us, would better suit the received doctrine of penalty. Startling as the sound may appear, would not the sense of the law which our author supposes run nearly thus?— Thou shalt not dethrone God. Nor create an Evil God beside him. Nor calumniate and ruin His good name forever. Thou shalt remember and regard His eternal blessedness, not changing it to infinite wretchedness. Thou shalt honor the laws which He has made, and not repeal or annul them. Thou shalt not destroy and annihilate the universe. Nor confound and reduce all things back to chaos. Nor steal away the world of matter from that of mind. Nor defame the angelic host, and mar the peace that reigns in heaven. And thou shalt not covet the power to commit these sins, or to strike a fatal blow at the welfare of all being. With some fear that our first reviewer will again misunderstand us, we humbly submit that the transgression of such a law would confer scarcely less " dignity of wickedness " than the common theory implies. And the cry of astonishment, —Is thy servant a God, that he should do this infinite thing!—seems to us as proper in the common view as it would be in the supposed case. If our author means to say that infinite guilt can attach to any rash act, or any wild, wicked dream of a puny creature, then let the infinitude be plainly stated, and the rational argument for deathless penalty stand or fall with it. If he does not intend thus, then why shall we not apply to the proper being of the incorrigibly wicked, and in their strict sense, those emphatic words with which his argument began: THE WAGES OF SIN IS DEATH?
We are indeed finite creatures, born of yesterday. But death is penalty—not inexorable fate. Sinful are we, but there love for us, and life. And though we are frail, eternity is not denied to us. " GOD SO LOVED THE WORLD THAT HE GAVE HIS ONLY BEGOTTEN SON, THAT WHOSOEVER BELIEVETII ON HIM MIGHT NOT PERISH, BUT HAVE EVERLASTING LIFE."
NOVEMBER 1, 1862.
Since the above was written we have found some things which vindicate our conjectures in page 19 respecting the opinion of John Locke, and in page 21 respecting the motto of Mr. Landis's book.
In the Life of Locke, by Lord King, in an essay entitled " Resurrectio et qua: sequuntur" (pp. 316, sq., Bohn's ed.), is a lengthy argument for our view, of which we have given the most significant passage, in our tract on " Eternal Death " (p. 4), and in that on "The Silence of the Scriptures" (p. 3), with his concluding words: " Taking it then for evident that the wicked shall die and be extinguished at last."
Our first clue to the alleged authorship of the motto in question was in a Catholic writer, Perrone, on the " Future Life of Man" (c. 6, Works, vol. 2., p. 831). He gives the passage as from Clement of Rome, without naming the place, but with a general reference to Dionysius Petavius, an eminent Jesuit writer.
We knew that no such utterance could be found in Clement. But, wishing to sift the matter thoroughly, we sent the clue to a E 41. literary gentleman who reported as follows: — An examination of the matter which you wished me to look up does not lead to any conclusions which will be very damaging to your literary reputation, or to your peculiar theological view. I have looked into Petavius, Theol. Dogma, De Angelis (Lib. 3., c. 8, § 5, in vol. 3., p. 113 of his Theol., Antwerp, 1700, fol.), and there find —' Clement of Rome, cited by Damascenus in his Selections, declaring the eternity of the punishments of the lost, says thus: ' — which is followed by a Latin translation of Mr. Landis's motto. This is given in Greek in a note, with the following reference: Clemens apud Damage., literature 10., Tit. 1.
Joannes Damascenus, who is thus referred to, wrote, as you know, in the eighth century. His Eclogae ' or Sacra Parallela ' consist of a collection of extracts from Scripture and the writings of various Fathers, under various heads, which are arranged in alphabetical order. There are two of these collections in the best edition of Damascenus, that of Le Quien; one contained in a manuscript belonging to the Vatican Library, and another termed the 'Rupefucaldine Parallels,' being found in a manuscript which formerly belonged to the Cardinal Francois de la Rochefoucauld (Lat. Rupefucaldus). The latter are believed to be the work of a compiler older than Damascenus, one who lived probably in the seventh century. But neither of these as edited by Le Quien, contains the alleged extract from Clement. In the list of writers from which extracts are given in the Eclogte or Parallela published from the Vatican MS., the name of Clement does not appear. In the Rupefucaldine Parallels the spurious Second Epistle to the Corinthians ascribed to him is cited several times, —but the Landis motto is not found. Under the letter X, Tit. 1, of ' The Saul and the Mind,' there is merely a citation from Irenaeus. The edition of Le Quien was published at Paris in 1712, in two vols. fol.
Probably Petavius found this citation in some edition or some manuscript of Damascenus. But its absence from Le Quien's edition leads one to doubt whether it really belongs to his Eclogae; it may have been added by some later and unknown hand, as a work of that kind was peculiarly liable to interpolations. If taken from any work ascribed to Clement of Rome, it seems not unlikely to have been de.. rived from the spurious Second Epistle to the Corinthians, which is several times quoted in the Rupefucaldine Parallels; the genuine Epistle, never.
So much for the motto! "
The Second Epistle contains nothing like the passage. See Debt and Grace, p. 290.
METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW. Vol. XLIII. January, 1861. Annihilation. By Rev. W. W. Patton. Pp. 31-49.
THE AMERICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. 3. April, 1861. Annihilation. By Rev. Enoch Pond, D.D. Pp. 215-231.
Neither of these articles is offered as a review, either of our books or of our arguments. And it would be a labor of Sisyphus to reply to restatements of hackneyed arguments in which most of the exegetical facts are ignored.
The first of these writers gives a passage sufficiently careless to be noteworthy. He says on Jude 7:— Of these fornicators he [the sacred writer] says, precisely as Jesus did of the rich sinner in hell, that they are now suffering the vengeance of eternal fire,' just as in the previous verse he had said of the fallen angels, that they were ' reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgment of the great day.' And even if the material cities were meant, the fire may have been termed eternal, as being supposed to be still burning, that country being alluded to by authors of that day as still smoking. (P. 43.)
Here is an assertion, in fact, that the Sodomites are consigned to the eternal fire before the angels for whom that fire was pre-pared, and before the final judgment. But the writer's italics ignore the form of the participle in the original, which refers it to the cities. And if he insists on its application to the inhabitants and in the present tense, the context will equally prove that they are now "giving themselves over to fornication, and going after strange flesh." But his last remark concedes that a fire called eternal may literally consume and destroy, — which destroys all his argument.
On another page he italicizes the phrase " abideth on him," in John 3. 36. So much is this passage insisted on that we may remark that God's wrath is not here said to abide forever. And if it were, the effect is named in Isa. 57. 16: "The spirit should fail before me, and the souls which I have made."
This writer argues against annihilation on the ground that the degraded Buddhists hold it. " Buddhism," he says, " which for centuries has numbered its votaries by millions in India, Burma, and China, has actually presented annihilation (or the state called nigban or nirvana) as the summit of hope, the final point of desire and perfection to be reached by gods and men!" (P. 46.) This statement impugns the common argument for the immortality of the soul from the general consent of mankind. And this doctrine might be explained as the perversion which despair has put on a truer doctrine of the extinction of those unworthy of eternal life. But this writer's description suggests, we think, the origin of the view. Nirvana, so far from being extinction, —the most utter and absolute removal from God,—was properly reabsorption into the divine essence. It was a form of apotheosis. The elements of it are found in the Bhagavad Gita, which illustrates the ancient pantheism, cited in " Debt and Grace " (pp. 266, 267). Extremes meet. Pantheistic apotheosis is no better than extinction. But it began by saying: "The soul neither kills, nor is killed." "It is ancient, constant, and eternal."
The second writer, having said that certain " arguments from nature for the immortality of the human soul, are all of them confirmed by the clearer light of revelation," and having cited Eccl. 3. 21, 12. 7, and Dan. 12. 2, concludes: — But it is in the Gospel emphatically, that life and immortality are brought to light; ' immortality, not for a particular description of men, but for all. Whether righteous or wicked, all are partakers together of immortality; all have entered upon an existence which is to have no end. (P. 223.)
The comment is doubtless a very clear assertion of a general immortality. But it is plainly not required by the text, since the words allow the sense that Christ has revealed eternal life for those who lay bold upon it. And it verbally contradicts such expressions as: " He that hath not the Son bath not life;" and "To those who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honor and immortality," etc.
And when the writer cries, in the next paragraph, " Shame upon the men" who deny the immortality of such as seek not for it, which even "the heathen" have affirmed, the shame may fall where it belongs.
Curiously enough, the same number of this Review gives for its third article, " Rothe's Address on Philip Melancthon." The editor hopes that the reputation of its distinguished author, Dr. Richard Rothe, Professor of Theology in Heidelberg, and the ability with which Melancthon's theological position and influence are delineated, will insure it a cordial welcome in this country, such as it has already received in Germany." We wish the same. The author incidentally shows ample respect for the classics of the heathen writers, even as models of ethics, while he is not bound by their metaphysics or theology. And those who are versed in the literature of our " heresy " will recollect how strongly Rothe asserts the extinction of the lost, even saying that "annihilation is death in the New Testament sense." (See " Debt and Grace," p. 159. and ' The Rights of Wrong," pp. 22, 23.) They who bandy epithets are apt to wound their friends.
We are quite content that one of these writers should grant us the benefit of heathen company while the other refuses it. The more so, since that ancient sect whose moral philosophy was most allied to the Christian — the Stoics — held the immortality of a class.
THE BOSTON REVIEW. Vol. 1. September, 1861. Immortality and Annihilation. Pp. 445-460.
This writer, introducing his article, adds to the titles of " Debt and Grace " and " Christ our Life " the following: " La Mort n'est qu'un Sommeil Eternel. Pere la Chaise. 1793."
The design of this is manifest: to associate with the doctrine of endless life for the righteous that Of the French infidels, that " Death is only an Eternal Sleep." As much as to say: They who affirm Christ to be our only hope of immortal being are in doctrinal kinship with those who cried, " Crush the wretch! " To assert a moral universe finally clean of evil, made up of those who follow after holiness, is to approach those who deny all moral universe by a doctrine of universal death. The exhortation to seek for immortality is caricatured as if it might mean, " Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." Thus extinction as penalty is confounded with extinction as inevitable fate; and God's judgment, destroying all that opposes his rule, is classed with a destruction that opposes and out rules God.
The writer partly recalls his grouping of books, and yet prints it. He may say what else he will.
Among his brave assertions, he tells us that " the whole projection of a rational being assumes the fact of its inherent im-mortality; " and he cites Jean Paul Richter as if to his purpose, though the passage is not good against our view unless by its Universalism. But he gives nothing like it — as he reads it —from Paul, or John, or the Richter (Judge) of all our faiths. He avers, indeed, that He who "brought life and immortality to light" "republished an obscured and fading truth," and "reaffirmed man's immortality;" but he does not cite the original declaration nor the republication.
He seems not to understand how man can lay hold on eternal life, if that includes immortality, without being the creator thereof; and he thinks some "palpable absurdities " are suggested by such doctrine. (Pp. 459, 460.) But any sceptic will allege all his "absurdities" against the doctrine of Peter: "Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which lives and abideth forever."
THE NEW ENGLANDER. VOL 21. April, 1862. Is the Doctrine of Annihilation taught in the Scriptures P Pp. 248-293.
It is said of Theodore Parker that he prepared himself for his discourse on the character of Daniel Webster by reading afresh every line of the published writings of that statesman.
We are personally of very small account. We are not even eloquent, as Webster was. But the question whether millions of our fellow creatures shall be eternally fiendish is at least as important as the analysis of the character and temporal career even of one great man. Our books have a little repute as representing one aspect of this great question. They are, possibly, at least worth reading.
The present reviewer names at the outset only our smaller books, " Christ Our Life" and " Human Destiny," which are plainly outgrowths of a larger work. He closes by saying: "In this examination of our author's works on the subject of the annihilation of the finally wicked, we have carefully endeavored not to omit any essential part of his argument," etc. We happen to know that he ordered the first book above named, apparently before seeing or reading it, for the purpose of his review. Also that he had not thoroughly read our principal work, though he had access to it, before sending his article to the press. Would Theodore Parker have been easily forgiven, if found thus working out a foregone conclusion?
The reviewer's Scripture argument did not require that he should examine our general argument, or even notice the book containing it. But when he asserts, at the outset, that the sacred word has " obliged all its hosts of readers to hold the same general views concerning God, the human soul, the way of salvation, and the future destiny of man," " through all the centuries," he should have shown, if he could, that our historical argument is faulty in its facts or its deductions. Yet his reader might suppose we have cared nothing about the history, though we give the chief points of it very plainly in one of the books professedly reviewed.
Again, the writer palpably ignores the contents of three entire chapters, — including our favorite argument from the silence of the Scriptures respecting the alleged immortality,— simply endeavoring to show that they stand in an illogical order. (Pp. 253, 254.) He would have us do something else first. In three other instances he requires proof of our main proposition before we adduce certain facts or arguments. (Pp. 252, 283, 290.) The reader will observe that in page 253 he complains that we have not first examined the use of the terms "life," "death," etc.; and in page 283 he complains that we do not touch a certain passage until, among other matters, we have first examined those terms!
That passage (Rev. 20. 10), we might easily guess, is of paramount importance with him. And, in fact, we find him quoting it two or three times to color, as it were, another of his proposed proof texts, before he begins the direct examination of that other text (Matt. 25. 41). (Pp. 283-285.) But he does not notice our exegesis of Rev. 20. 10.
He notices two of our authorities for the prolepsis which we maintain in certain passages. (Pp. 260-261.) But he closes his effort at reply by confounding the doctrine of prolepsis with that of an eternal now, exclaiming: " No one claims that the ‘everlasting life' is now all brought down into this present." With as good reason — or unreason — might we object to his sense of the phrase " hath everlasting life," because no one can live through a blessed immortality just now.
The remarks of Matthew Henry and Dr. Hodge on Eph. 2. 6 give real support, we think, to our exegesis, though the latter struggles against it.
The writer, as also the previous reviewer, might have spared the question whether we hold transubstantiation if our remarks in " Christ our Life," pp. 73, 74, had been noticed. How should our literal acceptation of the word " life" suggest any such thing, while that doctrine is held only by those who take the word life" in a metaphorical sense?
In his remarks on this point (p. 259) the writer calls the life which Christ gives "metaphorical or spiritual." But in his previous remarks on Gen. 2. 17 (pp. 255, 256) he thinks that "spiritual death" may have been most thought of, as if it were the primary and literal sense, and asks, " Is not the idea of death as exclusively physical rather the derived definition?" In this, and in his notion that our first parents could not regard the death of animals as showing the sense of the word " death," he agrees with writers referred to above, pp. 12, 15. But Albert Barnes, though he holds the " orthodox " view of the second death, says on Gen. 2. 17: "If an inquiry be made here, how Adam would understand this; I reply, that we have no reason to think he would understand it as referring to anything more than the loss of life as an expression of the displeasure of God." "It is incredible that Adam should have understood this (Gen. 3. 19) as referring to what has been called 'spiritual death,' and to ' eternal death,' when neither in the threatening, nor in the account of the infliction of the sentence, is there the slightest recorded reference to it." (Comm. on Rom. 5. 12.)
One instance of the reviewer's inaccuracy is worthy of notice. On page 254 he finds his author (in " Christ our Life") " saying that he is 'considering the alleged proofs of the immortality of the soul as such, or of man as man,' by which he may mean to exclude all evidence pertaining to the separate classes of men. But this should have appeared at the outset." We reply, this does appear at the outset, and thrice afterwards,—in the table of contents; in the division of the subject on page 7; in the title and contents of Chapter 4., which contains the above passage that half opens the eyes of the reviewer; and in the sentences immediately preceding that passage, which state emphatically, " We have purposely omitted several passages sometimes offered, which may fairly indicate the future life or the immortality of good men." And, " The reader will also recollect that we reserve the passages supposed to imply the immortality of bad men." (P. 32.)
The reviewer offers fourteen pages (267-281) to prove consciousness and punishment in the intermediate state. The gist of this argument lies, we think, in the statement that the "flame" of Hades (Luke 16. 24) and the fire of Gehenna are homogeneous, or of the same kind, and in the inference that if the latter destroys, the former must begin the process; and some, who have died long before the judgment, would perish before being judged. We leave all this, and his subsequent argument and his conclusion, with the reader.
THE FREEWILL BAPTIST QUARTERLY. Vol. 10. October, 1862.
The Annihilation of the Wicked not a Doctrine of the Bible. Pp. 373-387.
Passing over so much of this argument as is not new, we find the following paragraph: — Heb. 9. 27, 'It is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the judgment.' Those who contend for annihilation, speak of two literal deaths: first, physical death, which they believe to be the infliction of the punishment threatened for sin CPI and then what they call the second death, viz., a final passing out of existence after the resurrection and the judgment. But this text directly contradicts that idea, and asserts that while men will die before the judgment, he [they] will not die afterwards, for it is appointed unto men once to die, hut after this the judgment.' This, to our minds, settles the question of an annihilation, after the resurrection, while the spiritual death, which we think the unrepentant sinner will endure eternally, is one in which he is now involved. (Pp. 384, 385.)
What they call the second death. The writer, italicizing that death which even the Christian dies "once," seems to have forgotten that revealed sequel of the resurrection and judgment: "This is the second death. And whosoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into the lake of fire."
The writer's other proof-texts are Matt. 25. 41, 46; Mark 9. 43, 44; 2 Thess. 1. 9. He ignores most of the exegetical facts. And although our writers usually affirm the absolute sense of the word "everlasting," he charges them with " inconsistency " in that "after they have endeavored to prove that eternal, everlasting, and forever and ever, mean limited periods, they then turn round and tell us that annihilation is eternal, i.e., mending punishment." (P. 385.) Is the writer really "in meekness instructing those that oppose themselves, if God per-adventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth?" (P. 387.)