LONDON:
SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, AND CO., STATIONERS' HALL COURT.
1851
IN the following pages the first person plural is used;
notwithstanding the air of arrogance which some ascribe to that form of
expression. The writer knows that not a few Christians entertain opinions
somewhat similar to his, though, of course, with many variations. He has
therefore stated them plurally, as being in some measure the sentiments of a
class, which he believes to be increasing. By himself they have been strongly
held ever since he began to study seriously the Christian records. He has often
heard, and extensively read, the arguments against them: never with
acquiescence or assent, yet hitherto without any written attempt at refutation.
But to such an attempt some new reasons now induce
him. One of these is the circumstance—noticed by several friends—that a layman
of admired ability, in whose cordial respect for religion they truly rejoice,
has stepped aside, when treating of other topics, to cast a weapon at these
opinions. This is an added motive, though a minor one, for re-examining and endeavoring
to defend them. Not that the present writer, and those who think with him,
resent the charge of " feeble powers of reasoning; " conscious that
this feebleness is in every case much greater, than self-confident minds, in
their own case, imagine. But it is apprehended that the defense of
"infinite evil" from such a quarter, may produce in some thoughtful
persons new disaffection or prejudice towards Christianity; and may encourage
in others the stronger assertion of a dogma, which it is believed neither
Scripture sustains nor can reason vindicate.
There may be those who have renounced, or are prepared
to renounce, this dogma of endless evil, but who yet will shrink from indulging
the hope of any possible instance of "restoration" for the unsaved in
this life; as deeming such a hope entirely unwarranted by Scripture. Although the
writer here offers his reasons for believing that it is—on scriptural
grounds—in some cases allowable, still this (his readers should be apprised) is
not the leading topic or aim of the present Essay.
Its chief aim is negative; namely, to show that we are
not obliged, as Christians, to believe the endlessness of evil, but rather are
encouraged to expect the ultimate destruction of it, together with all in whom
it shall continue to bear sway.
This main argument would be still complete, if
Chapters 11, 18, 19, 20, and 21 (comprising about twenty-seven pages) were
passed over or withdrawn.
Those chapters relate to the consolatory though
dubious hope before referred to. But their omission would neither break the
continuity of the chief argument, nor diminish its strength. If that hope be in
other passages incidentally implied or adverted to, it can by such readers be
easily laid out of view, as forming no part of the general negative
conclusion—that evil will not be endless.
The writer has sought to avoid amplification, in order
not to enlarge this little volume beyond what a careful inquiry appeared
strictly to demand.
1 ON THE MEANING OP THE WORD INFINITE.
Cudworth on its strict sense, as belonging to God only
How used—of space—of bodies—of created spirits
Whether "sin an infinite evil "
2 ON THE DOCTRINE OF "INFINITE EVIL."
What it involves concerning God; Robert Hall's view of
this
Witherspoon—Saurin—Turretin—Tillotson—" Newest Whole Duty of
Man"—Dr. R. W. Hamilton—on endless sin
Endless augmentation of it involved
Case of fallen " spirits." Dr. Gray
3 ON THE SUPPOSED EXCESS OF GOOD TO RESULT FROM "INFINITE
EVIL."
Expected to be vast (contrary supposition of Fenelon)
Expectation examined. Possible state of things in the
Millennium
Other beings fallible, and some fallen
Fenelon on God's agency
4 ON THE ATHEISTIC TENDENCY OF THE DOCTRINE OF "INFINITE
EVIL."
Notion of creatures absolutely indestructible,
atheistic
Limitation, by endless evil, either of God's power or
goodness
Tendency to the impious consequence that God may do
evil
5 ON THE OBJECTION THAT THE EXISTEXCE OF EVIL MAY ALSO
BE THE GROUND OF ATHEISTIC ARGUMENT.
Argument of Epicurus, and of Richard Carlisle
Immensity of difference between the terminable and the
endless
Supposed act of the best of sovereigns
6 ON THE PLEA FOR "INFINITE EVIL," DRAWN
FROM THE TRUTH THAT GOD IS NOT ITS AUTHOR.
"Theologica Germanica"
Persian dualism
7 ON THE OBJECTION THAT THE PRECEDING ARGUMENTS ARE
NOT BUILT ON SCRIPTURE.
This denied—Professor M. Stuart—Dr. Chalmers's canons
Dr. Pye Smith on interpretation
8 ON THE RULE OF LITERAL INTERPRETATION, AS APPLIED TO
PRECEPTS.
It requires to be limited. Tholuck
on Sermon on the Mount.
Origen—Scoptzi
Jerome—Olshausen—Augustine—Calvin
9 ON THE SAME RULE, AS APPLIED TO SCRIPTURAL
DECLARATIONS.
Dr. Campbell on John 8.51. John Asgill—Adams
of Wintringham
Other texts in the gospels examined
10 ON THE TEXTS BY WHICH THE DOCTRINE OF ENDLESS SIN
AND SUFFERING IS COMMONLY HELD TO BE ESTABLISHED.
Texts, in Matthew, Mark, Peter, Jude, and Revelations,
cited
How to be treated
11 ON THE TEXTS BY WHICH THE DOCTRINE OF "
UNIVERSAL RESTORATION " IS THOUGHT TO BE SUPPORTED.
Texts, in John, Romans, Corinthians, Ephesians, Philippians,
Colossians, Timothy, Titus, 1 Epist. John, Apocalypse,
cited
Should modify interpretation of preceding
12 ON THE TEXTS WHICH APPEAR TO TEACH THE ULTIMATE
"DESTRUCTION" OF THE WICKED.
Texts, in Matthew, Romans, Corinthians, James,
Revelations, cited
13 ON THE TEXTS WHICH PROMISE " LIFE " TO
THE RIGHTEOUS.
Texts, in Matthew, Mark, John, Romans, Corinthians,
Timothy, 1 Epist. John, cited
Contrast weighty against endless evil, but opposed to
universal restoration
14 ON THE TEXTS WHICH DECLARE THE FUTURE SUFFERING OF
THE WICKED.
Texts, in Matthew, Mark, Luke, Revelations, cited
Inferences from them
15 ON THE QUESTION HOW FAR MAN'S NECESSARY OR
UNIVERSAL IMMORTALITY IS TAUGHT BY REASON OR SCRIPTURE.
Argued to be so, by Dr. Hamilton and Professor Stuart.
Doubts of Cicero, Socrates, Plato
Warburton and South on " the image of God"
Bradley on man's dependence—Richard Baxter—Isaac Watts
Existence wholly dependent on God's will
16 ON THE DOOM OF THOSE WHO PERISHED IN THE DELUGE.
Comments on Gen. 6.5, 6. Bishop Newton on the number
of antediluvians; and Dr. J. P. Smith
Bishop Horsley on their state; argument on their doom
17 ON THE RECONCILEABLENESS OF THOSE TEXTS WHICH ARE
THOUGHT TO DECLARE ENDLESS PUNISHMENT, WITH ULTIMATE "DESTRUCTION."
Comments on Matt. 25.46; texts which should influence
our view of this
Destruction an everlasting punishment
Pharaoh's host—Ravaillac—Damien.
Comments on Mark 2.43
18 ON THE PLURAL OR DIVERSE SENSES OF SOME WORDS
AFFECTING THIS CONTROVERSY.
The words rendered " ever" and "
everlasting." Stuart—Peter Martyr—Fuller
" Ends of the ages." "Before the
ages." Bloomfield—Ignatius —Eusebius
Juxtaposition of the same words in different senses
Parts of Greek Scripture, a version. Dr. A. Clarke
Senses of "punishment." Aristotle—Clemens Alexandrinus—Philo
19 ON THE DUAL OR PLURAL SENSE OF SOME OTHER PASSAGES,
AND ITS APPLICATION TO OUR SUBJECT.
Exemplified in Acts 10.15, John 13.8, Matt. 24.34, 44
A phrase may have plural meanings
Saurin and Broughton on "ambiguity"
20 ON THE DOCTRINE OF PARTIAL OR OCCASIONAL RESTORATION.
Doctrine of " universal restoration" not
warranted
Case of Judas
Justin Martyr on Socrates, etc.
St. Paul on the Gentiles
Argument for partial restoration
Opinions of Plato and of Virgil on future punishment
21 ON PARTIAL OR OCCASIONAL RESTORATION (continued).
Conciseness of Scripture
Restoration in the " separate state;" Olshausen on this
Augustine and Clemens Alexandrinus
maintain it
Philo Jutheue on Cain
Warning
22 ON METHODS USED BY DIVINES FOR MITIGATING THE
DIFFICULTY AS TO ENDLESS EVIL.
Saurin's principle
Objections to it
Dr. Harris on Foster
Archbishop King's hypothesis
Dr. Ridgley and Dr. Watts on the infants of the wicked
Our opinion of those methods
23 ON THE SILENCE OP THE APOSTLES, GENERALLY, AS TO
ENDLESS EVIL.
Except Matthew and Mark
Paul's Epistles
Epistles of Peter, James, and John
Discourses of apostles
24 ON THE OBJECTION THAT, IF THIS DOCTRINE BE
DISPROVED, OTHER FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES MUST BE RENOUNCED.
Professor Stuart's rash assertion
Its consequences
Eternity of God—its proofs
Everlasting life—its proofs
Dr. Gray's critique on Foster
25 ON THE OBJECTION THAT THE DOCTRINE WE QUESTION IS
CLOSELY LINKED WITH THAT OF THE ATONEMENT.
Dr. Stephen West's reasoning
Dr. Gray's argument
Bishop Pearson
Our contrary views
26 ON THE OBJECTION THAT OUR DOCTRINE LULLS MEN WITH A
DELUSIVE HOPE.
The charge
The reply
Sir J. Stephen—Dr. Jortin
Dr. Hamilton on views of infidels
27 ON THE ILL EFFECT OF FINDING THE DOCTRINE OF
ENDLESS EVIL HELD BY SPIRITUAL GUIDES.
It lowers confidence in their judgment on every point
Robert Hall's admissions
28 ON SOME PRACTICAL RESULTS WHICH SHOULD FOLLOW FROM
THE RECEPTION OF THE " POPULAR " DOCTRINE.
Celibacy
Number of the saved
Diversion of the mind
Checks and promptings to missionary effort
29 ON CERTAIN THEOLOGICAL STATEMENTS WHICH TIME HAS
MODIFIED.
Review of our method
Some interpretations dropped by the orthodox.
"Marrow of Divinity "
Author quoted by Burnet
Reynolds on God's grandeur
Judicial severities lessened
30 ON THE OPINIONS OF SOME EARLY CHRISTIANS.
Justin Martyr—Hamilton's comment
Irenaeus
Arnobius
Jerome
Gregory Nazianzen—Gregory Nyssen
31 ON THE RETROSPECT OF THE WHOLE.
Transubstantiation less injurious to God's attributes
than "infinite evil"
"Eclipse of Faith"
Our arguments may be ingeniously assailed
Prayer, and protest against abuse of doctrine,
advocated
Warning, and concluding prayer
THE question cited in our preface—"Why not
infinite good out of infinite evil?"--must be taken to imply—for it else
can have no weight—that, in order to the production of infinite good, the
existence of infinite evil is indispensable.
Before treating of that awful question, it is well to
premise, that, in the sense there attached to the word infinite, —which is a
very common use of it—infinites indefinitely differ in amount; for one might
safely assume, what in fact is intimated by words preceding, that the infinite
good is expected to be greater than the supposed infinite evil. The word,
however, is not thus used in its stricter and proper sense. " Infinite
space," writes Cudworth, " beyond the material world, hath been much
talked of. —But, as we conceive, all that can be demonstrated here is no more
than this; but, how vast soever the finite world should be, yet there is a
possibility of more and more magnitude and body still to be added to it by
divine power infinitely;—which potential infinity, or indefinite increasable of
corporeal magnitude, seems to have been mistaken for an actual infinity of
space."
Indeed the term Infinite, in its true and full
meaning, appears applicable only to the Self-existent. Of Space, it may perhaps
be said, as of God, that it is without beginning, without end, and without
boundary. But then Space is at most a negative infinite. So that we may affirm
with Cudworth, the true Infinity " is really nothing else but perfection.
Infinite understanding is nothing else than perfect knowledge. Infinite power
is nothing else but perfect power—a power of producing all whatsoever is
possible. Lastly, infinity of duration or eternity is really nothing else but
perfection, as including necessary existence and immutability in it. And because
infinity is perfection, therefore can nothing which included anything of
imperfection in the very idea and essence of it be ever truly and properly
infinite. There is nothing truly infinite, neither in knowledge, nor in power,
nor in duration, but only one absolutely perfect Being; or the Holy
Trinity."*
If of Space it may be affirmed that it is an endless
extension every way, at least all so-called corporeal " infinites"
can be only as endless lines of less or greater breadth. It is true, this
language, as applied to spiritual beings and qualities, is figurative; as the
notion of boundless space or all-comprehending extension is figurative when
applied to illustrate the Divine Omnipresence; inasmuch as extension does not
belong to spirit.
But the figure as used in the one case is analogous to
that employed in the other. If God's presence and duration may be likened to
illimitable space, so may a created spirit's being and duration to an endless
line. Or we may say—as is God's infinitude to boundless space, so is a created
spirit's existence (if He prolong it) to an unending line. These lines may be
considered as more or less broad, more or less bright, or more or less
attenuated, or dim, or dark, according to the excellency or obscurity, the
goodness and happiness, or the evil and imperfection, of the minds which they
represent.
But thus, the very phrase "infinite evil,"
and the proposition which has been often laid down, "sin is an infinite evil,"
appear to be in truth unmeaning or fallacious. It has been usual to disprove
that proposition by arguing, as Whitby does: " If all sins be for this
reason infinite as to demerit, then the demerit of all sins must necessarily be
equal; etc. Hence it will follow that God cannot render unto every man
according to his works, because though they commit innumerable sins, He can
only lay upon them the punishment due to one only, because He cannot lay upon
them a punishment which is more than infinite."* But we apprehend there is
another and further way of viewing the matter. Infinite, properly speaking, we
have seen belongs only to God and his attributes; certainly therefore not to
evil. Besides, to suppose a finite mind to have or originate something infinite
seems a contradiction. It has been shown that by infinite, in its secondary
sense, only endless is meant; but to say "sin is an endless evil," is
only to assume or beg the question in debate. Moreover, if "
infinite" really means perfect, and if, when unfitly applied to sin, it
can only mean endless, then the argument that sin is an infinite evil may be
put in other and correct words thus: God is perfect, whom sin immensely
outrages and opposes, therefore sin shall do so unendingly; an argument which
seems to carry its own refutation in the very terms of it.
CHAPTER II.
HE who believes, or imagines that he believes, the
existence of "infinite evil," professes a belief that the Being of
whom it is declared "none is good, save One, that is God"—of whom it
is revealed that " God is Love"—either wills to make, or must make,
of sin and suffering absolutely endless, in order thus to produce a larger
amount of holiness and happiness which shall be alike endless.
"If," says Robert Hall, "the eternal
misery"—that is, endless sin and suffering—"of a certain number, can
be rendered conducive to a greater amount of good, in relation to the universe
at large, than any other plan of action, then the attribute of goodness
requires it." [Works, vol. v. p. 528] We have used the phrase, endless sin
and suffering, because all (it is believed) who hold the doctrine, maintain
that, where suffering shall be endless, sin will be equally so.
Dr. Witherspoon, a calm and thoughtful divine of this
school, has the following statement: "What is damnation? It is to be for ever separated from God. It is to hate God and
blaspheme his name, as well as be banished from his presence." [Essay on
Regeneration, p. 269.] Saurin, in treating of the
qualities of future punishment, states the fifth and last of these to be
"increase of crime." And he asks, " Is not this the height of
misery? to hate by necessity of nature the Perfect Being, the Sovereign Beauty,
in a word, to hate God? O miserable state of the condemned! In it they utter as
many blasphemies against God as the happy souls in heaven shout hallelujahs to
his praise." [Sermons, vol. 3.p. 348. Robinson's translation.]
Turretin, an eminent Swiss divine, states, "The infinite
demerit of sin, however, is punished by a penalty of infinite duration. And
this the more justly, since as they never cease from sinning against God, so
neither from being punished by God, and as the guilt of crime will ever remain,
nor be cancelled by any expiation, nor any place be given for repentance, but
those sinners will ever burn with insane hatred of the Judge, and curse Him
amidst the flames, so the wrath of God, the most just avenger of wickedness,
will abide on them eternally."
Archbishop Tillotson remarks, "It cannot well in
reason be otherwise, but that a creature, which is extremely miserable, and
withal desperate, and past all hopes of remedy and recovery out of that dismal
state, should rage against the author of its torment, and do all the despite to
Him that it can, and wish that He were not, though it be in vain to wish
so."
The " Newest Whole Duty of Man" declares,
" The infinity of God makes infinite wrath the just demerit of sin. Those
that shall lie for ever under his wrath, will be
eternally sinning, and therefore must eternally suffer." And again, "
The condemned suffer eternally, since they will sin eternally:—nor can their
torments excuse their horrible sinning under them; for it is not the wrath of
God, but their own wicked nature, that is the true cause of their
sinning."*—Pp. 143, 503.
A much more recent writer says, "Man is an
immortal being. Always a solemn attribute, in certain connections it becomes
terrible. Sin has no tendency to wear itself out, or to loosen its hold upon
the mind. Therefore sin reigns. Therefore ' they cannot cease from sin.'
Moreover, instead of a supposed tendency in evil to exhaust itself, it unfolds
all the powers of a self-multiplication. We have simply to follow out these
views of sin through the future duration of the sinful soul. There is nothing
in this to limit such tendencies." [Hamilton, Rewards and Punishments, p.
245.] And again, he says of the lost, "Their will is singly sinful. Its
most distant, its endless, bias may be foretold. Everlasting punishment had not
been prepared but for that which would be, of its very choice, everlasting
sin." [Ibid., p. 371.]
This author had stated previously, "The natural
man's will is in Satan's fetters, hemmed in, within the circle of evil, and
cannot move be. yond it more than a dead man can raise himself out of his
grave."—Page 66. This work is stated to be recommended by Mr. Hervey, author
of " Meditations," etc. It is earnestly recommended, in the preface,
to youth, and as a family book.
But this being so, then must each line of sin (if not
of suffering) be not merely endless, but ever widening in breadth, and
deepening in darkness; so that, after a lapse of countless ages of ages, the
collective amount of sins of an individual spirit at that moment, shall
immensely exceed the collective amount of sins of all the condemned, unitedly,
in the earliest periods of their condemnation. For even if it be held that
suffering shall not augment proportionally, it is not conceivable that the
amount of sin itself should not augment by repetition and persistence.
We are aware that it has been attempted to obviate or
alleviate the moral difficulty as to unending evil, by abstruse speculations
concerning existence not in time, and the difference of such an existence from
one of successiveness and unendingness. (See " Disquisitions of Soame Jenyns.") But, an
existence of simultaneous wholeness is ascribable only to the Eternal, the
Self-existent. Nor do we think that any mode of the being of creatures—not even
of the bodiless and non extended—is conceivable,
which does not involve either successiveness in time, or else something
analogous or equivalent to successiveness, and to which the term endlessness
might be applied; whatever terms unknown by us might be needful to describe the
state more appropriately and fully. The attempt referred to succeeds rather in
making the mode of future life appear inconceivable and unintelligible, than in
really lessening the moral difficulty of which we treat.
That epoch therefore in an endless duration must, by
the supposition, arrive, when the sin of any one condemned sufferer shall by
mere addition, if not by heightened and multiplied intensity, transcend all the
moral evil which subsists at this hour in our world; and still with the sure
prospect of an incalculable never-ending increase. Nor, if misery do not
increase in the same immense and dreadful ratio, could this difference,
according to the hypothesis we are examining, be because that increase is not
deserved. The difference (we suppose) must be, because suffering is passive,
while sin is active; misery a result, but sin an act; and therefore misery
cannot be, as sin must be, strictly cumulative from the whole past. But it
suffices for our argument, that by the hypothesis, the sin of an individual
spirit would be as a line for ever growing endless in length and immeasurable
in breadth, advancing still into that awful infinitude; while the endless
misery would be caused by the " everlasting sin" of creatures whose
existence God willed to perpetuate.
The inference which we are constrained to draw, from such
opinions and the consequences they involve, is pretty obvious: it is, that
endless sin and misery are incredible. "This has, however," we are
told, "the disadvantage of proving too much; being conclusive, if
admitted, against the endless punishment of fallen spirits, not less than of
fallen men. That the difference between their nature and ours may be immense,
is admitted; it must, however, shrink into nothingness, if we compare either
with the Divine." [Gray, Immortality, p. 65.] Now we own that we shall not
think of our conclusion as "proving too much," if it can prove the
final extinction of evil in all cases. We may know too little of the nature or
state of fallen spirits not human, to argue on this. But should it at length be
found, that the Son of man came not only "to destroy the works of the
devil," but ultimately to destroy or to reclaim the Evil One himself with
all his host, who would not devoutly exult in this triumph, as a glorious
fulfilment of the word " He hath put all enemies under his feet.” [1 Cor. 15.25;
compare 2 Thess. 2.9, and Heb. 2.14.]
That divine, we think, must be what an old writer
styles "heaven's privy counsellor," who can positively demonstrate
(what is commonly assumed) that the devil and his angels must, in their revolt
and depravity, necessarily exist and act, as long as the holy and ever-blessed
God exists and acts.
BY those who regard this as the scriptural and true
doctrine, it is, we presume, without doubt held also, that the amount (in
breadth or extensiveness, and in brightness or intensity, so to speak) of
endless holiness and blessedness, shall immensely exceed the vast and endless
sum of moral evil; and this as a result of that evil and of its incalculable
boundless augmentations: a result which, without these in their full extent,
could never have been attained.
All this we admit is conceivable; nor could it have
been thought beforehand that any other supposition would be made, even as a
possibility. We find, however, a most eminent writer expressing himself thus:
" Thy glory would not be less, even if no one man received the fruit of
the Savior’s death. Thou could have caused him to be born for a single
predestined soul: a single one would have sufficed, if Thou had willed but one:
for Thou does all to accomplish thy wholly gratuitous will, which has no other
rule than itself." *
Bit with regard to the first and incomparably happier
supposition, where are the phenomena in nature, or the assurances in
Scripture—after granting the doctrine of never-ending ever-accumulating moral
evil—which can certify or fully persuade us of this? As to the actual state of
our own race, facts point to a different conclusion.
There is ground to believe that the amount of
rejection
* Fenelon, cEuvres Spirituelles, tom. 1.p. 38.
10 SUPPOSED EXCESS OP GOOD.
and neglect of spiritual good, of moral perversion or
utter ignorance, and of unfitness for real happiness, very far exceeds that of
love to truth and goodness, and preparedness for a heavenly state. Nor is it
quite clear (unless certain texts be taken in a sense which our opponents
condemn) that any such new condition of our race, as a whole, is predicted or
promised, as would entirely change the preponderance into that of spiritual
good and blessedness.
But even were this clear, it could neither annul the
present nor the past preponderance of spiritual evil, nor their unending
results.
It is granted that a considerable argument may be
raised in extenuation or abatement of the great difficulty we are discussing,
if we may expect a Millennium for our race, in which all will attain moral
renovation and spiritual preparedness for felicity: assuming further that this
earth, by some divine bounty miraculously profuse, shall be fitted to support
such an immensely augmented population. For if the aggregate of mankind then go
on to be doubled and redoubled only in each half century, the progression in
those ten centuries would be vast beyond all the conception of any who have not
computed it.
We shall find, in the twenty reduplications of the
thousand years, the number of our population multiplied 524,000 times and upwardg, so that the result would be
about 500 billions. This
doubtless is a cheering and wonderful thought, reminding us of what the
Creator, Savior, and Sanctifier of man may do, even without any suspension of
physical laws. Such an ordination would divinely alter the proportion of moral
evil and misery to that of good and happiness in this world. But still, happily
as it would change the relative or comparative aspect of God's ways and doings,
it yet would not alter, actually and absolutely, either the past or the
present. It
SUPPOSED EXCESS OF GOOD. II
would not annul the fact, that unnumbered spirits have
passed through this life without attaining holiness, and that therefore—on the
"orthodox" scheme—there is to be a never-ending addition of sin and
suffering, as it respects each one of that uncounted multitude.
But Reason also teaches that other beings or races are
in all probability fallible; and Scripture affirms that some others have
desperately fallen.
What certainty then have we, on the above hypothesis
of "infinite evil," that evil will not be as "infinite," as
vast and increasing, in the created universe, as good—or even more so? Will it
be said, that the perfections of God exclude this supposition? We reply, when
it is held unwarrantable to question that the perfections of God necessitate or
admit an absolutely unending augmentation of evil, the objector is palpably not
warranted in himself deciding what relative proportions of created good and
evil are or are not consistent with those same perfections.
If he does not say with Fenelon, " a single one
made happy would have sufficed, if Thou had willed but one," it behoves him at least to say, the Untreated
all-comprehending Good is the true Infinite; and all evil as well as good in
creatures, which God permits by upholding their being, is consistent with that
really infinite Good, whatever may be the relative proportions. But, if this
satisfy the objector, it must not be expected to satisfy us. For if we suppose
an excess or even an equal sum of moral evil and unhappiness in creatures, then
the Perfect Being upholds the existence of those whose sin and misery will
result in only a minor or equal sum of good. The author before quoted writes,
concerning the Deity, "As all which exists, exists only by the
communication of his Infinite being, as all which has intellect has it only by
an efflux of his sovereign reason, and all which acts acts
only by the impression of his supreme activity, it is He who does all in all;
it is He who in each moment of our life is the pulsation of our heart, the
movement of our limbs, the light of our eyes, the understanding of our mind,
the soul of our soul: all that is in us—life, action, thought, will—is by the
impression of this Power and Life; of this eternal thought and will. —Attention
costs Thee no pain. If Thou should cease to have it, all would perish; there
would be no longer any creature which could will, or think, or subsist. Wherever
God is He does all, and as He is everywhere, He does all things in all places.
He effects a perpetual creation, unceasingly renewed for all bodies: no less
does He create at each instant all free and intelligent creatures."*
This is incontrovertible. Therefore, on the
supposition of never-ending evil, the infinitely good and holy Being entirely
sustains the endless existence of growingly sinful creatures, whose criminal
and miserable course the mere suspension of his will and energy to uphold them
would at any instant terminate.
THE notion that the human spirit is in itself
indestructible, has been sometimes hazarded, apparently in order to obviate the
conclusion that the endlessness of evil depends on God's will. But that fact,
if proved, would at once elevate the creature into independency, and constitute
it in this respect a God. It could then no longer be said of the Supreme, He
"only hath immortality." Thus to suppose creatures who must
necessarily go on to exist, " nor borrow leave to be," is a direct
limitation of Omnipotence, and in truth, a sort of atheism.
But even apart from this, the unperceived tendency and
issue of the doctrine of "infinite evil" appears to us atheistic,
even when held by those whose creed and purpose are just the contrary.
For, let it be examined, to what their hypothesis
really leads. It is with them a first principle that God is infinitely good or
holy; nay, that God is Love. It is also held that God wills or permits moral
evil to be endless, by upholding endlessly the existence of those creatures who
will never be freed from it, and without whose being it would not be. It is argued,
this must take place, cannot but be ordained or permitted, if the highest good
and happiness are to be secured to others. In order that some creatures may
become and ever continue like God in holiness and bliss, others must subsist
without end in sin and misery. This course of argument is naturally chosen by
the devout, because it would appear still less consistent with' piety and
reverence, to limit God's infinite goodness, than to circumscribe the divine
power; more impious to say that God prefers to permit the endlessness and
boundless augmentation of sin and its results, than to say that God cannot but
permit this, if endless and transcendent good is to be secured.
Nor can we discern any medium between these
alternatives.
If there be more than one possible method of producing
endless good, and God chooses to produce it by the method of permitting endless
evil, then He chooses to permit endless evil. If that be the only possible
method, then it must necessarily be taken, and the divine power is restricted
to it. But to suppose a restriction or defect of the divine power in any
instance which does not involve a sin or a contradiction, is a tenet
fundamentally atheistic, In whatever point or attribute we limit or reduce
divine perfection, we are virtually striking at the very idea of God—that of a
Being every way infinite, every way perfect.
Further, somewhat more than a mere limitation, either
of goodness or of power, seems to us involved in the supposition under
discussion. For if a perfectly holy man or holy angel were supposed able and
willing to perpetuate the being of sinful and suffering creatures, for the
purpose of maintaining or enhancing by this mean the holiness and happiness of
others, then we perceive not why he might not also "do evil that good
might come;" for we cannot clearly discriminate between willingly or
necessarily perpetuating evil, and willingly or necessarily doing it. And if
this be true of any created moral being, we see not why, on the supposition we
are combating, the same should not be possible in regard to the Supreme.
But from supposing such a possibility we of course shrink
with entire aversion. For, besides implying defect of either goodness or power,
there would be involved in the even possible commission or direct causation of
evil, a direct denial of indefectible holiness. Apart, however, from this
impious thought, the hypothesis which makes the endless existence of sinners
and sufferers to be either the matter of God's choice, or else to be a fact
independent of Him, superior to the control of his will or power in bringing
about the purposes of his holiness and mercy, does, to say the least, most
perilously involve a circumscription of divine Omnipotence, or of perfect
Goodness.
We dare not believe—since for us it would be a sort of
blasphemy to believe—that He who is alone perfectly good, chooses that evil
shall be never-ending. Neither dare we believe that He " with whom all
things are possible" cannot prevent evil from being endless, without being
thus disabled or precluded from effecting everlasting good. Of the two, the
latter might seem the less irreverent and presumptuous, but for us it would
still, in no small measure, have that character.
IT may be alleged by Christians, who, with reverential
submission to what they deem revealed truth, adhere to the doctrine of endless
evil, that the prospect of even terminable evil and suffering extended to a
great multitude and succession of beings, is as truly, if not as greatly, at
variance with our weak and fallible notions of the divine attributes, as that
endlessly cumulative evil which we cannot reconcile with them.
Some sceptics, on the other hand, will go much
farther; and say, you reasonings have their true basis and legitimate issue in
the old argument of Epicurus, from the existence of evil; namely, either that
God was willing and not able, or that He was able and not willing, or that He
was neither able nor willing;* which argument, ironically inverted and
vulgarized, with an obviously atheistic aim, was heretofore printed on cards,
by the late Richard Carlisle, and exhibited in Fleet Street; to this effect—that
there could not be any real evils between that street and Whitechapel; for if
there were or had been any, it was incredible that the Almighty, All-wise, and
All-good, either could not or would not have prevented or removed them. But we
who cannot receive the doctrine of "infinite evil," are in reality no
way driven to any such conclusion. It is true the immense difference between
unending evil and evil which shall have a termination, especially when the
latter is or will be exceedingly great, has been by some minds habitually
overlooked, and therefore not much accounted of. But this oversight is, on the
part of Christians, if not quite unjust, altogether inconsiderate; and in the
sceptic, who probably denies the prospect of future retribution at all, it is
yet more unreasonable.
For let the case be stated: the sins and sufferings of
millions, who through millions of successive ages shall sin and suffer, but
whose being shall terminate, do not constitute the smallest imaginable fraction
of that sin and suffering which should be absolutely endless. One creature
whose guilt and misery should never end, would, at some assignable point of his
existence to come, have sinned and suffered a million times more than all those
millions collectively, through all the periods of their terminable being; and
would yet have to sin and suffer endlessly and incalculably more. Such is the
plain and true, though overwhelming and never to be completed estimate, of what
a belief in "infinite evil" really involves and imports.
We have only therefore to say to the objectors,
whether Christian or skeptical, the difference which you appear not to discern
is but a difference beyond all bounds, beyond all possibility of computation,
immeasurable evermore. Let no one then argue that interminable and
ever-increasing evil under the government of the ever-blessed God is credible,
because it is certain that evil exists, or even is and will be through an
indefinite period greatly prevalent; for, we repeat, these facts or statements
differ immensely, incalculably, and beyond all our conceptions. What greater
difference can be claimed in- proof of the nullity of such objections?
No illustration from human and temporal affairs can be
in any degree adequate to represent such a difference; since in such affairs
there is nothing unending. But let it be supposed that the autocrat of a great
nation were known to be the most just, wise, and benevolent of sovereigns, and
that a decree was published as from him, in a foreign language, which was by
many interpreted to mean, —all offenders shall be made galley slaves till
extreme old age, and then be broken on the wheel.
If we cannot put faith in this interpretation, are we
to be told it thence follows, that we must not believe so good a ruler can ever
ordain imprisonment or exile, or indeed any punishment at all?
NEITHER can the force of our great difficulty be
evaded, by insisting on what we acknowledge to be a sacred truth—namely, that
God is not the Author of evil: as if, for this reason, while the existence of
sinners must entirely and for ever hang on his
upholding will, still would the endless perpetuity of sin be nevertheless
entirely independent of Him.
We have indeed seen it affirmed, in a theological work
which some highly value, that " no creature is contrary to God, or hateful
or grievous unto Him, in so far as it is, lives, knows, hath power to do or to
produce aught, and so forth; for all this is not contrary to God. That an evil
spirit, or a man, is, lives, and the like, is altogether good and of God; for
God is the being of all that are—all things have their being more truly in Him
than in themselves; and also all their powers, life, knowledge, and the rest:
for if it were not so, God would not be all good. And thus all creatures are
good."
This doctrine, to which that of Fenelon above cited
bears some resemblance, would seem to imply, that even if all higher
intelligences and all humankind were to be endlessly condemned and sinful,
still not only would the goodness of God be unimpeachable, but even the
goodness of those creatures, in as far as they merely existed, and possessed
the powers which God conferred and upheld, would be undiminished. It implies
also that moral evil is so independent of God, that it can be perpetuated
without his permission or beyond his dominion. Thus it resembles the ancient Parsic dualism, which "limited God's almighty power,
by supposing an absolute evil, an independent ground of it beyond the divine
control, involving itself in the contradiction of supposing an independent
existence out of God."* Although this doctrine is not in the same sense
atheistic as that of some ancient philosophers virtually was, when they ascribed
to evil a past eternal self-existence, it is more dreadful in attributing to it
an everlasting future increase. For the Persian Magi predicted a period when
the evil principle " Arimanius, should
be-utterly destroyed," and " Hades utterly abolished."
IT is a common and specious fallacy to allege, that
such reasonings as have here been offered rest only on philosophic grounds, and
not on the basis of truth revealed.
So far from it, in our first reference to the divine
attributes, we have expressly appealed to scriptural declarations of them; nor
are we, it may be, less versed in the letter of Scripture, nor less imbued with
reverence for its Author and its spirit, than some who differ from us. We quite
accede also to the remark of Professor Stuart, that " the Bible is the
only sure source of knowledge, in regard to the future destiny of our
race." But the learned writer goes on to ask, " How is this question
to be settled by the Bible? Is it to be done by carrying along with us, when we
go to interpret the Bible, principles which decide beforehand what in our view
the Bible ought b speak, and to draw from these, conclusions as to what it does
speak Q "1- To this we answer, we have carried with us only those
principles which the Bible itself contains, and presents as the very
foundations of truth, and we contend that these must influence any sound
interpretation.
The strictures of some highly esteemed divines on this
general subject will not bear the test of inquiry. Dr. Chalmers writes, "
Instead of learning the designs and character of the Almighty from his own
mouth, we sit in judgment upon them, and make our conjecture of what they
should be, take the precedency of his revelation of what they are." He
subjoins, " Let the principle of what thinks thou' be exploded, and that
of what reads thou' be substituted in its place. Let us take our-lesson as the
Almighty places it before us."
He complains also that, "In the case of the
Bible, the meaning of its author, instead of being made singly and entirely a
question of grammar, has been made a question of metaphysics or a question of
sentiment." And, again, "That the authority of the Bible is often
modified, and in some cases superseded, by the authority of other principles.
One of these principles is the reason of the thing." In these
remonstrances there is some important truth, mingled, if we mistake not, with
incautious and erroneous views. It is certain, and is sincerely lamented by us,
that the liberty of d priori reasoning and that of free and rational
interpretation have been very often abused; and that when men proudly and
rashly sit in judgment on the attributes and ways of God, or when, in the same
temper, they professedly interpret, but really "wrest, the
Scriptures," there will ensue the gravest errors; such as a denial of
Christ's Divinity and Sacrifice, or of the reality of miracles, and other
fundamental truths.
Still we think it will be found, on examination, that
some of the above-cited rules for interpreting Scripture can in no way be
rationally sustained. Meanwhile, those of another eminent writer, in reference
to figurative or analogical passages, seem to us to demand a wider or more
various application than he himself designed to give them. "It is our
duty," writes Dr. J. P. Smith, "to understand all such passages, in
modes which shall be worthy of the dignity of God; and so to interpret them as
to deprive the contemners of revelation of a pretext for censuring and
rejecting it. If you do indeed resolve to take up the figurative language of
Scripture as if it were literally true, look well to yourself. Think what
consequences you are plunging into; what conceptions of the Infinite Majesty
you are cherishing in your mind, and propagating around you; what effects they
are likely to have upon other persons—yes, your own children—especially in the
well-educated and inquiring classes of society; and what vantage-ground you are
surrendering to the impugners of the Bible, thus giving your aid for
undermining the faith of probably the dearest to you.
It is observable that this comment and admonition are
not on a passage which is, in the ordinary sense, figurative, though, like many
others, it is to be viewed as analogical. The rule laid down therefore has
certainly, if it be correct at all, a large and diverse application.
THE rule above cited is again expressed in these terms
by the same writer: " The mind and meaning of the author who is translated
is purely a question of language, and should be decided upon no other
principles than those of grammar or philology." He complains that, instead
of this, the argument has been, " such must be the rendering, from the
analogy of the faith, the reason of the thing, the character of the divine
mind, and the wisdom of all his dispensations."
Now it is very obvious that the rule above urged, so
far as it is valid, must be applicable broadly: must be, in fact, offered as a
canon for the interpretation of Scripture universally.
We have seen, however, if there be any force in the
remarks cited at the close of the last chapter, that there are occasions when
it must be modified or limited; and probably every thinking Christian's
recollection has suggested others.
But it is desirable to adduce particular passages of
Scripture, and test the rule by an application to them.
Now if we may anywhere expect plainness and
literality, and if anywhere it be unsafe to use too much latitude of
interpretation, it would seem to be nowhere more than in the preceptive parts
of Holy Writ. Here it is that clearness of meaning appears most indispensable; here,
also, that we are under the strongest temptation to put an evasive gloss upon
the record. And doubtless this often is done.
But let us turn to the view taken of many New
Testament precepts, not by the lax or heterodox, but by the most devout and
strict expositors; and how far do we find even their exegetical rule and
practice to be founded on the strict principle of " what reads thou,"
or on the mere question of " grammar and philology."
Thus when our divine Teacher and Judge has solemnly
enjoined, " If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee," and, " if thy right hand offend thee, cut
it off and cast it from thee," there have been
doubtless those who understood this literally, and more than literally; for
Origen's self-mutilation found in the ancient church " many imitators,
insomuch that canons were expressly framed in condemnation of that
practice." This, however (as Dr. Tholuck
observes), on the principle of adopting "the proper sense," would be perfectly justified." " In
like manner would the slanderer be bound to tear out his tongue, and he who
felt tempted by improper talk, to destroy the sense of hearing. The very object
of these acts would, however, not be attained, for desire has its seat in the
heart. There pan consequently exist no case in which, for the subjugation of
desire, the destruction of any member would be obligatory."* N o one, we
apprehend, will dispute this conclusion; yet on what principle does it rest,
but on " the reason of the thing?" Only one more instance shall be
offered of the preceptive kind.
In Luke's Gospel (6.30) we read the commands of
Christ, "Give to everyone that asked thee; and of him that taketh away thy
goods, ask them not again." It may be worth remarking, to what a strange
escape the Christian father Jerome was induced, who, in order to justify giving
to every one, and in all circumstances, restricts the
matter of the gift to the spiritual gift of salvation." But Tholuck, viewing it of course as referring chiefly to
temporal matters, observes, " Would I conform absolutely to the precept '
give to every one that asked thee,' I must give the
knife to the child, and poison to the man who intends to commit suicide."
And Olshausen asks, " What could be more wanting
in love than the literal practice of this precept? It would be an encouragement
of begging reprobates." Augustine had shown long before, "that these
precepts relate rather to the inward preparation of the heart than to the
outward act, that so patience and benevolence may possess the soul, and that
may be done openly which appears capable of profiting others." Calvin says
on these passages, "we must look to the design of Christ." And Tholuck to the same effect: "we must understand them
with the restriction borrowed from the analogy of faith." Now what are all
these judgments, of divines who certainly cannot be accused of neological views, but a subordinating the " question
of grammar" to the "reason of the thing;" an attention, most
fitly, to what the text " ought to speak," in determining the sense
of a passage; or at least a deciding what it " does speak," on far other
grounds than those of "grammar and philology."
IT will perhaps be said, all this is fit or necessary
as it respects certain precepts; but the class of scriptural declarations, to
which reference must be had in deter-mining the question before us, is entirely
dissimilar to the preceptive parts of Scripture.
We reply, it is just because these classes of texts
are dissimilar, that we examine both, for the sake of diverse proof and
illustration of the principles to be vindicated—vindicated in their just and
cautious use. Let us therefore notice a few of the New Testament declarations.
Our Lord, addressing the Jews, declares (John 8.51),
" Verily, verily I say unto you, if anyone keep my word, he shall never
see death." "It is certain," observes Dr. Campbell, "that
he was understood by his hearers as speaking of natural death." This is
evident from their answer, " Abraham is dead, and the prophets; and thou
sayest, if a man keep my saying, he shall never taste of death." For that
these Jews were not Sadducees, appears by their affirming that Christ was
possessed by an evil spirit.t They believed therefore that Abraham and the
prophets were living as spirits; but that could be no argument against Christ's
declaration, if they had taken his words to mean, "he shall not suffer
eternal death;" which undoubtedly was their real, though not literal
sense.
It was on this passage and the similar one (John 11.26),
" Every one that is living and believes in me shall never die," that
the acute Asgill founded his paradox that no
Christian exercising strong faith would need to die, but might be translated
without seeing or tasting death. We may notice also that the grammatical form
in both those texts is the same as in John 4.14: "Whosoever drinks of the
water that I shall give him shall never thirst." The Samaritan's answer
proves that she took this literally. A Christian traveler in the great desert
who should do the same, and carry no water accordingly, would but treat the
meaning as " simply and entirely a question of grammar."
Another declaration of Christ, that to the Jewish
ruler, "none is good save one, that is God,"—seems to have been
interpreted by a pious divine of the Church of England somewhat on the same
principle; for he says, " Charity does not oblige us to think any man
good; because Christ says, a there is none good.' " But even if our Lord
had not also spoken of "a good man's bringing forth good things," and.
if Joseph and Barnabas had not been each described as " a good man,"
our own experience of Christian goodness, and thus the very "reason of the
thing," would have yet demanded of us only to understand the declaration
in a very modified sense; namely, that no being save God is originally,
essentially, and independently good.
In like manner the express declarations of our Lord
(Matt. xix. 26, Mark 10.27), "With God all things are possible," and
the previous announcement of the angel (Luke 1.37), "With God nothing
shall be impossible," would be limited by reason and conscience,
enlightened as they are by the whole spirit of the Scriptures, even if we did
not possess the text which assures or reminds us that " it is impossible for
God to lie." We should still be sure that to devise or do evil is not a
thing possible with God; and also that it is not possible with God to effect
absolute contradictions, as that twice two should not be four, or that the
whole should not be greater than a part, or that the same thing should at once
be, and not be.
We will only glance, in concluding these instances, at
the well-known declarations of our Savior (Matt. 26.26-28, and Mark 14.22-24),
" This is my body, this my blood;" and (John 6.53), " Verily,
verily I say unto you, except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his
blood, ye have no life in you." It is an undisputed fact, that millions in
Christendom take these words literally, and anathematize those who cannot. When
Protestants decline so to take them, they disclaim, as Romanists themselves do
in very many other passages, that merely grammatical interpretation which is
manifestly untenable.
This review of Scripture instances has been made in disproof
of a canon of interpretation, which, when applied in a general manner, would
often lead to error. It will no doubt have some bearing on the further
investigation of our subject. Yet what may perhaps be suspected does not at all
follow, that we are about to discard " grammar and philology" in respect
to the passages which in this controversy are usually adduced. On the contrary,
while we claim to assign to them only their due place and weight among the
principles by which a just interpretation should be guided, it will be
presently evident that we do not wish to elude, or to treat them with neglect.
THIS chapter will be chiefly occupied in the citation
of such texts; without any comment here on the meaning and force of the
expressions employed.
Matt. 18.8: "It is better for thee to enter into
life halt or maimed, rather than having two hands or two feet to be cast into
everlasting fire."
Matt. 25.41: "Depart from me, ye cursed, into
everlasting fire prepared for the devil, and his angels."
Mark 3.29: "He that shall blaspheme against the
Holy Ghost hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of everlasting
condemnation."
Mark 9. 43, 44, repeated at verses 45, 46, and at
verses 47, 48: "It is better for thee to enter into life maimed —or halt
into life—or into the kingdom of God one-eyed, than—to go into hell—to be cast
into hell —to be cast into hell fire, into the unquenchable fire, where their
worm dies not, and the fire is not quenched."
2 Peter 2.17: " These are... clouds driven by a
tempest, to whom the mist of darkness is reserved for ever."
Jude 1.6: " Angels... reserved in everlasting
chains under darkness unto the judgment of the great day."
Jude 1.13: " Wandering stars, to whom is reserved
the blackness of darkness for eve."
Revel. 14.9-11: " If any one worship the beast...
he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy
angels, and in the presence of the Lamb; and the smoke of their torment ascended
up for ever and ever."
Revel. 19. 3: " And again they said, Alleluia.
And her smoke" (that of the great harlot) " rises up for ever and
ever."
Revel. 20.10: "And the devil that deceived them
was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone where the beast and the false
prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever."
Matt. 25.46: "These shall go away into punishment
everlasting, but the righteous into life everlasting."
These texts, especially as thus brought together from
their dispersion through the various writings of the New Testament, and viewed
in their collective impression, form doubtless an awful array of threatening,
adapted to awaken a salutary dread of God's tremendous judgments.
It is probable also that many readers will contrast
them with the passages cited in the eighth and ninth chapters, imagining that
in two essential respects the cases differ; namely, that in those precepts and
declarations the necessity of limiting or modifying the sense was entirely obvious,
and moreover that it was sanctioned or even dictated by other passages of the
same book, whereas neither of those reasons, as they believe, can be maintained
with respect to these scriptural statements; from which they judge that a belief
in endless sin and suffering is necessarily deduced.
We think that, for candid minds, a further examination
of Scripture may considerably alter those views.
Let it be granted, at present and for argument's sake,
that we are to treat the matter altogether literally, and that the true
grammatical import of the last-cited texts is that which believers in
"infinite evil" affirm; subject only to the qualification which other
texts in the New Testament, of an opposite or materially different grammatical
import, may compel.
It appears to us that, by this rule of interpretation,
they must be modified or limited; inasmuch as we shall find, in the ensuing
chapter, a variety of others, which taken, in like manner, in their merely
grammatical sense, seem evidently to teach a different doctrine: a doctrine
also which we cannot embrace or vindicate, on account of that reciprocal
modification of it which the preceding texts and other Scriptures impose.
THE principal passages alleged in support of that
doctrine are as follows. If a part of them shall appear to some readers not to
bear, even when taken quite literally, the construction here assumed (which,
from the force of habit and association, is not unlikely), this we think will
not be the case with respect to the greater number. Not, at least, if the
reader endeavors to weigh them as if read for the first time, and apart from
any explications which the mind has been used to attach to them.
Our Savior declares to Nicodemus (John 3.17), "
God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world
through him might be saved."
His forerunner had before proclaimed him (John 1.29)
as " the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world." The
Messiah was understood by the Samaritans, as we learn from John 4. 42, to be
"the Savior of the world" with which phrase we may compare 1 John 4.
14, " We have seen and do testify that the Father sent the Son, Savior of
the world.”
Our Lord declared to his disciples, (John 12.32),
"And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all unto me."
The apostle Paul has written (Romans 5. 15 and 18,
19), "If through the offence of one the many be dead, much more the grace
of God, and the gift by grace, which is by the one man Jesus Christ, hath
abounded to the many. Therefore, as by the offence of one judgment came upon
all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came
upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience the
many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall the many be made
righteous."
The same apostle, treating of the end of Christ's mediatorial
kingdom, writes (1 Cor. 15.28), " When all things are subjected to him
" (i.e. to Christ), " then shall the Son also be subjected to Him who
subjected all things to Him, that God may be all in all." To the Ephesians
Paul wrote (1.10), " That in the dispensation of the fulness of times, He
might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in the
heavens, and which are on earth; even in Him."
So he declared to the church at Philippi (2. 9, 10),
" Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which
is above every name; that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of the
heavenly and the earthly and the subterranean, and every tongue confess that
Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father."
Thus to the Colossians (1. 19, 20), " For it
pleased the Father that in Him should all fulness dwell; and, having, made
peace through the blood of his cross, by Him to reconcile all things to Himself;
by Him, whether things on the earth or things in the heavens."
To Timothy the same apostle wrote (2. 4-6), "
This is acceptable in the eight of God our Savior, who willed all men to be
saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth;" adding (verse 6),
Christ Jesus " gave himself a ransom for all; to be testified in the
destined times." And again (1 Tim. 4. 10), "We trust in the living
God, who is the Savior of all men, specially of the believing."
So in the Epistle to Titus (2. 11), " For the
grace of God, salutary or saving to all men, hath appeared."
In the writings of St. John, we read (1 John 2.2),
" And he" (Christ) " is the propitiation for our sins, and not
for ours only, but also for the whole world;" with which we may compare
Paul's words to the Corinthians (2 Cor. 5. 19), " God was in Christ,
reconciling the world unto Himself."
Lastly, in John's Apocalypse, we find this remarkable
passage (Revel. 5. 13), "Every creature which is in heaven, and on the
earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, and all that are in
them, heard I saying, Blessing, and honor, and glory, and power be unto Him
that sits upon the throne, and to the Lamb for ever and ever."
Now we think it undeniable by impartial reasoners,
that, if this series of texts were interpreted literally—i.e. taken as they
naturally would be if no other passages relating to the destinies and issues of
human beings and affairs were found in Scripture—they would obviously intimate
the doctrine of an ultimate " universal restoration."
If, then, the class of texts previously cited, and any
other of like import or tendency, ought to qualify these latter, and would be
rightly adduced to assist in interpreting them, then, on every principle of
equity or parity of reasoning, these latter should no less be required to aid
in the interpretation of the former; so far at least as to preclude a positive
decision that the New Testament pronounces sin and misery to be never-ending.
If the texts which are cited in this chapter cannot,
when judged by other scriptures, and by the analogy of" faith, avail to
prove—what, if taken literally, we think they would prove—the doctrine that
" universalists" contend for, they may yet suffice to show with very
high probability that Evil shall terminate; that all rebellion and all rebels
shall be ultimately destroyed; that whatever is to remain and subsist
immortally, shall be "subjected to Christ," " reconciled to God;
" shall be " gathered together in one," and shall unanimously
ascribe " blessing, and honor, and glory, and power to, Him that sits on
the throne, and to the Lamb."
Further, if we impartially compare this series of
texts with the former, in point of numerousness, weight, plainness, and
diverseness of scriptural sources, it is thought no fair disputant will deny
that the strength of these towards modifying the interpretation of the others,
is, to say the least, equal, if not superior, to that of the former towards
restricting the import of these.
If scriptures more numerous, more diverse in
expression, more various as to the writings whence adduced, would support,
taken literally, the doctrine of universal restoration, these, as we judge,
must have proportionately more weight towards guiding our interpretation of the
passages which are held to affirm "infinite evil,' than those can have
towards determining the sense of the texts which this chapter offers.
It will scarcely be disputed that such comparison and
reciprocal influence of texts apparently disagreeing, is one legitimate and
important resource towards ascertaining the true sense of Scripture.*
* It may, however, be well to cite the rules laid down
by orthodox expositors. " The most comprehensive rule of interpretation
yet remains. Compare Scripture with Scripture, things spiritual with spiritual'
(1 Cor. 2.13). It is by the observance of this rule alone that we become sure
of the true meaning of particular passages; and, above all, it is by this rule
alone that we ascertain the doctrine of Scripture on questions of faith and practice.
A Scripture truth is really the consistent explanation of all that Scripture
teaches in reference to the question examined."—See also Horne on the
Study of the Scriptures, vol. 2.pp. 526, 527, 3rd edition.
IT will be found that this third class of passages bears
strongly on the interpretation of all which relate to our subject, and ought,
as we judge, to modify that of both the classes above collected.
It consists of texts which declare the future doom of
the impenitent, either by the name "death," or by other phrases which
may be rightly construed to convey that meaning. The first of these we offer
from—
Matt. 10.28: " Fear not them which kill the body,
but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear Him which is able to destroy
both soul and body in hell."
Here the same words, in the two clauses respectively,
are applied to the soul and the body—in the first " to kill," in the
second " to destroy." The former, while declaring that men are
"not able to kill the soul," seems to imply, what no real theist can
dare to question, that God is able to do so.
As to the latter clause, it would be strange to
conclude, that while to "destroy" the body means to kill, to
"destroy" the soul means endlessly to perpetuate life.
That the word literally means kill or "destroy,"
appears from the same Gospel (Matt. 2.13.): "Herod will seek the young
child to destroy him." Matt. 21. 40, 41: "The lord of the vineyard
will destroy those wicked " husbandmen.
Matt. 22. 7: " The king, sending his armies,
destroyed those murderers." Matt. 26. 52: "They that take the sword
shall perish — or be destroyed by the sword." *
We find also in another Gospel, that the words to be
destroyed and to die, are convertible; since we read (John 11.50), that
Caiaphas declared it "expedient that one man should die for the people;" and in John 18.14, his
saying is thus referred to, "that it was expedient that one man should
die, or be destroyed for the people."
The noun derived from this latter verb occurs Matt. 7.13:
"Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction."
The same word is employed in Acts 25. 16. " It is
not the custom of the Romans to give up any man to die, or to
destruction," etc. So in the Septuagint version of the Apocrypha (Bel and
the Dragon, verse 42): " He drew out Daniel, and cast those that were the
cause of his destruction into the den;" where the word evidently means the
punishment of death to which Daniel had been consigned. And in Acts v., after
Gamaliel's relating that Theudas was
"slain", he adds (verse 37), concerning Judas the Galilean, "he
also perished." See also 1 Cor. 10.9 and 10: they were "destroyed of
serpents," "were destroyed of the destroyer."
Correspondently with those expressions, we have
various texts which state the doom of the unrepenting to be " death."
Thus Paul writes,
Romans 1.32: " They which commit such things are
worthy of death."
Romans 5. 21: " Sin hath reigned unto death; or
by death."
Romans 6.21: " The end of these things is
death."
Romans 6.23: " The wages of sin is death."
Romans 8.13. " If ye live after the flesh, ye
shall die."
The same apostle wrote to the Church at Corinth (2
Cor. 2.15), " To them that perish we are the savor of death unto death.”
And to the Galatians (6. 8), " He that soweth to
his flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption."
In the Epistle of James (1. 15), we read that
"Sin, when it is finished, brings forth death."
And again (James v. 20), " He that convert the
sinner... shall save a soul from death."
In the Revelation of St. John, it is written (2. 11),
" He that overcome shall not be hurt of the second death."
And in Rev. 20. 6, " On such the second death
hath no power."
Rev. 20.14: " And death and Hades were cast into
the lake of fire. This is the second death."
All these phrases, taken literally, and that is the
manner in which we are at present viewing them, mean just what they express;
namely, "death," loss of life, "perishing," or
"destruction."
That such is their proper or literal import will be
farther-illustrated by citing, in the next chapter, texts or clauses frequently
connected with, and sometimes antithetical to them, which convey a contrasted
sense by the expression " life."
THERE are several passages in three of the gospels
which simply convey the promise of "life," without any epithet
annexed to that term. In contrast with language already quoted, "Broad is
the way that leadeth to destruction," we read in—
Matt. 7.14: "Strait is the gate... which leadeth
unto life."
Matt. 18.8, 9: " It is better for thee to enter
into life halt or maimed," etc.
Matt. xix. 17: " If thou wilt enter into life
keep the commandments."
Mark 9. 43, 43: "It is better for thee to enter
into life maimed," etc.
John 3.36: " He that believeth not the Son shall
not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him."
John 5. 28, 29: "All that are in the graves...
shall come forth, they that have done good to the resurrection of life."
John 5. 40: "Ye will not come unto me, that ye
might have life."
John 6.53: " Except ye eat the flesh of the Son
of man... ye have no life in you."
John 10.10: " I am come that they might have
life, and have it more abundantly."
John 10.28: " And they shall never perish — or be
destroyed."
John 20. 31: "These are written... that believing
ye might have life through his name."
In the epistles also we find various instances of the
like phraseology. Thus, in antithesis with a text already quoted, " If ye
live after the flesh ye shall die," we read—
Romans 8.13: "If ye, through the Spirit, do
mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live."
And so, in antithesis with the words above quoted,
"To them that perish we are the savor of death unto death," we have-
2 Cor. 2.16: " To the other" (i.e. the
saved) " the savor of life unto life."
2 Cor. 5. 4: " That mortality might be swallowed
up of life."
2 Tim. 1.1: " Paul, an apostle... according to
the promise of life which is in Christ Jesus."
1 John 5. 12: " He that hath the Son hath life;
he that hath not the Son of God hath not life."
Now taking, as we have proposed throughout, these
expressions in their plain and literal meaning, the habitual contrast of the
penalty of "death" with the free gift of "life," in
declaring the opposite states and prospects of the saved and the condemned, has
manifestly great weight against our interpreting " everlasting punishment"
to mean the very contrary of death; namely, a life or conscious existence that
shall never end.
No language, so far as the grammatical sense of words
may go, can be more entirely opposed to such an expectation.
It can no way be fairly inferred from these remarks that
we would treat the words "life" and "live," as here quoted,
and the phrases "life everlasting," "endless life," as if
they did not involve the idea and promise of perpetual well-being and
happiness. They manifestly do involve and express this. The whole tenor of
Scripture supports that conclusion. And so we hold, that except as to the
irresponsible, "death," and "die," and "everlasting
death," and " everlasting destruction," involve the notion and
denouncement of prior severe and awful suffering; how protracted, God knows.
But it is not the less certain, and it would, we think, were it not for
preconceived opinions, be most obvious to all, that the multiplied use of the
words "die " and " death," in reference to future
punishment, is a strong presumptive argument against the doctrine of unending
life in sin and torment; for that would mean, in all ordinary use of speech,
the reverse of death.
On the other hand, this habitual contrast of death
with life, as the apparently final issue, is in like manner opposed to the
literal interpretation of those various passages cited in Chapter 11 which
would seem, if taken literally, to promise universal restoration; and it
accordingly confirms the necessity or propriety of interpreting those in a very
restricted sense.
IN order to present the whole of the New Testament
evidence on this painful subject, it remains that we adduce the several
passages which intimate the sufferings of the impenitent. We have our Lord's
declaration (Matt. 8.12), " The children of the kingdom shall be cast out
into outer darkness; there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth."
Matt. 13.41, 42, repeated verse 50, "The angels
shall gather out of his kingdom them which do iniquity; shall sever the wicked
from among the just, and shall cast them into a furnace of fire: there shall be
wailing and gnashing of teeth."
In one of our Savior's parables it is said, concerning
him that had not the wedding garment (Matt. 22. 13), "Bind him hand and
foot, and take him away, and cast him into outer darkness: there shall be
weeping and gnashing of teeth."
And in the parable of the wicked servant (Matt. 24.
51), his Lord " shall cut him asunder, and appoint him his portion with
the hypocrites: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth."
So in the parable of the talents we read (Matt. 25.
30), " Cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness there shall be
weeping and gnashing of teeth."
In the passages already quoted from the Gospel of
Mark, the sinner is thrice warned (9. 43-48) of " Gehenna, the fire
unquenchable, where their worm dies not, and the fire is not quenched." In
Luke's Gospel our Savior utters the solemn denunciation (13. 27, 28),
"Depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity. There shall be weeping and
gnashing of teeth, when ye shall see Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and all the
prophets, in the kingdom of God, and you yourselves thrust out."
And in the same Gospel, it is declared of the rich
sinner (Luke 16.23-25 and 28), " In Hades he lifted up his eyes, being in
torments, and said, father Abraham, send Lazarus that he may dip the tip of his
finger in water, and cool my tongue; for I am tormented in this flame;"
and again, " Send" to my "brethren," " lest they also
come into this place of torment."
We read also in the Apocalypse, concerning him that worshipped
the beast (14. 9, 10), " The same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of
God, which is poured unmixed into the cup of his indignation, and shall be
tormented with fire and brimstone before the holy angels and before the Lamb.
And the smoke of their torment ascended for ever and ever, and they have no
rest day nor night, who worship the beast and his image, and whoso received the
mark of his name."
Concerning " the fearful and unbelieving, and the
abominable, and murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and
all liars," we read (Revel. 21. 8), " They shall have their part in
the lake which burned with fire and brimstone, which is the second death."
These passages, as we judge, add no material force to
the argument against ultimate restoration, inasmuch as that is admitted by its
advocates to be preceded by severe and protracted sufferings; but neither do
they materially strengthen the argument for never-ending sin and misery; since
their validity for supporting that argument must depend on the same rule of
interpretation which shall be adopted in regard to texts previously cited (in
Chapter x.),* into which rule we still have to inquire.
Yet these last-named passages concerning the
sufferings of the wicked, have an important bearing on our whole subject,
inasmuch as they, concurring with those of Chapter 17. below, still the more
clearly forbid our viewing the penalty of " death" or "
destruction" as the whole retribution threatened against the impenitent;
showing that a state and period of conscious suffering will awfully introduce
and form a dreadful prelude to that final penalty. Indeed, such an opinion as
these Scripture testimonies preclude, namely, that mere and immediate "
destruction" will be the whole doom of the unrepenting, is, we believe,
rarely if ever held by any persons professing faith in Scripture; although it
is sometimes, by opponents who are unable or disinclined to exercise
discrimination, unjustly imputed to them.
Dr. Whitby says, with truth, "If annihilation
only be the second death, the punishment and perdition threatened to sinners in
the other world, they must all suffer equally; because if there be no degrees
of annihilation or not-being, then all will equally not be, or lose their being;
and nothing by annihilation can lose more."
This is a very obvious truth, or might even be termed
a truism. But the present chapter shows that it is wholly irrelevant to our
view of the subject. Nor are we acquainted with any Christian writer who
maintains the opinion which it combats.
THOSE divines who maintain the doctrine of unending
misery generally premise or presuppose the natural, and in some sort necessary,
immortality of the human soul; natural, in the sense that, unless God by an
express act destroy it, the soul will never cease to be and to be conscious;
necessary, in the sense that it would be unfit and unworthy of the Deity so to
destroy. This they infer sometimes primarily from reason; sometimes from reason
and. Scripture jointly. Dr. It. W. Hamilton appears to deem the proof from
reason sufficient. He writes, " We argue with confidence, that as man can pleditate his immortality, he cannot be less than
immortal." " Immortality is as much a property and determination of
his nature as reason, or any quality besides." "Nothing agrees with
the annihilation, everything agrees with the immortality of the soul."
" The truth of this immortality is not speculative, but rests in
consciousness and capacity. No revelation could overthrow the fact, for to
dispute the fact would be to overthrow its own pretensions." "We have
argued, from the moral susceptibilities and inappeasable longings of the soul,
that it is immortal. The power of conceiving it amounts to demonstration."
It is added, in a later part of this
work, “ Let us think of the attitude in which the doctrine of the soul's
annihilation places the Deity. Man, being immortal, a workmanship of the
richest store, the heir of measureless blessings, is directly crushed."
" God, in this act of destruction, is seen to revoke his own design."
" This annihilation is not a moral act. It is physical." t " All
of power in God, as coalescing with infinite excellence, we can adore. But a
power, independent, detached, violent, we know not, nor is there any like power
revealed. We do not feel that our esteem for Deity is excited by the triumph of
such power over his moral perfections. In punishment we saw Him just: in
annihilation He is irresistible! Nor do we acknowledge that the best method of
winning our hearts. to Him is to lead us to the footstool of the throne on
which He sits, surrounded by the emblems of destruction and the wrecks of
existence!"
Professor Moses Stuart begins his Essays by speaking of
man as " a being endowed with a spirit Which can never cease to
exist;" and subjoins, "He who made us in His own image, made us
immortal like Himself; immortal in regard to the powers and faculties, as well
as the existence, of the soul: the immortal subjects, therefore, of happiness
or misery."
It must, however, be on the scriptural proof that this
writer alone relies; since he afterwards adds, " The light of nature has
never yet sufficed to make even the question clear to any portion of our
benighted race, whether the soul of man is immortal. Cicero, incomparably the
most able defender of the soul's immortality of which the heathen world can yet
boast, very ingenuously confesses, that after all the arguments which he had
adduced to confirm the doctrine, it so fell out that his mind was satisfied of
it only when directly employed in contemplating the arguments in its favor. At
other times lie fell into a state of doubt and darkness."* Again, "
It is notorious that Socrates, the next most able advocate among the heathen
for the same doctrine, has adduced arguments to establish the never-ceasing
existence of the soul, which will not bear the test of examination. How true it
is, that life and immortality are brought to light through the gospel.' It is
equally true they are brought to light only there."
Yet it would appear by the former quotation, that this
author supposed them to have been brought to light long before, in the
declaration, " God made man in his own image."
Now, we are far from questioning that strong
presumptive arguments for a future life, and even for an immortal life of man,
in connection with his well-being, are to be drawn from nature and reason. On
the contrary, we highly appreciate them.
Yet it has been correctly said, that " Socrates
and his disciples are represented by Plato as admitting that men in general
were highly incredulous as to the soul's future existence,' and as expecting
that it would at the moment of death be dispersed like air or smoke, and cease
altogether to exist; so that it would require no little persuasion and argument
to convince them that the soul can exist after death, and retain anything of
its powers and intelligence." This admission certainly goes to corroborate
Professor Stuart's statements as to the insufficiency of natural light.
With regard to the proof of man's immortality from the
expression (Gen. 1.27), " So God created man in his own image: in the
image of God created he him," it is to be observed that divines have on
this greatly differed. Bishop Warburton argued that "the image of God
consisted, not in his having an immaterial soul, for that is common to the
whole animal creation; but in his reason."* Dr. South, in a sermon on the
text, defines the image of God in man to have been "that universal rectitude
of all the faculties of the soul by which they stand apt and disposed to their
respective offices and operations." But if we choose to admit that the
expression "image of God" does indicate, among other attributes, the
gift of immortality, in what sense is this to be, necessarily, taken? God only
hath immortality: a whole, unsuccessive,
indestructible being. This alone involves omniscience. But it cannot be
supposed that God endowed man with an immortality which, although successive,
was independent and irrevocable. This would have been not merely to create a
sort of Demigod, but to limit his own divine Omnipotence.
No one affirms the absolute dependence of a creature's
being more fully than the Rev. C. Bradley; himself an earnest defender of the
doctrine of endless evil. Thus he writes, " We shall live for ever, simply because it is the will of Him who gave us
life, to preserve us in being. Without Him our souls are as liable to be
destroyed as our bodies: yea, let Him for one moment be unmindful of an
immortal spirit, and in that very moment that spirit has ceased to be. This
truth is not sufficiently remembered by us. We seem to think that our souls
have some natural claim to the eternity before us, and that Omnipotence itself
has no power to destroy them: but the thought is vain. The God, who is the
Father of our spirits, could annihilate as easily as He made them. Crowded as
is the universe with the living heirs of immortality, a word from his lips
would leave it for ever without an inhabitant, and
turn his own heaven into a desert, without a spirit rejoicing in it, or an
angel worshipping before his throne."*
What is it, then, for man to be immortal? It is to
have a loan of existence sustained every moment by divine energy, capable of
being endless. " If," says Baxter, reasoning with a sceptic, "by
corruptible you mean that which hath a certainty of perishing if God uphold it
not, I grant it of the whole creation." He subjoins, "No doubt there
is, unto all beings, a continual emanation or influx from God, which is a
continued causation."
But does it in any wise follow, that because God
created man capable of immortality, and even adapted for it, therefore his
Creator wills and ought in all instances to communicate immortality, or go on
to support the creature's being without end? May He not have, with the best
reason, a different purpose; and if it be so, shall we presume to say that He
"is seen to revoke his own design?"
Dr. Watts, when arguing for the extinction of the
infants of wicked parents, observes, " It will perhaps be objected, of
what use can it be for the great God to bring so many thousand souls of the
children of wicked parents into being, to destroy them so soon? Answer. Who can
tell me of what use it can be for God to create so many millions of animated
beings in the sea, or in the woods and deserts, for so short a continuance? Who
can tell why He should exert his almighty power to produce so many myriads of
fishes which man never sees, and insects, engines of curious and divine
artifice, of which millions are brought forth in one day, which are never seen
of men, and which in a few weeks or months perish again, and are lost for ever? It is as easy with Omnipotence to create souls as
bodies, or to make men as worms; and it is the illustrious and unconceivable
magnificence of his government, that He can produce worlds of such wonderful
creatures, and destroy them without any loss, though He should never acquaint
us with any of his reasons or purposes for this conduct."*
We know also that the first man was threatened with
the penalty of death (Gen. 2.17): "Thou shalt surely die;" or, "
dying thou shalt die" (3.19); " dust thou art, and unto dust shalt
thou return." Even if it were to be granted that an intimation of
suffering after death was conveyed in those words (which is not apparent),
still would the remark of Locke retain its force, " It seems a strange way
of understanding a law, that by death should be meant endless life in
misery."
We ought here to notice that a well-known argument has
been raised for the immortality of the soul, from the belief that the ultimate
atoms of matter are indestructible; and as the soul, although sui generic, is,
like them, in its being, one and indivisible, it must be indestructible also.
This argument has been put ably and successfully by the late Professor Thomas
Brown, of Edinburgh, in his " Lectures on the Mind." It is very
valuable; for if ultimate atoms are indiscerptible, and therefore
indestructible, except by God's will, so, more strongly concluding, both from
reasoning and consciousness, that the spirit is one and indivisible, we are yet
more certain that it will never perish, except the will of God cease to uphold
it. Still, it is to us a supposition lacking proof, that it never has been
God's will and act, since the first creation, to destroy any material atoms;
and equally destitute of proof, that He never has and never will destroy any
spirits which He hath made. The former is undoubtedly asserted; but the grounds
of absolute proof for it we have either not seen, or cannot remember.
As a sort of touchstone for the opinion last discussed
(that of a certainly universal immortality for human beings), we would call to
mind the case of that generation which perished in the general deluge. The
record preliminary to those events is found in Genesis, chap. 6., where we read
(verses 5, 6) the very remarkable statement, " God saw that the wickedness
of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of
his heart was only evil continually. And it repented Jehovah that He had made
man on the earth, and it grieved Him at his heart."
This emphatic declaration must have some weighty
meaning. Expositors in general tell us what it must not be taken to mean—justly
warning us against attributing human variableness or passion to the
Deity—rather than attempt to set forth precisely what it does mean; which
indeed we judge to be above a human expositor's ken.
The words, it is presumed, cannot mean less, than that
the great prevalence and continuance of mankind's wickedness was highly adverse
to the divine mind and will, and was reason for destroying those who wrought
it. They seem to mean more than this, although what more it may be hard to
discover or define.
But taken in the sense proposed, or taken literally in
any sense, they certainly in no way or degree indicate that it was God's will
and purpose to perpetuate the being of those sinners. If there be any one event
which the language makes improbable, it is this: that Jehovah should make those
immortal whom it is said to have "repented Him that He had made" at
all; should will or permit those to exist unendingly, as sinners and sufferers,
whom it is declared to have "grieved Him at his heart" that He had
created, or caused to exist.
Then follows (verse 7) the declaration of the divine
purpose: "Jehovah said, I will destroy man whom I have created from the
face of the earth; both man, and beast, and the creeping thing, and the fowls
of the air; for it repented me that I have made them."
Now we need not, in estimating this destruction, adopt
the views of Bishop Newton, who says, " it is reasonably computed, that
the number of antediluvians amounted to many millions more than the present
inhabitants of the earth."* Let us rather believe, with Dr. Pye Smith,
that their " number was really small."-I- Suppose it a very small
fraction (the nine-hundredth part) of our modern world's population, and that
thus only a million of human lives were destroyed by the deluge.
It is observable that the same word "destroy” is
applied to "man and beast, and the creeping thing and fowls of the
air." But, according to the theologians above cited, God willed, while he
swept them from this globe, to sustain in immortality that guilty million; to
permit the "wickedness which was so great in the earth" to be
augmented by endless additions in Hades, and " the imagination of the
thoughts of those hearts which had been only evil continually" to be
perpetuated everlastingly.*
Dr. Hamilton admits, "man is only a creature,
therefore dependent, and only exists in immortality, as he is immortally
vivified and upheld. God sustains him at every breath and pulse."* God,
then, could have "destroyed" that wicked and unhappy million by
simply withholding his creative or preserving energy; or, after a period of
retributive suffering, could have let them drop into non-existence. But not so.
Although "holy, holy, holy is the Lord God Almighty," and wickedness
is "the abominable thing that He hates," still it was his
will—according to these divines—that this aggregate of wickedness and misery
should be strictly everlasting. We repeat, the phrases by which this account is
prefaced must have some weighty meaning, though expositors are unable to say
precisely what meaning. It is said of the supremely Good, whose name is Love,
that man's great wickedness "grieved Him at his heart;" and then, we
are taught, that He "destroyed" man, by consigning him to an endless
being in wickedness and misery. Let it be judged whether the depraved and
doomed million of antediluvians could be fitly
designated "the heirs of measureless blessings." But whatever title were
given them, they need not, if blotted out of being, have been "directly
crushed;" for the mere and simple withholding of divine energy would have
let them and their sins and anguish cease to be. The very "emblems of
destruction" would have returned to naught. The very "wrecks of their
existence" would have utterly vanished. Do the advocates for a necessary
immortality conceive that "the best method of winning our hearts" is
to set before us a sort of destruction, which consists in the
indestructibleness of depravity and despair? If that immeasurably dreadful
result were in the prescient or omniscient view of God, could we conceive of it
as compatible with the perfect felicity of a Being perfectly good? Rather would
not the words "grieved Him at his heart " be in that case but a faint
expression of the painfulness of such a fact and prospect?
Some minds, even on the ground of Gen. 1.26, 27, which
can no way favor it except by an unwarranted inference as to the certain
endless life of all men, may be devoutly to that mystery as an act of pious
submission to God's unsearchable sovereignty. For us it would, on the contrary,
be profaneness to believe it; and, above all, on grounds which are for us so
palpably conjectural and insufficient.
The more this question is examined, the more strongly
do we hold to that scriptural statement—which Professor Stuart himself adduces—Jesus
Christ alone " hath made life and incorruption clear through the
gospel." But the very terms of this text intimate what the New Testament
everywhere expresses, that "life," "incorruption,"
"immortality," are "the gift of God through Jesus Christ." They
are first "brought to light" or " made clear" "
through the gospel," as " good tidings of great joy."
THE stress of proof for the endless suffering of the
wicked is chiefly laid on the phrases " punishment everlasting", in
Matt. 25.46; " everlasting condemnation", in Mark 3.29; "their
worm dies not, and the fire is not quenched ", in Mark 9. 43;
"destruction everlasting", in 2 Thess. 1.9; "everlasting
judgment ", in Heb. 6.2.
It is contended that these phrases plainly and
unequivocally declare the doctrine.
The most forcible of them—as has been already
remarked—is held to be the first (of Matthew), on account of its being placed
in antithesis with "life everlasting." It is therefore to this phrase
that our attention will be first and principally given. Although nothing is
more certain than that both those words have also other and different meanings,
which will be afterwards treated of, we shall accept here, as their primary
sense, the version "punishment everlasting." But then we must take
the phrase as a whole. Punishment stands as much in antithesis with "
life," as "everlasting" with " everlasting." But this
is in opposite modes. If "everlasting" be antithetic in the way of
parallel, "punishment" is antithetic in the way of contrast. Will it
be said that, in order to an absolute antithesis of contrast, the phrase should
have been " death everlasting? " I we judge from their reasonings on
the term " death," this would not have been held, by believers in
endless suffering, to disprove the doctrine.
About fourteen texts of the New Testament, to which
many might be added from the Old, appear to declare the ultimate destruction of
the wicked. We have seen also this fact or prospect very frequently put in
direct contrast with the promise of " life; "t and it cannot be
reasonable, or respectful to the Scriptures, that those many passages should be
allowed no influence on the interpretation of this, or rather should all be
ruled by the supposed meaning of this and a few others; so that " death
" and " destruction " should be construed as meaning
indestructible existence in all of them, in order to conform their import to
the doctrine for which the de-fenders of endless suffering contend.
An important reason, if we mistake not, will present
itself in subsequent pages, why the term "punishment" should have
been here employed as more comprehensively appropriate. That this word is
sometimes applied to the punishment of death, we see in the Septuagint (Wisdom
of Solomon 19. 4, 5), where, concerning the pursuing host of Pharaoh it is
said, "that they might fulfil the punishment which was wanting to their
torments, and that thy people might pass a wonderful way, but they might find a
strange death." And again, 2 Macc. 4. 38, where we read that Antiochus
" slew Andronicus the murderer " (of Onias),
" the Lord rendering to him his deserved punishment." Nor is the
punishment of destruction unfitly termed " everlasting punishment."
The memorable destruction in the Red Sea, above referred to, the frightful
death of Ravaillac (the murderer of Henry IV. of
France), and still more torturing destruction of Damien (who attempted to
assassinate Louis XV.), might be so described. The penalty was everlasting and
irreversible, as far as human power could make it so. It destroyed, as far as
man can destroy, the subjects of it everlastingly; and, moreover, it is an
everlasting fact in memory and in warning; an infliction or penalty adapted to
be of everlasting note and effect after its subjects have been destroyed.
The mortal existence of the Egyptian host, and of the
doomed assassins, is blotted out for ever. The penalty or forfeit is
everlasting to them. Their punishment is an everlasting memorial of retributive
justice to others.
Dr. Watts, we observe, in reference to the future
state of those infants, whom he supposes reduced to non-existence after death,
describes this as " an everlasting forfeiture of life, and a sort of
endless punishment without pain." It will be obvious how fully, when we
thus take "punishment everlasting" to mean ultimate and everlasting
destruction, the text is brought into accordance with other most impressive and
awful warnings. "Fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in
hell." "The wages of sin is death." "If ye live after the
flesh, ye shall die." The same idea appears to be conveyed in the words of
2 Thess. 1.9: " Destruction everlasting from the presence of the
Lord." Why, then, should the phrases, Mark 3.29, or, Heb. 6.2, require any
other interpretation than that of " the second death," which is
everlasting; a final and remediless destruction?
Neither can the expression, " where their worm
dies not, and the fire is not quenched," amount to any affirmation of an
endless existence in torment, when we consider that it is an allusion to the
last words of the prophecy of Isaiah, where we read (in the Septuagint
version), concerning the carcasses or corpses of transgressors, " their
worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched." The living
worm, in reference to carcasses, indicates solely their continued putrescence.
It is remarkable that the second clause occurs three times in Leviticus 6.9,
12, 13, where we read (verse 9), (verse 12,) (verse 13,). Our English version
is (verse 12), "The fire upon the altar shall be burning in it; it shall
not be put out;" (verse 13,) "The fire shall ever be burning upon the
altar; it shall never go out."
In Jeremiah 17, the same phrase occurs: " Then
will I kindle a fire in the gates thereof, and it shall devour the palaces of
Jerusalem, and it shall not be quenched."
We fully admit that, in our Savior's allusion to these
words, torment is intended, and that they are made to shadow forth a dreadful
doom; but since the corpses and the worms have perished, and the altars and the
palaces have been subverted, and the fires become extinct for ages, we cannot
think such emblems an adequate foundation for the terrible dogma of unending
sin and misery, but rather, if anything, an intimation of the very reverse—a
suggestion of the blessed hope that evil shall be at length consumed like the
ancient corpses, and extinguished like the altar's fire.
WHILE thus stating what we deem to be the most patent or
obvious, and most widely applicable sense of Scripture in regard to future
punishment, we yet see reason to think that another and ulterior sense is also
admissible, although it may have a less extended application.
Notwithstanding the elaborate essay of Professor
Stuart showing that the words in the New Testament (generally rendered
"ever" and "everlasting") do, in a great majority of
instances, mean an everlasting or unlimited duration, still the fact remains,
and is necessarily admitted by him, that these words are also frequently used
to express limited periods; and that the sense of them in every case must
depend on the nature of the subject to which they are applied.* That alcoves
(ages) sometimes mean a limited period, is manifest from 1 Cor. 10.11,
"These things are written for our admonition,
upon whom the ends of the ages are come;"* and from Heb. 9. 26, " Now
once at the conclusion of the ages hath he" (Christ) "appeared to put
away sin by the sacrifice of himself."
Then, on the other hand, we read in 1 Cor. 2.7, of
"the hidden wisdom, which God ordained before the ages.”
An end of ages, and a beginning or eternity anterior
to the ages, are thus declared; and one sees not how the limited sense of the
term could be more expressly made apparent.
In like manner, with regard to the term
"everlasting," we read in 2 Tim. 1.9, of God's " own purpose and
grace, given us in Christ Jesus before the times of the ages (or eval times);"
and again, in Titus 1.2, " in hope of everlasting life, which God, who
cannot lie, promised before the times of the ages, or eval times."
Moreover, this literal rendering of the last-named
text makes it evident that nearness, and even a sort of antithetic
juxtaposition, cannot at all prove identity of sense. For it is clear that in
the first clause means, according to the view of those who argue for its
largest sense (in which also we concur), " life everlasting;" and in
the second clause can mean only age-lasting (or secular or eval) times; before
which was an eternity.
A somewhat similar but still more impressive instance
occurs in Rom. 16.25, 26: " The mystery kept secret in eval or ancient
times, but now made manifest, according to the commandment of the eternal
God."
Here it is most evident that the sense of the second
clause, supposing it to declare the divine eternity, must essentially differ
from its meaning in the first clause. There it means only ancient—within the
cycles of time: here it means the eternal, without beginning as without end.
If farther proof be desired that the close and even
antithetic juxtaposition of the same word sometimes takes place in the New
Testament with a great diversity of meaning, we have it in John 3.8: " The
wind blows where it lists, and thou Nearest the sound thereof, but knows not
whence it cometh and whither it goes: so is every one that is born of the
Spirit." It had been said just above, " that which is born of the
spirit is spirit."
In 2 Cor. 5. 2, we read, " He hath made him to be
sin for us who knew no sin;" where the latter sin in the first clause of
our version, either means "a sin-offering," or else that Christ was
treated as if a sinner.
We confidently maintain therefore that if in Matt. 25.
46, to be interpreted to mean in the first clause a protracted but terminable
being of the wicked in suffering, and in the second a strictly everlasting life
of the saints, those two senses differ less, than when it is used in the
sentence above cited (Romans 16.25, 26) to speak on the one hand of God's
absolute eternity, and on the other of ancient or age-enduring times:
incomparably less also than the two senses, when it is employed in the same verse
to signify the Uncreated Spirit and the inanimate air; and far less than the
two senses, when employed to denote in one clause sin, and in the other the
sinless victim.
Further, it should not be overlooked that spoken words
(oral utterances) recorded in the gospels, are not given in the language in
which they were uttered. Let it be granted that the Greek version of each word
spoken by Christ in Syro-Chaldaic or Hebrew is
strictly an inspired version; still both these are less exact languages than
the Greek; and while the words alien', alcoan, were
doubtless the very fittest for rendering the word (or its equivalent in the Syro-Chaldaic or Aramean), those original words had
probably a somewhat more flexible and indefinite meaning and application. Thus
we read—Deut. 15.17: " So shall he be thy servant forever," i.e. all
his life. 1 Sam. 27. 12: " Achish said he shall be my servant
forever." Ps. xxi. 4: "Thou gayest him length of days for ever and
ever." 1 Kings 1.31: "Bathsheba said, let my lord king David live forever."
Neh. 2.3: " Let the king live forever." Deut. 32. 7: "Remember
the days of old." Gen. 6.4: " The daughters of men bare children, and
they became mighty men of old." Ezek. 26. 20: "The people of old
time." In all these texts the term is used.
Hence we may certainly infer that the version by was
not chosen solely for its power to express endlessness, but rather for that
degree of ambiguity, or capability of varied application, which made it as
nearly as might be a parallel to.
We have now further to examine the meanings of the
word. It has been shown already, in Chapter 16, that this word, which, is
properly enough rendered by the general term punishment, sometimes means the
punishment of death.
But then it also, as undoubtedly, has often the sense of
remedial correction, or chastisement. Indeed, it appears that this was its more
proper sense in classic Greek, from Aristotle's distinction—
Philo Judaeus uses the word
in both its senses. He writes of "inflicting continual punishment,
moderate to those whose trespasses are curable, but very severe as to the
incurable. For though in themselves they seem odious, yet are punishments the
greatest good to the foolish, as medicines are to the diseased in body."
Thus it is placed, as we judge, beyond fair and
reasonable dispute, that the phrase taken by itself might be literally and
truly rendered "eval or age-lasting chastisement." And it has also
been made sufficiently apparent, from other and stronger New Testament
instances, that the antithetic juxtaposition of "life everlasting,"
does not at all forbid such an interpretation, if on other grounds it can be
justified.
IT will, of course, be objected, Do you then plead for
two discrepant interpretations of the same words? We answer, if it shall appear
that, in several passages of the New Testament, certain words include or
involve a plurality of meanings, then the supposition of a second or ulterior
sense is not a supposition of discrepancy; and the analogy of faith admits and
probably demands that we should so regard the text in question.
Now such a plurality of meanings is generally recognized
in various special prophecies and general moral predictions. Thus "the Holy
Spirit says to Peter (Acts 10.15), on his refusing to touch and taste
promiscuously the creatures shown him in his vision, What God hath cleansed,
that call not thou common.” No one who reads that narrative can doubt of its
having this double sense: 1. That the distinction be-tween clean and unclean
meats was to be abolished. 2. That the Gentiles were to be called into the
church of Christ."
When the same apostle said to our Lord (John 13.8),
"Thou shalt never wash my feet," the divine Teacher answered, "
If I wash thee not, thou hast no part with me;" which words have the
twofold sense-1, of a severe caution against disobedience to Christ's immediate
and most condescending purpose; 2, of a solemn intimation concerning the
necessity, to true discipleship and union with Him, of spiritual washing by his
expiatory blood, and by the effusion of the Holy Ghost.
Again, our Savior enjoined (Matt. xxiv. 44, comp. Mark
13.30-37, and Luke xxi. 34-36), "Be ye also ready; for in such an hour as
ye think not, the Son of man cometh." And this injunction appears to have
had a threefold sense. 1. Be ye ready for the impending destruction of
Jerusalem, from which ye shall have to take flight. 2. Be ye ready for my final
"coming in the clouds of heaven." 3. Be ye ready for my coming by the
message of death, which may long precede that public advent.
In all these senses it had an important practical
application for those who heard it. The last sense has proved to be the most
important for myriads who have since read it, but to whom the Savior came in
death before his great appearing.
Both the last and second sense demand the devout
regard of those to whom He may either come in like sort, or who may be "
alive and remain" at his public and glorious reappearance.
In a prediction by Christ Himself, generally allowed
to be of a mixed and twofold import, referring primarily to the siege of
Jerusalem, and ulteriorly to the world's dissolution and the judgment day (of
which that event was to be a type), these words of our Savior occur (Matt. 24.
34, comp. Mark 13.30, and Luke 21.32): "Verily I say unto you, this
generation shall not pass, till all these things be fulfilled." In its
primary meaning, the passage must refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, but
some suppose, and we think with reason, that the phrase is here to be taken as
including an ulterior sense, " this family or race; and that it thus
declares, without addition of words, a second and very impressive fact; namely,
that "this race or family" of the Jews, so long scattered in its
great and last dispersion, shall not pass away till the great consummation of
all things: a prophecy which, through at least eighteen centuries, has been as
yet verified.
If it be said of these passages that they are not
parallel to the one under discussion, we reply, that a strict parallel can no
way be expected; it suffices if by them we show that there is room to expect at
times a secondary or ulterior sense.
Proofs have already been given (Chapter xviii.t) that
a word or phrase has sometimes diverse meanings where used repeatedly in the
same passage. But we have seen in the last-named texts that a word or phrase
has sometimes plural meanings where it stands alone. "What God hath
cleansed," describes meats once forbidden, and also the heathen to be
called into the church; to "wash," means both literal ablution and
spiritual purification; " the Son of man's coming" refers both to events
long past and to events still future—the ruin of the holy city —the deaths of
the saints—the great and final day.
The term probably describes not only "the
generation," some of whom witnessed that first awful visitation, but also
that race or family who are to subsist until the last and still more awful
scene.
Why, then, may not the phrase—which unquestionably
includes a manifold diversity of degrees of punishment—likewise involve a great
twofold distinction as to its duration and object? namely, the "destruction
everlasting" of many, and the protracted (age-lasting) correction, or
sanatory chastisement of some others. The phrase—as we have shown above—might
fitly describe either; why should it not be comprehensive of both?
An eminent French divine, when commenting on several
meanings included in St. Paul's words, "The love of Christ constrained
us," has remarked, " They that have written on eloquence should have
noticed one figure of speech which I think has not been observed—I mean a
sublime ambiguity; the method of one who, not being able to express the fulness
of his ideas by terms of single meaning, makes use of such as convey various
thoughts."*
Is not this plenitude, this plurality or pregnancy of
meaning, just what might be expected from the manifold wisdom of a prescient all-comprehending
mind? So viewing it, we cannot see that it would be right or reverential wholly
to exclude that hope, of which in the last chapter some grounds have been
suggested, that the passage which has been most urged in support of the
doctrine of endless misery, has in it a pregnant and ulterior meaning; a
reference, partially latent, yet easily discoverable, to the manifold
diversities of that great judgment, which Infinite wisdom and justice and
goodness will institute and fulfil.
THE doctrine of "universal
restoration"—though it has been plausibly advocated—we think is wholly
unwarranted by a general and impartial searching of the sacred Scriptures. For
us therefore it would be an irreverent and presumptuous tenet; but, on the
other hand, to deny the possibility of restoration in any case, with so many
passages of Scripture in our remembrance, which apparently favor the
expectation, would be for us irreverent and presumptuous likewise.
The believers in universal restoration have to nullify
or extenuate (which we think they attempt with very imperfect success) the
awful declaration of our Lord concerning Judas (Matt. 26. 24, Mark 14.21),
" Good were it for that man if he had not been
born." But then the very fact of this declaration being found applied to
that unique and extreme case, specially and only, seems to us to check, if not
preclude, the belief of its being always applicable, and to cases even the most
widely differing; which it would be if we restricted God's judgment to
universal " everlasting destruction" of all who depart this life
unrenewed.
Dr. Adam Clarke seems to us to have imposed on himself
and his readers a sophism, when, in commenting on Matt. 26. 24, he asks, "
Can the doctrine of the annihilation of the wicked consist with this
declaration, " It would have been well for that man if he had not been
born?" Then he must be in some state of conscious existence, as
non-existence is said to be better than that state in which he is now
found." But this, although it may be strictly a truth, is not at all
necessarily the truth stated in the text. The drift of the words—supposing
Judas to be utterly destroyed now, or even then—is plain and significant thus:
non-existence originally and wholly (i.e. never to have been) would have been
far better for him than the non-existence to which he is now reduced, as the
result of his own guilt and misery.
Even had the criminal been utterly and instantly
" destroyed" after his base hypocrisies and final crime, no wise and
good man can doubt that it would still have been far better for him if he had
never been born, rather than have lived a thief and deceiver, and died a base
ingrate and traitor.
Or suppose that by miracle he could have come into
being with mature powers, and consummated his whole guilt and ended his entire
existence in one day, still would it have been better for him never to have
been, than to have had his brief day of life filled only with crime and with
remorse, leaving behind it the ineffaceable record and memory of both?
We presume not to entertain the opinion which one of
the earliest fathers of the church did not scruple to publish in his First
Apology, " Christ is the first-born of God, and the Logos or wisdom, of which
all the race of men partook; and they who have lived with wisdom are
Christians, even though they were accounted atheists, as, among the Greeks,
Socrates and Heraclitus, and those who were like them." But still less can
we venture to affirm or argue, that for those men, or for Plato, Phocion, Solon, Aristides, and for other Gentiles
distinguished by virtue, though never widely known, or long forgotten, "
it were good that they had not been born."
St. Paul wrote (Rom. 2.14), " When the Gentiles
which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these,
having not the law, are a law unto themselves."
And our divine Master has declared (Luke 12.48),
" He that knew not" (i.e. his Lord's will), " and did commit
things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes." He has warned
us also (Matt. 7.1, 2), "Judge not, that ye be not judged; for with what
judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall
be measured unto you." We see not how "few stripes" (contrasted
with "many") can be ascertained to mean "everlasting destruction;"
far less how such a phrase could be used to denote endless torment.
We are restrained, and not merely by the warning above
cited, but by the general spirit of the gospel, from " meting" with
such a measure.
Far be it from us to pronounce, that for such
Gentiles, who sought God, " if haply they might feel after Him and find
Him," there can be no ultimate boon of faith and repentance, of mercy and
of life, through his atoning merits, who is " a propitiation for the sins
of the whole world."
This hope of a partial restoration, i.e. of the
ultimate recovery of some who, having come short of the promised rest, shall
yet not undergo irremediable destruction from the presence of the Lord, might
still be admissible, even if we understood the final sentence on the unsaved—in
the last day, when "before Him shall stand all nations"—as involving
in all cases "punishment everlasting," i.e. ultimate destruction in
the most remediless sense. It leaves and allows a happy significance to those
various and important texts, which declare the final subjection and unity of
all that shall continue to exist.
It also procures ampler scope for that incalculably
vast diversity, and refined exactness of discrimination, which must assuredly
have place in the divine awards to the differing individuals of those countless
multitudes that have dwelt and shall dwell upon our earth.
And this consideration appears indispensable to any
right thoughts of a universal judgment.
We have to reflect on the immense varieties and
dissimilarities of human condition, constitution, capacity, and nurture; the
strength of passions, the defect or power of intellect, the controlling
circumstances from birth to mature age, from the most savage ignorance or
fatuity to the highest forms of civilization and talent; from the darkest
idolatry, or most negative stupor, to the clearest revealed light and the most
distinct perception of its value.*
Moreover, if we look at those inconceivably multiform
and those minutely graduated differences, which the Author and Preserver of
nature has caused and maintained, between different orders of human, animal,
and vegetable life, between each of the unnumbered individuals of each order,
and each organ and faculty of every single object, how much more and greater,
must we not infer, will be the 'discriminating exactitude and multitudinous
diversity of the divine procedure, as to the respective moral destiny of ,each
one moral being.
curable might be a means of warning and recovery to
the "curable", so long as these should successively enter Hades.
Plato likewise expected that most transgressors would
be, by severe and long punishment, curable. He writes, "I think the
greater part of such examples will consist of tyrants, kings, potentates, and
political leaders, for these through their power commit the greatest and most
impious crimes." "Thersites, or any other private man who was
depraved, no one has represented as suffering great vindictive punishments, as
if incurable." —Oorgias, Ed. Routh, p. 295.
This further appears in the Phaedo (c. 57), where he
says of the carnal soul which resisted its being conveyed to Hades, that "
it wanders in all constrained perplexity till certain periods have passed, and
then of necessity is borne into the abode befitting it." Hence we see that
the words of Professor Stuart—" did not the Greeks and Romans hold to the
eternity of future punishments? Notoriously they did;"1 and of the late
Dr. Hamilton, "that they believed purifications not wrought upon the
wicked, but upon the good"'—convey quite erroneous impressions. It is
clear that gradation, in the continuance, as well as in the severity of
punishment, was the heathen creed; whereas the Christian believer in endless
misery allows, in continuance, no gradation.
WIZEN these things are duly weighed, it will be
certainly deemed in the highest measure probable—to us, indeed, it appears
beyond a doubt—that innumerable varieties, both of duration and degree, will characterize
God's condemning judgments.
At the same time it was, as we judge, fully to be
expected, from that prevailing conciseness of Scripture statements respecting
things unseen, which conduces so greatly to their impressiveness and force,
that all would be included and summed up, as we find it, in the brief
antithetic enunciation of those two extremes of human destiny—"punishment
everlasting, life everlasting;" between or within which, as between
opposite extreme points, countless gradations of every kind are undoubtedly
comprised. It is observable, that in the antithetic text there is no more
intimation of degrees of greatness or intensity than of degrees in duration,
and it might therefore be plausibly argued—if we limited our view to this text,
without reference to others which lead to a different conclusion—that all
punishments and all rewards will be equal. So fallacious would it be to draw
positive conclusions as to either point—that of degree or that of duration—from
a single text.
But moreover, and without looking so far forward as
the general and public judgment there referred to, we find no sufficient ground
for denying that there may at least be some restorations antecedently to that
event: in the separate state of spirits. The language of our Savior is
remarkable (Matt. 12.32): " Whoso speaketh a word against the Son of man,
it shall be forgiven him; but whoso speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall
not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in the future." Although this
may have been a sort of proverbial phrase with the Rabbis, it yet appears here
adapted and designed for a brief intimation, that there have been instances of
repentance and remission of sins granted in the " world to come" —the
Scheol or Hades of separate spirits.* The expression must otherwise be regarded
as a mere pleonasm, which it seems not reverent to attribute to the language of
our Savior, uttered in so solemn a warning.
The so-called parable of the rich man and Lazarus must
be understood as referring to that state.
It was in Hades (Scheol) that the rich man lifted up
his eyes, and sees Lazarus at a distance.* The scene is the region of departed
souls, intersected by a great gulf (a profound chasm and perhaps torrent),
which makes them mutually unapproachable. " Those passages. of Scripture
(e. g. Matt 12.32, 1 Pet. 3.18, and 4. 6) whose contents the Church found
occasion to embody in the very heart of her doctrinal system, speak of a return
from the dead) (Scheol, Hades) and of the possibility therein implied of sin
being forgiven after death. In this parable, therefore, nothing can possibly be
said of the everlasting condemnation of the rich man, inasmuch as the germ of
love, and of faith in love, is clearly expressed in his words." Some
belief and hope of such deliverances prior to the "last day" of
resurrection and final judgment, certainly existed in the early church.
Augustine (De Civ. Dei, lib. xxi. c. 13) plainly
states it: " But temporary pains some suffer in this life only; some after
death, some both now and then; but before that most severe and latest judgment.
But not all come into those sempiternal pains, which after that judgment shall
be for those who endure the temporal after death. For to some that which is not
forgiven in this, shall be forgiven in the age or world to come, lest they be
punished with the eternal punishment of the future world, as we have said
above."
Clemens Alexandrinus (about
A.D. 194) wrote that " the apostles, in sequence to their Lord,
evangelized those in Hades,"—"leading the Gentiles to conversion:"
and added, " for the punishments of God are salutary and instructive,
leading to conversion, and preferring the repentance to the death of the sinner;
and souls separated from their bodies, even though darkened by passions, are
able to discern more clearly, on account of being no longer encumbered with the
flesh." These opinions may seem very fanciful, and by many they will be
deemed anti-scriptural. But they at least show that such hopes are not a modern
innovation; having been entertained in the fourth and second centuries by men
of high character and unquestioned piety.
And now we subjoin a simple but important query:—If
these general views should at last prove to be the right and scriptural views
of man's futurity, namely, that the true followers of Christ shall pass at
death to commence a happy endless life, that the impenitent, after protracted
suffering, shall be destroyed in death everlasting, while some others obtaining
repentance amidst those chastisements of an unseen state, shall ultimately
attain to life and peace—if these issues (viewed in the broad divisions which
alone we are capable of making) should prove to be the true, what terms, we
inquire, could better correspond to the facts, than the collective phraseology
of the New Testament does correspond to them? containing as it does,-1. A condensed
antithetic summary of the future state, comprehending within it all
diversities; as "life" and " punishment," salvation and
perdition. 2. More numerous passages which describe, on the one part, the
glories of the future life, and on the other part, the sufferings and final
"death" or "destruction" of many. 3. Passages, scarcely
less numerous, which predict the reconcilement or restoration at last of all
those moral beings who shall survive destruction.
We repeat the question—If the New Testament be, or had
been, designed to foreshow these several issues, what fitter language could
have been employed? Not indeed to express these so exactly and definitely, that
there should be no motive for research, and for careful comparison of Scripture
with Scripture; but rather with so much indefiniteness as to produce
earnestness and anxiety in the inquirer, yet with so much combined and
reciprocally reflected light as might lead patient investigators to right
conclusions.
We do not see how the language of the New Testament,
taken as a whole, could have been more adapted to conduct us to such various
conclusions, in a manner consistent with that solemn obscurity which, for deep
reasons of divine wisdom, it might be still designed should involve this awful
subject.
If, on the other hand, it had been designed expressly
to teach and affirm the doctrine of unending evil, how easily might this have
been expressed in terms not to be softened or evaded. If it had been declared
that "the second death" is a living death, whose misery shall never
end, the doctrine would have been in these few words unequivocally set forth.
If, for example, the words which Philo Judaeus wrote
concerning the punishment of Cain, had been written in the New Testament, with
a plain reference to the existence of the wicked after death, " to live for ever in a dying state, and suffer in some sort an
unending death,"* then the meaning of the writer or writers would have
been put out of all reasonable doubt.. And we think there is just cause to
wonder (without any departure from humility and reverence) why, if that had
been their meaning, then, on so unspeakably momentous a subject, those few
decisive unquestionable words should not have been found in the New Testament.
At the same time restorations may be comparatively
very rare, and be limited chiefly to cases among the heathen, or among persons
in deep inevitable ignorance.
How obvious is the warning, that to reckon on
restoration must be, of all self-deluding hazards, the most perilous. If there
be any man who may look for irretrievable punishment and perdition, it must be
he who " continues in sin" from the presumptuous hope of restoration,
or even of extinction.
* Professor Stuart quotes the text " the wages of
sin is death, but the gift of God eternal life;" and then asks—" Is
it in the power of language to convey a stronger impression of the retributions
that will be made in the invisible world, than such an expression conveys?"
(Essays, p. 104.) We answer, if by the retributions be meant endless sufferings
(which is certainly the Professor's meaning in that phrase), then,
unquestionably and. manifestly, it is in the power of language (whether Hebrew
or Greek) to convey a far stronger, and more definite and undeniable,
affirmation of them, than either that or any other text of the New Testament
has conveyed.
IT deserves attention, in connection with this
question, to what resources of extenuation some of those theologians have found
themselves compelled or conducted, who have religiously shrunk from admitting
variations in the continuance of evil. Saurin even
lays down such extenuation as a rule. He says, " Take this principle"
(i.e. the doctrine of degrees of punishment), " which Scripture established
in the clearest manner; press home all its ' consequences; extend it as far as
it can be carried; give scope even to your imagination, till the punishments
which such and such persons suffer in hell are reduced to a degree that may
serve to solve the difficulty of the doctrine of their eternity; whatever
system ye adopt on this article, I will even venture to say, whatever
difficulty ye may meet with in following it, it will be always more reasonable,
I think, to make of one doctrine clearly revealed a clue to guide through the
difficulties of another doctrine clearly revealed too, than rashly to deny the
formal decisions of Scripture. I mean to say, it would be more rational to
stretch the doctrine of degrees (of punishments) too far, if I may venture to
speak so, than to deny that of their eternity."* We have willingly let
this good man and able writer speak for himself, against our conclusions. But
we still hold that no reduction of the degree of future evil (so it remain evil
at * Sermon on Hell (Rev. sly. 11), vol. 3.p. 341; Robinson's translation.
92 METHODS OF SOME DIVINES.
all) can "solve the difficulty" of its
endlessness; and we also demur, on the grounds already discussed, to viewing
the endlessness of evil as a "formal decision of Scripture."
For it is still to be asked to what point the
punishments of some appear to have been reduced, in the estimate of that
eloquent preacher. He writes, "There is an extreme difference between a
Heathen and a Jew; there is an extreme distance between a Jew and a Christian;
and a greater still between a Christian and a Heathen. 'There must therefore be
as great a difference in the other life between the punishment of a Jew and
that of a Pagan, between that of a Pagan and that of a Christian, as there is
between the states in which God bath placed them on earth. Moreover, there is a
very great difference between Jew and Jew, Pagan and Pagan, Christian and
Christian. Consequently, when we say, a Pagan wise according to his own
economy, and a Christian foolish according to his, are both in hell, we speak
in a very vague and equivocal manner."*
This may be quite true; but still we are led to
inquire—does the esteemed writer thus afford any material aid towards
"solving the difficulty?" In a popular discourse the use of the word
"extreme," and its being followed by "greater still," need
not be criticized. We may simply take these words to mean—what, no doubt, the
author intended —that the difference between the punishment of the least
culpable heathens, and of some who possess and abuse God's revealed truth, will
be most exceedingly or immensely great: in other words, that the " Pagan
wise according to his own economy" will undergo (if such a phrase be not
contradictory) the minimum of endless evil. But, after all, the true question
seems to be, would this minimum be such that destruction (extinction) would be
preferable—that it would be felt better to be no more, than so to live for ever?
If it would be thus (and we know it is the case
sometimes in the present life), then the endlessness even of such a state has
in it the essential difficulty yet unsolved; for it has in it never-ending sin
and never-ending pain.
If, on the other hand, it were better so to live for ever than, to cease to be, then the term "
hell" (as meaning the Gehenna of the New Testament) could hardly be
applied to such a state. That which was so much less unhappy than this life
sometimes is, as to cause its perpetuity to be preferred (since very many,
besides Job, have had to say here, " I would not live always"), that,
we presume to think, could not fitly be called hell. If it were so called, it
must be a hell without those torments which the fire and the worm represent;
since it is not conceivable, nor indeed is ever supposed, that, under those
unending inflictions, endless being would be chosen rather than destruction. So
that on this supposition the advocate of endless evil would have to recede from
or modify a strict construction of Mark 9. 43, Matt. 13.41, 42, etc.,* as
regards the nature or intenseness of suffering, as really as we do that of
certain other texts as in respect of its duration. Indeed, Saurin
by implication admits this, when he writes (in the way of censure), "we
conceive of all the wicked as precipitated into the same gulf, loaded with the
same chains, devoured by the same worm." To which it is fair to reply,
your rigorous principle of interpretation, if carried out consistently, claims
that you should conceive so. But since confessedly you can and ought to depart
from it, you are not entitled to object to our construction as to the duration
of evil, to which we think the whole tone of Scripture obliges, and which other
particular texts are judged by us " in the clearest manner" to
encourage.
In connection with this we remark, that similar views
of the eminent Dr. Harris (although in themselves very just and interesting) fail,
as we judge, to meet the argument of the late John Foster, to which they are
appended and addressed.* Dr. Harris points our attention to the phrase,
"that he might go to his own place" (Acts 1.25); which he generalizes
as applicable to every sinner's doom. We should willingly adopt the supposition
that this intimates a plurality of abodes for those who unhappily come short of
the "many mansions" of God's rest; inasmuch as some local
classification according to degrees of guilt and evil would (as in earthly
durance, so far as it is practicable there) be adapted to regulate the
qualities and proportions of punishment; but still, if the foregoing reasoning
upon Saurin's views be well grounded, then neither
the notion of separate localities (if Dr. Harris intend that) nor "the
minimum of punishment," of which he speaks, would, in our judgment, solve
the grand moral difficulty of believing sin and woe to be permitted to endure for ever.
In Dr. Harris's opinions, that, as it regards the
heathen, " the state of accountability may not be reached till a
comparatively advanced period of youth, and that there may be many who will be
reckoned with as to how little they have retrograded in evil, considering their
disadvantages, we rejoice wholly to concur; (and should gladly extend them to
those who, in lands called Christian., have been brought up in profound heathen
ignorance.) still all these admissions or theories go to illustrate the point
before us; namely, that, in order to palliate or solve the great difficulty
concerning endless evil, theologians have been induced to expedients which
deflect as widely as ours, though in another direction, from their own canon of
strict interpretation.
But of the constraint or impulse on devout minds
someway to obviate that great difficulty we have, in some other writings,
instances much more singular or peculiar. Archbishop King, in his book on the
"Origin of Evil," has said, "Those evils which overbalance the
desire and happiness of life put an end to life itself, and such objects as are
hurtful to the sense at length destroy it. The same seems to hold good in
thinking substances; viz., those things which affect the mind to a higher
degree than it is able to bear may, in like manner, put an end to it.* For they
may be supposed either to drive us to madness, or so far to disorder the
thinking faculty, as to make us think of nothing at all. Who can tell, then,
whether the punishment of the wicked may not lead them into a kind of phrensy
and madness? They may hug themselves in the cause the effects whereof they
abhor —the more they labor under it, the more they embrace the cause of it, and
will not suffer themselves to be anything but what they are. The divine
goodness therefore is not to be charged with cruelty for letting them continue
in that existence, though it be very miserable, when they themselves will not
have it removed; or for not altering their condition, which they utterly refuse
to have altered. 'Tis better for them indeed not to be, than to be; but only in
the opinion of wise men, to which they do not assent."
This subtle but forced supposition very strangely
represents the Holy and Almighty Being as prolonging endlessly the existence of
the wicked in hell, because they insanely prefer such an existence to none;
thus immortalizing sin and misery, because they will have it so, yet
immortalizing them under "a kind of phrensy or madness." The
archbishop's own hint of an alternative, namely, that suffering may " so
disorder the thinking faculty as to make us think of nothing at all,"
might have led him to a somewhat different hypothesis; viz., that in order to
perpetuate bare existence, it might please God to immortalize the wicked in a
state of utter unconsciousness and mental inaction, thus avoiding that
destruction which it is said would "revoke his own design;" and yet
mercifully causing both sin and suffering to cease.
Nor has this way of escape or refuge from the great
difficulty been unsought; for a divine of some note in another communion, Dr.
Ridgley, supposed that those dying in infancy would continue to exist "in
a state of everlasting insensibility."*
Dr. Watts, after commending " the modesty and
ingenuity with which Dr. Ridgley had represented this, sentiment,"
observes, "I cannot find it in the book of reason, nor conceive what end
it can answer in divine providence, to continue so many millions of
infant-souls in an eternal state of stupor. Is it agreeable to the conduct of
divine wisdom, and to the government of a God, to maintain such an innumerable
multitude of idiots, equal in number to almost all the rest of the human race,
in a long endless duration, and to reign over such an immense nation of
senseless and thoughtless immortals?
He justly thinks it "much more natural and
reasonable to suppose that God will deprive both the body and soul (i. e. of the infants of the wicked) of life, which Adam
had. forfeited both for himself and them
Those remarks may be applied, in a great measure, to
the hypothesis of Archbishop King, as well as to that of Dr. Ridgley.
Both have been mentioned, as well as the views of Saurin and of Dr. Harris, chiefly to show how devout and
able writers, in consequence of their averseness—whether on philosophical or
scriptural grounds—to the doctrine of "everlasting destruction" of the
wicked, have been urged. into hypotheses which we think wholly untenable; and,
in adopting them, have virtually deviated more from literal interpretation,
than we do by admitting diversities in the continuance of sin and suffering.
Are not the theories of endless existence in "phrensy," or of
"everlasting insensibility or stupor," or of punishment which the
subjects of it would prefer should continue without end, more alien from the
ideas which Scripture gives us, than is our expectation that God will at last
literally "destroy both body and soul in hell," or, as Justin Martyr
expressed it, that impenitent souls " are punished, as long as for them
both to be and to be punished God willed?"
That learned and pious defender of Christianity, the
late Dr. O. Gregory, ventures to say, "The notion of annihilation, after a
temporary punishment, has not the least foundation in Scripture, and is in
itself too absurd to demand any specific reply;" but he assigns no shadow
of reason for these bold assertions, and we discern none which is even
plausible.
IF it were the purpose of our blessed Savior to
predict and affirm " infinite evil,"—and therefore, which none can
doubt, that his apostles and their companions should as plainly do the same, how
can we account for the fact that neither Luke nor Paul, neither Peter, John,
nor James, have expressly announced that most appalling of doctrines, either in
their epistles, or in any spoken words of theirs recorded in the Gospels or
Acts of the Apostles, whether addressed to Jews or Gentiles? So that, if we
possessed the whole New Testament, with the sole exceptions of Matthew's and
Mark's gospels, we should have no color of clear evidence as to that doctrine;
nothing certainly on which a solid plea for it could be founded. Yet Paul had
said, in his touching address to the Ephesian elders, " I have kept back
nothing that was profitable for you;" and again, " I am pure from the
blood of all; for I have not shunned to declare unto you all the counsel of
God."
In almost all his fourteen epistles this apostle
introduces severe denunciations against sin; yet nothing that we know of in all
these can be supposed to affirm the doctrine of unending evil, unless it were
the phrase "destruction everlasting" (2 Thess. 1.9), and
"judgment everlasting" (Heb. 6.2), which, we have already shown,
admit a different interpretation. The same absence of reference to the doctrine
may be affirmed as to the epistles of Peter, John, and James, the three
disciples who had been most intimate with their Lord, and were most zealously
attached to his cause.
A few plain sentences might have stated and enforced
the doctrine distinctly; and such a doctrine—so tremendously and incomparably
momentous.
Is it supposable that, by the first and inspired
teachers of Christian truth, it could have been " kept back," or even
indirectly and dubiously presented? Surely, in the various records which we
possess, it might have been expected frequently and impressively to recur. We
have two discourses of Peter to the guilty Jews; one to Cornelius and his
companions; addresses of Paul to the Jews of Antioch, to the people of Athens,
to the elders of Ephesus, to the Jewish people and Sanhedrim, at the tribunal
of Festus, and before the king Agrippa.
In his Epistle to the Romans (chap. 2 and 3.) he
utters to the impenitent Jews severe threatening of divine judgment.
In that to the Hebrews (10.26-31) he expatiates on the
sore punishment of apostasy; and through his other epistles there are
interspersed solemn warnings to the un-repenting and ungodly; yet in no case do
we find a clear unquestionable declaration by him of that doctrine which very
many Christians deem so essential, and which assuredly, if it were known to be
true, would claim the most full, and reiterated, and forcible announcement by
those who devoted themselves to the spiritual good of men.
If it be said, as probably it will be—though, of
course, quite conjecturally—no doubt the apostles did proclaim the unending
misery of the wicked earnestly and often, we can only reply, how passing
strange, if so, that in discourses and letters which were to be handed down to
the church and to the world, as the authentic repository of Christian truth,
that awful prospect of endless guilt and torment, which they had orally
insisted on, should be nowhere plainly and explicitly announced by them.
IT has been affirmed, but, as we think, most rashly, "if
the Scriptures have not asserted the ENDLESS punishment of the wicked, neither
have they asserted the ENDLESS happiness of the righteous; nor the ENDLESS
glory and existence of the Godhead. The one is equally certain with the other. If
we give up the one, we must, in order to be consistent, give up the other also.
The criticism which would decide against the endless punishment of the wicked,
must also, to be consistent, blast my hopes of eternal life, and cover the
glories of the Godhead with everlasting darkness."
These are assertions which may alarm or perplex some
minds: nevertheless it remains indubitable, that the sense of words is greatly
influenced and regulated by the subject to which they are applied; and that the
meaning, as applied to punishment, decides and infers nothing as to its meaning
in connection either with " life" or with the " Godhead."
It would be only carrying out the Professor's reasoning, to say that, because
the phrase an "everlasting statute," is applied, in the Septuagint
version of Exodus 27. 21, to the oil and lamp of the tabernacle; 28. 43, to the
garments of Aaron and his sons; 29. 28, and Lev. 10.15, to the heave-offering;
in Exodus 30.21, to their washings in the laver of brass; therefore, to be
consistent, we must give up the revealed eternity of God, and the everlasting
life of the redeemed.
Nay, it might be further added, that even if the word
(annoy prove, as is alleged, the endless existence and consciousness both of
the righteous and the wicked, it would not therefore prove the divine eternity;
for a word fitly denoting a derived existence which lately began, and which is
successive, cannot rightly or properly denote an un-derived existence which had
no beginning, and is non successive. The latter is in reality a contrast to the
former. It would also be an argument of the same kind, to say that the solemn
words in Levit. 19.2, "Ye shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am
holy," must be " given up" as not affording proof of the
holiness of God, and as not enjoining holiness on Israel, because (as Saurin remarks in his sermon on that text) "the
original term is one of the most vague words in the Hebrew language. An
appointment to offices the most noble and worthy, and an appointment to offices
the most infamous, are alike expressed by it." He very rightly adds—and it
is a rule of large application—" the nature of the subject to which it is
applied, and not the force of the term, must direct us to determine its
meaning." t If no other text could convince us that such a rule is
sometimes necessary, this one would compel us to it.
But, apart from these considerations, it is certain,
that the existence, the self-existence, the sempiternity of God, is the one
great truth which written revelation presupposes, and on which it can alone be
founded. To the atheist, continuing such, its evidences are null, or
inconclusive at the most.
St. Paul most plainly alleges the value of natural
theology as the basis of proof, when he writes (Romans 1.20) concerning the
heathen, " the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are
seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and
Godhead;" and, in verse 23, he alludes to their belief of the
"incorruptible God", whose glory they endeavored to debase by
idolatries.
Dr. Cudworth has shown in detail, that the belief of a
supreme self-existent Godhead (combined with that of subordinate divinities,
who were the immediate objects of their worship) prevailed among the heathen;
drawing his proofs both from the poets, the philosophers, and the people. But
the Scripture proofs likewise of God's eternity, additional to those arising
from the term in question, are clear and diverse. The venerated name Jehovah
itself intimates self-existence. It is derived from that title which God
proclaimed, "I am that I am—say unto Israel I am hath sent me unto
you" (Exodus 3.14, 15). God is described (1 Tim. 1.17) as "the King
of ages, immortal, or incorruptible; and again (6.16), "who only hath
immortality (Malmo-tau)." He declares of Himself (Isaiah 44. 6, and 48.12):
"I am the first and I am the last." (43.13:) "Before the day
was, I am He." (Ps. 102. 27; comp. Heb. 1.12:) " Thou art the same,
and thy years shall have no end." (Ps. 90.4; comp. 2 Pet. 3.8:) " One
day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day;"
and we read (Rev. 1.8), " I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the
ending, which is, and which was, and which is to come." Such, too, is the
solemn ascription and adoration by the celestial worshippers (Rev. 4. 8),
" Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, which was, and is, and is to
come."
Are we then to " give up" the doctrine of
God's self-existence and eternity, whether as believed antecedently, or as
confirmed by his whole word, because the expression has diverse meanings, and,
in fact, can in no other case denote a strict and proper eternity?
Again, as to the "life everlasting" of the
saints, we assuredly feel under no necessity to " give up" that on
the grounds which the learned Professor urged. The language of the New
Testament concerning it is not couched in a single word or single form of
phrase only, but is amply diversified. They are to seek (Rom. 2.7) "honor
and incorruption." They contend (1 Cor. 9.25) for a " crown
incorruptible; they serve that Savior (2 Tim. 1.10) "who made life and
incorruption clear." Again (1 Cor. 15.53), "this corruptible must put
on incorruption, and this mortal—immortality." We are assured by Christ
(Luke 20.36), " Neither can they die anymore;" and again (John 10.28),
"they shall never perish:" for, as it regards them (Rev. 21.4),
"death shall be no more." So it is declared of Him who is the
immortal " Head of the church and Savior of the body" (Rom. 6.9),
" Christ being raised from the dead dies no more. Death hath no more
dominion over Him." And thus is virtually announced, together with the
deathless life of the Savior, the same deathless life of the saved: as it is
elsewhere more explicitly; for we read (Heb. 7.16) that their Savior has the
power of an endless life, or life indissoluble; and He has said (John 14.19),
"Because I live, ye shall live also." Once more, in another apostle's
words (1 Pet. 1.4), they are promised "an inheritance incorruptible and
unfading."
Now, with this diversity and copiousness of proof,
independently of the term altogether, for the everlasting life of the
saints,--to say, that in order to be consistent, that hope must be given up,
because we assign to that word a terminable import in reference to punishment,
we regard as an assertion signally unworthy of the devout and diligent writer.
It will be accordant with the general title of this
chapter, to notice here some observations of the late Dr. J. T. Gray, in a very
able Essay, where he criticizes the late John Foster's remark, that orthodox
teachers do not enough exert themselves in "expanding and aggravating the
awful import of such a word" as eternity. He refers to Mr. Foster's own
expedients, or "calculi of approximation;" and quotes his words:
"the most stupendous of these measures of time would be still nothing to
eternity."
Dr. Gray then proceeds to ask, "How could the
evangelical doctrines of the Incarnation and Atonement stand against such an
'aggravation' of infinity as is here recommended? Draw out, in equally extended
particularity, the disproportion between the divine nature and the human; and what
more improbable than such a contact of the two as the Christian Scriptures
assert?" We answer, the process or effort proposed by that deep and
eloquent thinker (although, for once, he did not make the happiest selection of
a term in the word "aggravating") still is and must be a right one;
since it is an attempt to aid and impress the mind in approaching that
conception of the endless, which indeed it can never have, but of which it may
discern the immensity incomparably more by such " calculi," than by
the thought or utterance of a single word. If the doctrine or fact be true, its
awful immeasurable importance should be attempted to be "sounded" or
"fathomed" with the longest line our minds can produce; if, on the
contrary, the fact, with regard to the duration of sin and conscious misery, be
on various grounds doubtful, then it behoves us to
employ the same sounding line, that we may be more aware of the dreadful
unfathomable depth which we have questioned. But as to the query, how could the
doctrines of the Incarnation and Atonement " stand against" such an
" aggravation of Infinity," we think the consequence thus suggested
is altogether groundless. To believe in the " great"—the
infinite—" mystery of godliness," is to believe what manifestly and
infinitely enhances and magnifies our conception of God's holiness, love, and
condescension. But to believe "the mystery of iniquity" and misery to
be never-ending, would be to believe what, for us, must fearfully shock and
loosen, as with a great earthquake, the otherwise immutable foundations of
God's goodness or power. The several objects of thought thus brought into
connection by the querist are, instead of being parallels, contrasts. The one
is an infinite act of holy, saving, self-humbling love. The other would be a
permission and perpetuation of unending guilt and woe and hatred. Would the
excellent author—who now, like the greater mind whom he criticized, knows
unspeakably more than we do on these lofty themes—have said, on more mature
reflection, that because we cannot admit the endless guilt and woe and hatred,
especially as coexistent and consistent with the Perfect Holiness, Power, and
Love, therefore we ought, logically, to refuse or hesitate to believe the grand
manifestation of these latter?—that because we try to explore, and are
compelled to recoil from, the inconceivable perpetuation of Evil through the
abysses of a coming eternity, therefore we must disbelieve or doubt the
Infinitude of Holy Mercy, bending from the eternity which it inhabited, to
embrace and snatch from ruin the feeble spirits, which have wandered, like lost
atoms, from its sphere and from its bliss?
AN American divine, Dr. Stephen West, in the preface
to his work entitled "The Scripture Doctrine of Atonement," affirms
that this doctrine "evidently implies the eternity of punishment;"
and remarks, "if the moral law will admit penitents to favor without any
atonement, it will hardly be believed that the disposition [in the Governor of
the world which such a law, so constructed and so understood, will naturally
exhibit, can ever admit of his inflicting eternal torments on any of his
creatures. For if the offence of the sinner be no greater in the view of God,
than may be overlooked merely upon the consideration of his repentance, and not
only wholly overlooked, but the transgressor be treated with every mark of
friendship and favor, who will believe that there is displeasure enough existing
in the divine mind ever to inflict eternal torments? For God to make such a
distinction between one who confessedly spends this short life chiefly in sin,
and one who spends it wholly so, and that, too, when the crimes of the former,
as the case may be, and many times in fact is, greatly exceed those of the
latter, naturally surpasses all belief." This is to say, in other words,
"eternal torment " or "infinite evil " would be wholly
incredible, but for that Christianity—that gospel, which fully manifests God's
infinite holiness and love; but now that we have the full manifestation of
these, and can say, "herein is love," etc., thus are everlasting sin
and misery made credible, and requisite to be believed, we are bound to believe
in unending evil and in God's infinite love reciprocally, in order that we may
be able to believe either; or at least to believe in "eternal
torment," in order that we may' not disbelieve or doubt the eternal and
atoning love of Him who ordains and perpetuates its infliction.
This astounding argument involves a very remarkable
concession; which claims to be attentively regarded. It admits and even affirms
that, without the sacrificial Atonement of God's dear Son, the fact of eternal
torments ("infinite evil") would be not credible; and that thus, by
his advent—concerning whom the angel said, "Behold I bring you good
tidings of great joy which shall be to all people "—there was in effect
first revealed, and alone made credible, the prospect of never-ending sin and
misery for a vast portion of mankind.
Thus God's " unspeakable gift,"—the
unparalleled proof and display of his holiness and grace,--is held to render
the perpetuation and augmentation of sin and suffering to infinity a matter of
sure belief; whereas, without that supreme act of divine sanctity and
loving-kindness, expressly directed against sin and misery, and "to
destroy the works of the devil," that very doctrine, it is admitted, would
" surpass all belief." Or it may be put thus—the sacrifice of Christ
is held to demonstrate transcendently that God is all-holy, and that God is
Love; but yet to afford also the sole demonstration that God will uphold the
desperately and increasingly guilty and wretched in an existence without end.
A somewhat similar notion, though rather implied than
expressed, is discoverable in the reasoning of Dr. Gray, already quoted; but it
is more apparent when he afterwards writes, "The same sort of mystery, we
perceive, attaches to the theory of the divine expiation for sin, as to that of
the divine punishment of it. To the wonders of God's judgments we oppose
therefore the wonders of his grace. Bring us the mind which can adequately
estimate the degree, the amount (John 3.16) of God's love towards the sinner,
and to that mind alone will we entrust the estimation of his displeasure
against sin."
It seems here all along implied, that the mysteries
are alike incomprehensible. If you stumble at the one, you may equally do so at
the other. But, whether this be implied or not, we must submit some reply to
the closing remark concerning God's "displeasure against sin;" by
asking—whether is it a greater proof of displeasure
against sin, first severely to punish, and then ultimately and utterly destroy
it, or, to uphold the wretched existence of those in whom it inheres, and
permit its active malignity (at least internally) forever?
To use an illustration—though all such must be very
defective—we may ask, which would be the greater proof of a wise and good man's
indignation or displeasure against the venom of a serpent—that he should crush
and destroy it, or, that he should keep it in life with its venom unchangeably
malignant? Further, imagine a fallen human soul in the serpent, and that the
venom therefore truly appertained to it, we then judge that the wise and good
man might justly, and mercifully on the whole, protract awhile the crushed
reptile's life in suffering, as a warning to other creatures likely to grow as
noxious; but we still ask, would righteous hatred of the evil poison be more
evinced by immortalizing the creature and its fatal venom, or letting these be
immortal, than by causing both the serpent and the poison to vanish out of
existence?
Bishop Pearson expresses a view which is akin to the
above cited, saying, " This belief is necessary to teach us to make a fit
estimate of the price of Christ's blood, to value sufficiently the work of our
redemption, to acknowledge and admire the love of God to us in Christ.
"For he which believeth not the eternity of torments to come, can never
sufficiently value that ransom by which we are redeemed from them, or be
proportionately thankful to his Redeemer, by whose intervention we have escaped
them. Whereas he who is sensible of the loss of heaven, and the everlasting
privation of the presence of God, of the torments of fire, the company of the
devil and his angels, the vials of the wrath of an angry and never to be
appeased God, and hopes to escape all these by virtue of the death of his
Redeemer, cannot but highly value the price of that blood, and be
proportionably thankful for so plenteous a redemption."
We would respect and love sincere and earnest
Christians, whatever be their peculiar opinions; but we do not understand, much
less participate, the mental or moral constitution of those divines who can
judge the doctrine of Atonement to be thus proved, corroborated, or exalted.
To our apprehension it is, on the contrary, most
manifest, that the amazing incarnation, self-humiliation, and suffering of
God's own Son become the more credible in proportion to the extended efficacy
of their results.
Truly, a strange perversion or paradox would it be (as
our faculties are constituted) to suppose that if the fruit of the Atonement
should prove to be ultimately the total extinction of that sin which God "
abominates," and of that misery in which He "hath no
pleasure,"—therefore must the Atonement be deemed the less credible and
sure, the less needful and indispensable, the less godlike and glorious.
If the heaven-descended "Savior of the
world" shall, in a large sense, "justify many,"—if He "
gave Himself a ransom for all," and will "draw all" unto Him, if
"where sin abounded, grace shall much more abound,"—if his divine
work of love have made known to principalities and powers in heavenly places
the manifold wisdom and compassion of our God—if it thus exert conservative or
rescuing influences even in other realms of creation, if, in relation to our
fallen race, it at once exalt and perfect and. beatify the saved, and abate in
degree or duration the sinfulness and misery of the lost, just in the
proportion of these beneficent and godlike triumphs will it to us appear
credible; as being gloriously commensurate with "the kindness and
philanthropy (Tit. 3.4) of our Savior God."
We are conscious that for us (and are sometimes
tempted to believe that for us alone) this Atonement shines forth in all the
fulness of its adorable and impelling grandeur, the plenary message of
victorious love and of super_ abounding grace; softening the dreadful woes and
abridging the terrible criminality of the unsaved, restoring some before the
great final day, as well as perfecting in immediate holiness the spirits of the
just; and in its last celestial triumph bringing all surviving moral beings
into devout, and loving, and joyful subjection unto Him who loved us, and gave
Himself for us.
We discern in it an efficacy
comporting with the majesty and greatness of its Author and Finisher: touching
all creatures with the blessed scepter of its almightiness, upholding the
sanctity and bliss of angels in their first estate, lightening even the fetters
of despair, extinguishing at last the being of the despairing, while exulting
in the blissful survivorship of the " great multitude " of the saved.
For us the Lord of Love, the Destroyer of evil, triumphs at once in his
all-merciful salvation, all-merciful restoration, merciful conservation, just
and merciful destruction.
Nothing, on the other hand, could so impugn, if not
subvert, for us, the credibility of the Atonement, as to contend that,
notwithstanding so divine and surpassing an intervention, so wondrous an
enterprise of omnipotent Love, " infinite evil" will still be
permitted to subsist; that, instead of Love going forth in resistless
sovereignty " conquering and to conquer," destroying the works of the
great enemy, and subjecting to its own blessed sway all that shall ultimately
survive in the universe, there shall still remain a mass of enmity, revolt, and
wretchedness, which, so far from being extinguished or allayed, shall be
unendingly, immeasurably deepened and prolonged.
THE objection most usually and strongly urged to these
milder and more cheering views of the Christian revelation is, that, by
ingenious reasonings against the plain terms of Scripture, they palliate "
the terror of the Lord,"* prophesy smooth things to the unconverted, and
lull the impenitent with a delusive hope of the ultimate destruction of being,
or the final recovery of happiness.
These are grave charges, and would, if well founded,
be painful consequences, which we should deprecate quite as truly as the
objector. They tend to excite a degree of apprehensiveness and hesitation while
advocating these views, which we believe to be scriptural. But we reply to
ourselves—which is more material to our mental tranquility than replying to
opponents—the fear -which shall operate efficaciously on the human mind must be
the fear of what is felt to be at the least credible; or even. probable, and in
some measure certain.
Knowing, on the contrary, as we do, that there
prevails a widely diffused suspicion and doubt (not to say unbelief, -though
that also is frequent) with regard to the very basis of Christianity and of all
religion, can we question that there must be a yet wider and far deeper
incredulity in regard to the appalling dogma which has been now discussed? And
is it not certain, that in very many thoughtful minds, by pressing its
acceptance as a necessary tenet, the whole foundation of faith is shaken and
endangered? Assuredly there is a growing number of reflective persons, in all
ranks of society, who have a strong, solemn, ineradicable persuasion that the
doctrine of never-ending evil cannot be reconciled with the moral perfections
of Deity; and it is no less sure that the faith of these in Christianity must,
to say the least, be weakened, if they feel bound to regard that doctrine as an
essential integral part of the religion. If indeed they be of a cautious,
humble, and reverent spirit, they may escape "shipwreck, concerning the
faith," by only deeming it more probable, as we do, that a very few
phrases have been misinterpreted, than that so tremendous and incredible a
doctrine is really designed to be propounded in the Christian Scriptures.
But it is too likely that the theological authorities
and leaders, whom these persons have been taught to esteem, still urge and
insist on this doctrine as so fundamental, that they who renounce it are, if
not heretics, on the high road of heresy; for that, with this, the revealed
scheme of redemption must stand or fall.
What then will follow? Either they are impelled to the
summary conclusion, it is more probable that Christianity is a delusion than
that this dogma is a truth—or, if they prize revealed hopes too much entirely
to abandon them, they will at least be prompted to a very material change of
views—to those very lax notions of inspiration, or perhaps to those mythical
theories, which are so current in our day. A writer, whose knowledge of society
cannot but give weight to his averment, pronounces " the opinion of the
endless duration of evil to be among the most effective of all the causes which
are at present inducing among us that virtual abandonment of Christianity, which
assigns a mythic sense to almost every part of the sacred oracles."
A similar statement had been made long before, in an
age when the modes of seduction to unbelief were perhaps less subtle, less
vaguely and refinedly insidious, than they have now
become. " These," wrote Dr. Jortin,
"are doctrines which have unhappily helped to propagate atheism or deism,
and have made many a man say to himself—if this be Christianity, let my soul be
with the philosophers."
It has been remarked, on the other hand, by a defender
of the doctrine of endless evil, " Some controvertists
have urged, that so long as the infidel identified it with the Christian faith,
he would persist in his disbelief. We affirm, from no narrow observation, from
no slight experience, that every attempt to cast it off he (the infidel)
regards as a sorry shift, an ignoble evasion. He can read the doctrine in
Christianity, if others cannot."
No doubt, this is often the fact. But wherefore?
because it is the instinctive policy of unbelievers to " read in
Christianity," or rather to fasten upon it, and bring forward, as an
inseparable part of it, whatever they conceive (rightly or wrongly) tends to
make it incredible or odious.
Nothing, except this their spirit and tactic, is to be
inferred from their suffrages on behalf of the doctrine in question; and the
implied praise of their right-mindedness, as to this particular point, seems
wholly misplaced. It either shows a short-sighted forgetfulness of the
infidel's temper and motive, or it is leaning on a treacherous advocacy, which,
duly weighed, is worth less than naught.
We waive the question, because it has not been raised
by us, whether that doctrine leads infidels to "persist in
disbelief;" though we assuredly believe it does. There are, no doubt,
several concurring causes which lead them so to persist.
We are quite persuaded, however, of what has been
argued already, namely, that it tends to generate skepticism in those who are
not infidels, but sincere inquirers; to shake the faith of thoughtful
Christians, and in many cases to unsettle, if not destroy, belief, by the
imposition of that as vital and essential to Christianity, from which the mind
recoils as incredible. We think the fear of translation and of harm from
publicity, which Dr. Thomas Burnet expressed, when he wrote on this subject in
Latin, was entirely erroneous in his own age, and still more would be so in
ours.
When we have mythical views of Scripture, and
pantheistic philosophisms, and antinomian
perversions, and every form of error, from Mormonite fanaticism to downright
atheism, scattered through cheap literature, and in some shape coming under the
notice even of many who would anxiously shun them, it surely need not be
apprehended that a serious and reverential investigation of Scripture doctrines
and Scripture language, grounded on a steadfast adherence to revealed truth,
can increase the dangers which in so many forms are assailing the foundations
of faith. On the contrary, it is our confident hope that such inquiry,
conducted in a right spirit, is a main defense against those dangers.
BUT, besides all this, we know that the mere fact of
this doctrine having been and still being pleaded for by many highly esteemed
preachers and writers, has shaken that confidence in their judgment, lowered
that high appreciation of their mental soberness and enlargement, which would
otherwise have conduced to corroborate our general
faith.
For, undoubtedly, belief in religion, both natural and
revealed, is strengthened, even in minds highly intelligent, by the fact that
other minds of yet higher capacity and power have closely scrutinized and
firmly believed those most momentous truths; and it is also strengthened, in
the great mass of believers, by a persuasion of the same scrutiny and the same
belief on the part of the foremost teachers of religion generally. Else to what
purpose do the advocates of Christianity so often and studiously remind us,
that it has been embraced by minds distinguished for intellect, probity, and
learning?
But then if some of these superior minds are found by
us to maintain, as fundamental, a tenet which we cannot but judge incredible
and unwarranted, inevitably the authority of those minds will have a greatly
diminished influence in confirming our general faith. Few indeed may at all
suspect that the tenet has been professed by them insincerely; but many will
suspect that the very devoutness of those good and gifted men—their deep and self-renouncing
veneration for the unsearchableness and sovereignty of God, and their
self-imposed adhesion to interpretations which their forefathers adopted—has
made them bow to an opinion which right reason and enlightened criticism
combine to explode.
And if they have thus been governed in a question so
solemnly important, so deeply affecting our conceptions of the divine
attributes and government; of what authority—it will unavoidably be asked—are
their conclusions as to other points?
How shall the reasoning or the belief of minds so molded—eminent
as they may otherwise be in piety and talent—afford confirmation of real value
to the truth of any doctrines which they espouse?
True, the other reasonings and conclusions of these
minds ought to retain just that weight which they intrinsically possess; but it
is impossible that they should—as it respects us and many more —possess or
acquire the added weight which they would have derived from the mental and
moral superiority of their authors, if they had not contended for this one
dogma, which we cannot but deem manifestly untenable.
The impression on our minds, from their advocacy of
what we account a capital error, especially when pleaded for, as it sometimes
is, with uncharitable harshness, cannot but subtract very materially from the
support which those devout and learned men would afford by their general
researches and convictions to the great doctrines of religious truth.
There have indeed been and still are those who, while
acceding themselves to the doctrine of interminable evil, have conceded, in a
tolerant spirit, full liberty of judgment in regard to it. The late
distinguished Robert Hall wrote, as his opinion to a doubting correspondent,
that " the doctrine is not an essential article of faith, nor is the
belief of it ever proposed as a term of salvation;" that "if we
really flee from the wrath to come, by truly repenting of our sins, and laying
hold of the mercy of God through Christ by a lively faith, our salvation is
perfectly secure, whichever hypothesis we embrace on this most mysterious
subject. The evidence accompanying the popular interpretation is by no means to
be compared to that which establishes our common Christianity."
These admissions are honorable to the writer's
judgment and charity, and have some tendency to abate, as it respects him, the
impression of which we have been treating; still, when he writes in the same
letter, " for my own part, I acquiesce in the usual and popular
interpretation," there remains on our minds a portion of that impression
which detracts from our deference towards even so good and great a man's
opinions, and from the authority that would else accompany his warm adherence
to evangelical truth.
IT seems to us that the practical consequences which
might naturally arise from the doctrine of never-ending evil, if it were really
and firmly believed, would be such as to militate against the dictates both of
right reason and of sound and pure Christianity. We have heard of instances
where persons, conscious of strong hereditary predisposition to mental
derangement, have accounted celibacy therefore, for themselves, a sacred duty,
and have through life acted upon that conviction, with a self-denial which one
cannot but think in their case right-minded and laudable. But it appears
certain that the great liability of human beings universally to a never-ending
existence in sin and misery, would, if believed, be a much stronger argument
for adopting universally the principle of the " unlawfulness of marriage,"
as held by a transatlantic sect.
At least, under the immeasurable and terrific hazard
which, if that doctrine were true and ascertained, would be obviously involved
in the birth of infants, we see it not possible that a woman could "
remember no more the anguish, for joy that a human being was born into the
world." The risk of its suffering endless moral and penal evil, would be,
in our view, a far greater reason for pain and dread, than the very uncertain
hope of its endless welfare could be for joy. The negation or non-existence of
endless good is a mere and absolute nonentity or nothing; while the positive
augmentation of the sum of guilt and woe everlastingly, is a possibility which
might harrow up even a savage mother's heart. Nor is it, we believe, in reality
and practically, a possibility which is often, if ever, contemplated.
It is true, we find in one of the defenses of the
popular doctrine, already referred to, the following remarkable passage:—"
All who are converted, shall, by a persevering grace, be saved. They shall
never perish. What system can sum up so many? Ours are no niggard views. Nor do
we hesitate to avow the inconceivable preponderance of this aggregate over the
lost. We do not think that it is an accidental description of the great
multitude' that 'no one can number them;' and while we read no such description
of hell, we feel that it would be unlike the Book and the Gospel of God. We
have strong large premises to bear out our conclusion. These we do not
urge."
In that conclusion we, in reading it, have truly
rejoiced. It is in fine contrast with the topic of Massillon, which so
electrified an auditory that were perhaps little the better for his eloquence, "
the small number of the elect." But we presume that the " large premises"
must be found in the expectation of coming and successive ages, when the
message of divine truth and grace shall be incomparably more effectual to
convert and to save. We deny not such a probability, but hail it and pray for
it as the most blessed of changes. Yet far extended into futurity must be the
period of such successes, if it shall be long enough to overbalance the
apparent failures of ages past and of the present time.
With respect to these, the late Dr. Chalmers wrote,
" The converts, in respect of the whole auditory, may constitute a very
little flock. As the fruit of the labor of a lengthened incumbency, all that a
most assiduous pastor shall leave behind him may be a mere fraction—turned
through his means to genuine faith and discipleship." He terms
"spiritual renovation an event of exceeding rarity," and speaks of
the " quantity of Christian good that is done," as " a very
handful out of the untouched mass," and of " the soundest
theologians," as " aware of the extreme paucity of conversion."
We hope and believe that this is too strongly stated; but taking it even with
large allowance, it will still leave a dark view of present facts. And apart
from any such estimates by others, if as Christians we look upon society,
meditating the gross and palpable contaminations to which most in the great
masses of mankind are exposed, and reflecting on the enticements to unbelief
and dissipation for those whose position seems more favored, we cannot but feel
that the risk of men's leading and continuing an non devout, unspiritual, and
im-moral life is lamentably great; and if never-ending evil is to be the
terrible result, we are brought back to the sad inference that it is impossible
for Christian parents to rejoice, with so tremendous a hazard imminent on the
futurity of the dearest.
Neither do we understand how the zealous believers in
never-ending evil (especially those who have employed their thoughts in arguing
for it, and consequently may be supposed to have entered its abysses) have ever
been able to divert their minds from such an appalling prospect: how Carey
could find heart to arrange a botanic garden, or Mr. Ruskin to study the
refinements of architecture and painting, or William Cowper to translate the
Iliad and Odyssey. A devout Christian missionary to the Hindoos
was once heard by us to say, that except he had believed in the endless misery
of the idolatrous heathen, he would not have commenced or prosecuted his work.
If he would have been deterred because the object would not then have been felt
vast and overwhelming enough to engage or stimulate his benevolence, this, as
we conceive, betrayed a strangely self-exalting requirement of motive or
impulse.
Angels are content " to minister to them that
shall be heirs of salvation."
Sydenham remained in London during the great plague,
unshrinkingly facing that peril, in the persevering effort to save men from
bodily death. Howard exposed and sacrificed his life in attempts to lessen the
temporal miseries of the imprisoned.
To be instrumental in rescuing men from the second
death, and exalting them to endless life, one would think an office which no
man or angel need wish further to magnify; which might satisfy the largest aim
of charitable ambition.
But if that good man meant, that could he have
believed the sins and pains of unconverted heathens terminable, he would not
then have drawn on them the frightful hazard of rejecting the gospel, and so
rendering them interminable, this would involve the belief that the "Savior
of the world," by commanding his "glad tidings to be preached to
every creature," gave rise not only to endless felicities, but withal to
endless additions of guilt and torment.
Such a belief, it seems to us, instead of enkindling
the zeal of Christians for the conversion of idolaters, might rather lead them
to regard that primitive commission as temporary, and to refrain from efforts
whose defeat would render them not merely "a savor of death unto
death," but a cause or instrument of undying anguish.
On the other hand, the " popular " belief
which zealous missionaries commonly profess, namely, the never-ending misery of
all unconverted persons, whether they have heard the gospel or not, would to
our minds operate as a dark temptation to gloomy and despondent inaction. We
should be impelled to say—in mournful wonder, if not in doubting bitterness—if
He of whom it is proclaimed that He alone is Good, will permit evil and misery
to subsist and accumulate to infinity, why should his feeble creature weakly
interpose? — why not rather acquiesce in the fearful mysterious doom which
revelation hath announced, and which the only wise God prevents not!
"If the eternal misery " (i.e. the endless
sinning and suffering) " of a certain number can be rendered conducive to
a greater amount of good, in relation to the universe at large, than any other
plan of action, then the attribute of goodness requires it."
Such was the hypothetical argument of a good and great
man in defense of the doctrine of endless evil. But we should be sorely tempted
to subjoin, if divine goodness requires it, why should poor human goodness labor
to contravene or diminish it? We grant that such reasonings or sentiments might
be wrong, fallacious, presumptuous: we may be reminded, with truth, that they
could also be carried out, in the necessitarian spirit, to excuse indifference
towards every evil which God permits and tolerates, and thus might have paralyzed
or stayed those noble efforts already referred to, of Sydenham or Florence
Nightingale, of Wilberforce or Clarkson, of Howard or Shaftesbury. But still,
in proportion as the evil which divine Providence will permit is held to be
immense and unbounded, augmenting and unending, will human endeavors to abate
it, according to our feelings and judgment, be the more sorely discouraged.
The great and happy prompting to missionary labors
(abroad or at home) would in our minds be—the belief, here defended, that evil
has its bounds; that it will be wholly extinguished at length; that, on
whatever shall." never perish," the amplitude of love's victory will
be at last complete. It is in this persuasion that we could go to the school,
or to the congregation, or to heathens by the wayside, feeling ourselves
emphatically " workers together with God;" instruments of an almighty
beneficence and mercy which can have no limit.
IT will be remembered that in foregoing chapters we
examined certain rules laid down for the interpretation of Scripture; and then showed,
as we think beyond question, that they cannot be consistently maintained, and
do not admit of strict application to our present subject.
Nevertheless, after having first insisted on the great
moral argument from the perfections of God, as revealed to us, we did not shun
the philological inquiry; but gave it pretty full and distinct consideration.
Yet, should the conclusions to which that inquiry
brought us appear to some, as we have no doubt they will, forced or infirm, or,
at the best, not sure, then must we revert to that great moral argument, and
contend that here, as in not a few other instances, reverence for the divine
perfection demands that we be guided not by the letter, but by the spirit of
God's word.
On the whole matter it may be added, even before that
renewed and more careful research which has been made into the testimony of
Scripture, we held it presumptuous, in our own case (for we charge nothing on
others), to impute to the Perfect Being the endless perpetuation, even
permissively, of moral and penal evil. But since that research, we should
account it yet more so. For seeing as we have done the diversity of texts which
bear upon this subject, and the manner which they ought to modify each other,
we still the more strongly judge that it would be culpable in us to teach or to
believe that evil shall have no termination, and shall, as by necessity it then
must, endlessly accumulate.
If, after such research, we should do this, it would
be in face, or in the remembrance, of many passages of God's word, which, in
our judgment, must be taken to affirm that evil shall be ultimately destroyed,
and that all who then survive shall be brought into willing and filial
subjection, and happy allegiance to Himself.
We do not adopt or vindicate the theory of "
development" introduced by divines of a very different school, nor are we neologians, in the sense of admitting or supposing that
great and real novelties of doctrine can be elicited from the New Testament by
any sober and devout inquirers.
Yet it cannot, we conceive, be disputed that some
opinions, or interpretations, of former days, would not be urged or defended by
judicious divines in our own. We might speak of those which astronomical and
geological science have modified. But it is closer to our immediate topic if we
refer to such as concern matters moral and punitive. Few, we presume, would now
advance this proposition: "If you transgress the law once in all your
life, and that only in one thought, you arc thereby become subject to the curse,
which, as you have heard, is eternal damnation in hell:" and
"forasmuch as the offence is always multiplied according to the dignity of
the person against whom it is committed, man's offence must needs be an
infinite offence, and the punishment must needs be infinite."
Fewer still, we suppose, would publish a meditation
thus beginning: "O wretched man, where shall I begin to describe thine
endless misery, who art condemned as soon as conceived; and adjudged to eternal
death before thou vast born to a temporal life? (datnnatus
antequam natus)—Augustin."
Nor do we apprehend that, in regard to the intensity
of future suffering, such a statement would be now given or even defended as
Dr. T. Burnet quotes from an unnamed writer of a former age:—" If all the
men born from Adam to this day, and to be born henceforward, should live to the
last day; and all the blades of grass which ever sprang up were men; and if
they should share equally one pain which the soul suffers for one mortal sin in
hell, so that to each one should be given an equal portion of that pain, then
would each particle of that pain for each one man be greater than all the
torments which all the holy martyrs, and all robbers, and criminals have ever
suffered." " Thus he," says Dr. Burnet. " And if to these
most cruel pains you add eternity, you will fill up all the parts, numbers,
modes of inhumanity."
Neither do we expect that any, even of the American
divines, would now borrow the language of an Englishman (1723) who writes:
"In hell—one or two attributes are usually supposed to bear sway; but many
perfections shall there be displayed and exalted. His power; in sustaining the
criminals amidst the fire of his wrath. He could 'easily consume them to
annihilation; but He will uphold and harden them, to be always in a
destruction, that will never be finished. His grandeur—so high and great, so
incomparably supreme is He, that ten thousand times ten thousand most miserably
tormented spirits shall not, in the least, be pitied or regarded by Him to all
eternity; ten thousand times ten thousand most doleful sighs and shrieks, and
groans, and yelling, and roaring, and howling, under the most exquisite torture
and anguish of spirit, shall not meet with the least pity, compassion, or
relenting unto all eternity. O the dignity of that Being, that has an
everlasting hell to be the representation or the triumph of his grandeur! There
He rides in magnificent though gloomy state; and marches over a world of damned
heads, with most non commiserating disregard and disdain. Over the gates of
hell may be written, Holy and reverend is his name! ' There He is tremendously
aggrandized."
Further, we do not suppose that very many Christian
teachers would now teach as Augustine did when he wrote, " It may therefore
be rightly said, that little ones departing from the body without baptism will
be in the mildest damnation of all. Yet lie greatly deceives and is deceived
who preaches that they will not be in damnation; since the apostle saith,
Judgment was by one to condemnation,' and a little after, by the offence of one
upon all men to condemnation.' "
It is observable that these interpretations have been
gradually modified or renounced, in some correspondence or proportion to the
advancement of milder and more equitable maxims and practices in human law and
government. The state of public opinion relatively to political justice and
mercy, as well as our own special temperament, will in some measure affect our
conclusions on higher and abstruse matters. When the doctrine of "infinite
evil " was perhaps rarely questioned, the judicial severities of
Christendom were such as our sense of equity and humanity would now repudiate.
Servetus was burned at the stake. Damien was dreadfully and variously tortured,
and then pulled asunder by horses. Whereas Pianori is
dispatched by the instantaneous guillotine. The forger and other offenders, who
were punished capitally, now undergo a milder sentence. And men's estimates of
human justice will necessarily have some influence on their construction of the
divine threatening. Not that they will (if right-minded) either alter God's
word, or refine away its substantial import; but their interpretation will be
rightly influenced by that practical view of justice and mercy to which the age
has attained, and to which, we ought to add, a right view of the spirit of
Christ's gospel has conducted it.
STILL, in fact, although our construction of Scripture
on this subject differ from that of the " schoolmen," and also from
that of the Puritans, yet is it really anything but novel. It is rather a
return to the opinions of not a few Christian teachers of the early ages. These
views were held, under various modifications, but all involving a non-belief,
or at least non-assertion, of the doctrine of infinite evil, not only by
Origen, but by Justin Martyr, who wrote, "It is not proper to call the
soul immortal," p. 147—meaning, not necessarily or universally. "
Those souls which are worthy to appear before God, die no more; but these are
punished as long as God wills for them to exist and to be punished," p.
149. So Irenaeus: "As the heavens, the sun, the moon, and the stars were
made, when before they were not, and continue through long periods, according
to the will of God, so judging concerning souls and spirits, and, indeed,
concerning all things that are made, one would in no degree err; for all things
which are made have a beginning of their creation, but continue as long as God
wills them both to be, and to continue. For life is not from us, nor from our
nature, but is given according to the grace of God; and so, he that duly keeps
the gift of life, and offers thanks to Him who bestowed it, shall receive
length of days for ever and ever; but he who casts it away, and is ungrateful
to his Maker for being made, and knows not Him who bestows it, he deprives
himself of continuance for ever and ever."
Arnobius wrote, the souls of the condemned "lie (in
torments), and being reduced to naught, vanish in the frustration of perpetual
destruction. For they are of middle quality, as is learned from the authority
of Christ, and may be destroyed, if they ignore the God of life, or be freed
from exile, if they have attended to his threatening and his favors. This is
the true death of man; this which makes nothing to remain; for that death which
is seen is the severance of souls from bodies, not the extreme end of abolition.
This, I say, is man's true death, when souls ignorant of God are consumed by
torment of very long duration in fierce fire."
Jerome, on Isaiah 56.24, says, " Moreover, they
who maintain that punishments will at some time end, and, although after long periods,
torments will have a termination, use these testimonies;" and then, having
given the passages which seem to favor that opinion, he adds these words:
"All which they unfold or adduce, wishing to maintain that, after anguish
and torments, reliefs are to come, which are now to be hidden from those to
whom fear is salutary, that by terror of punishment they may desist from sin;
which question we ought to leave to the knowledge of God alone; of whom not
only the mercies but the dreadful inflictions are justly weighed, and He knows
whom, in what manner, and how long He ought to condemn." He had said
something of like purport on Isaiah 24, near the end: "It is to be known
that human frailty cannot know the judgment of God, nor decide concerning the
magnitude and measure of penalties; which is left to the will of God."
Broughton very properly asks, after quoting those last
words—" Would Jerome have said this, had he believed the eternity of hell
torments."
Gregory Nazianzen (Orat. 40,
p. 665), after having spoken of the eternal punishments of the condemned in the
common manner, doubtingly, and as if correcting himself, subjoins, "Unless
one please here also to understand this in a more philanthropic sense, and more
worthily of the Punisher;' intimating that it is more humane and more divine to
moderate these punishments. When Nilus, disciple of
Chrysostom, and a martyr, noticed this place of Nazianzen, he inferred from it
that in those times the dogma of the eternity of punishments had been doubted
of, and disputed by the fathers; " for Nazianzen," says he, "
permits those who will, to regard that fire in a milder or more philanthropic
sense."
Gregory Nyssen wrote, " Since it needs that from
such (a soul) the stains in its nature, by sins, be by some healing process
removed, on this account, in the present life, the medicine of virtue has been
applied for the cure - of such wounds; but if it remains unhealed, then, in the
life after this, the healing is dispensed. But as there are differences in
sufferings of the body, of which some admit cure with more ease, some with more
difficulty, in which amputations and cauterizes, and bitter drugs are employed
for the removal of the disease which assails the body, in some such way the
subsequent judgment is announced for healing the disorders of the soul; which
to the more loose or proud is a menace, and a dismal resurrection, that by fear
of the retribution of sufferings, we might be made prudent as to the flight
from wickedness; but to the more wise there is believed to be cure and healing
from God, who recalls his own creature to that grace which it had at the
beginning."* Elsewhere the same father wrote, " But his aim (namely,
that of God) is one—that of perfecting by some means in every man all the
fulness of our nature; these indeed at once already in this life being purified
from wickedness, those being healed subsequently by fire in fitting periods, and
thus to all those who have not made a right estimate of good and evil in the
life which is here, adding the (final) communication of that good which is in
Him."
THESE citations have been made, not from great
deference for the opinions of the "fathers," * but to show that a
non-reception of the doctrine of infinite evil cannot be regarded as a modern
innovation; since we have instances of it among Christians of the first ages.
Their authority is not great, for they held other opinions, which we can no way
receive. The last quoted, for example, Gregory of Nyssa, appears to have held
transubstantiation.t Still we are free to acknowledge, that we could less
unwillingly, because with less pain to conscience or the moral sense, accept
the dogma of transubstantiation than that of " infinite evil."
That dogma, no doubt, contradicts the senses, and is
moreover at variance with reason and all our conceptions of possibility. But it
does not infringe or weaken the belief of the moral perfection of God. On the
contrary, were it credible, it would rather enhance our estimation of divine
love and condescension; and certainly would enlarge the sphere or idea of
divine Omnipotence; for it would imply a triumph over even the contradictory and
impossible. Whereas it appears to us that the theory of never-ending
evil—whether as chosen, or permitted to be perpetual by the Supreme Being, or
whether as in itself inevitable, and not controllable by Him, except at the
cost of an infinite good—would involve inferences most formidable to a belief
of the moral perfection and omnipotence of God; more formidable, as we
conceive, than even the creed of ancient Parsism, in
its best shape (already referred to *), and of the Gnostics and Manicheans,
which was partially grafted upon it. Because in maintaining the existence of
antagonistic and rival principles of good and evil (Ormuzd
and Ahriman), these ancient speculatists, or many of
them, held those rival powers to be themselves subordinate; ultimately to be
controlled by the supreme and perfect Deity, who would at length extinguish or
annihilate all evil: whereas the very essence of the doctrine we have been
examining, is the frightful fact that, under the immediate administration of
the Most Holy and Most High, neither moral nor penal evil shall be caused or
permitted ever to cease.
It has been well said, by a late writer, "Admit
but the possibility of the ultimate disappearance of evil, and the burden of
the mystery of its present existence be-comes from that moment not intolerable.
The crushing weight of an infinite pressure is lightened. That anything, or
many things, can be working together now for final evil, and that nothing ever
can or will cause the universe to become again like its Author, all-good; this
is the disturbing, distressing thought or theory, which, In proportion as it is
received, outweighs all accumulation of evidences from all the regions of
physical or metaphysical theology. Any mystery, or even any evil, may be borne,
if we may be permitted to believe that it will cease at some point of the
future; but the moment we assume that the least evil is eternal, we darken our
whole view of God's character and government indefinitely."
In that admirable treatise, " The Eclipse of
Faith," the atheist and sceptic are introduced as saying, "We agree
with you Christians, that the Bible contains no greater difficulties than those
involved in the inscrutable constitution and course of nature.' " * To
that position we can fully accede, if it be admitted, as has been here argued,
that the Bible does not reveal and affirm endless evil; but not otherwise. It
is said, perhaps truly, the universe does not contradict that doctrine; on the
contrary, terrible analogies point towards it. But were this granted, it is yet
but negative, or at most very obscurely presumptive; it leaves large room for
hope that evil may not be endless; whereas, if the Bible unquestionably
affirmed that it shall be so, it must be owned that it would reveal, positively,
a continuance of sinfulness and misery incalculably greater than nature and the
universe anywhere foretell or demonstrate. Most true it is, that the Bible
reveals (in God's perfection and the prospect of the redeemed) unspeakably
higher good than nature could even imagine; but, not the less, it would contain
greater difficulties concerning evil than nature presents, if it really taught
what many find in it.
We are quite aware that the foregoing arguments can be
very ingeniously disputed, with great plausibility and frequent success, by skillfully
evading a fair view of what has been advanced, and by denouncing the reasonings
employed as heretical and pernicious.
It would be easy for an adroit writer to minister to
the zeal or prejudices of a party, and perhaps to reinforce his own convictions—whether firm or
tottering—by skillfully constructing and disposing such strictures. It is sufficient
reason for publishing this volume without a name, that we are the less called
on to answer such aspersions, or partial, and incorrect representations as
those criticisms might possibly contain. They would be best answered by
silence, and by the indications -which these pages offer—if at all responding
to our desire and consciousness—of an upright and devout aim, and a fair
treatment of the question. We have no expectation that our arguments will
convince persons who are firmly fixed, and as it were intrenched, in contrary
opinions. On the other hand, we have no apprehension that they will promote
unbelief or heresy; or will tend to weaken the faith and obedience, or abate
the love and gratitude of those who shall accept them as conclusive, or admit
that they possess some weight. Meanwhile we trust that they will cheer and
disburden certain minds, now shaken and oppressed with grievous doubt; as
showing that the doctrine of unending evil is no more necessary to the belief
of Christ's deity or Christ's redemption, than is the doctrine of Christ's real
bodily presence in the Eucharist, or that of infant perdition; that, on the
contrary, the renouncement of the belief that evil will never terminate or be
destroyed, renders the " great mystery of godliness " incomparably
more credible; the adoration of God our Savior unspeakably more cordial and
confiding; and his gospel a more glorious and veritable gospel for the world.
We offer heartfelt prayer to the Author of all truth
and virtue, for tenderness of conscience, and a right spirit, that this our
happier doctrine may never, by us or by the readers of these pages, be wrested
as, by some, all doctrines of grace have been; may never be so perverted, as to
bear antinomian fruit; never to make sin appear less hateful and formidable;
nor the punishment of unpardoned sin less certain and imminent, nor its anguish
less intense; but, on the contrary, that, by the fuller credibility and
conceivableness of this prospect, it may take deeper hold on many spirits.
We would desire and pray that these views of divine
equity and mercy, which approve themselves gloriously and delightfully to our
moral judgment, may prompt us at once to a more fervent thankfulness and devout
self-scrutiny, proportioned to our stronger belief and apprehension of a
Redeemer's love, and of the vast spheres and cycles of manifold efficacy in
which that love will be evinced and triumph.
If there were to be any one of us, or of our readers,
who should become less afraid of perdition, because perdition is here so
represented as to be an object of rational belief; if there were any one who
should learn to abhor iniquity less, because here taught that the God, who is
all-good, will (as we trust), in some remote hereafter, blot out and expunge
from his creation that which He far more abhors; if any one
should aim at all less strenuously at being made altogether and quickly meet
for his Redeemer's joy, because he has learned to hope that those who, through
hardness of heart, shall never be made meet for it, will, after endurance
incalculable by us, "utterly perish;" that unhappy person (continuing
so to abuse the glad tidings) must be believed to provoke and draw down upon
himself the most lengthened and severest sufferings of futurity. Wherefore?
Because he "continues in sin that grace may abound;" or, at least,
flatters himself, that it will superabound towards him, at the expense of
divine truth and justice. Such a case (may God forbid its occurrence) would
appear even more criminal and wretched, than that of those who can pervert
God's grace, while holding the darkest and harshest tenets that man's theology
has supposed or constructed from the Christian Scriptures; because such a
reader would be perverting that view of the gospel which is justly felt to be
more attractive and glorious; consciously making an evil use of what he
professes to accept as the true and blessed interpretation of God's gracious
purposes.
In the meantime we conclude our inquiry with this
heartfelt prayer to the sole Author of good. Thou, in whom all moral glory and
excellence combine and reign, who art all-holy, all-just, all-merciful, unerring
in the purposes and acts which those attributes involve and regulate—Thou, to
the transcendent beauty, unity, and harmony of whose spiritual perfections, our
weak conceptions of goodness are but faint analogies—Thou knows the feeble
thoughts which it has been here attempted to arrange and to express.
So far as they are founded in thy holy truth, and
devoutly intended to subserve thy glory, and to aid our fellow-men in faith and
hope and adoring thoughts of. Thee, prosper them, we pray Thee, toward those
most important ends. If, more or less, " we have erred," if our
narrow apprehension of the character and scope-of thy justice and thy mercy,
and of the infinite range of thy divine acts and counsels, has misled us into
some wrong interpretations of thy revealed truth, Thou sees that, so far as we
can ascertain our ruling motive, it has been, in all humility and reverence, to
vindicate the honor and rectitude of thy ways. Therefore, we pray Thee, 0
adorable Lord, to forgive those errors and that short-sightedness. Graciously
avert all ill result from them, which we most earnestly deprecate. Make these investigations,
whatever alloy of error be found in them, at least very useful to some kindred
minds, who hitherto have not been able to bear a more overwhelming doctrine,
neither yet now are able. And let not any, good Lord, pervert these words to
their own harm and loss. We beg it in his name who came not to condemn, but to
save. Amen.
THE END.